Making of a New Constitution in Turkey Monitoring Report: the Basic Principles and the Choice of Government [4] System in the New Constitution October 2013
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TESEV DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM Making of a New Constitution in Turkey Monitoring Report: The Basic Principles and the Choice of Government [4] System in the New Constitution October 2013 Author: Levent Köker The monitoring reports on the new constitutional process aims to monitor and record efforts towards a new TESEV constitution by the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission within the Turkish Grand National Assembly Bankalar Cad. that began in October 2011. This report is the fourth among a series of monitoring reports in which the Minerva Han, No: 2 Kat: 3 respective roles, contributions and performances of the Parliament, political parties, non-governmental 34420 Karaköy İstanbul T +90 212 292 89 03 organizations and the media are monitored, evaluated and recorded. Previous reports that make up this F +90 212 292 90 46 series, intended as a guideline and means for solution-oriented intervention at such times when the process www.tesev.org.tr may be blocked, may be obtained at www.tesev.org.tr and www.turkeyconstitutionwatch.org. Copyright © November 2013 All rights of this publication are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced electronically or mechanically (photocopy, storage of the records or information, etc.) without the permission of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı - TESEV). The views expressed in this report may not coincide partly or completely with TESEV’s institutional views. TESEV Democratization Program would like to thank the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) and TESEV High Advisory Board for their contributions to the preparation and promotion of this report. ISBN: 978-605-5332-51-8 Printed by: İmak Ofset Basım Yayın San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. Translated by: Salih Selçuk Özgün Atatürk Cad. Göl Sok. No: 1 Yenibosna Bahçelievler/İSTANBUL-TÜRKİYE Prepared for publication by: Sezen Ünlüönen Tel: 0212 656 49 97 Copies: 300 www.turkeyconstitutionwatch.org Contents FOREWORD, 2 INTRODUCTION, 4 I. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND RULES THAT SHOULD BE PART OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 5 A. The Philosophy of State, Society and Politics, 5 B. Basic Rights and Liberties, 6 C. The Basic Organization of the State: Local Autonomy and the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, 9 II. THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OPTION, 11 A. The Parliamentary System through the English Example, 11 B. The Evaluation of Other World Examples, 12 C. An Evaluation from the Perspective of Turkey, 13 D. The Proposals for a Parliamentary System in the New Constitution, 14 III. THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION, 17 A. The Presidential System as a Conceptual Type through the USA Example, 17 B. The Evaluation of Other World Examples, 18 C. The Presidential System in Turkey’s Search for a Government System: An Evaluation, 19 IV. THE SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OR “A PARTY-AFFILIATED PRESIDENT,” 22 CONCLUSION, 23 1 Foreword Özge Genç, TESEV Democratization Program It has been two years since the work began to write a new constitution under the roof of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). Currently, we see that the four political parties which make up the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission have not reached an agreement in many areas that would render the constitution new, and that they continue to have political-ideological divides between them that are hard to overcome. One of the controversial issues is the government system, which closely concerns not only the executive body, central-local administrative relations, justice in representation and the judiciary, but also basic rights and liberties. As we have previously stated in the third monitoring report, which was released as part of our “Constitutional Monitoring” study, the proposals of the political parties regarding new legislation on the government system are not the type of remedies that can help solve systemic problems. The presidential system as offered by AK Party, which is based on the vision of an efficient state apparatus that can operate with an increased pace, responds only to the party’s own needs. CHP and MHP fail to suggest a democratic, pluralist and individual-based system that will improve the parliamentary system by eliminating problems in representation, and thus, fail to provide a solution to the troubled parliamentary experiences of the past and the present. The current positions of the political parties on the matter do not allow for an effective debate to take place concerning the government system. Unless a new constitution is written, however, we will have to face the problem of a popularly elected presidential office that has authority but lacks responsibility along with new problems in representation. The present report is the fourth of a series of monitoring reports in which the TESEV Democratization Program follows and analyzes the process of constitution making, and it addresses the selection of a government system in the new constitution. It aims to offer a substantial basis for the public debates on the government system which accompany the process of constitution making, and to provide a reference point for such debates. The report, which was written by Levent Köker, intends to assess the presidential and parliamentary systems proposed by the political parties, establish their strengths and shortcomings, and deal with the current problems of the political system in order to answer the question of what kind of a system is needed. Drawing on several world examples, Köker searches for answers to the questions of “if a choice is to be made between the parliamentary and the presidential system, which will be acceptable according to which criteria?” and “what is an ideal parliamentary or presidential system?” In the final section of the report, he touches upon options like the semi-presidential 2 system and a party-affiliated president, which are sometimes mentioned in the debates on the issue. One important point repeatedly emphasized by the report is the existence of sine qua non principles which a system needs to be based on in order to be considered democratic, regardless of the form of government. Köker sums up these principles under the headings of the philosophy of state, society and politics; rights and liberties; and local autonomy and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. As indicated by Köker, the tradition of parliamentary government has historically been overwhelmed by a strict authoritarian bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey. In this regard, while the parliamentary system may be a preferable form of government given Turkey’s experience with democracy, it is clear that this is not an ideal system, either, if it is not subject to a consistent set of principles. On the other hand, Turkey lacks the kind of political culture and the kind of public administration tradition required for an ideal presidential system. The notion that there is a positive correlation between stable government and the presidential system stands in contradiction with the principle that a constitutional state mechanism requires the separation of powers, which is the fundamental raison d’être of the presidential system. Therefore, it is not possible to regard the proposals of the political parties as liberal suggestions with the capacity to solve the most basic problems that have led to Turkey’s need for a new constitution. Considering the inadequacy of the current debate in solving Turkey’s democratization problems, it will not be wrong to argue that the debate on the government system is likely to emerge again and again. Thus, it is necessary to, first, discuss what the sine qua non principles for the new constitution and the new political system should be, and then turn to a discussion of systems when an agreement is reached on those principles. No system is permanent, and what is important is that the debate on what kind of a system will be adopted should be undertaken in an informed and participatory manner. Consequently, we hope that the fourth monitoring report prepared as part of the TESEV Democratization Program’s “Constitutional Monitoring” study will offer a foundation for the debate on the government system and lead to the creation of a platform for debate that is prudent and not solely reactionary. We would like to thank Seyfettin Gürsel and Oktay Uygun for bringing valuable contributions to the first draft of the report with their observations and assessments; Bekir Ağırdır, Şahin Alpay, Meral Danış Beştaş, Ferhat Kentel, Yusuf Tekin and Serap Yazıcı for attending the round table meeting organized preceding the preparation of the report, and Abbas Kılıç for preparing the preliminary report for that meeting. [*] [*] The views expressed in this report belong to the author and may not coincide partly or completely with 3 those of the contributors. Introduction Turkey has nearly reached, albeit slowly, a crossroads in the process of making a new constitution. This crossroads probably will become even clearer in the fall months, when we expect to witness the process of solving the Kurdish issue, called the peace and solution process, gain speed. It seems that if the building of an entirely new constitutional order fails, a partial constitutional amendment will emerge as an inevitable alternative. One of the major reasons for this stems from the defects of the established constitutional order, which comprise the main source of the government system debate ignited by AK Party’s proposal for a presidential system. Foremost among them is that the constitution of 1982, which appears to adopt a parliamentary system, has, in violation of that system choice, created a presidential office that carries too much authority. Thus, since it has created such an “authorized but irresponsible” presidential office, the current system is already defected. Unless any changes are made, this defect is likely to lead to new conflicts and crises from 2014 onwards, when the president will start being popularly elected. Therefore, the system needs to be rebuilt within a framework of logical coherence and legal suitability that takes into account the relationship between authority and responsibility.