Taming the Intractable Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle
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International Journal of Innovative Research and Knowledge Volume-3 Issue-7, July-2018 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE ISSN-2213-1356 www.ijirk.com TAMING THE INTRACTABLE INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE ILEMI TRIANGLE PETERLINUS OUMA ODOTE, PHD Abstract This article provides an overview of the historical trends of conflict in the Ilemi triangle, exploring the issues, the nature, context and dynamics of these conflicts. The author endeavours to deepen the understanding of the trends of conflict. A consideration on the discourse on the historical development is given attention. The article’s core is conflict between the five ethnic communities that straddle this disputed triangle namely: the Didinga and Toposa from South Sudan; the Nyangatom, who move around South Sudan and Ethiopia; the Dassenach, who have settled East of the Triangle in Ethiopia; and the Turkana in Kenya. The article delineates different factors that promote conflict in this triangle and how these have impacted on pastoralism as a way of livelihood for the five communities. Lastly, the article discusses the possible ways to deal with the intractable conflict in the Ilemi Triangle. Introduction Ilemi triangle is an arid hilly terrain bordering Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia, that has hit the headlines and catapulted onto the international centre stage for the wrong reasons in the recent past. Retrospectively, the three countries have been harshly criticized for failure to contain conflict among ethnic communities that straddle this contested area. Perhaps there is no better place that depicts the opinion that the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must than the Ilemi does. Interethnic strain, turmoil, and violence have long characterized this triangle. At the core of this contested triangle live the Turkana who move back and forth between South www.ijirk.com Page 39 International Journal of Innovative Research and Knowledge ISSN-2213-1356 Sudan and Kenya. Surrounding them West to East are the Didinga and Toposa from South Sudan who graze their cattle, sheep and goats on the Western pastures of Ilemi; the Nyangatom from South Sudan and Ethiopia who oscillate across its Northeastern boundary and the Dassanech who come out of the East from Ethiopia.1 Even though the Dassanech of Ethiopia use the Ilemi triangle, Ethiopia has at no time placed an official entitlement on the Ilemi, which therefore leaves the ownership dispute primarily between Kenya and South Sudan.2 As Prunier3 asserts, “abstract morals notwithstanding, even tragedies do not occur in a vacuum.” The political power resistances and economic rivalries between the Countries that this triangle borders, strengthened by the colonial powers that ruled the area, have divided the population and resulted on many occasions in the massacre and forced migration of large numbers of civilians. In 1924, the unrestricted grazing point in the triangle was earmarked after the consultation at Kitgum, Uganda that brought together colonial officials from Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan.4 Here governments of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda established that Sudan should hand over some territory North of the 1914 line to either Kenya or Uganda, who would then protect the Turkana people. Sudan consented to the Kenyan military crossing the line to defend the Turkana people. Consequently, in 1928, the government of Kenya offered financial support to Sudan to take up the area. After two years neither Kenya nor Sudan was willing to take up the duty of administration of the area with the claim that the management of the area was expensive.5 In 1931 the Red Line, was sketched to change the 1914 boundary and to mark the points of Turkana pastures. During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (at that time Abyssinia) in 1936, Italy for a short time claimed the Ilemi triangle. The Italians however, rejected the Red line and instead recognized the 1914 straight line as the boundary. On the other hand, the Dassanech and Nyangatom initiated attacks against the Turkanas in 1939, leading to massive loss of lives. As a result, the Italians dropped the claim for the territory, as the British Air Force aggression on the Dassanech and Nyangatom raiders began. In the 1940s Britain’s foreign office assessed a Blue “patrol” line in the Northwestern course of the Redline, while Sudan drew their own border, deeper into Kenyan and Ethiopian territories that Kenyan and Ethiopian pastoralists were not allowed to go beyond. However, in 1956 the Sudanese authorities stopped their management in the area East of the “patrol” margin.6 Kenyan and Ethiopian representatives convened in an effort to amend the border line that led to a swap of border posts, specifically the Ethiopian post of Namuruputh that limited the entry of the Dassanech to Kenya. President Kenyatta officially requested the British officials for back up to get the Sudan government to defend their current border— the 1914 line, by the Red line in the Ilemi triangle. These efforts did not achieve much success and to date Kenya has not satisfactorily talked about the Ilemi dispute to re-draft the map of the Ilemi triangle.7 Many countries, it seems— Kenya, Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Italy, Britain have pursued ambitious quests to determine which Country the Ilemi triangle belongs to. Civil society organizations, religious organizations, local community leaders have sought to resolve and transform conflict in this area in innovative ways too. At the core of the debate that has followed the tragedies of the Ilemi are the questions: are all these efforts truly ones of peace building? Which have been successful? Which Country does the triangle belong to? Why are the communities in this area caught up in a spate of inter-ethnic conflicts with no lasting solutions? 1Guo, R, Territorial Disputes and Resource Management: A Global Handbook (New York: Nova Publishers, Inc, 2006) p.139. 2 Lovell-Hoare, S., & Lovell-Hoare, M, South Sudan, (England: Bradt Travel Guides, 2013) p.179. 3 Prunier, G. The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995). p. 1. 4Amutabi, M. N, ‘Land and Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle of East Africa,’ Kenya Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 2010). 5 Lovell-Hoare, S., & Lovell-Hoare, M, South Sudan, (England: Bradt Travel Guides, 2013) p.180 6 Lovell-Hoare, S., & Lovell-Hoare, M, South Sudan, (England: Bradt Travel Guides, 2013) p.180 7Guo, R, Territorial Disputes and Resource Management: A Global Handbook, (New York: Nova Publishers, Inc, 2006) p.140. www.ijirk.com Page 40 International Journal of Innovative Research and Knowledge Volume-3 Issue-7, July-2018 Factors that Sustain Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle There is a very strong consensus in the community that conflict is a major problem in the Ilemi Triangle region owing to the high levels of violent conflicts experienced. Conflict persists in the Ilemi triangle and there are multiple conflict causal factors. The greatest causes of conflicts established by the study were: resource scarcity (land, water, pasture) and the resulting disputes of boundaries. Conflict memories and yearning for vengeance makes communities fight as a way of paying back, thus making conflict a recurrent issue in the Ilemi Triangle. Social exclusion and marginalization by the respective state apparatus are further initiators and propellers of conflict in this area. Below are the factors explained in-depth: Lack of Official State Presence in the Ilemi Triangle Arguably, political gimmicks are responsible for the conflict and instability facing the border areas of Kenya and her neighbours. This reality points to the paradox in the Ilemi triangle. Whereas deficiency of state presence at the borders is a major driver of insecurity, and in some cases their presence actually fuels conflict. It is thus not sufficient to argue that state presence at the borders always prevents conflict. It is important to explore how each state involved in the Ilemi has contributed to or inhibited peace building efforts in the region. Both the Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities have made little attempts to reduce the enmity between the Dassanech and Turkana communities. However, from the 20th century until recently, both governments have also encouraged the tensions by supplying firearms to their ethnic communities who live along the borders of the disputed area. After the end of World War I the Ethiopian authorities provided the Dassanech with automatic weapons, and often joined them in the fight against the Turkana community. In the early 20th century illegal firearms were prohibited in Kenya, spiralling conflict between the two foes, as the Turkana became more susceptible to attacks.8 Apart from arming these communities with firearms, the negligence that both governments have had in tackling this conflict has also intensified this problem. Absence of development in the Ilemi triangle has led the three governments to ignore the region even further. It is in the Ilemi Triangle region that endless conflicts have occurred over grazing rights. The negligence by the Kenyan, Sudan, and Ethiopian governments to tackle conflict in the Ilemi Triangle has enhanced the episodes of conflict over grazing land. Despite the three governments having organized a series of peace gatherings in 2006 in collaboration with representatives from each of the communities, the outcomes of these meetings have not bore any fruits. The security roles of the Ethiopian, Sudan and Kenya states have been by and large abortive. Besides, where improvements have been initiated, the powers of the local raiders far outnumber government forces.9 Most facts give credibility to the propagation that the conflict surrounding the Ilemi triangle and its people has its origins in state neglects and marginalization by the relevant governments. Boundary Disputes Today’s international order generally follows a distinct territorial definition. The leaders of such territories are the determinants of how these territories are governed.