Chapter 1
“We will stay and fight it out . . . ”
The Strategic Situation on the Afternoon of July 3, 1863
Union Army of the Potomac under George G. Meade and The the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee spent the first two days of July 1863 locked in titanic combat. The second day witnessed large scale Southern attacks against both ends of the Union line. James Longstreet’s massive assault smashed Dan Sickles’ Third Corps, wrecked additional brigades, and nearly collapsed Meade’s left flank. On his right, another attack swept across Rock Creek and up the wooded and rocky slopes of Culp’s Hill, where only hard fighting and good luck saved the Union defenders. The day produced combined casualties of more than 16,000 men and continued late into the night before finally sputtering out on the slopes of Culp’s Hill.1 By the end of the day, the Army of the Potomac held a shorter fishhook-shaped line anchored on high ground with the advantage of interior lines of communication. The prominent points on this line were Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill on the northern end, and Little Round Top and Big Round Top on the southern end. Between those hills ran a low ridge called
1 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968), 442. 2 Gettysburg’s Forgotten Cavalry