Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health
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Special Theme – Tobacco Tobacco industry tactics for resisting V public policy on health Yussuf Saloojee1 & Elif Dagli2 The tactics used by the tobacco industry to resist government regulation of its products include conducting public relations campaigns, buying scientific and other expertise to create controversy about established facts, funding political parties, hiring lobbyists to influence policy, using front groups and allied industries to oppose tobacco control measures, pre-empting strong legislation by pressing for the adoption of voluntary codes or weaker laws, and corrupting public officials. Formerly secret internal tobacco industry documents provide evidence of a 50-year conspiracy to ‘‘resist smoking restrictions, restore smoker confidence and preserve product liability defence’’. The documents reveal industry-wide collusion on legal, political and socially important issues to the tobacco industry and clearly demonstrate that the industry is not disposed to act ethically or responsibly. Societal action is therefore required to ensure that the public health takes precedence over corporate profits. Recommendations for reducing the political influence of the tobacco industry include the following. Every tobacco company in every market should publicly disclose what it knew about the addictiveness and harm caused by tobacco, when it obtained this information, and what it did about it. The industry should be required to guarantee internationally recognized basic consumer rights to its customers. Trade associations and other industry groupings established to deceive the public should be disbanded. These recommendations should be incorporated into WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Keywords: tobacco industry, legislation; public policy; health policy; persuasive communication; mass media; propaganda; public relations; treaties. Voir page 908 le re´sume´ en franc¸ais. En la pa´ gina 909 figura un resumen en espan˜ ol. Who decides health policy? hostile and where populations are least educated about the harmful effects of smoking’’ (1). Tobacco is a major health hazard and an important Four cigarette manufacturers dominate about economic commodity. If it were not harmful to three-quarters of the global market: Philip Morris, health there would be no reason to control its use. On British American Tobacco (BAT) and Japan Tobacco the other hand, if the market for tobacco were small are transnational companies; the China National there would be little opposition to the regulation of Tobacco Corporation is a monopoly, producing this trade. As a result of the conflict of interest about 30% of the world’s cigarettes but mainly between health and corporate wealth, public policy supplying its domestic market (2). China is, however, on tobacco has evolved in an ad hoc fashion. It has preparing to become a major exporter of tobacco. emerged as a product of different pressures, The future of the tobacco industry lies in the including those of the tobacco industry and the world’s developing countries. Between 1986 and public health lobby. 1996, cigarette exports from the United States grew The tobacco industry has a formidable record by 260%. Philip Morris now makes more profit of resistance to legislation and of developing new selling cigarettes abroad than in the United States (3). markets for its products. Even as its key markets in BAT sells about 70% of its cigarettes in Africa, Asia, high-income countries were shrinking it succeeded in Latin America, and Eastern Europe. A BAT booklet increasing sales in middle-income and low-income notes: ‘‘The 1990s have seen new opportunities for countries. As was noted in a South African news- the Group, especially in Central and Eastern Europe paper: ‘‘It is an unpalatable fact that growth in this and in the Far East, with the opening up of markets industry will take place where governments are least previously closed to Western tobacco manufac- turers’’. BAT has acquired factories in Hungary (1992), Ukraine (1993), the Russian Federation V This article is based on a paper presented at the WHO International (1994), Uzbekistan (1994), Poland (1995), and the Conference on Tobacco and Law, New Delhi, 7–9 January 2000. Czech Republic (1995) (4). 1 Executive Director, National Council Against Smoking, South Africa. Questioned about the ethics of targeting the Correspondence should be addressed to this author at the following address: PO Box 23244, Joubert Park, 2044, South Africa world’s poor, a manager at Rothmans Export Ltd (email: [email protected]). (now part of BAT) replied: ‘‘It would be stupid to 2 Professor of Paediatrics and Head, Department of Pulmonology, ignore a growing market. I can’t answer the moral Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey. dilemma. We are in the business of pleasing our Ref. No. 00-0628 shareholders’’ (5). This narrow corporate philosophy, 902 # World Health Organization 2000 Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2000, 78 (7) Tobacco industry tactics for resisting public health policy involving an exclusive commitment to shareholders popular opinion that environmental tobacco smoke rather than accountability to all stakeholders, includ- was harmful to health, and the restoration of the ing customers, means that anything is acceptable in social acceptability of smoking (10). defence of company profits. The tobacco industry has one aim: to sell the maximum number of cigarettes. In order to achieve Mobilizing corporate resources this it is prepared to crush any obstacle. The manufacturers have ignored the harm caused by The 1953 meeting proposed that the tobacco cigarettes and for decades they have engaged in a companies should put aside their competitive vigorous effort to silence critics, distort science, differences and agree on issues of legal, political influence public opinion, control public policy and and social importance to the entire industry, and that coordinate their strategy on litigation. they should jointly establish and fund a centre to An insight into their behaviour is provided by promote their general public relations interests. the millions of pages of formerly secret internal In 1954 the industry established the Tobacco documents that have been made public because of Industry Research Council. Its task was to reassure litigation. These documents, which are available on the public that the industry could responsibly the Internet, take one into the boardrooms of the investigate the smoking and health issue and that it United States tobacco companies and their coordi- could resolve any problems that were uncovered. The nating centre, the Tobacco Institute. Council’s real role, however, was ‘‘to stamp out bush fires as they arose’’. Instead of supporting genuine scientific research into the problems, it spent millions Engineering consent of dollars publicizing research purporting to prove that tobacco did not cause cancer. Its true purpose In the early 1950s the United States tobacco industry was to deliberately confuse the public about the risks found itself besieged by concerns about the safety of of smoking. ‘‘Doubt is our product,’’ proclaimed an its products as a result of new medical evidence internal tobacco industry document in 1969. ‘‘Spread conclusively linking smoking and cancer (6). Increas- doubt over strong scientific evidence and the public ing concern in the media and the scientific commu- won’t know what to believe.’’ nity about the role of cigarettes in causing disease had By the late 1950s most of the industry already reduced consumer confidence. A decline in sales accepted that smoking caused lung cancer: in 1958 combined with the threat of litigation from ailing three British scientists, after meeting leading officials smokers led to what was referred to in industry and scientists of the United States tobacco industry, documents as the ‘‘1954 emergency’’. reported: ‘‘With one exception the individuals whom The industry reacted by mobilizing its collec- we met believed that smoking caused lung cancer’’; in tive resources to regain control and to defend itself April 1970 an internal memorandum in Gallaher on three major fronts, namely litigation, politics and Limited, a British tobacco company, commenting on public opinion (7). In December 1953 the heads of all studies conducted on dogs that developed cancer but one of the cigarette manufacturers in the United after being exposed to tobacco smoke, reported: States consulted Hill and Knowlton, a public ‘‘Auerbach’s work proves beyond all reasonable relations company. A memorandum after this meet- doubt the causation of lung cancer by smoke’’ (11). ing noted that the one essential job was to stop public Yet in 1969 the following advertising copy was panic and that the only problem was to establish developed for the Brown & Williamson Tobacco public confidence and create public assurance (8). corporation. ‘‘Ten years ago there was a cancer scare The goal was to preserve company profits, not over the wax in milk cartons. And over using iodine to to protect the public. It was not to identify and get a suntan. These theories were about as valid as the eliminate the harm caused by cigarettes but to calm one that says toads cause warts. And they’re about as public fears and reassure smokers that no change in valid as today’s scare tactics surrounding cigarettes. smoking behaviour was necessary. It was also to Because no one has been able to produce conclusive prevent government regulation and to avoid litiga- proof that cigarette smoking causes cancer. Scientific,