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South and East China Seas: Challenges and Opportunities for Enduring Regional Peace and Security

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South and East China Seas: Challenges and Opportunities for Enduring Regional Peace and Security South and East China Seas: Challenges and Opportunities for Enduring Regional Peace and Security June 7, 2013, 10:00 - 11:30 AM - Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters In September 2010, American journalist, Nicolas Kristof wrote and published in the New York Times that, “Look Out for the Diaoyu Islands” “Tensions have erupted over some barren Nicholas Kristof rocks in the Pacific that you may never have heard of, but stay tuned – this is a boundary dispute that could get ugly and some day have far-reaching consequences for China, Japan, Taiwan and the United States”. Kristof made a right prediction, and the dispute has become more serious, because it involves not only maritime boundary, but also territorial sovereignty. September 10, 2010 “The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2011 Robert D. Kaplan, a member of the Defense Policy Board of the U.S. Defense Department, warned of China’s “undeniable naval expansion, . forcing every country around it to react.” He posited the “21st century’s defining battleground is going to be on water” and “the South China Sea is the future of conflict.” Potential Flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific Region ■ Kuril Islands/ Northern Territories ■ ■ Dokdo/Take- shima Diaoyutai DiaoyutaiIsland Group Paracel Islands ■ Scarborough Spratly Shoal Islands President Barack Obama with China’s Xi Jinping in 2. 2012 Vice President Xi pointed out that China is firmly committed to the path of peaceful development and is sincere in developing relations with the US. He also said that The Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate the two major countries of China and the US. PRC State Oceanic Administration Resolvedly safeguard the country’s maritime rights and interests; Establish PRC as a maritime power. Xi’s China Dream • In 11. 2012, Mr Xi made his first reference to “China Dram” when he was promoted to the top Communist Party post. • President Xi's dream is of a stronger nation with a strong military” President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping will hold their first meeting since Xi became president in March when they sit down for the Sunnylands summit in Rancho Mirage, California, today & tomorrow. The US and China Sunnylands Summit • Will they Talk about the ECS issue? And/or the SCS issue? • The ECS and SCS are smaller than the Pacific Ocean. But are these two important East Asian semi-enclosed seas wide enough not only to accommodate the US and China, but also Japan and Taiwan in the ECS; and big enough to accommodate Taiwan as well as ASEAN claimants, in particular, the Philippines and Vietnam, in the SCS? • What will be the China’s dream in the ECS and SCS? Xi Jinping visits Woody Island? Will China’s dream include a visit of Presidet Xi to Diaoyutai Island? To Woody Island? To Pagasa Island? To Taiping Island? Or, To James Shoal? President Ma’s Taiwan Dream? • Does Presient Ma Ying-jeou’s also have a dream for Taiwan? • If he really works harder enough and successfully transform the ECS, the Taiwan Strait, and the SCS from a sea of confrontation to a sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation, it might not be a dream for President Ma to win the Nobel Peace prize during the last three years of his second term. President Ma visited Pengjia Islet in the East China Sea (7.Sept.2012) Unlikely to visit the Diaoyutai Island Group now, but how about Taiping Island (Itu Aba) in the Spratly Archipelago of he South China Sea? Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea Sovereignty & Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea Ownership of land features Claims to maritime zones South China Sea. Six parties compete in whole or in part over the small islands, reefs atolls, cays, shoals, and sandbars. Similarities and Differences between ECS & SCS ECS Sovereignty and Maritime disputes • 3 Territorial sea laws • 3 baseline claims • 3 EEZ and Continental Shelf Claims and different principles applied for the claim • 3 white papers • Unilateral actions taken to support respective claims • Rising tensions and conflicts • ECSPI/Implementing guidelines • Bilateral or multilateral COC • ECS Joint development / Joint conservation • US concern and involvement • Taiwan-Japan fisheries talk • Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement • Future development? Similarities between ECS and SCS Dispute • Large Marine Ecosystem • Semi-enclosed Sea • Abundant Marine Living and Non-living Resources • Important Trade Routes • Return of the Occupied Islands by Japan After WWII • Territorial Sovereignty & Maritime Boundary Delimitation • Outer continental shelf claims Similarities between ECS and SCS Dispute • Different Applications sand Interpretations of the LOS Convention • Obligations to Settle Disputes by Peaceful Means • The proposal for a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation, and Friendship” • Involving 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Largest Economies in the World • Increasing Concern about the Rise of China and its Assertive moves • Increasing U.S. Concerns and Involvement • Emerging US-China Strategic Competition • The Issue of “One China” and Taiwan’s Being Excluded from the Track I Regional Security Dialogue Process Differences between ECS and SCS Dispute • Number of Parties Involving in Disputes • Number of Occupied Islands • Asymmetric Military Capabilities • Application of the Mutual Defense Security Treaty • More Outside Powers are involving • The U-shape line, Nine-dotted Line and Historic Rights Claim Differences between ECS and SCS Dispute • The Existence of Security Dialogue Process (ASEAN-led series meetings – AMM, ASEAN Summit, ARF, ASEAN-China Summit, ADMM+, Expanded AFM, EAS, UK/Singapore led Shanga-ri la Security Dialogue) • The SCS Workshop Process (1990 - ) • SCS DOC and COC • Arbitration Major factors that trigger conflict in the East & South China Sea • Increasing Chinese assertiveness; • Actions or counter-actions taken by other claimants, in particular, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam; • Increasing Military Spending and Arms Procurement • Increasing U.S. Concern and Involvement; • American Strategy of Rebalancing toward Asia ; • Increasing involvement of external powers; • Conclusion of a regional code of conduct; • Arbitration Major Factors that Trigger Conflict in the East and South China Sea • Sovereignty/core interest; • Sovereign rights/Maritime interests; • Energy Security; • Food Security; • SLOC; • Domestic political pressure; • Rising nationalism; • The Concern of China’s Rise; • US-China strategic competition; • International Law/UNCLOS. Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes • Is dispute existing • When did it begin? When is considered the Critical date • Who is exercising effective control? • Who is changing the status quo? And by what means? Threat to use or use of force? Coercive way? • Who trigger or give rise the tensions? By what actions? • Who are the key players? • US Concern and Involvement Shintaro Ishihara 16.4.2012 Japanese Nationalization of the Prime Minister Noda disputed DIG, 12.9.2012 7.7.2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident • The Philippines' biggest warship was locked in a standoff with two Chinese vessels in the SCS; • Tensions were quickly escalated in the SCS (10 April – June 2012). Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East & China Seas • Recent developments -- 4.16 2012 Tokyo Governor Ishihara -- 4.10 Philippine Scarborough Shoal -- June 2012 Vietnam Law of the Sea -- June 2012 Shansa City -- July 2012 Noda Administration Nationalization -- August 5, 2012 President ECSPI/Implementing Guidelines -- August Chinese activists landed DIG and arrested -- September 2012 Noda Administration’s decision -- September 2012 China Baseline 17 Diaoyu Dao -- September 2012 Water cannon fight Taiwan/Japan Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East & China Seas • Recent developments -- November 2012 CLCS submission -- December 2012 Abe winning election -- Jan – June Chinese patrolling in the water and also in the air of DIG -- April 10, 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement -- May 9 2013 shooting incident in the Bashi Channel -- May 25 P3-C encountering in the SCS -- June 1 Shangari La Defense Dialogue -- China’s proposal (putting aside disputes, 1972, 1978) -- Japan’s response (to China (no consensus; no dispute; to Taiwan (ECSPI, 3 parties cooperation) Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East & China Seas • Recent developments -- US position (rebalancing toward Asia policy) (US official position and statement, 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, 8/2012 statement department statement, congressional bills, Acting assistant secretary Yun, no coercive act, no unilateral changing status quo. ) -- Standoff – Renai Reef (Second Thomas Shoal) -- June 10 US-Japan exercise -- US/Philippines relations (Nimitz aircraft carrier)/exercises -- COC/ARF/46 AMM/5th ASEAN-US leaders meeting/APEC/EAS/ASEAN Summit/ASEAN + China Summit Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East & China Seas Challenges • Arbitration; • U-shaped line • China’s forced to take more assertive moves, such as Renai Reef, taking back those islands occupied by the Philippines; • Rising conflict; • US being dragged into conflicts in the ECS and SCS; Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East & China Seas Opportunities • Rule of engagement, • NO Fly zone, • conflict management mechanisms, • maritime cooperation, • DOC cooperative projects • COC • New leaders/new cabinet members Challenges • A litmus test for China, re. peaceful rise of China; • A test for the implementation of US Rebalancing strategy toward Asia; • Sino-American relations; • Peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific
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