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INDIA- AGREEMENT THE GEOPOLITICS OF BALUCHISTAN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Dr. Mohammad Hassan Hossein bor

ARABIAN GULF CENTRE FOR IRANIAN STUDIES WWW.ARABIANGCIS.ORG -IRAN CHABAHAR AGREEMENT THE GEOPOLITICS OF BALUCHISTAN

INTRODUCTION The Chabahar Agreement signed between the Indian Prime Minister Modi and Iranian President Rouhani in May of this year will enable India to develop the in Iranian Baluchistan as a major economic and strategic corridor linking India to and Central Asian markets. The Agreement is seen as India’s strategic response to the China- Economic Corridor (CPEC) under which China will invest about 47$ billion to link Western China via overland roads, pipelines, and railways to Port in Eastern Baluchistan. The Indo-Chinese rivalry underscores the geopolitical significance of Baluchistan as a focal point in the New Great Game played by the US, China, and India in Asia. This paper addresses the local, regional, and international implications of the two emerging strategic seaports and their impact on the Arabian Gulf and the Baluch movement in Iran. Chabahar is India’s response to China’s move in Gwadar. Both ports are part of Baluchistan, on the coast within 70 kilometers of each other. Therefore, an understanding of Chabahar will be difficult without reference to Gwadar and vice versa. This paper is divided into three parts. The first covers the historical background and geopolitical significance of Baluchistan and its two strategic seaports. The second deals with the regional implications reflecting the role of regional actors namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The third treats the international implications of the Indo-Chinese rivalry over Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, as well as the US-China competition in the Arabian Sea, , and beyond.

2 www.arabiangcis.org PART I forcefully annexed western Baluchistan into Iran. The Durand Line, drawn also by the British BALUCHISTAN AND ITS in 1894, further divided eastern Baluchistan GEOSTRATEGIC LOCATION: between British India and Afghanistan. THE IMPORTANCE OF CHABAHAR Upon the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1948, Baluchistan regained The ports of Chabahar and Gwadar are its independence for a short time, but was located on Baluchistan’s Arabian Sea coast invaded and annexed by Pakistan the same stretching from the to . year. These events have led to the rise of The geostrategic location of Baluchistan Baluch nationalism, which is the driving force underscores the importance of the two ports. behind the Baluch quest for independence. Therefore, the historical background and the geostrategic importance of Baluchistan THE GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE are presented first to provide the context to OF BALUCHISTAN: THE NEW GREAT better understand Chabahar and Gwadar’s GAME significance. Until the advent of British Colonialism in the Baluchistan - meaning the Baluch homeland mid19-th century, Baluchistan maintained its - covers about 240,000 square miles with a independence, for the most part, from the coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles from surrounding empires. This is reflected in the the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi in Pakistan. It fact that the pre-division period is known by occupies one of the most strategic locations the Baluch as the Baluch Doura or the Baluch in the world, linking the Middle East, Central era, a historical concept used by the Baluch Asia, and South Asia. It is also one of the to refer to the state of affairs in Baluchistan richest lands in terms of natural resources prior to its division and occupation by Iran including oil, gas, uranium, coal, gold, iron and Pakistan. ore, and immense seabed resources along The Baluch Doura survived the British colonial its long coastline, including its -200mile rule (1947-1858) because the British did Exclusive Economic Zone. not replace the Baluch political rule and Baluchistan has an estimated population institutions, but simply created its own of around 35 million including 7 million parallel system of administration to control the in Iranian-occupied western Baluchistan; defense and external affairs of an otherwise 25 million in Pakistani-occupied eastern an independent Baluchi state (1). Baluchistan, Sind, and Punjab; and around Under the British Empire, Baluchistan was 3 million in Afghanistan. In addition, there is divided into three parts. The Goldsmid Line, a large Baluchi population numbering more drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896, than a million in the neighboring Arabian Gulf gave western Baluchistan to Persia. The states. There are also significant numbers Baluch in Iran, however, maintained their of Baluch living in India, East Africa, and independence until 1928 when, with British Turkilometersenistan, as well as in diaspora approval, Pahlavi occupied and in , US, and Australia. Baluch, like

3 www.arabiangcis.org , are one of the largest nations in the 4. Baluchistan is the most viable economic Middle East and South Asia without a state route for overland roads, railways, and of their own. pipelines from , China, and Baluchistan borders the Indus River and Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea and from the Punjab in the East, the Strait of Hormuz and Middle East and South Asia to China and the Gulf of in the West, the Arabian Central Asia. If connected, the land-locked Sea and Indian Ocean in the South, and the Afghanistan and energy rich Central Asian Iranian provinces of and Khorasan countries will gain access to international as well as Afghanistan in the North(2). markets for their energy exports. The strategic location of Baluchistan places 5.With a coastline of about 1000 miles, Chabahar and Gwadar ports at the center Baluchistan would have jurisdiction and of the growing rivalry among the US, China, ownership of the sea and seabed resources and India in the Indian Ocean, South Asia, along its coast for two hundred miles under and Central Asia. Baluchistan’s geopolitical Exclusive Economic Zone provisions of the significance is based on this strategic location Law of the Sea, a major factor in the Baluch and its tremendous reserves of natural drive for independence. The energy resources resources summarized as follows: in Baluchistan’s coastal seabed are reported 1. Located directly at the entrance to the Strait to be the largest in t he world. of Hormuz on a coastline stretching nearly Map of Gwadar& Chabahar, Source: Yale 1000 miles to Karachi, Baluchistan occupies Global Online a strategic position with a commanding view of the shipping lines carrying 40 percent PART II of world oil supplies. The world economy depends on these supplies and securing THE CHABAHAR AGREEMENT AND the shipping lines passing through the Strait ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS: of Hormuz and Arabian Sea is of vital THE ROLE OF IRAN, PAKISTAN, importance to the world economy. AFGHANISTAN, AND THE ARABIAN 2. Baluchistan connects the Middle East, GULF STATES Central Asia, and South Asia via sea, land, The Chabahar Agreement between India and air and can serve as a major hub for trade, and Iran is part of 12 pacts signed by the energy, transportation, and communication Indian Prime Minister Modi and Iranian links among the countries of these regions. President Rouhani during a summit in early 3. Baluchistan holds large reserves of natural May of this year. Afghan President Ashraf resources including silver, uranium, aluminum, Ghani also joined Modi and Rouhani for and oil, gas, gold, copper, and platinum. the signing of a trilateral trade agreement As we know, the competition for natural facilitating transit of goods among these resources is intensifying among the major countries and providing India with access economic and military powers, attracting to Afghanistan via the Chabahar port. Under them to Baluchistan. this Agreement, India will invest 500$ million

4 www.arabiangcis.org in expanding and operating Chabahar port in from Malik on the Iran-Afghanistan border. Iranian Baluchistan and transforming it into Work is underway to connect it to Malik and India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central then to the - highway completed Asia. India will undertake several other major by India in Nimroz province in Afghanistan. projects worth 20$ billion including setting Iran has also started constructing a railway up an LNG plant and a gas cracker unit in linking Chabahar to where it will the Chabahar free trade zone.(3) connect with the Iranian rail network and to The Chabahar Agreement has been described Central Asia and CIS countries. as a “strategic game changer”(4) not only Third, the deal serves as a major source for Iran, India, and Afghanistan, but also for of revenue from duties and tariffs imposed Pakistan, Arabian Gulf states, China, and on goods passing through Chabahar as Central Asia. It has wide ranging strategic, well as from transit and transportation fees economic, diplomatic, and political implications generated from the use of Iranian roads, benefiting Iran, India, and Afghanistan at the railways, and pipelines linking Chabahar to expense of their rivals (5). Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran is expected IRAN to levy sizable duties on imports coming Coming in the aftermath of the nuclear from India and the Gulf region and exports deal and lifting of Western sanctions, the originating from Central Asian countries and Agreement provides Iran with far-reaching Afghanistan. Fourth, Iran sees Chabahar economic and trade opportunities, which could as an alternative to located be as important as the lifting of economic inside the Arabian Gulf west of the Strait of sanctions by the West. To sweeten the deal Hormuz. Any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz during the Summit, Prime Minister Modi would cripple Iran’s trade and commerce returned part of the 6.4$ billion owned by and would render Bandar Abbas unusable. the Indian refiners to Iran and pledged to Unlike Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is Iran’s quickly transfer the rest(6). only deep water port, giving it access to the First, the deal helps Iran secure and expand a Indian Ocean. greater market share for its energy products Geopolitically, Iran also considers the Chabahar in India at the expense of Saudi Arabia. Agreement as a strategic victory for boosting Second, it serves as a catalyst for attracting its political influence in Afghanistan, Central substantial international investments needed Asia, and Southwest Asia; for strengthening for developing Chabahar and its infrastructure. its position in the Arabian Gulf against Saudi In addition to India, Iran has granted land Arabia; and for projecting its power in the and facilities to Afghanistan, Commonwealth Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The expanded of Independent States (CIS), and China for political, economic, trade, and investment investments in the Chabahar Free Trade Zone. ties between India and Iran could lead to a Iran has also built a 600 kilometer highway strategic alliance paving the way for stronger linking Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of naval cooperation in the Arabian Sea and Iranian Baluchistan, and 240 kilometers away Indian Ocean. Similarly, growing trade and

5 www.arabiangcis.org commerce among Iran, Afghanistan, and CIS countries could lead to greater political influence by Iran in those countries at the Iran, as is commonly known, has been and expense of Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi remains locked in a rivalry with Saudi Arabia Arabia. The roads, railways, and pipelines for regional pre-eminence and market share linking Chabahar to Afghanistan and CIS for its energy products. It is aware that it countries provide Iran with major political can increase its regional influence, and thus and diplomatic leverages for influencing achieve its strategic goals, only if its economy those countries at the expense of its rivals. develops. It is the acute rivalry that it has with With a view to counter its regional rival Saudi Saudi Arabia that saw it forgo the opportunity Arabia, Iran is set to use Chabahar and energy to attend the recent summit on oil in on agreements with India to further strengthen April 7. Iran refused to attend the meeting, its strategic interests in the Arabian Gulf and which was called by major oil-producing the Arabian Sea for regional dominance and countries in an effort to boost the current greater market share for its energy products. low oil prices by freezing production. Iran It is using Chabahar as a major land-air-naval insisted that it would continue to increase base to project power in the Arabian Sea its production in order to regain the market and Indian Ocean. The port is a launching share it had lost to Saudi Arabia and other pad for Iran’s arms shipments to Houthi oil producers due to the sanctions, despite rebels in Yemen. Iran’s fleet of submarines threats by Saudi Arabia to do likewise, which is based in Chabahar. Referring to Saudi- could keep prices low and possibly force Iranian competition, Lindsay Hughes, a Iran to capitulate. will no doubt be research analyst at the Indian Ocean Research banking on the fact that while it has prodigious Programme, states that: amounts of proven oil and gas reserves, Riyadh has only oil reserves, albeit being Pakistan the largest oil producer in the world. Tehran The Chabahar port, along with the Afghan-Iran- knows that Saudi oil exports and market share India trilateral agreement, is bound to affect can only decrease as long as US crude oil the regional dynamics of the Iran-Pakistan supplies remains at very high levels…. Given relationship. It has created a direct economic those factors, it is critical that Iran increases contest with Gwadar, less than 70 kilometers its market share of energy products, which east of Chabahar, in Pakistani Baluchistan. makes its growing relationship with India Like Chabahar, Gwadar is a deep sea port that much more important.”(7) located on vital maritime lines and overland Tehran’s refusal to attend the Doha oil summit routes connecting China and Afghanistan to was a clear signal to OPEC and other oil the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Iran’s producing countries that “Saudi influence use of Chabahar undermines Pakistan’s over oil production and exports is, if not plans for linking Gwadar to Central Asia waning, not as salient as was previously and Afghanistan via railways, pipelines, and thought.(8) overland routes, thus reducing the prospects

6 www.arabiangcis.org for increased trade and commerce with our defence and security institutions on and access to major energy resources in regional and maritime security.”(10) As a result, those countries. More immediately, access Pakistan-Iran competition in the Arabian Sea to Chabahar frees Afghanistan from using is expected to intensify with far reaching Gwadar and Karachi ports in Pakistan, thus consequences for Southwest Asia and the threatening stable sources of revenue, which Middle East. are the tariffs and transition fees Islamabad Afghanistan charges for the use of those ports. The Chabahar Agreement is considered a Politically, Iran stands to gain in competing key victory for Afghanistan. In the words of with Pakistan over influence in Afghanistan, Michael Kugelman, a South Asia specialist Central Asia, and the Middle East, an objective at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, shared by Pakistan’s archenemy India. Due “this Chabahar project is more important to to its dependence on the Pakistani ports, Afghanistan than to anybody else. It could Afghanistan has had to “comply to a degree be an economic bonanza for an economically with Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which is troubled country…” (11). Afghanistan will be formulated to a very large extent by the able to ship its goods, including its vast Pakistani Army. The maritime access that natural resources with an estimated value of Chabahar now gives to Afghanistan means that 700$ billion, via Chabahar to key markets in can formulate its policies independent Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It could of its concerns about Pakistan.”(9) import more easily key goods it needs. In Similarly, the Chabahar-Gwadar rivalry is addition to trade and commerce, Afghanistan seen by Tehran as a means to counter the can serve as a transit route for roads, railways, Saudi-Pakistan alliance in order to strengthen and pipelines linking Central Asian countries Iran’s position in the Arabian Gulf region. via Afghanistan to Chabahar, a vital source of With the presence of India in Chabahar transit revenues for that country. Politically, on its Western borders and the loss of its use of Chabahar could eliminate Afghanistan’s influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan can ill- dependency on Pakistani ports, thus allowing afford to divert its attention and resources Kabul to pursue its own independent foreign from its main fronts with India in the East, policy as mentioned before. thus giving Iran a freer hand to maneuver in Saudi Arabia the Middle East. The presence of China and India in Gwadar Strategically, Pakistan feels encircled and is and Chabahar, respectively, has brought the alarmed by the Indian presence in Chabahar. emerging Asian giants to the doorsteps of Pakistani military fears that the port can be Arabia with far reaching ramifications for used by India to eavesdrop on Pakistan and the regional balance of power in the Arabian to gather intelligence on its naval moves Gulf and the Middle East; for the security of in the Arabian Sea and the . shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz; This perception is further boosted by Prime and for the intensifying naval competition Minister Modi’s statement that “We have between the two Asian powers in the Arabian also agreed to enhance interaction between Sea and Indian Ocean.

7 www.arabiangcis.org Iran’s strategy of using Chabahar as its main of the Gulf region and their opposition to strategic base for projecting power in the Persian domination. Anyway, Saudis are Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean poses a direct acting decisively to protect their interests as threat to the Arab Gulf States making them demonstrated in Yemen and will not defer to to conduct immediate counter-measures to an outside power when their vital interests protect their interests. are threatened. Given the close Arab-Pakistan ties, the The Baluch Factor: The Major Hurdle Saudis are certain to support their ally in The major hurdle in developing Chabahar is the competition between Chabahar and fierce opposition by the Baluch nationalists Gwadar. Iran-Pakistan cooperation has been fighting for independence. There are active shaken by major tensions in their relations and growing insurgencies in both Iranian and emanating from their competing interests in Pakistani Baluchistan that could threaten Chabahar and Gwadar and their alliances with Chabahar and Gwadar corridors. The hinterland opposing powers, namely India and China to the East, West, and North of Chabahar as mentioned before. Saudis could benefit is inhabited by Sunni Baluch opposed to from this friction. In addition, Iran-Pakistan Iranian rule and designs in Baluchistan. relations could come under further stress The distance from Chabahar to Zahedan, due to the intensifying Arab-Iranian rivalry in Baluchistan’s provincial capital, is more the Arabian Gulf and the pressure it creates than 600 kilometers and to the Iran-Afghan on Pakistan to take a side. However, given border is 840 kilometers. Both sides of the Pakistan’s weak position vis à vis India, border are inhabited by the Baluch. From it can hardly afford to take the Arab side the North, the distance between Chabahar against Iran as shown by Islamabad’s refusal and the nearest Iranian cities of Bandar to enter the Yemen conflict as expected by Abbas and Kerman is 871 kilometers and the Saudis. 1100 kilometers, respectively. The space These developments could pave the way between these distances constitutes the for an opening toward Arab support for the heartland of Baluchistan. It would be a Baluch struggle against Iran. Saudis could formidable challenge, if not impossible, for persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition the Iranian government to protect such long to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian distances and secure Chabahar in the face of Baluch. There are compelling geopolitical widespread Baluch opposition, particularly reasons for such a Saudi policy. After all, if this opposition is supported by Iran’s Arabs, , and Baluch are the three regional adversaries and world powers. The main actors in the Gulf. In this equation, projected roads, railways, pipelines, and Free Arab support for the Iranian Baluch is a Trade Zone facilities will be inviting targets matter of strategic necessity in confronting for Baluch insurgents. the Iranian hegemony in the region, a policy Historically, Iran and Pakistan have benefited that can benefit Pakistan as well. The Arab- from the division of Baluchistan and are united Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history in maintaining the status quo by suppressing

8 www.arabiangcis.org any demand for Baluch autonomy. They growing in strength and gaining momentum cooperated against the Dadshah revolt in since its eruption in 2005. Similarly, there Iranian Baluchistan in the 1950s when Pakistan have been continued uprisings among the arrested and extradited Dadshah’s brother Baluch against Iran ever since its forceful and his companions to Iran. More recently, annexation of western Baluchistan in 1928, Pakistan arrested brothers of including the tribal revolts in Sarhad in the leader Abdul Malik Riggi, and returned them 1930s and 1940s, Mir Dadshah’s revolt in to be executed by Iran in 2011. The policy the 1950s, the insurrection by the Baluch of suppressing Baluch is certain to continue Liberation Front in the 1960s and 1970s, and for as long as it can be maintained by both the ongoing Baluch insurgency against the governments. Iranian clerical regime. The issue of the two ports has reinvigorated The Chabahar and Gwadar issue has Baluch nationalism in both Iran and Pakistan, intensified the Baluch struggle against Iran giving a new impetus to their quest for and Pakistan, providing Baluch nationalists independence. They see their national with a stronger momentum internally and movement as a direct response to the division internationally. As mentioned earlier, Baluch and occupation of their homeland by Pakistan insurgents are active against both Iranian and and Iran and these countries’ oppressive, Pakistani governments in their respective exploitative, and discriminatory policies parts of Baluchistan. Although the insurgency toward the Baluch. They consider Iran and in Pakistan is much stronger, the Baluch Pakistan as occupiers whose decisions on insurgency in Iran is spreading fast and wide Chabahar and Gwadar are self-serving and and is slowly evolving into a mass movement against Baluch interests. Therefore, they against Iran and its plans in Chabahar. are vehemently opposed to Indian and Externally, Baluch nationalists have launched a Chinese moves in Chabahar and Gwadar, major campaign in opposition to the Chabahar respectively, on the ground that the Baluch Agreement and are calling for independence are the rightful owners and that they were not from Iran. Due to their efforts, the international consulted about nor consented to Delhi’s media has seen a much wider coverage and Beijing’s involvements. of events in Iranian Baluchistan than ever Baluch nationalists also point to the fact that before. Similarly, the human rights violations they have never accepted nor recognized in Iranian Baluchistan are documented and the Goldsmid Line dividing the Baluch reported more frequently by international between Iran and Pakistan nor the Durand human rights organizations. The plight of the Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. Baluch and Baluchistan is receiving greater They have struggled relentlessly to regain their exposure in the halls of Western governments lost freedom and to reassert their sovereignty and international organizations. over their homeland. This is evidenced by The campaign for independence has alarmed several major insurrections by the Baluch the governments of both Iran and Pakistan. against Pakistan in 1973 ,1962 ,1958 ,1948, Iranian officials regularly and publicly denounce and the current insurgency which has been the US and Saudi Arabia for their alleged

9 www.arabiangcis.org support of the Baluch insurgency in Iranian interests. In this context, the strategic ports Baluchistan. Similarly, Pakistan has officially of Chabahar and Gwadar are emerging accused India of assisting Baluch rebels in its as major focal points in this rivalry for the territory. Neither government, however, has same main reason that attracted the great produced any evidence to back its claims powers to Baluchistan in the 19th century: and there is no independent evidence to its geostrategic importance. It can be said this effect. with confidence that Baluchistan is one of the most strategic lands in the world, PART III and the Baluch nationalists are ready to advance their cause by capitalizing on the CHABAHAR, GWADAR, AND opportunities created by these great power THE GREAT POWERS: THE rivalries in the region. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The geopolitical implications of the Chabahar India and Gwadar seaports are enormous for the India’s initiative in Chabahar is intended Indo-Chinese and the American-Chinese primarily at countering its archrival China, rivalries in Asia and the Indian Ocean. All securing its energy supplies, encircling its three great powers are showing renewed enemy Pakistan, and expanding its influence interests in Baluchistan for its strategic ports in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Symbolically, and geopolitical location. This has, in turn, the move is seen as a bold assertion of India’s given a new impetus to the Baluch national role as a major player and successor of the movement and its quest for independence. British Empire in the subcontinent. After all, Baluchistan lost its independence Strategically, Chabahar will enable India during the nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian to directly challenge the Chinese moves in rivalry referred to by historians as the “Great Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan. The China- Game.” That competition of great powers Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 47$ brought Baluchistan under the hegemony billion project linking Western China via roads, of Britain as her forward base to prevent railways and pipelines to Gwadar, provides Russian advances toward British India and China with direct access to the Indian Ocean. the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and Delhi sees China’s buildup of a naval base Arabian Gulf. The division of Baluchistan is and listening post in Gwadar as a threat another legacy of the Great Game that left to India’s navy in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of the Baluch at the mercy of Britain’s client Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, states, namely Pakistan and Iran. the CPEC is seen as a strategic move by Today, there is a New Great Game played China and its proxy Pakistan to encircle out in Asia and the Indian Ocean by the US, India in West Asia. Access to Chabahar China, and India. The dynamics of the New is part of the Indian strategy to check the Game are the same as before: projection of Chinese moves in the Arabian Seas, Strait of power, competition for resources, the search Hormuz, and West Asia. In addition, access for spheres of influence, and pursuit of their to Afghanistan through Chabahar solidifies

10 www.arabiangcis.org the Afghan-Indian alliance against Pakistan expedite its plans for connecting Central and paves the way for India’s access to Asia via pipeline to Chabahar where Delhi Central Asia. can link it to the Oman-Iran-India under-sea Equally important are Indian plans to transform pipeline currently under consideration. With Chabahar into a major economic, trade, this in mind, Indian Prime Minister Modi and and industrial hub in the Middle East and a President Berdimuhamedov spring board for access to Afghanistan and met and signed seven agreements regarding Central Asian markets. The port will enable natural gas, defense, and petrochemicals in Delhi to better secure energy supplies from mid-July 2015. As noted by Future Directions Iran, the Middle East, and Central Asia and International: “Turkmenistan’s support for to expand the market share for Indian trade India’s desire to join Agreement on and commerce in these regions. India ranks trade and transit, which includes , second after China in oil imports from Iran. Iran, Turkmenistan, , and Oman, Chabahar serves to solidify India-Iran energy can only add to India’s need to make this ties and provide Delhi with access to new pipeline a reality.”(13) energy sources in Central Asia through If implemented, the pipeline connecting Afghanistan. As the third largest and fastest Central Asia to India via Chabahar would growing economy in Asia, energy security have profound geopolitical implications. It is paramount in India’s move in Chabahar would greatly enhance India’s energy security and its long term plans for linking the port and its access to Central Asia’s vast energy via overland pipelines to Central Asia and resources. It would boost India’s political via undersea pipeline to India. and economic standing in Central Asia Access to Chabahar has created a new and strengthen its position in countering momentum for India’s energy drive in Central China’s growing influence in the region. It Asia and its strategy to counter the growing would provide CIS countries an alternative Chinese influence in that region. Chabahar for exporting their oil and gas to Asia and provides Delhi with a viable option to sideline Europe through Chabahar, thus lessening the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India their dependency on . Given the Pipeline (TAPIP) in favor of a sub-sea gas historically close Indo-Russian ties, Russia pipeline from Oman and Iran to India. This plan would be less alarmed by India than China was first discussed by the foreign ministers competing in CIS, a Russian sphere of of the three countries in February 2014, but influence. India and Russia could join forces was not pursued due to the US opposition in countering the Chinese influence in the and Western sanctions on Iran. With the region. Russia could also join India in using lifting of the sanctions, this plan has become the same pipeline for exporting its oil and feasible and high on the Indian agenda. This gas to Asia. is particularly the case due to India’s serious reservations about TAPIP passing through China Pakistan and risks associated with it (12). The Gwadar-Chabahar contest is a reflection Therefore, it is anticipated that India would of the broader rivalry between China and

11 www.arabiangcis.org India for hegemony in Asia. As such, the Chinese Navy can bypass the Indian and strategic importance of the two emerging US navies in the Indian Ocean and avoid the ports is better understood in the context Strait of Malacca in case of any potential of the Indo-Chinese rivalry in the Indian blockade by the US Navy. In short, access Ocean, Afghanistan, and Central Asia; China’s to Gwadar will further strengthen the China- alliance with and support of Pakistan; Indo- Pakistan position against India. China border disputes; and the two powers’ The economic advantage of Gwadar for never-ending thirst for natural resources. China and Pakistan could equal its strategic While India’s plans for Chabahar are in the importance. Gwadar is developed with a view early stages of implementation, China’s to transform it into a major commerce hub, plans to develop Gwadar as a major deep especially for exports of Chinese goods to seaport - equipped with an airport as well as the Middle East, Europe, and Africa and for industrial, commercial, and naval facilities - imports of goods and energy supplies needed have proceeded for more than a decade and to fuel the growing Chinese economy. Most are in an advanced stage. The next phase is of the oil imported by China and Pakistan to connect the port to Western China through comes from the Middle East in close proximity a network of roads, railways, and pipelines to Gwadar. Upon its completion, the Gwadar planned under the massive 47$ billion CPEC port is expected to serve as the key conduit project. Although it has not officially reacted, for energy shipments via pipelines to Western China, like its proxy Pakistan, considers the China, thus ensuring greater energy security. Chabahar Agreement as a direct challenge to China’s plans and activities in Gwadar have CPEC and China’s naval facilities in Gwadar. alarmed India and are of concern to Washington Gwadar is the ultimate strategic prize for such as well. In a report on Pakistan published by massive Chinese investment in Pakistan under the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis CPEC. It will give China a major beachhead in Delhi, India sees a direct threat from the on the Indian Ocean close to the Strait of Chinese presence in Gwadar. It states that Hormuz, “effectively making [China] a two- the “ being so close to the Strait ocean power,” in the words of Claude Rakisits, of Hormuz also has implications for India as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. (14) it would enable Pakistan to exercise control Once finished, it will have dual-use civilian- over energy routes. It is believed that Gwadar military facilities including a naval base for will provide Beijing with a facility to monitor Chinese warships and submarines as well US and Indian naval activity in the Persian as a listening post to monitor the US and Gulf and Arabian Sea, respectively, as well Indian naval moves in the Arabian Sea and as any future maritime cooperation between Indian Ocean. Given its commanding view India and US.”(15) Given such perceptions, of the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar can be used the Chabahar-Gwadar contest will continue by the Chinese navy to threaten or blockade for the foreseeable future because there is that narrow waterway should hostilities erupt no end in sight for the Indo-Chinese rivalry with the US or India. Through direct overland in Asia. pipeline access to the Indian Ocean, the Like India’s plans in Chabahar, China’s designs

12 www.arabiangcis.org in Gwadar also face a major hurdle in the threat. As noted in the unclassified diplomatic widespread Baluch insurgency in Pakistani cable mentioned earlier, “Indeed, Gwadar is Baluchistan. Referring to the Gwadar-Chabahar important: not for what it is today, but for contest and security situation in Pakistani what it will indicate about Beijing›s intentions Baluchistan, an unclassified diplomatic in the coming years and decades.” (17) The cable to the US Department of State, dated main US concern is that Gwadar, when December 2015 ,31, reported: and if connected to China, could give it “Gwadar would serve to check India›s own potential strategic and economic advantage strategic ambitions, as Islamabad leverages in the region. Washington’s threat perception Beijing against New Delhi. The problem is reflects its position as a superpower with that these are all long-range plans -- and overwhelming naval superiority over China dreams. They conflict with messy ground- for the foreseeable future. level realities. Visiting Gwadar for a week in The US also supports the Chabahar Agreement 2008, I was struck not only by how isolated with some reservation about India’s investment it was, between pounding sea and bleak in Iran. As the only counterweight to China desert, but how unstable was the region of in Asia, a huge emerging market, and the Baluchistan, which lies immediately beyond largest democracy in the world, India is the port in all landward directions. Ethnic seen by the US as a natural strategic ally in Baluchi rebel leaders told me that they countering China’s ambitions in Asia. Pakistan’s would never permit roads and pipelines to alliance with China and its destabilizing role be built there, until their grievances with the in Afghanistan are other major factors shifting Pakistani government in faraway Islamabad US policies toward closer ties with India. In were settled. The security situation is indeed this context, the Chabahar corridor is seen fraught with peril. The Chinese know this. They as beneficial to the US interests for offsetting know that a pipeline network from Gwadar China’s 47$ billion Gwadar Corridor and for into Central Asia and China must await the opening a new trade route to Afghanistan political stabilization of Afghanistan -- and whose economic and political stability is Pakistan, too. Until such a day, Gwadar, important to the US. In the words of Adam while a potentially useful coaling station V. Larkey, a South Asia expert, “The massive for a budding Chinese navy, constitutes, in Gwadar project reveals China’s regional power essence, a road to nowhere.” (16) play. There is no comparison in scale and intent between China’s role in Gwadar and India’s in Chabahar, but the Americans are The US broadly shares India’s concerns pleased that India is pushing back against over Chinese naval presence and activities the Chinese expansionist mindset…” (18) in Gwadar and the threat it could pose to The Obama administration has expressed the Strait of Hormuz and shipping lines in support for India in spite of strong objections the Arabian Sea. But unlike Delhi which sees by some US senators who are critical about an immediate threat, Washington looks at Indian investments in Iran under the Chabahar China’s actions in Gwadar as a long-term accord. As testified earlier this month by the

13 www.arabiangcis.org Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia on the ground in Chabahar and Gwadar Nisha Desai Biswal before the US Senate reveal a different story, as described before. Foreign Relations Committee, “For India Behind the scenes, their strategists are to be able to contribute to the economic busy planning their next moves and that is development of Afghanistan, it needs access where Baluchistan’s future is debated. So that it does not readily have across its land far the status quo is preferred, but events boundary. And India is seeking to deepen its on the ground and the dynamics of their energy relationship with the Central Asian rivalries may change and dictate a different countries and looking for roads that would course of action that may eventually lead to facilitate that…” Biswal, however, assured independence for Baluchistan. the senators that the US administration has taken up their concerns and has been “very The Baluch International Campaign clear with the Indians what our security The Chabahar Agreement, along with the concerns have been…” (19) Gwadar Corridor, has boosted the drive by Baluch nationalists to internationalize the The Baluchistan Card Baluchistan case in an effort to attract regional Consequently, the Indo-Chinese competition and international support for an independent over Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, state. The issue of the two ports has elevated is expected to intensify further after their the profile of Baluchistan among Arabian completion. The major factors driving the Gulf states, Western capitals, and certainly competition are the growing Indo-Chinese India and Afghanistan. As an example, and American-Chinese rivalries in Asia and there is an increasing awareness in the US the Indian Ocean and the rising tensions in about the Baluch and Baluchistan as well as the South China Sea between the US and growing calls for an independent Baluchistan China. It is this geopolitical dynamic that has in some influential circles in Washington. forced Baluchistan and its two ports into their The issue of Chabahar and Gwadar was strategic calculations. The three powers see one of the main concerns raised during The Baluchistan and its geostrategic significance Baluchistan Hearings held for the first time as an important part of the balance of power by the United States Congress in February equations in Asia and the Indian Ocean. 2012. This historical event (in which the author They are playing the Baluchistan card to testified) played a key role in publicizing and safeguard their interests and to advance internationalizing the Baluch cause. Equally their plans against their rivals. important is a Resolution pending in the US The US and India find themselves, more or Congress recognizing the rights of the Baluch less, on the same side that is supporting and calling for an independent Baluchistan. the Chabahar corridor and countering the Although opposed by the US Department of Chinese moves in Gwadar. None of the State, the Resolution, if approved, carries three powers, however, has taken an official great moral and political weight in promoting stand on Baluchistan, at least not in their the Baluch cause in the US and would set a public pronouncements. But their actions precedent for other Western powers to follow.

14 www.arabiangcis.org As part of their international campaign against India and China, respectively. After all, the Iran and Pakistan, Baluch nationalists have Baluch are the rightful owners of the ports. expressed a strong desire to provide the US As mentioned, restoring Baluch control and Navy with access and bases in Chabahar and sovereignty over these strategic ports is one Gwadar in exchange for US support for an of the main demands of Baluch nationalists independent Baluchistan. Accordingly, they in both Iran and Pakistan. have tried to make the case that the Baluch interests coincide with those of the U.S. at this juncture of history for several reasons. First, the US has reservations about Indian investment in Chabahar and is opposed to Chinese naval bases in Gwadar, issues that are of major concern to the Baluch as well. Second, the security of shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz could be endangered Conclusion: Prospects by Iranian militarization of Chabahar and The Indo-Iranian project in Chabahar is coastal Baluchistan, a major preoccupation of considered a win-win for India, Iran, and the Iranian Baluch as well. Third, the Baluch Afghanistan. But its implementation faces oppose the gas pipeline project for carrying serious challenges and its success is far Iranian gas to Pakistan, a position in line from assured. The first impediment is the with US policies and economic sanctions rising insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan. imposed on Iran. Fourth, the Baluch also The Sunni Baluch have repeatedly attacked support the US policies against the growing Iranian forces and installations in and around Iranian hegemony in the Arabian Gulf and Chabahar. The second challenge is the the threat it poses to US allies in the region. chronic instability in Afghanistan which is Finally, Baluchistan and Afghanistan are used a party to the Chabahar Agreement. The by the Iranian and Pakistani military and prospect that the Chabahar corridor could intelligence services to shelter and support free Afghanistan from dependency on Gwadar Afghan and other jihadist groups in and Karachi could prompt Pakistan to restore their continuing attacks against American, the Taliban to stop the project. Third, there is NATO, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. a possibility that the US and other Western To counter this threat as the US prepares countries could re-impose their sanctions to withdraw from Afghanistan, it may be in case Iran violates its obligation under necessary at some point for the U.S. and the nuclear deal signed last year. Such a Afghan governments to support Baluch scenario would change Indian calculations nationalists who espouse secular values. and participation in the project. Fourth, given The Baluch perspective and position on the rising tensions between Saudi Arabia and Chabahar and Gwadar ports is certain to Iran, any Arab-Iranian conflict in the Arabian affect the development of the two ports as Gulf is bound to affect the project negatively. major economic and strategic corridors by

15 www.arabiangcis.org REFERENCES (1) Hosseinbor, M. H. (1984). Iran and Its Nationalities: the Case of Baluch Nationalism. Karachi: Pakistani Adab Publications, 4042-. (2) Curzon, G. N. (1966). Persia and the Persian Question. London: Frank Gass & Co, 225. (3) Gupta, R. (2016, June 13). Iran, India, and Chabahar: Recalling the Broader Context. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5060. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/fP7q4p (4) Gulati, Monish. (2016, June 11). India-Iran Agreement on Chabahar is a Strategic Opportunity – Analysis. Review. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/nlMsjj (5) Ibid. (6) Bearak, M. & Murphy, B. (2016, May 24). To Sidestep Pakistan, India Embraces an Iranian Port. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/JATKAW (7)Hughes, Lindsay. (2016, April 26). Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar. Future Directions International. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/P7HH4J (8) Ibid. (9) Ibid. (10) Gupta, R. (2016, June 13). Iran, India, and Chabahar: Recalling the Broader Context. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5060. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/fP7q4p (11) Kugelman, Michael. (2015, August 5). Examining the Implications of the Indo-Iranian Chabahar Port Deal. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/about-dw/profile/s-30688 (12) Hughes, Lindsay. (2016, April 26). Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar. Future Directions International. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/P7HH4J (13) Ibid. (14) Rakisits, Claude. (Fall 2015). A Path to the Sea: China’s Pakistan Plan. World Affairs. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/pfAotd (15) Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2011, Jan. 7). A Tale of Two Ports: Gwadar and Chabahar Display Chinese-Indian Rivalry in the Arabian Sea. YaleGlobal Online. Retrieved from http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/tale-two-ports (16) UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-201420439- Doc No. C05785443 Date: 122015/31/. Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/6383Sent (17) Ibid. (18) Choudhury, Uttara. (2016, May 26). US Backs India-Iran Chabahar Port Deal as It Outflanks China-Pakistan Gwadar Project. First Post. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/c8Ysjm (19) Ibid.

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