4 ' Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002
“ my I an CENTLALINTELMGENCE AGENCY Q PRIORITY Intelligemae Infonnaii-en Cable W W2?
'\‘\ ¢\ PACEE 11 U513? 1 ;;x+E/M 5.; "o~M;2/;;¢"'*'o*;;='ga.;;""*12;""'I‘;;4m" éJI{?§“”I.T~§?"““E115;/T~i»1E§& o1;:r¢"*~os,;, SDO “@~,;f"" GER FBIS DCSE IRS AND S _ __ DD/I___4__ §XQ___¢_
This mamzml contains information afleeting the Notional Defense or the United states wi\;1u1n the memnmg or the Espionage J‘.2‘(>€i's, I- me I Secs 793 and 794 the transmiaaon or revelation 0! which In any manner to an unauthorized person "Is prphiblted by lawe
fl J“ v
M M‘, im '2‘ WV 4'fl\_\?,V1'\1j‘\IJ‘\
lav:/m|q\':1v$ir\Q M» I ewzflwmfizqraqvym _ I1 —i$B n DH? 9 FEBRUARY I968 COUNTRY U) CD JIH VIETNAM OOI 29 JANUARY - 6 FEERUARY 1968» OUBJECT VIEWS OF VIEHINGPRISONERS OF WAR IN PLEIKU ON OBJECTIVE$ OF THE TET ATTACKS, THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES HAD THE ATTACKS SUCCEEDED IN PLEIKU, REACTION OF THE POPULACE TO THE ATTACKS, PLANS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT, FUTURE NFLSV PLANS, AND POSSIBLE REACTION OF THE NFLSV TO POSSIBLE MILITARY DEFEAT» HCQ 3.3(h)(2) SOURCE 3.3(h)(2) A. EHAN VAN KINH (AKA KINHLANHI, AN ETHNIC soutn VIETNAMESE NATIVE OF HOAI MY VILLAGE, HOAI NHON DISTRICT, 4 -Q Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 0 who who 00---u Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ‘N l+7,+27 3.?(c) PAGE OF ¥' PM-~1ES if .1. " L~U:N=F-I-=Q=F_~fl‘;~T-I-‘»§A:»t_, \.T~§1lL» r¢M=flflw§i2@) L‘°i*3@*@f?e‘L“.Qi%‘1.1Q:..Z,/‘YZ....._. _ __;e-.....,,_,,,- _., e .._-,,,,:....,.~.-..> .._ ‘ ...... -M-..<.., '_.>._ -._ ,_.,.= __._ ._1_L I _; _ _ ;_J;_, > _ 3.3(h)(2) '%' ‘raw A _. Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ¢ """ ' ' ‘ ' ‘ '""”'""" “ " ' ' “Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 35¢» PAGE :5 OF 17 PAGES ,—C~9-N-F TB-EH—TIA—L ccntrols) (claaaqlcattonz (dlnem i ______3jMhX2) 1- ASKED WHAT THEY WERE TOLD WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TET COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH BEGAN ON 29 JANUARY 1968, THE PRISONERS ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS: 3jMhX2) A. ‘THE MISSION WAS T0 \ (1) ATTACK AND DEFEAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND ALLIED ARMED FORCES; (2) ENCOURAGE TO JOIN THE REVOLUTION ALL THOSE ELEMENTS WHO HAVE NOT UP TO THIS POINT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE REVOLUTION, SUCH AS THE LARGE CIVILIAN MASSES IN THE CITIES, AND ALL OTHER GROUPS WHO FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER HAVE BEEN LIMITED OR COMPLETELY RESTRICTED FROM ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE REVOLUTION; (3) ESTABLISH FAVORABLE POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR ALL THOSE ELEMENTS WHO ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IN THE PARTICULAR ATTACK ON PLEIKU THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO ENTER —€=O=N=F—I—D=E—N—T—I-A=L Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 '"r* nu“ I . 0 no Bl-Illtu . Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 IN #7427 "*5‘°’ PAGE 1+ QF 17’ PAGES " ~~-~~ I ~ »~ 0 - T - .\ w W .1 *\\‘I..‘\ " :"lI'“‘ \.>__ ae_co¢Et | __\\;w 8? _ =m PLEIKU AND. AFTER SECURING THE AREA; OHGANZZE ALL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE CITY TO AGITATE ACTIVELY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UUALITION GQVERNEMENTO THE OBJECTIVE 3jMhX2) OF THE COUNTRY"WIDE ATTACKS WAS TO LIBERATE ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM. IN THE CASE OF PLEIKU, THIS WOULD BE DONE BY THE LIBERATION AHMED FORCES ENTEHING PLEIKU, STOPPTNO ALL TRAFFIC, AND STAGING MASS DEMONSTRATIONS. 0. 3jMhX2) T T ‘AFTER THE INITIAL ATTACK, WAS TO PARTICIPATE IN DEMONSTRATIONS ALONG HIGHWAY 19 AND THAT HE WAS TO HELP LEAD THE PEOPLE INTO PLEIKU CITY» fine DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD T OCCUR WHILE THE LIBERATION ARMED FOHCES WERE LIBERATING PLEIKU AND ALL OF VIETNAM. D. THE 3jMhX2) \ \ OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACKS IN PETKU AND MANY OTHER PROVINCES WAS TO LIBEHATE BOTH MILITARY REGION 5 AND ALL THE REST OF SOUTH VIETNAM“ WV WW ’ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ‘V -v* » 47L+27 35¢» PAGE 5 ©F '17‘PAGE$ 3jMhX2) THE OBJECT IN LAUNCHING SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM WAS TO (1) LIBERATE ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM; (2) UPSET THE THIEU"KY GOVERNMENT, AND (5) ESTABLISH A COALITION GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING ALL SECTIONS OF VIETNAM. A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM ARE VERY CLOSE, IT IS REQUIRED THAT SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE ITS OWN GOVERNMENT FOR THE PRESENT. 2. ASKED WHAT THEIR FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES WERE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDERS, THE PRISONERS REPLIED: A. THE PARTICULAR MISSION 3jMhX2) \ \ OF THE H-15 BATTALION (BN) AFTER THE ATTACK WAS TO ENTER AND SECURE THE AREA IN PLEIKU WHERE THE GOVERNMENT OFFICES WERE LOCATED. THE H-15 BN, AFTER STATIONING ITSELF AND SECURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA, WAS THEN TO CONDUCT A SEARCH FOR ANY REMAINING POCKETS OF RESISTANCE. KINH AND HIS BATTALION WERE THEN TO WAIT FOR FURTHER ORDERS OR UNTIL A COALITION GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED. Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ' _lF‘h‘vI\V_ ~ . .. . U~0Q "Q"----~ tllllnvno ,. , ,. , Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 [S L|.1L|') 7 35¢» PAGE 6 CF17 PAGE$ —||—C~9-H-'F~I—B-E~N—T—I-15T=-L A (clu-flfleativn) (di-mm cmmols) ______“____L Q‘ M v [:::::::i:i::::]DN THE NDHNTNE EDLEDNTNG THE 3jMhX2) ATTACK, KY wAs To PARTICIPATE TN EHTNGTNE TNTD ELETHD DTTY ALL OF THE PEOPLE IN suHH0uND1Ns, NEAH»ET AREAS AND SEND THEN To vAH10us COLLECTION POINTS THROUGHOUT THE CITY WHERE POLITICAL CADRES WOULD EXPLAIN To THEN THE REASON FOR THETH LIBERATION. FOLLOWING THE POLITICAL LECTURES, THE COMMANDER WOULD AHH1vE TN THE CITY TO TssuE FURTHER ORDERS TO THE LIBERATION FORCES AND THE PEOPLE. c.[::::::::::::::}NsTHucT10Ns NERETD eo To PHov1NcE 3;yhX2) HEADQUARTERS AFTER THE ATTACK AND TNTTTATE THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. CONCURRENTLY, HE wAs To DDDHDTNATE WITH THE LTBEHATTDN ARMED FORCES AND THE STAFF OF PLEIKU PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS ON PLANS To CELEBRATE THE LIBERATION. D. []FDLLOw1Ne THE ATTACH,[::::::::::::::131%hX2) TO so TO THE OUTLYING AREAS OF PLEIKU AND EXHORT THE PEOPLE To coHE INTO PLEIKU,WHERE THEY NEHE To AHEND POLITICAE LECTURES. C9—N-—FIB—ENTIA—L “b '41!’ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ' ' " ‘“ I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 wr ‘P’ IN Ll-7L+27 s.5(¢) PAGE 7 OF17 PAGES ‘° E.-U=N=‘F-I-D=E—N=T—I=19<-L A (clauqloctioiu) T (dtssem cantrols) - _ Y V _ v W J" V __r___ T Fwy“. H I ‘FOLLOWING THE ATTACH 3‘NhX2) WAS T0 MEET WITH A NUMBER OF COMRADES AND PEOPLE TO ORGANIZE POLITIC/11 MEFTINQS. HE WAS THEN TO ORGANIZE THE WOMAN'S) YOUTH, AND FARMERS’ GROUPS AND INITIATE POLITICAL LECTURES FOR THEM IN‘ WHICH IT WOULD BE EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE REVOLUTION WAS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN VIETNAM, UNDER THE VIETNAMESE AND THE MONTAGNARDS, AND ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY BRING ABOUT REUNIFICATION WITH NORTH VIETNAM. 5. ASKED IF THEY WERETOLD AND IF THEY BELIEVED THAT THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN ANY GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GVN AND THE AMERICAN FORCES, THEY ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS: 2 33(h)(. POLITICAL CADRES HAD ) ‘ T-OLD HIM AND HE BELIEVED Ti-AT AFTER LIBERATION ARMED FORCES HAD ENTERED THE CITY OF PLEIKU AND THE FIGHTING HAD ENDED, THE POPULACE WOULD EMERGE FROM THEIR HOUSES, STAGE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS, AND PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETINGS WHICH WERE TO BE HELD. . B _ HF 3.3(h)(2) WAS OFSIMILAR MIND PERSONALLY, THAT 9% PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE s1NcE§ELy WISHED T0 BE LIBERATED AND THAT WHEN A LARGE sonv - _c_o=u_F- —I—D=F—N—T-T—A=L N0-E0251-eN_|;1-ssa=4_ I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 Approved for Release: 2019/04/1T7 002800002 IN ,L;7'L}27L Esun \ PAGE 8 OF 17 PAGES o_€"~O=i8=F-I—=D—-FN==T-T_=-=A=L A We wmflwis) _ _, ___M_,__V__ W2, W____,_ __ _ (elrwigcatwn) (giwm 0, _ I OF LIBEHATION FORCES WERE PRESENT, THESE 9O PERCENT WOULD JOIN THE REVOLUTION. AS TO WHY HE AND MANY SOLDIERS BELIEVED THE PEOPLE WOULD JOIN IN AN UPRISING, HE SAID MANY PEOPLE, EVEN THOUGH UNARMED, JOINED THE TROOPS MARCHING INTO THE CITY. THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT THE LIBERATION ARMED FORCES WOULD SUCCEED. FHE PEOPLE WOULD 3jMhX2) PARTICIPATE IN THE LIBERATION OF PLEIKU. AT THE TIME HE BEGAN HIS MARCH INTO THE CITYHE BELIEVED THAT IF THE BATTLE WAS INDECISIVE, THOSE PEOPLE MARCHING WITH THE TROOPS WOULD BE KILLED OR CAPTURED BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS. \FOLLOw1Ne 3jMhX2) THE LIBERATION OF PLEIKU THE PEOPLE WERE TO ENTER THE UITYQ HE HAD NO IDEA HOW MANY PEOPLE WOULD PARTICIPATE. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WANTED VERY MUCH TO BE LXBERATEDW ‘WAS TOLD BY A POLITICAL CADRE 3jMhX2) THAT FOLLOWING THE LIBERATION OF PLEIKU THE POHLACE WOULD BE ORGANIZED FOR A "CELEBRATION" AND BROUGHT INTO THE CITY. IN HIS OPINION, THESUPPORT OF THE POPULACE DEPENDED ON THE SUCCESS OF THE LIBERATIONO C-0-N— F—I—D—E—N-1 —1—A=L iw \-|r Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 A I “Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 I ‘.1 ‘,4 I ‘+7427 Esun T PAGE 9 OFI7 PAGES u—€-6—H—F-I-B-E-NAT I—A—L ._.,_,L¢l¢'£¢¢¢"<>g) ~ fdiwm wntwh) ,0 ____,< _‘__,__Wvw_,_, j ___"_, ,_v_,‘___,__,W_Wfi_ ____,____‘______W____ -1 . 4. ASKED WHAT ACTUAL SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED FROM THE POPULACE, THEY REPLIED: THE PEOPLE GAVE NO SUPPORT, ACTIVE 31%hX2) A. [::::::::::::::] OR PASSIVE, T0 THE LIBERATION FORCES, INSOFAR AS HE WAS AWARE. HE BELIEVED THE PEOPLE STAYED IN THEIR H0usEs BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID OF ALLIED ARTILLERY AND AIRSTRIKES. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WERE AFRAID OF THE LIBERATION FORCES. 3IMhX2)- B. THE . TOWARD PLEIKU UNTIL THE TIME HE WAS CAPTURED, ABOUT A THREE— AND'ONE-HALF-HOUR PERIOD, NONE OF THE PEOPLE LEFT THEIR HOUSES UNLESS SPECIFICALLY CALLED UPON BY THE VC TO DO SO. EVEN THEN, THEY RETURNED TO THEIR HOUSES AS SOON AS THE LIBERATION FORCES HAD PASSED. THEY WERE/POLITE, BUT THEY WERE ALSO VERY AFRAID OF BEING KILLED. ‘IT WAS NECESSARY FOR 31%hX2) THE VC ARMED FORCES TO BE PRESENT IN A LARGE BODY TO GIVE THE PEOPLE CONFIDENCE. HIS GROUP OF ONLY FOUR OR FIVE PERSONS II!/XS Ol_ITN?.,1MRFRED BY THE PEOPLE, SO IT COULD NOT FORCE. THE PEOPLE TO JOIN THE DEMONSTRATIONS. C—$N—l--l—D:l:—N— T—I-A=L A Approved f0rEReTee'se: 2019/A04E)17 002800002 I T»-....‘. .. . — ---..:— A--T»-- -....,.w»<- ‘YP>‘ Q. I‘-4 ., --‘~ ____,_ A '_ _ . __ _,__..¢ H. —_ __ _ 7--.-. ; __, __._ _“_;_-wE_,_-, V_ _:______I _ , V ' Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 IN LUQ27 _ s.5(¢) a—€-9-H-F~I~B—ENT I_A—L _ T._ m¢@;-;g,nc¢¢1_<_:;’»_) rrmmn controls) ._ ,_ - _ .. T W lilflflunflb .,...~.,.., V ETA’? PEOPLE WERE AFRAID OF LEAVING THEIR 3-3(h)(_23 HOUSES, EVEN THOUGH THE CADRES THEMSELVES DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OH NOT VICTORY HAD BEEN WON, THEY EXHORTED THE PEOPLE TO $1. LEAVE THEIR HOUSES BY SAYING THAT PLEIKU HAD BEEN LIBERATED. IF THAT DID NOT WORK, THE CADRES FORCED THE PEOPLE OUT TO $1 JOIN DEMONSTRATIONS. DURING THE FOUR HOURS TROM WAS |‘._‘ MARCHING, HE SAW FROM 155 TO ZOO PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN DEMONSTRATIONS. HE WAS AWARE THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ESCAPED AND RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES BUT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY. D.£]THE PEOPLE GAVE NO ASSISTANCE, BUT 3.3(h)(2) HE WAS SURE THAT FOLLOWING THE LIBERATION OF THE CITY, THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE JOINED THE REVOLUTION AND GIVEN ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. E. NO ONE GAVE HIS GROUP HELP. 3§MhX2) THE FIGHTING WAS STILL GOING ON, AND THE PEOPLE WERE AFRAID TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES. _ 5. ASKED IF THEY WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH AT KHE SANH OR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ), THE PRISONERS REPLIED: C9-N—FIB—ENTIA—L N9—F9R'E-I-6-N—B-I-S5-EH- mv ww Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ‘ " " " '" ‘ ' " " “Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 002800002 .,.. -w|N ..L+7I+27.. 3.5(c) PAGE 11>0F, PAGES _ 17 ’ H5 (cmsmwrwy @_m=»fw-rwl-L. __.- Q __ _ ,___,__ T, __w__ l 3‘xhX2) AT [:::::::::::::::]HE KNEW THAT ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM WAS TO BE ATTACKED, BUT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING CONCERNING SPECIFIC ATTACKS IN THE QUANG TRI~THUA THIEN (TRI-THIEN)/ DMZ AREA. B.[1HE WAS TOLD THAT MAJOR ATTACKS 3TNhX2) WOULD BE LAUNCHED IN THE HUE AND DMZ AREAS WHILE PLEIKU WAS BEING ATTACKED. HE BELIEVED THAT THE TARGETS OF THE ATTACK IN THE PLEIKU AREA WERE THE U.S 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND II CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND THAT THE ATTACK WAS PLANNED TO PREVENT THESE FORCES IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS FROM REINFORCING THE NORTHERN AREA. IN HIS OPINION, THE FOOD AND SUPPLY SITUATION IN HUE WERE MORE FAVORABLE THEN IN PLEIKU AND THEREFORE THE NORTH MIGHT HAVE MORE IMPORTANCE THAN THE WEST IN THE EYES OE THE MILITARY REGION. C. £lHE WAS AWARE THAT SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS 3.3(h)(2) WOULD BE LAUNCHED NATIONWIDE, BUT HAD NOT HEARD THAT SPECIFIC ATTACKS WOULD BE LAUNCHED IN THE TRI—THIEN/DMZ AREA. ' ' ' , - ‘ . . ’.‘-w\.:.'i€\‘ _ 1 . W Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 "'-- -V ..~~ -- - \ 0 00 pQni|ua¢ . Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 IN 47L+27 35¢» PAGE '12 OF 1 7 PAGES ' C 9—H—FI B-E—H T I_ A—L (class! cation . diuem ccmtrola _ .1 ,2 r 2 EEE E, __EEWEmE. . ".@ M D. Tf??i::::::::::]HE wAs NDT ANAHE, PHTDH To BEING ggyhxg) CAPTURED, OF ANY SPECIFIC LOCATIONS THAT NEHE TO BE ATTACKED. E. [:::::::::::::::]HE wAs TOLD THAT ALL OF s0uTH 3;yhX2) VIETNAM WOULD BE ATTACKED; HOWEVER,THE TRI-THIEN AREAS OF THE DMZ WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. s. ASKED IF THEY NEHE AWARE OF ANY EFFORT TO ORGANIZE AN "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY“ As ACOALYHON HovENENT I0 NEGCTIATE NTTH THE NATIONAL LTEEHATTDN FRONT (NFLSV), THE PHTsoNEHs REPLIED: 34NhX2) A. [1 HE HAD NOT HEAH>0F ANY PLAN FOR A COALITIDN sovEHNNENT, OR OF AN ALLIANCE ESTABLISHED To ORGANIZE A COALITION eovEHNNENT. HE wAs TOLD BY CADRES THATA s;xhN2) B.[:::::::::::::] COALITION GOVERNMENT MIGHT REPLACE THE NFLSV AND BECOME THE SOUTH v1ETNANEsE GOVERNMENT. sixhxz) c. [lHE HAD HEARD THAT A POLITICAL COALITION OF soHTs wAs T0 BE FORMED FOLLOWING THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE LIBERATION ARMED FORCES AND NATIONALIST TROOPS. HE KNEW OF NO PLANS c0NcEHN1Ne EITHER AN ALLIANCE OR A GOVERNMENT BY COALITION. A _L-O=N=F-I—B-"E-N—T~I A—L ‘Y WI!‘ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 - CV . qpfl '»#7427 3.5(C) PAGE 13 OF :17‘ uses 0 ' .%'°"' °°'“'°“? __ , . .. :-r.~‘uqfIr;r~. ~-an Ce Te _ D. 3 3(h)(2) [:::::::::::::] HE HAD HEARD THAT THEEE WOULD BE A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE WHICH WOULD COORDINATE WITH THE NFLSV TO SETTLE THE WAR. E. 3 3(h)(2) El HE WAS TOLD BY POLITICAL CADRES IHAT POSSIBLY, FOLLOWING VICTORY, A COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ORGANIZED IN ORDER TO CARRY ON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NFLSV AND EVENTUALLY TO REUNIFY NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. IN HIS OPINION A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR EVEN A FRONT WOULD BE IDEAL FOR ESTABLISHING PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR FRONT WOULD HAVE THE PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE OF NOT BEING CONSIDERED AN ORGAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AS THE NFLSV IS. A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR FRONT WOULD APPEAL PARTICULARLY TO THOSE ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY WHO MOST STRONGLY OBJECT TO A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT; A COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO PARTICIPATE FREELY IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRSO 7. ASKED IF THEY WERE AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR FOLLOW—UP STEPS IN THE CURRENT ' STRATEGI, THE PRISONERS ANSWERED: 33 (hxz) A¢[:::::::::::::::] IN THE EVENT THAT souTH VIETNAM IS NOT COMPLETELY LIBERATED, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NFLSV WILL Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002|N I L+7_L*27 s.5(¢) PAGE 1LT OF 17 PAGES ‘ ‘.11-'--*. I ‘ _ A _i_ ‘> ,-_‘ ._ . 7 9 I --.~v I v L. !' I I . U §‘/~ _ __“___ (classification) (discern mntrobL * {W _=m_:L_ ‘ -- ~- -'b|A \_ .. -- \> . .. .-. . , REMAIN UNCHANGED AND WILL BDNTINME To BE PuEsuED BY METH0Ds MsED PREVIOUSLY. THE NFLSV WILL NDT FADE ANAY, BUT, IF NECESSARY, NILL NITHDHAN I0 ITS BAsEs AND CONTINUE THE STHUGG LE ALL c0MMANDERs AND SOLDIERS HNDM THAT IN ALL AREAS AND NITH ALL UNITS THERE WILL BE TIMEs OF TDTAL VICTORY AND TIMEs OF sMALL DEFEATS AND soMETIMEs THERE WILL EvEN BE LARGE DEFEATS. BUT T0 Acc0MPLIsH THE REVOLUTION ALL THAT Is NECESSARY IS THE DETERMINATION To suocEED. B. [1 ADDDHDINB TO HIs POLITICAL DADHE, 3.3(h)(2) STRATEGY WOULD c0NTINuE To BE THE sAME AS BEFORE THE ATTACKS IN THE EvENT SOUTH vIETNAM IS NDT DDMPLETELY LIBEHATED. THE POLITICAL DADRE sAID THAT THIs WAS POSSIBLE BEcAusE ONLY ONE-THIRD OF THE LIBEHATIDN ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT TWO-THIRDS WERE sTILL IN RESERVE. IN ADDITION, LARGE AM0uNTs OF AssIsTANcE WERE BEING RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND CONSEQUENTLY THE NFLSV WOULD HAVE AMPLE SUPPLIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARMED FORCES 0NcE HAD ONLY EBMM AND 81/82MM MORTARS FOR HEAvY-MEAP0Ns SUPPORT AND Now wITH FOREIGN AID THEY HAvE ROCKETS AND VERY LARGE MORTARS EvEN AT BATTALLION LEVEL . —C9—N—FIB—ENTIA-L N6-F9R'EI'GN—B'I'5'5'EH— ll ‘Iv ~I~' Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ' "' '" " """"'"" ’ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 A _r . _,N ‘uyuzy 35¢» rAes15,or171nAs:s ‘ ‘ ' ‘ — I ll-L —'- “" _-—"1"""""‘@4 ‘*- L 0. K::::::]oIRER THAN THE LIRERAILDM OF VIETNAM, RE 3.3(h)(2) HAD HEARD or NO PLANS CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIVES. IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS OF soME SOLDIERS REGARDING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF PLEIKU wERE NOT LIBERATED, A POLITICAL CADRE AMSMERED BY RIDICULING 3.3(h)(2) 1RE s0LD1ERs. [::::::::]N0 IDEA wRAT THE NFLSV WOULD DO IN THE EVENT PLEIKU WAS NOT LIBERATED. D. FDLITIDAL cADREs SAY THAT IN THE 3.3(h)(2) EVENT COMPLETE VICTORY 1s NOT ACHIEVED, STRATEGY w1LL CONTINUE T0 BE ATTACKS ON THE CITY AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN ALL URBAN AREAs, AND THE CONTINUED REINFORCEMENT AND BUILD-UP OF THE LIBERATION ARMED FDRcEs so THAT THEY CAN ANNIHILATE THE GVN/ALLIED ARMED FORCES. E. NFLSV CONSIDERS THAT IT 3.3(h)(2) [:::::::::::::::]THE CAN SUFFER LOSSES DR INDECISIVE BATTLES AT A LOCAL LEvEL WITHOUT LOSING GENERALLY, CONSEQUENTLY IT CONSIDERS THAT WHILE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE T0 SUFFER A LOSS AT THE LOCAL LEvEL IN ONE PARTICULAR AREA, THIS w0uLD NOT CONSTITUTE A LOSS ovER AU” 0R AT ALL, BECAUSE VICTORIES IN DIRER LocAL AREAS MAY COMPENSATE. '€=0=N=F- I'=D=E—N—T— I —A=L Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 O/-T-'~I'4 .. .v...... \._¢,..-..., .,...¢»~..,....._...~»>-w.-1»<---=....1.-. ‘I141 -- ...... _.¢-.~. _.._...... -..._..~._-._ ...__ .,_,.....»...... ,.---.-W---~» ..-....._....-_-..-M... . -..-.-....v. ~.w....¢~-- 1* --.-.-.-. »\-P-.1-~...... -, - , W. ...».. Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 * IN ’ “W27 35¢» PAGE 15- o:=17‘ mess '—C-9—H—~F~T-B-E~N—%'—T—A-L (classification) _ (dissem contreli) ~ ~- ~*-'--,1.»-< , .. ~ T-\.- 4],. \1¢>'fl .» .., W . 8. ASKED HOW THEY THOUGHT THE NFLSV OR HANOI WOULD EXPLAIN AN INDEOISIVE MILITARY CONCLUSION TO CURRENT MILITARY ACTION, THE PRISONERS REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: A. ‘WHETHER CURRENT MILITARY ACTION 3.3(h)(2) IS DECISIVE OR NOT, THE NFLSV, IF NOT ENTIRELY SUCCESSFUL, WILL MERELY CONTINUE ON WITH THE STRUGGLE NO EXPLANATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY. :~ E.[EEsAHnLEss OF THE RESULTS OF THE 3.3(h)(2) RECENT ATTACKS THE NFLSV WILL NOT ADMIT To LARGE L0ssEs. THE FRONT HAS ALWAYS STATED THAT "TO FIGHT IS TO LOSE MEN". DESPITE LOSSES THE FRONT WILL CONTINUE To FIGHT. EVEN IF '“ THE FRONT HAS TO HEs0HT TO GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TO THE USE OF THE "THHEE ARROWS" TACTIC, IT WILL CONTINUE T0 FIGHT. 3.3(h)(2) c.T::::::1 THE FRONT EXPECTED HEAVY LOSSES, BUT ET REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LOSSES WERE LARGE OR SMALL, THE T FRONT WILL NOT DISSENINATE THE RESULTS OF THE MISSIONS, 3.3(h)(2) ACHIEVED OR NOT. ‘THE FRONT WILL STATE kw THAT FIGHTING WILL CONTINUE AS BEFORE. I —c=e=N=|5-T-né-E-H-T-T-A=L _ N0-|=0R'ErsN—m'ssEM— NT av ‘av ‘I!’ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ‘E‘ I‘ “ ' "“"'_'; " ' Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002 ' ~_," _, . Q7427» afun PAGE OF 17‘. 17 . PAGES (ckulgflon! -__{diue1n controls) " _ _}_=__" -=.=.-7_~ _._-_. -7 —— “I 1 ‘M 0. [:::::::::::::] IF CURRENT FIGHTING IS INDECISIVE 3.3(h)(2) OR EVEN IF THERE IS A LOSS OF SOME KIND, THE FRONT WILL MERELY REPEAT WHAT IT HAS SAID BEFORE: "AN EASY VICTORY COSTS LITTLE “ BLOOD, A DIFFICULT VICTORY COSTS MUCH BLOOD, REGARDLESS, THE RESULT WILL BE VICTORY." I‘! 3.3(h)(2) E. [:::::::::::::::]AN EXPLANATION BY THE FRONT CONCERNING AN INDECISIVE on EVEN A LOSING BATTLE WILL NOT BE NECESSARY, BECAUSE, AS STATED BEFORE, A PARTICULAR LOSS IN A LOCAL AREA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OVER-ALL LOSS. 3.3(h)(2) REPORT CLASS —€=6=N'=F-1-I?-"E-N—T-I-A-L Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02800002