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Political Economy of Growth: An Evaluation of Revenue Department / Administration with Special Focus on District Faisalabad
Faisalabad Submitted to GC University Lahore in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
IN
Political Science
By
Kiran Khurshid
Registration No.
65-GCU-PHD-PS-2008-2011
DEPARTMENT of Political Science, GC UNIVERSITY LAHORE ii
A
Political Economy of Growth: An Evaluation of Revenue Department / Administration with Special Focus on District
Faisalabad
Kiran Khurshid
Registration No.
65-GCU-PHD-PS-2008-2011
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
GC UNIVERSITY LAHORE
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Acknowledgments
After the grace of Allah, first and foremost I am indebted to my supervisor Mr. Khalid Manzoor Butt and the Chairperson of Political Science Department who helped my research put on the track whenever I felt out of my element. There were many hiccups during the long journey to this research completion despite that my supervisor always helped me scale these through his sagacious advice and he was always willing to move his good offices in my support whenever required.
I am also grateful to my alma mater, i.e., GCU to provide me this opportunity to do Ph.D. at my home town in a qualitative manner.
I am thankful to many people who helped me start and complete my research work at GCU and in my personal sphere.
I would not be out of place to acknowledge the contribution of the revenue department at Faisalabad who shared their candid views with me. Among them are Tehsildar Mr.Rana Sajid and stenographer Mr. Zahoorul Haq, who assisted me in collecting vital data of revenue collection. Mr. Yahya Naib Tehsildar, Jaranwala Tehsil for extending his support during my field visits and especially Mr. Iftikhar Gill Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Sadar, Faisalabad for not only extending his valuable assistance but also offering his insight into the phenomenon under research. Besides them, the District Revenue Accounts branch also was ready to oblige me for sake of this research whenever I requested them. For that I am thankful to them.
On a personal note I am grateful to my parents for always encouraging and motivating me to seek more knowledge and for instilling in me an appreciation for out of the box thinking.
Staunch support and motivation of my husband during the last leg of this journey inspired me anew to finish this onerous task. I am grateful to him for his constant prodding and persistent interest in my research.
Lastly, I would like to thank my younger brother Zohaib Khurshid for doing all tedious work for me and for typing my thesis, accompanying me on field tours, doing recordings and taking pictures. He helped me shape up my research work in desired format. For that, I am grateful to him.
May Allah bless them all. viii
Abstract
In the agrarian economy like sub-continent, the land revenue has traditionally remained a major source of revenue collection by the government especially in absence of industrialization. Mughals established the skeleton of the land administration in sub- continent and the colonial regime of Britain later developed muscles on it. Purpose was maximum collection of revenue to bear the expenses of state craft. In order to maximize the potential of wasteland especially in Punjab, the British introduced the most extensive and efficient system of canal irrigation at that time. Huge but hitherto unpopulated and uncultivated tracts of west Punjab now Pakistan were made irrigable by means of digging of a network of canals from Indus River System and by offering lucrative grants of fertile lands to the leading agriculturist classes in east Punjab now India. This scheme opened new vistas for development in plains of five rivers in Punjab and a new socio-economic milieu took birth here by employing the prowess and entrepreneurship of landed gentry from east Punjab.
Not only theses engineering and administrative feats changed the demographic profile as well as subsequent socio-economic and political landscape of Punjab but also greatly enhanced the avenues of land revenue collection. Many new taxes, rents, fees and cesses were introduced under the relevant Acts to be collected from the landowners, peasants and tenants as the case might be. The base of the land revenue widened a great deal and the revenue increased tremendously. This phenomenon of canal colonies was awesome and remains so for many till today. However, the subject matter of present study is the efficiency of the revenue administration and its efficacy in collection of land revenue. For that matter, the district Faisalabad has been selected as area of study first because it was at the heart of the Chenab Colony, the biggest canal colony and secondly the researcher worked there in the revenue department at tehsil and district level and directly imbibed information from the environment and came up with multiple observations on its present working. ix
It has been noticed with grave concern that this erstwhile most productive department that was the mainstay of the provincial revenue receipts has gone to the dogs. Its significance has receded due to emergence of new sources of revenue, e.g., excise and taxation, industry, and a plethora of federal taxes. Despite many efforts and drives to enhance the revenue collection by the BOR, results are not very impressive. Data collected from original sources reflect this dwindling trend carefully hidden behind a thin veneer of financial jugglery. It is interesting to note that the actual demand or target of revenue receipts is either slashed by dividing it into suspension or irrecoverable amounts or under booked or not booked at all. It all leads to under assessment of the revenue demand each year thereby reducing the target of collection on the one hand. On the other hand, during the collection against this target, there appear many loops, snags and leakages.
Many malpractices have taken roots in the revenue department due to lose supervision and control. Quality of HR has also deteriorated. Timely observance of notified schedules of revenue assessment and collection are largely ignored. Professionalism is often being sacrificed in the name of political expediency. Politicization of the revenue department especially at the grass roots level has eroded the chain of command and corroded the norms of service. Currently, the revenue department is in reverse paradigm and standing upside down. Introduction of cosmetic reforms has proven counterproductive. That is why, the need of the hour is the overhauling the revenue department with strong administrative commitment coupled with staunch political will after taking into confidence all the stakeholders.
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Dedication
To my parents
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Table of Contents Page Chapter No Topics No.
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction 2
1.1.1 Statement of the Problem 7
1.1.2 Significance of the Study 8
1.1.3 Research Objectives 8
1.1.4 Sources of Data 9
1.1.5 Research Methodology 9
1.1.6 Data Collection Techniques 10
1.1.7 Structure of the Thesis 13
1.1.8 Citation Style 14
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 16
Chapter 3 Historical Evolution of Land Administration in Punjab 29
3.1 Defining the Land Revenue Administration 30
3.1.1 Explaining the System of Land Revenue Administration in 30 Punjab
3.2 Statutory Framework of Land Administration in Punjab 34
3.3 Historical Evolution of land revenue administration in 37 Punjab
3.3.1 Land Revenue Administration before British 37
3.3.2 Land Administration of Punjab under British Raj 39
43 Colonization Schemes 46 The Colonization Scheme of Chenab Colony xii
47 Branches of the Lower Chenab Canal 48 The Colonization Begins 48 Selection of Colonists Phase 1 (1892): Allotment on Rakh & Mian Ali 49 Branches Phase 2 (1896): Allotment on Jhang & Bhowana 50 Branches Phase 3 (1898): Allotment on Gugera & Burala 51 Branches 51 Distribution of Colonists by Religion and Tribe 52 Square System 52 Units of measurement of Land 52 Killabandior the Square System 53 Village Plan 3.3.3 Land Administration in Post-Colonial Punjab 55
3.3.4 Functions of the Land Revenue Administration 60 a) Revenue Specific Functions 60
b) Miscellaneous Functions 63
An Evaluation of Revenue Collection in District Chapter 4 65 Faisalabad Data Analysis 2001-2013
4.1 Land Revenue Defined 69
4.2 Mechanism of Collection of Land Revenue 71
Selection of Indicators to Evaluate the Performance of 4.3 72 Revenue Department in District Faisalabad
4.4 An Evaluation of Revenue Collection 75
4.4.1 Collection of Water Rate 75
4.4.2 Collection of Agriculture Income Tax (AIT) 88
1. Land Based AIT 88 xiii
2. Income Based AIT 88 4.4.3 Local Rate 98
4.5 A Comparative Analysis of Three Indicators 100
Chapter 5 Suggestions and Recommendations 103
5.1 Structural Variables 106
5.2 Political Variables 108
5.3 Socio-Economic Variables 109
5.4 Miscellaneous Variables 110
5.5 Initiatives Taken By the Government 110
1. Computerization of Land Record Management and 110 Information Systems (LRMIS) 2. Citizens Feedback Model 114
5.6 Recommendations 115
115 1 Improving the Revenue Collection 116 2 Improving the Infrastructure 117 3 Improving the Patwari Culture 119 4 Improving the Quality of Human Resource 120 5 Redefining the Boundaries of Revenue Estates 6 Excluding Urbanized Revenue Estates from 120 Assessment of Land Revenue 121 7 Maintenance of Revenue Record 122 8 Reclaiming State Land from Illegal Occupation 9 Bridging the Disconnect between Revenue, Judiciary 123 and Police 124 10 Depoliticize the Revenue Department Annexures 126
a. Terms & Definitions 127 xiv
b. The Punjab Board Of Revenue Act, 1957 (XI Of 1957) 130
The Punjab Irrigation And Drainage Authority Act, 1997(XI 131 c. of 1997)
Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding 132 d. Act, 1977
e. Village Plans in Chenab Colony (a.b.c.d.e.) 133
Endnotes 138
Bibliography 141
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List Of Tables
3.1 Administrative Units in Punjab 35
3.2 Sanctioned Posts of Tehsildars 35
3.3 Sanctioned Posts of Kanungos and Patwaris 36
3.4 Canal Colonies Where Situated in Punjab 45
3.5 Distribution of land in Chenab Colony 48
3.6 Breakup of Auction sales in Chenab Colony 50
3.7 Chenab Colony: Allotment of Land 54
3.8 Schedule of Crop Inspection/Girdawari by the Revenue 62 Officers
4.1 Collection of Water Rate (Abiana) in District Faisalabad 78 (2001-2013)
4.2 Collection of Agricultural Income Tax(Land Based AIT) in 89 District Faisalabad (2001-2013)
4.3 Collection of Agriculture Income Tax (Income Based AIT) 95 in District Faisalabad (2001-2013)
4.4 Collection of Local Rate in District Faisalabad (2001- 99 2013)
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List of Flowcharts
3.1 Current hierarchy of Revenue Officers in the field 31
3.2 Organization of Board of Revenue 32
3.3 Administrative Structure under Mughals 38
3.4 Administrative Structure in British India 40
3.5 Civil Divisions during British Era 41
3.6 City Government post – devolution Scenario 56
3.7 Hierarchy of Revenue Department in Punjab 59
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List of Graphs
4.1 Water Rate (Abiana)% of Collection against Original 81 Target
4.2 Water Rate (Abiana)% of Collection against Net 81 Recoverable
4.3 Comparison of the % of WR Collection of Original Target 82 and Net Recoverable
4.4 Agricultural Income Tax (Land Based) % of Collection 90 against Original Target
4.5 Agricultural Income Tax (Land Based) % of Collection 90 against Net Recoverable
4.6 Comparison of the % of Collection of AIT (Land Based) 91 Original Target and Net Recoverable
4.7 Agriculture Income Tax (Income Based) % age of Total 96 Recovery against Original Target
4.8 Agriculture Income Tax (Income Based) % age of Total 96 Recovery against Net Recoverable
4.9 Comparison of the % of Collection of Original Target and 97 Net Recoverable
4.10 Local Rate % of Collection against Original Target 100
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List of Maps
4.1 Map of Pakistan 66
4.2 Map of Punjab 67
4.3 Map of Faisalabad 68
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AC Assistant Commissioner ADC Additional Deputy Commissioner AIT Agriculture Income Tax AWB Area Water Board BOR Board of Revenue CBR Central Board of Revenue CO Consolidation Officer CPC Code of Civil Procedures Cr.P.C. Criminal Procedures Code DAO District Accounts Officer DC District Collector DCO District Coordination Officer DDO® Deputy District Officer (Revenue) DLR Director Land Records DM District Magistrate DPO District Police Officer D & SJ District & Sessions Judge EDOR Executive District Officer Revenue FO Farmers‟ Organizations HR Human Resource LR Local Rate LRMIS Land Records and Management Information System MNA Member of National Assembly MPA Member of Provincial Assembly PIDA Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority PKR Pakistani Rupee PLGO Punjab Local Government Ordinance PMU Project Management Unit PR Proprietary Rights RO Revenue Officer RZH Register Haqdaran e Zameen or Records of Rights SMBR Senior Member Board of Revenue SP Superintendent of Police WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority WR Water Rate
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“The fault, dear Brutus, is not with our stars……
but with ourselves.”
Shakespeare
Julius Caesar
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Chapter 1
Introduction
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1.1 Introduction
Political economy is best defined as an interface between politics and economy and its impact on allied aspects of social life. By the same token, political economy of growth can be explained as interplay of economic and political variables against the backdrop of demographic and resultant economic transformation in a certain area over a certain period of time. Political economy can be explained further as an interdisciplinary approach to study economics, law and politics in a society. Economic choices are influenced by the political institutions, institutional corruption, overall legal framework and political system in operation. The economic system operates in a given political environment and choices made regarding resource allocation and distribution, whether in society at large or in a small segment of society or region within the boundary of state, are the subject of political economy.
Before delving deeper into the concept of political economy of growth, it will be pertinent to mention first the parameters of economic growth. The fundamental factors or parameters of growth are quality of physical capital, quality of human capital, technology employed and access to markets. However, the quantum of these factors diverges in each state. Still the growth or prosperity of any state or society is dependent upon the strength of its institutions, geography and culture. Institutions operate under a certain legal framework. Since the subject under study is political economy of growth, hence, the reference is being made to the political and economic institutions.
No political system works on its own volition or in isolation. It operates under a legal system insulated by a political system. Revenue administration in province of Punjab earlier united Punjab and since 1947 the West Punjab has also grown and been shaped up under different political regimes, be it the Suri kingdom run by Sher Shah Suri, or Mughal Empire especially Akbar the Great, being advised by its revenue minister Todar Mal, or Sikh administration of Ranjit Singh and most remarkable of these British colonial regime, all contributed to some large or small extent to the development of land revenue administration in Punjab. Its expansion cannot be studied in isolation of the prevalent political system rather in order to comprehend it fully, the political context and circumstances surrounding its development require to be understood first.
The district Faisalabad which is the focus of this research work is unique at least in one respect that is a city established by the Colonial regime. There are few parallels in the world where a city
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was established in this way. There have been instances where a town or a village was developed into a big urban center or a new city was built on the ruins of a town devastated due to a natural calamity or ravaged by war. In this instance a city was „created‟ under the name of Lyallpur by transforming the wasteland of the central Punjab. The motivating factor was to tap the economic potential of the region.
Its economic potential was realized as far back as during the era of Mughal emperor Akbar. Mughals brought entire land from Kashmir to Peshawar under their sway and named it Punjab; the land of five rivers.1 The central chunk of Sandal bar comprising one of five doabs; tract lying between two rivers named by the Mughal Emperor Akbar by joining first two syllables of the adjoining rivers was now termed Rachnadoab. It stretched over a plateau between river Ravi and Chenab. Sikhs after Mughals continued with almost same administrative set up.
The annexation of Punjab by British in 1849 was a defining moment in the administrative history of this region. In order to reap more revenue they brought this area under cultivation by means of introducing an advanced irrigation system. According to the Imperial Gazetteer of Punjab, the Rachna doab was a tract, lying between 30o 35‟ and 32o 50‟ N. and 71o 50‟ and 75o 3‟ E., comprising the Sialkot, Gujranwala, and Lyallpur districts, and parts of Gurdaspur, Lahore, Montgomery, Jhang, and Multan, this now came to be termed as Chenab Colony.2 The canals were dug up and settlers were invited to cultivate the waste land. A letter written by H.M. Elliot Esquire, secretary to Government of India to Lt. Colonel Sir H.M. Lawrence K.C.B. president to the Board of Administration for the Affairs of Punjab delineated the prevalent policy in following words.
“Colonists may be invited from distant provinces to break up the soil and settle upon the land, though it is to be feared that the love of home which prevails among our agricultural classes will preclude the possibility of much advantage being derived from this source.”3
The Gazetteer of Chenab Colony compiled in 1904 stipulated the object of British Government in colonizing the waste land of Rachna doab commanded by the Chenab Canal as enunciated by the Financial Commissioner and duly approved by the Government. The purpose was two-fold:
1. To relieve the pressure of population upon the land
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2. To colonize the area with the best class of agriculturists4
At the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the British had divided it into five civil divisions for administrative purposes, Delhi Division, Jullundur Division, Lahore Division, Rawalpindi Division and the Multan Division. (Spelled as Mooltan) Lyallpur was then a tehsil of District Jhang falling in Mooltan Division.5
Mooltan Division comprised of following Districts.
1. Mianwali 2. Muzaffargarh 3. Jhang 4. Mooltan 5. Dera Ghazi Khan 6. Lyallpur (1904-1960)
Initially district Jhang had six tehsils, Jhang, Chiniot, Shorkot, Lyallpur, Samundri, and Toba Tek Singh. Due to rapid transformation of Chenab Colony, redrawing of administrative boundaries was deemed expedient. Following report is indicative of the mindset of the British regime.
“Proposals for the establishment of a new District headquarters at Lyallpur are before Government. This is a step which is without doubt, most urgently required. The colony is now far too big and populous to be a mere adjunct to the District of Jhang with a headquarter miles away from the line of Railway.”6
According to the Gazetteer of Chenab Colony, 1904,
“The town was founded in 1896 and was designed by Capt. Popham Young, C.I.E., in the form of a square with eight bazaars radiating from a central chowk, the main design covering an area of about 110 acres, or four sq, with room for extension on northwest and southwest.”7
A new district of the name of Lyallpur was carved out on 1st December, 1904 which comprised of three tehsils, Samundari, Toba Tek Singh and Lyallpur with a sub tehsil at Jaranwala. Sir Ganga Ram, the Chief Engineer in British government designed the new city comprising of 100
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acres of land on the pattern of Union Jack; the British Flag. Zaigham Pasha and Shoukat Ali Shahid state in their joint endeavor titled, „From Sand Dunes to Smiling Fields: History of Lyallpur Now Faisalabad,
“It was in the form of a big square which was subdivided into four equal squares with a site for clock tower in the center. Eight radial bazaars were provided, each taking off from clock tower. All the eight bazaars were interlinked by a circular road (ring road) the areas of new town at the time of its establishment was 3 square miles… its foundation stone was laid down in 1896. It was named after Sir James Lyall K.C.S. the then Lt. Governor of Punjab and associated with the project of colonization of Lower Chenab Canal valley.”8
The clock tower was got built in 1918 with a collection of Rs.18 per square from each tenant of the government in the colony hence, it was inscribed on the monument that this clock tower was erected by the inhabitants of Chenab Colony in the grateful memory of Queen Victoria, 1903. That was the way a new city was carved out. Lyallpur was made a tehsil of Jhang in 1896 and it was elevated to a full-fledged district in 1904.
In 1913, Jaranwala subdivision was raised to the level of a tehsil, comprising of Syedwala and a part of Sahiwal and Sheikhupura. TehsilTobaTek Singh was made a sub division in 1930. In 1960, Lyallpur was made a part of newly carved out Sargodha division which consisted of Jhang, Sargodha, Mianwali and Lyallpur. In 1977, Lyallpur was rechristened as Faisalabad as a tribute to the late King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia.
During the colonial era, Lyallpur not only got built from scratch but also it grew faster as a mundi town or business center in the region. At that time, mainstay of its economy was agriculture by rendering the thousands of squares of uncultivated land under productive use by employing the best agriculture races in east Punjab. The government levied taxes and collected revenue from these peasants, tenants and land holders whatever the case was. Land revenue in shape of land revenue was collected by the state functionaries and deposited into the government treasury. The incidence of taxes was sufficient to meet the expenses of government and to render more area under cultivation by digging out more canals.
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After the inception of Pakistan, Lyallpur was renamed Faisalabad in 1977, it continued to remain an important business center. Other than being an agrarian economy, Faisalabad now boasts of being a city hosting major textile units in country. It is now called Manchester of Pakistan and is ranked the third biggest economic center in Pakistan after Karachi and Lahore.
At present, it comprises of six tehsils or administrative units responsible for revenue collection and general administration, namely,
1. Faisalabad City 2. Faisalabad Sadar 3. Jaranwala 4. Tandlianwala 5. Samundri 6. Chak Jhumra
Each of these tehsils is headed by an Assistant Commissioner (AC) who work under the overall supervision of a District Collector (DC) or District Coordination Officer (DCO), the top most officer or public manager in the district ( a district roughly equivalent to a city) being assisted by an Additional District Collector (ADC).They all are responsible for collection of land revenue for the provincial exchequer with team of their subordinate revenue functionaries in the district, all working under overall supervision and control of the Board of Revenue (BOR), Punjab.
Since its inception as a mundi town up till now, a lot of new variables have emerged in Faisalabad. Economic and political landscape has changed a great deal. With the growth of industry and opening up of new economic avenues, significance of land revenue collection declined. With the passage of time, lack of administrative supervision, corruption, leakages, neglect of government and deteriorating institutions and weakening mode of revenue collection have resulted in dwindling revenue collection in this profitable head of government income.
However, in order to study the malaise affecting the performance of the revenue administration, the focus of research has been made on the era beginning in 2001 up till 2013. The original data of this period pertaining to the selected indicators has been collected from revenue department which has been duly verified by the district treasury. The year2001 has been selected as a starting point because in this year, the entire system of the local government was revamped by introducing
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the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO), 2001 which changed the political landscape and the system of local laws. These changes directly affected the performance of land revenue administration. That‟s why it is important to learn the working of the revenue department in present context and year 2001 has been marked as a starting point for sake of this research. Furthermore, the observations and experiences of the researcher are also related to this time period (Mar, 2008 to Oct, 2010).
1.1.1 Statement of the Problem
The dilemma of the developing states especially the post-colonial states is the poor resource generation and lopsided resource distribution. The drives for resource generation and resultant resource distribution among different departments and the sectors of society are either marred by individual choices or sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. A corollary of this is the dependence on external donors. The aid money seldom comes without political and social agenda and of course it has direct economic ramifications also.
The contention of the researcher is that ours is not a poor country but is poorly managed. Punjab was annexed primarily for economic motives and the Sandal Bar (the Central Punjab) was settled for sake of maximum revenue generation by the colonial regime.
With this motive, the Board of Revenue, Punjab was established with its headquarter in Lahore. The best agriculturalist classes were urged to develop new settlements there. The railways, road and irrigation network was established. Within few years its revenue potential was increased manifold.
After the independence of Pakistan, Faisalabad emerged as the textile hub in the country.But as the focus of the government shifted from agriculture sector to industrial sector, the land revenue declined. In recent years, the situation has deteriorated to the extent that it has become stagnant and the gap between its budget outlay and resource generation is widening. Reasons are multiple. The most important of these are administrative corruption and disinterest coupled with political adhoc-ism. The revenue department has been rated now as one of the most corrupt departments in Punjab. A shadow economy is existing and a major chunk of the revenue collection is pocketed by the individuals running the show. There is also the need to analyze the flawsin the revenue department on the structural and functional levels.
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1.1.2 Significance of the Study
This research study is unique as it is being carried out by an individual who is privy to the practices and procedures of the Punjab revenue department in general and of its working in Faisalabad in particular. The researcher has already contributed seminal work on Faisalabad titled, “A Gazetteer by the Native” and “A Catalogue of Revenue Estates in Tehsil Sadar Faisalabad with Site Maps”. This study will have practical consequences. A number of studies have already been carried out under the auspices of the revenue department by the private consultants who fail to grasp the underlying issues and ignore the politico-economic undercurrents. These proposals are seldom put into practice for want of their practicality and are shelved for good. The money invested for such studies goes down the drain. The researcher has not only developed this firm understanding that the revenue generation can be effectively increased but also she has practically proven that in tehsil Sadar, Faisalabad, the area under her jurisdiction from march 2008 to April 2010. A comparative statement for the month of December, 2009, of all tehsils in Punjab is indicative in this regard and substantiates the hypothesis of the study. The revenue receipts for the month of Dec, 2009 alone in this tehsil were around, Rs.10, 10, 5000, an unprecedented revenue collection in that tehsil. This study may also have ramifications for the recovery of other departments as well and to analyze the structural and functional flaws in the revenue department.
1.1.3 Research Objectives
In order to unravel the knots in this research study, the following research objectives have been framed:
To decipher as to how and why a productive department turned into a non-productive one when it came to be managed by the indigenous elite. To study the revenue department through its focus on the revenue receipt and expenditure in Faisalabad, this insight may also be indicative of the plight of other public sector departments and resource generation organizations (WAPDA, Steel Mill Karachi, or Central Board of Revenue, for instance) in terms of setting unrealistic targets, political write-offs and rampant corruption.
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To analyze the reasons of institutional deterioration and rise of corruption. The shadow economy is responsible for shrinking revenue base. The system of monitoring is poor. Bureaucratic inertia and delegation of task to clerical or subordinate staff are also instrumental in promoting this trend.
1.1.4 Sources of Data In order to conduct this study both the primary and the secondary sources of data have been consulted. The primary sources are available in shape of historical documents in the Punjab Archives department and in other different administrative departments. Punjab District Gazetteers, Punjab Archives (Administrative reports, Election reports before partition: 1909, 1919, 1937, 1946), National Archives, Islamabad (Post partition administrative record), Record of Board of Revenue, Punjab, Archives of Government College University, GCU which contains administrative reports of British India. Interviews with the local land lords, peasants and government functionaries have also been held in order to collect oral but vital and firsthand views of the major stakeholders. Information from various national and local newspapers as well as the original data from the revenue department has been gathered to depict the budget target and collection gap in the revenue collection in Faisalabad. The time frame fixed for the purpose is 2001 to 2013. The secondary sources in shape of books, encyclopedias, reports and journals have also been consulted. Newspapers, magazines and internet have also been accessed to study electronic materials in form of e-books, e-journals and e-articles available on the topic.
1.1.5 Research Methodology
The selection of methodology is essential in research because it determines the course of research as well as its outcome. It is an empirical study and a combination of different approaches of research has been used to make this study more productive. The historical and descriptive approaches have been adopted to analyze the research problem and statistical technique has also been adopted for data analysis.
This study is unique in the sense that it is not only first of its kind but also it has been conducted by one of the persons who is privy to the working of the revenue department in Faisalabad. It is worth mentioning here that no such study has been carried out earlier on these dimensions even in
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Punjab not to speak of Faisalabad. Therefore, there was scanty material available on the topic. In order to carry out this research, the primary sources i.e. observation and interview technique have been adopted and substantiated by the original data/revenue collection figures of the period under discussion.
The period selected for research is 2001-2013. Reason for its selection is first availability accessibility and reliability of data regarding revenue collection and secondly the first hand knowledge of the researcher during some of this time frame. The selection of this time frame also makes this research up to date by taking into account the latest information in the backdrop of evolving socio-political variables in play.
1.1.6 Data Collection Techniques
As described earlier, there was dearth of relevant literature. Therefore, the data had to be collected directly through observation, interviews and original revenue recovery figures submitted by the department for its own consumption.
Observation
The researcher worked as Deputy District Officer (Revenue)/ Assistant Commissioner in tehsil Sadar Faisalabad from March 2008 to March 2010 and then as District Officer (Revenue) exercising powers of District Collector in entire Faisalabad comprising of six tehsils from April 2010 to October 2010. During this time period, the researcher actively worked as an officer in the land revenue administration in Faisalabad and directly observed the challenges and shortcomings in collection of land revenue. The researcher also came across a number of stake holders who shared their candid opinion and views on the working of the department and the problems they faced. The researcher was in a position to take the feedback from the peasants and landlords on the one hand and discuss it thoroughly with the government functionaries in the revenue department on the other hand. During this period, the researcher also came up with research work based on her observation titled, „A Gazetteer by the Native, and A Catalogue of Revenue Estates in Tehsil Sadar Faisalabad‟. Actually, these observations and experience of the researcher became instrumental in motivating her to select this topic for research and her own job experience subsequently served as field study for purpose of this research.
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Interview technique
In order to conduct this research study and make it unbiased, it was deemed appropriate those interviews from the stake holders may be held to glean their views on the matter. The population selected for interview was categorized as big landlords, small peasants, tenants and government officials responsible for collecting the land revenue. They were asked question regarding the method of revenue collection, its rates and evasions on the part of the landed gentry as well as the conduct of the revenue officials towards the former.
Since the population under study is quite large because Faisalabad has been divided into six tehsils for administrative purpose, namely, Tehsil City, Sadar, Jaranwala, Tandlianwala, Samundari and Chak Jhumra, each headed by an Assistant Commissioner (AC). Due to this reason, the researcher resorted to apply a non probability, „purposive‟ or „Judgmental‟ sampling method. Earl Babbie writes: “Sometimes it‟s appropriate to select a sample on the basis of knowledge of a population and purpose of study. This type of sampling is called Purposive or Judgmental sampling.”12 This method was quite useful because in this way units for sample were selected on the basis of observation and knowledge about the population under study and nature and aims of the research. In this regard, Torchin William M.K. writes: “Purposive sampling can be used in situation where you need to reach a target sample quickly and where sampling for proportionality is not primary concern.”13 Thus the researcher tried to capture different stake holders categorized as big landlords whose land comprised of more than 50 acres, small landlords/peasants owning land of less than 25 acres and the middle level landlords owning land from 25 to 50 acres. Another category of stake holders selected for interviews were tenants both of government and of private landlords. Besides that a couple of lumberdars (Village Headman), patwaris, gardawars/kanungo, revenue officers and officials in Board of Revenue were also interviewed for sake of this research.
Mapping
As mentioned earlier, the district Faisalabad comprises of six administrative units called Tehsils namely Faisalabad City, Sadar, Tandlianwala, Jaranwala, Samundari and Chak Jhumra. In order to conduct the interview, the purposive sampling technique was adopted. These interviews were conducted on spot there.
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Focus Group Discussions (FDGs)
In each of these tehsils, the focus group discussionswere also held with the all the stake holders described earlier.
The group discussions conducted in the tehsils focused on eliciting the response and views form the selected farmers and the lumberdars of the area with regard to the rates of revenue recovery and their difficulties in depositing that due. Many of respondents were of the view that they were better off with the previous system and did not appreciate the initiative of government to computerize the land record system. In their response to facilitation by the government and minimizing the corruption in the system, they believed and quoted personal experiences to bear out that all these measures proved counterproductive in the end. Majority of them were skeptic of the initiatives and overtures of the government but ironically they supported the local revenue officials responsible for revenue collection. However, a small number of respondents were of the view that the initiatives of the government how so ever meager were meaningful and if given to work on proper lines may result in reducing their hardships and exploitations.
Another group discussion was conducted in the tehsil office of local revenue functionaries both officer and officials. This focused group discussions was joined by the revenue officer Mr. Yahya, Tehsildar, tehsil Jaranwala, Mr. Iftikhar Gill, Naib-Tehsildar, tehsil Sadar, kanungos and a couple of patwaris. They believed that the officer at the supervisory level lacked interest and adequate knowledge of the relevant laws and they also observed that over the years they have witnessed a downward trend in collection of revenue and administrative oversight. However, they stated that exceptions were there. They also believed that the initiatives of the government at senior level were not well thought out, hence, had many flaws and loops which also indicated that there was a communication gap or sense of alienation between the higher echelons and lower tiers of revenue department.
Hypothesis It is presumed that the cost incurred as maintenance charges must be proportionate to income. If it is established that the cost incurred or investment is less than the profit margin then they said organization is doing well. The collection of land revenue is dwindling gradually whereas the land revenue base is the same. The area under research is Faisalabad. The reasons for this deteriorating trend are multiple, ranging from institutional weakness to lack of administrative oversight,
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increase in corruption and undue political interference. This hypothesis is tested here through regressive analysis technique by means of analyzing actual data of previous ten years, 2001 to 2013, of land revenue collection intehsil Sadar, Faisalabad. In this instance, budget target of collection in a given fiscal year is used as independent variable and the actual recovery of revenue as the dependent variable. The researcher has tried to substantiate this hypothesis as well as practically validate this contention by applying heron-job experience and observations with the support of actual data as well as interviewed the major stakeholders.
There is a need to re-organize our revenue administration/department through its structural- functional reorientation steered by political will and administrative commitment.
1.1.7 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis has been divided into following five chapters.
1. Introduction The first chapter includes the brief introduction of the topic, statement of the problem, significance and objectives of the research and sources and research design. 2. Literature review and conceptual framework The second chapter focuses on the review of available literature on the topic in form of books, articles, reports and websites. The conceptual framework has also been derived after reviewing this literature. 3. Historical Evolution of Land Administration in Punjab The crux of third chapter is evolution and development of land administration in Punjab through centuries beginning from pre-Mughal era to Mughal period, under the Sikh rules and its development under the British Raj. After the inception of Pakistan, the same structures were continued with slight modifications in statutes and rules governing the land revenue administration. This chapter also discusses the variables that shaped up the system of land administration throughout history. 4. An Evaluation of Revenue Collection in District Faisalabad: Data Analysis 2001-2013 After discussing the historicity and the evolution of land administration in Punjab, the scope of the research has been narrowed down to the evaluation of revenue administration in district Faisalabad which is located in central Punjab now in Pakistan. This chapter throws light on the unique origin of Lyallpur (Faisalabad) under the colonial regime and its subsequent
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rechristening as Faisalabad in 1977. The productivity of the land revenue administration in Faisalabad has been gauged through determining 3 indicators of revenue collection, Water Rate, Agriculture Income Tax and Local Rate over the last decade (2001-2013). 5. Conclusions and Recommendations The last and the fifth chapter encapsulates all the discussion in foregoing chapters and comes up with the conclusions and recommendations for policy making in future. It also gives suggestions regarding increase in productivity of the land revenue administration and its efficient resource generation.
1.1.8 Citation Style
For references and bibliography, 16th edition of „Chicago Style‟ has been used in this thesis.
Despite the best efforts to collect the original and authentic data, there have been faceda few shortcomings. Though all these figures of collection of revenue have been duly verified and vetted by the district accounts office of Faisalabad yet sometimes there appeared some discrepancy of data in assessment of income based AIT. It was also difficult to collect the original data, had the researcher not privy to the revenue department and worked in a senior position at in the district government Faisalabad; it would have been much more difficult to access these original figures. The revenue officials were also reluctant to share their views lest it is misconstrued. But the researcher ensured them that it was purely a research work and their true identities will not be disclosed at any level. Whereas, the peasants and landowners were more forthcoming and open in sharing their views and requested again and again that their views be shared with the government. Because they strongly felt that any new policy or reform regarding revenue assessment and collection was devised by the government without taking feedback of major stakeholders like landed gentry and they felt a sense of alienation about with the system.
It is the prime responsibility of researcher to remain impartial and objective. The original data used for analysis in chapter 4 has been taken from government archive / record is not some secret data. Rather the position of the researcher helped her access for research purpose and to substantiate hypothesis. It doesn‟t jeopardize the finding of the research as well because the intention of this research is to ensure meaningful contribution to the system of land revenue administration in Punjab. Therefore, all the stakeholders may benefit out of it.
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In nut shell, I have tried my level‟s best to conduct this research in an unbiased and objective manner and have come up with the candid conclusions and recommendations for overhauling of the land revenue administration and revenue collection. The mistakes are my own and any feedback from the academicians and students of political economy is welcome.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
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Political Economy and Growth
All struggle throughout the known human history is about the resources and who controls it; Whether these are natural resources like water, and land or developed resources like energy and technology etc. Through the economic resources arevital for survival of any nation but ascendency over these resources is the domain of politics. How to control, develop, utilize, distribute and multiply economic resources within a given political set up is the biggest question any government faces. The interplay of these two sets of variables is the central theme of political economy debate.Encyclopedia Investopedia defines the political economy more systematically in following words.
“The study and use of how economic theory and methods influences political ideology. Political economy is the interplay between economics, law and politics, and how institutions develop in different social and economic systems, such as capitalism, socialism and communism. Political economy analyzes howpolicy is created and implemented.”1
It further explains political economy;
“Because various individuals and groups have different interests in how a country or economy is to develop, political economy as a discipline is a complex field, covering a broad array of potentially competing interests. Political economy also involves the use of game theory, since groups competing for finite resources and power must determine which courses of action will give the most beneficial results, and what the probability of those results being reached are.”2
There is no single, agreed upon definition of the term “political economy”.
The OECD concisely says that: “Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time”.3
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DFID delineates as to how political economy analysis can advance development effectiveness: political economy analysis can be applied as a powerful tool to gauge the effectiveness of aid. It concentrates on how power and resources are distributed and contested as well as its implications for development outcomes. It penetrates the formal structures to unravel the underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or obstruct change. These insights are vital for DFID to advance challenging agendas affecting governance, economic growth and service delivery. It can help producing better results by identifying the opportunities and barriers for policy reform and how donor driven intervention can promote positive change. This is particularly relevant in fragile and conflict torn states where the challenge of ensuring peace and socio-economic justice is fundamentally political.4
The World Bank describes political economy as the study of both politics and economics, and specifically the interactions between them. It focuses on power and resources, how they are distributed and contested in different countries and sectoral contexts, and the resulting implications for development outcomes. Political economy analysis involves more than a review of institutional and governance arrangements: it also considers the underlying interests, incentives, prior experiences with reforms, social trends, and how all of these factors effect or impede positive change.5
Economic growth and its distribution across all sections of society on more or less on an equitable pattern has been the most burning question in any political system throughout the history. Even now successive governments are largely judged on this parameter which may have diverse indicators.
“Economic growth is the increase in the inflation-adjusted market value of the goods and services produced by an economy over time. It is conventionally measured as the percent rate of increase in real gross domestic product, or real GDP*, usually in per capita terms.”6
Factors propelling economic growth can be explained further in following manner;
“Increase in a country's productive capacity, as measured by comparing gross national product (GNP) in a year with the GNP in the previous year. Increase in the capital stock, advances in technology, and improvement in the quality and level of literacy are considered to be the
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principal causes of economic growth. In recent years, the idea of sustainable development has brought in additional factors such as environmentally sound processes that must be taken into account in growing an economy.”7
Fruits of growth may be judged on basis of income distribution, employment opportunities, access to government institutions, rise in living standards and gradual increase in economic empowerment of the less advantaged. In simple terms, the growth in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is meaningless unless it has some trickle down,howsoever meager,impact across all sections of society. This question of growth and distribution has been at the heart of the capitalist and socialist debate. In order to unravel these knots, the researcher came across several books of significance. Political economy of growth as a concept was first tackled by Paul Baran and Sweezy in the book under same title against the backdrop of American consumer economy in post-World War II scenario. They believed that economic growth is meaningless if not translated in public good. Whether the apologists of imperialism or modern advocates of public policy, the mainstay of their argument is public dividend or public good in consequence of the policy in question.However, the concept of growth in economic theory has become a misnomer. It has been discussed so vociferously by many schools of thoughts that its meanings have become mixed up. It means different things to different people. For some, growth simply means economic growth as indicated by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita income, and by general standard of living of a common man. It may also mean when less and less people live below poverty line in a country.
Before delving deeper into the concept of political economy of growth, it will be pertinent to mention first the parameters of economic growth. The fundamental factors or parameters of growth are quality of physical capital, quality of human capital, technology employed and access to markets. However, the quantum of these factors diverges in each state. Still the growth or prosperity of any state or society is dependent upon the strength of its institutions, geography and culture. Institutions operate under a certain legal framework. This question has also been raised in a report published by UNICEF titled “The Political Economy of Health, Particularly Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, in Four Countries of South and East Asia”; the fundamental question of why political economy analysis is important for development effectiveness has been addressed. Though the report is a study of maternal and child health in four
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countries in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines and Nepal, however, it also highlights the vital issues of decision making being raised in the political process and that equally affects all sectors of public policy be it health and nutrition or the land administration. Though there may be socio- cultural variables affecting the respective states and societies yet some inferences may be drawn in a broader perspective. As mentioned under;
“What causes governments to give priority to [a particular issue] …, given that national political systems are burdened with thousands of issues to sort through each year? In marked contrast to our extensive knowledge about the medical interventions necessary to prevent [for example] maternal death, we know little about the political interventions necessary to increase the likelihood that national leaders pay meaningful attention to the issue…. What „political will‟ means … has been left as an unopened black box.”8
Apart from the debate on the health question, the critique of mechanism of political prioritization and political will being satire as an unopened black box is very much relevant to the decision making processes in south Asian context.
Economic growth is hollow if it is not further translated into economic development on a sustainable basis. Economic development is measured through Human Development Index or HDI which determines incidence of poverty, literacy and mortality in society. If economic growth does not affect the standard of living of a common man then it indicates the loops in political system as well. This is an area of study related to good governance.
Governance is the art of public management or the way the policies of government are implemented or not implemented. Good Governance by the same token can be attributed as a model of governance and decision making in which the benefits are reaped by all and sundry in all areas socio-economic justice and political emancipation of all. “Good governance is therefore a subset of governance, wherein public resources and problems are managed effectively, efficiently and in response to critical needs of society. Effective democratic forms of governance rely on public participation, accountability and transparency.”9
Good governance is participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable, and pivotal of all indicators is the rule of law. “Good governance ensures that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development
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resources, and that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus among the three stakeholders the state, private sector and civil society.”10
The World Bank has defined the dimensions of good governance as such;“property rights and rule-based governance; the quality of budgetary & financial management; the efficiency of revenue mobilization; the efficiency of public expenditures; and transparency, accountability and (minimal) corruption.”11
The subject matter of revenue administration is fundamentally the study of good governance in its all three aspects; economic good governance, financial good governance and political good governance. The concept of good governance is not new to study the administration, though this term has been coined in recent past to denote the efficacy of any type of political set up and under whatever legal framework it is operating. There are many actors both formal and non-formal involved in decision making process. Political elite might be most active of all but bureaucracy is also actively assisting it to reach certain decisions and formulate a policy. NGOs, associations, interest groups, lobbies, and IGOs or in short civil society have their role in shaping and reshaping a government response or decision. Good governance has eight major characteristics; it is participatory, consensus-oriented, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and adheres to rule of law as its guiding principle12. These elements of good governance are subjective in nature. But it is ironical that despite all, these high ideals of good governance remain elusive. No country can claim that it has achieved the ultimate stage yet it is the parameter against which the governance paradigm is being judged now.
Ronald Hym in his book “Britain‟s Imperial Century 1815-1914: A study of Empire and Expansion” has elaborated upon the machinations and the tactics of the colonial regime in transforming the local population. Lewis D.Wurgaft in his book “The Imperial Imagination: Magic and Myth in Kipling‟s India” has delineated that the imperial power through its system of control shaped the native economy, political set up and social norms and gave these an altogether new orientation. He declared it as removal of objectionable fat.
Issues of economic growth and good governance have different and more daunting challenges in a post-colonial society. In this context, many scholars have tried their level‟s best to high light the various issues of colonialism. Karl Marx in his writings propagated the idea of transformation of the Asiatic society into a new capitalistic setting under British imperial control. He also pin-
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pointed the lasting effect of colonialism upon the traditional societies. Hamza Alavi‟s writings provide the insight on the transformation of the Indian society into a new orientation under British Raj.In his work titled, “The State in Post-Colonial Society: Pakistan and Bangladesh” Alavi has analyzed the dilemma of post-colonial societies with special focus on military-bureaucratic oligarchy. He has enunciated that a new alignment of interests emerged embracing landed class, indigenous bourgeoisie, and the Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisies.Their convergence of interest has worked to the advantage of bureaucratic-military oligarchy which is suitable to all parties. Views of Hamza Alavi can be analyzed against the backdrop of politics in Pakistan. The subsequent development which unfolded on the political canvass after independence placed military bureaucracy in power multiple times13.
Anita Lomba in her book Colonialism/post colonialism gave a detailed note on the concept of colonialism and its effects on the post-colonial state.Dr. Muhammad Waseem in his book “State, Society and Politics in Pakistan” has conducted a detailed study of the politics of Pakistan that gives a penetrating theoretical explanation of the political spectrum and the choices made.
Hilton L. Root in his research work titled, “Pakistan‟s Managerial Dilemmas” has delineated in detail the issues plaguing the polity in Pakistan. In the opening passage he has candidly stated,
“Discretion without accountability is deeply rooted in Pakistan‟s political history, profoundly shaping the country‟s administrative system. Pakistan‟s political institutions offer the leadership many opportunities for violating citizen trust. Institutional change is proposed as a tool for politicians to maintain their authority through policy reform rather than patronage. Institutions are needed that allow politicians to lead while preserving the impartiality, permanence, and expertise of a public bureaucracy 14.”
This is the crux of his research. The people who are at the helm of affairs, whether from politics or bureaucracy wield enormous power and patronage in society. Even in political decision making the opposition benches as well as the lower tiers are marginalized. Development programs are handed down to the local bodies that have no role in development planning. This disconnect among tiers, sector and different segments of society has further entrenched the desire for personal aggrandizement. It is by no means an open secret that politics of patronage and personal extension in power have wreaked havoc with the institutional stability in Pakistan.
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Nicolas E. Martin has furthered the same debate in his thesis submitted in his Ph.D Thesis titled, “Politics, Patronage, and Debt Bondage in the Pakistani Punjab”. He has examined the multiple dimensions of rural politics in Pakistani Punjab ranging from criminalized politics to violence and bonded labour. He has substantiated that the landed elite generally exercises considerable influence through patronage and tendency relations that helps them to buy votes in election and to enforce debt that bondage. He has analyzed that instead of ideological commitment, the politics of violence, kinship and local rivalries hold sway in Pakistani Punjab.
At one place (P.294) he has stated, “it emerges that inequality in the social distribution of power combined with the personalization of state institution or the principal condition for the persistence of vertical patron-client ties. Given that without the personal appropriation of state institution land lord and politicians are unlikely to be able to dispense the patronage required to build personal clienteles,…and in particular the police and the judiciary are used by the landlords to reinforce their own power, and how in the process they contribute to inequality and instability 15”. Actually, in his opinion it is the absence of a professional “Weberian-type state bureaucratic institution in which opportunities to pursue individual interest are kept in check by legitimate procedures, processes and audits 16”.
“Class, Power, and Patronage: the Landed Elite and Politics in Pakistani Punjab” by Hassan Javid is another research work consulted during the course of my research.He has attributed the period of colonial rule in Punjab as a „critical juncture‟ where the colonial rulers struck a bargain with the landed elite to ensure the maintenance of order and revenue generation in exchange for state patronage. Unfortunately, the self-seeking pattern that emerged after this marriage of convenience has continued uptill now by the state and the landed elite through selective legislative interventions, bureaucratic power, and electoral politics. Any attempt to reverse or to make a dent in this arrangement have not been successful so far 17.
M. Ghaffar Chaudhry, in his research article titled, “The Theory and Practice of Agricultural Income Tax in Pakistan and a Viable Solution”, has discussed in detail the issues of agricultural income tax in Pakistan. He has traced it through history. Out of nine commissions (1959, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1970, 1975, 1986, 1988, 1989 and 1993) that studied agricultural taxation on the two recommended. He has debated that there is no unanimous consensus among the writers over the adoption of land revenue and agricultural income tax. He has concluded that the agricultural sector is already over taxed in the form of indirect and implicit taxes therefore; it needs to be
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„regulated through private marketing system with close supervision by the government system‟ 18. He has further suggested introducing a two-tier system of agricultural taxation, „involving a proportional land tax on the pattern of land revenue and a uniform tax on marketed surplus 19.‟ While evaluating his work, it is interesting to note that he has done an extensive debate on the concept of agriculture income tax in Pakistan and the issues be setting it. However, the solution he offers appears to be more theoretical than practical. Because the interests of well entrenched landed gentry are hampering recovery of income based AIT. So, how the tax on marketed surplus will be collected in absence of complete information regarding agriculture produce?
The same subject of agricultural income taxwith a view to estimation of the revenue potential in Punjab has also been dealt by Anjum Nasim. He has stated though the subject of taxation of agricultural crop income is the domain of the provinces since 1967-97, yet the actual collection is negligible. He has quoted that in 2009-10, the provincial government collected rupees 1.2 billion in agricultural income tax, of which the share of Punjab was rupees one billion. It constituted 2.2% of the tax revenue of the provincial government and 0.22% of the total direct tax revenue in the country. It is strange to note that the federal government has estimated the potential of agricultural income tax upto rupees 200 billion 20. Anjum Nasim is of the view that the malaise of the agricultural sector is too pronged. Firstly, it has greater potential as compare to the actual tax collection by the provinces. Secondly, this sector also needs to be taxed on the same rates as applicable to similar income in other sectors of the economy. These both views by and large endorse the views of the researcher as discussed in this research work.While evaluating the reasons for untapped tax potential of agriculture sector, Anjum Nasim held that, first because it was on land and not on income.Secondly, rates of taxes have not been tied with income potential from land. Thirdly, lack of effective tax administration is another constraint in realizing its full potential. Fourthly, strong political influence of big land owners also obstructs it. Taxing the agriculture income needs to be at par with business income for revenue generation as well as for equitable treatment of all sectors by the government 21.
Another author Syed Muhammad Ali has enunciated in his work titled, “Development Poverty and Power in Pakistan: the Impact of State and Donor Intervention on Farmers”, though Pakistan is an agrarian economy still the rural development is one of the most difficult challenge.He has evaluated the impact of donor led policy in the lights of peasants in Pakistan. This study focuses on three aspects first, the role of state institution and policy to deal with the rural poverty in
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Pakistan. Secondly, it assesses the impact of donor policy on the rural poor. Thirdly, it evaluates the reasons for low performance as a result of interventions.After touching upon all these aspects, he comes up with the conclusion that a structural and holistic reform needs to be adopted to address the root causes of rural poverty and economic disparity. In absence of a uniform policy, no donor led intervention howsoever strong can work 22.
Most relevant and still valuable work on the revenue administration is still the official Gazetteer of Lyallpur (1905) though Punjab in a broader perspective has also been discussed in the Imperial Gazetteers of India. Gazetteers complied by the deputy commissioners or the in-charge of a territorial jurisdiction were required to record the basic data, information, pattern of civilization, main occupations, health and climatic challenges, etc., in a given period of time. It still offers an interesting and valuable account of that area. However, that period now more than a century apart cannot take into account the huge transformation that has taken place. Forces of urbanization, migration, industrialization and globalization have created far reaching changes.
Land Administration and evolution of land revenue collection in the raj has also been addressed by the Francis Woodruff Mason in his epic work on the subject till to-date. It also discussed briefly Chenab colony where stage was being set for a new district Lyallpur. Yet his canvas is too broad, the focus of work is not the revenue administration only let alone Lyallpur.
Zaigham Pasha and Shaukat Ali Shahid, in their joint work titled, From Sand Dunes to Smiling Fields: History of Lyallpur now Faisalabad, have dealt with the subject of colonial transformation in Chenab colony which later came to be Lyallpur and was renamed Faisalabad in 1977. This book gives an insight into much relevant developments during raj and in the immediate postcolonial period yet it does not address the question of land distribution and creation of a new social order as its result. Still this work bridges some gap in a huge void in this context in the world of academia.
It is worth mentioning here thatno comprehensive or exclusive work was available that directly addressed land administration issues especially land revenue in Punjab in recent scenario let alone district Faisalabad. There is extensive research work done on the political economy of the pre- colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods but hardly any focused research was carried out to investigate the unexplored realities of the political economy of district Faisalabad. Many
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historians, political scientists, anthropologists and ethnologists took active interest in development of colonial and post-colonial Punjab.
Conceptual Framework
The researcher after going through this literature has reached an understanding of the issues by evaluating the prepositions discussed. The researcher has sought to combine all these studies to have an overall view of the problem and reach at certain conclusions. The literature available on this topic may be divided into two broad categories, primary or original sources and the secondary sources. So far as the background knowledge or theoretical perspective was concerned, there were multiple books available in international and national context. Some of which have also been discussed in this chapter. However, there has not been available any such book which could specifically address the research questions.
After going through the available literature, the researcher consulted the original data available in the archives of the Board of Revenue (which was not in very good shape) and the data in the district revenue accounts branch of the district government Faisalabad. Personal observations or the hands on experience of the researcher as revenue collector in Faisalabad from 2008 to 2010 has played vital role in addressing the research questions with firsthand knowledge of prevailing socio-political milieu.
However, as compared to personal knowledge and observations, more weightage has been given to the opinion of the peasants and farmers belonging to sub-division which is a territorial unit of land revenue administration. In focused group discussions many small (below 12 acres land), medium (from 12 to 25 acres of land) and big land lords (above 25 acres of land) were interviewed in a village assemblies held in geographically diverse tehsils, i.e., Sadar, Samundri and Jaranwala to evolve a neutral and realistic opinion of the ultimate stakeholders in any government initiative involving land administration and land revenue collection.
Though in this research paper, their opinion has played an instrumental role in reaching at certain conclusions and analysis yet their input is seldom kept in view at any policy change affecting their livelihood as the tillers of land. Result is a huge communication gap between the government and the governed and this is widening. The government initiatives to overhaul land administration through Land Records and Management Information System (LRMIS) and the system of formulation of farmer‟s organizations (FOs) under Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Act, 2006
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(PIDA) are being viewed skeptically by majority of farmers at all levels. They believe these are donor driven programs and effectiveness of these is questionable. They believed that previous systems were more effective even if corrupt. The present reforms have also failed to curb corruption in the system,meaning thereby that the very purpose of its inception is far from realized.
Actually, it transpired from all this discussion that the main stakeholder in the land revenue collection is the rural peasant and a few of them are landed aristocrats. Whether they are the owners of land or the tenants either of government or some private land lord. They have to pay water rate (WR) for the canal water being used to irrigate the fields in addition to a fixed nominal tax as Local Rate and the agricultural income tax being levied under the Act and rules. The system of water rate collection was plagued with certain issues like canal water theft, feuds arising out of theft and exorbitant fines levied thereto, misappropriation and leakages before depositing the same in government exchequer. FOs under PIDA alone cannot address these. Rather they are mostly politically bogged down under influence of local landlord or by the tribe of the culprit of the water thief. Collection of WR has gone down due to stealth of water and zero punishment because the president of FO doesn‟t move the police station. The FOs were devised on the pattern of cooperatives system but ignoring the ground realities of class and clan politics rife all over Punjab. Pulling out the irrigation department or rather minimizing its role rested the corruption portal from the official‟s hands to these private persons who are even more difficult to be brought to book due to multiple factors.
Issue of levying of fine on water theft and its payment because it far exceeds the principle amount is yet to be addressed. These cases remain pending in offices of officers responsible for years. Inaccessibility of water at tail end of canal in many villages even after rehabilitation of water network; there are questions still not addressed.
Similarly pulling out patwari or the smallest revenue functionary from the land records maintenance and issuance of its copies has left people with more complaints than before. But the LRMIS system is still evolving. Its imperfections may be removed to make it more responsive. Biggest issue of all is the availability of patwari at a short notice too whereas the officials at the LRMIS field offices are not that responsive and accessible. Though some people had contrary opinion too who had suffered at the hands of some whimsical patwaris and the current system is not whimsical at least.
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There are institutional and service gaps which could be addressed though some reforms in existing systems.
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Chapter 3
Historical Evolution of Land Revenue Administration in Punjab
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Before the current system and it pros and cons are evaluated in a rigorous manner in the subsequent chapter, it is pertinent to trace the historical evolution of land administration, its extension and the factors that helped evolve it. Without tracing its roots and explaining its contours, and impartial research analysis cannot be made. Hence, it needs a fair explanation.
Agriculture was the mainstay of the medieval economy anywhere in the world and the king used to make his presence felt in shape of establishing some system of land administration and collection of revenue in exchange of protection to its subjects. In subcontinent prior to Mughals, foreign invaders who came here, among them Sher Shah Suri tried to introduce some land reforms. Mughals added more flesh to the skeleton provided by Sher Shah Suri. When Sikhs captured Punjab and established their rule here, they almost retained the earlier administrative set up. In 1849, when the British annexed the Punjab from Sikhs, they completely overhauled the land administration in Punjab and tried to remodel it on modern lines.
3.1 Defining the Land Revenue Administration
Land revenue administration can be explained as “the regulatory framework institutional arrangements, systems and processes that encompass the determination, allocation, administration and information concerning land”.1
3.1.1 Explaining the System of Land Revenue Administration in Punjab
A village is called an estate, where a separate record of rights is maintained carrying the names of each and every land owner, tenant or lessee who has any claim in that land. Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to define “land” first.The Land Revenue Act does not define the word Land however, the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, defines it in Section 2, as any land occupied or let for agricultural purpose or for the purpose subservient to the agricultural or for the pasture, and includes sites or buildings and other structure on such land.”2 And the revenue generated / collected from the agricultural land is called the land revenue for the purpose of this Act. The demand for land revenue is generated twice in the agricultural year at the time of harvest of crop. The agricultural year commences on 1st July and ends at 30th June. The persons who are unable to pay the revenue to the govt. within due date are called defaulters and the demand not met or collected within the on-going fiscal year and is outstanding after the due date, is declared arrears of land revenue. Besides the land revenue outstanding, sometimes the other government departments also approach the revenue department to help them recover their outstanding dues
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from their own defaulters, then the collector may declare such demand as arrears of land revenue and the revenue officials collect it from the defaulters on a charge / fee of 2% to be paid to the revenue officials of the revenue collected as such. For sake of management and administration, the land has been divided into different units. The highest unit is Province,which is divided into nine Divisions, each headed by a Commissioner. A division comprises of a couple of districts. Each district is headed by a Collector.District is further divided into many sub-divisions or tehsils, headed by an Assistant Commissioner. The tehsil comprises of many revenue circles, each headed by a revenue officer. The revenue circles are divided into patwar circles, each headed by a patwari. Each patwari circle is contained of many revenue estates or villages and there may be two to three lambardars/village headmen in a village, representing their own patti. A revenue estate may comprise of two or three pattis, each headed by an independent lambardar.
Divison Headed by Devisional Commissioners
District Headed by Collectors
Sub Division/Tehsil headed by Assisstant Commissioner
Revenue Circle headed by a Revenue Officer
Patwar Circle headed by a Patwari
Village Headman in each Patti
Flowchart 3.1
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The land revenue administration is under the controlling authority of Senior Member, Board of Revenue (SMBR), who heads Board of Revenue. Soon after the Punjab was annexed, a Board was established to look after the newly annexed areas.Its chairman was called the Financial Commissioner. Present Board of Revenue(BOR) is the successor of that Board , the office of Financial Commissioner was abolished in 1955 to be replaced by West Pakistan BOR. Currently the Board of Revenue drives its powers from the Board of Revenue Act, 1957. It has been entrusted with the tasks of efficient maintenance of land records, management of state land, speedy resolutions of land disputes, revenue collection for the provincial government and ensures relief measures in terms of natural calamities. For the last purpose, the SMBR has also been notified as the Provincial Relief Commissioner.
Senior Member Board of Revenue (SMBR) /Provincial Relief Commissioner
MBR Colony MBR Consolidation MBR Taxes MBR Judicial 1-8
Flowchart 3.2
Member Revenue is also Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department and Chief Land Commissioner.
Member Colonies is also Secretary to the Government, Colonies Department.
Member Consolidation is also Secretary to the Government, Consolidation of Holdings Department.
Following are the attached departments / autonomous bodies of the BOR.
Directorate of Land Record.
Directorate General Relief.
Provincial Disaster Management Authority.
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Punjab Land Commission.
Punjab Privatization Board.
Major functions of the Board are;
Assessment and Collection of Land Revenue, Agriculture Income Tax, Capital Value Tax, Stamp Duty, Registration and Water Rate (Abiana)
Land Surveys and maintenance of record of rights
Registration of deeds and documents
Adjudication of revenue disputes arising out of agricultural land as an appellate court
Supervision of subordinate Revenue Courts.
Acquisition of Land under Land Acquisition Act 1894
Facilitating of farmers for agricultural loans
Act as Court of Wards
Supervise the residual work of the defunct Settlement and Rehabilitation Departments
Appointment of Lambardars
Conferment of powers under the Revenue Laws
Change of names of Villages, Tehsils and Districts
Crop inspection reports
Collection of fee under the Stamps Act and Court Fees
Printing, revision, publication and distribution of revenue manuals
Management and Disposal of State Land
Management and Disposal of Land under Thal / Cholistan Development Acts
Transfer of State Land to the Government Departments
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Jinnah Abadi Schemes for poor
Policy formulation and monitoring of rehabilitation work of the calamities affected population
Relief and Rehabilitation of displaced persons
Management of funds for calamities
Punjab Flood Commission – Planning for preventive and protective measures against Floods and Rains
3.2 Statutory Framework of Land Administration in Punjab
The edifice of land administration in Punjab has been based on a number of Acts and statutes coupled with local customs and practices. Its legal strength is derived from the Acts, Manuals and Rules delineated below:
The Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.
The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967.
Court Fee Act, 1870.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Stamp Act, 1899.
Registration Act, 1908.
Colonization of Government Land (Punjab) Act, 1912.
Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960.
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962.
Punjab Jinnah Abadis for non-Proprietors in Rural Areas Act, 1986.
Punjab Conferment of Proprietary Rights on non-Proprietors in Abadi-Deh Act, 1995.
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Punjab Agriculture Income Tax Act, 1997.
Punjab Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Rights Act, 1950.
Land Reforms Regulations 1972.
The Colony Manual
Land Records Manual
Settlement Manual
Administrative Units in Punjab Number of Divisions 09
Number of Districts 36 Number of Tehsils 137 Number of Sub Tehsils 26 Number of Kanungoi/Revenue circles 793
Number of Patwarcircles 7830 Number of Revenue Estates/Villages 25557
Table 3.1
Sanctioned Posts of Tehsildars Number of Posts of Field Tehsildars 131 Number of Posts of Settlement Tehsildars 06 Number of Posts of Consolidation Officer/Tehsildars 38 Tehsildar Posts in Headquarter (BOR) 19 Number of Ex-Cadre Posts 102 WAPDA 33 Railways 01 Banks 01 NHA 13 HBFC 09 Others 36 Total 296
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Total Sanctioned Posts of Naib Tehsildars 560
Table 3.2
Sanctioned Posts of Kanungosand Patwaris Number of Posts of Kanaungos 944 Number of Posts of Patwaris 8504 Number of Posts of Patwaris in Settlement Operations (Lahore, Gujrat and Rawalpindi) 210
Table 3.3
Section 7 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 defines the classes of revenue officers as under, a. The Board of Revenue. b. The Commissioner of the Division. c. The District Collector. d. The Assistant Collector of the first grade. e. The Assistant Collector of the second grade.
Appointment of Collectors is the subject of section 8 of Punjab Land Revenue Act which stipulates that in each District „there shall be a Collector who shall be appointed by Government, and who shall exercise throughout the District, all the powers, and discharge all the duties, of the Collector under this Act.‟3
Assistant Collectors in a tehsil appointed under section 10 of this Act may be granted all or any of the powers of the Collectors under Sub-section (1) of section 16 subject to the control of the Collector.
Under the Section 11 of this Act, the tehsildar has been entrusted with the local revenue administration of a tehsil, acting under the control and supervision of Sub-Divisional Collector (AC) of that tehsil.
Section13 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act deals with the superintendence and control of revenue officers. It states that the,
37
1. „The Board of Revenue shall be subject to the control of Government.
2. The general superintendence and control over all other Revenue Officers shall be vested in, and all such Officers shall be subordinate to, the Board of Revenue.
3. Subject to the general control of the Board of Revenue, Commissioner shall control all other Revenue Officers in the Division.
4. Subject as aforesaid and to the control of the Commissioner, a District Collector shall control all other Revenue Officers in District.‟4
Section 14 of the act, deals with the power of the Board to distribute business and withdraw and transfer cases from subordinate offices working also as revenue courts. It states;
1. „The Board of Revenue may, by written order distribute, in such manner as may be deemed fit, any business cognizable by any Revenue Officer under its control, and by like order, withdraw any case pending before any such Officer.
2. The powers exercisable by the Board of Revenue under sub-section (1) may, by like order and in like manner, be exercised by Collector in respect of any business cognizable by, or any case pending before, other Revenue Officers under their respective control.‟5
3.3 Historical Evolution of Land Revenue Administration in Punjab
The skeleton of this system was first established by Sher Shah Suri who for the first time in 1540 introduced the Land Records System is sub-continent which was further developed by Raja Todar Mal, a jewel and the revenue Minister in the court of Emperor Akbar, the great. The British, later on, further organized it more systemically by measuring each and every square of land, developed maps, took out extensive settlement operations in order to book the accurate demand of revenue against cultivated land as correctly and exactly as possible. The same system was adopted in West Pakistan after 1947.
3.3.1 Land Revenue Administration before British
Sher Shah Suri, an Afghan chieftain who ruled North India briefly after defeating Humayun, father of great Mughal Emperor Akbar. Even during his brief sojourn, Sher Shah Suri introduced a couple of valuable administrative reforms for which he is remembered till today. He had
38
designated “a group of villages as parganahs, which in turn formed larger units called Sarkars, or revenue districts, each having a chief shiqdar or revenue collector and chief munsif, the leading judicial officer.”6
Mughals modified this system even further. They also awarded the civil bureaucracy with military powers and called them mansabdars or commanders. Ain-e-Akbari by Abul Fazal who was a renowned courtier of Akbar has captured glimpses of the court and administration under Akbar. The Mughal Empire was divided into provinces or suba run by a subedar. The province or suba was further divided into shiq or sarkar, almost equivalent to a district. District was run by amalguzar or shiqdar. The parganah or group of villages was the lowest tier of administration. An agent of government used to collect the produce from the parganah. In order to improvise upon the collection system, Todar Mal, the revenue minister of Akbar and one of the nine jewels of his court, carried out survey of land and distinguished the type of land on basis of soil classification for purpose of assessment of land revenue. He also initiated the practice of maintaining the records of rights of land and practice of recording crop inspection twice a year in order to assess the produce of land as accurately as possible.
Administrative Structure under Mughals
Governor over a Province (Suba)
Shiqdar/ Faujdar/ AmalguzarShiq or Sarkar (district)
Agents Paraganah (a group of villages)
Flowchart 3.3
The divine rights of king demanded unconditional submission from its subjects. The king‟s men collected the lion‟s share and only paltry share of produce was left for bare sustenance of the farmers. The share was collected in kind and the rate of collection was arbitrary. The mansabdars
39
were not hereditary nobles but ruled during the pleasure of king. Their sanads or certificates could be revoked anytime by the king. They were empowered to maintain an army of a number authorized by the court to fight on the side of king as well as to collect the revenue, for instance, panj-hazarimanabdar or das-hazarimansabdar, meaning a mansabdar who was authorized to maintain an army of five or ten thousand soldiers. “There was no concept of ownership of land. It was temporarily granted to an amir for maintenance of his household and army subject to the payment of a fixed share to the treasury of the king. Whenever the center grew weak, the far flung provinces generally used to become independent and declared suzerainty. It was the administrative structure especially revenue management of Mughals that provided the foundation to British Empire. The British retained the original structures so far as it was expedient and modified these where necessary.”7
3.3.2 Land Administration of Punjab under British Raj
The British East India Company annexed Punjab in 1849 from the dwindling Sikh empire. It further sold Kashmir to dogra Hindu raja in exchange of Rs.75000, leaving Punjab proper for cultivation and land administration by British themselves. In war of independence in 1857, the elite in Punjab by and large cooperated with the British which earned the former titles in land as well as opportunity to be recruited in army as reliable servants in the royal army.
The vast land of Punjab also tempted the British to explore its huge agriculture and revenue potential. With a view to tap the fertile land of Punjab. They introduced an extensive irrigation system juxtaposing it with an equally effective land revenue collection and grants of land tenures. It not only generated them more wealth but also helped consolidate their political hold.
40
Administrative Structure in British India
Governor General-in- Council
Governors of Provinces
Divisional Commissioners
District Officers (Collectors, Magistrates, Law and Order)
Sub-Divisional Officer
Magistrate
Flowchart 3.4
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Annexation of Punjab-1849 Administration / Civil Divisions during British Era
1. Delhi Division 2. Jullundhur Division 3. Lahore Division 4. Rawalpindi Division 5. Multan Division
Multan Division Districts
Lyallpur Mianwali Muzaffargarh Jhang (Dist.) Multan D.G. Khan
(1904-1960) Tehsils of JhangDistt.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Jhang Chiniot Shorkot Lyallpur Samundri Toba Tek. Singh Sargodha Division (1960) Districts
Sargodha Mianwali Jhang Lyallpur Faisalabad (1977)
Lyallpur Toba Samundri Jaranwala Faisalabad Division (1st July 1982) Districts
Toba Tek. Singh Jhang Faisalabad Chiniot District Tehsils (2009) Kamalia Chiniot Jaranwala Gogra Jhang Tandlianwala Toba Tek Singh Shorkot Samundri Sadar City Faisalabad (1982) Chak Jhumra (1987)
Flow Chart 3.5
Source:-Gazetters of Multan, Jhang, Chanab Colony
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An excerpt from a report printed even before the annexation of Punjab indicates the motive behind expansion and revenue potential of Punjab.
“Punjab might become a most valuable acquisition. It possesses great mineral wealth; its agricultural produce might be almost infinitely multiplied by a judicious system of irrigation, and transit trade on five rivers, if subjected to modern tools, would furnish revenue nearly equal to the ordinary expenses of the government.”8
As early as in 1849, the government was weighing pros and cons of its nascent policy in Punjab. In this regard, a letter written by H.M. Elliot Esquire, secretary to Government of India to Lt. Colonel Sir H.M. Lawrence K.C.B. president to the Board of Administration for the Affairs of Punjab delineated the policy in following terms:
“Colonists may be invited from distant provinces to break up the soil and settle upon the land, though it is to be feared that the love of home which prevails among our agricultural classes will preclude the possibility of much advantage being derived from this source.”9
The large barren tracts between the lands of five rivers were hugely uncultivated due to absence of some sustained source of irrigation. These were termed the crown wasteland. The eastern Punjab enjoyed the blessing of monsoon rain whereas the western Punjab had sparse agriculture owing to its dependence on well irrigation. The British immediately after annexation of Punjab envisaged bringing this vast land of western Punjab under cultivation by employing the entrepreneurship of agriculturist class from eastern Punjab and by laying out an extensive network of canals dug out from rivers.
“Between 1885 and the end of British rule in 1947, the canal irrigated area in the Punjab, excluding the princely states, increased from under3,000,000 to around 14,000,000. The great bulk of this increase took place in the canal colonies, which experienced the greatest expansion in agricultural production in any part of South Asia under the British.”10
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Imran Ali in his research endeavor „The Punjab under Imperialism (1885-1947)‟ has beautifully encapsulated the colonization scheme in Punjab under British in the following manner.
“The great agricultural colonization schemes undertaken in the western Punjab during British rule turned this area into virtual human laboratory, as castes, clans, and tribes from different parts of the province converged on the new lands….the Pakistani Punjab, where these „canal colonies‟ are situated, still depends predominantly for its agrarian viability on the irrigations schemes initiated during the past century….the eastern parts of the old Punjab, now in India, provided large numbers of colonists to these tracts.”11
Colonization Schemes There were nine canal colonies in all, established on lands of Bari, Rechna, and Jech doabs. These schemes included the Sidhnai, Sohag Para, and Chunian colonies. Relatively larger schemes were initiated namely, Lower Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab, Lower Chenab and Nili Bar. Upper Chenab and Upper Jhelum were also smaller schemes. The names of these colonization schemes are as under (table: 3.4).
The Sidhnai Canal Colony The Sohag-Para Canal Colony The Lower Chenab Canal Colony The Chunian Canal Colony The Lower Jhelum Canal Colony The Jhang Canal Colony The Lower Bari Doab Canal Colony The Upper Chenab Colony The Upper Jhelum Colony The Nili Bar Colony
The largest of these were the Chenab colony situated at the river Chenab wherein district Lyallpur was established. The officially stated objectives of the largest project, Chenab Colony, has been delineated in the Chenab Colony Gazetteer (1904) as such,
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1. “To relieve the pressure of population upon the land in those districts of the Province where the agricultural population has already reached or is fast approaching the limit which the land available to agriculture can support.
2. To colonize the area in question with the well to do yeoman of the best class of agriculturists, who will cultivate their own holdings with the aid of their families and usual menials, but as much as possible without the aid of tenants, and will constitute healthy agricultural communities of the best Punjab type.”12
To these objectives Imran Ali has added a third objective also that is to improve the quality of life of the villagers in these colonies by means of establishing model village sites and accordingly its allotment too.13
Well, the first two are historical facts of British Colonial Policy in Punjab. But the third objective added by Ali is actually not an objective but a by-product of this policy. It is small wonder that the native nomadic population or “Jangli” became inhabited and settled in these model villages where they could live in ease, peace and with a small measure of civic sense. These villages had residential plots, graveyards and villages ponds for drinking water. A new social class emerged in these settlements whose interests were closely aligned to that of the ruling colonists. That‟s how, they became legitimate political successors after independence.
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Canal Colonies Where Situated in Punjab14 Name of Period of Doab Districts Name of Estimated cost of Colony Colonization Canal Construction (000) Work Sidhnai 1886-1888 Bari Multan Sidhnai 1,301 Sohag para 1886-1888 Bari Montgomery Lower Sohag 1,803 Para Chunian 1896-1898 Bari Lahore Upper Bari * 1904-1906 Doab Chenab 1892-1905 Rechna Gujranwala, Jhang, Lower 53,072 1926-1930 Lyallpur, Lahore, Chenab Sheikhupura Jhelum 1902-1906 Jech Shahpur, Jhang Lower 43,613 Jhelum Lower Bari 1914-1924 Bari Montgomery, Multan Lower Bari 25,086 Doab Doab Upper 1915-1919 Rechna Gujranwala, Sialkot, Upper 43,596 Chenab Sheikhupura Chenab Upper 1916-1921 Jech Gujrat Upper 49,770 Jhelum Jhelum Nili Bar 1926-** Bari Montgomery, Multan Sutlej Valley 83,787 Project Table 3.4
*Chunian Colony obtained irrigation from southern extension of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, Which Was constructed in the 1860s to provide irrigation to proprietary lands in Amritsar and Lahore districts.
**Not Completed by 1940s.
Source: PCM, pp. 2-25; and statement II-G in Administrative Report of the Punjab Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch), 1945-1946.
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The Colonization Scheme of Chenab Colony Colonization scheme cannot be discussed in isolation of the irrigation plan actually the later preceded the former. The plan for construction of artificial irrigation system to water the parched tracts of Rachna Doab was in the pipeline since 1862. Various feasibility reports were prepared which could not get green signal because of inadequacy of estimates and uncertainty of financial return.
It was in 1882, that the government selected the Lower Chenab Canal Project. This canal was originally designed as an inundation canal for the irrigation of the portions of the Jhang and Gujranwala Districts. The head was situated at Garh Golah on the left bank of Chenab, and it was anticipated that it would command 881 square miles, of which 164square miles would be Crown waste available for colonists. The discharge was to be 1800 cubic feet per second that expected to irrigate 144,000 acres of land, 25.4 per cent of entire area. The canal was opened in 1887. But in 1989 it was decided to convert it into a perennial canal of first magnitude.
The revised project of 1891 was estimated to cost Rs.2,65,15,966, out of which sum Rs. 2, 56, 84, 175 were shown as direct and Rs. 8, 31, 791 as indirect charges. It was anticipated that the canal would actually irrigate 528, 500 acres in 1899-1900, 993,000 in 1909-10, and that it would reach a full development of 1,100,000 acres in 1914-15, with its head-works at Khanki, a village in Gujranwala district, 8 miles below Wazirabad.15 The project got the sanction of Secretary of State in July 1892.
The Gazetteer of 1904 noted that the subsequent extensions of the initial project expected to bring 6,013 sq miles under irrigation and that of colony to 4,431 sq miles. Consequently revenue increased too. The main line of canal had a bed-width of 250 feet, and had run with a depth of about 11 feet and a discharge of 11,000 cubic feet per second.
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Branches of the Lower Chenab Canal 1. Gugera Branch Upper The larger branch of the canal with a length of 56 miles takes off at Sagar and carries about one-half the whole supply. Gugera and its branches irrigate the South-Eastern side of the Colony nearer to river Ravi.
2. Lower Gugera Branch 81 miles
3. Burala Branch 46 miles
4. Jhang Branch Upper The second largest branch of the system and carries about 3,000 cubic feet per second with a length of 69 miles, irrigates North-Western side of Colony.
5. Lower Jhang Branch 38 miles
6. Bhowana Branch 7.5 miles
7. Rakh Branch 52.5 miles * Rakh and Mian Ali Branches irrigate the central portion of colony, former being more Northerly. 8. Mian Ali Branch 27 miles Beyond the tail of the Rakh branch near Pacca Anna, the irrigation boundaries of the Jhang and Gugera system meet. The total length of these main channels is 426 miles. From these branches the distributaries and water channels have been designed to carry water to the land. In 1902-03, the total length of distributaries was 2,254 miles. There were 43 miles of escape channels and the water courses of a total length of 11,000 miles which took off from the distributaries. The total capital cost of the project up to end of 1903-04 was Rs. 280 lakhs with a profit margin of 24% on the capital invested. The revenue was expected to multiply manifold in the coming years as the concluding lines in Imperial Gazetteer of Punjab, describe;
“The canal has thus not only enormously relieved the pressure of population in the congested districts of Punjab, but has proved a most remunerative investment, besides adding largely to the wealth of the country.”16
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The Colonization Begins The Chenab colony comprised at that time of Faisalabad, Khanqah Dogran, and a part of district Jhang, Chiniot and Gujranwala. “The land of Chenab Colony was for the most part Government waste, and was thus adapted for colonization on a scale hitherto untried in the history of India, if not of the World.”17
As early as in 1887, the allotment had been started under the Occupancy Tenants or Dakhilkari Scheme. Every family was allotted one Sq of land under this scheme. Property rights were to be granted later on subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. The terms and conditions were revised afterwards. For the purpose of distributing the land and of settling the colonists in villages, a special Colonization Officer was appointed with headquarters at Lyallpur (in 1907, the D.C. was given these powers). In year 1903-04, there were about 1,423 villages, the average size being about 50 sq or 1,400 acres. The work of colonization began in earnest in 1892 under E. D. Maclagan, D.S., the then Colonization Officer.
Selection of Colonists On the first stage, the grantees were divided into three categories.
Distribution of land in Chenab Colony
Type Area Allotted Criterion
Capitalists 6-20 sq of land Selected by Financial Commissioners
Yeomen 4-5 sq of land Hindu & Muslim Jats-Rajputs
Peasants ½ to 3sq of land Jat, Kamboh, Sainis, Arains from E. Punjab
Table 3.5
Source: The Gazetteer of Chenab Colony
In subsequent allotments, other means of disposal of land were also adopted e.g.
Sale by Auction Camel Service Grants Military Pensioners Police Grants
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The capitalist grantees were well-to-do settlers who were expected to pay a handsome amount when the time came for grant of Property rights of the said allotment. Their tracts of land allotted to them were bigger than those of the peasant and yeomen grantees. The yeoman also belonged to the agricultural class. Ali has explained the composition and scheme of yeoman grants in following words.
“These Yeomen are simply the leading individuals among the peasant class---men who by wealth, energy or ability have raised themselves above their fellows without ceasing to belong to the agricultural population. . . . They were intending to attract the class which is not infrequently met in parts of province, viz., the men who without attaining to the ranks of the richer gentry are still well above the ordinary level of the peasant land-owner. Naturally this class comprises some of the most intelligent and enterprising men in agricultural community. They have good credit and resources, and if they can be attracted to the land should form most useful members of the new colony.”18 By the same token, the camel serving grantees who were predominantly Biloch herdsmen on the bank of river Ravi, they were expected to provide camels to the government when the occasion presented itself.
The division was based on the different terms of allotment and the range of the land allotted. Absentee landlords were discouraged. Preference was accorded to leading agriculturalists families from Central Punjab. Moneyed classes were not encouraged. When the landlords started selling their land to moneyed class frequently, in order to curb this trend the Land Alienation Act was imposed in 1901.
Phase 1 (1892): Allotment on Rakh & Mian Ali Branches
Almost 40,000 acres were reserved for allotment to capitalists, 60,000 to yeomen grantees and 27,000 to peasants. 10,000 acres were meant to be sold for auction and 20,000 acres were reserved for forests.
The old cattle breeding class of bar nomads were preferred for peasant allotments at this stage, firstly because they were good cultivators secondly to buy their cooperation for outside settlers. By the end of 1904, they had got 253,752 acres in peasant grants and 79,633 acres under camel service terms.
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Village plan here was simplest of all. Actually no such plan was made at this stage which required measurement of all sites as well as records of rights; a flaw rectified subsequently. Harrals, one of the strongest among Jangli or nomad tribes got grants on Rakh Branch. The allotments were also made to Mazhabi, pensioner grantees, and Auction land to Christian missions e.g. Roman Catholic Mission on Rakh Branch. The later also named their villages as such, e.g., Maryabad.
Phase 2 (1896): Allotment on Jhang & Bhowana Branches Breakup of Auction sales in The Railways were established as far as Lyallpur in 1896. Chenab Colony The system of telegraph had been introduced and a network of water courses was underway. Against this Auction Sales 10,000 (acres) backdrop, the upper part of Jhang Branch canal was Capitalists 35,000 opened for allotment. Considering the performance of Military Yeomen 14,000 Capitalist and Yeoman Grantees along Rakh Branch unsatisfactory, their share in this new allotment was Military peasants 56,000 reduced as against the Peasant grantees. This area was Punjab Police 5,000 deemed a bit inferior in soil quality than the earlier Burma Military Police 1,000 allotments. Quite a number of grants were exchanged too. The process of allotment along Jhang Branch was Nomad peasants 544,000 completed by 1898. Total 700,000
Table 3.6
Source: The Gazetteer of Chenab Colony
The Jhang Branch plan for peasant villages set a standard. „The Bharwana clan of Sial caste received Yeoman‟s grants mostly on the Bhowana Branch in Jhang and Chiniot. Other Sial clans which got the land were Maghiana, Bhojuana, Patuana, Rajbana, Lakhuana and Khanuana, almost all Sial clan names end in ana‟. Qureshis, Mazhabi and pensioner grantees also got the allotments. The manner in which these villages were named is also very interesting, for example, the chak 424 JB Montgomerywala was named after the then Settlement Commissioner.
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Phase 3 (1898): Allotment on Gugera & Burala Branches
The allot able land here was initially estimated to be around 700,000 acres. Break-up has been given above.
It took two years to complete the allotment process in this phase. The beauty of this entire process was that it progressed with the supply of canal water, railways, telegraph and other means of communication. The possibility of canal extensions and further allotments was not ruled out. However, major work of this arduous undertaking (colonization) had been accomplished during these three phases. A Rubicon had been crossed.
The village plan at Gugera Branch was the best of previous sites. Among others, Vattus; not a prominent tribe at that time, were granted land here as nomads and Hitharis. Biloch nomads were given the camel service grants, and the missionary societies were also allotted land and entire villages were inhabited by Christian converts, for instance, chak 371 GB Batemanabad was named after a missionary.
Distribution of Colonists by Religion and Tribe
It appears from the colonization plan that in the first phase many things were not anticipated. The village sites were haphazard and the allotments were not organized on basis of castes. The estates on the Rakh and Mian Ali Branches are not homogenous by tribe or religion. Rather each caste and religion got their representation without a specific design. This fact has been admitted by the Colonization Officer himself in his report. A defect soon remedied in subsequent phases. Though no hard and fast rules were ever followed in this regard yet it can be safely stated that „center of the colony was occupied by Hindu Jats, the inner ring by Muhammadan Jats, Arains, Gujjars and Rajputs, and the outer ring by nomads of the Bar(Janglis), including Camel Service Grantees, and men from riverain villages called Hitharis. Villages had been named usually after their elders or patrons. The elder from the leading tribe was appointed as the headman. There could be two to three headmen in a village. Sometimes the Zaildars were also appointed from among the colonists. This division disturbed in 1947 when a large number of immigrants came and were awarded land in colony districts.
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Square System
The square system was introduced here by the British regime as an attempt to organize the agriculture and assessment of crop. The huge tract of colony was divided into sq by the revenue officers on the base line laid with a Theodolite by the Irrigation Department. On the Rakh and Jhang Branches there are several base lines, while on the Bhowana Branch, the number is excessive. While whole of the Gugera branch is on one base line only.
Units of measurement of Land
12 Karams make a Gunter‟s chain
1 Karam = 5 feet 6 inches
1 sqkaram = 1 Sarsahi
9 sarsahis = 1 marla
20 marlas = 1 kanal
8 kanals = 1 acre (ghumao)
Theoretically each square is a rectangular figure with sides of 200 karams or 1,100 feet. The area of a sq is approx. 27.78 acres. In practice, sq may be sometime slightly larger or smaller.
Killabandior the Square System
The square was the basic unit of allotment. After the square system was adopted, the allotees started drawing haphazard fields within the sq for cultivation. Then, the Colonization Officer, Sir Popham Young, devised a system of Killabandi.
The Killabandi aimed at,
„dividing each square into 25 small squares or Killas each 220 feet by 220 feet, the area being 1 ghumao 18 marlas‟.
Due to the successful implementation of Killabandi the idea was adopted in other colony districts also i.e., Jhelum and Gujranwala. Non-implementation of Killabandi was liable to be punished k2under the rule 32 of The Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. Like squares, these were also not
53
perfect. But they saved time, effort and resource to re-measure every piece of land and assessment of crop yield could easily be calculated.
Village Plan
Initially the village plan escaped the attention of pioneers of Chenab Colony project. Later on, recognizing its significance in planned development a check-list was devised keeping in view the fundamental requirements. Gradual improvement can be observed in site plans from phase 1 to phase 3 of colonization. In each village an area of one sq had been allotted in the center of the estate for the village site. Another sq of same dimensions was also reserved in most cases for future growth.
Two printed site plans used to be issued containing the names and indicating the area allotted. One copy was kept at office whereas the other was given to patwari for implementation. It was obligatory for grantee except when otherwise provided, to build a house in the estate in which he was granted land. The grantees also brought their accommodation habits and styles of construction with them. They built their dwellings in their native style. This also has been summed up in the Gazetteer of 1904 as distinct dwelling habits of the Ludhiana Grantees, Jullundhar Grantees, and Amritsar Grantees. The villages were named officially after the appointment of Lambardar or village headman. Despite that the villages were denominated by their numbers for sake of administrative convenience. There are three distinct sets of serial numbers.
Rakh and Mian Ali 1-209 Jhang & Bhowana 1-504 Gugera & Burala 1-623
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Chenab Colony: Allotment of Land19 Type of Rakh Jhang Gugera Estensiona Total Grant Branch Branch Branch Acres Acres Acres Acres Acres % % % % % Colonization Scheme
Peasant 280,000 500,000 544,000 ____ 1,324,000 70.00 91.0 77.7 80.2 Yeoman 60,000 25,000 35,000 ____ 120,000 15.0 4.5 5 7.3 Capitalist 60,000 25,000 45,000 ____ 130,000 15.0 4.5 6.4 7.9 Police ______6,000 ____ 6,000 0.9 0.4 Military ______70,000 ____ 70,000 10 4.2 Total 400,000 550,000 700,000 ____ 1,650,000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Final Distribution
Peasant 342,768 439,431 542,652 103,829 1,428,680 75.0 81.2 77.7 81.1 78.3 Yeoman 44,331 38,461 58,250 8,834 149,876 9.7 7.1 8.3 6.9 8.2 Capitalist 38,390 30,580 50,921 8,450 128,341 8.4 5.7 7.3 6.6 7 Miscellaneous 31,535 32,626 46,774 6,913 117,848 6.9 6.0 6.7 5.4 6.5 Total 457,024 541,098 698,597 128,026 1,824,745 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3.7
NOTES: a. These extensions were the Bahlak, Bhangu, Nahra, Nupewala, Dangali, and Killianwala. The figures do not include three extensions opened up during 1926-1930: Pir Mahal, Khika, and Buralla. b. Includes auction purchasers. c. Does not include 81,464 acres of privately owned land that fell within the boundaries of Chenab Colony. SOURCE: Imran Ali, “The Punjab Canal Colonies, 1885-1940” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, 1980)
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3.3.3 Land Administration in Post Colonial Punjab
In 1947, when sub continent got independence, Punjab was also divided into Eastern Punjab and Western Punjab. Western Punjab became part of newly emerged state of Pakistan. Eastern Punjab was further divided into three provinces by the Indian government owing to administrative issues. It is the western Punjab where the phenomenon of canal colonies took place.
Before discussing the socio economic and political transformation in the post colonial society, it will be pertinent to thrash out the structural changes introduced in the system. Since its inception, a great emphasis and rhetoric was made regarding getting rid of colonial system/structures and images. The system of district administration also came under fire. Many small changes were introduced from time to time under different regimes, most notable of these which were introduced under the Bhutto regime during 1970s and in the 1990s by the government of Benazir Bhutto. However, the Musharraf regime gave top priority to the introduction of a new local government system which abruptly changed the scheme of the things in the district setup. The new system which was introduced under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO) 2001 abolished the institution of magistracy as well as placed the police under the direct control of provincial government leaving a huge void between the district police and the district administration. Background of this development was that the concentration of judicial and executive functions both in hand of a single officer was much criticized since long. However, advantages behind this scheme of things had been enunciated by the British in the following manner.
“The influence and the opportunity of beneficial exertion which results from this are great. It is essential to the advancement of the public interest, entrusted to the Collector (DC) that complete security of life and property should exist throughout the district. It is essential to the development of industry that all lawless violence should be repressed and so repressed as least to interfere with the comfort and welfare of the peaceful and well disposed. The strong establishments in the revenue department may be made the efficient agents for strengthening and regulating the police and the magistrate, in the discharge of his duties as Collector, will have opened out to him channels of information and sources of influence which, when duly improved, cannot fail to exercise a most beneficial effect.”20(Section 6(2) and (3) of Act, XVII of 1887).
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Flowchart of City Government post – devolution Scenario
Flow Chart 3.6
Source:
CITY DISTRICT NAZIM
CITY DISTRICT NAIB DISTRICT COORD NAZIM OFFICER
EDO EDO IT EDO EDO EDO EDO Revenue Health LAW W&S Literacy
DO DO E&T DO DO DO DO Revenue Health Roads Buildings Housing
EDO EDO F&P EDO CD EDO Education Agriculture
DO SW DO Agri. DO Forest DO DO DO DO Planning Account DO Labour Colleges Secondary s DO DO WM Livestock
DO F&B DO F&I DO Coop. DO Fishers DO Agri. Engg.
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It transpires after going through the relevant manuals and statutes that the District Collector was the head of district administration and was deemed to be the most reliable person in the district by dint of his office. It has been highlighted by Thomson in his „Directions for Collector‟ edition of 1850, paragraph 27.
“Nothing can pass in the district of which it is not the duty of Collector to keep himself informed and to watch the operation. The vicissitudes of trade, the administration of civil justice, the progress of public work, must all affect materially the interests of the classes of whom he is the constituted guardian. Officious interference in matters beyond his immediate control must be avoided, but temperate and intelligent remonstrance against anything which he sees to be wrong is one of his most important duties.”21
This unequivocal supremacy was the need of the hour during the early period of British colonial administration of Punjab which was challenged subsequently by the native intelligentsia in post World War I scenario in the wake of nationalist sentiments among indigenous population. Since then, the office of the DC started shedding many of its powers. The process which was spurred in previous decades reached a climax in 2001 under the Musharraf regime. Under the objective of decentralization, a set of new offices was created under the District Collector who was now renamed the DCO. The real structure of district government which emerged now as devolution of powers scheme was a complex one which did away with an effective system of checks and balances among key departments of district. Though, the DCO is still the head of the eleven devolved departments but he was placed under the control of Nazim, an elected public representative in the district. Since 2008, the elections of local bodies have not been held in Punjab entrusting the role of the district Administrator to the DCO/DC through an executive order. It is another anomaly of present system, where the powers again have been centralized in one office. But it is ironic to note for the chagrin of public that this stop gap arrangement since 2008 leaves much to desire for coordination among DC, DPO and D&SJ, the three heads of their respective departments in the district.
Partition of Punjab changed its geographical boundaries. The political scenario that had started unfolding in early nineteenth century in unified Punjab manifested itself fully in post-colonial environment. It was marked and marred at the same time by the agitational-coalitional politics and biradri-ism. The political elite that emerged soon after the emergence of Pakistan in the West Punjab was feudal land lords protected and nurtured during the British Raj. Earlier they were being patronized by the British regime and were allowed to play only limited political role. But after 1947, they were completely independent to toe their interests, which they did. This agriculture class when found its way in the corridors of power, it directly affected the land administration and agriculture policies in Punjab.
Besides these agrarian political elite, there emerged other interest groups. There emerged a growing class of lawyers or legal practitioners due to chronic litigation among the agriculture class. But in recent years, the role of lawyers has undergone a negative transformation. Primary reasons for that is absence of an effective enforcement mechanism since scrapping of magistracy in 2001 as well as
58 the deteriorating writ of the administration due to increase in political intervention in the system. This saddening fact has been highlighted time and again in recent years since introduction of PLGO 2001, with the sporadic butorganized incidents of violence by lawyers in different cities in Punjab. Where they took law and order situation in their hands and challenged the writ of the administration by beating up police officials, revenue officials or judges or officials in local judiciary on trivial issues. Result is weakening of the image of the local government institutions and difficulty in performing their tasks.
The other interest group which emerged was media which in most cases manipulated the facts. The role of both electronic and print media has to be assessed with a pinch of salt. Instead of reporting the matters objectively, many local reporters try to have their own axe to grind by blackmailing the revenue field staff on petty matters or camouflaging them where their extortion and corruption needs to be exposed.
Due to increase in the level of political intervention in the working of administration, there has emerged a strong land mafia in every district that is ever ready for illegal occupation of state land most often with the aid of political patronage or usually with the connivance of the local revenue field formation. The pronounced nexus between the local political elite with that of revenue formation in the district especially the patwaris and kanungos and revenue officers has further added insult to injury in the already weakening structures of revenue administration.
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Hierarchy of Revenue Board of Department in Revenue Punjab
Divisional Commissioner
Deputy Commissioner/DCO
Addittional Commissioner
Assistant Commissioner
Tehsildar
Naib Tehsildar
Gardawar/ Kanungoh
Patwari
Village Headman/ Lumberdar
Village Chowkidar
Flowchart 3.7
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3.3.4 Functions of the Land Revenue Administration a. Revenue Specific Functions
o Assessment and collection of land revenue, cesses, rents and fees as levied under different statutes to be recovered by the provincial revenue department to be deposited in the government exchequer. It include, Water Rate, Local Rate, Agriculture Income Tax, Mutation Fees, Stamp Duty, Registration Fee, Rent of Government Lands and many other miscellaneous government dues such as court fee or fines etc.
o Adjudication of disputes arising out of land and which fall under the purview of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, Colonization Act and Tenancy Act which have been supplemented by various rules and manuals. Dispensation of justice in the revenue courts is based on a system of hierarchical control of checks and balances. The general conduct of revenue courts is governed under the Code of Civil Procedures (CPC) and Code of Criminal Procedures (Cr.P.C) as applicable in civil and criminal matters to be tried by independent judiciary.
o Acquisition of Land for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. For this purpose, a land acquisition collector (LAC), usually the AC concerned is appointed who selects and assesses the value of land to be acquired under the relevant Act in congruence with the requirements of the project or matter in hand. o Maintenance of Record of Rights or periodical record carrying basic information about the type and ownership of land as to who is tilling the land whether owner himself or through tenant. It contains all relevant but minute information about every inch of the land in a revenue estate for purpose of assessment and collection of revenue.
o Where ever there is the state land, i.e., the land owned by any state department, the district collector is the custodian of that land under the Colonization Act and is liable for its protection and keeping it free from encroachment and illegal occupation.
o Harvest or crop inspection or Girdawri in common parlance, twice in a year is also the responsibility of the revenue administration. Each patwari in his patwar circle is responsible for inspecting all fields whether cultivated or not and also note in his crop inspection register the change of harvest and ownership if any on ground so as to keep his record updated. The field kanungo, naib-tehsildar, the tehsildar, AC, ADC, and the District Collector are also required to tour and examine record along with site inspections according to the instructions regarding checking of Girdawari or crop issued by the Board with reference to circular No. 60, dated 25.10.1982,
61 issued by the Director of Land Records, Punjab, placed as annex E. The purpose of crop inspection was to cross check the change in tendency or ownership of land as well as the yield of crop in a given area for a specific harvest. Therefore, it also served as a mechanism of control and supervision of land records by the revenue hierarchy.
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Nature of Work Standard Prescribed Duration
Responsibility of Gardawar and Patwari for Crop Inspection
i. Attestation of changes 100% Within month of completion in cultivation, of Girdawari possession on rent etc, after spot inspection.
ii. Checking of Girdawari At least 10% of the total Within 15 days after for verification of field numbers in each village completion of the Girdawari. crops sown etc. of his circle
iii. Checking of page-wise 100% ----- do----- totals of register
Girdawari& its comparison with the jinswar(produce) statement Revenue Officers (Naib Tehisidars, Tehsildars& Consolidation Officers) iv. Attestation of changes 100% Within two months after in cultivations, in the completion of the Girdawari. presence of right- holders v. Checking of Girdawari At least one village of each Within 15 days after for verification of patwarcircle under the charge completion of the Girdawari. crops down etc. (not least than 5% of the total khasara numbers of the village).
Assistant Commissioners/Political Assistants/Colonization Officers vi. Checking of At least 3 villages in each Within one month after Girdawari. revenue circle under his completion of the Girdawari. charges.
Deputy Commissioners /Additional Deputy Commissioners/ Settlement Officers vii. Sample checking of At least one village of each Within one month after Girdawari. tehsil in the District completion Commissioners/ Additional Commissioners viii. Sample checking of At least one village of each Girdawari . district in the Division. Table 3.8
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o Consolidation operation and Settlement operations are to be carried out after regular intervals. The purpose is to reorganize the titles of land anew after approximately 30 years as in settlement operation. Both of these are huge and protracted exercises needed to be done minutely and thoroughly. At some revenue estates in Punjab, the settlement operation is in the pipeline. Veteran revenue tehsildars are appointed as the Settlement Officers or as the Consolidation Officers to carry out this onerous task. b. Miscellaneous Functions
The scope of the revenue administration has been broadened under Section 19 of the Land Revenue Act stipulating that „any other task which may be conferred upon them‟ that is the revenue officers. Therefore, the revenue hierarchy has been entrusted with many tasks of the nature of general administration described as under:
o To ensure price control of commodities of daily use or edibles like vegetables and fruits, by acting as price control magistrates under the Price Control Act, authorized to conduct the summary trial on spot and announce a fine up to 25000 or a punishment of two days in jail which is not appealable or a fine up to one lac or an announcement of sentence of up to three years in jail appealable in a civil court. The revenue officers, naib-tehsildar, tehsildar, AC and ADC are entrusted the magisterial powers by the Home Department under this Act.
o Spearheading miscellaneous campaigns for selling of commodities of daily use at subsidized and controlled rates to avoid black marketing such as flour, sugar, wheat or fertilizers.
o Undertaking assignments or campaigns to curb illegal activities with the assistance of the police department, for instance, illegal sale and purchase of decanting of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), stoppage of kite flying under Kite Flying Act, checking and controlling illegal weighbridges in the area of its jurisdiction to protect poor farmers from exploitation of the nexus of the industrialists and commission agents and also check weights and measures in general markets with the assistance of the Labor department, to name a few special campaigns.
o Organizing bazaars and markets under Local Government Ordinance, 2001, for selling of cheap goods of daily use with the assistance of local traders and retailers for general public especially in the month of Ramzan.
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o Special efforts to mobilize local philanthropists and well to do industrialists, farmers or civic community in an event of natural calamity, e.g., floods and earthquakes.
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Chapter 4
An Evaluation of Revenue Collection In District Faisalabad: Data Analysis 2001-2013
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Map 4.1
Map of Pakistan
67
Map 4.2
Map of Punjab Province, Pakistan
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Map 4.3
Map of Faisalabad
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Lyallpur which started as a Mandi Town 1897, graduated to a full-fledged district in 1904 and renamed Faisalabad in 1977 has now attain the status of a division with three more districts in its fold, namely Jhang, Toba Tek Singh and Chiniot.
Geographically, district Faisalabad is located in northeast Punjab, between longitude 73°74 East, latitude 30°31.5 North, with an elevation of 184 meters (604 ft) above sea level. The city or urban center covers an area of approximately 1,230 square kilometers (470 sq mi), while the entire district including rural areas is spread over more than 16,000 square kilometers (6,200 sq mi).
4.1 Land Revenue Defined
Land has been defined in the Civil Procedures Code or CPC, as „earth and anything attached or fastened to the earth‟.1
Whereas the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 defines “Land Revenue assessed or assessable under this Act, or any other law for the time being in force relating to Land Revenue, and includes any rates imposed on account of increase in the value of land due to irrigation.”2
Rates have further been defined as rates and cesses primarily payable by land owners, and include, a. The local rate, if any payable under any law for the time being in force, and any fee similarly leviable from landowners for the use of benefits derived from embankments and works for supply or storage of water for agricultural purposes and for the observation and reclamation of soil and drainage and reclamation of swamps; b. Any annual rate chargeable on owners of land under any law for the time being in force for the benefits derived from drainage works carried on for the public health, or for the improvement of land or for the proper cultivation or irrigation thereof, or for the protection from floods or other accumulations of water, or from erosion by a river; c. Village officers cess; and d. Any sum payable on account of village expenses; whereas
Rent means „whatever is payable to a landlord in money or kind by a tenant on account of the use or occupation of land held by him, but shall not include any cess, or other contribution or due or any free personal service;3
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Land revenue is the revenue collected on the agriculture land and its produce. Agriculture year in Punjab commences on 1st July of each year and ends at 30th June. There are two crops kharif in September and rabi in April. Major cash crops of kharif are rice, and rabi crops are wheat and cotton. When the crop is ready, an inspection or girdawari is carried out by the revenue officials twice a year to inspect the change in cultivation on site as well as the cultivator so as to book the demand of revenue accordingly keeping in view the nature of land, harvest and its yield. Demand for Agriculture Income Tax (AIT) is also booked twice a year after crop inspection, once in mid November and the other in mid April. The demand for Water Rate or Abiana is booked once in a year at the resumption of the agriculture year on July 1st by the irrigation department.
It is apt to mention here that the land has been broadly classified into two main categories for sake of assessment of land revenue, irrigated and unirrigated land. The Land Revenue Act defines both under section 4 sub section 10 and section 4 sub section 27(a) respectively. Irrigated Land means „land irrigated by a canal, tube-well, well, Jhalar, Karez, spring or any other means of irrigation.‟4whereas the unirrigated land has been defined as „land other than irrigated land, and includes land fed by rains, floods, hill torrents and uncultivable or wasteland.‟5
Though there are traditionally multiple sorts of dues and rents, fee and fines collected by the revenue department which include the mutation fee, stamp duty, Capital Value Tax or CVT on commercial property, court fee on receipts and challans to be submitted to any court of law in connection to any case instituted therein. Besides that, there is rent, lagan or pata that is recovered from the tenants of the government lands who have been granted the right of cultivation of the government land subject to relevant conditions governing that scheme but the government retains the proprietary rights and in case of Punjab government, the colonies department, BOR.
The tenancy rights are transferable under the section 19 of the Colonization Act with the approval of the District Collector. However, if a tenant fulfills all the conditions, he may be awarded the proprietary rights by the government under the relevant scheme. These are multiple schemes, for instance,
Dakhilkari Scheme
Well Sinking Scheme
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Abadkari Scheme
Temporary Cultivation Scheme
The Grow More Food Scheme
The Live Stock Breeding Scheme
The Remount Breeding Scheme
The Mangla Dam Scheme, etc.
4.2 Mechanism of Collection of Land Revenue
The Chapter VIII of the Lak8nd Revenue Act, 1967 has been dedicated to the collections of land revenue. Section 746 of this Act fixes the liability for payment of land revenue on the land owner and it is deemed as the „first charge on the produce on lands, rents and profits‟.7 However, if a defaulter of the land revenue reneges on his commitments and is unable to meet his liability accruing from his land despite repeated verbal directions and notices,then the coercive actions against such a defaulter are initiated under section 80 of the Act8. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, an arrear of land revenue may be recovered through any one or more of the following processes, namely a) By service of a notice of demand on the defaulter under Section 81; b) By arrest and detention of his person under Section 82; c) By distress and sale of his movable property and uncut or un gathered crops under Section 83; d) By transfer, under Section 84, of the holding in respective of which the arrear is due; e) By attachment, under Section 85, of the holding in respect of which the arrear is due; f) By annulment, under Section 86, of the assessment of that holding; g) By sale of that holding under Section 88; h) By proceedings against other immovable property of the defaulter under Section 90.‟
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These are the powers to be exercised by the revenue officers to ensure 100 percent collection of the land revenue from the defaulters.
The District Collector may also impose fine and confiscate the crop if sown illegally on the state land of which he is a custodian under the Colonization Act. He may also announce any arrears of other departments on their request to be declared as the arrears of the land revenue to be collected by the revenue department on the deduction of two per cent charges to be paid to the revenue department for rendering its services to some other government department.
4.3 Selection of Indicators to Evaluate the Performance of Revenue Department in District Faisalabad
The Punjab Revenue department has traditionally been assigned to collect land revenue in the province as well as affect multiple recoveries on behalf of the various other provincial departments from the defaulters under the Land Revenue Act, 1967. Originally, it collects Water Rate, AIT, Local Rate, Mutation fee, Stamp duty, Registration fee, CVT, Government dues, and various other fees and rents from the tenants of the government as well as any other fee or fine levied by some court or law to be collected on some decree or from some judgment-debtor.
However, for sake of this research study, three main indicators have been selected to evaluate the performance of the Punjab Revenue Department. These are Water rate, AIT and Local rate. Reason for excluding other indicators is that these three are purely related to agricultural land. Recovery of which is still largely dependent on the direct effort of the state departments. Whereas, Mutation fee levied as the transfer of land from one owner to another is levied though both on rural and urban land transfer on a minimum fixed rate to be depositek8d in the government exchequer. The collection in this head of income is very high though leakages are there. But this indicator of recovery has been excluded from scope of because it is „automatically‟ paid by a buyer of one land through a challan/receipt in government treasury without it transaction is not deemed to be final. So the onus of its payment falls primarily on the private parties involved in land transfer. Default on it creates infirmity in the transaction of land transfer. Besides that, the real growth in the collection of revenue as well as the efforts of the revenue department cannot be judged from the growth in collection of Mutation fee, CVT, Registration fee and Stamp duty, because of the following reasons.
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1. The onus of its payment is primarily falls on the private parties involved because the transaction of the property is not complete without deposit of fixed percentage of such fee. In order to secure the transaction and his property the buyer makes sure the payment of the fee and submission of receipt at the time of passing of „Mutation‟ (transfer) of land by the revenue officer of agricultural property and by the registrar in case of urban immovable property.
2. By the same token, the CVT, Registration fee and Stamp duty are levied on urban immovable property only which may be either commercial or residential. CVT is levied on urban commercial property. But these three taxes on land transfer are paid by the buyer on a fixed rate in government exchequer. Responsibility of which lies with the private owner of the land who is anxious to secure its investment by paying the requisite fee directly to the public exchequer to ensure finality of transaction of his ownership.
3. Besides that, the collection and record keeping of CVT, Registration fee, Stamp duty are responsibility of Registration office. These are deposited directly in the bank by the buyer of the land or his agents. Receipts are affixed with record. Registration office, though, a part of the revenue department reports directly to the District Collector who is also the Registrar of the District by virtue of his office. He supervises the work of sub-registrars, the in charges of respective registration branches concerned with land transfer of the urban immovable property. Whereas the revenue officers that is Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars are responsible for land transfer in the rural areas and they also report to DC who is also a senior revenue officer. However, the revenue field staff is responsible for effective recovery in the agricultural areas from the land owners in the shape of Water rate, AIT and Local rate.
4. An important factor in excluding the CVT, Registration fee, Stamp duty, Mutation fee and other fees and fines from the scope of this study is that the growth in these heads is not the result of efforts of the revenue officers first because these are directly paid by the landowners in the banks receipts. Onus is on the buyer. People in urban areas are more aware of the legal implications in case of non-deposit of fee and they ensure it on their own accord. Still there are leakages and corruption in these heads of collection but since they don‟t fall under the purview of effort and collection of the revenue field staff, hence, it has not been discussed to evaluate their performance.
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5. Most importantly, there are multiple other factors for growth of the mutation fee, stamp duty, registration fee and CVT. These all taxes are levied on transfer of land from one owner to other, either through sale or through gift. Market prices are driving the price for property and these are independent of the government control. The higher the price of land, the higher the tax payment according to the fixed percentage of the total value of the land. However, the DC rate of the minimum value of land is being notified by the government is fiscal year in each district below which no land transaction can be effected. The price of land beyond the government regulations so is the number of transactions. The above mentioned fee all are collected on the transactions involving transfer of land which is sole prerogative of the individual owners as well as market forces. Government does not have any role in its assessment of its demand as it may fluctuate according to number of property transactions. As there is no fixed mode of assessment, so there is no fixed or targeted collection. By the same token, it does not clearly indicate the efforts of revenue officers to improve its collection. The role of the district government in minimal as the land evaluation table is issued by the DC concerned in each fiscal year which sets minimum bench mark for transfer of property, generally termed as DC rate. In these heads of collection, the improvement or progress in collection can only be ensured throughbringing to book all transactions, ensuring effective audit mechanism to control leakages and regular supervision and control of registration branches by reconciling the bank scrolls on regular basis.
6. To encapsulate the foregoing discussion, the mode of assessment, estimated budget target, its collection and mode of collection all differ so far as these two sets of indicators of land revenue collection are concerned. Hence, these two streams of revenue collection have been differentiated on these two basis. Government dues and miscellaneous fees, fines and receipts are not that significant a head of revenue collection to warrant for sake of scope of this research paper. That is the reason that three main indicators of the performance of revenue department have been selected (Water rate, AIT and Local rate) because these introduce special efforts for collection by the revenue field staff.
In nut shell, despite all these recoverable demands, rents, rates, cesses and fees, traditionally there remained significant following heads of collection because their assessment varies each year and the demand is booked by the district government each fiscal year keeping in view the reports and records of the revenue field staff regarding,
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the area under cultivation,
type of the land cultivated, and
Thirdly, the assessment of the yield or produce of each crop per acre issued and prepared by the agriculture department.
After this assessment which may fluctuate every year depending on the factors mentioned above, the annual targets are assigned by the BOR and are booked in the provincial budget as estimated income. Then the revenue department is assigned the task to make all out efforts to recover or collect this assessed demand or the recovery target. That is why these have been selected as main indicators of recovery for this research study.
4.4 An Evaluation of Revenue Collection
4.4.1 Collection of Water Rate or Abiana has been selected as the first indicator of the evaluation of the efforts of the revenue department in district Faisalabad. Pakistan is primarily an agricultural economy and Punjab contributes to around 80 % of its agriculture produce. The entire system of agriculture here is directly dependent on the extensive irrigation system developed in the colonial period. This scheme of canal irrigation has been devised on Indus River System. The main source of irrigation is the canal water that is why Water Rate has been imposed across the board on all beneficiaries of the canal system alike.
Water Rate is the charge levied on the peasants, landlords and tenants equally by the government in exchange of the water provided for irrigation to their parcel of land for agricultural use. No government department is exempted from payment of Water Rate. For instance, the cultivated area under rightful occupation of the Pakistan Air Force, Ayub Agricultural Research Institute and the Agricultural University in Faisalabad which are institutions of national repute are assessed for payment of the land dues inclusive Water Rate, AIT and Local Rate.
Earlier the mode of assessment varied. But since 2003, the irrigation department has introduced a uniform rate of assessment of all lands in Punjab and the land lord or government tenant pays on basis of that flat rate according to the size of this land and flow of water from the water channel. It was decided in the Cabinet meeting of Punjab government held on 10thjune, 2003 that,
1. „Flat rate of Abiana at Rs. 85 per acre included in culturable command for Kharif crop. Rs. 50 included in culturable command for Rabi crop was approved. Further, rate of Rs. 250 per acre for sanctioned orchards was approved.
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2. The new system of flat rate of Abiana would come into effect from 1st of July, 2003. 3. The collection of Abiana will continue to be made through revenue administration.‟9However; it is no longer the case. Revenue department is no more responsible for collection of Abiana under prevalent instructions issued by the irrigation department which will be discussed later on in this chapter. Water rate has been historically a major area of recovery/collection. Irrigation department booked or assessed the demand of water rate, accounts of which were used to be sent to the office of DC to ensure its collection through the revenue field staff. The assessment of water rate has been a complicated affair traditionally. Wherever, the case was reported of breaking up of a water channel by a land owner to water move to his piece of land than his prescribed share, then the irrigation department authorities used to lay penalty on entire village on the damaged distributary or water channel whom they suspected of being the beneficiaries of broken water channel. This penalty or „tawan‟ in vernacular language could be twenty times more than the actual rate of abiana and process of its fixture was predominantly arbitrary. The affectees traditionally could file an appeal in the office of the divisional Commissioner. Since 2001 when the devolution of powers plan came into force under the PLGO, then the powers of the Commissioner were devolved upon the office of Executive District Officer Revenue (EDO-R) at the district level. But it also changed when the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Act was adopted in all over Punjab in recent years. Now it is the office of the sub-Engineer of concerned circle in the irrigation department who is empowered to suspend, give total remission or reduce the amount of penalty. Tawan or fine was also to be recovered by revenue department. Sometimes accumulated fine or tawan exceeds the original demand of abiana. The late payment charges were termed surcharge at the rate of 10 percent of the demand of abiana levied on the land owner.
However, for the sake of this study only pure water rate inclusive of tawan or fine for breach of a canal or distributaries has been selected as the land revenue indications minus late payment charges. The target assigned by the BOR at the start of agricultural year includes the new demand or current assessment of the water rate to be collected as well as arrears of the previous years to be collected from defaulters.
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In the data tabled in this chapter regarding collection of water rate, the target is combined figures for current assessment of the corresponding years as well as the accumulated arrears of water rate, collective efforts are undertaken jointly by the revenue department for recovery of current as well as previous demand, and hence, these have been taken as „combined‟ target.
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Indicator 1: Collection of Water Rate (Abiana) in District Faisalabad (2001-2013) Column Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column Column 10 1 9 Years Target Remission Collection Suspension Irrecoverable Net Balance % % against Given by Recoverable against Net Govt. original Recoverable Target ( PKR) 2000- 01 218410307 4938164 131164147 40393187 7600191 165474765 34310618 60.05 79.26 2001- 02 234222343 2678025 124551481 52749137 6683396 172111785 47560304 53.17 72.36 2002- 03 280529385 5256391 117517557 75306419 10263564 189703011 72185454 41.89 61.95 2003- 04 330577185 18609664 108580477 75378246 22276971 214312304 105731827 32.84 50.66 2004- 05 404726033 9666025 115894343 121115044 28790063 245154901 129260558 28.63 47.27 2005- 06 343305034 3837085 46726241 119394682 41125351 178947916 132221675 13.1 26.11 2006- 07 356655874 1237816 53648754 161726808 53536444 140154806 86506052 15.04 38.27 2007- 08 325823514 4258797 26526582 191737870 67426690 62400157 35873575 8.14 42.51 2008- 09* 295038135 39471940 20120109 103749476 121450590 30366129 10246020 6.81 66.25 2009- 2010 243528601 5892699 8636870 110223386 118775646 8636870 0 3.54 100 2010- 11 228999032 27948033 6388701 97561927 97000396 6488676 99975 2.78 98.45 2011- 12 216734001 73825636 37882645 58029966 46849754 38028645 146000 17.47 99.62 2012- 13* 10582520 3899460 1969037 57628036 42345987 1969037 0 18.6 100 Grand Total 3.489E+09 201519735 799606944 1264994184 664125043 1453749002 654142058 22.91 55 Table 4.1
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
From the combined target/amount to be recovered, the remission is deducted. Remission each year is deducted when the over assessment of water rate is condoned by the Sub-Engineer (SE) irrigation or due to some other damage to crop or land. Remission amount is deducted from original collections. It comes to amount recoverable under column 4 as mentioned in table 4.1. Suspension is the amount suspended from collections by orders of some court till the decision of the appeal of review filed by the land owner. As his plea is pending adjudication in the court of law, hence, temporary relief is granted to him by awarding the stay order or issuing the order to maintain status quo, thereby halting its recovery.
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Irony is that due to overburdening of the legal system, corruption at the lower level of court staff, disinterest of the revenue field staff, lack of supervision and having overburdened with the administrative assignments. Such injunctions and stay orders continue to persist for years. There have been reported incidents, when the revenue officers „advised‟ the land owners to obtain some status quo order from a court of law. It served them mutually as the pressure for collection was shifted from the land owner and the collection target of the revenue officers was reduced because of amount being under suspensions.
Irrecoverable as mentioned in column 6 of table 4.1 is the amount under litigation which has been assessed as tawan or fine for breach in the distributor or a canal imposed on all beneficiaries. Ratio of this fine may be twenty times the original amount of water rate. When the aggrieved landowners file appeal in the competent forum and the amount of fine is reduced say from twenty times to ten times as per discretion of the authority, then there arises a need for recalculation of the fine against each landowner. But what generally happens is that no timely calculation is done by the irrigation department which renders the collection from the landowners involved difficult. As the appeal has already been decided with some relief to the peasants, so the revenue department cannot ask for its payment, hence, this amount is reflected as irrecoverable which is due to the sheer negligence of the irrigation department to make revised accounts. And this amount lingers on, unless some special effort is made to implement the decision of the court and make revised accounts of imposition of fine.
Remission, suspension and irrecoverable amounts are deducted from original target as well as previous collection that give us net recoverable amount as in column 7 of table 4.1. (Col .3+4+6+4- Col. 2= Col.7).
The graphical depiction or the recovery or collection has been projected below. The chart 4.1 projects the percentage of original target of water rate as assigned by the government or in this case BOR for district Faisalabad from fiscal year 2001-2013. The figures have been obtained by applying following formula;
80 or
Whereas the chart 4.2 projects the % of collection of net recoverable by applying following method;
or
A comparative analysis of both these charts highlighted the marked difference in the resultant percentage or the eventual performance of revenue department. In both presentations, there is huge difference of the end result that is annual percentage of recovered amount against its original target.
As the performance of revenue department is evaluated as against the projected percentage against net recoverable, hence, the earlier columns especially Suspensions is ignored that suspends the collection of millions and billions of rupees thereby reducing much the original target. Pressure on the revenue officer also recedes in this way. They have to collect fewer amount from land owners, therefore less effort is required.
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Water Rate (Abiana) % of Collection against Original Target
70
60 50
40
30 20 %ageRecovery 10 0
Years
Graph 4.1
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
Water Rate (Abiana) % of Collection against Net Recoverable
120 100 80 60 40 20
0 % age ofNet Recoverable
Years
Graph 4.2
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Comparison of the % of WR Collection of Original Target and Net Recoverable 120 100
80
60 %age 40 % age of Original Target 20 % age of Net Recoverable 0
Years
Graph 4.3
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
Since 2001 when the PLGO was adopted, it transformed the system of local government as well as affected the working of the revenue department by doing away with the enforcement mechanism such as district magistracy as well as overhauling the job descriptions and nomenclature of the district administration for sake of devolution and decentralization of powers.
Consequent upon such developments, the irrigation department also undertook reforms to introduce participatory irrigation management. The efforts were already underway since 1997 when the Punjab Provincial Assembly adopted the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Act which set up a Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA). This package of institutional reforms was viewed as an attempt to empower the peasants and farmers at grass roots level to ensure effective water management through community participation and ownership. Under this reform package three entities were established in a hierarchical manner.
1. Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA)was devised at provincial level comprising of the representatives of farmers and the members from the public sector. 2. Area Water Board (AWB) at canal command level 3. Farmers Organizations (FOs) at the level of distributary
Under PIDA a pilot project was initiated in the Lower Chenab Canal (LCC) Area (East)comprising of four canal divisions, Khanki, Upper Gogera, Lower Gogera and Burala.
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This project set up an Area Water Board of LCC notified in 2000. Under this AWB, the first Farmers‟ Organizations (FOs) were established in 2005 comprising of the representatives of local farmers. This delay was for want of devising of relevant rules. Mohammad Arif Raza, et al, have described the rationale of behind making FOs in their research article titled, ‘Institutional Reforms in Irrigation Sector of Punjab (Pakistan) and their Impact on Sugarcane Productivity‟.
„Farmers organizations are basic management units responsible to operate and manage irrigation and drainage infrastructure within its jurisdiction. The process of institutional reforms commences with community development at village level so as to aware farming community of Participatory IrrigationManagement (PIM) initiatives and to organize them for establishment of FOs.‟ 10
The objectives behind these reforms ware to enhance community participation and awareness about dealing the issues of water theft, breach of water courses and their timely repair and maintenance, collection of Water Rate and conflict resolution arising out of share of canal water by the farmers themselves through their own locally elected FOs.It was believed that devolution of responsibility at the local level and empowerment of the peasant would lead to the improvement in the irrigation system and collection of Water Rate. Unfortunately, this measure has been proven counterproductive. The interviews with the peasants, land owners and with some of the presidents of the respective FOs have established that the performance of majority of such FOs is far below the mark. They don‟t have the enforcement mechanism at their disposal to ensure 100% and timely collection of Water Rate from the defaulters. They also lack supervision and support of the officers of the irrigation department in their district so their issues linger on. Another important factor highlighted was the kinship or biradri(caste) politics. A local former from Samundari stated when interviewed that the president of his FO was an influential man and therefore, was selected by his clam through majority of votes. He himself is patronizing water theft by his community. Similarly, he collects WR more rigorously from the Jatt minority instead of his own Rajpoot kinsmen. The presidents or members of FOs ignored breach of canal and water theft by their own kinsmen. The other biradris face a disadvantage. Police doesn‟t respond to them if they seek to get a case registered against the culprits. Resultantly water theft has become rife. It was also highlighted in some cases that the respective members of FOs either hesitated in collecting the Water Rate from door to door on the one hand and on the other hand, some who were successful in such collection
84 usurped all funds and no amount was deposited in the government treasury. But they got Scots free as no action was taken by the department to investigate the matter or to redress the situation. Result is not only the loss to the government but also the erosion of the credibility of the FOs on the whole.Few peasants praised the working of their respective FO rather majority demanded that the previous system of Water Rate collection was better and more effective. That was a responsible as well as a responsive system. During the interview, the Revenue Officer, Tehsil Jaranwala, condemned the inaction FOs in his area lamenting the fact „that ultimately Revenue Department will have to collect this amount as arears of land revenue. Because the FOs are unable to tackle their canal water issues and have been rendered ineffective due to lack of supervision and control of the irrigation department‟. The collection of even current demand of Water Rate has suffered what to speak of collection of arrears, fine or surcharge on its breach. Asrar-ul-Haq in his research paper titled, Performance Of Farmers Organizations In Punjab – Pakistan : The Challenges and Way Forward,has explained this dilemma in following manner. He has undertaken a case study of 82 FOs in the pilot project of LCC to unravel the performance of these grass roots but nascent organizations. He has come up with almost the same concerns as shared by the stakeholders with the researcher in interview.
„The overall evaluation indicates that performance of about 20% FOs is good, about 60 –65% FOs are performing satisfactorily, while the performance of 15 – 20% FOs is unsatisfactory to poor. The performance evaluation brings out specifically good results with regard to the dispute resolution, improved equity and development of local capacity for irrigation management. The main concerns highlighted by the study include: significant declining trend in abiana collection, weaknesses of FOs in maintenance of accounts and records, increasing water theft, and elite capture in some cases. One of the major issues flagged by the evaluation relates to difficulty of FOs in dealing with water stealers and the abiana defaulters. This is attributed partly to the peculiar sociopolitical setting and partly to the lack of recognition of the FOs in the local administrative set-up. Another issue that has been brought out is the need for rehabilitation of FO managed channels. The problem faced by FOs is that the dilapidated channels seriously constrain their ability to efficiently operate the system. The challenge therefore is that of optimizing the timing of system modernization and the management transfer.‟11
Therefore, Haq recommended the „imperative need for,
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„Capacity building and mainstreaming of FOs, avoiding institutional fatigue, closercoordination and support by AWB / PIDA, and improved monitoring systems foridentification of problems and timely course correction.‟12
Due to these reasons mentioned above there have been witnessed a significant deterioration in collection of Water Rate. The structural deterioration, absence of a supervisory mechanism over FOs, lack of enforcement mechanism at their disposal as well as socio political factors have exhilarated this trend. On top of these factors is the financial jugglery of misrepresentation of the accounts and figures. This declining trend can be witnessed in the table 4.1 as well as in its graphical presentation. This downward trend is not only visible in the collection of Water Rate but also in the booking of demand or targets over the years. In district Faisalabad, the canals were given under the control of PIDA and AWB in a gradual manner starting from 2005, this process completed in 2009 when all canals were given under the direct control of AWB under PIDA and the FOs were constituted on each distributary for collection of Water Rate and maintenance of canals. The revenue department was entrusted with the responsibility of collecting the arrears or fines accruing from previous judgments of the courts in the issues allied to water theft. Therefore, demand for current year is now booked and assessed by the respective FO which is responsible in depositing this amount in the account of FO. These figures are not shared formally to the revenue department at any level. Therefore, the declining trend of the collection can be witnessed in table 4.1 from year 2005-06 onwards where even a glance at the percentages depicted in the column 9 indicates that there has been significant decline in collection of water rate in Faisalabad. The reasons are twofold. First because since 2005-06, the canals in Faisalabad were being started handed over to the AWB for sake of water rate collection and secondly the shirking of responsibility among the revenue officers for its collection because of the constitution of FOs. This declining trend appears far wards if they take into account the fact that it does not include the current demand of local rate since 2009 onwards. That amount goes largely unaccounted for and the leakages and corruption by the FOs is yet to be evaluated as it is beyond the scope of this research study. The revenue officers when interviewed also mentioned individually that the amount of arrears is far more difficult to recover because the defaulters are more inclined to pay the current demand and when they know that the current demand is to be collected by the FO concerned then they are least interested in paying their past liabilities.
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For instance when the Patwari of patwar circle 204/RB Tehsil Sadar Faisalabad was interviewed about the status of recovery, he explained that it is very difficult to recover these revenues pending from last year. Because, new demand is recovered by the FO concerned, therefore, people are reluctant to pay through Patwari. A comparative analysis of percentage of collection against original target and against net recoverable is a classical case study of financial jugglery. There appears to be a huge gap between the two which has widened tremendously in the recent years. Because the huge amounts are covered under the suspension and irrecoverable which are deducted from the original demand/target but not permanently. It does not absolve the defaulter of his liability but only gives him space to avoid its payment in near future. But what actually happens is that the officials responsible for this collection avoid pursuing the court litigations to mitigate the amount of suspension and revision of accounts thereby reducing the irrecoverable amount. The huge amounts under suspensions and irrecoverable not only reduces the stress for collection of water rate on the revenue officer/FOs but also upon the defaulters. Consequently, the amount net recoverable is significantly reduced as against the original target. When the percentage of collection is calculated against the net recoverable then the result is far optimistic thanwhen it is calculated against the original target. Even a cursory glance at column 2 of table 4.1 is sufficient to bring to the notice that there has been a gradual decline in the assessment of demand of water rate over the years, largely, because since 2009, no current demand is being assigned for recovery to the revenue department. On the other hand, the collection of water rate by the FOs does not exactly present a rosy picture. This trend cause observed by the researcher while interviewing with the stake holders and in the FDGs. This concern has also been felt by the irrigation department and PIDA. The following correspondence of the Chief Engineer of the irrigation department is self-explanatory. Due to the inability of the FOs to recover the Water Rate, the Chief Executive, Area Water Board/ LCC (West) Circle, Faisalabad directed Executive Engineers under his command vide letter No. MOP/AWB/LCC (W)/2012/516, dated 02012013 that „according to agreement rules 12(5) the collection and recovery of water charges by the FOs for the current demand shall be done through respective Lumberdars or village headmen who shall deposit the collected amount in FO account after deducting collection charges‟. The in depth analysis of the water rate over a time period under research as a major source of land revenue indicate a declining trend in its collection due to multiple reasons.
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This may include the structural weakness, lack of enforcement mechanism, manipulation of facts and figures, and incapacity of FOs to collect the same. It is suggested that FOs be held accountable to some government department either the irrigation or the revenue for sake of assessment and collection of water rate. The concept of the ownership of community is ideal but it cannot be successful ignoring the ground realities of local culture where caste, politics and kinship is rife. The merit and justice are often sacrificed on the altar of blood relation and caste. This especially is true in the socio-political backdrop of Punjab. The majority of population here is illiterate and poor; therefore, when human resource is empowered it resorts to multiple excesses. It goes without saying that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. However, it is not only the financial corruption which is eroding the system under discussion but the incapacity of FOs, lack of supervision and in absence of enforcement mechanism, the FOs cannot realistically be expected to perform up to the mark. It will always result in resorting to seek help from the revenue department as it has the field staff and legal recourse available for collection of demand at its disposal. The politics of caste and clan has inhibited the growth of FOs since its inception. A local middle level landlord of Jaranwala stated in the interview that water theft is continuing with impunity now with the patronage of president of FO in his village. Mere replacement of structure cannot guarantee its success unless a concrete approach is adopted.Keeping in view the ground realities as well as the available resources, no reform efforts can work in isolation.
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4.4.2 Collection of Agriculture Income Tax (AIT) Second indicator selected for evaluation of the performance of the revenue department in the district Faisalabad is the collection of Agriculture Income Tax or AIT. The assessment of Agriculture Income Tax (AIT) is made under the Punjab Agriculture Income Tax Act, 1997 and subsequently modified in 1998, supplemented by the Punjab Agriculture Income Tax Rules, 2001. AIT is assessed on 2 bases;
1. Land based AIT 2. Income based AIT
The Land based AIT is collected by the district government from the owners only on a land holding exceeding 12.5 acres. Whereas the Income based AIT is payable by cultivators whether he is owner or not on a net agriculture income of more than Rs. 80000 in a given year. As the mode of assessment and rates of calculation of these both types of AIT are different, therefore, they have been dealt separately by the revenue department. The researcher has also maintained this dichotomy in this study in order to highlight the contrast between the two as well as bring in to sharp focus the efforts of the revenue department to ensure collection in both. These have been termed as indicator 2 (A) & (B).
Indicator 2(A): the land Based AIT as discussed in the First Schedule of the Act stipulates the „slab of total cultivated land, computed as irrigated land, by treating one acre of irrigated land as equal to two acres of unirrigated land excluding mature orchards.
Rate of tax per acre13
1 Not exceeding 12 /2 acres Nil
1 Exceeding 12 /2 acres but not exceeding 25 acres Rs. 100/-
Exceeding 25 acres Rs. 300/-
Exceeding 50 acres Rs. 350/-
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Mature Orchards
Irrigated Rs. 500/- per acre
Unirrigated Rs. 150/- per acre
Indicator 2 (A):
Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in District Faisalabad (2001-2013)
(Land Based AIT)
Agricultural Income Tax Period Target given by the Collection Balance %age Govt. (PKR) (PKR) (PKR) 2000-01 52252206 45370790 6549448 87.39 2001-02 103900701 95963777 6900694 93.29 2002-03 40040704 20620564 17539808 54.04 2003-04 34719518 17472088 15149959 53.56 2004-05 31793198 16269805 13043197 55.5 2005-06 28995970 13609130 13918427 49.4 2006-07 29590107 13546461 13847269 49.5 2007-08 29492561 13474881 14025612 59 2008-09 29635862 24832715 3334129 88.16 2009-10 18191712 15770026 1934176 89.08 2010-11 16921640 16153778 213838 98.69 2011-12 21707185 19566390 2064873 90.45 2012-13 19626106 18159885 1276793 93.43 Grand Total 456867470 330810290 73.9608 Table 4.2
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Agricultural Income Tax (Land Based) % of Collection against Original Target 120 100 80 60 40
%ageRecovery 20 0
Years
Graph 4.4
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
Agricultural Income Tax (AIT) (Land Based) % of Collection against Net Recoverable
120 100 80 60 40 20
0 % against Net Recoverable
Years
Graph 4.5
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Comparison of the % of Collection of AIT (Land Based) Original Target and Net Recoverable 120
100 80
%ages 60 40 % against Original Target 20 0 % against Net Recoverable
Years
Graph 4.6
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Indicator 2(B): Income Based AIT
Section 3 (3) of the Act stipulates, „subject to the provisions of this act, there shall be levied, assessed and collected for each assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of July, 2001, Agriculture Income Tax in respect of the total agricultural income of the income year of every person at the rate specified in the 2nd schedule‟14:
The Second Schedule
Rates of the Tax of Total Agriculture Income
Rates of the Tax of Total Agriculture Income shall be as under:-
1. Where the total income does not exceed 5% of total income Rs. 100000/-
1 2. Where the total income exceeds Rs. Rs. 5000/- plus 7 /2% of the amount 100000 but does not exceed Rs. exceeding Rs. 100000/- 200000/-
3. Where the total income exceeds Rs. Rs. 12,500 plus 10% of the amount 200000/- but does not exceeds Rs. exceeding Rs. 200000/- 300000/-
4. Where the total income exceeds Rs. Rs. 22,500 plus 15% of the amount 300000/- exceeding Rs. 300000/-
Provided that no tax shall be payable on the first eighty thousand rupees of the after mentioned income.
This Act requires that a cultivator has to file return of total agricultural income assessable under Income based AIT. Section 4 (3) (a) „every person whether owner or cultivator having net agricultural income of more than Rs. 80000 in a given year‟.15It has been further described in Section 4 (3) (b) „every person who has cultivated land measuring 50 acres of more of irrigated land even if his agricultural income is below Rs. 80000 in a given year‟.16 „If, during the income year, he has cultivated land measuring:
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i. Fifty acres or more of irrigated land; or
ii. One hundred acre or more of unirrigated land; or iii. Irrigated and unirrigated land the aggregate area of which is equal to or more than fifty acres of irrigated land, one acre of irrigated land being reckoned as equivalent to two acres of unirrigated land, shall file a return of his total agricultural income or the agricultural income of such other person, as the case may be, for the said income year in such form and by such date as may be prescribed.]
[(4) No assessment on the basis of return shall be made by Collector after the expiration of two years from end of the assessment year in which the total Agricultural Income Tax was first assessable.]17
The return of the Income based AIT is computed in the following manner. Section 4-A of this Act describes the method of computation of agriculture income in following manner.
„The following allowances and deductions shall be made, namely:-
a) Any expenditure on account of labor for-
i. Tilling the land;
ii. Sowing the seed;
iii. Ploughing/Planting;
iv. Tending/Pruning;
v. Rendering the produce fit to be taken to market;
vi. Any other agricultural operation;
b) Any expenditure incurred on purchase of-
i. Seed;
ii. Fertilizers and Pesticides;
c) Any expenditure incurred on-
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i. Hiring animals, tractors, agricultural machinery and implements used for earning agricultural income;
ii. Repaik2r and maintenance of water courses; d) Any expenditure incurred on-
i. Harvesting of agricultural produce;
ii. Marketing of agricultural produce; e) Any sum paid on account of-
i. Ushr;
ii. Local cess and other cesses;
iii. Water rate (Abiana);
iv. Electricity bills in respect of tube wells and lift pumps used for agriculture;
v. Fuel charges in respect of tube wells and lift pumps used for agriculture;
vi. Rent of land used for agriculture;
vii. Obtaining of the agricultural loans;
viii. Mark up of agricultural loans; f) In respect of depreciation of such buildings, machinery and plant being the property of the assessee used for the purpose of earning agricultural income, allowance at the rate of 15% of the written down value; and g) Any other expenditure not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of agriculture.‟18
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Indicator 2-B: Collection of Agriculture Income Tax in District Faisalabad (2001-2013)
(Income Based AIT)
Column Column Column Column Column 1 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 7 8 9 Column 10 Number % of against % against Assesses Demand/Target Net Total original Net Period Taxable (PKR) Remission Suspension Recoverable Collection Balance Target Recoverable 2000-01 86 1705235 62294 80435 1562506 1561093 1413 91.54 99.9 2001-02 88 2083699 185686 113135 1784878 1529061 255817 73.38 85.68 2002-03 82 1457769 86373 134029 1237367 995792 241575 68.3 80.47 2003-04 58 1107972 0 0 1107973 950533 157439 85.79 85.79 2004-05 48 1230205 0 0 1230205 821704 408501 66.79 66.79 2005-06 44 1321215 0 0 1321215 984796 336419 74.53 74.53 2006-07 44 1467564 0 0 1467564 1122588 344976 76.49 76.49 2007-08 43 4802069 0 0 4802069 3630730 1171339 75.6 75.6 2008-09 53 9949893 0 0 9949893 3135087 6814806 31.5 31.5 2009- 2010 50 8909946 100394 0 8809552 3629720 5179832 41.73 41.73 2010-11 0 4059850 0 0 4059850 3036126 1023724 74.78 74.58 2011-12 0 3371597 0 0 3371597 2141464 1230133 63.5 63.5 2012-13 8083694 0 0 8083694 4952060 3131634 61.26 61.26 Grand Total -- 38979111 434747 327599 48788363 28490754 20297608 73.09 58.39 Table 4.3
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Agriculture Income Tax (Income Based) % age of Total Recovery against Original Target
100 80 60
% age 40 20 0
Years
Graph 4.7
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
Agriculture Income Tax (Income Based) % age of Total Recovery against Net Recoverable
120 100
80 60 %age 40 20 0
Years
Graph 4.8
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Comparison of the % of Collection of Original Target and Net Recoverable
120 100
80 60
%ages 40 % age against Original Target 20 0 % age against Net Recoverable
Years
Graph 4.9
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
The assessment of the income based AIT is done by the DC concerned if the landowner fails to file his tax return in a given tax year upto the stipulated timeline in September. It is levied in case of a land lord owning cultivated land above fifty acre or earning an agriculture income of more than Rs. 80000 per annum. The Income Tax Act provides that if a land lord has chunks of land in different districts, he may file tax return in any of the district of his choice. When the both indicators 2(A) and 2(B) have been compared, there appeared many contrasts. There not only is the difference of method of tax assessment between the two. But also more focus of the revenue department appears to be on collection of land based AIT that is leviable upon landlords cultivating land below 50 acre and above 12.5 acre whereas there appeared to be no control over the assessment of income based AIT. As the table 4.3, there has been a steady decline in the number of income based tax assesses. The peasants overall were critical of the role of the revenue department in this regard. „They held that the big land owners are being favoured by the revenue officials at the time of income based AIT assessment therefore, they pay less than what is due to them‟. The detail of the facts and figures available at the revenue accounts branch in district Faisalabad reflected that the since year 2010, no such tax assesses has been assessed for this purpose in any of the six tehsils in the entire district. It indicates the level of interest taken by the revenue department in assessment and collection or land revenue. The recovery against this indicator 2(B) is being made against previously generated demand.
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4.4.3 Local Rate The section 2 of the Punjab Local Rate (Assessment and Collection) Rules, 2001 provide, „a District Government/City District Government may levy local rate on lands assessable to land revenue as provided in Part-1 of the Second Schedule of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance. 2001.‟19
Section 3 further elaborates the assessment of the Local Rate that „in each revenue estate a list of assesses liable to pay local rate shall be prepared at the time of Rabi and Kharif season every year and shall be maintained by the halqapatwari in the same manner and form as that of dhalbach (list of accounts)for land revenue.‟20
The rate of assessment of Local Rate has been specified under the section 136 of Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 read with Punjab Local Rate (Assessment & Collection) Rules, 1980 as under: a) Local Rate is leviable on all lands within the local limits of district council. Barren and unirrigated land is exempted from it. b) It is leviable twice a year on following rates; Land Ratio of Local Rate Irrigated land upto 25 acres Rs. 2/- per acre Unirrigated land upto 50 acres Rs.0.50/- per acre
The Local Rate is collected in the same manner as that of the land revenue but it is deposited in the local fund of the district government after due reconciliation of figures with that of the district accounts office.
The charges of local rate per acre are nominal. These were traditionally collected from the land owners along with the water rate. The interview with the stake holders as well as the observations of the researcher transpired that due to the phasing out of the water rate the collection of local rate from land owners has also suffered. Despite that, it interesting to note that among three indicators selected for research study, the local rate presents the most optimistic and positive picture. Not only its demand/target is far low because of its meager charges per acre but also its collection has been ensured up to hundred percent during past years. On interviewing the revenue officers, it was highlighted that the local rate has become very difficult to collect in absence of the collection of water rate by the revenue department.
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The land owners, who traditionally aid local rate along with the water rate, now pay the water rate to the FOs. Whereas the local rate at the rate of Rs. 2 per acre is to be collected by the revenue department. The revenue department instead of collecting it from door to door tries to pay it out of their own pocket. It goes without saying that the meager salary of the patwari is not sufficient to support his own livelihood. Therefore, such payments can only be made through leakage or „avenues‟ present in the system. The demand of local rate is not very high but its collection in this manner is not commendable.
Indicator 3: Collection of Local Rate in District Faisalabad(2001-2013)
Local Rate Target given by the Collection Balance %age Govt. (PKR) 2000-01 3574763 2934530 640233 82.09 2001-02 4357957 3342459 1015498 76.7 2002-03 4616604 3750197 866407 81.23 2003-04 4621954 3112730 1509224 67.35 2004-05 5977501 4076088 1901413 68.2 2005-06 7250140 3869108 3381032 53.4 2006-07 6559769 4851787 1707982 74 2007-08 5413198 4357910 1055288 80.5 2008-09 4760504 4758820 1684 99.96 2009-10 3564156 3564156 0 100 2010-11 3600000 3600000 0 100 2011-12 3689884 3629884 0 100 2012-13 3629884 3603761 26123 99.28 Grand Total 62072886 49869350 12104884 80.33 Table 4.4
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
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Local Rate % of Collection against Original Target 120 100 80
60 40
%ageRecovery 20 0
Years
Chart 4.10
Source: Compiled by the researcher from the original data verified by the District Accounts Office
4.5 A Comparative Analysis of Three Indicators It is pertinent to mention here that in collection of water rate the demand or assessment is declining whereas the percentage of collection against the net recoverable improving. That meant there is inverse relationship between the two, the assessment and collection, indicating some serious flaw in assessment and collection paradigm. But the Income based AIT collection reflects that the number of assesses are declining so is the percentage of recovery and sadly the tax assessment in this particular head of receipts has come to a standstill in recent years. A comparative analysis of all three indicators reflects not so optimistic a picture. The assessment and collection of Water Rate has been handed over to the FOs who lack will and enforcement mechanism required for the purpose. Studies and the stakeholders already have started raising doubts as to the viability of WR collection in this manner. The provincial government has almost lost its grip on the WR collection. There has been some half hearted talk to somehow re-engage the revenue department in its collection. It appears soon we will be reinventing the wheel. The troubles regarding WR collection which are brewing under the surface will soon surge upwards with a new intensity if the issues are not tackled soon. With WR recovery in serious jeopardy, land based AIT shrinking and income based AIT from being under assessed to not assessed at all, the revenue department is fast losing its command and control of land revenue collection let alone generation. A group of small formers from Tandlianwala stated that the incidence of land based AIT falls heavily across all segments of rural population whereas the big landlords who are liable to pay income based AIT avoid it by paying only the land based AIT and there is no enforcement or regulatory mechanism to hold them accountable. The base of Local Rate is already paltry. Time may come when the revenue department will become a huge establishment with stagnant revenue base. Given its performance, it is fast losing its rationale and justification for existence.
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These three indicators of recovery highlighted multiple flaws and loops in the system.
It has become a norm to criticize the colonial structures but any efforts to replace those have come to naught. Reason is no concerted approach is adopted rather the areas under reforms are touched in bits and pieces. This leads to imbalances in the system and structures. It tilts the scales in favor of one department or entity on the expense of the other. For instance, FOs were created with a positive approach in mind but it has largely failed to accrue the desired the benefits because ground realities were ignored. Absence of proper system of checks and balances has also weakened it. There also appears from the projection of data that there has been an increasing tendency in the revenue department to under assess the demand or reduce it under the cover of suspension or irrecoverable so as to reduce their budgetary targets and to enhance the end result that is in the percentage even when the actual amount recovered is far less the original target. The reasons for under assessment may be attributed to the largely manual revenue record which is the description of the Patwari to update. Once this record has been properly updated and computerized, then it will of course, reduce the discretion of revenue officials. Once the record has been computerized correctly down to each and every change in the ownership and division of the land, then the under assessment of the revenue target will be curtailed effectively. Revenue department is a huge establishment but if it is not employed efficiently then it will become a white elephant. New organizations may be established but reducing the prime responsibility of the revenue department i.e. assessment and collection of land revenue is not practical. It has statutes and acts at its disposal to ensure effective and hundred percent revenue collection, an extensive legal mechanism which other organizations lack. Instead of creating new structures without full cognitive input, it is imperative that the existing structures may be either over hauled, restructured, cleansed, reorganized, or modified.
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Instead of running two parallel setups for the same purpose, preferably there should be one single dedicated setup or may be the two entities should work in unison in a balanced manner.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations
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The land revenue system which was established in Punjab in colonial era with the aid of one of the best and most extensive irrigation systems in the world at that time was one of the main sources of revenue during British Raj. It incurred huge profits which were not only sufficient for the maintenance of its administrative establishment but also gained fruits for its colonial regime, too.
After going through the relevant research material available, interviewing the stake holders and analysis based on observations and personal experiences, it has transpired that multiple factors have been responsible for the downfall or stagnation in the land revenue administration in Punjab.
Times have changed. Almost one and a half century has passed and during this period, many new variables have emerged. Most importantly the rapid urbanization has thrown many new challenges to the land revenue administration. The democracy, literacy and consciousness of their rights among the peasants and landlords in western side of Punjab now in Pakistan has been instrumental in posing new challenges to the supremacy of the revenue administration. Their authority has further been undermined due to the archaic Laws and Acts on one hand and due to rampant corruption on the other hand. Many political elites in Punjab assembly are from landed gentry, a tradition started before partition and nurtured deeply even after it. Ironically, they offer main resistance to any positive change to the system under study. Their grass roots links with revenue officials specially Patwaris and patronage at lower level further undermines the authority of the higher echelons of land revenue officers.
In a nut shell, the malaise plaguing the revenue administration can be encapsulated as under:-
The post –colonial societies almost always face the criticism of being mired and rooted in its colonial past. The statutes and system introduced and developed during colonial era become archaic with the passage of time because necessary modifications were either not done at all or not in time. Usually the changes introduced were not sufficient to help tackle the administration new challenges of modern times.
The industrializations and resultant urbanization over all in the world has led to the socio-economic transformation in the society. By the same token, though the economy of Pakistan is primarily rural, still it has come very far from what it was in colonial era. Industrialization has opened up new sources of revenue generation for government. Currently industry contributes 24% of GDP as compared to 21% of GDP share of the agriculture in Pakistan (reported in current financial year Economic Survey of Pakistan).
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The revenue administration in a district derived its strength from the magistracy and Police was also subordinate to D.C. /D.M. The PLGO, 2001 did away with magistracy and absolved Police of the control of D.C. A toothless district administration was left to carry out its functions in environ of non-cooperation among institutions. The district administration which was and still is primarily the revenue administration was based on the principles of checks and balances. PLGO did away with it. Due to the evolution of the institution of magistracy which was fundamental of police oversight in a district has resulted in absence of control or supervision over local police. This void has not been filled or substituted by any other mechanism. Therefore, the coordination among two key departments revenue and police has been missing which has also affected the day to day functioning of general administration on district level.
Multiple interest groups have emerged and tried to intimidate the officials and flexed their muscles at cost of administration, especially, the lawyers and local print and electronic media. Due to the changing circumstances and politico-legal environment under the new local government ordinance, police has remained unresponsive even when they were required to intervene in the face of aggression of the lawyers against revenue functionaries as was the case in district courts Faisalabad in 2009 and same was repeated in district courts Sheikhupura in 2010. The same apathy of the police department has been experienced in such cases of violence by the local judiciary as well. The rise of organized violence among lawyers has also taken its toll on the police officers who did not remain unscathed themselves.
An evaluation of the revenue administration indicates many flaws and malaise it is facing at present. These are the fundamental variables responsible for the gradual decrease in the collection of land revenue.
1. Structural Variables 2. Political Variables 3. Socio-Economic Variables 4. Miscellaneous Variables
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5.1 Structural Variables
More tangible factors affecting the revenue collection are structural. The society has changed. Economy has undergone radical transformation. New sources of revenue have also emerged. The public has become more conscious of their rights and is more literate now. But the structures and systems in land revenue administrations are same as were a century ago. These archaic structures have failed to evolve with time. Resultantly, these rigid structures are in a state of decay due to their unresponsiveness to the public needs in the changing circumstances.
The attempts of the successive regimes in modernizing or reforming the land revenue have come to naught. Reasons behind their failure are, these reforms are not deep rooted and they ignore the basic cultures and demands of landed gentry. Hence, their appeal is limited to being just cosmetic in nature. The delicate balance between judiciary, revenue and police administration in the district has been disturbed in the name of reforming the revenue department. Strangely, all such initiatives to reform the revenue department have been focused on grass root level or district level ignoring the upper tiers.
The PLGO 2001 did away with the system of magistracy that was an effective instrument of civilian oversight over District Magistrate (DM), district police and was an effective mechanism to ensure hundred percent revenue recoveries. Scraping of magistracy not only demoralized the revenue administration but also adversely affected its efficacy in the field assignments. The magistrate who was more often a revenue functionary, AC second class (tehsildar), AC first class, District Magistrate or the District Collector could command police or there was at least a direct relationship between two. Now, after PLGO 2001, there is disconnect and police has become immune to the directions or requirements of district administration which is also responsible for collecting land revenue. There have been instances after 2001 where the district police remained unresponsive or impervious to calls of district administration resulting humiliation of government functionaries at the hands of mob or sometimes lawyers. Reason is that then delicate balance among the local administration has been missing in new system. The checks and balances are absent in this system. It further deteriorated the already not too positive image of the revenue administration in public eyes and adversely affected its efforts at revenue collection in absence of effective enforcement mechanism.
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Another important factor hindering the recovery of land revenue is urbanization. Faisalabad was purely an agricultural district but the growth of allied industry and expansions of its urban centre altered not only its demography but also geography. The areas classified for land revenue have now become urbanized rendering it impossible for recovery of land revenue. But in the recovery rolls these areas are still classified as agricultural which means there occurs a gap between budget target and actual recovery which cannot be realized. Strangely, there has not been done much to alleviate or address their situation. Earlier, where there were the water courses to irrigate the agricultural land, people covered these water courses with cemented slabs because of the nature of land there changed into residential or commercial due to urbanization and increase in population. These water courses were, therefore, lost for collection of water rate but demand for water rate still exists in the rolls of government.
The inaction of local government functionaries in the irrigation department may be attributed either due to indifference or due to fear of being enquired into to justify decreasing the „collectible‟ demand from the rent rolls of the irrigation department. There is an urgent need address these issue and rationalize the revenue demand after redefining the boundaries of revenue estates anew. Exclusion of urbanized areas/ revenue estates from assessment of land revenue is essential for setting rational targets and thereby not forcing the revenue officials to seek shortcuts to „reflect‟ maximum recovery from such areas.
Often a lot of hue and cry is raised on the patwaris not sitting in their respective patwarcircles which leads to the exploitation of the public and its humiliation at the hands of patwaris, resulting in corruption. But apart from other reasons, the most tangible of all is that patwarkhanas in most patwar circles have gone into disuse or destroyed. These buildings need to be repaired or make functional if government wants patwaris to sit there for dispensation of functions at local level. Besides that, almost every other day, some court of law or some office in revenue hierarchy or even anti-corruption courts or office of the Ombudsman either in the district or divisional headquarter or provincial capital, for inspection of revenue record in his custody. His other administrative duties, for instance, arranging Ramadan bazaars for provision of cheap commodities, duties at sale points of subsidized sugar, flour or wheat, arranging goods for flood affectees, supervision of routes during month of Moharram etc., are reasons for not letting him sit in his own patwar circle. These issues need to be addressed practically to make patwari accessible to public.
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5.2 Political Variables
It is saddening to note that over the decades, the revenue department has become overly politicized. The evidence of politicization is much higher at the level of patwaris, kanungo, naib- tehsildars and tehsildars, whereas many senior level officers also manage their positions in nexus with local political elite, usually a sitting MNA or MPA, though the political intervention at the higher level of revenue department from AC upwards may not be ruled out altogether.
Postings and transfers of the patwaris and revenue officers are often influenced by the local politicians. It was also indicated in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the revenue officers/officials. They confided with some reticence that in order to secure good revenue circles or patwar circles and in many instances in order to avoid disciplinary proceeding they seek political patronage and in exchange extend political and other favors to their local political elite. Observations also verified this fact that in number of cases, the political elite especially the members of political party in power assumed it their inherent right in the systems to patronize revenue functionaries.
Ironically, if they are not directly trying to influence the administration, they do so by taking active side with the defaulter of the government revenue or obstructing the recovery of revenue from the defaulters by threatening the revenue officials or seeking time in delay the coercive measures to be adopted by the revenue officers so as to buy time for the defaulters to obtain some stay order from a court to maintain status quo. In some instances, the political elite either patronize the defaulters or they avoid paying the revenue, thereby hindering the efforts of the revenue administration to meet its budgetary target.
Unfortunately, in recent past has witnessed the involvement of local revenue functionaries in organizing political rallies and processions for government in office. The patwaris and revenue officers who are required to be domiciled of the same district often have their political affiliations and allegiance to local political elite which they mostly use to get „good‟ circles for postings. They also try to invoke political connections to avoid administrative wrath in case of their negligence of their profession. This patwari-politician nexus has eroded the sanctity of administration.
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5.3 Socio-Economic Variables
Socio-economic factors which have impinged upon the collection of revenue are multiple. Cost of living has increased considerably because of ever rising inflation. It is being difficult for the middle class to make both ends meet. It is even more difficult for the salaried class in public sectors especially at the lower level who do not have any other source of income. No wonder, many of them resort to corruption and misuse of their authority. An average income of patwari is few thousand rupees but their life styles and overview of their assets and investments belie their claims of honesty and professionalism. The corruption in the revenue department Punjab at least at the lower functionaries has become so pervasive and entrenched that it is now being taken for granted both by the government and the public. It does not mean that the upper echelons are totally disconnected rather it is more implicit. Hence, it is difficult to detect.
Result is the discredit of the important government institutions and distrust between the rulers and the ruled. It also results in failure to catch or recruit self-respecting educated individuals in the systems at gross roots level.
The phenomenon of urbanization has led to the rise of absentee landlords who have migrated to cities for better opportunities, modern lifestyles or for sake of quality education for their children. The result is that they do not directly supervise their tenants and often disputes arising out of ownership of land and share of crop arise. Such issues also affect the collection of revenue.
The culture in rural Punjab, especially in district Faisalabad is rife with biradarism. The caste oriented society supports and favors the members of its own clan howsoever at fault. It is largely due to low literacy rate and lack of exposure. This ethnocentrism many a time is key factor in affecting the policy of the government.
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5.4 Miscellaneous Variables
There are many other factors which are impeding the revenue administration in Faisalabad. The observation and the interviews with stake holders have indicated that there is a huge gap between the ruler and the ruled. The access of the layman to the offices of government is restricted. The officers are either over burdened with the administrative duties, meetings or the entry to their offices is restricted by peon. Due this inaccessibility to the public offices, the grievances of general public are not addressed by the officers in charge. Though, the exceptions are there but these are few.
The Land Revenue Act required the Deputy Commissioner (DC) to spend 15 days and nights in a month in field. The rest houses were established by the government at far flung places for that purpose. However, where there was no rest house available, the DC used to camp under the sky with their subordinate staff. The purpose was to mitigate the gap between government and the masses. It provided the opportunity even to the tiller of land to directly access the DC in his hometown and this itinerary also provided some control over the working of subordinate revenue functionaries of the area. This practice continued during the British Raj and during early decades after the inception of Pakistan. Unfortunately, this practice is no longer in vogue; reason being destruction and decay of such rest houses and weakening of law and order situation.
By the same token, the senior officers from the Board of Revenue used to tour various districts and entrusted under their supervision. Even at present, the eight members judicial in the Board of Revenue hold revenue courts of appellate jurisdiction in divisional headquarters entrusted to them by SMBR. But the erosion affecting the overall working of the revenue administration has pervaded the Board of Revenue as well (BOR).
In a nut shell, by interviewing the stake holders, the researcher came up with the observation that lack of adequate administrative oversight by the seniors over the subordinate revenue functionaries, general apathy towards public, rife illiteracy among the peasants, caste system, politicization of the administration and chronic litigation have been contributing factors in overall deterioration in revenue department adversely affecting collection of revenue.
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5.5 Initiatives Taken By the Government
1. Computerization of Land Record Management and Information Systems (LRMIS)
This project has been initiated with the financial assistance of World Bank. The first phase of the project commenced in 2010 with following three fold objectives.
Increased access to land records at lower transaction cost, through a client-responsive service Increased security of land titles To increase collateral value of land thus boosting economic activity
By the end of 2014, it is expected that all revenue record in all 36 districts of Punjab would have been scanned and available for issuance to the general public on demand in the service centers established in the respective district complexes. In order to successfully carry out this project, the Project Management Unit (PMU) has been established in the Board of Revenue that supervises and issues guidelines and time frames to the field offices. Under this project, the service centers have been established in each district and eventually these will be replicated at the tehsil level as well. These service centers have been located in the compounds of the district complexes for sake of easy accessibility of revenue record as well as to enable the DC or AC to directly supervise its progress and to resolve any issue which may crop up. The PMU headed by a Project Director (PD) has recruited young blood i.e. the educated, energetic and IT literate youth to scan the important record but they can seek support of the revenue functionaries wherever required. Purpose behind this new recruitment is that they are less susceptible to corruption because they do not have any stakes in the existing revenue system.
The brief obtained from the PMU on the issues faced during computerization of land records delineated: a. The scanned documents need to be duly checked and then corrections are to be made to make the record error free. But the verification of revenue record by the revenue staff is very slow. In order to expedite it, the senior officers up to the level of the Chief Secretary and the SMBR have been taken in the loop to direct and monitor the subordinate officers down to the level of the DC. b. There has been strong resistance from groups with vested interest, such as revenue functionaries and land mafia has also been witnessed by the PMU. In order to address this situation, the constant persuasion and communication between PMU, district Government with the anticipated resistance groups has been done.
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Apart from these issues, PMU has been succeeded in retrieving and reconstructing the following missing or damaged revenue record.
1. RHZs - 361 retrieved out of 364 2. Field Books - 1,232 retrieved out of 2,305 3. Mutations - 80,807 retrieved out of 94,797
Large numbers of inconsistencies and errors in the manual revenue record have also been found, e.g.;
1. Sale over and above the actual right 2. Name of right holder not listed in shajra or pedigree sheet 3. Shares of right holders in khewat is not equal to 1/1 4. Area of right holders is not equal to area of land parcels 5. Area of right holder is not according to his share in khewat 6. Shares of right holders in kahtooni is not equal to 1/1 7. Area of land parcel in RHZ is not equal to that of in „field book‟
The LRMIS intends to achieve from this project,
i. „An efficient and transparent land records system, in line with internationally accepted standards that serves the needs of all levels of government/private sectors and individuals.
ii. Accurate and complete information of people‟s right.
iii. Instant updation of records, hence no need for the 4 year updation.
iv. Scanning of almost 30 million pages.
v. Data entry of 38.5 million land owners completed.
vi. Eradication of corrupt and fraudulent practices.
vii. Protection against duty evasion by miscreants. viii. Better security of people‟s rights by capturing the pictures and thumb impressions of the right holders.
ix. Issuance of Fard (i.e. copy of record of rights) in less than 30 minutes and attestation of mutation in less than 50 minutes.
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x. Equality in service delivery to all beneficiaries discouraging VIP culture.
xi. Boosting economic activity by restoring the confidence of people in the authenticity and reliability of land records.
xii. Round the clock, 24 hours a day, access to basic information of rights in the land records through web-based internet portal “www.punjab-zameen.gov.pk”.
xiii. Facilitation of public to provide feedback, seek information or register complaints through establishment of a Call Centre accessible via UAN # (042)-111-222-277.
xiv. Job creation for 3,000 IT professionals directly and 10,000 indirectly.
xv. Web based camera monitoring of the activities at Service Centers.
xvi. Establishment of data center site to ensure the security of data at the highest level.
xvii. Establishment of in-house training site. xviii. Biometric attendance system‟.1
When the stakeholders, the landed gentry, peasants and farmers as well as the revenue functionaries were interviewed and their comments on the system after the computerization were sought. Most of them opined that the system is yet to respond fully to their needs. They agreed that sometimes they had to „oblige‟ patwari to obtain their fard for some emergency purposes but now the service center which is responsible for issuance of fard or other important record closes at 4‟O clock. One of the farmers told that in some matter of litigation he had to attach the fard (copy of his parcel of land) in the court for bail but he could not obtain in time because of the non-cooperation of the officials at the service center. The man in charge told him that the service center had closed at 4pm whereas he was available in the office and it was yet a few minutes to 4pm. Besides that they told that the officials in service centers were not saints either. He believed that the patwari system was better and more responsive than this system of service centers. Initially, they worked honestly and diligently but now many of them deliberately try to delay issuance of documents to extort money either with the connivance of the revenue functionaries or on their own accord.
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On the other hand, the patwaris who were interviewed lamented the fact that officers at service centers deliberately pass on misleading information to the DC about the correction of entries and responsiveness of the revenue functionaries. Sometimes, they directly ask for money for accepting the corrected records. They said that patwaris are notorious for their corruption but these service center officials are no better. However, there were a few individual with moderate views who appreciated that system of computerization was a positive initiative. Though, they admitted that there were certain hitches still if the system is given time to work then through constant monitoring and modifications it will improve and reap the intended benefits.
It goes without saying that this system of computerization is belated initiative which should have been started far earlier. But it is a welcome step. No doubt problems are there and there is strong resistance from within the lower tiers of revenue hierarchy. But given to work, the system will improve gradually. However, it is pertinent to mention here that isolated attempts to reform the system and introduce cosmetic changes will not bring about the desired fruits. Unless the patwari culture is changed through a consulted approach, the exploitation and corruption cannot be eliminated from the revenue department.
2. Citizens Feedback Model
Another initiative of the Punjab government is Citizen Feedback Model which has been applied primarily in public service oriented departments where there are bulks of complaints of public grievances, corruption and unresponsiveness of the officers concerned to these issues. The departments selected for this purpose are Police, Revenue and Health. Mechanism devised for this purpose is that there in each office/unit in these departments a computer cell has been established where names, contact numbers and addresses of the clientele are recorded. This information is passed on to the Chief Minister‟s Secretariat on daily basis where a desk has been established for monitoring and cross checking the service delivery in this department. The officer in charge of this desk calls randomly the contact numbers of the persons sent by the field offices and takes their views as to whether they were dealt with respectfully or they had to grease the palm of any official. This direct feedback helps improve the service delivery in these departments.
This system is still in its nascent stage. It is not free of flaws. Earlier, it was reported that contact numbers of the clientele are largely fictitious. Besides that, a single number has been repeatedly recorded. Even there is no mechanism to record the exact number of visitors in a department in a day. Despite publicity by the government, the public largely is unaware of existence of any such feedback mechanism. Most importantly, it appears to be stop gap arrangement of monitoring by the current political regime in Punjab which unfortunately may be terminated by new government in office. If the grievances of the people are to be addressed genuinely on permanent basis, then the relevant institutions need to be strengthened.
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5.6 Recommendations
1. Improving the Revenue Collection
The first and foremost duty of the revenue department is the collection of revenue under different heads as discussed earlier. Over the years, the land revenue, though, still a major source of income for government exchequer has been over taken by other sources of income as well. There has also been witnessed a gradual decline in the collection of government revenue due to one reason or another. The disinterest and apathy of its officers apart, the corruption and leakages have been responsible for this decline. The system of collection of recovery is not without checks and balances. The amount collected from the „tax payers‟ is to be deposited in government treasury through a challan form in the office of the District Accounts Officer (DAO) to be credited to the relevant head. The copy of this challan is also given to the treasurer of the tehsil office which is under the supervision of the tehsildar and in the office of the district revenue accounts working under the control of the DC. The annual audit conducted by the Director General Civil Audit, an independent office also checks and submits written reports on the financial working of the district revenue department. Despite this mechanism, the system has its flaws. The rural population is largely illiterate or gives patwari the cash amount who may not deposit it in the bank. It occurs frequently and comes to notice in detail scrutiny or when such a defaulter comes across some senior officer. Only then patwari can be held liable for depositing such amount in the government exchequer.
The inspection of record brings to notice another sort of fraud where the record of receipts of mutation fee deposited in the government exchequer is tempered. What happens in this scenario is that the amount actually deposited is far less than the amount due. For instance, if the amount calculated is 20000 rupees, the deposited amount may be 200 rupees. But on the receipt of the deposit, the patwari adds two ciphers to show that the amount deposited is 20000 rupees. This sort of tempering is pervasive among patwaris and can be detected easily by tallying it with the record of the DAO.
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In order to address such issues, a close scrutiny of record, regular touring by the officers as well as close supervision of the field staff is essential. The officers at every level should be accessible to the general public either through an open door policy or fixing meeting hours or may be through holding open courts. The officers need to win over the trust of the public. The distance or the gap needs to be mitigated.
The revenue base is not meager in Faisalabad, problem lies with the leakages in the collection mechanism. The field offices are at fault for not addressing loops and the senior management may be held guilty of criminal neglect of the former. The monitoring mechanism has become very weak rendering any such supervisory oversight almost in effective. The higher the office the greater is the responsibility for supervision of its lower tiers. Therefore, the practice of regular monitoring of the field offices need to be carried out effectively and objectively at every level up to the Board to hold field offices more accountable.
2. Improving the Infrastructure
It appears that almost 80% patwarkhana(office of the patwri in a patwar circle) are located in some private building taken on rent by the patwari himself or in rural areas mostly in a place provided by some influential land owner. Result is patwari cannot work independently and is mostly influenced by the persons obliging him. The remaining 20% of patwarkhana though established on government land are in shabby or dilapidated condition, the maintenance of which is an onerous task due to the apathy of the government to provide funds for that purpose. The precious revenue record contained of multiple registers carrying information about the record of the land and ownership of 8-9 revenue estates is under the custody of a patwari of that circle. The placement of this record at some private place or a place there is poor security is not without danger. Because this is the very basic information of the land and vested interests of numerous stake holders, peasants, owners, tenants, tillers and residents of that area are attached to this. This record if tempered, damaged, stolen or burned is very difficult to reconstruct and may lead to a series of hardships for these people which may also lead in endless litigation among the stake holders. In order to mitigate this situation, the government seriously needs to build the infrastructures at the grass roots level so as to make patwari not only independent of the exogenous influence but also to make him accessible to the public. By the same token, the government owned rest houses in each district need to be maintained and the revenue officers in charge of the area may be required to visit those areas regularly.
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3. Improving the Patwari Culture
It is also strange to note that a patwari, the lowest revenue functionary is required to attend many offices in the revenue hierarchy from tehsildar‟s to SMBR‟s, and attend courts in district and capital to present the revenue record in both civil and criminal matters. He also has to impart many field assignments and collect information from his revenue estate for the offices in the head quarter speedily. He has to fulfill this multifarious task which require mobility of patwari but strangely he is neither given any conveyance e.g. bicycle or motorcycle, nor any conveyance allowance.
Besides that, all the stationary and relevant forms as well as the cloth map of the revenue estate are to be purchased and prepared by the patwari himself out of his pocket. A patwari a Basic Scale 9 who is only given a few thousand rupees in the name of pay by the government can ill afford all these in a legal manner. It goes without saying that his resourcefulness may be attributed to his corruption, exploitation and leakages in the system especially collection of revenue.
In case of any natural calamity or crisis, the patwaris are asked to collect contribution in money or in kind from the philanthropists or well-off individuals in their jurisdiction. But in many instances it is not possible for them to achieve the target assigned therefore they have to achieve this target by hook or by crook. Many a time, they are asked to organize processions or rallies in support of government or some other cause which they do without financial support of the government. The financial support provided by the government exchequer for these purposes is either peanuts or none at all. In order to motivate the revenue functionaries, their pay packages and incentives also need to be rationalized keeping in view the never ending scope of their duties and rising standard of living in an inflation prone economy, so as to remove the possibility of any lopsided justification for corruption and exploitation on part of these government servants.
In order to make him accessible to public, he may be directed to sit in his own office at least for two fixed days of the week and to get it implemented other concerned departments especially judiciary may be requested to cooperate in the interests of public not to summon patwaris with record on those two days.
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Their service structure needs to be improved too. The requisite qualification of patwari needs to be enhanced too from matriculation to a bachelors degree holder or more preferably a law graduate, so that he may be able to read and comprehend the circulars and edicts of government especially the complicated judicial verdicts affecting the rights of individuals or the property of the state won after a protracted legal battle which might have spanned two three decades. He can only get these implemented if he comprehends theses. At present, many such documents lie unattended or misunderstood for want of clear understanding and proper legal education.
It is also suggested that his pay packages may be improved keeping in view the minimum standards of living in the country. When the precious record is placed in his hand making him the village accountant, ignoring his basic needs and ladening him with excessive assignments and responsibilities without bothering to stop for a moment how will he manage, it implies that the system itself is pushing him towards corruption. Patwari will not become honest, if his basic needs and wants are not addressed.
Their offices or patwarkhanas need to be rebuilt too. Government should take it as its fundamental responsibility if it wants to stem exploitation in the revenue department and make patwari responsible. Currently, mostly patwaris manage their offices in rented buildings which is being paid from his own pocket. Affordability of such rented buildings for a patwari earning a salary of only few thousands rupees is an open secret. The record which is a public asset is not safe there either. The government may for all practical purposes club a few adjacent patwar circles and build a joint office block for such patwaris along with their safe keeping of record making it mandatory to sit in office for at least two fixed days as mentioned above. In such an office block comprising of patwaris of a four or more patwar circles, two motor bikes may be placed at their disposal for their mobility whenever required.
Only haranguing the patwari culture and blaming it for rampant corruption does not offer any solution. Small but meaningful yet practical steps need to be taken if the system is to arrest the dwindling trends.
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4. Improving the Quality of Human Resource
Another important factor is overall deterioration in the quality of human resource (HR) in revenue department. The patwari who is the custodian of precious revenue record is only a matriculate who can barely read and write Urdu language. The current system of correspondence in government offices and judiciary is bilingual i.e. Urdu and English. Rather English language is used more than Urdu. The patwari is unable to comprehend the notification, directives, circulars, instructions and judicial decisions which are usually communicated in English. If they are unable to understand the spirit of the matter then how can they be expected to get these implemented? Even many revenue officers lack requisite command over English language to enable them to interpret the spirit of the order. It appears from the observation of facts that the overall decay in revenue department also manifests itself in the quality of its HR. In case of patwaris, the class of veteran and skilled professionals in their work is fast diminishing. The new recruits now rely more on the expertise of retired patwaris in exchange of monthly stipend. The miscellaneous of the patwaris do not spare them then chance to maintain record and work with their own hands, thereby, leaving them little chance to hone their own job skills. Same goes true for the revenue officers. Their knowledge about relevant revenue rules and laws is not up to date also. They just undergo a short training course at the time of their recruitment. If the quality of HR is not up to the mark in the lower rungs of revenue department then the upper echelons are not an exception either. The officers for the rank of Assistant Commissioners upwards to the Board of Revenue are selected and appointed through a competitive examination at provincial or federal level. But they are also imparted rudimentary training about the relevant rules and laws after their recruitment. Rest they have to learn on job on their own accord. The disinterest in the supervisory tier has taken its toll on the efficiency and efficacy of the lower formation.
There is a dire need to improve the quality of training courses not only at the time of recruitment of the functionaries but also to introduce refresher courses and workshops regarding introduction of new rules at suitable intervals at least in divisional head quarters if not in each district. It will help them keep abreast of the latest instructions and laws which they are required to implement.
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5. Redefining the Boundaries of Revenue Estates
Partitioning of land among stake holders and fixation of boundaries within a revenue estate and with the adjacent revenue estates is an important task of revenue department which has been rendered very difficult in urban areas due to frequent transaction of land. The loops in such cases spur the stake holders to resort to litigation. It is pertinent in this age of technology that the system of GPS may be utilized in demarcation of land so as to avoid any ambiguity in this regard.
The boundaries of the bigger revenue estates need to be modified to so as to make them manageable administratively. Ironically, it happens that a revenue estate of a patwar circle is not geographically congruent with other revenue estates in the same circle which is an anomaly and needs to be addressed at least for sake of better management.
6. Excluding Urbanized Revenue Estates from Assessment of Land Revenue
The phenomenon of urbanization is catalyst behind economic growth and modernization. The growth of industry and business in Faisalabad has led to sprawling urban center by usurping the agricultural land surrounding it. Though, this agricultural land is no longer in agricultural use. It has been converted either into commercial property or in residential colonies. The water courses which were laid there to irrigate the agricultural land have also been encroached or covered with the cement blocks by the new owners. However, the water rate continues to be imposed upon these new owners even when no water is being consumed there to irrigate the agricultural land. This change of land use on spot has rendered it impossible the collection of land revenue from these owners. Result is an outstanding amount is reflected to be collected from these „defaulters‟. Sometimes, the owners in occupation of such land resort to court of law for dispensation of justice and mostly succeed in obtaining and injunction order restraining the revenue authorities from collection of revenue from them. It gives temporary respite to the land owner but it is not a permanent solution. The permanent solution is to take into account such areas where land use has been changed from agricultural to urban. Such areas need to be excluded from the assessment of land revenue. It will be a huge and extensive exercise in all over Punjab but can be carried out in different phases in each district. It will help rationalize the genuine revenue demand and target of the land revenue which will be practical and achievable. Interestingly, an urban area that comes out of the ambit of land revenue falls under the purview of awaiting area for sake of collection of other allied taxes.
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7. Maintenance of Revenue Record
It is a point to ponder that the precious revenue record lying with patwari, Tehsil office, and District record room and in the provincial record room in the Board of Revenue is poorly maintained. It has already been mentioned elsewhere in this research that this record carries vital information regarding the ownership of the land, classification of land, crop inspection and resultant assessment of land revenue. This record is further used for ascertaining the rights of legal heirs, demarcation of land, and land in the use of various government departments and for other allied legal and financial matters. History stands witness that this record being maintained since 1860, if lost or damaged is difficult to reconstruct in its original shape as it happened when the revenue record room in district courts Lahore was burnt in 1998.
Generally, the record rooms even if not burnt are in no go area for government servants other than those forcibly posted their. Reason being poor maintenance and up keep, poor lightening, dust, humidity and resultant growth of dangerous insects. The record there is dumped in shape of big heaps or in broken cupboards or in big sacks without any differentiation of era or geography. No government official is willing to work in the record room due to these reasons. It is very difficult to locate the relevant file or record there. It also results in protracted litigation because the relevant record cannot be produced in the court of law where the case is pending adjudication for want of record.
These record rooms wherever situated need to be maintained and most importantly the hygienic conditions there need to be improved. The record room in the Board of Revenue is in basement and no official is willing to step foot in the dungeon. Setting the things in order in any record room in any district not to speak of Faisalabad alone is a gigantic task which can only be accomplished with missionary zeal combined with some special incentives for the officials working for that purpose.
Computerization of land records is another important step towards maintenance of land records on modern lines. Though, the project in this regard as discussed above is still in the pipeline yet it has succeeded in scanning the record of almost 23 districts. But it still has to complete it all 36 districts of Punjab touching upon the ancient record of the previous century. Even with the computerization, the manual record keeping may not be altogether ruled out.
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8. Reclaiming State Land from Illegal Occupation
Faisalabad is a colony district. Though, the Proprietary Rights (PR) have been granted to a large number of its original settlers, however, huge chunks of land owned by the state are lying their vacant there. In such instances, the tillers from the adjacent land try to occupy and cultivate the state land if agricultural whereas, the urban state land is occupied for commercial or residential purpose. As the District Collector is the custodian of the state land under the Colonization Act, he is responsible for retrieving the state land for illegal occupation or encroachment. Many systematic campaigns have been ordered to be carried out in district Faisalabad by energetic District Collectors. Some collectors, however, chose to remain quiet on the issue or just ignored it. In some cases, the District Collector or the Assistant Commissioner who exercises the delegated powers of the tehsil collector has passed order of section 32 and 34 of the Colonization Act to retrieve the state land.
This task is not an easy one because the illegal occupants are equally resourceful and try to resist any such move by means of political manipulations or obtaining the injunction orders from a court of law by concealing the facts. In order to ward off any attempt of aggression by these illegal occupants, the revenue functionaries plan and organized action with the assistance of Police. They also have to arrange for heavy machinery on rent in case of cemented construction. Where the harvest has been sown on the state land, the collector may order to attach the standing crop as it becomes the property of the government being sown on its land. This standing crop is attached under section 83 of Land Revenue Act 1967 and the money obtained through its open auction is deposited in government exchequer. Retrieval of state land is an important but difficult task of the revenue department. In recent past, the attempt of government to sell the state land in open auction to general public has not been very successful. Systematic effort needs to be done in this regard taking into confidence the judiciary and political elite so as to render the illegal occupants unable to take refuge of law or political patronage.
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9. Bridging the Disconnect between Revenue, Judiciary and Police
The beauty of the system of the local government in the British Raj was that there was a striking balance among the district revenue, district judiciary and district police. There were opportunities for frequent interaction among these on administrative matters. The heads of all three departments of district, the DC, the District and Sessions Judge (D&SJ) and the Superintendent of Police (SP), were interdependent administratively on each other but overall supremacy was enjoyed by the civil administration, the DC who was also the Chief Executive of the district. He was also the District Magistrate (DM) who had the instrument of magisterial powers at his command. His subordinate revenue officers also exercised this delegated authority in their areas of jurisdiction. The magisterial functions provided them with an opportunity to exercise control and supervision of the functioning of the police department. They could check the record of the police station, challans to be submitted to the court by the police, general inspection of police station and the working of the police officials there. The magistrate also served as a buffer between the district judiciary and civil administration. This striking balance and interdependence among these three departments can be further highlighted by observing that in each district revenue, judiciary and police all offices were housed in one district complex. The custodian of which was the DC.
After the inception of Pakistan, this interdependence was challenged and the magisterial functions of the civil administration were characterized as colonial teeth to bite the indigenous masses. So it was deemed expedient that such judicial or magisterial functions were taken from the DC and he should be the in charge of the civil administration only. First such attempt was made in 1970s and later the major magisterial powers were taken from the DC and were given to district judiciary. In 2001, the PLGO finally abolished the institution of magistracy without any attempt to fill the resultant void. The earlier civil oversight over the police got vanished and now police has been under the direct control of political elite. This dis-connect and absence of checks and balances in many instances has taken its toll on the administrative efficiency and efficacy of the government has suffered. If the provincial government directs the DCO/DC to convene a meeting on the law and order situation in the district, being the head of the civil administrative, he seldom gets the appropriate response from the head of the police.
As mentioned earlier, there are a lot of cases arising out of the disputed property and the issues of ownership of the land in which the state may also be a stake holder, therefore, the interaction between revenue department and the district judiciary is intermittent. In order to address hitches and lacunas in communication, meetings are held involving the officers from both sides to address these issues.
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A very common issue is the issuance of injunction orders by the judiciary to halt any campaign initiated by the district government. But unfortunately, despite airing such issues time and again both formally and informally no serious tangible outcome has been seen. Still the DCO/DC is empowered to impose section 144 of Cr.P.C. on administrative grounds. The DPO/ SP often requests the DCO to impose section 144 if police has to carry out some campaign e.g. under Kite Flying Act. The removal of the interdependence among these departments has left the system of statecrafts in disarray. There is a dire need to introduce some connection or mechanism to enable these departments to respond to an issue in a unified manner mutually acceptable to all. An effective and pragmatic system of checks and balances is required at district level.
10. Depoliticize the Revenue Department
The malaise afflicting the revenue department has been worsened due to its politicization. The political intervention into the day to day functioning of the revenue department from postings and transfers of its official and officers to influencing the presiding officer of revenue court have eroded the independence and dignity of its administration. Many a time, it has observed that a patwari is more loyal to its political patron than to the state. The political elite try to intimidate the revenue officers by threatening and sometimes ensuring their forcible transfers. Positive political intervention is rare. There are many examples where the career path of a revenue officer or patwari has been effectively watched over by his political patron acting as a guardian angel. Due to this, the secrecy of information and independence of actions in the department have suffered a great deal. The image of the department in the general public and its officials has also been ruined. Another drawback of this political intervention is that the recommendees and the tasks assigned by the political leadership take precedence over the matters of general administration and the officers become a stooge at the hand of politicians in their attempt to appease and oblige the later.
Any incidence of political intervention if reported and proven should be made an example of. The political intervention is not only disastrous but also cancerous that has robbed this significant government department off credibility and public trust. This trust deficit is the root cause behind the deteriorating performance of the revenue department.
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If the government wants to revitalize this department and improve its efficacy and ensure rise in revenue collection, then it has to restore the confidence of public in it. It will have to be curbed through the support of the government laced with determination and steel will.
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ANNEXURES
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Terms & Definitions:
Assessment: Fixing the amount of and imposing land revenue upon an estate is called Assessment.
Board of Revenue - The Board of Revenue established under the Board of Revenue Act, 1957. (West Pakistan Act XI of 1957).
Field Book: it contains the details of measurement of each field e.g. its length, breadth, diagonal detail, and worked out total area.
Irrigated Land - Land irrigated by a canal, tube well, well, lift, spring, tank or by any other artificial means of irrigation
Un-irrigated Land- land other than irrigated land, and includes land fed by rains, floods, hill torrents, and uncultivable or waste land.
Khasra Girdawari: It is the crop inspection register, wherein entry of every crop cultivated in every Khasra number (per acre) is made after spot visit by the Patwari in presence of Lambardar (Village headman) and other interested persons. It also indicates ownership, person cultivating and the crop sown on the land. It is made twice in a year i.e. for crops of Kharif (October) and Rabi (March).
Khasra Number - A Portion of land of which the area is separately entered under an indicative number in the record-of-rights.
Khewat: is the name of list of owner‟s holding arranged in numerical order.
Lambardar: or headman is a person who is appointed by the District Collector under the Land Revenue Act 1967. His duties include collection of land taxes of an revenue estate (mauza) A settlement thus consists of : fixing the assessment; and framing the record of rights. Land - The world Land has not been defined in the Land Revenue Act, but under the Punjab Tenancy Act,1887 it means” any land occupied or let for the agricultural purpose or for the purpose subservient to the agricultural or for the pasture, and includes the sites or building and other structure on such land.”
Land Holding - A share or portion of an estate held by one land-owner or jointly by two or more land-owners.
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Landlord - a person under whom a tenant holds land, and whom the tenant is, or a lessor.
Land Owner – a person whom a holding has been is transferred or an estate or holding has been let in farm, but exclude a tenant.
Lal Kitab comprises following statements Annual area, annual corps and annual revenue account, Annual transfer of land and Annual sales and mortgages, assessment.
Mussavie (Index Map): Geographic data is recorded or mapped on special kind of paper maps for each village. These are known as the mussavies .These are surveyed paper maps at different scales depending upon village area, normally at a scale of 1”=40 Karam .The measuring unit on mussavies is “karam”. Mussavies are developed at the time of settlement. No changes can be made in this record set till next settlement.
Patwari: is a person acquiring any right in an estate as a land-owner should report for mutation. Patwari carries out field survey/crop inspection twice a year in the months of March (Rabi) and October (Kharif) and maintains the records of rights.
Patwar Circle: a group of three to four revenue estates clubbed together and given under the supervision of one patwari.
Patwarkhana: office of Patwari where he also keeps the current record.
Rates and Cesses - Primarily payable by land-owners by the authority of Government; village officers‟ cess; and any sum payable on account of village expenses.
Records of Rights (Register Haqdaaraan-e-Zamin or Misl-e-Haqiat): This register contains ownership records and is developed at the time of settlement along with field book and Mussavie, and owner information. It indicates the vital but basic information about each parcel of land containing the ownership detail, details of tenants and type of land under cultivation for revenue or tax assessment.
Revenue Circle: it comprises of many patwar circles and is under the supervision and control of a naib tehsildar or tehsildar, each called a revenue officer.
Revenue Court - Court constituted as such under the law relating to tenancy as in force for the time being.
Revenue Estate – Any area for which a separate record-of-rights has been made; or which has been separately assessed to land-revenue; or which the Board of Revenue, declare to be a revenue estate.
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Revenue Officer –an officer discharging functions of a Revenue Officer under this Act.
Roaznamchah (Diary): It is a daily report register in which all important daily events are written like crop health, pesticide attack on crop, land transfer or mutation, village boundary benchmark(SehHadda) status and other similar activities.
Shajrah Parcha /Latha(cloth): The reflection of mussavie on big cotton cloth map is known as “latha”. This record set is primarily kept by patwari of the village, who makes temporal changes like splitting or merging of land parcels. (Usually with a red pencil).
Shajra Nasb: the genealogical tree of the land owner s is called ShajraNasb.
Tehsil: A group of estates forming a sub division of a district or tehsil also called Pargana in mughal era.
Tenant - A person who holds land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that other person, and includes the predecessors and successors-in-interest of such person, but does not include a mortgagee of the rights of a land-owner or a person who takes from Government a lease of unoccupied land for the purpose of subletting it.
Tenancy - a parcel of land held by a tenant under one lease or one set of conditions. Cultivated land is classified into seven types. Land which remained unsown for eight successive harvests is called Banjar qadim. Land which remained unsown for four successive harvests is called Banjar jaded.
Intiqal: Mutation or transfer of land from one owner to another.
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THE PUNJAB BOARD OF REVENUE ACT, 1957 (XI of 1957)
CONTENTS
1. Short title, extent and commencement 2. Definitions 3. Constitution of a Board of Revenue 4. Superintendence and control of Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts 5. Powers of the Board 6. Conduct of business 7. Revision of orders by the Board 8. Review of orders by the Board 9. Power to make rules 10. Savings and validation 11. Repeal of West Pakistan Ordinance XII of 1956 and continuance of action taken thereunder
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TEXT
1THE 2[PUNJAB] BOARD OF REVENUE ACT, 1957 (XI of 1957) [28th February, 1957]
An Act 3 to provide for the constitution of a Board of Revenue for [the Punjab] Preamble.— WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the constitution of a Board of 4 Revenue for [the Punjab]: It is hereby enacted as follows:-
1. Short title, extent and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called 5[the Punjab] Board of Revenue Act, 1957. 6 7 [(2) It extends to the whole of the Province of [the Punjab] except the Tribal Areas.] (3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on and from the 14th day of October, 1955.
2. Definitions.— Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context—
(i) “Board” means the Board of Revenue established under this Act;
(ii) “Government” means the Government of 8[the Punjab]; and
(iii) “Member” means a member of the Board of Revenue established under this Act.
3. Constitution of a Board of Revenue.— (1) There shall be a Board of Revenue for 9[the Punjab] which shall consist of such Members as may be appointed by the Government from time to time. (2) The Government may, whenever considered necessary or expedient, appoint or remove a Member. 4. Superintendence and control of Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts.— (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), and to any orders of the Government with respect to the appointments and conditions of service of Revenue Officers, the general superintendence and control over all Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts in West Pakistan 10shall vest in, and all such officers, in so far as their functions as Revenue Officers are concerned, shall be subordinate to the Board. (2) The Board shall be subject to the control of the Government, and in all matters, other than those in which the Board exercises appellate and revisional jurisdiction, the Government shall have power to issue such directions to the Board as may be considered necessary or expedient and the Board shall carry out those directions. 5. Powers of the Board.— (1) The Board shall be the controlling authority in all matters connected with the administration of land, collection of land revenue, preparation of land records and other matters relating thereto. (2) The Board shall be the highest court of appeal and revision in revenue cases in the Province.
(3) All proceedings relating to any of the matters referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) which immediately before the date of coming into force of this Act, were pending before the final appellate or revisional authority of any Province, State or other territory or area which has been 11 included in the Province of West Pakistan , shall stand transferred to the Board. 6. Conduct of business.— (1) Subject to the approval of the Government, the Board may distribute its business amongst its members and may, by rules, regulate the procedure of all proceedings before it. (2) Any order made or a decree passed by a Member shall be deemed to be the order or decree of the Board. (3) Where in a case which the Members of the Board are required to dispose of collectively, in accordance with the rules framed under this Act, there is a difference of opinion amongst the Members as to the decision to be given on any point—
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(a) it shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of Members if there is such a majority; and (b) if the Members are equally divided, the Members shall state the point on which they differ and the case shall then be heard, on that point, collectively by those Members who heard it and by another Member, and if there is no such Member, by an additional Member to be appointed by the Government for the purpose of that case, and then the point on which there is the difference of opinion shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of all such Members. 7. Revision of orders by the Board.— (1) Any order made or a decree passed by a Member either on appeal or in revision shall, subject to any order made or decree passed under the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section and of section 8, be final. (2) Any person considering himself aggrieved by an order made or a decree passed by a Member, in such class of cases as may be specified in the rules framed under section 9 of this Act, may apply to the Board for revision of such order or decree, and if the Full Board considers that there are sufficient reasons for doing so, it may revise that order or decree and pass such further order as it may think fit after hearing the applicant: Provided that no revision shall lie to the Full Board against an order made or a decree passed by a Member in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.
Explanation— “Full Board” shall mean two or more Members of the Board, as may be determined by the rules. (3) Every application under sub-section (2) for revision of an order or decree shall be made within a period of ninety days from the date of that order or decree. 8. Review of orders by the Board.— (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree passed or order made by the Board and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made , or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record 12[or for any other sufficient reason] desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply to the Board for a review of judgment and the Board may, after giving notice to the parties affected thereby and after hearing them, pass such decree or order as the circumstances of the case require. (2) Every application for a review of a decree or order under sub-section (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date of that decree or order. 9. Power to make rules.— (1) The Board may, subject to the prior approval of the Government, make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1), the Board may make rules for all or any of the following purposes, namely:- (i) the procedure to be followed in any proceedings taken before a Revenue Officer or Court; (ii) to prescribe the forms, manner and subject in, or on which any returns or information about any cases or class of cases or proceedings or other matters shall be submitted by a Revenue Officer or Court to the Board or to any other authority; (iii) to prescribe the authorities or the officers by whom any particular cases or class of cases generally, or with respect to any particular locality, shall be dealt with; (iv) to provide for the territorial and pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the various Revenue Courts; and (v) to specify the class of cases in which a revision under sub-section (2) of section 7 shall lie to the Board. 10. Savings and validation.— (1) Notwithstanding the expiry of the West Pakistan (Board of Revenue) Ordinance, 1955, everything done, action taken, obligation, liability, penalty, or punishment incurred, inquiry or proceedings commenced, Member appointed or person authorized, jurisdiction or power conferred, rules made and order issued under any of the provisions of the said Ordinance shall be continued, and, so far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorized, conferred, made or issued under this Act.
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(2) Everything done, action taken, obligation, liability or penalty incurred, inquiry or proceedings commenced, Member appointed or person authorized, jurisdiction or power conferred, rules made and order issued after the date of expiry of the West Pakistan (Board of Revenue) Ordinance 1955, and before the 15th day of August, 1956, which could have been done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorized, conferred, made or issued under the said Ordinance if it had been in force during the said period shall be continued and, so far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorized, conferred, made or issued under this Act. 11. Repeal of West Pakistan Ordinance XII of 1956 and continuance of action taken 13 thereunder. — (1) The West Pakistan Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1956 , is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1956 14, or any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other Authority, everything done, action taken, obligation, liability or penalty incurred inquiry or proceedings commenced, Member appointed or person authorized, jurisdiction or power conferred, rules made and order issued under any of the provisions of the said Ordinance, shall be continued and, so far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively done, taken, incurred, commenced, appointed, authorized, conferred, made or issued under this Act.
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1 This Act was passed by the West Pakistan Assembly on 6th Feb., 1957; assented to by the Governor of West Pakistan on 23rd Feb., 1957; and was published in the West Pakistan Gazette (Extraordinary), dated 28th Feb., 1957, pages 363-67. 2 Substituted by the Punjab Laws (Adaptation) Order, 1974 (Pb A.O. 1 of 1974), for “West Pakistan”. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Substituted by the West Pakistan Laws (Extension to Karachi) Ordinance, 1964 (VII of 1964). 7 Substituted by the Punjab Laws (Adaptation) Order, 1974 (Pb A.O. 1 of 1974), for “West Pakistan”. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Now “the Punjab”. 11 Ibid. 12 Inserted by the West Pakistan Board of Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1964 (XVIII of 1964). 13 W.P. Ord. XII of 1956. 14 Ibid.
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THE PUNJAB IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE AUTHORITY ACT, 1997 (XI of 1997)
CONTENTS
12. Short title and commencement 13. Constitution of the Authority 14. Composition of the Authority 15. Board of Management 16. Powers and duties of the Authority 17. Right of entry 18. Arrangement with local bodies or other agency 19. Control over Provincial water resource 20. Appointment of officers, servants, etc 21. Delegation of powers to Managing Director, etc 22. Persons serving in the Provincial Irrigation and Power Department 23. Authority Fund 24. Budget, audit and accounts 25. Establishment of Area Water Boards, etc 26. Transfer of rights and liabilities 27. Rules 28. Regulations 29. Removal of difficulties 30. Repeal
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TEXT
1THE PUNJAB IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE AUTHORITY ACT 1997 (XI of 1997) nd [2 July, 1997] An Act
to provide for the establishment of the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority.
Preamble.— Whereas it is expedient to establish the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority to implement the strategy of the Government of Punjab for streamlining the Irrigation and Drainage System; to replace the existing administrative setup and procedures with more responsive, efficient and transparent arrangements; to achieve economical and effective operation and maintenance of the irrigation, drainage and flood control system in the Province; to make the irrigation and drainage network sustainable on a long-term basis and introduce participation of beneficiaries in the operation and management thereof;
It is hereby enacted as follows:-
(4) Short title and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority Act 1997.
It shall come into force at once.
(5) Constitution of the Authority.— (1) There shall be established an Authority to be known as the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority.
The Authority shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and shall by the said name sue and be sued. (6) Composition of the Authority.— (1) The Authority shall consist of such number of members as may be notified by the Government.
The Minister for Irrigation and Power shall be the Chairman of the Authority.
Not less than six members shall be farmers and the number of non-farmer members shall not exceed the number of the farmer members 2[out of whom at least four shall be women.]
In the absence of the Chairman in a meeting the members present in the meeting may elect a member from amongst themselves to act as Chairman of the meeting. (7) Board of Management.— (1) Subject to the control and guidance of the Authority the management of the affairs of the Authority shall be carried out by the Board of Management appointed by the Authority with the prior approval of the Government and comprising a Managing Director and three General Managers.
The Managing Director and the General Managers shall have technical background and practical experience in the profession relevant to their job description. (8) Powers and duties of the Authority.— The Authority shall have the following powers
1 This Act was passed by the Punjab Assembly on 27th June, 1997; assented to by the Governor of the Punjab on 29th June, 1997; and, was published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary), dated 2nd July, 1997, pages 1063 to 1068. 2 Inserted by the Punjab Fair Representation of Women Act 2014 (IV of 2014)
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and duties—
(1) To receive irrigation supplies at the barrages falling within the province and from the inter-provincial or link canals and deliver the same in agreed quantities to the various water users and Area Water Boards in the Province.
(2) To ensure conveyance of drainage effluent to the outfall in co-ordination with Area Water Boards and Farmers Organisations as the case may be.
(3) To exercise all the powers under the Canal and Drainage Act 1873, the Soil Reclamation Act 1952 and any other law for the time being in force relating to the subject matter of these Acts.
(4) To fix the rates in consultation with the Government for the supply of irrigation water and of the drainage cess payable for the disposal of the drainage effluent.
(5) To levy appropriate surcharge for late payments and recover arrears from defaulters under the Land Revenue Act provided that in case the Government declares a remission, waiver, re- scheduling or suspension of payment of any of the dues of the Authority, the same shall be debited to the account of the Government who shall simultaneously notify how the Authority shall be compensated for the loss thereby caused to the Authority or any other entity established under this Act.
(6) To formulate and implement policies in the water resources sector with a view to continuously improve and achieve effective, economical and efficient utilization, preservation and improvement of such water resources by the water users of the Province on a sustainable basis.
2 To formulate and implement policy guidelines and procedures for the proper and efficient exercise of powers available under this Act by the various entities and their directors and employees and to prescribe training requirements and programmes which may be conducted by the various entities under this Act in this behalf.
3 To conduct any inquiries and hear any complaints and adjudicate on any dispute or differences of opinion between the Authority and different entities established under this Act and any individual and the said entities in accordance with the principles of natural justice relevant thereto and to faithfully and punctually implement such decisions as per letter and spirit thereof.
(9) To prescribe and adhere to the procedures for the filing of documentation regarding water allocation in the Province and all concessions, licences and leases granted by any entity under this Act and to ensure availability thereof to the general public for inspection and taking of copies thereof.
(10) To establish criteria and procedures for granting, modifying, reassigning, renewing, suspending or revoking any concessions, licences or subleases granted by the Authority to any other entity or person and for the management of the infrastructure in the event of suspension or revocation of a concession, licence or sublease.
(11) To operate and maintain the irrigation tube-wells, drainage, storage reservoirs and flood control infrastructure in the Province including hill torrent control and development works for irrigation of adjoining lands including watershed management practices in catchment areas.
(12) To plan, design, construct and improve the irrigation, drainage, storage reservoirs and flood control system with a view to ensure optimal utilization of the water resources of the Province on an equitable and efficient basis.
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(13) To maintain all relevant and necessary records, registers and data banks as may be relevant or necessary for the effective performance of any or all of its powers and duties.
(14) To issue such directions and take all such steps as may reasonably be necessary for the prevention and removal of encroachments and unauthorized construction along or on the properties of the Authority.
(15) To prescribe rates, fees and other charges to be payable in respect of various types of services which the Authority may be required to render or provide under this Act.
(16) To operate and maintain the equipment, machinery and stores of the Authority effectively, efficiently and in a business like manner.
(17) To undertake anti-erosion operations including conservation of forests and reafforestation and with a view to achieve this purpose, to restrict or prohibit by general or special order the clearing or breaking up of land in the catchment areas of any rivers, hill torrents and other streams.
(18) To undertake any work, incur any expenditure, procure machinery, plant and stores required for use by the Authority and to negotiate, execute, adopt and ratify all such contracts as may be considered necessary or expedient.
(19) To acquire and dispose of any land, property or machinery or equipment or any other interest in or regarding any land or property.
(20) To direct that any work required to be carried out by a person in connection with training of rivers, hill torrents and any other streams or undertaking of anti-erosion measures including conservation of forests and reafforestation but remaining undone shall, after reasonable notice to such person and due consideration of any objections raised by him in this regard, be undertaken by the Authority and determine the cost to be borne by such person, or after notice and due enquiry, by any other person who may be held by the Authority to be liable for the same.
8. To utilize the Authority Fund to meet the cost and expenses incurred on account of and in connection with the due performance of the various functions of the Authority under this Act including the payment of salaries and other remunerations to the management and employees of the Authority.
9. To formulate, implement and continuously review and improve the policies and procedures relevant to the management of finances and maintenance of the accounts of the Authority as well as for the inventory and assets valuation and disposal and for the recruitment, promotion, retirement (upon attainment of age of superannuation or otherwise) and earlier conclusion of employment of the employees of the Authority.
10. To formulate financial policies aimed at ensuring that the finances of the Authority are managed in a consistent, conservative and diligent manner as to protect its assets including providing for their maintenance and periodic replacement as necessary, preserve its capital and reserves, and promptly service its debts and obligations.
11. To formulate, adopt and implement policies aimed at promoting, formation, growth and development of Area Water Boards, Farmers Organizations and compilation and faithful monitoring of the results thereof as per the requirements prescribed under this Act and to ensure orderly and systematic induction thereof into the operations of the Authority.
(25) To prepare or cause to be prepared and regularly update or cause to be updated Staffing, Operational and Financial Plans.
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(26) To prepare and implement policies with a view to ensure that the staffing levels within the Authority and other entities under this Act conform with the corresponding levels indicated in the Staffing, Operational and Financial Plans prepared and updated as above.
(27) To formulate and implement policies with a view to ensure that the Authority and other entities as the case may be under this Act become fully operative as self supporting and financially self sustaining entities, to the extent of full recovery of O&M cost of canals and subsidiary drains within a period of 7 to 10 years.
(28) To formulate, implement and regularly update policies, studies and research programmes with a view to development and management of water resources, solve and eliminate and prevent water logging and salinity, and to develop irrigated agriculture in the Province.
(29) To conduct studies with a view to regularly analyze and evaluate the impact of the operations and policies of the Authority on the ecology and environment within the Province with a view to establish the various available options for the minimization of the adverse impact of such operations and policies, if any, and to adopt the optimal options for further action.
(30) To coordinate and regulate the measures being undertaken or required to be undertaken in the Province for recording and gauging surface waters, monitoring of groundwater table and quality of water and the compilation of data relevant thereto and in this regard to establish and regularly maintain proper liaison with similar work being undertaken in other provinces.
(31) To cause studies, surveys, experiments, technical investigations and research to be conducted in connection with or regarding the functions and duties of the Authority or of any other entity under this Act.
(32) To publish or cause to be published various policies, details, data and information relevant to the affairs of the Authority on a regular basis and to ensure reasonable access of the public to the same. 6. Right of entry.— (1) The Managing Director, or any other person authorized by him in writing, may, after reasonable prior notice to that effect, enter upon and survey any land, erect pillars for the determination of intended lines of work, make borings and excavations and do all other acts which may be necessary for the preparation and implementation of any scheme under any provision of this Act.
(2) If the affected land does not vest in the Authority, the power conferred by the above sub-section shall be exercised in such manner as to cause the least interference with and damage to such land and the rights of the owner thereof.
(3) When any person enters into or upon any land pursuant to sub-section (1) above, he shall, at the time of such entry or as soon thereafter as may be practicable but in no case later than 60 days from the date of such entry, pay or tender payment for all necessary damage likely to be caused on account of any operations proposed to be carried out or carried out under sub-section (1) above.
(4) In case of any dispute, the same shall be referred to the Collector/Deputy Commissioner of the district who shall decide the same within a maximum period of 60 days from the date of such reference.
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7. Arrangement with local bodies or other agency.— (1) As soon as any scheme has been completed by the Authority or at a later date, the Authority may arrange by a written agreement with a Local Body or other agency within whose jurisdiction any particular area covered by the scheme lies, to take over and maintain any of the works comprising such scheme in the said area.
(2) The Government shall have the power to direct the Authority to hand over any schemes completed by the latter to any agency of the Government or a Local Body or take over such schemes completed by any Agency.
(3) In any such case, the Authority shall be entitled to receive the expenditure incurred on such schemes.
8. Control over Provincial water resources.— Subject to the Indus Water Treaty (1960) and Water Apportionment Accord (1991), the Authority shall have control over all the rivers, canals, drains, streams, hill torrents, public springs, natural lakes, reservoirs (except such reservoirs as are under the control of WAPDA) and underground water resources within the Province to give effect to schemes to be prepared under this Act in relation to public purposes. 9. Appointment of officers, servants etc.— The Authority may employ such officers and servants, or appoint such experts or consultants as it may consider necessary for the performance of its functions, on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit. 10. Delegation of powers to Managing Director etc.— The Authority may, by general or special order, delegate to the Managing Director, a Member of the Board of Management or officer or servant of the Authority any of its powers, duties or functions, under this Act subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose. 11. Persons serving in the Provincial Irrigation and Power Department.— (1) All employees of the Irrigation Wing of the Provincial Irrigation and Power Department except such employees as may be specified by the Government in this behalf shall, subject to any other provisions contained herein, on coming in force of this Act, become the employees of the Authority.
(2) Employees under sub-section (1) shall serve the Authority on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by rules and regulations of the Authority but in any case not less favourable than their existing terms and conditions of service.
(3) The Authority shall, through adoption of policies of hiring freeze, reassignment, non - replacement of employees retiring upon attainment of age of superannuation and providing incentives for early retirement, bring the number of its employees in conformity with the corresponding numbers indicated in the relevant Staffing, Operational and Financial Plans.
(4) The government shall contribute to the pension, gratuity and final payment of provident fund of the employees of the Provincial Irrigation & Power Department who become the employees of the Authority under sub-section (1) as per the relevant Rules.
12. Authority Fund.— There shall be a fund to be known as the “Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority Fund” vested in the Authority to which shall be credited all sums received by the Authority. 13. Budget, audit and accounts.— The budget of the Authority shall be approved and its accounts shall be maintained and audited in such manner as may be prescribed.
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14. Establishment of Area Water Boards, etc.— (1) The Government may establish Area Water Boards and Farmers’ Organizations and assign to them such functions as it may deem fit:
Provided that the Area Water Boards shall comprise not less than eight members who shall be representatives of the farmers three out of whom shall be from the tail reaches of canals; the Chairman of the Area Water Boards shall be a representative of the farmers and the number of non-farmer members of the Boards shall not exceed the farmer members.
(2) The Authority shall, within one year of its establishment, devise and implement pilot programmes, policies and take steps thereunder to ensure that an Area Water Board covering selected canal command and Farmers’ Organisations at the minor and distributary level are formed in a phased manner in accordance with the relevant Bye-Laws and Regulations framed by the Authority.
(3) The pilot Area Water Board and Farmers’ Organisations shall be vested with such functions and power as would be required to enable them to become financially self-sustaining and self-sufficient to the extent of recovering complete O&M charges for maintaining canals and subsidiary drains within a maximum period of ten (10) years in the case of Area Water Board and seven (7) years for Farmers’ Organisations from the respective dates of their formation.
(4) The process of setting up of further Area Water Boards and Farmers’ Organisations will depend upon the successful functioning of the pilot project.
15. Transfer of rights and liabilities.— Upon coming into force of this Act all assets and liabilities and all rights and obligations of the Irrigation Wing of Provincial Irrigation and Power Department shall stand transferred to the Authority, on such terms and conditions particularly as regards use and disposal of the said assets as may be prescribed by the Government.
16. Rules.— The Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.
17. Regulations.— The Authority may by notification make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder for the administration and management of the affairs of the Authority. 18. Removal of difficulties.— If any difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the provisions of this Act the Government may `make such orders, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty.
19. Repeal.— The Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority Ordinance 1997 (XX of 1997) is hereby repealed.
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PRICE CONTROL AND PREVENTION OF PROFITEERING AND HOARDING ACT, 1977
CONTENTS
1. Short title, extent and commencement 2. Definitions 3. Powers to make order, etc 4. Delegation of Powers 5. Effect of Orders in consistent with other enactments 6. Fixation of Prices 7. Penalties 8. Attempts and abetments 9. Offences by Corporations 10. False statements 11. Power to try offences summarily 12. Power to amend schedule 13. Presumption as to order 14. Burden of Proof in certain cases 15. Protection of Action taken under the act 16. Repeal
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TEXT
PRICE CONTROL AND PREVENTION OF PROFITEERING AND HOARDING ACT, 1977
th [25 May, 1977] An Act to provide for price control and prevention of profiteering and hoarding.
Preamble.— Whereas it is expedient to provide for price control and prevention of profiteering and hoarding; It is hereby enacted as follows:-
31. Short title, extent and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977.
It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
It shall come into force at once.
32. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
(a) "Controller- General" means the Controller-General of Prices and Supplies appointed by the Federal Government, and includes any Deputy or Assistant Controller-General of Prices and Supplies so appointed, and any other officer authorized by the Federal Government to exercise all or any of the powers of the Controller-General under this Act;
(b) "dealer" means a person carrying on, whether in conjunction with any other business or not, the business of selling any essential commodity, whether wholesale or retail;
(c) "essential commodity" means any of the commodities or classes of commodities mentioned in the Schedule;
(d) "importer" means a person importing into Pakistan, whether under an import licence granted by the Federal Government or otherwise, any Essential commodity from outside Pakistan, but does not include a person importing any essential commodity as part of his personal baggage;
(e) "notified order" means an order notified in the official Gazette;
(f) "producer" means a person engaged in the manufacture or production of any essential commodity.
3. Powers to make orders, etc.— (1) The Federal Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing equitable distribution of an essential commodity and its availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating the prices, production, movement, transport, supply, distribution, disposal and sale of the essential commodity and for the price to be charged or paid for it at any stage of transaction therein.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), an order made thereunder may provide-
(a) for controlling the prices at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold in any area;
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for regulating the production, treatment and keeping of any essential commodity;
for regulating, by licences, permits or otherwise, the transport, movement and distribution between the Provinces of an essential commodity;
for prohibiting the withholding of sale of an essential commodity ordinarily kept for sale;
for requiring any person holding stock in a Province of an essential commodity to sell in another Province the whole or a specified part of the stock at such price, to such persons or class of persons and under such conditions as may be specified in the order;
for fixing the maximum quantity of any essential commodity which may at any time be possessed by a producer or dealer;
for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating or prohibiting any of the matters aforesaid;
for requiring persons engaged in any of the matters aforesaid in respect of any essential commodity to maintain and produce for inspection such books, accounts and records relating to their business and to furnish such information relating thereto, as may be specified in the order;
for requiring every importer, producer and dealer to mark the essential commodities with the sale prices and to exhibit on his premises a price list of the essential commodities held by him for sale; and
for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the entering and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make such search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to believe that a contravention of the order has been, is being or is about to be committed, or any records connected therewith, the grant or issue of licences, permits or other documents and the charging of fees therefore.
4. Delegation of powers.— The Federal Government may, by notified order direct that any power conferred on it by or under this Act shall in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by-
(a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Federal Government , or
(b) Such Provincial Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a Provincial Government as may be specified in the direction.
5. Effect of orders inconsistent with other enactments.— Any order made under section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other then this Act.
6. Fixation of prices.— (1) Subject to such general or special orders as may be made by the Federal Government under section 3, the Controller. General may, by .notification in the official Gazette, fix specific maximum prices of essential commodities and different prices may be fixed for different localities or for different classes or categories of any essential commodities.
(2) No person shall sell or re-sell any essential commodity at a, price higher than the maximum price so fixed.
(2A) Every Dealer, importer or producer of an essential commodity the maximum price of which
145 is not for the time being. Fixed by a notification issued under sub section (I) shall, if so required by the Controller General by an order in writing or by a notified order, informed the Controller General by notice in writing forwarded to him by registered post acknowledgment due to his intention to raise the price of the essential commodity and shall not raise the price-
(a) Before the expiration of 30 days from the day on which the notice is received by the Controller General; or
(b) At any time thereafter, if, within the said period, the Controller General communicates to him an objection to the price being raised.
(2B) A notice under sub section (2A) shall specify the amount by which the price of the essential commodity is proposed to be raised and the reasons therefore shall be a companied by the latest annual audited accounts of the dealers, importers or producer.
(3) Every dealer, importer, or producer shall supply to the Controller-General such information regarding to the production, importation, purchase, stock, sale or distribution of any of the essential commodities as the Controller-General may, by an order in writing or by a notified order, require.
7. Penalties.— (1) Any person who contravenes any order made under section 3 or a notification issued, or order made under section 6 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to one lac rupees;
Provided that, if a person convicted for an offence punishable under this subsection is again convicted for such offence, the term of imprisonment awarded to him shall not be less than one year.
(2) If the order made under section 3 so provides, any Court trying any contravention of such order may direct that any property in respect of which the Court is satisfied that the order has been contravened shall be forfeited by the Federal Government.
8. Attempts and abetments.— Any person who attempts to contravene, or abets a contravention of, any order made under section 3 shall be deemed to have contravened the order;
Provided that a person who buys an essential commodity for his personal consumption or use and not for sale not be deemed to have abetted the contravention of an order controlling the price at which the essential commodity may be sold.
2 Offences by corporations.— If the person contravening an order made under section 3 is a company or other body corporate or a partnership or other body of individuals, every director, manager, secretary, member or other officer or agent thereof shall, unless he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention, be deemed to be guilty of such contravention.
3 False Statement.— If any person--
(a) when required by an order made under section 3 to make a statement or furnish any information makes any statement or furnishes any statement which is false in any material particular and which he knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be false, or does not believe to be true; or
(b) makes any statement as aforesaid in any book, account, record, declaration, return or other document which he is required by any such order to maintain furnish, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine, or whit both.
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12. Power to try offences summarily.— Offences punishable under this Act shall be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class who , may, if so empowered, try the same in the manner provided in sections 2 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act v of 1898).
10. Power to amend Schedule.— The Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette, amend the schedule so as to add to, or omit from it any commodity or class of commodities.
11. Presumption as to order.— (1) No order made by any authority other than a Court in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court.
(2) Where an order purports to have been made and signed by an authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, a Court shall, within the meaning of the Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), presume that such order was so made by that authority.
12. Burden of proof in certain cases.— Where any person is prosecuted for contravening any order made under section 3 which prohibits him from doing an act or being in possession of a thing without lawful authority or without a permit, licence or other document, the burden of proving that he has such authority, permit, licence or other document shall be on him.
13. Protection of action taken under the Act.— (1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of any order made under section 3.
(2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government for any damage caused or likely to be caused by anything which is in, good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of any order made under section 3.
14. Repeal.— The Essential Commodities Act, 1957 is hereby repealed.
1SCHEDULE
(See section 2)
2 Tea
3 White sugar
4 Milk
5 Powdered Milk
6 Milk food for infants.
7 Edible Oils, hydrogenated or otherwise
8 Aerated water , fruit juices and squashes
9 Salt.
10 Potatoes.
11 Onion.
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12. Pulses all sorts.
13. Fish all sorts.
14. Beef.
15. Mutton.
16. Eggs.
17. Gur.
18. Spices and vegetable.
19. Red Chilies.
20. Drugs and Medicines.
21. Kerosene Oil.
22. Charcoal.
23. Firewood.
24. Matches 40/50 sticks.
25. Coal.
26. Chemical Fertilizers all sorts
27. Poultry Food.
28. Bricks.
29. Cement.
30. Phutti (seed cotton).
31. Cotton (Lint).
32. Cotton Seed all sorts.
33. Wool, shoddy or raw.
34. Caustic Soda.
35. Soda Ash.
36. Paddy.
37. Ice.
38. Pesticides.
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38. Meat on Hoof
2 The Officers specified below are authorized to exercise the power of the Controller General of prices and supplies under clause a sub section (2) of section 3 of said Act, in so for as these relate to items mentioned at serial numbers 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,21,22,23,24,25,26 & 27, of the schedule to that Act, and under clauses (d), (f), (g) and (I) of the said sub section 2 in respect of all items mentioned in that schedule, namely:-
1. Secretary Industries Department, Government of (i) the Punjab, (ii) Sindh, (iii) Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province.
2. Director of Industries, Government of (i) the Punjab, (ii) Sindh, (iii) Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province.
3. All District Coordination Officers.
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12. Substituted by S.R.O (No.1 (7)/2005-CA Vol-III) Dated 12 June 2006 13. Inserted by S.R.O F.No.1(7)2005-CA Vol-III) Dated 14 September 2006
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End Notes
Chapter 1
1. Mannucci, Storia, vol.1, 322 2. Sir JaduNath Sarkar, India of Aurangzeb, p.312 3. Letter No 418, dated Camp Ferozepore, 31st March 1849. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, comp. Officers of the Punjab Commission 1849-1879 (Lahore: Neda Publishers, 1995)…..Page 4. Gazetteer of Chenab Colony (Lyallpur) 1904, 49 5. Imperil gazetteer of India; Provincial Series, Punjab, 702 6. Gazetteer of Chenab Colony, An excerpt from annual report 1896-97 by Capt. F. Popham Young, Colonization Officer Chenab Colony 7. Gazetteer of Chenab Colony, 1904, 149 8. Zaigham Pasha and Shaukat Ali Shahid, From Sand Dunes to Smiling Fields: History of Lyallpur now Faisalabad. Faisalabad: KitabMarkaz, 1996, 149 9. The illustrated London News, 28th March, 1846 10. Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 9th Edition, (Belmonte: Wadsworth Chapman University, 2001),179
Chapter 2
1. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/political-economy.asp 2. Ibid. 3. http://www.unicef.org/health/files/Four-country_Summary_PEA_report.pdf 4. DFID. Political economy analysis: how to note. London: United Kingdom Department for International Development, 2009. 5. World Bank. How-to notes: political economy assessments at sector and project levels. Washington DC: 2011. 6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_growth 7. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/economic-growth.html#ixzz4FbK3UmJY 8. http://www.unicef.org/health/files/Four-country_Summary_PEA_report.pdf 9. http://www1.aucegypt.edu/src/engendering/good_governance.html 10. Ibid. 11. http://go.worldbank.org/07NKGLDBT0 12. C:\Users\User\Desktop\Definition of Governance and Proposed Framework of good governance.html
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13. Hamza Alavi, “The state in post-colonial society: Pakistan & Bangladesh”,https://newleftreview.org/I/74/hamza-alavi-the-state-in-post-colonial-societies- pakistan-and-bangladesh 14. Hilton L. Root, “Pakistan‟s Managerial Dilemmas”, The Pakistan Development Review, 36:4 Part I (Winter 1997) 467-496. 15. Nicolas E. Martin, “Politics, Patronage, and Debt Bondage in the Pakistani Punjab”(Ph.D diss., London School of Economics, 2009), 1-295. 16. Ibid. 294. 17. Hassan Javid, “Class, Power, and Patronage: The Landed Elite and Politics in Pakistani Punjab”(Ph.D diss., London School of Economics, 2012) 1-299. 18. M. Ghaffar Chaudhry, “The Theory and Practice of Agricultural Income Tax in Pakistan and a Viable Solution”, The Pakistan Development Review 38:4, Part II (Winter 1999) 757-768. 19. Ibid. 764. 20. AnjumNasim, “Agricultural Income Taxation: Estimation of the Revenue Potential in Punjab”, Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, (2012)321-335. 21. Ibid.335. 22. Syed Muhammad Ali,“Development, Poverty and Power in Pakistan: The impact of State and Donor Interventions on Farmers” (Routledge, 2014), 9-91.
Chapter 3
1. http://www.cssforum.com.pk/punjab-public-service-commission/pcs-pms/61535-assistant- director-land-record-notes.html 2. Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 3. The Land Revenue Act, 1967, 32 4. Ibid. 39-40 5. Ibid. 41 6. KiranKhurshid,A Treatise on the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Structural-Functional History 1601-2011 (Lahore:2011),26 7. Ibid.27 8. The illustrated London News, 28th March, 1846 9. Letter No 418, dated Camp Ferozepore, 31st March 1849. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, comp. Officers of the Punjab Commission 1849-1879 (Lahore: Neda Publishers, 1995) 10. Ali, Imran, The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),9-10 11. Ibid. xiii
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12. Gazetteer of Chenab Colony (Lyallpur) 1904,49 13. Ali,The Punjab under Imperialism,13 14. Ibid.9 15. Gazetteer of Chenab Colony (Lyallpur) 1904,26 16. Imperil gazetteer of India; Provincial Series, Punjab,210 17. Ibid. 209 18. Ali,The Punjab under Imperialism,20 19. Ibid.22 20. Mec. Douie‟s & M. Gorrie‟s, Land Administration and ManagementManual( Lahore: Mansoor Book House). 137-138 21. Ibid. 138
Chapter 4
1. Code of Civil Procedures Act V of 1908, ninth edition, Commentary by Aamer Raza A. Khan 2. Land Revenue Act, 1967, Commentary by Liaqat Ali Butt, (Lahore: Irfan Law Book House).16 3. Ibid. 18 4. Ibid. 14 5. Ibid. 23 6. Ibid. 258 7. Ibid. 259 8. Ibid. 262 9. Minutes of the Cabinet meeting, Govt. of Punjab held on 10th June, 2003 10. M. Rif Raza, et al, Institutional Reforms in Irrigation Sector of Punjab (Pakistan) and their Impact on Sugarcane Productivity, Journal of Agriculture Research Review 41, no.1(2009).4 11. AsrarulHaq, Performance Of Farmers Organizations In Punjab – Pakistan : The Challenges and Way Forward, Issue: Irrigation and Drainage special issue; selected papers of the 20th ICD Congress, Lahore, Pakistan Volume 59, Issue 1, 23-300, Feb 2010 12. Ibid. 13. The Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, The First Schedule, 13 14. The Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 Section 3 (3), 5 15. Ibid. The Second Schedule, 14 16. Shahid Pervez Jami, Manual of the Agricultural Income Tax, (Lahore: Tax Forum Publication, 2011), ii 17. Ibid. 18. The Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, 7-8 19. The Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, Part 1, second schedule. 20. The Punjab Local Rate (Assessment and Collection Rules),2001.
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Chapter 5
1. Brief issued by the LRMIS Land Records Management Information System run by Project Management Unit, Board of Revenue Punjab
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Webliography 1. Alavi, Hamza.The state in post-colonial society: Pakistan & Bangladesh.https://newleftreview.org/I/74/hamza-alavi-the-state-in-post-colonial-societies- pakistan-and-bangladesh 2. Talbot, Ian A. The Punjab under Colonialism: Order and Transformation in British India. 3. https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact =8&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.global.ucsb.edu%2Fpunjab%2F14.1_T albot.pdf&ei=D9zwU- u2BsXY0QWPxIGAAg&usg=AFQjCNHxhUGZyVbTcmMiFZdSMeQussNbmg 4. http://www.cssforum.com.pk/punjab-public-service-commission/pcs-pms/61535-assistant- director-land-record-notes.html 5. https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact =8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Feconomics.mit.edu%2Ffiles%2F1354&ei=O9 rwU7btIsqd0AWyyoCQAQ&usg=AFQjCNELbYz2ZiMunAOy9sn0IdfeU_0JQw 6. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/political-economy.asp
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Articles and Journals
1. Acemoğlu, Daron, and James A. Robinson (2006). "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, 100(1), pp. 115-131. 2. AsrarulHaq, Performance Of Farmers Organizations In Punjab – Pakistan : The Challenges and Way Forward, Issue: Irrigation and Drainage special issue; selected papers of the 20th ICD Congress, Lahore, Pakistan Volume 59, Issue 1, 23-300, Feb 2010 DOI;10.1002/Ird.347copyright@John Wiley & sons Ltd. 3. Bolton, Patrick, and Gérard Roland (1997). "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1057-1090. 4. Bose, Niloy. "Corruption and Economic Growth," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, 2nd Edition, 2010. 5. M. Rif Raza, et al, Institutional Reforms in Irrigation Sector of Punjab (Pakistan) and their Impact on Sugarcane Productivity, Journal of Agriculture Research Review 41, no.1(2009).4
6. Roland, Gérard (2002), "The Political Economy of Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), pp. 29-50. 7. The illustrated London News, 28th March, 1846
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Acts and Manuals 1. The Punjab Land Revenue Act,1887. 2. The Punjab Occupancy Of Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act,1952. 3. The Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. 4. The Land Acquisition Act,1894. 5. The Punjab Restitution of Mortgage Land Act, 1938. 6. The Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act,1961. 7. The Stamp Act, 1899. 8. The Registration Act, 1908. 9. The Court Fee Act 1870. 10. Land Consolidation Act 1960. 11. The Punjab Local Government Ordinance,2001. 12. Transfer of Property Act 1982. 13. Land Revenue Rules 14. Settlement Manual Rules 15. Land Records Manual 16. Land Administration Manual 17. The Manual of Agriculture Income Tax