Please do not circulate or cite without permission. Paper prepared for the MIT Gov Lab, April 23, 2021. Please find the latest version here. Power to the Parents? Representation and Interest Aggregation in Delhi∗ Emmerich Davies Ashwini Deshpande Harvard Graduate School of Education Ashoka University
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[email protected] April 19, 2021 With increasing urbanization, urban governments are coming under increasing pressure to provide high quality services to diverse and growing populations. How will states best serve their growing urban populations? Many governments are implementing strategies that have been popular and often successful in rural areas such as decentralizing the provision of services and using community-driven development programs. Decentralization and community-driven development programs have become increasingly common policies to attempt to improve the distribution of public goods across low- and middle-income countries. There is concern that decentralization and CDD programs can result in elite capture as elites are best able to mobilize and capture the benefits of decentralization. Questions about whether decentralization and CDD programs are subject to elite capture are centrally concerned with issues of representation. To understand whether local politics have been captured, however, we need to first ask whose interests are represented and how interests are aggregated from individuals to the final distribution of public goods. We gain purchase on this question by studying a series of reforms in the city of Delhi that decentralized the administration of discretionary school-level budgets to elected bodies of parents.