Regional Integration and the Expertise Dilemma: The Political Profile of The European Commissioners Cinthia Regina Campos. Professor at UNILAB. E-mail: [email protected] Ernani Carvalho. Professor at UFPE. E-mail: [email protected] Enivaldo Rocha. Professor at UFPE. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

This paper seeks further evidence of the College member profile to assess whether the European Commissioners remain experts in their respective portfolios. Professional and political data for all former European Commissioners (N=287) was used. The paper concludes that there’s no significant evidence to affirm that European Commissioners have become less technocratic and more political actors.

Key-words: European Comissisoners; Experts; Portifolios; Political Actors.

267 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Regional Integration and the Expertise Dilemma: The Political Profile of The European Commissioners Cinthia Regina Campos – Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira Ernani Carvalho – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco Enivaldo Rocha – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

1. INTRODUCTION

The (EC) is considered one of the most important institutions of the European system whether in light of its decision-making capacity, stemming from its power of legislative initiative, or by virtue of its role in the implementation and monitoring of community public policy. Still, since the EC’s creation sixty years ago, few empirical studies have been dedicated to tracing the poilitcal-professional profile of the members of the institution; thus, shedding light on the dynamics surrounding commissioners’ appointment and subsequent oversight In turn, these studies indicate that the EC has counted individuals with a predominantly political profile among its members (WONKA 2004; DÖRING 2007). However, little is known about their educational and professional backgrounds or their previous performance—in other related positions—in areas in which they will likely work in the commission. The growing role of the EC in the process of deepening European integration has stimulated the interest not only of the academic community, but also of European society, especially after the 2008 economic crisis. The group of experts formed to rescue from a financial crisis that came to be known as Troika counts on the European Commission’s oversight, in addition to representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank; the EC is responsible for technical support and dialogue between Greek authorities and the aforementioned financial institutions. The EC has also been responsible for the austerity plans adopted by member states in an attempt to contain the consequences of the 2008 crisis. Due to the adoption of unpopular measures, alongside the European Central Bank, the institution achieved the greates loss of European citizens’ trust, according to Eurobarometer data, No. 415 (2014). According to the report, in 2007 the Commission had 52% of the trust of European citizens. However, in March 2014, only 32% had trust in the institution. The same report also indicates that 51% of Europeans agree that the President of the EC should be chosen based on the European Parliament (EP) eurogroups’ recommendation. In other words, although they agree that the European Union is the best available

268 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 solution to the problems faced by the continent,1 there is a concern among European citizens about the way that supranational institutions direct this solution. It is clear that the importance of this article lies precisely in providing more empirical subsidies for understanding the dynamics at play when the EC performs its functions. By raising more evidence about the profile of members of one of the main institutions of the European Union, this paper aims to analyze the institution’s trajectory to better understand the direction that the creation of community public policy can take. Thus, it is valid to ask: Is there any relationship between the professional profile and the portfolio for which a commissioner was nominated? Is previous experience a basic prerequisite for the office? Or having a high educational level is a fundamental characteristic? Does the area of academic training matter? Is this correlated to the main area of the portfolio? Did the number of commissioners with a political history increase in the recent colleges? How the enlargement in 2004, and its consequent modifications in the distribution of commissioners by country affected the criteria applied by the member states to choose the commissioners? Is national affiliation more important now than before the enlargement? The paper aims to answer those questions and raise more evidence on other issues. Therefore, a database was compiled with information on all commissioners who have passed through the European Commission from the first Hallstein term (1958) to the (20142), with an N = 287. Most of the data were collected from the Dorie system, an EU website that provides various documents, including the CVs of those who have held the post of . Other data sources, such as the National Assemblies, personal websites, and political parties also served as complementary and/or confirmatory sources. The first part of the article identifies the main institutional changes in the EC appointment and dismissal process, and the possible impacts of these changes. It also discusses the main empirical articles that have addressed the issue. Then, we present the research methodology, the data source, and the first findings. The first results show that the number of commissioners in elective positions has indeed increased as well as their affiliations to the parties of the incumbent in their country of origin. There has also been an increase, in equal measure, of portfolios identified as political and social, and in the number of commissioners with previous experience in the same field of the portfolio. The paper also created three different indexes to measure the Education Level, the

1 Also according to the same report, 58% of respondents versus 32% believe that the future will be better in the EU than outside of it. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_en.pdf, accessed on March 20, 2016. 2 This dataset includes commissioners who replaced former members during the term, except for the Juncker commission. For access the dataset created for this paper, please contact the authors.

269 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Education Field, and the Political Salience to identify whether the expertise 3 in the former commissioner profiles is predominant comparing to political previous experience. However, the paper verifies that the expertise persists in the commissioners’ curricula, despite the increase of political capital.

2. THE NOMINATION PROCESS AS AN EX-ANTE CONTROL

Over the past two decades, researchers have applied the delegation theory, the principal- agent model, and game theory to understand the politico-institutional implications of European integration and how member states react to this dynamic as well (TSEBELIS & GARRET 1996, 2000; HUG 2003; TALBERG 2003; FRANCHINO 2004, 2005, 2007; TRONDAL 2008). 4 Considering the classical definition of the principal-agent model, the delegation of authority occurs due to the inherent limitations of government leaders (LUPIA 2001). In this context, some issues require a specific expertise, which ideally can only be provided by agencies completely dedicated to solving problems related to that particular issue. Therefore, governments can, to a certain extent, regulate the performance of these agencies through various mechanisms, particularly establishing the rules according to which the agent will perform their tasks. And here is the great dilemma: how can agencies be controlled without interfering in their autonomy? The agency’s autonomy is constantly perceived as an essential feature that boosts its efficiency. The main idea is that the agent is able to exert their functions only based on technical criteria rather than basing their proposals on political preferences. In the context of European integration, the scenario becomes even more complex. Majone (2001) points to two distinct, but related forms of delegation: the member states to the supranational level and the latter to the institutions responsible for integration. The mechanisms and objectives of each type of delegation could be completely different. First, the member states would give up part of their sovereignty, allowing the community to decide and act on its behalf; at the same time, they take part of the decision-making when they discuss and bargain within Council. In the second type, the member states create agencies and institutions dedicated to finding the best policy for everyone

3 Measured here by the education indexes. 4 There is a complementary view to this perspective; many consequences emerge, and the supranationality dynamics provide new theoretical assertions (Moravsick 1991, 1993, 1997, 2002; Majone 1998, 1999, 2001; Peterson 2001; Thatcher 2003). There is another group of experts that proposes a model inspired by Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalism (1964) to analyze the complex institutional structure of the European Union. According to this view, each political- institutional actor, whether national, supranational, or even sub-national, has the ability, to some degree, to influence the system. This feature directly affects the preference formation of each of these players. Thus, the European Union is often presented as a sui generis institution (Scharpf et al 1996; Marks et al 1996; Hooghe & Marks 2003; Hooghe 2012).

270 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 and identifying the best way to cement it through its participation in the Council. In the latter case, decision-making is shared with several players. The first type of delegation requires a commitment of member states to the concept of supranationality. Thus, the decision-making system needs to be reliable in the sense that no individual interest shall be privileged. To strengthen the member states’ commitment, the delegation of authority to specialized agencies and the empowerment of supranational institutions is desired. In other words, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Justice would need to function autonomously. But in practice, does this delegation occur? Do member states always transfer authority to the supranational level? Or, do they always seek to monitor or interfere with the functions of European institutions, as assumed in the principal-agent model? The debate on the autonomy of EU institutions is far from a consensus, especially with regard to the EC. Beyond understanding the extent to which the Commission is autonomous or not, the question is whether it should indeed be independent, either from the member states or other institutions, in particular the Council and Parliament, or even of the European citizen. The principal- agent model also discusses a crucial mechanism for ex-ante control created to discourage the agent to act completely autonomously: naming senior bureaucrats. Considering that the member states cannot dismiss the commissioners, there is only one opportunity to try to preserve national interests within the European Union. Crombez (1997) was the first to observe this feature more closely. In his view, the Commissioners’ preferences would be fully aligned with the member states. This happens because when a country appoints its representative to the Commission, it will probably choose someone close to national interests. On the other hand, Tsebelis & Garret (2000) argue that this cannot be a fact for all member states, taken in account that a commissioner clearly influenced by national interests would lose credibility and persuasiveness within the Commission itself. As a technocratic institution, credibility and power of persuasion are two essential characteristics in decision-making. Wonka (2007) warns of the growing influence of Parliament over all European decision- making dynamics, especially the Commission appointment process. For nearly forty years, the commissioners were appointed separately from each member state. They also voted unanimously for the office of President of the Commission and, finally, the Council approved the whole Commission unanimously. After the Treaty of Maastritcht (1993), the procedure remained in place, but Parliament has to be consulted on both the Commission President and other members. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Parliament has seen its influence increased through effective approval, not consultation, by a simple majority vote.

271 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 The Treaty of Nice (2003) was responsible for the most important change in the nomination process: the member states within the council must now decide by way of a qualified majority. Moreover, after the 2007 enlargement process, national governments have the right to nominate just only one member to the commission, which reduces its options. Furthermore, the Treaty also predicted that in the near future, the number of Commissioners would be less than the number of member countries5. According to Marks et al. (1996), the multi-level approach makes an important caveat when one tries to apply the principal-agent model to the European context. According to this view, intrinsic complexity of the block makes it very difficult for a a member state to exert direct control, either as principals (in relation to supranational institutions) or as agents (especially with regard to the commission_. Due to the various dynamics present in the decision-making process, from voting rules to the number of actors involved, the Commission deals with a variety of constituents, which puts it at an advantage at various times. That is, even if, when appointing commissioners, member states are trying to advance their national preferences, the commissioner would still be configured as a mere agent of the member states when exercising his or her functions, especially given that the decision-making process is intricate enough to make it sufficiently autonomous. According to Wonka’s data (2007) from the first commission until the 2004 (n=215), the percentage of commissioners without previous political positions reduced from about 40% to close to 0%. Somewhat more intuitive, Peterson (2006) points out that the political career still remains an important selection criterion in the Barroso Commission (2004–09), where the majority of the commissioners had previous political careers. Another important empirical work dedicated to the appointment process as an ex-ante control mechanism is Döring (2007). The author also investigates two variables proposed by Wonka (2007), i.e. former higher political position and party affiliation are widely used as criteria by member states criteria. His database is similar to Wonka’s (2007), with commissioners from 1958 to 2004, based also on the Munzinger Archive. Therefore, their conclusions are similar; the smaller member states tend to nominate more Commissioners with political affiliations than its larger peers. In a multivariate analysis, the author then points to the idea that it cannot be statistically confirmed that party affiliation is the main criterion applied by member states. However, he believes that this can be explained by the fact that

5 This reduction was also confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty (2009). However, this last measure was ruled out by a European Council Decision in May, 2013. EC Decision available in: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2013.165.01.0098.01.ENG, accessed in April 8, 2017.

272 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 some member states had previously had two seats to appoint to the Commission, with the result that some of them indicate a government coalition and other opposition. Despite the scholarly efforts mentioned above, there are still several analytical gaps in the literature, especially on the Commissioner nomination process. After losing a seat in the Commission due to the enlargement in 2007, did the strongest member states increase the importance of party affiliation as a criterion for appointment? If so, this would bolster previous findings that political reasons would guide the key states member block preferences, and no credibility, as Majone (2001) states. If the first evidence indicates that political experience has been a trend in the commissioners’ profile, what can we conclude about their training and possible previous experience in areas related to the portfolio for which they were nominated? Despite the political history, would the commissioners preserve the necessary expertise for the position? Do national governments balance very strong political nominations with commissioners with high expertise skills in the same profile? Another issue is whether domestic politics interfere in the choice of a specific name. Can we consider the national dynamics a first filter faced by member states? For example, would broad coalition governments be more tempted to appoint commissioners directly linked to the incumbent? Do governments indicate commissioners attached to the opposition or the situation, or would they even choose an independent commissioner? On the other hand, during the last two decades, a number of procedural changes were made to the nomination process, including the reduction of nominees for the big five because of the inclusion of new member states, and the European Parliament becoming the main veto player. Could we then identify a nomination pattern over the commission's history? Could we suggest that the more integration deepens, the more modifications are made to strengthen supranational motivations? Table 1 presents the main changes made to the commissioner’s nomination process.

273 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Table 1. Major Changes in Commissioners Nomination Process

Treaty/Year Modification Founding block treaty, which created the High Authority, embryo of what the European Commission would be. Its members were appointed directly by national governments under the unanimity rule. After initial training, the members chose Treaty of Paris among themselves the president of the institution. The Commission was created (1952) After the Treaty of Rome (1957) but keeping the High Authority in operation. In Merger Treaty (1965), both institutions were united in only one Commission, but still keeping the same appointment procedure.

The Commission President is chosen separately and previously to the other members. Governments chose by unanimity, while the Parliament is consulted, Maastricht Treaty without veto power. Then the member states suggested to the President of the (1993) Commission names to create the team. Finally the European Parliament and the Council unanimously ratified the Commission for a whole by simple majority.

The procedure remains the same. The difference is that now the European Amsterdan Treaty Parliament acquires veto power by a simple majority, during the Commission (1999) President choosing process.

Treaty of Nice The only change with a great impact is in voting among member states and within (2003) the Council of Ministers from unanimity to qualified majority.

It creates now in the European Commission the High Representative post for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It is chosen separately from the other Lisbon Treaty commissioners, but with the Commission President’s consensus. The president is (2009) chosen based on European Parliament elections. The party group that gets more seats has preference in the appointment.

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the EU Treaties. For more info: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision- making/treaties/index_pt.htm

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS PRELIMINARY DATA

As discussed before, this paper has as its objective identifying the main factors of the European Commissioner profile, analyzing how the institutional changes affect the national government’s choices, the Commission's general profile and the dynamics with the other institutions. Therefore, it became imperative to build a database with detailed information about European Commissioners political and professional profile, considering all the efforts since 1958 to the last commission formed in 2014, with a total N = 287.6 The database was assembled based on various sources, but mainly on commissioners curricula available through the Dorie system, the European Union’s primary database; the European Parliament's website; on the websites of national

6 Replacements during the terms are also considered, counting each one as a new case. Renominations were also considered as a new case. Among 287 observations, 102 were renominated for the following commission.

274 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 conferences; and Parlgov, a database set up by the University of Bremen7. Several variables were collected: educational background; professional experience; historical of political occupation; and finally national party affiliation. Due to a wide variation in their curricula, with variables such as Portfolio and Education, a subsequent reclassification was necessary. In a study about cabinet formation under Chile’s coalition presidentialism, Dávila, Washed & Avendaño (2013) studied the hypothesis that there is a correlation between one’s technocratic academic career and one’s relevance to the ministry he or she occupies (i.e.,, those people whose career is guided by expertise would hold economical ministries, while those closer to the political party militancy assume political ministries). Therefore, the authors present a tripartite classification of portfolios, dividing them as follows: political ministries, considering the responsible portfolios for policy coordination, whether internal or external; economic ministries, bringing about issues involving high investments in public spending, such as infrastructure, labor, energy, and environment; and, finally, social ministries, including topics such as education, culture, planning, health, and justice. A reclassification was also necessary, 8 considering the wide range of portfolios in the commission since its role in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the expansion in the subject and the number of members throughout history. Following the author’s explanatory logic, we have the following tripartite reclassification of European portfolios:

Table 2. Grouped Portfolios

Portfolio Issue Grouped

Enlargement, Regional Policy, Foreign Affairs, General Secretariat, Political Inter-institutional Relations.

Transportation, Agriculture, Telecommunications, Finance, Budget, Trade Policy, Competition, Internal Market, Environment, Fiscal Economic Policy, Development, Employment, Fisheries, Energy, and Industrial Affairs.

Education, Health, Culture, Research, and Science, multilingual, Social Social Affairs, Legal Affairs.

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Dávila, Lavados, & Avendaño (2013).

It is also important to remember that many of these portfolios have undergone changes for more than 60 years as the Executive Committee, with some of them being created,

7 Unlike Wonka (2007) and Döring (2007), this article does not use the Munzinguer Archive for restricted access issues, mainly because it is a secondary database. 8 For an alternative classification, see Franchino (2009).

275 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 refurbished, extinct, and/or aggregated with other portfolios, which greatly hampered the variable reclassification. Given what was discussed above, in addition to the main hypothesis investigated— that there is a predominance of political characteristics in the profile of EC commissioners, it is worthwhile investigating if:

H1: There is an increase in the number of portfolios dedicated to multilevel political articulation.

Based on the classification above, the chart below was elaborated with each portfolio theme by commission. It’s possible to identify a natural predominance of economic portfolios in all Commissions, with the culmination of 18 in Barroso’s term. However, there is a growing importance of other issues in the last three terms, with special attention to the social ones. There is also a decrease in political portfolios throughout the transition from Barroso to the Junker commission (2014), from 8 to 4.

Graph 1. Distribution of Portfolio per Commission

Source: Elaborated by the authours.

H2: There is a growing presence of commissioners with previous experience in elective position. Another important point for this article is the presence of commissioners with an elective historical position in their curriculum as a politicization indicator. This variable is also crucial because it represents a thermometer for the national and supranational prior political nomination

276 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 that the candidates have and that perhaps increases the possibility of being appointed by national governments. Among the 285 cases collected,9 74% (N = 211) of commissioners have had elected offices at some point before his period of terms in office. Differently, what is infered, given the commission’s technocratic character, almost all the terms presented proportionately more commissioners who have held elected positions than the opposite.10 Exceptions only the first two terms, both chaired by Hallstein (1958–62), and the commission chaired by Malfatti (1970–72). Thus, the high presence of commissioners passing through elective office has been a constant since the Ortoli commission (1973–77).

Graph 2. Commissioners with a Previous Political Elected Position

Juncker (N=28) 86% 14% Barroso II (n=29) 72% 28% Barroso I (n=34) 74% 27% Prodi (n=35) 74% 26% Santer (n=20) 85% 15% Delors III (n=16) 88% 13% Delors II (n=16) 100% 0% Delors I (n=18) 78% 22% Thorn (n=15) 93% 6% Jenkins (n=13) 69% 31% Ortoli (n=16) 63% 38% Malfatti (n=9) 44% 56% Rey (n=14) 57% 43% Hallstein II (n=10) 40% 60% Hallstein I (n=12) 42% 58%

Yes No

Source: Elaborated by the authors. The dataset also considers commissioners who replaced former members during the term.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the salience of the occupied elective office also matters. Thus, the variable was reclassified to ascertain the frequency of commissioners who have

9 In two cases it was not possible to confirm the political historic. 10 The chi-square correlation was significant (p-value = 0.002), but 33% of the cells have observed values below 5. We could not calculate by the Fisher’s exact test.

277 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 held high-level elected positions in Europe. In the table below, the growing presence of commissioners with a great political history, including former prime ministers and former Members of European Parliament (MEP), can be observed. They are mainly present after the increase in the European Parliament's participation in the community decision-making process, reaching its apex during the current Juncker (2014–18) term, with seven former members of Parliament and four former prime ministers.

Table 3. The Most Important Elected Position Held Before

Position Commission Primer Minister MEP Deputy City Council/Mayor Total Hallstein I 0 0 3 1 4 Hallstein II 0 0 4 0 6 Rey 0 0 8 0 14 Malfatti 0 0 4 0 4 Ortoli 0 0 10 0 10 Jenkins 0 0 9 0 9 Thorn 0 0 14 0 14 Delors 0 3 11 0 14 Delors II 0 4 12 0 16 Delors III 0 5 9 0 14 Santer 2 5 10 0 17 Prodi 2 5 20 0 27 Barroso 2 3 20 0 25 Barroso II 1 6 13 1 21 Juncker 4 7 12 1 24 Total 11 38 159 3 211

Source: Elaborated by the authors. N=285.

H3: With the 2004 enlargement, those member states that lost the privilege to appoint two commissioners now choose them based on national political alignment.

Another important political variable is the commissioner party position in relation to the national government. Identifying if the party to which the commissioner affiliated at the time of appointment to the EC provides the initial evidence to assert that national governments apply political criteria when choosing a representative for the commission. In the graph below, only 14% (N = 40) of the commissioners had no party affiliation at the time of his/her appointment, and 69.5% (N = 198) of them were members of coalitions present in the situation. Only 47 commissioners were affiliated to the opposition in their countries of origin. When the variable Affiliated to the incumbent in National Government is crossed with the Post-enlargement Indication—the moment countries

278 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 start nominating only one commissioner instead of two—there is a high correlation (p-value = 0.007), which highlights the growing trend to indicate the supporters of the national government. This reinforces Doring’s (2007) suspicion that countries that possessed two nominations, recommended commissioners proportionally to national coalitions. Now, with only one seat per country, there is a strong growing tendency to nominate commissioners connected directly to the national government.

Graph 3. National Political Alignment Before the Nomination

Source: Elaborated by the authours. N=285.

This raw data preliminary analysis indicates that there are elements that identify politicization within the commission, either by increasing issues dedicated to the theme, or by political party alignment to the European Parliament and national governments. Does this mean the EC is essentially becoming a more political and less technocratic institution? Do political characteristics prevail over all others when it comes to the final nomination? Could we find mixed commissioner profiles with nominees who have both played significant political roles and possess a high-level academic background? To answer these questions and refine the commission members profile analysis, we will consider the influence of academic training and experience in the committee-member profile.

4. DOES EXPERTISE STILL PERSIST?

The main objective of this paper is to identify if the prevalence of the political variable in the profile of European Commissioner. However, we also seek to investigate whether technical

279 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 variables—such as education in areas related to economic and political integration and relevant professional experience—are present in the profile of those nominated and if this necessarily translates into a decrease in expertise,11 defined here as previous experience in the specific portfolio area.12 Even if the commission's members profile politicization is growing, as verified by previous studies and confirmed in this paper, it does not mean that there would be an automatic loss of expertise. In an analysis specifically of the Barroso commission, Prifti (2013) identifies several members with high qualifications—including international academic training—in areas related to the portfolio. If commission politicization is increasing, it is still valid to investigate whether expertise has been maintained in the commissioner profile13. Based on Dávila, Lavados, & Avendaño (2013), the variable Academic Training was split in two: Area and Level of Training.14 At first, we identify the prevalence of Law degrees (42.2%; N = 121), Economics (37.3%, N = 102) and social sciences (19.9%, N = 57) in commission members’ curricula. In relation to academic degree, 39.7% of commissioners have at least a master's degree (N = 114), and 25.1% have a PhD (N = 72). All variables were separated into binary variables in order to collect as much information about the commissioner profile as possible, because many of them have training at different levels and different areas at the same time. Therefore, another three variables were computed to determine: the Education Level Index, where PhD has the largest number; the Education Field Index, as economy considered the most important, followed by law; and, finally, the Political Salience Index, focusing on commissioners who have been prime ministers, MEPs and parliamentarians in the country of origin.15 In the Education Level Index, the table below indicates that the first administration had proportionately a high level of academic training, while the others terms have members at median and fairly levels. Looking at the (1999), it is possible to identify a growth in the number of commissioners with high educational levels, despite the recent drop in the Juncker Commission (2014). However, the indication index shows an increase when compared to the

11 Expertise is usually defined by whether the agent has high education skills in areas related to his duties in the bureaucratic agency as well as previous experience in the same field (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Majone, 1999, 2003; Lewis, 2007). 12 This classification is based on Prifti (2013). This paper is an exploratory attempt to verify whether the commission can still be considered the most important bureucratic and executive branch in the European Union. The College of Commissioners cannot be considered itself to be the whole bureacracy. It is mainly responsible for coordinating with other institutions and implementing the common European policy at different levels. More information about its main members is necessary to simply affirm that they have become politicians. For a specific study on non-appointed officials, considered careerists in the EC, see Hoogue (2004). 13 For a systematic review on the theoretical arguments of politization versus expertise in the European Comission, see Campos (2014). 14 The areas are: Law, Economics, Social Sciences, Humanities, Natural Sciences. The Education Levels are: Undergraduate, Master, and Doctorate/PhD. 15 For detailed information on how all the indexes were measured, see appendix 1.

280 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Barroso Commission. Now almost all of its members have attained a fair level of academic training. Despite these variations, the concentration of commissioners with a median level of reasonable academic training has a certain numerical stability. It should be highlighted in the Delors II Commission (1988–92), as shown in graph 2, that all members have held elected positions before. However, almost all of them have a median educational level, a not very different pattern compared to other colleges.

Table 4. Index of Education Level for each College

Index of education level Commission Low Median Fairly High Very High Total Hallstein 0 7 0 1 3 11 Hallstein II 0 4 0 0 6 10 Rey 0 9 0 0 5 14 Malfatti 0 6 0 0 3 9 Ortoli 1 9 0 0 6 16 Jenkins 0 10 0 0 3 13 Thorn 1 10 0 0 4 15 Delors 0 15 1 0 2 18 Delors II 1 12 0 0 2 15 Delors III 1 13 0 0 1 15 Santer 2 13 2 1 2 20 Prodi 2 11 12 0 10 35 Barroso 2 17 5 0 10 34 Barroso II 1 13 7 0 8 29 Juncker 0 6 17 0 5 28 Total 11 155 44 2 70 282

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The Education Field Index considered a greater weight to economics, followed by law—due to the integration dynamics, where the economic integration and the juridical framework are the main features of the regional integration. The table below identifies a predominance of commissioners who have a high academic background related to areas like economics and law. Considering all commissions, the proportion of commissioners with fairly and high levels is quite similar. It is important to note that the increase in the number of portfolios dedicated to political articulation and social affairs can influence the index for the most recent commissions. For example, the portfolio Health, Education, and Culture does not require a commissioner trained in Economics or Law. As presented in graph 1, since the Barroso commission, there has been an increase in social portfolios, which might explain the concentration of commissioners with median and fairly levels

281 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 in the Education Field Index. In addition to the previous experience in a related area, the portfolio may indicate that expertise is still configured as a selection criterion.

Table 5. Index for Education Field for each College

Index of education Field Comissão Low Median Fairly High Very high Total Hallstein 5 3 0 3 0 11 Hallstein II 3 4 0 3 0 10 Rey 3 5 2 1 2 14 Malfatti 4 1 0 2 2 9 Ortoli 7 3 4 2 0 16 Jenkins 2 4 4 3 0 13 Thorn 1 7 4 3 0 15 Delors 2 6 4 6 0 18 Delors II 5 4 4 2 0 15 Delors III 4 6 3 2 0 15 Santer 9 4 5 2 0 20 Prodi 9 10 7 6 3 35 Barroso 7 9 9 8 1 34 Barroso II 9 6 10 4 0 29 Juncker 6 9 8 5 0 28 Total 76 81 64 53 8 282

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

H4: Previous experience in portfolio issue is a recurring criterion in the profile of European Commissioners.

According to Franchino (2009), previous experience plays an important role in the appointment process, as the member state may consider it to be more important to have a commissioner with notoriety in the specific policy area, regardless of his or her political views.16 Thus, the variable Previous Experience in the Portfolio Area is binary-measured if the commissioner has already held a position(s) in the specific portfolio area.17 Within this classification, it was also considered when former commissioners had held positions in ministries with similar thematics in their countries of origin. The assumption is that even if serving as minister is considered holding a political office, the appointed commissioner brings that expertise to the commission. In addition,

16 The author also discusses how party ideology affects the distribution of portfolios in the European Commission. 17 For this variable, we applied not Dávila, Lavados, & Avendaño’s (2013) classification, but the specific theme of the portfolio.

282 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 national cabinets might be composed of experts outside the National Assemblies. The dataset indicates this possibility because 61.4% (N = 175) of cases have assumed the position of minister and 10% (N= 29) of them have never before assumed an elective office. Moreover, the ministries’ political-electoral salience varies significantly between European countries (Joan & Smith 2002; Druckman & Warwick 2005). The graph below shows that, except for the Hallstein II (1962–67) and Jenkins (1977-81) commissions, all other terms present a predominance of commissioners with some previous experience in the portfolio area. Although there is no statistical significance to affirm that the EP's empowerment has contributed to a greater number of commissioners with previous experience, 70.6% (N = 89) of 126 cases collected after the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) had previous experience against 61.6% (N = 98) of 159 cases collected before this date that also report experience in the portfolio subject area.

Graph. 4. Previous Experience in the Portfolio Theme

Juncker (N=28) 86% 14% Barroso II (n=29) 69% 31% Barroso I (n=34) 62% 38% Prodi (n=35) 69% 31% Santer (n=20) 75% 25% Delors III (n=16) 81% 19% Delors II (n=16) 56% 44% Delors I (n=18) 67% 33% Thorn (n=15) 67% 33% Jenkins (n=13) 38% 62% Ortoli (n=16) 50% 50% Malfatti (n=9) 78% 22% Rey (n=14) 50% 50% Hallstein II (n=10) 40% 60% Hallstein I (n=12) 67% 33%

Yes No

Source: Elaborated by the authors. The dataset also considers commissioners who replaced former members during a term.

H5: There is a growing politicization in the profile of European Commissioners.

283 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Finally, as discussed previously, the presence of commissioners with political experience has been recurrent in the most recent administrations. The main argument against a politicized commission is that politics would affect its ideological autonomy, which is required by a supranational institution, which is compromised of the European community and not individual member states (Majone, 2001; Wonka 2004; 2007; Doring 2007; Prifti 2013). In an attempt to ascertain the degree of politicization in the careers of commissioners, we created a Political Salience Index that considers only the elected positions they previously held. These include: national parliament; EP member and prime minister / president, with different weights for the last two. In the table below, we have the index crossed by term, which identifies a significant increase in political salience beginning with the Thorn Commission. The dataset indicates that the increased politicization occurs beginning in the 80s, in other words, before the main institutional reforms of the European Union took place. It is worth noting that at least 32% (n = 9) of the current Juncker' commissioners have a significantly high level of political salience18.

Table 6. Index for Political Salience for each College

Index of Political Salience Commission Low Median Fairly High Total Hallstein 8 4 0 0 12 Hallstein II 6 4 0 0 10 Rey 6 6 2 0 14 Malfatti 5 4 0 0 9 Ortoli 6 8 2 0 16 Jenkins 4 8 1 0 13 Thorn 1 11 3 0 15 Delors 4 13 1 0 18 Delors II 0 12 3 1 16 Delors III 2 11 3 0 16 Santer 4 10 4 2 20 Prodi 9 19 5 2 35 Barroso 9 20 4 1 34 Barroso II 10 14 4 1 29 Juncker 5 14 5 4 28 Total 79 158 37 11 285

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

18 We would like to thank one of our reviewers who pointed out that Juncker Commission presents lower scores in education levels and field indexes within its members and, at the same time, a higher political salience in their profiles. Our reviewer suggested this might be explained by the Euro crises. Indeed, the perception of a democratic deficit (Moravcsik, 2002) might have increased after the European financial crises, which might have stimulated national governments and European parliament to nominate a more politicized commission compared to the previous teams under Barroso. However, a case study focused on the Juncker commission is needed to raise more evidence to test this hypothesis. We encourage researchers to delve deeper into this puzzle.

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Finally, the paper tests the correlation between the three indexes created to ascertain commissioners’ expertise and political salience. In the table below, the level of education is correlated with the areas traditionally associated with the main comunitary policies, like Law and Economics (p-value = 0.002). This means that the commissioners specialized in these areas are also those with higher levels of education. Although the relationship is positive, it is still weak as the correlation coefficient value shows. Regarding the Political Salience Index, it presented significance only in the Education Field (p-value = 0.008). However, the correlation is negative, indicating that the higher the level of political salience, the lower the level of importance of the training area. In other words, commissioners with a more political profile do not have Law or Economics training. However significant, the correlation coefficient is very low (-.157), requiring caution in the conclusions.

Table 7. Correlation Expertise versus Political Salience

Index for Index of Index of Political Spearman Correlation's Test education Field education level Salience

Index of Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .184** -.157** Education Field Sig. (2 extremities) . .002 .008 N 282 282 282 Index of Correlation Coefficient .184** 1.000 -.057 Education Level Sig. (2 extremities) .002 . .341 N 282 282 282 Index 2 for Correlation Coefficient -.157** -.057 1.000 Political Salience Sig. (2 extremities) .008 .341 . N 282 282 282

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Based on the evidence presented, it is still not possible to say that increasing politicization in the European Commissioners’ CVs automatically means a decrease in expertise as a selection criterion, given that expertise has also increased with politicization. One possible explanation for the low negative correlation values between Education Field and Political Salience indexes is the increasing variation on the portfolios issues, requiring a more plural education of most of the commissioners. It is still puzzling that the Level of Education does not have any significant relationship, either negative or positive, with the Political Salience Index. The data indicates that

285 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 there is reason to believe that despite the increase in politicization of the European Commission, expertise as a selection criterion can still be considered relevant and should be fully investigated.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The European Commission has raised the interest of researchers in recent years with its power of initiative and augmention of trading capacity after the insertion of qualified majorities in the European decision-making process. Similarly, the European public has questioned the role of the institution and its legitimacy in the formulation of Community policy. The impact of the ’s dismissal (1995–99)19 and the increase of complexity in the process of appointing commissioners process—delegating more and more power to the European Parliament—are some of the reasons for the increase in studies about the institution in recent years. However, empirical research is still incipien in the areas of the commission's participation in decision-making, and on the professional and political profile of commissioners. This exploratory paper aims to reduce this empirical gap by analyzing the degree of politicization in the commissioner profile and assess whether its increase has affected the expertise degree historically inferred in the institution. We intend, therefore, to investigate the main hypothesis that despite the increase of political experience in former commissioners’ careers, the academic background and previous experience in office still remains an important appointment criterion. Based on Wonka (2004) and Doring’s (2007) findings, the paper presentes an independent database with information on the former commissioners’ profiles. However, unlike previous studies, this paper is innovative by investigating not only the political profile, but also variables that may indicate a lower or higher degree of expertise. Previous experience, level, and area of education are exploratory variables applied to understanding whether national governments attempt to balance high political profiles with high professional skills in the college of the European Commission. The overall conclusion of this paper indicates that it is a current strategy for member states to appoint politicians with high national visibility, that also happen to be specialists in a given area. This strategy not only allows the appointees to convince the European Parliament during the ratification process, but they are also able to negociate the common policy inside and outside the Commission. In conclusion, considering both the data in a temporal analysis or in a raw format, there is indeed a significant negative correlation between the degree of expertise and politicization. However, the correlation coefficient is low, indicating that the correlation strength is weak. In other words, it

19 Due to corruption cases with the direct involvement of some of its members.

286 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 is not possible to say yet that there is a general loss of expertise in the commissioner profile, although commissioners have presented a growing politicization. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the Commission has become a very important executive branch in Europe Union, almost equivalent to the Council. The intensification of previous political experience in the former commissioner’ curricula, specially in the recent years, might indicate an increasing need for a more skilled College in terms of political articulation. The Europe Union has faced a persistent euroscepticism, notedly after the Euro crisis. Perhaps, only high levels of expertise are not enough to convince the europeans (and member states) that the benefits of deepining political-economic integration still worth it. Finally, the article introduces the European Parliament’s empowerment in the commissioners’ ratification as an important mechanism to be investigated. Studying this institution’s role and its increasing delegation to oversee the commission raises an important future research question: what are the motivations for the EP to assume this responsibility? Would this move represent an attempt to infer democratic legitimacy, even if indirectly? According to Moraviscik (2002), the real democratic block deficit is not the vote absence, but the absence of a tecnocratic, insulated, and autonomous institution, which can enhance confidence in the bloc. However, to what extent can such an important institution—important to the community as it directly affects European citizens—be insulated bureaucratically? Beyond the European Commission’s politicization, better understanding the impact of this trade-off between policy and expertise allows us to analyze more deeply the direction in which community integration is going.

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