Regional Integration and the Expertise Dilemma: The Political Profile of The European Commissioners Cinthia Regina Campos. Professor at UNILAB. E-mail: [email protected] Ernani Carvalho. Professor at UFPE. E-mail: [email protected] Enivaldo Rocha. Professor at UFPE. E-mail: [email protected] Abstract This paper seeks further evidence of the College member profile to assess whether the European Commissioners remain experts in their respective portfolios. Professional and political data for all former European Commissioners (N=287) was used. The paper concludes that there’s no significant evidence to affirm that European Commissioners have become less technocratic and more political actors. Key-words: European Comissisoners; Experts; Portifolios; Political Actors. 267 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Regional Integration and the Expertise Dilemma: The Political Profile of The European Commissioners Cinthia Regina Campos – Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira Ernani Carvalho – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco Enivaldo Rocha – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco 1. INTRODUCTION The European Commission (EC) is considered one of the most important institutions of the European system whether in light of its decision-making capacity, stemming from its power of legislative initiative, or by virtue of its role in the implementation and monitoring of community public policy. Still, since the EC’s creation sixty years ago, few empirical studies have been dedicated to tracing the poilitcal-professional profile of the members of the institution; thus, shedding light on the dynamics surrounding commissioners’ appointment and subsequent oversight In turn, these studies indicate that the EC has counted individuals with a predominantly political profile among its members (WONKA 2004; DÖRING 2007). However, little is known about their educational and professional backgrounds or their previous performance—in other related positions—in areas in which they will likely work in the commission. The growing role of the EC in the process of deepening European integration has stimulated the interest not only of the academic community, but also of European society, especially after the 2008 economic crisis. The group of experts formed to rescue Greece from a financial crisis that came to be known as Troika counts on the European Commission’s oversight, in addition to representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank; the EC is responsible for technical support and dialogue between Greek authorities and the aforementioned financial institutions. The EC has also been responsible for the austerity plans adopted by member states in an attempt to contain the consequences of the 2008 crisis. Due to the adoption of unpopular measures, alongside the European Central Bank, the institution achieved the greates loss of European citizens’ trust, according to Eurobarometer data, No. 415 (2014). According to the report, in 2007 the Commission had 52% of the trust of European citizens. However, in March 2014, only 32% had trust in the institution. The same report also indicates that 51% of Europeans agree that the President of the EC should be chosen based on the European Parliament (EP) eurogroups’ recommendation. In other words, although they agree that the European Union is the best available 268 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 solution to the problems faced by the continent,1 there is a concern among European citizens about the way that supranational institutions direct this solution. It is clear that the importance of this article lies precisely in providing more empirical subsidies for understanding the dynamics at play when the EC performs its functions. By raising more evidence about the profile of members of one of the main institutions of the European Union, this paper aims to analyze the institution’s trajectory to better understand the direction that the creation of community public policy can take. Thus, it is valid to ask: Is there any relationship between the professional profile and the portfolio for which a commissioner was nominated? Is previous experience a basic prerequisite for the office? Or having a high educational level is a fundamental characteristic? Does the area of academic training matter? Is this correlated to the main area of the portfolio? Did the number of commissioners with a political history increase in the recent colleges? How the enlargement in 2004, and its consequent modifications in the distribution of commissioners by country affected the criteria applied by the member states to choose the commissioners? Is national affiliation more important now than before the enlargement? The paper aims to answer those questions and raise more evidence on other issues. Therefore, a database was compiled with information on all commissioners who have passed through the European Commission from the first Hallstein term (1958) to the Juncker commission (20142), with an N = 287. Most of the data were collected from the Dorie system, an EU website that provides various documents, including the CVs of those who have held the post of European Commissioner. Other data sources, such as the National Assemblies, personal websites, and political parties also served as complementary and/or confirmatory sources. The first part of the article identifies the main institutional changes in the EC appointment and dismissal process, and the possible impacts of these changes. It also discusses the main empirical articles that have addressed the issue. Then, we present the research methodology, the data source, and the first findings. The first results show that the number of commissioners in elective positions has indeed increased as well as their affiliations to the parties of the incumbent in their country of origin. There has also been an increase, in equal measure, of portfolios identified as political and social, and in the number of commissioners with previous experience in the same field of the portfolio. The paper also created three different indexes to measure the Education Level, the 1 Also according to the same report, 58% of respondents versus 32% believe that the future will be better in the EU than outside of it. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_en.pdf, accessed on March 20, 2016. 2 This dataset includes commissioners who replaced former members during the term, except for the Juncker commission. For access the dataset created for this paper, please contact the authors. 269 | Revista Política Hoje - Volume 28, n. 1 Education Field, and the Political Salience to identify whether the expertise 3 in the former commissioner profiles is predominant comparing to political previous experience. However, the paper verifies that the expertise persists in the commissioners’ curricula, despite the increase of political capital. 2. THE NOMINATION PROCESS AS AN EX-ANTE CONTROL Over the past two decades, researchers have applied the delegation theory, the principal- agent model, and game theory to understand the politico-institutional implications of European integration and how member states react to this dynamic as well (TSEBELIS & GARRET 1996, 2000; HUG 2003; TALBERG 2003; FRANCHINO 2004, 2005, 2007; TRONDAL 2008). 4 Considering the classical definition of the principal-agent model, the delegation of authority occurs due to the inherent limitations of government leaders (LUPIA 2001). In this context, some issues require a specific expertise, which ideally can only be provided by agencies completely dedicated to solving problems related to that particular issue. Therefore, governments can, to a certain extent, regulate the performance of these agencies through various mechanisms, particularly establishing the rules according to which the agent will perform their tasks. And here is the great dilemma: how can agencies be controlled without interfering in their autonomy? The agency’s autonomy is constantly perceived as an essential feature that boosts its efficiency. The main idea is that the agent is able to exert their functions only based on technical criteria rather than basing their proposals on political preferences. In the context of European integration, the scenario becomes even more complex. Majone (2001) points to two distinct, but related forms of delegation: the member states to the supranational level and the latter to the institutions responsible for integration. The mechanisms and objectives of each type of delegation could be completely different. First, the member states would give up part of their sovereignty, allowing the community to decide and act on its behalf; at the same time, they take part of the decision-making when they discuss and bargain within Council. In the second type, the member states create agencies and institutions dedicated to finding the best policy for everyone 3 Measured here by the education indexes. 4 There is a complementary view to this perspective; many consequences emerge, and the supranationality dynamics provide new theoretical assertions (Moravsick 1991, 1993, 1997, 2002; Majone 1998, 1999, 2001; Peterson 2001; Thatcher 2003). There is another group of experts that proposes a model inspired by Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalism (1964) to analyze the complex institutional structure of the European Union. According to this view, each political- institutional actor, whether national, supranational, or even sub-national, has the ability, to some degree, to influence