Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways
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LC Paper No. CB(1)277/10-11(02) Legislative Council Panel on Transport Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways MTR Tsuen Wan Line Service Disruption on 21 October 2010 The Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways under the Legislative Council Panel on Transport requested the Administration to provide a paper on the service disruption of the Tsuen Wan Line (TWL) of MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) on 21 October 2010. The cause of the incident and the contingency measures adopted by MTRCL are set out in the paper of the Corporation at Annex. The Administration’s assessment on the handling of the incident by MTRCL and follow-up actions taken with MTRCL are set out in this paper. The Incident 2. The incident was caused by the overhead line contact wire breakage which occurred at Platform 2 of Yau Ma Tei Station, TWL towards Central. As a result, the train service between Yau Ma Tei and Jordan Stations was suspended. The contact wire breakage was attributed to the combination of multiple independent factors. 3. Initially, there was a traction motor fault on the incident train causing high short-circuiting direct current passing from the overhead line through the pantograph and the train onboard circuit breaker (which was installed as the first line of protection for the motor). 4. Secondly, the onboard circuit breaker failed to interrupt the high short-circuiting direct current flow. As a result, the protection system of the overhead line section between Prince Edward and Yau Ma Tei Stations was activated to cut off the power supply. 5. Thirdly, after the incident train had stopped at Yau Ma Tei Station, despite the power supply to the incident overhead line section had been cut off, high electrical current was intermittently passed from the adjacent overhead line section between Cheung Sha Wan and Prince Edward Stations to the incident overhead line section when the following train passed through the two overhead line sections. The heat of the high short-circuiting direct current, repeated for two pantographs of the following train passing through the above overhead line sections, gradually caused overheating of the contact wire. 6. Fourthly, the pantographs of the incident train were not successfully lowered as required under the established procedures before the Operations Control Centre (OCC) tried to resume the power supply to the incident overhead line section for recovery of the train service. After two unsuccessful attempts to resume the power supply, the overhead line contact wire eventually broke due to repeated heating by the high short- circuiting direct current. 7. After MTRCL’s recovery works, train service resumed gradually at 9:57 a.m. Given the scale and the duration of service disruption of this incident, the Government considered the incident serious. After the incident, the Electrical & Mechanical Services Department (EMSD) directed MTRCL to conduct fleet check on the concerned pantographs, traction motors and circuit breakers. The fleet check was completed with no abnormality found. 8. Because of the incident, the train service of TWL was converted to loop services, running at every four minutes between Tsuen Wan Station and Yau Ma Tei Station; and every six minutes between Jordan Station and Central Station. Public announcements were made by MTRCL on the trains and in the stations of TWL and other railway lines to inform passengers of the changes of train service patterns. 9. In accordance with established contingency arrangements, MTRCL mobilised emergency bus (e-bus) services to fill the service gap and convey train passengers in both directions between Yau Ma Tei Station and Tsim Sha Tsui Station via Jordan Station. The first e-bus from Nathan Road outside Tsim Sha Tsui Station departed at 7:53 a.m. and that from Yau Ma Tei Station departed at 8:10 a.m. According to the report by MTRCL, the Corporation deployed about 115 additional staff to support Yau Ma Tei Station and affected stations including key interchange stations during the incident. 10. Upon notification of the incident by MTRCL, TD’s Emergency Transport Coordination Centre (ETCC) immediately alerted other public transport operators for the provision of supplementary relief transport, as well as cross-harbour tunnel companies for possible increase of traffic volume arising from additional vehicle trips. TD also advised passengers via radio stations to consider using the Tung Chung Line or the Tseung Kwan O Line and other public transport modes to cross the harbour. Intending passengers of TWL were advised to interchange at Mei Foo Station for West Rail Line on journeys to Tsim Sha Tsui. 2 11. E-bus service was maintained until 10:20 a.m. A total of 72 e- buses were deployed with 156 trips operated carrying a total of about 6,000 passengers. Impact on Passengers 12. According to MTRCL, about 100,000 passengers who travelled on MTR trains along the Nathan Road corridor between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on weekdays were affected by this incident. As the incident took place during peak hours on a working day, a large number of rail passengers on TWL heading for Tsim Sha Tsui and Central were unable to continue their journeys on the trains upon reaching Yau Ma Tei Station. Some might have avoided TWL whilst some had had to change for MTRCL’s e-buses or other public transport services. Although planned contingency arrangements were implemented by MTRCL, there was confusion in the information conveyed to the stranded passengers and chaos in the boarding activities for e-buses at Hamilton Street. Main issues of Concern 13. Apart from the delay caused by the incident, passengers were most dissatisfied that (a) MTRCL failed to give them clear and precise information about the train services available and the operation of the e-buses; and (b) the lack of effective crowd control measures at the boarding point for e-buses at Yau Ma Tei Station. There were strong requests from the public for MTRCL to review their implementation of contingency measures, to improve dissemination of information to the affected passengers, and to provide additional staff during handling of incident. Government’s Assessment 14. Given the prolonged delay caused by the incident during the morning peak period and the scale of impact on rail passengers, the Government considered the incident a major and serious one. 15. Preliminary review of the incident suggests that by and large, MTRCL was able to follow the contingency procedures. However, there were a number of areas in which deficiencies were glaring. They include : (a) Alert System - MTRCL informed TD’s ETCC of the occurrence of the incident (at 7:06 a.m.) 20 minutes after the first tripping of the circuit breaker; whereas according to the established 3 procedure, the notification should have been made within eight minutes (i.e. by 6:54 a.m.) MTRCL’s explanation is set out in paragraph 40 of MTRCL’s paper at Annex. (b) E-bus Operation - Better arrangements should have been made for earlier arrival of the e-buses and much more orderly boarding at the designated locations. The routing and operation of e-buses have to be reviewed to enhance operational efficiency minimising delay caused to passengers and undue inconvenience to other road users. (c) Communication with the Public - Precise and full information should have been disseminated in time to inform the passengers about the incident, the impact of the incident to the train service, and contingency arrangements put in place, to enable them to plan their onward journey, including taking alternative transport modes. Moreover, information should be updated as recovery work progresses, so that the affected passengers can make informed decisions for their journey. (d) Staff Preparedness - Station staff should have been more conversant with the contingency plans, have undertaken drills at regular intervals and have been properly equipped for ready implementation of contingency plans. A sufficient pool of manpower should have been prepared and mobilised for guiding passengers and crowd control at stations and street level. 16. EMSD agreed with MTRCL’s preliminary findings on the cause of the incident. The protection system of overhead power supply system was proved to be sound. However, the failure mode of the traction motor and circuit breaker requires further investigation. While awaiting findings as to why the traction motor and circuit breaker failed, EMSD has asked MTRCL to take necessary actions to enhance their maintenance of onboard equipment including the pantographs, traction motors and circuit breakers. Follow-up Actions with MTRCL 17. EMSD has discussed with MTRCL on the cause of the incident and conducted inspections on the overhead line and train equipment concerning the incident. EMSD has also followed up with MTRCL on implementation of improvement measures. In particular, MTRCL has instructed the traction motor and circuit breaker supplier to investigate the 4 failure of the incident circuit breaker and propose improvement measures. In addition, MTRCL would, with immediate effect, enhance their inspection and maintenance frequency of the concerned pantographs, and onboard circuit breakers pending the successful implementation of the supplier’s recommended improvement measures. MTRCL would also install visual indication device in the driving cab to confirm the “pantograph down” status to train captain for his subsequent confirmation with OCC. Before the completion of installation of visual indication device, train captains have been instructed to activate the pantograph control button twice whenever he is required to lower the pantographs on their trains. 18. The Transport and Housing Bureau and TD have reviewed with MTRCL the service-related contingency arrangements deployed during the incident, as well as discussed with MTRCL the required improvement measures to prevent recurrence of the problem. MTRCL has undertaken to put in place the following improvement measures : (a) Alert System - To strengthen internal operating procedures of OCC to ensure strict adherence to established procedure regarding timely notification to TD of any incidents affecting train services and the issue of appropriate “Alerts”.