NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE

REPORTBY THE COMPTROLLERAND AUDITOR GENERAL

The British AntarcticSurvey: Managementof Major Capital Projectsand Scientific Programmes

ORDEREDBY THE HOUSEOF COMMONS TO BE PRINTED 23 MARCH 1993

LONDON:HMSO 572 f7.40 NET THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act, 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act.

John Bourn National Audit Office Comptroller and Auditor General 8 March 1993

The Comptroller and Auditor General is the head of the National Audit Office employing some 800 staff. He, and the NAO, are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies have use their resources. THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAIOR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Contents

Page Summary and conclusions 1

Part 1: Introduction 6

Part 2: The management and control of major capital projects 10

Part 3: The management control and evaluation of science research 21

Appendices

1. Case histories of the major capital projects 29

2. The science divisions of the British Antarctic Survey 33 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAPlTAL PRO,ECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Summary and conclusions

1 The British Antarctic Survey (the Survey) are an institute of the Natural Environment Research Council [the Council). The Council are funded by a grant-in-aid from the Science Budget, administered until recently by the Department of Education and Science (the Department) but, since 1992, by the Cabinet Office’s Office of Science and Technology. Gross expenditure on the Survey in 1991-92 was some E26.5 million (or f27.7 million at 1992-93 prices) of which El7.5 million (f18.3 million) were running costs.

2 The Survey’s primary aim is to execute a balanced programme of high quality science in the Antarctic. Their research also acts as a vehicle for the United Kingdom to pursue its objectives under the Antarctic Treaty of 1961. In recent years the Survey have made major scientific advances including the discovery of the “ozone hole” and research into global warming.

3 In 1983, Sir Hermann Bondi, then the Chairman of the Council, submitted proposals to the Secretary of State for Education and Science containing a detailed programme for the extension of the Survey’s research activities in the Antarctic. The proposals, commonly known as the “Bondi Programme”, were subsequently approved by the Secretary of State. As a consequence, the Survey’s annual funding was increased so that by 1984 it was f 5 million more than in 1982-83. However, these funds proved insufficient to carry out either the Bondi Programme or new funding demands with which the Survey found themselves faced. Since 1986, therefore, the Survey’s funding has increased substantially.

4 A large part of the increased funding undertaken since 1983 has been devoted to the following four large-scale capital projects: . a hard air strip and associated facilities, including a berthing jetty for ships, at Rothera Station in the Antarctic; . a new supply/science ship, the RRS James Clark Ross;

l a replacement research station at Halley in the Antarctic; . the purchase of a De Havilland Dash 7 aircraft for conversion to Antarctic operation, in particular to the use of wheels and skis for take- off and landing.

5 In addition, funds have also been used greatly to increase the amount of the Survey’s scientific work. In response to this situation, the Council have formulated a new strategy for Antarctic research, which they set out in “Antarctica 2000”, published in June 1989. The strategy in part looks to a greater involvement in the Survey’s activities of groups such as higher education institutes and other Council institutes, seeing in this a means of broadening the intellectual base of Antarctic research.

1 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPITAL PROIECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

6 Against this background the National Audit Office examined: (a) how the Survey planned and managed the four capital projects listed above: and (b) the approach of the Survey and the Council to the management, control and evaluation of the Survey’s scientific programme. The National Audit Office’s main findings and conclusion are set out below.

The Survey’s 7 The management of the four projects represented a formidable challenge, management of their particularly to a small organisation like the Survey. The Antarctic four major capital environment presents difficulties of an unusual nature, as do the limited projects access to Antarctica and the fact that construction work is entirely restricted to the short Austral Summer. The Survey rose well to this challenge in that, from the three projects so far completed, they have succeeded in obtaining virtually all the facilities that they had set out to obtain. This outcome owes much to the drive, determination, effort and enthusiasm of those concerned. However, all four projects have exceeded, or are projected to exceed, their planned cost budgets. And two of the projects-Halley and the Dash 7 -have exceeded their timetables (paragraph 2.1 and Table 1).

8 The National Audit Office concluded that, overall, the Survey had achieved reasonably good value for money on each of the projects. However, they also considered that, in managing the projects, the Survey had taken some courses of procurement action which did not fully comply with best practice and which, although they had turned out largely successful, involved a degree of risk which might, if the Survey had been less fortunate, have proved more costly and problem-ridden.

9 Project management of the RRS James Clark Ross project was exercised jointly by the Council and the Survey, under formally documented agreements, with the Council taking a leading role. In the case of the other three projects, however, the Council delegated full responsibility for project management to the Survey under arrangements which were not formally documented: instead, they were put in place by means of unwritten understandings. The National Audit Office concluded that letters of delegation should have been drawn up, clearly setting out the relationship between the parties. The Council intend that financial and management delegationsshould be clearly specifiedin writing for future projects (paragraphs 2.8-2.9).

10 Best practice had been followed in appointing project officers to manage and control the projects. But the Council and the Survey now recognise that the resources devoted to project management were insufficient. As a result, project officers-this is noted without prejudice to their efforts, abilities or achievements-had neither enough time nor supporting staff. Consequently, some aspects of project management were performed less than adequately. For future projects the Council plan to satisfy themselves as to the capacity of the organisation concerned to discharge the necessary functions (paragraph 2.12).

II While three out of the four project officers possessed technical expertise and had substantial experience of managing smaller value projects, the project officer for the RRS James Clark Ross lacked knowledge of ship construction

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technologies and experience of larger-scale projects. His chief assistant was, however, a qualified naval architect and he himself had extensive administrative and contractual experience which was highly valued by the Council. The National Audit Office concluded that the Survey should have provided project managers with project training and support. It would, in the National Audit Office’s view, have been preferable to have appointed a Project Officer for the RRS James Clark Ross with specific knowledge and experience of ship construction and larger-scale projects (paragraph 2.13).

12 The Statements of Requirements for the four projects were generally satisfactory except that they did not contain criteria for “availability, reliability and maintainability”. In addition, the Statement of Requirement for the RRS James Clark Ross was still being prepared when the design contract for the project was let. The National Audit Office acknowledge that the Survey had given consideration to the general questions of risk and cost throughout the life of the projects, but concluded that not to specify clear “availability, reliability and maintainability” criteria and to place a design contract before requirements were specified increased the risk involved (paragraphs 2.15 and 2.18).

13 The projects were particularly risky because of the hostile Antarctic environment, the short Antarctic working season and problems of access. Environmental risks such as weather and sea-ice were severe and largely unpredictable. They could be assessed but not controlled. The Survey were well aware of these risks and took a range of important steps to avoid them. For example, they arranged for potential contractors to visit Rothera to gain an appreciation of the risks involved in such a remote location. They also carried out some pre-contract feasibility work but the amount of this was restricted by the funds that the Council were able to allocate. In addition, the Council did not undertake formal risk analyses for these projects, relying on other measures to guard against the uncertainties well known to them from their experience of Antarctic conditions. Had a formal risk analysis been undertaken, a decision to undertake a separate hydrographic survey for the Rothera jetty might have resulted. Without this, the jetty had to be redesigned and repositioned leading to unexpected costs of some f2 million-although these costs were contained within the contingency set before construction work commenced. The National Audit Office concluded that the Council and the Survey could have taken more action to control risk. In this context they noted that the Council have now modified their procedures governing pre-contract feasibility work to bring them in line with current Treasury guidance (paragraphs 2.19-2.21 and Table 2).

14 The Survey had shown good awareness of the need to avoid changes in the requirements for the projects after the design briefs had been finalised. Their efforts to this end had been successful. The National Audit Office concluded that this had made an important contribution to the success that the projects enjoyed (paragraph 2.25).

15 The Survey used a German-based contractor to carry out the design of the Halley project. They used the same contractor’s London-based sister company to carry out the procurement for the project. They did so under the misapprehension that both companies would work to the same technical standards though this did not prove to be the case. The division of design and procurement between distinct companies of different nationalities

3 THE BRITISH ANTARCTK SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

which this caused led to monitoring and delivery problems as well as difficulties of co-ordinatibn. Whilst the major causes of delay on this project were bad sea-ice conditions and a ship motor failure, these co-ordination, monitoring and delivery problems were contributory factors (paragraph 2.28).

16 Because they considered such a measure essential, the Survey themselves acted as the project manager for the RRS James Clark Ross rather than using their design consultants in this role which is a common practice in the shipbuilding industry and one normally followed by the Council. The shipbuilder and the consultants subsequently claimed that this arrangement caused confusion as between their roles and that of the Survey although the Council regard these criticisms as more a matter of perception than substance. In the case of the Rothera project, the design consultants were appointed project manager: consequently, they were in a strong position to carry out their responsibilities and they enjoyed a clear-cut relationship with the Survey (paragraphs 2.32-2.34).

17 Tha National Audit Office observe d that the consultancy contracts for detailed project design were in some cases not completely satisfactory or contained inadequate indemnity insurance thereby exposing the Council and the Survey to unnecessary contractual risk. They note that the Council have now amended their procedures to ensure that any consultants that they employ in future hold adequate indemnity insurance (paragraph 2.36).

16 The Survey demonstrated awareness of the potential usefulness of “audit consultants”-that is, consulting engineers-and employed them in a number of instances. They planned to use them for the Halley project too, but decided not to do so, judging that an audit would not significantly add to the levels of expertise already available. However, a professionally conducted audit consultancy might have provided advance warning of what proved to be some technical deficiencies in the design specification for the project. While acknowledging the use that the Survey had made of audit consultants, and without suggesting that the use of audit consultants was appropriate in all cases, the National Audit Office considered that the Survey could have made greater use of them (paragraph 2.37).

19 The National Audit Office concluded that the conditions contained in the build contractsfor the RRSJames Clark Rossand Rotheraprojects were generally strong and satisfactory: cost overrun risk was carried by the contractor in the former case and in the latter the Survey took measures to assist the contractor in assessing and reducing risk. There were also good liquidated damages clauses. However, in the case of the RRS James Clark Ross, the contract should have linked milestone progress payments to the value of work performed (paragraphs 2.42-2.431.

20 The Council and the Survey are taking advantage of the opportunity to learn lessons from the conduct of the projects for application to future work that they may undertake. Comprehensive post-completion reviews of the Rothera and Halley projects have been carried out and a review of the RRS James Clark Ross project is to take place shortly (paragraph 2.48).

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The approach of the 21 Proposals for science projects to be included in the Survey’s research Council and the Survey programme are submitted to the Survey Director for approval. Under a new to the management, “project documentation” system introduced in 1992, these proposals must control and evaluation now provide extensive details of their future resource and other of their scientific implications. The National Audit Office concluded that this new system was programme an important tool which made for improved management of the Survey’s scientific research programme. They also concluded, however, that the system would be improved further if it showed the full cost of each project. This was recommended by the Council’s 1991 Science Management Audit of the Survey, and the Survey are committed to introducing full costing as a sounder basis for comparing costs and making decisions (paragraphs 3.4-3.6).

22 The approach of the Council and the Survey to the control and evaluation of scientific research includes the use of a Peer Review programme under which internationally selected and independent expert referees assess the Survey’s scientific programme and annual programme reviews by independent groups. It also includes the use of Science Management Audits, under which the Survey’s overall scientific performance is periodically assessed against objectives laid down by the Council. The last such audit took place in 1991 and commented very positively, noting that the standard of work and the quality of staff was high. The National Audit Office concluded that this approach, and in particular the Peer Review programme and the Scientific Management Audits, provided a comprehensive, effective and independent basis for the review of the Survey’s performance (paragraphs 3.8-3.11).

23 The Survey have developed, and are continuing to review and improve, measures of output and productivity. They are doing so both to meet the needs of the Department and other organisations and for use for their own purposes as part of their Corporate Planning system. The National Audit Office concluded that the Survey were using acceptable measures and recommended that they should continue their present endeavours to develop and improve them. The National Audit Office also concluded that the Survey had made successful efforts to increase their collaboration with higher education institutes in the United Kingdom and with scientists overseas. These efforts were continuing in line with the Science Management Audit report of 1991 (paragraphs 3.12-3.19).

5 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAYOR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Part 1: Introduction

1.1 Antarctica is a unique place. It is the only Halley: Rothera; Faraday and Signy; and one continent without a native human small sub-Antarctic field station at Bird population. Its temporary inhabitants, who Island. The Survey’s headquarters at are principally engaged on scientific research, Cambridge manage the scientific programmes are governed by an international treaty. It is and provide administrative and logistic the coldest, windiest continent, 58 times the support. size of the United Kingdom. Its 14 million square kilometres contain 90 par cent of the 1.5 In 1982, Ministers decided to increase the world’s freshwater in an ice sheet up to five activity and visibility of the Survey. Funding kilometres thick. Malting of this ice sheet was to be increased progressively so as to be, would produce a rise of 65 metres in world by 1964-85, f5 million a year more than it mean sea level. It is here that the British had been in 1962-83; thereafter it was to be Antarctic Survey (the Survey) undertake set to maintain broadly the level of activity their programme of scientific research. allowed for by the 1964-65 provision. The Chairman of the Council, Sir Herman” 1.2 The Survey date back in their present form Bondi. submitted a detailed programme for to 1967 when they became an institute of the the extension of the Survey’s research Natural Environment Research Council (the activities in the Antarctic which was Council) who are funded by a grant-in-aid approved by the Secretary of State for from the Science Budget, administered until Education and Science in the Summer of recently by the Department of Education and 1983. Commonly known as the “Bondi Science (the Department] and, since April Programme”, this defined both the scientific 1992, through the Cabinet Office’s Office of objectives for expansion and the capital Science and Technology. Gross expenditure infrastructure investment needed to support on the Survey in 1991-92 amounted to some the increased level of research. E26.5 million, or about 15.6 per cent of the Council’s budget: f17.5 million of this 1.6 By mid-1966 it had become clear that the amount were running costs. The Survey have funds available to the Survey were a total staff of over 400 located at their insufficient to maintain their existing level of headquarters in Cambridge and in the activity let alone that envisaged in the Bondi Antarctic. Programme. In response to this a group of officials, chaired by the Cabinet Office, was 1.3 The Survey’s primary aim is to execute a set up to investigate the funding shortage and balanced programme of high quality science suggest options for the Survey’s future level in the Antarctic, undertaking research of of activity. Since that time the Survey’s both global and regional importance. Through funding has increased substantially both in their programme of research the Survey terms of cash (Figure 2(a)), and constant maintain an active, authoritative and prices (Figure 2(b)). influential presence in the Antarctic, and act as the vehicle through which many of the 1.7 Most of this increased funding has been United Kingdom’s objectives in support of, approved for the following major capital and compliance with, the Antarctic Treaty of projects either contained in the original 1961 are effected. Bondi Programme or subsequently identified (for figures see Table 1): 1.4 The map at Figure 1 shows the Survey’s l the construction of a hard air strip and principal geographic area for scientific associated facilities, including a berthing activity encompassing the British Antarctic jetty for ships, at Rothera Station. Territory and the Falkland Islands Construction began in 1966 and was Dependencies of South Georgia and the completed in 1991 at a cost of South Sandwich Islands. Currently scientific f17.5 million at 1992-93 prices: field programmes operate from four permanent Antarctic Research Stations:

6 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAPITAL PRO,ECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Figure 1: The British Antarctic Survey ResearchStations and Major Staging Posts.

Shetland __

Weddell Sea

,&\ Bluff / ...... ;~,,~

(Sweden-Finland)

0 600 , km I ’ \ Source:British Antarctic Survey THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Figure 2: British Antarctic Survey ExpenditureHistory a: At Historic cost Expenditure(fmillion)

47.0 0 Capitalprojects/schemes and minor capital Total of generalexpenses and receipts

32.8

26.6

I

1980-81 1981.82 1982-83 1963-84 1984.85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90ICC 1990-91 1991-92 Year h: Ai 1992-93 prices Expenditure(fmillion)

0 Capitalprojects/schemes and minor capital 52.4 50 m Total of generalexpenses and receipts

1980-U 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92

Source:Natural Environment Research Counc;l Figure2a showsthe increasein capitalexpenditure both absolutely and as a propordonof total BritishAntarctic Survey expenditure since 1980-81. Figure2b shows the increasein caNal wenditure at constantL)rices both absolutely and as a urowltion of total BritishAntarctic Survey expendituresince 1980-81.

l the replacement of the oldest of the the Council’s budget in respect of non- Survey’s two supply/science ships, the Survey use of the vessel by scientists RRS Tohn Biscoe. The RRS lames Clark suworted_. bv the Council: Ross’was delivered to the &rvey in 1991 l the replacement in advance of its for proving trials at a total cost of L42.6 anticipated life of the research station at million at 1992-93 prices, of which smne Halley, located on a fast moving ice shelf f6 million was funded from elsewhere in

8 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

with high snow and ice accumulation. pollution: and advances in the study of Construction of the replacement station renewable economic resources in the began in 1988 and was completed in 1992 Southern Ocean. at a total cost of Lg.4 million at 1992-93 prices; 1.9 In June 1989 the Council published “Antarctica 2000” their long-term strategy for l the purchase of a De Havilland Dash 7 Antarctic Research. This identified the areas aircraft in July 1990, and wheel-ski and of scientific research on which the Survey other conversion work to be completed in would concentrate in the future and the 1993. As a result of current constraints on criteria against which scientific priorities the Survey’s budget, progress has halted would be determined. The Survey’s activities for the time being on the wheel-ski would be complemented by a greater conversion. However, as at February 1992 involvement of groups such as the higher the estimated total cost was E12.5 million. education institutes and other Council Brief project histories are contained in institutes, to broaden the intellectual base of Appendix 1. A further project, to refurbish Antarctic research. and expand the Cambridge headquarters, was a United Kingdom laboratory and office Scope of the National Audit Office building project managed by the Council, and examination is similar to a number of other United Kingdom projects. It is therefore not 1.10 Against this background the National Audit considered further in this review. Office examined two major aspects of the Survey’s activities: 1.8 During the last 10 years the Survey’s scientific work has also grown significantly. (a) how the Survey planned and managed The number of staff with scientific and their major capital projects programme technical qualifications employed by the (Part 2); Survey has increased from 119 in 1982 to 186 (b) the approach of the Survey and the in 1991, and the Survey have made major Council to the management control and scientific advances during this period evaluation of the Survey’s scientific including: the discovery of the “ozone hole”; programme (Part 3). research into global warming; climate modelling and detection of global background

The main features of the National Audit Office’s examination 1. Consultants were appointed to advise on technical aspects of the construction of the RRS James Clark Ross, and the contractual provisions and management issues pertaining to all the capital projects. The Consultants were 3i Enterprise Support Limited (Dr Maurice Barton].

2. Discussions were held with the Ministry of Defence who have experience of major construction projects including shipbuilding. 3. To guide the investigations, use was made of current guidance on good practice issued by the Treasury’s Central Purchasing Unit. (At the time the projects started, not all this guidance was available to the Council or the Survey. The Council and the Survey did have available, and used, a number of other sources of comparable guidance.)

4. A member of staff of the National Audit Office visited the Rothera Research Station on the maiden voyage of the RRS James Clark Ross, in December 1991, to gain first-hand experience of the ship and airstrip projects.

5. A questionnaire was sent to 30 recipients of Special Topic Awards. It covered:

l types and duration of research projects;

l institutional and private sector assistance provided;

l effects of logistical/financial constraints on research proposals; . views on the assistance provided by the Survey.

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Part 2: The management and control of major capital projects

2.1 The Survey’s programme of capital projects, draw it to the attention of the Survey. The particularly the four major ones, would have Council and the Survey, however, used a represented a formidable challenge to any number of other sources of comparable system of project management. The guidance including the Treasury’s Guide to difficulties involved were accentuated by the Investment Appraisal. harshness of the Antarctic environment, limitations on access to Antarctica and the 2.3 The National Audit Office considered that fact that construction work in Antarctica is the Council, given their limited experience of entirely restricted to the short Austral projects of the type being undertaken, should Summer. Despite this, the three projects so have been acquainted with the latest far completed provide the Survey with guidance at the earliest possible time. They virtually all the expanded or upgraded thus conclude that there is a need to facilities they set out to obtain. This outcome circulate this type of guidance widely owes much to the drive, determination, effort amongst those whom it concerns. and enthusiasm of those concerned. But there have been problems and all four 2.4 The methodology that the National Audit projects have either exceeded their planned Office used in their examination was to costs or completion dates or both (Table 1). concentrate on how the guidance had been followed on the RRS James Clark Ross, the 2.2 The National Audit Office examined how most costly and complex project ever this small public sector body coped with the undertaken by the Council. Evidence from additional burden of managing a relatively the other three projects was, where large and varied capital programme and the appropriate. used to confirm or qualify the extent of the advice and support they findings made from the case of the RRS James received from their parent body. To this end, Clark Ross. The analysis was divided into they drew up a checklist of current good five major stages: setting up the programme; practice in project management derived from pre-contract considerations; contract strategy; guidance issued by the Treasury’s Central the employment of consultants and project Purchasing Unit, which in their judgment build. could serve as a yardstick against which to compare the Council’s and the Survey’s 2.5 The results of the National Audit Office’s conduct of the projects. At the time the examination are shown below. Key aspects of projectsstarted, not all this guidancehad yet the CentralPurchasing Unit’s guidance are been issued. What had been issued was not shown boxed in bold. They are followed by circulated to the Council until 1990, so that the National Audit Office’s evaluations and they were not in a position before then to conclusions.

Table 1: Timetabling and cost overruns SUPPlY Estimated current Planned Actual Project Estimate Cost at Final Estimated Completion Estimated Cost Decision cost Date Completion Date fm’ to proceed fm’ Em’ James Clark Ross 30.2 40.8 42.7 1991-92 1991-92 Rothera 11.5 14.2 16.7 1991-92 1991-92 Halley 5.2 6 9.4 1969-90 1991-92 Dash 7 10.4 10.4 12.5 1991.92 1993-94 * 1992-93 prices Source:British Antarctic Survey Table 1 shows the timetabling and cost overruns which have occurred.

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Setting up the programme by means of informal understandings between the Council and the Survey. The 2.6 An organisation embarking on a project National Audit Office believe that letters of should: delegation should have been drawn up clearly setting out the relationship between l ensure that there are in place suitable the parties. They noted. however, that I reporting/communications/control financial delegations of authority were systems and methods (paragraphs clearly defined within the Council. For their 2.7-2.11); part, the Council accept that, in future, l identify the management resources agreements on delegation and the formal required (paragraph 2.12): relationship between the parties involved should be properly documented from the l commission those professional services outset. required to implement the project and obtain a suitable project manager and 2.10 Although guidance on the conduct of project staff (paragraph 2.13). management was not available at the time (paragraph 2.3), the Council have recently issued guidance on project investment Reporting, communications and control appraisal to their staff and research systems institutes. However, the Council are still 2.7 Responsibility for managing the programme considering the need for further formal of projects lay ultimately with the Council guidance to be issued. whose experience of similar projects was limited. The Council decided that in order 2.11 The Council’s involvement in contractual for the maximum possible benefit to be and financial matters ensured they had good gleaned from the Survey’s experience of visibility of the projects’ progress but there managing projects in Antarctica they should were two deficiencies: delegate substantial elements of project l despite discussion of staffing needs, the management to the Survey. Against this Council had not reached agreement in background the National Audit Office advance with the Survey as to whether examined how responsibility had been they had adequate resources to manage apportmned between the Council and their the programme of projects. Although the component body, the Survey, and what lines Survey had experience in managing of reporting and control had been set up similar projects this did not extend to between them. managing a number of large projects concurrently; 2.8 For the RRS James Clark Ross project the Council retained the responsibility for l the Council did not obtain a detailed contractual matters and the handling of definition in advance of the start of the financial approvals and associated budgetary programme of how the Survey intended arrangements. Project management was to manage the projects. As a result, the exercised jointly by the Council and the Council were not able to review the Survey, under formally documented adequacy of the arrangements or make agreements, with the Council taking a suggestions for improvements. leading role. Because of the project’s size and The Council recognise that, taking account of complexity and the Council’s recent experience gained through these projects, it experience of managing a shipbuilding would be desirable in future cases involving project a Council officer was appointed the delegation of project management powers project director and chaired the steering to achieve an understanding in advance on group, although day-to-day project the way in which those powers will be management was delegated to the Survey. exercised. In particular they should satisfy themselves as to the capacity of the 2.9 The other projects were dealt with in the organisation concerned to discharge the same way for contractual and financial necessary management functions. matters, but for project management the Council delegated full responsibility to the Survey. These arrangements were not formally documented but were put in place

11 THE BRlTISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAPITAL PRO,ECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Project management resources Pm-contract consideration: 2.12 The National Audit Office found that best Deciding what to build practice had been followed in appointing project officers to manage and control the 2.14 An organisation embarking on the detailed projects. However, the Council and the design and procurement of a project survey now recognise that the resources should: devoted to project management had been . define the need for the project insufficient. As a result, the project (paragraphs 2.15 and 2.16); officers-although this did not reflect on their efforts, abilities or actual . identify the best means of meeting the achievement-had neither enough time nor need, where possible establishing the supporting staff. Consequently, some aspects cost of each option (paragraphs 2.17 of project management were performed less and 2.181; than adequately. The RAS James Clark Ross l quantify all major value for money project was managed by one member of the risks involved [paragraphs 2.19-2.21). Survey’s staff. The other projects suffered from the same lack of resources: for two In this way the organisation will establish years the Rothera and Dash 7 projects were a clear idea of what they want and how to managed, without supporting staff, by one get it. The specific procedures involved in project officer who was tasked with doing this are set out in Treasury’s additional duties. The Council now recognise guidelines on investment appraisal and, that they should have satisfied themselves since March 1989, in the Project Executive that the proper level of resources was Plan recommended by the Treasury’s available in advance of embarking on the Public Competition and Purchasing projects. Unit.

Commissioning professional services and the suitability of project management staff Statement of requirements 2.13 All four project officers appointed by the 2.15 The National Audit Office found that the Survey were internal appointees. Three of Statements of Requirements for all four them had technical expertise and substantial projects were generally satisfactory except experience of managing smaller value that: projects. The fourth, however, the project . none of them contained criteria for officer for the RRS James Clark Ross. lacked “availability. reliability and knowledge of ship construction technologies maintainability” and no formal and experience of larger-scale projects. His consideration of these factors had been chief assistant was, however, a qualified undertaken. However, the Survey had naval architect, and he himself had extensive given thought to the general question of administrative and contractual experience risk and cost throughout the life of the which was highly valued by the Council. projects. [These points are further Despitethis, the Surveydid not consider considered at paragraphs 2.18, 2.19 and contracting in experts or seconding an 2.42): experienced project officer from elsewhere to the Survey. Moreover, they did not arrange l in the case of the RRS James Clark Ross, for any of the project officers to receive there were no provisions for quality additional training in project management. assurance, although a clause covering However, the Survey took steps to widen the quality assurance was included in the range of specialist expertise available by main contract (see paragraph 2.44). employing consultants (paragraphs 2.32-2.37). 2.16 In addition, the Statement of Requirements fnr the RRS James Clark Ross project was still being prepared when the design contract for the project was let. This led to claims from the consultant that further work was necessary beyond that originally envisaged.

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Evaluation of options the risks involved in a fixed price construction project in such a remote 2.17 Alternative options were evaluated by the location. They did not, however, conduct a Survey for the RRS James Clark Ross. Halley formal risk analysis for any of the projects. In and Rothera. In the case of the Dash 7, the the case of the jetty at Rothera. this absence Survey, on its own initiative, examined a of risk analysis, together with the tight time number of alternatives and commissioned a scale, led to a failure to conduct a separate feasibility study for one of them. However, it hydrographic survey and to the use, instead. was some three years later and at the request of en existing 1970s Admiralty survey which of the Council that the Survey drew up a had been commissioned for another purpose. Statement of Requirements against which to As a result. the jetty had to be redesigned assessthe available options earlier identified, and repositioned increasing the cost from an in conjunction with en aeronautical estimated f81,OOOto more than f2 million. consultant. Formal examination of the These increased costs were, however, available options only took place et this contained within the contingency set at 20 stage. The Survey, however, are of the per cent of the project cost, on the advice of opinion that because they kept options under the Survey’s consultants, prior to contracts long-term review for several years, they were being awarded for the construction of the able to mount a rigorous appraisal and airstrip and jetty. develop formal Statements of Requirement relatively expeditiously. Pre-contract work Through life costs 2.20 An additional means of identifying and reducing risk is to carry out pre-contract 2.18 In the case of the RRS James Clark Ross, constraints on the size of the ship’s hull feasibility work on a project before the beginning of detailed design and meant that large amounts of equipment had construction. This exposes problems and to be packed aboard the ship into a relatively difficulties and enables a clearer idea to be small space, making maintenance potentially formed of the project’s precise requirements. very difficult and expensive. This enhanced It thus helps to set a better contract. There the need for tight “availability, reliability and was en opportunity for the Survey to carry maintainability” requirements to minimise out such work during the delay of two to through life costs. Although the Survey had three years between the requirements for given general thought to the question of projects being identified and the release of through life costs, they did not develop any funding to finance the start of detailed design “availability, reliability and maintainability” (Table 2). requirements which might have helped to measure and control those costs. Nor did they do so for the other three projects, Table 2 although being much smaller these projects Year in Year in which were less likely to justify the additional costs which projecl detailed design of prescribing “availability, reliability and Project conceived began maintainability” requirements. James Clark ROSS 1985 1987 Risk analysis Rothera 1983 1988 2.19 The risks associated with these projects were Halley 1984 1987 particularly acute. Not only did the Antarctic Dash 7 1985 1989 Source:National Audit OfOceana/ysis of British Antarctic environment present difficulties of an Survey data unusual nature but the limited access to F00tnOteS: Antarctica, and the need to make full use of 1. These projects were conceived at an early stage in the the Austral Summer for construction and Strategic Plan. and at the time the Council took the view scientific work, meant that greater emphasis that significant wsources should not be devoted to pre- contract work until there was a reasonable certainty that than usual had to be placed on project funding would be approved. timing. The Survey were aware of the risk 2. In the case of the Dash 7, the Survey carried out informal involved and took a range of important steps investigations into suitable aircraff during the period to avoid it. In particular, they arranged for 19R5-RQ potential contractors to visit Rothera prior to submitting tenders in order that the contractors should gain a full appreciation of

13 THE BRrrISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPlTAl, PRO,ECTS ANII SC03NT,FIC PROGRAMMES

2.21 The Survey understood the benefits of this ensure that, before a project is type of work. However. the Council faced submitted for full approval, critical difficult problems at the time over the assumptions made in preparing initial deployment of available resources and considered that the claims of this work could not be preferred to other high priorities for their available resources. (The Council have nevertheless modified their procedures and guidance on pre-contract feasibility studies in line with current Treasury guidance.) As a Selecting the strategy result of this lack of allocated resources, pre- 2.23 The Council and the Survey adopted a contract work sometimes overlapped with contracting strategy of seeking to maintain as detailed design-as in the case of the RRS much control as possible over the design and James Clark Ross-or began very close to the construction of the projects themselves, start of detailed design after being abandoned while trying to keep to the tight deadlines at an earlier stage-as in the case of Rothera imposed on them by the need to carry out and Dash 7 project. This greatly limited the work within the short Austral summer. The value of the pre-contract work carried out: it National Audit Office do not question the restricted the amount of pre-contract work; appropriateness of this strategy, but note that and it meant there was not enough time Treasury guidance warns that it is a strategy available for the lessons of the pre-contract which is difficult and likely to generate a work to be evaluated and fed into the heavy administrative workload. Despite these formulation of the detailed design contracts. considerations, neither the Council nor the Survey assessedthe workload likely to be Contract strategy involved. Nor did they consider the possible benefit of seconding staff from other Government departments. although the 2.22 L public sector organisation embarking on project should: National Audit Office consider that this might possibly have proved helpful. select a contract strategy and decide how it should be administered, taking Delivery of service account of the amount of input required by the organisation: the 2.24 Conscious of the environment in which they greater the risk, the greater the input operated the Survey placed great emphasis required (paragraph 2.23): on the need for contractors to have substantial polar experience. This led to a ) select the contractors best capable of number of consequences, including the delivering the service and accepting following: the defined level of risk (paragraph 2.24); l it limited competition by restricting the number of bids made for contracts. As a I aim to make no client changes once a result, despite pressure on the Survey particulardesign feature has been from the Council to considera wider decided, because such changes are one range of bids, only 21 per cent of of the most significant causes of cost contracts were let competitively (Table 3), overruns in construction projects: the although these constituted 52 per cent of elimination of change should be a all the contracts in terms of monetary prime objective of the project V&E; management strategy (paragraph 2.25); l it led the Survey to give insufficient I should consider, with the advice of weight to other factors in the choice of consultants where these have been contract strategy, such as programme or appointed, how the design and technical integration and production construction stages of a project are to management. For example, in the case of be inter-related and who is to carry Halley. the design contract was given to a them out. Where there would be clear German company largely because of the advantage in giving the design and company’s polar experience. However, construction to the same contractor, the Survey had not appreciated that there this should be done (paragraphs 2.26, were differences between German and 2.27. 2.29 and 2.30); United Kingdom design philosophy and

14 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Table 3: The use of tendering for the major capital projects Project stages and nature of tendering Project Minor Feasibility Detailed design Procurement Construction Consultancy Study James Clark Ross c c Halley S S’ S Sl Rothera S’ S’ C’ Dash 7 S’ S S’ S/l S Key: S = Single tender * = Foreign companies // = aircraft bought through broker C = Competitive tender / = supervision only Source:National Audit Officeana/ysis of NaturalEnvironment Research Council and British Antarctic Survey documentation. Table 3 shows that only three out of 14 wntracts (21 per cent) were tendered for competitively. However, the three contracts represented 52 per cent by value of all the contracts let.

practice; and these differences led to methods. However, these extra costs would difficulties in the assembly of the base in have been contained within the fixed cost, Antarctica. and are therefore not separately identifiable. The National Audit Office noted that the 2.27 The National Audit Office noted that Survey might have been able to use difficulties had arisen when the Ministry of contractors without polar experience working Defence had procured a new class of ocean in conjunction with polar consultants as they tugs to a design previously commissioned had done in the case of the AAS James Clark from a firm of naval architects and without Ross. The Survey had not examined this close parallel in commercial use. The option in detail. However, on the basis of expense and delays arising from a range of their extensive Antarctic experience, they do failures in that case adequately to not believe it would have been feasible. communicate between the architect and construction contractor had led the Ministry of Defence to decide against designing any Changes in requirement vessel in future independently of the ship 2.25 The National Audit Office noted that the builders. (Public Accounts Committee 3rd Survey were well aware of the need to avoid Report, Session 1974, HC 303.) changes in the requirement after the design brief had been finalised and had made 2.28 The Survey also employed separate design successful efforts to prevent such changes and procurement contractors for the Halley taking place. project. This conflicted with the Council’s view in 1965 that a single contractor should Separate contractors for design and be used for this project. It also created a construction number of problems for the project. The Survey used a German-based contractor to 2.26 In the case of the RRS James Clark Ross, the carry out the design of the Halley project. Survey employed different contractors to This company was also contracted to carry out the design and construction. They undertake the project procurement. However. did so with a view to achieving an unusually the Survey subsequently decided to engage tight spwifiration for this highly cperialiaecl the German company’s London registered vessel and a fixed price from the contractor. sister company to carry out the procurement. However, against these advantages, such a The Survey did so because they and the course of action carried the danger that Council considered the project could be additional design work might have to be better managed if the materials were performed, at their expense, by the procured by a United Kingdom company. construction contractor, unless there was Although the Survey and Council were liaison between him and the designer. As the aware that the two companies were shipbuilder was not selected until the design operationally and legally separate, they was in an advanced state such liaison could assumed that a high degree of integration not happen. In fact, the builder of the RRS would be achieved because of the companies’ James Clark Ross did have to make design links through their holding company in changes to accommodate his construction

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Copenhagen. This did not prove to be the responsibility for the damage. Furthermore, case, and led to monitoring and delivery the construction contractor declined to problems. As a result: exercise his rights as the novated customer to pursue recovery of the repair costs and, l the design reflected German procurement under the terms of the novation, could not be practice- that is, it provided a required to do so by the Survey. As a result, framework and left the details of the the repair was paid for by the Survey. The design to be worked out by the suppliers scale of repair cost involved in this case was and sub-contractors. This created small in relation to the project’s size. difficulties amongst United Kingdom However, it serves to illustrate the potential suppliers and sub-contractors who were difficulty that can arise from novation in this used to working with a more detailed way unless adequate legal safeguards are design and did not expect to have to established at the time novation takes place. provide the details themselves. It also created monitoring and delivery problems; Employment of consultants l questions about the design from sub- contractors had to be routed through the 2.31 An organisation managing a project should procurement contractor to the design seek and commission the necessary contractor; and professional advice and assistance. Where . the procurement contractor could not consultants are used the organisation authorise changes to the design on-site should:

other than at the Survey’s liability l decide their role and their relationship because he did not have responsibility for with the project manager (paragraphs the design. 2.32-2.34):

The timetable for the Halley project was tight l select consultants on technical merit and these factors contributed to the project’s where apropriate drawing up short lists late completion (Table 1). However, the major and ensuring a consistency of causes of this delay were bad sea-ice treatment of bids [paragraph 2.35); conditions and a ship motor failure, leading to the loss of half of the construction period l draw up an appropriate agreement in the 1990-91 season. with the consultants [paragraph 2.36).

2.29 The separation of responsibilities of contractors also gave rise to difficulties and Role of consultants lack of clarity causing liabilities in the case 2.32 In the case of the RRS James Clark Ross of Rothera. In addition to separate design and project, the Survey originally intended that construction contracts, the Survey let a the consultants should act as project separate contract for the provision of fuel managers for the construction phase. This is tanks, which had to be ordered before the a common practice for the construction of constructioncontract was placedin order to merchantships and the onenormally achieve delivery in time for shipping to the followed by the Council. However, although Antarctic. This contract was subsequently the consultants-Burness. Corlett and novated to the construction contractor- that Partners-were used to prepare the ship is, the latter took the Survey’s place as the design and the detailed building contract customer. Before the tanks were specifications and to provide a technical despatched to the Antarctic, they were oversight of the construction contractors, inspected by the design contractor and Swan Hunter. responsibility for the detailed responsibility for them was accepted by the monitoring and control of the project was construction contractors. When they arrived assumed by the Survey. They considered this in the Antarctic, however, they were measure of direction essential in order discovered to be damaged. The damage cost adequately to discharge their financial f28.000 to repair. obligations and to secure value for money.

2.30 Because contractual liability was unclear, 2.33 The Survey were accordingly involved in the neither the design consultants, nor the continuous supervision of the construction construction contractors, nor the suppliers of contractor and were responsible for the tanks were prepared to accept

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co-ordination between them and the Consultancy contracts consultants. This arrangement was 2.36 The detailed project design contracts, drawn subsequently claimed by both the up by the Council and let to consultants, shipbuilder and the consultants to have been were not completely satisfactory in that they the cause of confusion and uncertainty had: between their roles and that of the Survey. The consultants further claimed that changes l no guide price for building the design or in the role expected of them had not been incentives for achieving it: and formally conveyed to them adding to their l no. or inadequate, provisions for uncertainty. The Survey have noted these professional indemnity insurance on the claimed difficulties which they had not part of the consultant. In the case of the perceived at the time. They accept that, for RRS James Clark Ross and Rothera the future, material changes to contractual projects, the contracts did not require the roles should be formally conveyed. consultant to prove he had professional liability insurance. This exposed the 2.34 By contrast, in the case of Rothera the Council and the Survey to needless Survey delegated the design consultants (ID contractual risk. The Council have now Systems) to act as project managers. The amended their procedures to ensure that design contract gave the consultants clearly consultants hold adequate indemnity defined responsibilities and restricted the insurance. Survey’s role to the overall management of the project. Moreover, in a letter separate Audit consultancies: evaluating consultants’ from the contract, the consultants stipulated work that all communications between the Survey and the main construction contractor were to 2.37 “Audit consultants” are used to evaluate the take place through themselves, a stipulation work performed by design consultants, thus which was observed. As a result, the providing a check on the completeness and consultants had adequate control over the validity of the design work carried out. Audit project to carry out their responsibilities and consultancy is accordingly a valuable means relation between the Survey and the of assuring the technical acceptability of the consultants were clear and unambiguous. design. The National Audit Office acknowledged that the Survey had shown Selection of consultants awareness of this and had made use of audit consultants in a number of instances. 2.35 The consultancy contract for the RRS James Nevertheless, without suggesting that the use Clark Ross project was awarded by of audit consultants was appropriate in all cumpetilive tendering. However, the tender cases, the National Audit Office considered board formulated their selection criteria after that the Survey could have made greater use they began their evaluation of the tenders; of them. For example, the Survey planned to and used selection criteria, a marking engage a firm of consulting engineers to audit proforma and a tender questionnaire which the Halley design, but decided not to do so, were, in a number of instances, inconsistent judging that such an audit would not with each other. Although the Council and significantly add to the levels of expertise the Survey had discussed procurement with already available on the project. specialists at the Ministry of Defence in Subsequently, it transpired that the Halley advance of the contract award, the tender design specification was not without board did not itself include a ship problems (paragraph 2.28) which a procurement specialist. In the case of the professionally conducted audit consultancy other projects, the Survey awarded the might have helped to identify. consultancy contracts on a single tender basis.

17 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAP lTAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES -

Photo 1: British Antarctic Survey DASH-7 Aircraft.

Photo 2: Royal Research Ship-JAMES CLARK ROSS THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Photo 3: The British Antarctic Survey Jetty at Rothera- Under construction,

Photo 4: British Antarctic Survey- Base Halley. THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMMES

Project build Award of contracts 2.41 The construction contract for the RRS James 2.36 An organisation managing the construction Clark Ross was let competitively and tender phase of a project should: appraisal. which was provided by the design . draw up contract documents for the consultants, was satisfactory. The same was construction phase, including general true for the Rothera project. By contrast, the specifications and documentation of procurement for Halley was let on a single- the scope of work (paragraph 2.39 and tender basis. The reasons for this and the 2.40); consequential outcome are discussed above (paragraph 2.24). l award the construction contract after a review of suitable contractors and a Contract conditions check of their experience and capability to execute the contract 2.42 The contract conditions contained in the firm (paragraph 2.41); price contract with Swan Hunter for the RRS James Clark Ross were generally strong and l ensure contract conditions are satisfactory, reflecting advice the Council had appropriate and suitable (paragraphs received from consultants and the Ministry of 2.42-2.45) Defence. In particular, all cost overrun risk was carried by the contractor; there were good liquidated damages clauses; and there Specifications for construction contracts was a clause covering quality assurance. 2.39 The precise specification for the RRS James Nevertheless, the National Audit Office noted Clark Ross allowed a fixed price contract to some important areas where contract be let. The design was, however, unusually conditions did not follow Ministry of Defence detailed and amendments were necessary to practice: the specification to fit it to the working l Payments: the contract did not link methods of the shipbuilder and his suppliers. milestone progress payments to the value The Council and the Survey did not ensure of work performed, a standard feature of that the level of design conformed to the Ministry of Defence shipbuilding normal practice in the shipbuilding industry co”tracts; and to the Committee of Public Accounts’ recommendation of 1974 (paragraphs 2.26 and l “Availability, reliability and 2.27 above). maintainability”: there was no formal provision dealing with availability or 2.40 There were shortcomings in the reliability. The National Audit Office specifications for Halley. They did not considers the lack of formal provisions to contain sufficient detail for use as the basis have been an unwise omission. for letting tenders in the United Kingdom. And in some cases they failed to comply with 2.43 Like the contract for the RRS James Clark United Kingdom building, fire and electrical Ross construction, the contract for the standards-although compliancewith these Rothera build, which was awardedto the standards was specified as a requirement in firm of Pelley, was let on a firm price basis the contract. Consequently, parts of the and contained generally strong and specifications had to be amended or satisfactory conditions. In this case, the expanded before a sub-contract could be let Survey took measures to assist the contractor for supplies of material and construction. The in assessing and reducing risk which enabled subsequent delays resulted in some materials them to tender on the basis of a much lower having to be hastily packed, which in turn contingency than would have otherwise been caused problems in the identification and the case. The Halley procurement contract, assembly of materials in the Antarctic. These however, suffered from some deficiencies. In difficulties, together with bad sea-ice particular, it contained inadequate provisions conditions and a ship engine failure, for sub-contractor liability for defects. And it contributed to the delay in completing the did not require sub-contracts to be project (Table 1). competitively let.

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2.44 Companies with “quality assurance 2.47 Because projects reached their various phases certification” operate to an international at different times, there was an opportunity standard of quality assurance which greatly to identify lessons from earlier, and apply mitigates the risk that the work they perform them to later projects in the programme. will be unfit for its purpose. The Survey did Lessons could also be applied to any future not let the Rothera and Halley contracts to projects the Council and the Survey might companies certified in this way-but it undertake. might have been impossible to do so since few civil engineering companies at the time 2.48 The National Audit Office found that the possessed such certification. Since then, Survey had taken good advantage of this however, certification has become far more opportunity: widespread and it is government policy to l a post-completion review of the RRS encourage British industry to acquire it. And James Clark Ross is planned for Spring the Ministry of Defence has announced a 1993 involving the project consultants, new policy of only letting contracts to the shipbuilder and the project officer; Quality Assurance certified companies. The Survey propose to consider the quality l a high-level post-completion review of assurance certification status of future the Halley project was carried out in contractors on major capital projects. December ISSZ following a full settlement of outstanding amounts between the 2.45 The National Audit Office also found that contractor-Christiani and Nielsen-and ncme of the contracts relating to these the Survey and the Council: projects contained “availability, l in the case of Rothera the Survey maintainability and reliability” provisions. undertook a timely and comprehensive Particularly in the case of the RRS James post-completion review. The review Clark Ross such contractual safeguards might examined the performance of all parties have been beneficial. involved in the project and the adequacy of the original statement of requirements. The review will form the basis of a final Evaluation report by the project manager which will be made available to all Council and 2.46 An organisation managing a project should Survey managers of capital projects: and carry out an evaluation at the end of the project. The evaluation should measure . the Dash 7 has still to be introduced into the success of the project and define and service, so no review has yet taken place. record the lessons learnt, in order to improve performance on subsequent 2.49 In addition, the National Audit Office found projects. that the Survey have controls in place to review performance during the course of the projects. These controls include, most importantly, regular meetings of scientific users and project management groups.

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Part 3: The management control and evaluation of science research

Introduction divisions work up a selection of these ideas into formal proposals, which describe each 3.1 “Antarctica 2000” sets out the Council’s project’s expected scientific merits and likely perception of Antarctic research in terms of a resource costs. In 1992, the Survey strategy for the Survey’s science and supplemented this process with a new system involvement of other groups in Antarctic of project documentation under which highly research. It describes major changes in the detailed information is specified, for five Survey’s organisation. The three existing years in advance, concerning each proposal’s scientific divisions were replaced by six new resource requirements and its health and divisions geared to support five principal and safety, environmental and legal implications. two minor “Science Themes” addressing Proposals, once drawn up and documented, major areas of the interdependent physical, are submitted to the Director of the Survey chemical and biological processes of the for approval. They must also be approved by Antarctic system. Figure 3 shows the current an external peer group review of their structure of the Survey’s scientific work set scientific merits. up as a result and Appendix 2 contains a synopsis of the responsibilities of the science 3.5 Successful proposals which include plans for divisions. Antarctic field work must go through a further approval stage, in order to be 3.2 Fourteen major science programmes allocated a place in the Survey’s crowded contribute to the Science Themes. Each field work programme. These proposals are programme is based on a large-scale research scrutinised by the Survey’s Field Operations topic expected to involve work lasting at Working Group which includes experts in least a decade. In turn, the programmes are logistics and field support. Their broken down into research projects, which recommendations are then submitted for last two to five years and are subject to approval to the Director’s Committee-on annual review and evaluation. It is at the which the Survey’s Director and other senior project level that scientific work can be most personnel sit-who accept or reject the easily managed; and it is here, accordingly, planned field work. that the Survey concentrate most of their management effort. An example of a science 3.6 The National Audit Office found that the research project is at Figure 4. new project documentation system (paragraph 3.4) was an important tool for 3.3 Against this background the National Audit improved project management. But the Office conducted a review of: Survey allocate only the direct costs rather than the full cost to each proposal. They do l the management control and evaluation not, for example, charge projects with the of the Survey’s science programme cost of ship transport to Antarctica nor with (paragraphs 3.4-3.14); the costs of accommodation and support. The

l the Survey’s collaboration with other use of full costing would conform to the scientists (paragraphs 3.15-3.20). recommendations of the 1991 Science Management Audit (see paragraph 3.10) and the Survey are committed to introduce full The management of science costing as a sounder basis for comparing projects project costs and making decisions.

3.4 Ideas for projects are generated either by Survey staff or, less usually, scientists outside the Survey. The Survey’s science

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Figure 3: Structure of Science Strategy, British Antarctic Survey Science Divisions, science themes and componentprogrammes are shown. Letters refer to British Antarctic Survey Divisions.

Division

Pattern and Change in Geological Evolution Science Theme the Physical Environment of West Antarctica of Antarctica I I

West Antarctic Crustal Development A Atmospheric Dynamics B,C in the Antarctic and Plate Tectonic Evolution

A Ice and Atmosphere C/B Subduction-related Chemistry 1PKlCeSSeS Programme

A Dynamics of West Antarctic Ice Sheet

Evolution of Late B Mesozoic/Cenozoic Palaeoenvironments

Southern Ocean C Palaeooceanography and Palaeoclimate

Antarctic Geographic

Source: ‘Antarctica 2000’: National Envirmment ResearchCouncil Sfrategy for Antarctic Research,June 1989.

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E F

Terrestrial and Freshwater Life 1Sciences

Physics of Solar-Terrestrial Phenomena from Antarctica I Humans in Isolated Polar Communities 4

Pelagic Ecosystem Radiowave Generation D . Survival Strategies E . Studies F ’ and Propagation

Energy flow and D Ecosystems and - Higher Predators F Conservation ’ Dissipation in Geospace

cal Adaptations

-L Information and Mapping 1

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Figure 4: How Antarctic ice shelves respond IO climatic changes Background The aim of this research project is to understand the structure of the ice covering the Antarctic and predict how it will react to changes in the world’s climate. These are important questions, particularly because of their bearing on how global warming. through its effects on the Antarctic, may in turn affect sea-levels. A warmer world climate might, paradoxically. cause more snow to fall in Antarctica and this would partly counteract any potential rise in global sea-levels by locking up water in the Antarctic snow. At some stage warming could cause the Antarctic ice sheet to shrink and if this happened sea-levels might rise dramatically. The project will contribute to a firmer understanding of what is actually likely to happen.

Personnel and work targets During 1990-95. three-and-a-half man-years of work each year are to be devoted to the project. And, in addition, Norwegian and German scientists are collaborating in the work as part of the international Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf Programme (WISP). The project’s main targets for work to be carried out before the end of 1995 are: (i) to drill boreholes through the Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf and obtain samples of water and sediment: (ii) to take measurements through the boreholes of water temperatures. currents and tides: (iii) tao;~R~$y measurements of ocean temperature and salinity at various depths at the ice shelf edge. working from RRS Branfield or James

(iv) to construct a mathematical model of ocean circulation beneath the Filchnsr-Ronne Ice Shelf.

Findings and achievements so far The project has developed a hot water drill capable of penetrating 600 metres of ice and used it to drill two bore-holes through which measurements have been taken. Results from one of the bore-holes have supported the Survey’s theoretical predictions of how water circulation beneath the ice shelf melts the ice. Results have also confirmed the existence of a plume of fresh water flawing outwards immediately under the ice shelf: the plume shows the characteristics predicted by a mathematical model developed by the project.

Five Scientific papers have been published, including one in Nature. Three more are in preparation. Scientists working an the project have attended international conferences and given Seminars to report on their work. Source: NationalAudit 0fk-e sumnvy of British Antarctic Survey data, 1990.

Control and evaluation review of the Survey’s research programme every five years. To support these they carry The Survey’s internal approach out annually a sample review of research projects of the Survey’s scientific disciplines. 3.7 Annual “project progress reports” are The reviews are carried out by peer review prepared by the Heads of the science panels composed of independent expert divisions. The reports evaluate the outcomes referees drawn internationally. The panels of projects against their objectives for the report their findings to the Council. The last year. They also identify what constraints full review took place in 1990: all 14 major projects are facing and what extra resources science programmes were approved and they may require. After appraisal of the graded “Alpha”. An “Alpha” grade means reports by the Survey’s Directorate, under- that a programme of research is considered of achieving projects may be modified, reduced high scientific merit and likely to make a in scope or cancelled. The reports are also significant contribution to its subject of study. appraised by the Programme Review Groups, set up in 1989--one Group for each science 3.10 The Science Management Audit concentrates division-to provide an external on the Survey’s overall scientific performance independent review of the scientific value of against objectives laid down by the Council. the Survey’s research. Such an audit is carried out by an expert group appointed by Council and normally The Council’s external approach chaired by a Council member, and the 3.8 Over and above the Survey’s own evaluation group’s findings are reported direct to the system, the Council have developed external Council itself. The audit takes into account and independent reviews to provide the aims and methods of the research assurance about the Survey’s scientific including: the context within which the programmes. The two main constituents of research is being carried out; the these systems are set out below. effectiveness of the scientific leadership and management; and the efficient, effective and 3.9 The Peer Review Programme is concerned economical use of resources. Such audits also with the quality of the Survey’s science take place at approximately five yearly activity. The Council undertake a major intervals. The last audit took place in 1991 and commented very positively, noting that

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the Survey had fully met the requirements Financial Management paper “The the Council set down following a previous Management of Research and Development” Visiting Group and that the standard of work (PES (FM) (92)(l)) issued in January 1992. and quality of staff was high. It produced a number of recommendations for further action which lay at the margins of the Output and productivity measures Survey’s operations. Many of these mirrored the results of the National Audit Office’s own 3.12 The Council are required to produce certain investigation, in particular that: output and productivity measures for the . there is a need to clarify the relationship Department and other organisations. They between the Survey and the Council’s also require information for their own Polar Sciences Committee; purposes, as part of their Corporate Planning system. They have made efforts to refine the l a focal point for training and development measures to ensure that they are precise, should be created. consistent and accurate as possible, and to this end those in use were reviewed in 1991. 3.11 The National Audit Office found that the procedures and mechanisms developed by 3.13 The Survey have developed, and are the Council and Survey provide a continuing to review and improve, indicators comprehensive, effective and independent of their own against which to measure their basis for the review of all aspects of the success in attaining their stated goals. These Survey’s performance. In particular. they are set out in Figure 5. The National Audit noted that the evaluation of basic science Office examined these indicators and research by independent expert panels of the concluded that, taken in conjunction with nature of the Peer Review Group is widely the Peer Review Programme and Science recognised as one of the most effective Management Audit, the use of such proxy appraisal mechanisms available, endorsed in outputs as measures was acceptable and the Treasury Public Expenditure Survey

Figure 5: British Antarctic Survey: Output and productivity measures Goal 1: Quality and quantity of scientific production Primary (in order of importance)

l Number of papers published annually in internationally recognised journals with a strict policy of internal peer review (hard reference journals). . Number of papers published annually in edited volumes. such as special publications, conference proceedings etc which have been subjected to peer review (other significant publications).

Secondary

l Number of staff elected to national and international scientific bodies.

l Number of invitations to present papers/significant lectures at scientific/policy meetings nationally and internationally.

Tertiary

l Comparison of British Antarctic Survey production of quality science with that of other Antarctic operators. Goal 2: Cost-effectivenessof scientific production Primary (in order of importance)

l Number of papers published annually in internationally recognised journals with a strict policy of internal peer review (hard reference iOUrnalS).

l Number of papers published annually in edited volumes, such as special publications. conference proceedings etc which have been subjected to peer review (other significant publications).

Secondary

l The number of submissions of theses for higher degrees per number of eligible Staff and Success rate

l Comparison of primary Output and Productivity Indicators with statistics for other Antarctica operators. Source: British Antarctic Survey.

The figure shows the range of output and productivity measures employed by the British Antarctic Survey.

25 THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY: MANAGEMENT OF MA,OR CAPITAL PROIECTS AND SCfENTIFfC PROGRAMMES

consistent with Treasury Guidelines. The researchers with three year grants. Table 4 National Audit Office also found that further shows details of the Programme. The efforts by the Survey to develop and improve Programme has been launched in three measures of output and productivity- distinct “rounds”, in each of which despite the difficulties involved-stood to researchers in higher education institutes yield great benefit to the management of the were encouraged to apply for grants. Survey’s science programme. 3.16 For each round the Survey set aside an amount to fund researchers. This has been Collaboration with other maintained at a constant level despite scientists reductions in the Survey’s science budget. The invitation to participate in the first round was a general one relating to topics in 3.14 Antarctica 2000 envisages the Survey’s the Atmospheric, Earth, Marine Life and activities being complemented by a greater Terrestrial Life sciences. This was contrary to involvement of other groups to broaden the the Council’s usual regulations which require intellectual base of Antarctic research. The a narrower focus. The second and third National Audit Office examined the Survey’s rounds conformed to normal practice: the progress in increasing the extent of its latter concentrating on the acquisition of the collaboration with other scientists. AAS James Clark Ross and marine research, in particular two international research programmes concerned with global warming, Collaboration with higher the Joint Global Ocean Flux Study and the education institutes in the United World Ocean Circulation Experiment. Kingdom 3.17 To determine the value of collaboration from 3.15 The Survey have a long-established record of the researchers’ point of view the National collaboration with higher education institutes Audit Office issued a questionnaire to the and this record has been enhanced since holders of 30 of the 40 grants and 1984 by the Antarctic Special Topic studentships awarded during the first and Programme, under which the Survey provide second rounds of the Programme. They received 26 responses (representing 65 per

Table 4: Antarctic ResearchSpecial Topic Scheme Research Grants CASE Studentships Total value Round Nature of research applications awarded awarded f 1st Wide range of Antarctic smence 61 15 615.930 6 192.512

2nd Adaptation in Antarctic organisms 65 12 623.428

Recent atmospheric changes and climate in Antarctica

Antarctic Quaternary geology and geomarphology 5 100.000

Antarctic tectonic Paleo-magnetism. magneto-stratigraphy and fabric studies

3rd Modelling air-ice-ocean (To be interactions 17 a 628.106 funded 1992.93 Physical and to biogeochemical 1994-95) processes in the Southern Ocean 2 48.000 Source: “University Researchin Antarcdca” edited by RB Heywood- British Antarctic Sw!ey.

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cent of the award holders). Table 5 details of the main constraints in the past has been the results obtained. Respondents largely that field work in the Antarctic has involved commented favourably about their long absences from the United Kingdom experience of collaboration with the Survey incompatible with the academic teaching and the assistance they had received. commitments of many researchers. The Moreover, the great majority of respondents completion of the Rothera air strip, and the had either met or were meeting the scientific proposed deployment of the Dash 7 aircraft, objectives of their collaborative work should reduce the duration of these absences satisfactorily. and therefore increase the pool of researchers willing to accept collaborative work. 3.18 The scope for more collaboration with higher education institutes was considered by the 1991 Science Management Audit Group. One

Table 5: Collaborativework between Higher EducationInstitutes and the Survey (Responsesfrom Higher EducationInstitutes to a National Audit Office questionnaire) (i) Respondents scientific work and relationship with the Survey % Means by which respondents become aware of opportunities Personal contacts 69 to undertake collaborative work with the Survey Survey advertisement 19 University contacts 11 Scientific conferences a

Respondents’ general comments about their relationship with Favourable 31 the Survey Mixed 19 Adverse 6 NOW 42

Respondents who visited Antarctica 42

Respondents’ achievements of scientific objectives of their work Completely achieved 39 Partly achieved 4 Progressing well 36 Problems with progress Ambiguous responses 1: (ii) Respondents’ rating of assistance provided by Ihe Survey Per cent of respondents Better than AS Worse than Not Type of assistance expected expected expected applicable Financial assistance 4 62 11 23 Assistance from scientific staff 42 39 - 19 Assistance from administrative staff 15 39 - 46 Communications assistance 6 31 - 61 Information Technology assistance 4 19 - 77 Transpolt assistance 31 11 - 56 Assistance with science eouipment 11 35 - 54 Source: Analysis of 26 returns to NationalAudit Officequestionnaire. Table 5 shows that most respondents became aware of the Survey through personal contacts: that less than half visited Antarctica; and that most respondents, who expressed an opinion. formed a favourable view of the assistance the Survey contributed to their work.

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International collaboration substantially increased since 1983. Figure 6 provides a few examples of the type of 3.19 Table 6 shows the range of the Survey’s international collaborative projects in which collaborative involvement with other the Survey are engaged. countries and how this involvement has

Table 6: International research collaboration of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) 1983-91 Y&Y Type of collaboration 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Overseas scientists working with 8AS in the Antarctic 5 8 5 3 9 12 9 12 20 Long stay wer?.eas visitors at BAS HQ 6 10 9 8 6 7 11 15 20 BAS scientists working with other nations’ Arctic and Antarctic Programmes 1 2 4 2 1 4 8 2 6 Memoranda of Understanding in force 1 1 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 Total 13 21 19 15 19 27 34 37 56 Source: NationalAudit Ofriceana/ysis of data from British Antarctic Survey Annual Reportsand other SAS documents.

Figure 6: Examplesof collaborative research between British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and other countries Research Countries involved Description Polar Anglo-American Coniugate Britain (British Antarctic Survey). The research examines how electrically-charged particles (ions Experiment PACE (began in 1966 United States (John Hopkins and electrons) discharged from the sun cause movements in the and still continues) University. Maryland -Applied ions and electrons in the Earth’s upper atmosphere; and how Physics Laboratory). these movements in turn cause the Row of larger-scale air currents. Two over-the-horizon radars--one located in BASS Halley base in Antarctica, the other in Goose Bay. Labrador--are being used to study these effects.

West Antarctic crustal blacks Britain (British Antarctic Survey), The research involved the coduct of several regional geological (1988-1993) United States (Ohio State University studies and a regional airborne geophysical survey to establish of Washington. Seatbe). New how West Antarctica came to be formed. The research suggests Zealand (New Zealand Antarctic that West Antarctica is composed of a number of land masses Research Programme) which broke away from the ancient supercontinent of Gondwana and then drifted together wross the Earth’s crust. The research findings help towards an understanding of the mechanisms which cause continents to break up and move across the Earth’s crust. They also help geologists r.?construct a more satisfactow picture of the Gondwana supercontinent.

Ice Core Orilling (began 1982 and Britain (British Antarctic Survey). The research involved drilling to extract samples of ice buried still continues) United States (Ohio University) beneath surtace snow on the Dyer Plateau in Antarctica. These samples enable a determination to be made of how temperature and atmospheric circulation have affected snowfall and ice chemistry in Antarctica over the past 200 years.

Heating of Oxygen ions in Space Britain (Dr Richard Home. British The research investigated the effects of a special type of ultra- (began in 1989-and continuing) Antarctic Survey). United States low frequency radio waves (known as “electro-magnetic ion (Professor Richard Thorn& University cyclotron waves“) and how. in certain circumstances. these of California) radio waves can heat up electrically-charged oxygen particles in me tams outer .mmbp”ere. Source:National Audit Of&e sunmwy of British Antarctic Survey data.

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Appendix 4 Case histories of the major capital projects

Project: RRS James Clark Ross

Aims and objectives 1 The Survey is dependent on re-supply by sea of bulk cargoes such as food, fuel and equipment. The location of the Rothera base requires the supply ship to make passage through ice hence the vessel has to have an ice-breaking capability. There are also scientific programmes of research into geophysics, marine biology, oceanography and meteorology which need to be carried out in the Antarctic seas. The RRS James Clark Ross was designed to fulfil these requirements and also to provide some passenger berths for ferrying staff between Port Stanley and the Antarctic bases.

Descriptibn 2 The ARS James Clark Ross is 99m long, has a beam of 19 metres and draught of 6.3 metres. She is powered by Diesel Electric machinery and has a cruising speed of 12 knots. She is capable of steaming through continuous sheet ice up to 0.8 metres thick. Bow and stern thrusters give her very high manoeuvrability.

3 The RRSJames Clark Ross carries a crew of 26 and has berths for up to 50 passengers. The fuel capacity allows for endurance of 53 days at 12 knots. She is fitted with workshops, laboratories and a range of winches and scientific equipment for her scientific programme.

Methodology 4 The Survey developed a Statement of Requirements which brought together the scientific, logistic and ice breaking requirements into a single document. Previously they had selected consultants to develop this into a specification suitable for shipbuilders to tender against. The tendering consultants were also asked to provide an estimate of the cost to build the vessel: five submissions were received, all produced estimates in the region of f20 million. A consultant was duly appointed. When the build tenders were received they were in the range f37 million to f45 million. The funding gap necessitated a submission for increased funding, which was considerably delayed in being granted. The ship was built at Swan Hunter Shipyard at Newcastle.

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Project: Rothera airstrip and related facilities including the Jetty

Aims and objectives 5 Several important elements of the Earth Sciences programme can only be achieved by air surveys and the transportation of scientists by air to otherwise inaccessible Antarctic locations. Prior to the building of a permanent (gravel) airstrip at sea level, aircraft at Rothera operated from an ice runway some 5 kilometers from the station and at a height of 300 meters. This posed problems of aircraft safety due to high wind speeds and poor flying conditions. due to the presence of low lying cloud.

6 The aims of the project were to: (i] increase the safety of aircraft: [ii] increase air operation time; [iii] provide an efficient and effective fuel supply (a jetty was built adjacent to the airstrip to facilitate direct access to fuel tanks from supply ships]; and (iv] increase the safety of aircraft and comfort of aircraft maintainers with improved hangers.

Description 7 The airstrip is located at Rothera Point on Adelaide Island just west of the Antarctic peninsula (67%). It is a compacted gravel runway, built from local stone, and extends into the sea at its northern end by 175 metres. Overall, the runway is 915 metres long, 45 metres wide, with an aircraft parking area measuring 180 metres by 60 metres. Facilities include a hangar suitable for a De-Havilland Dash 7 aircraft, a bulk fuel storage depot to hold 300m’ of aviation turbine fuel, and limited navigational aids and runway lighting. At its southern end a jetty has been constructed so that supply ships can safely and effectively discharge aviation fuel to the storage depot, and food and other commodities for base personnel.

Methodology 6 The Survey employed a consultant (IDG of Canada) to undertake a feasibility study of the airstrip proposal. IDG were subsequently chosen to manage the project. This included: the preparation of detailed plans and specifications; the selection of the main contractor (Pelley of Canada]; on site supervision and contractor/client liaison. A separate contract was let to supply and erect the bulk fuel storage tanks.

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Project: Halley V Research Station

Aims and objectives 9 Halley has been the location of one of the UK’s Antarctic bases since 1956. It is on a floating ice shelf 150 metres thick. Whilst this provides a relatively stable foundation, the four previous station buildings were buried under compacted snow at a rate of about 1.5 metres each year and eventually crushed by the overburden pressure. This, the fourth rebuild, was necessary to enable the Survey’s scientific programmes to continue into the Zlst century. The objectives of the new build were to: (i) provide safe and secure living and scientific accommodation and all the necessary support facilities; [ii] accommodate 20 people during winter and 30 people during summer; (iii) provide flexibility in layout; and (iv] be capable of 75% removal at the end of its life in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty.

Description 10 The Halley V Research Station comprises three single storey buildings, each on a raised steel jackable platform, which will be maintained 4.5 metres above the snow surface. These buildings and their associated sub-structures are described below. (i) accommodation building (15m x 59m): facilities include station communications. computing, medical, and sleeping area: (ii) Ice and Climate Building (15m x 12m) facilities include meteorological office and laboratory, uzune laboratory, boundary layer laboratory; (iii) Space Science Building (l&n x 14m) facilities include an optical laboratory, an electronics laboratory and an automatic data analysis system laboratory: and (iv] sub-surface structures comprising inter-connecting tunnels between the surface buildings, housing services including water-making facilities and bulk fuel storage.

Methodology 11 The Survey planned and controlled the project work undertaken by consultants and undertook various administrative and procurement tasks. They also directly employed a team of 46 to 58 construction workers to undertake the building work during the Austral summers 1989-90 to 1991-92.

12 Christiani and Nielsen*, Hamburg was employed to carry out the feasibility study and detailed design work. It in turn contracted-out work to various firms.

13 Christiani and Nielsen*, London was employed to carry out provision, supply and the supervision of the erection and handover of the station. It in turn contracted-out work to various firms.

*These companiesare completely independent of each other, but are owned by Christiani and Nielsen, Copenhagen.

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Project: Dash 7 Aircraft

Aims and objectives 14 To improve communications and personnel transfer between the Falkland Islands and Antarctica and the support of deep field science in the remoter areas of Antarctica, an aircraft with greater range and carrying capacity than the existing Twin Otter type was required. Such an aircraft could also undertake long-range remote sensing flights.

Description 15 To achieve the aims and objectives it is necessary to convert an existing aircraft to operate in either a wheel or ski configuration. The range/payload requirement is a minimum of 5,ooolb over 1,250 nautical miles: a rear cargo door or tail ramp is necessary for easy field loading of bulky items. The aircraft must be capable of carrying passengers over a minimum distance of 675 miles with a public transport category certificate of air worthiness.

Methodology 16 A second hand aircraft was purchased in 1990 from Airlines of Britain Holdings, England. Aircraft design, manufacture, installation and conversion was to be undertaken by Field Aviation Company Limited, Toronto and their sub-contractors. Whilst the range and carrying capacity of the Dash 7 have been improved it is not at present intended to continue with the wheel-ski conversion for budgetary reasons.

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Appendix 2 The science divisions of the British Antarctic Survey

Division: Ice and The atmosphere, ocean and ice-covered regions in Antarctica form a system of Climate global significance. In the Ice and Climate Division .&i&gists and meteorologists work together in an integrated programme of research with the aim of developing a coherent scientific understanding of physical and chemical processes in Antarctica which may then be used in models to predict the effect of global environmental change.

Division: Geology Geologists are interested in understanding the forces and processes that formed the land on which we live, and in the plants and animals that have inhabited the Earth since life began. West Antarctica and, in particular, the Antarctic Peninsula are of special interest because they form part of the highly active Pacific rim. The region contains important clues for the understanding of the formation and break-up of supercontinents, the evolution of life in high latitudes. and environmental changes in the south polar regions over hundreds of million of years.

Division: Upper The Upper Atmospheric Sciences Division is concerned with the study of the near- Atmospheric Sciences earth interplanetary region known as geospace. This region encompasses the inter- relations between the Sun’s atmosphere, also known as the heliosphere, and the Earth’s upper atmosphere.

The Division’s research programme is part of a very large international effort, aimed ultimately at developing sufficient understanding to predict when and where storms within geospace resulting from solar disturbances will occur. Experiments are conducted in the Antarctic and there is collaboration with the Survey’s colleagues working in the Arctic. There are two themes to the research programme: energy flow and dissipation within geospace, and radio wave generation and propagation.

Division: Terrestrial Less than 2 per cent of the Antarctic continent and its surrounding islands is free and Freshwater from permanent snow and ice. Yet these small and widely dispersed areas support a Life Sciences range of terrestrial and aquatic communities adapted to severe environmental stresses. How the species arrived there across the Southern Ocean and established themselves in such apparently inhospitable sites is not known. Biologists of the Terrestrial and Freshwater Life Sciences Division work together in interdisciplinary programmes to provide quantification of the establishment and survival of species, the development of communities and their sensitivity to both human disturbance and global climatic change.

Division: Marine The Southern Ocean comprises about 10 per cent of the world’s oceans, and is Life unique in having the whole of its boundary defined by contact with other major oceans (Pacific, Atlantic and Indian). This boundary is a distinct and important oceanographic feature, the Polar Frontal Zone (previously called the Antarctic Convergence]. The Southern Ocean is also unique in having a seasonal ice cover which ranges from about 21 million km’ at winter maximum to about 7 million km* at summer minimum. This seasonal movement of ice has profound effects on the biology of the Southern Ocean, and its role in world climate.

The Marine Life Sciences Division is concerned with understanding the structure and function of the Southern Ocean marine ecosystem.

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Division: Geophysics Geophysics Division is engaged in understanding the two fundamental energy systems that govern life on earth: the tectonic engine that dissipates heat from the centre of the earth, causing earthquakes and volcanoes and the slowly changing pattern of continents and oceans; and the climate engine that gains its energy from the Sun but in which the Earth itself plays an active and ever-changing part.

Geophysics uses the methods of physics to examine the geological record of the action of these two systems. In particular those parts which are inaccessible by direct means-the rocks and sediments which lie beneath the ocean bed and, in the case of Antarctica. beneath the continental ice sheet. The results of this work provide a longer-term perspective to efforts to understand global change.

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