Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for Election Response in the Hub 2013

Prepared by the Eldoret Hub Focal Point, International Organization for Migration (IOM), with support from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

1. Introduction

In early 2012, The National Disaster Operation Center (NDOC) with support from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) launched a contingency planning process for the upcoming, March 2013 general elections in . Under the humanitarian pillar of the contingency plan, eight hubs were identified throughout the country, aimed at supporting the government in its election preparedness activities and response.

According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, contingency planning is, “A management tool used to analyze the impact of potential crises and ensure that adequate and appropriate arrangements are made in advance to respond in a timely, effective, and appropriate way to the needs of the affected population(s). Contingency planning is a tool to anticipate and solve problems that typically arise during humanitarian response. ” 1 Inter-agency contingency planning, which does not replace individual organizational planning or sector level planning, provides a common framework to guide the collective action of all partners and ensure complementarity of humanitarian actions between organizations.

The Eldoret Hub, which encompasses the four counties of Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu, began its own contingency planning in mid-2012 in order to enhance the overall emergency preparedness and response capacity of all partners and stakeholders in the Hub. The initial step in this process consisted of consultations with members of the protection working group on the potential threats and risks, and their possible impacts. The focal points for the Hub then held a meeting on 03 December to review the outcomes of the previous contingency planning consultations and begin building a Hub-level contingency plan that would bring together the various coordination, preparedness, and response tools developed up to that point, and situate them within the unique context of the region. This meeting represented a continuation of the first phase of the contingency planning process and produced a zero draft of the plan, which was then shared with all partners for their feedback.

On 07 February 2013, the Hub conducted a second contingency planning meeting aimed at expanding upon or updating the scenarios created in the earlier meetings, and addressing the actual preparedness and response plans for the Hub. The second draft of the contingency plan resulted from this meeting and was presented to partners for last comments, after which the document was finalized.

2. Background Following the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, post-election violence occurred throughout the country that resulted in deaths, widespread displacement and instability, and the destruction of property. In addition to overarching unrest and spontaneous episodes of violence, targeted ethnic violence also occurred throughout Kenya. According to an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report conducted in February 2008, the districts and localities most affected by the electoral violence included , Burnt Forest, Eldoret, Endebess, , , Kikuyu, Kisii, , , , , , Molo and Tigoni. 2 In the North Rift Valley region, it was reported that the clashes that erupted Dec. 29-30, 2007 occurred along ethnic lines, with non-Kalenjin communities (including Kikuyu communities) targeted most.

1 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance,” November 2007. 2 “Report from OHCHR Fact-finding Mission to Kenya, 6-28 February 2008.” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Accessed 17 December 2012 1

Given the tenuous ethnic relations and pattern of displacement in Eldoret and the North Rift Valley region, combined with factors including high youth unemployment rates, poor security, the proliferation of small arms, land disputes, and cattle rustling, the region is at risk of future violence surrounding the upcoming presidential elections. Particularly, tensions between PEV IDPs who are Kikuyu and members of the Kalenjin and other ethnic groups may ignite if violence is incited along ethnic lines.

3. Key Assumptions • The government of Kenya and its partners will step up efforts in prevention and in support of peace-building; nevertheless, the humanitarian communities should be prepared in case of an outbreak of violence. • The Government of Kenya and the Kenya Red Cross will spearhead response in the eventuality of any outbreak of violence. • The Kenya Red Cross Society is the designated lead agency and will co-lead (with DC’s, CC’s, and PC’s) operational coordination in the field. • The Humanitarian Coordinator, with OCHA support, will support the Government of Kenya in the coordination of the UN/NGO response. • Focal point organizations in the eight designated hubs will provide support to coordination at a sub-national level.

4. Humanitarian Scenarios On 03 December, the Eldoret Hub began the process of building its own contingency plan with a workshop that was focused primarily on situational analysis and scenario-building within the December 2012 – April 2013 timeframe. During the second contingency planning meeting, these scenarios were reviewed and adjusted to reflect better the current reality. Scenario-based contingency planning is just one type of planning that organizations can undertake, but is also one of the most common forms of planning among humanitarian actors, NGOs, UN agencies, national governments, and donors.

4.1 Hazard and risk analysis 3 The contingency planning process for the Eldoret Hub began with an analysis of the potential hazards (also known as threats) and their levels of risk, as well as their likely humanitarian impacts. Conducting a broad analysis of all potential hazards ensures that a full range of possibilities is considered, and that the most relevant or critical hazards are pinpointed for further scenario development.

During both workshops, participants were broken into groups representing the four counties covered by the Hub: Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu. In the first, each county working group was asked to list potential hazards or threats present in their counties, after which they were asked to identify which among the hazards was of the greatest risk. In the second, they were asked to review their rankings and adjust them as necessary to fit the current circumstances. Risk, which was defined for the groups as, “The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions,” is essentially made up of two core elements: (1) the probability or likelihood of the hazard occurring and (2) the potential humanitarian impact of the hazard. The greater the impact and likelihood of an event, the higher the risk.

3 See Annex I for full hazard and risk analysis developed during the 03 December 2012 contingency planning meeting in Eldoret. 2

Among their top (very high or high) risks, all four counties listed violence related to some Impact of kind of manipulation or incitement by Event politicians or political groups. Three counties Catastrophic RISK (Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi and Uasin Gishu) also made specific reference to idle and KKK unemployed youth, and the likelihood of Major groups utilizing this particular demographic to incite violence and cause displacement. The Medium general security situation also emerged as one of the top risks, though it manifested differently in each county. In Elgeyo Moderate Likely Almost Certain

Marakwet, participants talked about the Likelihood of Event absence of security personnel while in Nandi, Source: IASC cattle-rustling was of particular concern. Participants from both Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu cited the proliferation of small arms as a particularly high risk that might have major implications for the region, though in the latter case it was tied specifically to suspicion and mistrust amongst communities. Finally, three of the four groups, including Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu, listed land issues to be of serious concern.

Each of the counties also listed threats and hazards that were unique to their county contexts. In Elgeyo Marakwet, political incitement (of youth, along ethnic lines, in response to ICC proceedings, etc.) and a lack of security ranked as the top risks, but the county group also listed poor infrastructure and environmental hazards including landslides and deforestation, the latter of which could be a serious problem if instability prevails. In addition to its concerns about political confusion and the manipulation of specific groups and circumstances, the Nandi group cited boundary demarcation issues. The group also cited the targeting of casual laborers, resource-based conflicts, issues around the ICC and unresolved IDP issues as risks, but ranked them lower than the other threats. The Trans Nzoia group looked at displacement not only as a result of its high risk hazards, but also as a high risk hazard in and of itself, given all the negative implications of forced displacement, i.e. lack of access to resources, rise in gender-based violence, rise in human rights abuses, etc. The Trans Nzoia group also focused heavily on issues surrounding the political process such as limited civic education and the 1/3 representation rule for women, though ranked these as lower risk. Finally, the Uasing Gishu County group seemed particularly concerned with polarization, manipulation, and the insecurity that can result from speculation and a lack of clarity on both election outcomes and the ICC process. This group spoke extensively about the role of the media in the process, and cited biased coverage as a major concern in the county.

The humanitarian impact in most cases came down to extensive displacement, particularly from rural to urban environments, matched with the disruption of basic services, an increase in crime and human rights abuses, inadequate shelter and protection, and the loss of life and property. Many groups also discussed the economic impact of a potential crisis, particularly for the North Rift Valley, which provides goods to many other parts of Kenya.

4.2 Scenario-building (best, most likely, worst)4

4 See Annex II for more on the scenarios developed during the 03 December 2012 contingency planning meeting in Eldoret. 3

The contingency planning meeting on 03 December continued with a scenario-building exercise which was meant to explore the implications of the most “at risk” hazards or threats. The exercise asked participants to examine the ways in which these hazards they identified might unfold and to look specifically at the impact or results that these hazards might have. The types of scenarios developed include best-case, most likely, and worst-case. These same scenarios were reviewed and adjusted in the second contingency planning meeting, and will be reviewed and adjusted again in the case of a run-off.

Best case scenario All of the four counties agreed that, generally speaking, the best case scenario in all cases would be for change to happen peacefully, without any violence or displacement.

Most likely scenario Based on current trends and the analysis of those working in Elgeyo Marakwet, the most likely scenario envisages that unemployed youth will be paid and manipulated to cause some degree of violence. Political incitement will lead people to unite around common fronts, and low levels of conflict will result from people dividing themselves along political or ethnic lines. Business and basic services (including health services, with the greatest impact being on those targeting chronic diseases) are likely to be disrupted, movement restricted, and suspicion between communities enhanced. The Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) will probably be deployed, and will likely be accompanied by an increase in human rights abuses, possibly including SGBV. Finally, there is likely to be an increase in illegal logging and sawing, and a generally negative impact on the environment.

In Nandi, the pre-election period is likely to see an increase in dissatisfaction and discontentment with political decisions and maneuverings, some degree of illegal squatting on land, and a frustrated young population. As the elections move forward, it is likely that animosity between political groups will increase, as well as rumors over vote rigging and other types of manipulation. Land will most probably be turned into a political agenda item, while those without jobs will increasingly become dependent on outside assistance, making them much more vulnerable to political machinations. Following the elections, it’s likely that there will be pockets of dissatisfaction and violence in the county, impatience with the Land Commission, and engagement in illegal activities by young people who remain unemployed, possibly leading to drug abuse, crime, and some cases of SGBV, which in turn can have significant psychological and physical effects (e.g. STIs and HIV infection).

The participants representing Trans Nzoia County believe the most likely situation to be one in which there is a moderate political temperature, floods in Namanjalala, a scramble for the Endebess constituency, resistance to the resettlement of IDPs, and the displacement of the Kapkoi IDPs by the host community. Some kind of disarmament campaign will likely be carried out and community policing enhanced. There is also likely to be tension over land, with some people fleeing their homes and incidents of SGBV being reported. Further tensions and mistrust will probably arise from the transportation of voters that is likely to take place in the region.

In Uasin Gishu, the most likely scenario is that some youths engage in violence in exchange for payouts, which is accompanied by sporadic migration and an increase in cases of SGBV. It is probable that there will be tensions arising from a delayed announcement of results, leading to new rumors and more propaganda and manipulation. If there is no outright winner, it is likely that information flow will be a significant problem, as well as unmonitored media outlets. Finally, there is

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likely to be politicization of land issues and the ICC process, which will also lead to some degree of violence, displacement, and SGBV, and the deployment of additional police.

Worst case scenario In Elgeyo Marakwet, the worst case scenario would be one in which there is violence, displacement, numerous cases of SGBV, looting, destruction of property, and loss of life. This would be accompanied by a major disruption to livelihoods and key services, road blockades, economic instability, and food insecurity, and would likely lead to environmental destruction that in turn would worsen the humanitarian situation by causing landslides and other hazards.

Participants from Nandi agreed that the worst case scenario would be one in which violence, displacement, SGBV, loss of assets and employment, a disruption of services, and general instability were the results of conflicts over nominations, disruptions in voting, disputed results, or land issues. In the worst case scenario, the unemployed youth would significantly contribute to insecurity by joining militia groups and engaging in hooliganism.

In the worst case scenario, Trans Nzoia would experience full-fledged violence with high levels of human rights violations and a large number of displaced. Livelihoods and basic infrastructure, as well as essential community services such as education and health, including care for chronic diseases such as HIV, would be disrupted, and incidents of gender-based violence would increase. If the worst case came to fruition, there would likely be a uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and the formation of militias, paired with a major loss of property and a response by the KDF.

Finally, in Uasin Gishu, the worst case scenario would be one where youth are engaging in violence and creating general mayhem, while general mistrust among the population leads to further propaganda, hate speech, and displacement. In the worst case, there would be multiple candidates declaring themselves winners with the losers unwilling to admit defeat. The situation would be made worse by suspicions regarding the IEBC’s integrity and biased media coverage leading to more violence and destruction. Displacement, SGBV, the disruption of essential services such as treatment for chronic diseases (e.g. HIV and TB), and the disruption of livelihoods would likely accompany this scenario, leading also to future problems such as food insecurity, high mortality, and drug resistance for chronic conditions.

4.3 Preliminary planning estimates The initial estimates were developed during the 03 December meeting and are based on the worst- case scenarios discussed during the same. County Scenario Estimated No. of People Elgeyo Marakwet General insecurity 100 ,000 people affected Nandi Political issues – shifting affiliations 25,000 people displaced Nandi Land disputes in pre -election period 3,000 people displaced Trans Nzoia Political violence 30 ,000 people displaced Uasin Gishu Interference with electoral process and >15,000 people displaced continuing speculation over outcome

During the second meeting, participants developed estimates for the most-likely scenarios. County Scenario Estimated No. of People Elgeyo Marakwet Political i ncitement 10,000 people affected General insecurity 50 ,000 people affected 5

Deforestation/environmental destruction 5,000 people affected Unemployed, idle youth 100,000 people affected Nandi Political disputes 1,000+ casualties Land issues 1,150 casualties High youth unemployment Unknown Trans Nzoia Political violence 33,000 people affected Proliferation of small arms and light weapons/regrouping of militias Land issues Uasin Gishu Youth incitement 10,000 people affected Interference with electoral process >10,000 people affected Contested elections and misinformation None Land issues >15,000 people affected ICC process 10,000 people affected

4.4 Hot spots The following areas were mentioned during the contingency planning meeting as potential hot spots in the Eldoret Hub: County Hotspot Elgeyo Marakwet (Keiyo South) Kamwosor, Kapchorwa , Kapyemet , Kabiemit , Tumeiyo , Chepkorio , Flax, Chemoibon, Kocholwa, Kabokbok, Changach, Moi, Tambul (Keiyo North) , Tambach, Bugar, Kessup Forest, Keiyo North/Baringo border (Marakwet) Kapcherop, Kapsowar, Embobut, Tirap Sabor, , Kipkabus, Tot, Mogil, Arror (bordering Tugen, Pokot, and Marakwet) Nandi C ounty, the Nyanza -Rift Valley border, the w ater catchment area in Aldai, Kabujoi Forest in Nandi/Nandi Forest, Muhoroni, Kipkurere, border between Muhoroni and Nandi Trans Nzoia Kitale Town, Endeb ess (Khalaha, Salama, Kimondo, Chepchoina, Patwaka), Namanjalala, Cherangany (Kachibora, Kapsara, Geta/North Kisii), Kolongolo/Kwanza (Kapkoi/ Katikomor/Chepchoina), Saboti (Gituamba, Mucharage, Machewa), Chepchoina Phase II, and Chebyuk Uasin Gishu Langas, Munyaka, Burnt Forest, Turbo, areas along the high way within Uasin Gishu (i.e. Kipkaren, Juakali), Ziwa, Soy and Ray Farm, Kipkenyo, Wendanyi, Kesses, Kapsaret, Kiplombe Ward, Moi University, Cheptiret, and Annex

5. Response Planning

5.1 Response objectives and strategies The response strategy links the scenarios to subsequent plans and defines what is to be achieved by an intervention. In this case, the objective of the response strategy is to support the Government of Kenya and the Kenya Red Cross in mounting a timely, efficient and coordinated response, should one be necessary, to minimize the humanitarian consequences on the population.

The approaches for achieving this objective shall include close coordination and cooperation between the Government of Kenya, the Kenya Red Cross, and other humanitarian actors throughout the election period. More specifically, humanitarian actors shall fill any remaining gaps identified after the first wave of response through direct implementation, support to government, and 6

enhancement of coordination mechanisms, including through the activation of sector working groups where needed. The humanitarian response supported by the Hub will be grounded in the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.

5.2 Management and coordination arrangements

Coordination Coordination is defined by ATHA as the “Systemic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner.” 5 Good humanitarian coordination is generally multi-sectoral and multi-faceted, strengthens the capacity of local actors, is transparent and accountable, and is based on mutual commitment and cooperation.

There are a variety of humanitarian coordination mechanisms that exist in the four counties covered by the Eldoret Hub. These include: Coordinating Chair Participants Frequency of Objective body meeting The Eldoret Hub IOM, with support GoK, humanitarian Once every few To coordinate/ support from OCHA partners in four months, but with humanitarian preparedness counties, including regular and response across four KRC communication counties County County Humanitarian actors Once every couple To strengthen coordination Stakeholder Commissioner and (including KRC and of months systems at the county level Coordination county sub-hub relevant GoK actors) and provide a platform to Mechanism leader (e.g. World from across the better plan and address (CSCM) Vision) county county-level challenges Protection County Organizations active Once a month To review protection issues Working Group Commissioner in protection sector in UG and TN counties and government District Disaster District Humanitarian actors When need arises To coordinate emergency Management Commissioners (including KRC and and disaster response at Committees relevant GoK actors), district level (DDMCs) CBOs, FBOs District Peace District DPC members Once a month or To review the current Committees Commissioners and (elected) as needed security situation and (DPCs) District Chairmen coordinate interventions in trouble spots Champions of Transparency Peace actors, Weekly To coordinate peace- Peace International particularly those building and advocacy involved in advocacy efforts Catholic Justice The Bishop Faith-based Weekly to monthly To coordinate faith-based and Peace organizations peace-building and advocacy efforts Peacenet Peacenet North Rift Peace actors at all Ad hoc To coordinate peace- Coordinator levels building activities

During its second contingency planning meeting, the Hub asked participants to review the mechanisms currently existing and make recommendations on how these might be improved or expanded upon to be more inclusive. The Hub then analyzed and consolidated the inputs to produce a basic coordination tree, as follows: 6

5 Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action, “Humanitarian Coordination: An Overview,” January 2008. http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/ATHA%20Thematic%20Brief%20Humanitarian%20C oordination.pdf . 6 See Annex IV for the coordination mechanism inputs per county. 7

At the district level, there are a variety of mechanisms established to provide a forum for information-sharing and the coordination of responses, both preventative and humanitarian. The District Peace Committees, along with PeaceNet, Champions of Peace, and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, play a major role in collecting, analyzing and sharing information on how situations are developing on the ground, and in early warning/early response. Including these EWER mechanisms in the humanitarian coordination system is essential for tying incoming data on risks and conflict to specific actions. Once it is determined that a humanitarian response is necessary, the main coordinating body at the district level, the District Disaster Management Committee, will engage humanitarian partners to ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable are addressed in a timely and efficient way.

On the county level, IOM and OCHA are working closely with the Government of Kenya to strengthen coordination systems through the development of the County Stakeholders Coordination Mechanism (CSCM). The role of the CSCM is to hold coordination meetings for stakeholders active in the county, prioritize needs, standardize good practices, provide support to other sectors, monitor duplication and gaps, provide regular updates on activities, delegate responsibilities, and share information. Each of the four counties covered in the Hub has its own CSCSM which is chaired by the County Commissioner and supported by the county coordination focal point. In Uasin Gishu, the county coordination focal points are IOM and OCHA, while in Trans Nzoia, World Vision is playing the supporting role in county coordination.

The Eldoret Hub, which is one of eight coordination hubs established to support preparedness and coordination at the sub-national level, is meant to provide additional support to humanitarian operations in four counties, covering the following districts: Keiyo North, Keiyo South, Marakwet East, Marakwet West, Nandi South, Nandi North, Nandi Central, Nandi Hills, Tinderet, Trans Nzoia East, Trans Nzoia West, Kwanza, Endebess, Eldoret East, Eldoret West, and Wareng. IOM is the lead focal point for the Eldoret Hub, with support from OCHA, but all actors who play a role in humanitarian response are considered partners.

Although sector leads have been identified at the national level, there are currently very few all- inclusive sector working groups active at the hub level. Should an emergency occur, however, it is anticipated that the structure that exists on the national level would be applied, to the extent possible, to the sub-national level, and working groups led by pre-designated agencies would be

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activated.7 As such, the Hub has asked organizations currently on the ground in the four counties to identify the sectors in which they would like to participate.

It should be noted that while some of the coordination bodies mentioned here are currently only mildly active (depending on the location and situation), during an emergency they would become reinvigorated, with regular meetings and focal points.

Information management and communication During the second contingency planning meeting, participants were also asked to review the communication mechanisms that currently exist, and look critically at whether those mechanisms were meeting the needs of all the organizations that could potentially be involved in humanitarian response. Following the exercise, the Hub gathered particpants’ inputs, analyzed them, and produced the following chart, which reflects an amalgamation of the county groups’ contributions:

NAIROBI LEVEL

This information-management system is not meant to limit communication or information-sharing between various stakeholders, but rather is meant to ensure that relevant actors are aware of all the key players and can include these players in their own communications systems, for the benefit of overall coordination and efficiency. This system can also facilitate information flow in situations where individual organizations may be unable to reach out to all the necessary partners. In particular, the Hub can act as a one-stop shop, helping organizations on the ground to disburse important information to relevant actors, be they at the community or Nairobi levels.

To be of further assistance in the collection and distribution of timely information, OCHA has developed a reporting system in which all the humanitarian hubs participate. The reporting template, which consists of only four key questions, enables the hubs to provide a succinct daily update on any early warning signs, humanitarian needs, coordination issues and gaps.

To enhance communication and information-management from the Hub side, IOM has designed a website that houses relevant information related to the Hub and its activities.8 The website includes, among other things, information on the purpose and objectives of the Hub, updates on meetings and other activities, the latest contingency plan, the 4W, KIRA tools, and links to the KIRA

7 See Annex V for sector lead information. 8 Eldoret Hub website: https://sites.google.com/site/theeldorethumanitarianhub/home . 9

and OCHA websites. 9 The Hub has also developed a list of partners for each of the four counties 10 and an extensive list of contacts that includes representatives of various government bodies, KRC, CBOs, FBOs, I/NGOs, UN, and donors. Both of these tools allow the Hub to reach its partners in a timely manner and ensure full transparency of Hub operations.

Additionally, in order to ensure that information collected at the grassroots level is leading directly to timely and effective responses that meet the needs of affected populations, IOM, in its capacity as humanitarian hub focal point, and Mercy Corp’s Local Empowerment for Peace Program (LEAP) are planning to integrate the prevention and humanitarian pillars at the regional level through further operationalization of the Eldoret Hub. This means that during the election period, Mercy Corps will place three key EWER staff in the Hub office so that when daily updates come to Mercy Corps or its partners through their early warning networks in the field, that information can be more easily transmitted to the humanitarian arm, either for information-sharing and preparedness purposes or to trigger an actual response. IOM and Mercy Corps will come up with a tracking system to ensure that the right people are receiving the right information, and to avoid excessive duplication. Information flow and response between the two pillars will more or less be as follows:

Media engagement Generally, as first responders, the Government of Kenya and the Kenya Red Cross will be in the best position to speak to the media. Should an inter-agency humanitarian response become necessary, however, the Hub would play a lead role in managing media relations, with prior approval from partners involved. The purpose would be to ensure consistent messaging from the humanitarian community on the ground.

External coordination arrangements with government Due to the fact that the government is at the helm of most of the coordinating mechanisms, contact between government actors and humanitarian organizations is likely to be frequent. In the case of the Hub, where the focal points are non-governmental, the Hub shall keep government representatives at district, county, and provincial levels updated on all activities and developments, and shall include these representatives in all appropriate forums. Finally, in a crisis, it is expected

9 Humanitarian Response Kenya: http://kenya.humanitarianresponse.info/ . KIRA: https://sites.google.com/site/kenyainitialrapidassessment/home . 10 See Annex III. 10

that the sector leads would liaise directly with their relevant government counterparts and share relevant information with the Hub.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of ways in which humanitarian actors shall interact with government – in fact, it is expected that there will be interactions outside of the pre-ordained mechanisms. The coordination structures, however, establish pre-determined access points that can help to ensure full inclusion of relevant actors.

Security and access According to the National Contingency Plan to Manage Possible Effects of 4 th March 2013 Electioneering, the following measure have been put in place at the national level to enhance security during the elections: • Over 500 police officers have been trained and deployed in the Crime Intelligence Unit to enhance collection of intelligence. • Capacity building and training of police officers across all ranks on crowd management and enforcement of electoral laws. • Induction of special police officers. • Commanders at all levels have undergone induction courses on supervisory roles. • Collection of data and mapping of vulnerable areas to prevent possible flare ups and build public confidence. • In liaison with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, politicians are being monitored with a view to taking appropriate action against hate speech and incitement to violence. • Joint meetings are being held with IEBC to identify other gaps. • In the spirit of community relations, the police have engaged the public to identify their concerns in terms of security as partners. • Police officers have been sensitized on election offences and their role as law enforcers. • General Policing and law enforcement have been enhanced.

More specifically, police representatives at the district level have shared that there shall be two police officers present at every station. Additionally, the Kenya Police will be seconding officers from the Kenya Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, and the Prisons Service, and keeping them on standby so as to increase overall police capacity during the election period. The police stand fully ready to offer protection to humanitarians trying to reach vulnerable populations, to humanitarian assets, and to the vulnerable people themselves, should it be necessary.

Resource mobilization During an emergency, additional funding streams will become available to humanitarian organizations working on the ground. These include: 1. The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) The ERF is a pooled fund that is available to both UN and NGOs for life-saving interventions. Kenya has been chosen as a recipient country for the ERF, so the UN HC/RC can release the funds immediately at the country level, should an emergency occur. More information on the ERF can be found here: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian- financing/emergency-response-funds-erf . 2. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) The CERF is also a pooled fund, though is administered outside of the country and is not available to NGOs. If there is an emergency, the HC/RC can make an application for the release 11

of funds. Funds must be dispersed within six months and must be applied to “life-saving” activities. More information on the CERF can be found here: http://www.unocha.org/cerf/ .

There is also a flash appeal system that the HC/RC can trigger in consultation with stakeholders, though this is just a means for raising funds and is not a fund unto itself. Flash appeals are generally used for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response for the first three to six months of an emergency, and should ideally be issued within one week of the onset of an emergency. Flash appeals provide a concise overview of urgent life-saving needs, and may include recovery projects that can be implemented within the appeal's time frame.

Participants in the second contingency planning meeting agreed that the Hub could play a role in resource mobilization in two distinct ways. First, by sharing information on new funding opportunities as it becomes available, and second, by helping to coordinate submissions to the humanitarian funding mechanisms so as to avoid duplication.

5.3 Response plan

Response plan The Government of Kenya is responsible for taking the lead in all humanitarian sectors, supported by UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, while the Kenya Red Cross is expected to be the first line of response in an emergency situation.

The National Contingency Plan to Manage Possible Effects of 4 th March 2013 Electioneering puts in place a system to determine the government body that will address the various scales of disaster: • If there is minimal displacement (less than 5%) in a district, the local District Commissioner (DC) and DDMC will be responsible for the management of the situation. • If there is isolated violence by organized gangs resulting in loss of lives or displacement of over 5% of people from one area, the county in charge will be responsible for managing the situation. • If there is a regional disturbance resulting in displacement from a large part of a district or more than one district, the Permanent Secretary of Provincial Administration and Internal Security shall manage the situation, with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of State for Special Programs acting as co-chair. • If there is a national catastrophe spread across multiple counties, the National Security Council/National Disaster Executive committee will be responsible for managing the situation. In any given situation, the refugees present in the area will benefit from the same initial response and assistance as others in the region, should it be needed.

If the first responders, i.e. the government and KRC, encounter capacity constraints and require additional support, the humanitarian community stands ready and willing to be of assistance. While KRC and the Kenyan government can always reach out to humanitarian partners individually, it is hoped that interventions will be coordinated with or through the Hub so as to avoid confusion and the duplication of efforts. Involving the Hub will allow it to also assist in upwards coordination (i.e. to the Nairobi level) and to create linkages with available resources outside the Hub that might support interventions on the local level.

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During the second contingency planning meeting, participants were asked to review a response flow chart and change it to reflect how they felt response should occur. The below is an amalgamation of the four county groups’ inputs. 11

Groups were also asked to review their most likely scenarios and start thinking about what kinds of interventions might be necessary to address these situations. Generally speaking, the counties where the likelihood of displacement was ranked higher, also had a greater variety of possible humanitarian interventions, given the additional needs and vulnerabilities brought on by displacement, e.g. NFIs and shelter, water and sanitation, education, and food support. Psychosocial support was mentioned by all counties as a necessary intervention in a variety of scenarios, as was health or access to basic services or medication, including treatment for chronic conditions (e.g. HIV and TB), which many noted may be disrupted by any degree of unrest. Other interventions of note, that may have more implications for the government and development communities than for the humanitarian, include security (which was mentioned numerous times by three of the four counties), livelihoods support, and continued peace-building interventions. 12 In the final consultations on the contingency plan, some counties also noted the potential need for post-election food assistance, though this is not something that emerged during the CP meetings, most likely due to timing. It was noted that late February/early March is the time when people should be preparing their farms for planting, but many farmers have been temporarily moving away for security reasons or cannot afford to buy seeds, thus jeopardizing the future food security of the region. Given that the area serves as the breadbasket of Kenya, this could have national implications.

Resource mapping Needs-based planning uses overall anticipated humanitarian needs as the basis for planning the scope of the intervention. Once the potential needs are identified, the process or needs-based planning begins with analyzing capacity to determine how much augmentation will be needed to meet anticipating needs.Thus as part of the planning process, the Hub collected information on existing sectoral capacities in the four counties, as well as the capacity of organizations to respond to an emergency.13

11 See Annex VII for inputs by county. 12 Ibid. 13 See Annex VIII for sectoral capacities per county. 13

Elgeyo Marakwet appears to have sufficient sectoral coverage, with the presence of organizations active in the areas of food, agriculture, education, health, peace-building, shelter, and WASH. Possible humanitarian impacts noted in the contingency planning sessions, however, included a disruption in services, livelihoods, and other various economic activities, suggesting that there may be a need for recovery programming. There also may be a need for additional food support, given the aforementioned problems regarding the planting season.

In Nandi, there looks to be capacity in the areas of health, nutrition, education, food, protection/peace-building, and WASH. Though based on the scenarios developed during the contingency planning sessions, there may be some need for organizations that can do recovery interventions, particularly if there is a significant loss of property or livelihoods. Additionally, should there be any displacement in the area, there may be a need for more support in the area of shelter/NFIs.

Of the four counties, Trans Nzoia has the least amount of sectoral or organizational coverage. According to information collected, Trans Nzoia has organizations working in food, agriculture, education, health, peace-building, and WASH, but has no coverage in shelter/NFIs, which could become an issue in case of any displacement (which was noted in the most likely scenarios). While there is WASH coverage in the county, it is limited to only a couple of interventions, meaning that additional capacity could also be needed in this area should there be a displacement situation.

Uasin Gishu likely has the best coverage of the four counties, with all of the sectors being represented to some degree. The WASH sector has a bit less representation than the others, which could be an issue in the case of displacement or an influx of displaced from other areas, both possible impacts noted in the scenarios. Uasin Gishu may also face food insecurity, as many people have already self-displaced in advance of the elections, and may not have made preparations for the planting season. This could also require additional resources.

Needs assessments Needs assessments and response may be hampered due to security constraints at the onset of the emergency. In this case, we might rely on figures generated by local authorities and other non- governmental partners operating on the ground. However, when security conditions allow, humanitarian partners will carry out multi-sector needs assessments.

The Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team agreed to support a process to strengthen multi-sector assessments in sudden onset emergencies to ensure that a common methodology and tools are used by the humanitarian actors in Kenya to ensure quality and comparativeness. OCHA is working with ACAPS, UNICEF and ECB to facilitate a consultative process to review current assessment practices and to identify an appropriate mechanism for future multi-sector assessments. The process is being undertaken in three phases: consultation; agreement on and implementation of an appropriate mechanism/tool; and a consolidation/capacity building phase. The roll out of the mechanism, known as the KIRA began in October and hub level trainings were undertaken in November 2012 and continued into January and February 2013. In the immediate phase, the KIRA tool is being linked closely with contingency planning. It is intended that the tool will be adapted in the longer term for use in a range of sudden onset emergencies. 14

14 Draft Inter-agency Contingency Plan for Pre- and Post-Election Response, 2012/2013, prepared by the Inter- Sector Working Group. More information on the KIRA can be found here: https://sites.google.com/site/kenyainitialrapidassessment/home . 14

Roster of Experts In the Eldoret Hub, a roster of experts has been developed in the area of psycho-social support, with special emphasis being put on those trained to work with survivors of SGBV and children. The Hub will link its roster with other, existing lists of experts, including those developed by UNFPA, Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital’s Center for Assault Recovery – Eldoret, and KRC.

6. Annexes: I. Analysis of hazards and risks VI. Communication mechanisms II. Possible scenarios VII. Response plans III. Partners by county VIII. Sectoral mapping IV. Coordination mechanisms IX. Emergency contacts V. List of sector leads

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ANNEX I: ANALYSIS OF HAZARDS AND RISKS

1. Elgeyo Marakwet

Risk Hazard/Threat Possible Humanitarian Impact Hot Spots VERY Unemployed idle youth • Displacement. (Keiyo South) HIGH (particularly those from ‘low • Disruption in HIV/AIDS & TB Kamwosor, Kapchorwa, risk’ areas being used to drug adherence. Kapyemit, Tumeiyo, cause political violence in • Inadequate psychosocial Chepkorio ‘high risk’ areas). support, especially for (Keiyo North) Iten, children. Tambach, Bugar • SGBV (Marakwet) Kapcherop, Kapsowar, Arror, Tot HIGH Political incitement along • Loss of life and property. (Keiyo South) ethnic lines. • A lack of accessibility of health Kamwosor, Flax, and food services. Chepkorio • Lack of essential commodities (Keiyo North) Iten, and price hikes. Tambach, Bugar • Disruption of economic (Marakwet) Kapcherop, activities. Kapsowar • Disruption of social order and harmony. • SGBV HIGH Poor security in the area / lack • Increasing criminality/security Ray Farm, Keiyo South, of police posts in strategic incidents go unaddressed, Changach Barack, Epke areas. leading to more insecurity. • Restricted movement. • Lack of access to services. • Disruption of business. • SGBV MEDIUM Inaccessibility and poor • Difficulties accessing hard to Changach Barack, Epke, communication networks. reach areas in case of Simitu, Setano emergencies. • Difficulties getting distress calls in time. LOW Proliferation of small arms in • Emergence of gangs that Arror, Cheptongei counties bordering pastoral threaten people. Forest, Tot communities. • Escalation of insecurity. • Loss of life and property. • Challenge to governance. MEDIUM Landslides (during rainy • Loss of life and property. (Keiyo South) season April-August and • Disruption of activities, Chemoibon, Kocholwa, December) economic and otherwise. Kabokbok, Chorget, Embobut, Toroplongon, Sego LOW Deforestation/environmental • Youth begin deforestation for (Keiyo South) Muoi, destruction timber and charcoal burning. Tambul, Sabor,

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• Threaten greater industry. Kaptagat, Kipkabus (Keiyo North) Kessup Forest, Bugar (Marakwet) Embobut, Tirap, Cheptongei Forest MEDIUM Incitement in response to • Internal displacement. Regional adverse ICC proceedings. • Grouping along ethnic lines. LOW Unsettled IDPs/t argeting of • Manipulation of vulnerable Embobut, Chororget, IDPs awaiting resettlement or population. Rokocho, Emis those already resettled in • Displacement and hostile areas. encampment. • Spread of disease. LOW Increase in cattle rustling and • Loss of lives and property Arror, Mogil, politicians playing on this to Chesongoce advance their political agenda.

2. Nandi

Risk Hazard/Threat Humanitarian Impact Hot Spots VERY Political confusion (URP/TNA) • Displacement: HIGH and manipulation throughout o Mass movement of casual the election process. labourers to areas of origin, VERY Boundaries, demarcations leading to economic HIGH and names (e.g. Nandi disruption escarpment became Nyando) o Displacement in the event VERY Land disputes. that Kosgei is not a running split into HIGH mate (based on ethnicity & three (Nyanza, Western, politics) and R. Valley in Nandi) LOW ICC proceedings and tensions o ICC issues: if strong Nyanza/R. Valley border in case of a run-off (may evidence is found (local become high later). process eligibility), there’ll LOW Unfulfilled promises of be displacement along compensation for IDPs from Nyanza/R. Valley border the PEV and forest evictees. o Economic disruption MEDIUM The targeting of casual • Conflicts – resulting in labourers (e.g. around tea displacement: estates) because they are o Loss of life & property perceived to be of a certain o Low-scale SGBV issues political party by virtue of • Economic Impact: ethnicity. o Due to displacement of MEDIUM Resource based conflict casual labourers Water catchment area in o Tea/sugarcane prices might Aldai, Kobujoi Forest in be affected – reduced Nandi/Nandi Forest HIGH Idle, unemployed youth agricultural productivity manipulated and used. • Limited Movement: across the HIGH Cattle rustling border

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LOW Fallout from devolution • Poor coordination: o Due to poor coverage o Displacements in Chemase Limited representation of Chemase Farm, Nandi Farm due to privatization. NGOs East • Lack of access to health & food services in the event of displacement.

3. Trans Nzoia

Risk Hazards/Threats Humanitarian Impact Hot Spots HIGH Violence resulting from/by • Displacement Kitale Town, Endeb ess political parties (particularly • Relocation and/or (Khalaha, Salama, post-election) resettlement Kimondo, Chepchoina, • Lack of access to food, Patwaka), Namanjalala, education, NFIs, shelter, WASH Cherangany (Kachibora, • Rise in human rights abuses by Kapsara, Geta/North civilians and police Kisii), • High levels of insecurity Kolongolo/Kwanza • Rise in SGBV incidents and (Kapkoi/ child protection incidents Katikomor/Chepchoina), • Need for psychosocial support Saboti (Gituamba, for traumatized population Mucharage, Machewa) • Need for camp establishment HIGH Proliferation of small arms. and management Kitale Town, Endeboss • Displacement to Uganda as (Khalaha, Salama, refugees Kimondo, Chepchoina, • Poverty rise because of lack of Patwaka), Namanjalala, commodities, failure to plan, Cherangany (Kachiboya, shortage of food, granaries Kapsara, Geta/North destroyed, livestock Kisii), stolen/killed, burning and Kolongolo/Kwanza destruction of crops (Kapkoi/ Katikomor/Chepchoina), Saboti (Gituamba, Mucharage, Machewa)

HIGH Displacement Kitale Town, Kwanza and Saboti Limited civic and voter education Regrouping of militias Lack of negotiated democracy Unsettled or unfinished business of IDP resettlement 1/3 rule for women representation

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4. Uasin Gishu

Risk Hazard/Threat Humanitarian Impact Hot Spots MEDIUM Political polarization and • Inadequate security personnel • Langas shifting of voting masses • Flight/displacement to other • Munyaka areas • Burnt Forest HIGH Ethnic polarization and • Need for shelter, NFIs, health • Turbo groupings services, psychosocial support, • Areas along WASH, peace-building, highway within UG HIGH Suspicion and mistrust information counseling and (i.e. Kipkaren, amongst communities, provision of voice for the Juakali) paired with the proliferation affected population • Ziwa of small arms. • Enhanced vulnerability of • Soy and Ray farm women, children, elderly and • Kipkenyo VERY Speculation over ICC process / disabled • Wendanyi HIGH High Court ruling • Influx of IDPs from other • Kesses HIGH Intimidation of aspirants regions • Kapsaret VERY Incitement of youths to • Heightened tensions in certain • Kiplombe HIGH engage in violence (esp. areas due to migration of Kesses) voters LOW Manipulation of voter • Need for establishment of IDP demographics camps MEDIUM Hate s peech • Family breakups and divorce VERY Crystalized political especially in mixed marriages HIGH alignments • Loss of children VERY Speculation of outcomes, • Reduced livelihood activities HIGH candidates prematurely • Loss of property declaring themselves as winners HIGH Political manipulation by politicians through food, transport, and money inducements (esp. Kapsaret) HIGH Contested elections, especially by unsuccessful politicians/political groups HIGH Presidential run -off MEDIUM Aggression and segregation amongst communities. LOW Actual violence and displacement VERY Land issues HIGH VERY Biased media coverage and HIGH spread of misinformation.

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ANNEX II: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

1. Elgeyo Marakwet Scenario 1: Political incitement Best case scenario Nothing bad will happen; people will refuse to listen or will ignore it. Most likely scenario People will unite around a common front; conflict will result with people bein g divided along political lines; disruption of basic services including health. Worst case scenario Violence, displacement, destruction of property and loss of life, SGBV, disruption of communities and livelihoods, disruption of basic services including health, and economic instability.

Scenario 2: General insecurity Best case scenar io Peace and harmony . Most likely scenario Business disruption, restricted movement, disruption of sports/training activities, disruption of basic services including health, and an increase in suspicion among people and communities; deployment of KDF soldiers and an increase in human rights abuses. Worst case scenario Loss of life and destruction; displacement; livelihoods affected; economic instability; food insecurity; disruption of basic services including health; 50,000 likely affected.

Scenario 3: Deforestation/environmental destruction Best case scenario No destruction. Most likely scenario Encroachment; felling of trees; logging and illegal sawing; charcoal -burn ing ; poaching. Worst case scenario Torching the forests; clearing of forests; soil erosion; destruction of water catchment areas; disruption of ecosystem; drought; floods; landslides; reduction of water spots.

Scenario 4: Unemployed, idle youth Best case scenario Peaceful voting; refusal to fight. All is calm. Most likely scenario Unemployed youth are paid and manipulated to cause violence; SGBV, disruption of basic services including health. Worst case scenario Blocking and barricading roads, loot ing, SGBV, destruction of property, disruption of basic services including health and access to medication.

2. Nandi Scenario 1: Political issues – disputed results in the post-election period Best case scenario Peaceful voting and acceptance of outcome. Most likely scenario Dissatisfaction in some areas; s ome degree of animosity; increased suspicion and rumors; pockets of insecurity possibly including some SGBV. Worst case scenario Disruption of voting or buying of votes leads to disqualification of aspirants/voters and subsequent violence; fighting, displacement, loss of property and life, SGBV, disruption of basic services including health. Casualties: 1,152 people.

Scenario 2: Land disputes in the post-election period Best case scenario Stakeholder s in agreement on status quo. 20

Most likely scenario Land being co nverted into a political agenda; impatience over Land Commission; pockets of insecurity with possible associated SGBV. Worst case scenario Land conflicts and displacements, food insecurity , disruption of basic services including health, and looting of property; SGBV if encampment occurs; tribal clashes leading to: • Displacement: 3,000 people • Casualties: 1,000+ people • Loss of property

Scenario 3: High youth unemployment Best case scenario Youth used as agents, data clerks, presiding officers. Most likely scenario Dependency on handouts ; engagement in illegal activities; SGBV . Worst case scenario Youth engaged in hooliganism or militia groups; youth engagement in illegal activities and stockpiling of weapons; SGBV and disruption of basic services including health.

3. Trans Nzoia Scenario 1: Political violence Best case scenario Absence of hate speech; ethnic cohesion/coexistence; open political space; food secure/security; no displacement; no threats/tension; vibrant NCIC in Trans Nzoia County. Most likely scenario Moderate political temperature; flood s in Nama njalala; scramble for Endebess constituency between communities; resistance to resettlement of IDPs; displacement of Kapkoi IDPs by host community; SGBV. Worst case scenario Approximately 33,000 people to be displaced; full -fledged violence with high levels of human rights violations; disruption of livelihoods and basic infrastructure and essential community services; loss of property; SGBV & protection issues; civil unrest; KDF/army is sent to intervene; disruption of education and other basic services; uncoordinated humanitarian response.

Scenario 2: Proliferation of small arms and light weapons/regrouping of militia groups Best case scenario No small arms and militia groups; security is beefed up. Most likely scenario Disarmament carried out; community policing enhanced. Worst case scenario Uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and formation of militia; lawlessness thrives as well as SGBV.

Scenario 3: Land disputes Best case scenario No tensions ; people working in unity. Most likely scenario High tensions; some people fleeing their homes/minor displacement; SGBV. Worst case scenario Major displacement (approximately 30,000 people), death, SGBV, destruction of property, crops, and animals; education and health services disrupted.

Scenario 4: Mass transportation of voters Best case scenario Voters not transported. Most likely scenario Tensions and mis trust ; some degree of transportation of voters . Worst case scenario Destruction of lives and property , blocked roads , disruption of basic services including health, SGBV.

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4. Uasin Gishu Scenario 1: Pre-election incitement of youths to engage in violence; suspicion and mistrust among the communities Best case scenario Youths resist manipulation; harmonious co -existence in the communities Most likely scenario Some youths accept and engage in violence in exchange for handouts; isolated cases of suspicion leading to sporadic migration, displacing 10,000 people (also, previous MOUs, historical injustices), some SGBV. Worst case scenario Most youths engaged in violence leading to mayhem; total mistrust leading to propaganda, hate speech and displacement of > 15,000 people; widespread use of arms and SGBV; disruption of basic services, including health.

Scenario 2: Interference with electoral process and continuing speculation about outcome. Best case scenario Accepting the results of election as announced b y IEBC; peaceful elections. Most likely scenario Tension due to delayed announcement of results leading to propaganda and rumors; manipulation. Worst case scenario Multiple declarations as winners (including self -declarations) , mass action, violence, destruction of property, displacement of >15,000 people, SGBV, disruption of basic services, including health.

Scenario 3: Contested elections and spread of misinformation Best case scenario Results accepted and losers con cede defeat peacefully; well -co ordinated election information flow, unbiased media coverage. Most likely scenario There is no outright winner; partial co -ordination of information flow, un - monitored social media. Worst case scenario Loser refuses to concede the results, IEBC integrity is questionable; un - coordinated flow of information on election process, biased media coverage leading to anarchy.

Scenario 4: Land issues Best case scenario No major land issues arise; people peacefully coexist and respect property as per law and Land Commission. Most likely scenario Politicization of land ; some violence/displacement; SGBV. Worst case scenario Violence, displacement, SGBV, delayed planting leading to food insecurity, disruption of basic services including health.

Scenario 5: ICC issues/High Court ruling Best case scenario Outcome does not lead to tensions or violence. Most likely scenario Politicization of the ICC process; protests and some violence; police dispatched; SGBV. Worst case scenario Massive protests, rioting, SGBV, displacement, cancelling of elections, disruption of basic services, including health.

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ANNEX III: PARTNERS BY COUNTY

1. Elgeyo Marakwet County AMPATH District Peace Committees Cheptebo A.I.C. Development A-Step Child Fund Anglican Church of Kenya Constituency AIDs Control Council (CACC) Peace Net Elgeyo Marakwet Development Stakeholder Mercy Corps Forum International Organization for Migration (IOM) Kenya Red Cross Society (KRC) Kenya Water for Health Organization (KWAHO) KVDA Samaritan’s Purse International World Vision Kenya United Nations Office for Coordination of Catholic Justice and Peace Commission Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) MYWO Kenya National Commission on Human Rights United States International Development/KTI (KNCHR)

2. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) EGPAF- Elizabeth Glazier Techno serve Friends of Nandi Environment Heifer International Goal Kenya CARE -MTRH Choose Life Centre for Community International Organization for Migration (IOM) Nandi Human Rights Kenya Red Cross Society (KRC) Walter Reed Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Marithiano Organization (KNCHR) Mercy Corps Rural Women Peace Link Peace Ambassadors Kenya Catholic Justice and Peace Commission SoS Children’s Village Change Agents for Peace International United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF) District Peace Committees United Nations Development Programme APHIA PLUS (UNDP) United Nations Office for Coordination of Local Capacities for Peace International Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) Walter Reed United States International Development/KTI Wareng Youth Initiative World Vision Kenya Anglican Church of Kenya AMPATH Constituency AIDs Control Council (CACC)

3. Trans Nzoia County Child Welfare Society of Kenya Goal Kenya

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Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Kenya Red Cross Society (KRC) Chamber of Commerce Change Agents for Peace International DIGROT Catholic Justice and Peace Commission District WASH Committee IDP network Kenya Health Right Vi Agroforestry Programme International Organization for Migration (IOM) Sports C reative Arts for Change Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Na tional Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) (KNCHR) Mercy Corps Rural Women Peace Link United Nations High Commission for Refugees Farm Africa (UNHCR) United Nations Office for Coordination of UNDP peace monitors/NSC Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Water Mission International District peace Committees World Vision Kenya Anglican Church of Kenya AMPATH

4. Uasin Gishu County United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) Provincial Administration United Nations Development Programme IDP Network Kenya (UNDP) United Nations Office for Coordination of UNDP Peace Monitors/NSC Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF) District Peace Committees International Organization for Migration (IOM) Sports creative Arts for Change United States International Development/KTI Wareng Youth Initiative United Nations High Commission for Refugees Center for Human Rights and Governance (UNHCR) Save The Children A-Step SoS Children’s Village Change Agents for Peace International Catholic Relief Services (CRS) ECCO AMPATH Catholic Justice and Peace Commission World Vision Kenya Anglican Church of Kenya Mercy Corps Rural Women Peace Link Goal Kenya KESOFO Danish Refugee Council (DRC) Cradle Cheptiret Eldoret Youth Group Peace N et Kenya Red Cross Society (KRC) CARE -MTRH Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Family Health Options (KNCHR) National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) Champion of P eace Movement Municipal Council of Eldoret LVNWSB Samaritan’s Purse Constituency AIDs Control Council (CACC)

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ANNEX IV: COORDINATION MECHANISMS

Elgeyo Marakwet County

Nandi County

Trans Nzoia County

Uasin Gishu

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ANNEX V: NATIONAL SECTOR LEADS Sector Name Organisation Function / Title Email Tel Government coordinators Agriculture and Tom Dienya Ministry of Livestock / Assistant Director of livestock (agriculture) / Didactus Ministry of Agriculture Crops / Chair ALSWG [email protected] Ityeng (livestock) Early recovery Vincent Matioli Ministry of State for Director of Early [email protected], Special Programmes Recovery and DRR Education Robert Olodo/ Ministry of Education Education in Emergencies [email protected], Olodo

Mutuiri Zachary Desk [email protected] 0721445619 Mutuiri 0728535268 Food James Odour National Disaster Chair [email protected] Management Authority / Kenya Food Security Steering Group Health Dr. Mutunga / Dr. Ministry of Public Head of Dise ase [email protected] Shikanga Health and Sanitation Surveillance and Response / Medical Epidemiologist

Nutrition Valerie Wambani Ministry of Public Emergency and food [email protected] Health and Sanitation, security programme (Division of Nutrition) officer

Protection Collins Omondi Kenya National Human Rights Officer [email protected] Comission for Human Rights WASH/WESCO Fred Mwango (MoWI)/ Ministry of Water and 1. Chairman fredmwango@yaho o.com / Eliud ORD Eliud Wamwangi Irrigation / 2. WESCOORD secretariat [email protected] / 0734147706 (MoWI)/ Ministry of Public chair [email protected] Doyle Doyle Brika (MoPHS) Health and Sanitation 3. Chair - Hygiene and 0720861041 Sanitation TWG Shelter / NFI Ministryof State for Special Programmes UN / NGO co -coordinators Agriculture and Robert Allport / Paul FAO Coordinator for Livestock [email protected] 0737701441 livestock Omanga / Jordan and Pastoralism / Crop [email protected] /0735800383 Ramacciato production Officer / [email protected] / 0732759059 Liaison Officer

Early recovery Myeon Joa Kim UNDP Inter -Agency Early [email protected] 0710 295129 Recovery Advisor, Field Support

Education Sajjad Ismail UNICEF Education Specialist [email protected] 0710820828

Food Matthew Mcilvenna WFP Programme Officer [email protected] 707722347

Health James Teprey WHO Disaster Preparedness [email protected] 733330100 and Response Advisor

Nutrition Brendah Akwanyi UNICEF Nutrition sector [email protected] 725893319 coordinator

Protection Salaton Leteipan UNHCR Protection Officer [email protected], 721728007 Child Protection Margaret Basigwa UNICEF Child Protection Officer [email protected], 0727534693

(sub sector) Stephanie Shanler [email protected] (Stephanie)

Gender Based Matildah Masumba UNFPA Humanitarian Specialist [email protected] 0728 600 509

Violence (sub Brendan Ross UNICEF [email protected] (Matildah) sector)

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Shelter / NFI Sharif Ahmed / Fatma IOM Migration Specialist / [email protected] 0725 850597

Said Programme Officer- [email protected] / 0728600507 Emergency Response & Recovery

WASH/WESCO Jane Maonga UNICEF WESCOORD/WASH [email protected] 0705120189 ORD sector coordinator

Inter -sector Lucy Dickinson OCHA Humanitarian Affairs [email protected] 0722521031 Officer Cross cutting issues focal points Gender Njoki Kinyanjui / Susan UN WOMEN Gender Advisor / Gender [email protected] 0721382541 / Nganga Advisor [email protected] 0207624385

HIV/AIDS Jacqueline Dache UNHCR HIV Consultant [email protected] 0725 652 240

HIV/ADS Angeline Wambanda IOM HIV Consultant [email protected] 0716 73 41 29

HIV/AIDS Gary Jones Senior AIDS Security and [email protected] 0705 658499 Humanitarian Advisor

PSEA Christine Uyoga PSEA Network Protection from Sexual [email protected] 0734 733 489 Exploitation & Abuse (PSEA) Age Ibrahim Njuguna Help Age International Emergency Programme [email protected] 0722369366 Manager

Disability David Munyendo / CBM Regional Emergency and dmunyendo@cbmi -nbo.org 0731 090 014 Nerea Thigo Recovery Coordinator [email protected]

Early Recovery Myeon Joa Kim UNDP Inter -Agency Early [email protected] 0710 295129 Recovery Advisor, Field Support Cash Transfer Glenn Hughson CaLP East Africa Focal Point [email protected] 0731777421 Programming

Urban Buck Child GOAL Country Director [email protected] 0738908722 vulnerability Forum

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ANNEX VI: COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS

Nandi County

Trans Nzoia County

Uasin Gishu County

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ANNEX VII: RESPONSE PLANS

Elgeyo Marakwet County

Scenario Impact Interventions Resources In response to political • Loss of life and property. Shelter and NFI distribution Shelter/NFI kits , staff, incitement, people will unite • Lack of accessibility to health and Psychosocial support transport around common fronts; food services. Medical attention Counselors, medical personnel, conflict will result with people • Lack of essential commodities and Recovery support such as drugs being divided along price hikes. cash to start a business and Cash support political/ethnic lines. • Disruption of economic activities. economic empowerment Essential commodities Peace-building intervention • Disruption of social order and and security harmony General insecurity leads to • Increasing criminality/security Development interventions Cash for work business disruption, incidents go unaddressed, leading Health services, drug Counselors, medical personnel, restricted movement, to more insecurity. distribution extra medications disruption of sports/training • Restricted movement. Psychosocial support Security personnel activities, and an increase in • Lack of access to services. Provision of security Mobile clinics suspicion among people and • Disruption of business. Provision of mobile services, communities; deployment of e.g. health KDF soldiers and an increase in human rights abuses. Some environmental • Disruption of activities, economic Enhanced security in trouble Security personnel destruction including and otherwise. spots encroachment; felling of • Industry threatened Environmental conservation trees; logging and illegal programs (longer term) sawing; charcoal-burning. Unemployed, idle youth • Barricaded roads, disrupted trade Food distribution/economic Food, staff, transport • Torching of houses and looting of support Shelter and NFIs property Shelter and NFI support Counselors Psychosocial support Nandi County

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Most -Likely Scenario Humanitarian Impact Types of intervention required Resources needed for intervention Disputed results in post - • Displacement and loss of lives Secure sites Security staff election period with • Insecurity Psychosocial support Cooking and NFI kits dissatisfaction in some • Loss of lives Provision of adequate shelter and NFIs Food areas; some degree of • SGBV Provision of health facilities and medical Human resources, including animosity; increased supplies (including blood) health professionals suspicion and rumors during Provision of clean water and sanitation Transport and fuel voting period. facilities Medical supplies Food distribution Communications equipment CCCM Financial resources Land being turned into a • Displacement and casualties Peace -building Experts on conflict mitigation political agenda, leading to • Loss of property and Legal support and legal support land disputes and livelihoods Mortuary services Shelter, health, NFIs, food, impatience over Land • Food insecurity Rest is same as above water Commission. • Contamination of water Mobile mortuary Veterinary supplies High youth unemployment • Criminal activity Engage youth in peace -building As above leading to dependency on • Damage to property Capacity handouts; engagement in • Loss of life Security illegal activities. • Cattle rustling

Trans Nzoia County

Most -Likely Scenario Humanitarian Impact Types of intervention required Resources needed for intervention Some political violence, but generally • Displacement Psychosocial support NFIs and shelter a moderate political temperature; • Relocation and/or Distribution of shelter and NFIs Human resources scramble for Endebess constituency resettlement First Aid assistance including trained between communities; resistance to • Lack of access to food, Watsan support counselors and resettlement of IDPs; displacement of education, NFIs, shelter, Food distribution doctors Kapkoi IDPs by host community. WASH Health intervention Food • Rise in human rights abuses Provision of security Financial resources by civilians and police Transport (ground • High levels of insecurity and air) Proliferation of small arms leading to • Rise in SGBV incidents and Provision of security Equipment for a disarmament campaign and the child protection incidents Information-sharing DPCs and means enhancement of community policing. • Need for psychosocial support Surveillance for them to for traumatized population facilitate • Need for camp establishment Transport Land disputes and management Resettlement assistance, including shelter Land and shelter • Displacement to Uganda as Provision of security provision refugees Finance • Poverty rise because of lack of Transport Equipment

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Mass transportation of voters commodities, f ailure to plan, Provision of enhanced security Finance shortage of food, granaries Surveillance Transport destroyed, livestock Information-sharing and management stolen/killed, burning and destruction of crop

Uasin Gishu County

Most -Likely Scenario Humanitarian Impact Types of intervention required Resources needed for intervention Some youths accept and engage in • Inadequate security personnel Displacement of 10,000 requires Shelter and NFIs violence in exchange for handouts; • Flight/displacement to other areas shelter and NFI distribution Water, transport isolated cases of suspicion leading to • Need for shelter, NFIs, health services, Water trucking Medication sporadic migration (also, previous psychosocial support, WASH, peace- Health services, distribution of drugs Health MOUs, historical injustices). building, information counseling and Family tracing professionals and provision of voice for the affected Education intervention counselors population Psychosocial support Tagging of children • Enhanced vulnerability of women, Livelihoods support CCCM Tension due to delayed children, elderly and disabled Displacement requires the same as Same announcement of results leading to • Influx of IDPs from other regions above. propaganda and rumors; sporadic • Heightened tensions in certain areas outbursts of violence with defeated due to migration of voters aspirants claiming foul play. • Need for establishment of IDP camps • Family breakups and divorce especially There is no outright winner; partial in mixed marriages Displacement requires the same as Same co-ordination of information flow, un- • Loss of children above. monitored social media. • Reduced livelihood activities Land issues • Loss of property Displacement requires the same as Same above. ICC issues/High Court ruling Displacement requires the same as Same above.

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ANNEX VIII: SECTORAL CAPACITIES PER COUNTY

ANNEX IX: KEY EMERGENCY CONTACTS AND FOCAL POINTS

A. County Focal Points County Focal Point 1 Focal Point 2 Focal Point 3 Elgeyo County Commissioner, Iten Rev. Samuel Cleseek Kenya Red Cross, Kapsowar Marakwet Tel: 0722541600 AIC, Iten/Kapsowar Tel: 0726071799 Email: [email protected] Tel: 0736609353 Email: [email protected] Rev. Kenda Tel: 0721586798 Nandi County Commissioner, District Commissioner, Kapsabet District Commissioner, Nandi Hills Tel: 0722372358 Tel: 0726981092 Tel: 0721357747 Email: Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] [email protected] Trans Nzoia County Commissioner, Kitale KNCHR, Kitale Talaso Chucha Tel: 0722813761 Tel: 0722387016 World Vision, Kitale 0725438285 Tel: 0721560728 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Uasin Gishu County Commissioner, Eldoret Kenya Red Cross, Eldoret Laura Jones Tel: 0728157553 Tel: 0720430455 IOM, Eldoret Email: Email: Tel: 0722209445 [email protected] [email protected] Email: [email protected]

B. Emergency Contacts

Contact Location Contact Information Fire Emergency Uasin Gishu 0532061185 Joseph Owini, CFO, 0722468816 Trans Nzoia 0723373047 Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital - Uasin Gishu 0701790434 Emergency (Eldoret) 0739526255 Healthcare Assistance Kenya (HAK)/ UN Kenya 1195 (toll free) Women OCPD Elgeyo Marakwet Joseph Mwaniki, Keiyo South, 0723018778 Nandi Nandi South, 0722230762 Nandi North,0724247674 Trans Nzoia Kitale, 0727409533 Uasin Gishu Eldoret East, 0722838115 Eldoret South, 0722274743 Eldoret West, 0723408802 KRC Regional Team Rift Valley Patrick Nyongesa, 0720430455 Ambulance, 0700395395 Eldoret Humanitarian Hub Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi, Laura Jones, 0722209445 Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu Annastacia Some, 0710602739 Gender Focal Points (Ministry of Gender, Uasin Gishu Judith Sinrore, 0715785332 Children and Social Development) Meshak Akivaga, 0710499126 Nandi Lucy W. Maina, 0733939072 Elgeyo Marakwet Nathan Kibon 0721560005 Calleb Bunyasi, 0727235186 Trans Nzoia Pauline Mwengi, 0720910061 EWER Systems Kenya Uchaguzi, SMS 3002 Peace Hub, 0716431222 Uwiano, SMS 108