Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for Election Response in the Eldoret Hub 2013
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Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for Election Response in the Eldoret Hub 2013 Prepared by the Eldoret Hub Focal Point, International Organization for Migration (IOM), with support from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 1. Introduction In early 2012, The National Disaster Operation Center (NDOC) with support from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) launched a contingency planning process for the upcoming, March 2013 general elections in Kenya. Under the humanitarian pillar of the contingency plan, eight hubs were identified throughout the country, aimed at supporting the government in its election preparedness activities and response. According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, contingency planning is, “A management tool used to analyze the impact of potential crises and ensure that adequate and appropriate arrangements are made in advance to respond in a timely, effective, and appropriate way to the needs of the affected population(s). Contingency planning is a tool to anticipate and solve problems that typically arise during humanitarian response. ” 1 Inter-agency contingency planning, which does not replace individual organizational planning or sector level planning, provides a common framework to guide the collective action of all partners and ensure complementarity of humanitarian actions between organizations. The Eldoret Hub, which encompasses the four counties of Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu, began its own contingency planning in mid-2012 in order to enhance the overall emergency preparedness and response capacity of all partners and stakeholders in the Hub. The initial step in this process consisted of consultations with members of the protection working group on the potential threats and risks, and their possible impacts. The focal points for the Hub then held a meeting on 03 December to review the outcomes of the previous contingency planning consultations and begin building a Hub-level contingency plan that would bring together the various coordination, preparedness, and response tools developed up to that point, and situate them within the unique context of the region. This meeting represented a continuation of the first phase of the contingency planning process and produced a zero draft of the plan, which was then shared with all partners for their feedback. On 07 February 2013, the Hub conducted a second contingency planning meeting aimed at expanding upon or updating the scenarios created in the earlier meetings, and addressing the actual preparedness and response plans for the Hub. The second draft of the contingency plan resulted from this meeting and was presented to partners for last comments, after which the document was finalized. 2. Background Following the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, post-election violence occurred throughout the country that resulted in deaths, widespread displacement and instability, and the destruction of property. In addition to overarching unrest and spontaneous episodes of violence, targeted ethnic violence also occurred throughout Kenya. According to an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report conducted in February 2008, the districts and localities most affected by the electoral violence included Nairobi, Burnt Forest, Eldoret, Endebess, Kericho, Kitale, Kikuyu, Kisii, Limuru, Naivasha, Nakuru, Nyamira, Mau Summit, Molo and Tigoni. 2 In the North Rift Valley region, it was reported that the clashes that erupted Dec. 29-30, 2007 occurred along ethnic lines, with non-Kalenjin communities (including Kikuyu communities) targeted most. 1 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance,” November 2007. 2 “Report from OHCHR Fact-finding Mission to Kenya, 6-28 February 2008.” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Accessed 17 December 2012 <http://blog.ushahidi.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/final-ohchr-kenya- report-19-march2008.pdf> 1 Given the tenuous ethnic relations and pattern of displacement in Eldoret and the North Rift Valley region, combined with factors including high youth unemployment rates, poor security, the proliferation of small arms, land disputes, and cattle rustling, the region is at risk of future violence surrounding the upcoming presidential elections. Particularly, tensions between PEV IDPs who are Kikuyu and members of the Kalenjin and other ethnic groups may ignite if violence is incited along ethnic lines. 3. Key Assumptions • The government of Kenya and its partners will step up efforts in prevention and in support of peace-building; nevertheless, the humanitarian communities should be prepared in case of an outbreak of violence. • The Government of Kenya and the Kenya Red Cross will spearhead response in the eventuality of any outbreak of violence. • The Kenya Red Cross Society is the designated lead agency and will co-lead (with DC’s, CC’s, and PC’s) operational coordination in the field. • The Humanitarian Coordinator, with OCHA support, will support the Government of Kenya in the coordination of the UN/NGO response. • Focal point organizations in the eight designated hubs will provide support to coordination at a sub-national level. 4. Humanitarian Scenarios On 03 December, the Eldoret Hub began the process of building its own contingency plan with a workshop that was focused primarily on situational analysis and scenario-building within the December 2012 – April 2013 timeframe. During the second contingency planning meeting, these scenarios were reviewed and adjusted to reflect better the current reality. Scenario-based contingency planning is just one type of planning that organizations can undertake, but is also one of the most common forms of planning among humanitarian actors, NGOs, UN agencies, national governments, and donors. 4.1 Hazard and risk analysis 3 The contingency planning process for the Eldoret Hub began with an analysis of the potential hazards (also known as threats) and their levels of risk, as well as their likely humanitarian impacts. Conducting a broad analysis of all potential hazards ensures that a full range of possibilities is considered, and that the most relevant or critical hazards are pinpointed for further scenario development. During both workshops, participants were broken into groups representing the four counties covered by the Hub: Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu. In the first, each county working group was asked to list potential hazards or threats present in their counties, after which they were asked to identify which among the hazards was of the greatest risk. In the second, they were asked to review their rankings and adjust them as necessary to fit the current circumstances. Risk, which was defined for the groups as, “The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions,” is essentially made up of two core elements: (1) the probability or likelihood of the hazard occurring and (2) the potential humanitarian impact of the hazard. The greater the impact and likelihood of an event, the higher the risk. 3 See Annex I for full hazard and risk analysis developed during the 03 December 2012 contingency planning meeting in Eldoret. 2 Among their top (very high or high) risks, all four counties listed violence related to some Impact of kind of manipulation or incitement by Event politicians or political groups. Three counties Catastrophic RISK (Elgeyo Marakwet, Nandi and Uasin Gishu) also made specific reference to idle and KKK unemployed youth, and the likelihood of Major groups utilizing this particular demographic to incite violence and cause displacement. The Medium general security situation also emerged as one of the top risks, though it manifested differently in each county. In Elgeyo Moderate Likely Almost Certain Marakwet, participants talked about the Likelihood of Event absence of security personnel while in Nandi, Source: IASC cattle-rustling was of particular concern. Participants from both Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu cited the proliferation of small arms as a particularly high risk that might have major implications for the region, though in the latter case it was tied specifically to suspicion and mistrust amongst communities. Finally, three of the four groups, including Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu, listed land issues to be of serious concern. Each of the counties also listed threats and hazards that were unique to their county contexts. In Elgeyo Marakwet, political incitement (of youth, along ethnic lines, in response to ICC proceedings, etc.) and a lack of security ranked as the top risks, but the county group also listed poor infrastructure and environmental hazards including landslides and deforestation, the latter of which could be a serious problem if instability prevails. In addition to its concerns about political confusion and the manipulation of specific groups and circumstances, the Nandi group cited boundary demarcation issues. The group also cited the targeting of casual laborers, resource-based conflicts, issues around the ICC and unresolved IDP issues as risks, but ranked them lower than the other threats. The Trans Nzoia group looked at displacement not only as a result of its high risk hazards, but also as a high risk hazard in and of itself, given all the negative implications of forced displacement,