On Visserâ•Žs Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents
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University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics Volume 24 Issue 1 Article 19 4-2-2018 On Visser’s Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents Lisa Reed The Pennsylvania State University Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl Recommended Citation Reed, Lisa (2018) "On Visser’s Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents," University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics: Vol. 24 : Iss. 1 , Article 19. Available at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl/vol24/iss1/19 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl/vol24/iss1/19 For more information, please contact [email protected]. On Visser’s Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents Abstract Landau (2013) and van Urk (2011, 2013) use data involving VisserÕs Generalization to argue that (a) the understood thematic subject of a passive verb is syntactically projected as a weak implicit argument (WIA) and (b) antecedent resolution in obligatory control (OC) structures is determined by the syntactic processes of Agree and predication. This paper further examines sentences involving control and passivization and provides five areas in which improved empirical coverage is achieved under an account that makes the opposing assumptions, namely, that the external argument of a passive is syntactically unprojected (only being interpretatively available via existential binding or meaning postulates, as argued in Parsons (1990), Lasersohn (1993), and Bruening (2013)) and that the reference of PRO is determined post-syntactically, by a Bare Output Condition, as most recently suggested, e.g., in Reed (2014: Ch. 7). 1 This working paper is available in University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics: https://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl/vol24/iss1/19 On Visser’s Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents Lisa Reed* 1 Introduction This paper examines sentences in which control interacts with passivization either in the form of a personal passive, such as the French example in (1), or an impersonal passive, as in (2). (1) Le jeu a été joué [en PRO tirant le levier sur le côté de la machine]. the game has been played while pulling the lever on the side of the machine ‘The (slot) game was played by pulling the lever on the side of the machine.’ Parallel English data first observed in Roeper (1983, 1987) (2) Il a été proposé/décidé [de PRO fonder une nouvelle nation]. it has been proposed/decided of to.found a new nation ‘It was proposed/decided to establish a new nation.’ Parallel English data first observed in Manzini (1983:427) Landau (2013) and van Urk (2013) argue that these types of sentences support their two hy- potheses in (3a-b), namely, that the understood subject of a passive verb is syntactically projected as a weak implicit argument (WIA), and that the reference of PRO in contexts of obligatory con- trol (OC) is primarily determined by Agree and predication. (3) a. The understood thematic subject of a passive verb is syntactically projected, as originally suggested in Government-Binding (GB) terms in Roberts (1987), but, more recently, in Minimalist terms in Landau (2010, 2013) and van Urk (2011, 2013). b. The referent of obligatorily controlled PRO (PROOC) is primarily determined by the computational system, as originally proposed in transformational terms in Rosenbaum (1967) and more recently, in Minimalist terms, in Landau (2010) and van Urk (2013). In this paper, I will use the same types of data to argue in favor of the opposing views in (4a- b), namely, that the understood subject of a passive verb is not syntactically projected and that the reference of PRO is determined at Logical Form (LF) by a Bare Output Condition (BOC). (4) a. The understood thematic subject of a passive verb is syntactically implicit, as originally argued in GB terms in Williams (1985, 1987), Chomsky (1986), Rizzi (1986), Brody & Manzini (1987), Roeper (1987), and others, and, in Minimalist terms, in Bruening (2013). b. The referent of PRO is determined at the syntax-semantics interface by some version of a Theory of Control, as originally suggested in transformational terms in Chomsky & Lasnik (1977), and, in Minimalist terms, in Reed (2014). The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines key aspects of the theories of control and passivization assumed by Landau, van Urk, and myself, the goal not being to exhaustively compare and contrast the two approaches, but rather to make it clear where we are in agreement and where we are not. Section 3 then examines five areas in which these two theories make oppos- ing empirical predictions. Section 4 provides a very brief summary of the findings. 2 Points of Agreement and Contention The analyses of control developed in Landau (2010, 2013), van Urk (2011, 2013), and Reed (2014) *I wish to thank Marc Authier, Benjamin Bruening, and the audience at the 41st Annual Penn Linguistics Conference for helpful comments, suggestions, and native speaker judgments. Sincere thanks as well to Ava Irani and Milena Šereikaitė for publishing this work online. All remaining errors and omissions are my own. U. Penn Working Papers in Linguistics, Volume 24.1, 2018 160 LISA REED share a number of features that make these theories much more similar to each other than they are to alternative movement or implicit argument approaches to control. More specifically, we agree on each of the three points summarized in (5). Given space constraints, the focus in this section will be on just the second and third hypotheses. Namely, (5b) makes it clear that we share the view that PROOC is the “default,” found in any syntactically transparent context, while non-obligatorily controlled PRO (PRONOC) is attested “Elsewhere.” Importantly, and as is indicated in (6a-b), what constitutes a transparent or an opaque domain does differ under the two theories. While Landau and van Urk assume that an embedded ForceP/CP does not create an opaque domain, I assume that it does. (5) a. PRO is licensed by specific bundles of features (Chomsky & Lasnik 1995). Landau (2000, 2013) and van Urk (2013): PRO is licensed by any T that is not associated with interpretable [+T, + Agr] fea- tures. Reed (2014: Ch. 6): Following Bowers (2002), PRO is licensed only if there are no functional heads with unvalued phi-features that would have to undergo Agree with an inherently phi- associated nominal (which PRO is not). b. The computational system determines the relative distribution of obligatory and non-obligatory readings of PRO (Chomsky 1980: 33). Landau (2013), Reed (2014), and van Urk (2013): PROOC is the “default,” found in syntactically transparent contexts. PRONOC is attested “Elsewhere,” i.e., in syntactically opaque contexts or in structur- ally ambiguous contexts in which the OC derivation results in semantic anomaly. c. The reference of PRONOC is determined by pragmatic factors that include logo- phoricity (Williams 1992), topicality (Bresnan 1982), and genericity (Postal 1970). (6) Contrasting Views of Syntactic Opacity: The Status of ForceP Landau (2013) & van Urk (2013): NOC readings only arise whenever predication and Agree are either both structurally blocked or when their operation results in semantic anomaly. I.e., ForceP does not create an opaque domain for predication or Agree. Reed (2014): The Bare Output Condition (BOC) in (7) determines the antecedent of PROOC. I.e., ForceP does create an opaque domain. (7) By default, PRO must take as its antecedent a c-commanding implicit or explicit argument within the superordinate clausal domain that immediately dominates the clause in which it appears, with lexical specifications ruling out potential antecedents and ForceP constituting a phase that “closes off” the search space. If there are no c-commanding potential anteced- ents or the search space is closed off by ForceP, PRO is assigned the index arb and its phi- feature specifications are logophorically determined. Reed (2014:302) It is important to bear in mind that Landau and van Urk are firmly committed to the view that control complement clauses uniformly take the form of ForceP (formerly, CP).1 For one thing, this is what allows them to accommodate Partial Control (PC) in examples like (8a). Namely, the head of ForceP, which is unspecified for number, “mediates” the control relation and this is what allows PRO to differ in semantic number from its controller.2 As will be made clear in Section 3.4, indi- rect questions further entail this assumption under their system. 1 In more recent work, Landau (2015) modifies this assumption slightly, analyzing Exhausative Control in terms of FinP complementation coupled with predication and Partial Control in terms of ForceP/CP comple- mentation and binding. Although I will not explore this more recent version of Landau’s theory here, the criticisms advanced in this paper appear to apply equally to it. 2 For critical discussion of this and other approaches to Partial Control, see Authier & Reed (to appear). ON VISSER’S EFFECTS, CONTROL, AND WEAK IMPLICIT AGENTS 0 0 (8) a. Professor Smithi T wants [ForceP Force [ PROi+ to [(PRO) meet after class]]]. |______| |_____________| |__________||____| Agree Agree Agree Agree Landau (2004:848) b. *Professor Smith met after class. As indicated above, I adopt the opposite view that ForceP complementation correlates with NOC or, put differently, that FinP complementation results in OC. In other words, I associate (8a) with the FinP complement structure in (9) and account for PC in the terms suggested in Jackendoff & Culicover (2003). Namely, the semantic anomaly of sentences like (9) allows for conventional- ized coercion of a group argument into the argument structure of PC verbs like want. It is this im- plicit argument that serves as the antecedent of PRO. (9) Professor Smith wants [FinP [TP to [vP PRO meet after class]]]. Two final theoretical points warrant discussion before concluding this section.