EJT0010.1177/1354066114541879European Journal of International RelationsBayram research-article5418792014

E IR Article J

European Journal of International Relations What drives modern 2015, Vol. 21(2) 451­–479 © The Author(s) 2014 ? Individual values and Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav cosmopolitan allegiance DOI: 10.1177/1354066114541879 ejt.sagepub.com

A. Burcu Bayram The University of Texas at Arlington, USA

Abstract Why do some individuals see themselves as world citizens? A significant number of individuals around the world view themselves as world citizens. This is a curious phenomenon that merits attention. Yet despite a growing body of work on cosmopolitanism, the literature lacks a clear explanation of what moves individuals to see themselves as citizens of the world. This article explicates the psychological underpinnings of cosmopolitan allegiance by bringing in personal values. Multinomial logistic regression analysis using World Values Survey data (2005–2008) shows that -transcendence, self-enhancement (except power), and openness-to-change values as defined by the Schwartz Value Theory lead to cosmopolitan allegiance, while conservation values hinder this attachment. This finding indicates that world citizenship on the ground is a multifaceted role attractive to individuals with varied outlooks on life. In people’s perceptions, world citizenship is congruent with morality, diversity, and as well as with self-interest. By offering a psychological account of cosmopolitan allegiance, this study adds the missing micro-foundations to macro theories of cosmopolitanism and provides the needed empirical evidence. By illuminating what drives contemporary world citizens, this research contributes to a richer understanding of the bottom-up cosmopolitanism crucial for democratic and efficacious global governance.

Keywords Cosmopolitan allegiance, cosmopolitan, personal values, Schwartz Value Theory, world citizenship, World Values Survey

Corresponding author: A. Burcu Bayram, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, The University of Texas at Arlington, 601. S. Nedderman Drive, 206 University Hall, Arlington, TX, 76019, USA. Email: [email protected] 452 European Journal of International Relations 21(2)

Introduction Why do some individuals view themselves as citizens of the world? According to the 2005–2008 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) carried out in 57 countries across the world, over 30% of the 65,269 respondents strongly identify as world citizens. This is an important phenomenon that merits attention. The term ‘cosmopolitan’ derives from the Greek word kosmopolitês, meaning citizen of the world (Miller, 2010). When asked where he was from, Diogenes the Cynic responded that he was ‘a citizen of the world.’ World citizenship anchors the very project of cosmopolitanism. Moral, legal, and politi- cal commitments of cosmopolitanism are tied to this very allegiance. Thus, it is crucial to analyze what drives the current generation of Diogenes. Yet despite a growing body of work on cosmopolitanism, the literature lacks a clear explanation of what moves individuals to see themselves as world citizens. Partly responsible for this lacuna is the normative and abstract nature of the cosmopolitanism scholarship. Theoretical works have examined the moral principles of cosmopolitan- ism (Dallmayr, 2003; Nussbaum, 1996; Waldron, 2010), the possibility of cosmopoli- tan justice (Beitz, 2005; Caney, 2008; O’Neill, 2000), and the compatibility between cosmopolitanism and nationalism (Bowden, 2003; Nussbaum, 1996; Rorty, 1994).1 Different aspects of cosmopolitan democracy have also been explored (Archibugi, 2004; Cochran, 2002; Franceschet, 2000; Held, 1999; Koenig-Archibugi, 2011). Yet scholars have paid insufficient attention to what makes individuals identify as world citizens in practice. Only a handful of empirical studies have analyzed cosmopolitanism at the individual level. Scholars have examined the correlates of a general cosmopolitan orientation (Norris, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2009), transnational identities (Jung, 2008; Pichler, 2012), and cosmopolitan support for international (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). In the field of International Relations (IR), studies on foreign policy dispositions have established that cooperative internationalism marked by a cosmopolitan sense of obligation toward the wider international community is an important dimension structuring mass and elite atti- tudes toward international (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995; Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Nincic and Ramos, 2010; Rathbun, 2007; Wittkopf, 1990). Despite important progress, however, a satisfying account of what drives individuals to see themselves as world citizens still eludes us. Cosmopolitan allegiance and a series of cosmopolitan orientations such as positive feelings toward immigrants and a weak sense of nationalism are often lumped together (Norris, 2000; Schueth and O’Loughlin, 2008). Scholars have argued that younger people are more likely to be cosmopolitan (Jung, 2008; Norris, 2000). Although important, by itself, age does not fully explain why individuals identify as world citizens in the first place. IR scholars have examined how a cosmopolitan posture informs individuals’ foreign policy preferences, yet little has been done to uncover the origins of this posture. In sum, our understanding of cosmopolitan allegiance remains limited. This is a critical void for three main reasons. Cosmopolitan allegiance taps a ’s self-view as a world citizen. This is a voluntary attachment. Unlike socially ascribed ones, this attachment implies a choice (Huddy, 2001; Thoits, 2003). What underlies this self-understanding is not immediately obvious. The world community is ill-suited to Bayram 453 offering feelings of stability, security, or positive distinctiveness, factors found to drive psychological group membership (Brewer, 1991; Castano et al., 2002; Hogg and Abrams, 1993). Therefore, the question of cosmopolitan allegiance begs an answer. Second, world citizenship implicates important political and normative debates about the global order. It is well known that identity generates mass support for political sys- tems. The cosmopolitan order is no exception. A democratic and efficacious cosmopoli- tan order requires some sense of world citizenship at the mass level (Calhoun, 2007; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Kuper, 2004; Urbinati, 2003). Empirical evidence supports this intuition. IR scholars have found that a cosmopolitan foreign policy orientation increases support for peaceful conflict resolution, multilateral diplomacy, and international institu- tions (Chittick et al., 1995; Herrmann and Keller, 2004; Herrmann et al., 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Nincic and Ramos, 2010). Since cosmopolitan allegiance constitutes the backbone of bottom-up cosmopolitanism, understanding the origins of people’s sense of world citizenship is crucial. The third and final consideration is a normative one. The individual is the chief unit of moral concern in the cosmopolitan project (Brown and Held, 2010b; Pogge, 1992). For a richer account of cosmopolitanism, it should also be the main unit of theoretical and empirical analysis. Those aware of the importance of this matter have urged scholars to investigate the ‘cosmopolitan condition of real people’ (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 9). This research takes on this task. In this article, I analyze the psychological of cosmopolitan allegiance by bring- ing in individual values. Macro theories of cosmopolitanism routinely rely on micro- assumptions about world citizens. In particular, existing approaches characterize world citizenship as the manifestation of specific motives. World citizens are other- regarding humanitarians in normative accounts (Brown and Held, 2010b; Nussbaum, 1996), self-interested elites in critical economic models (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2000), open-minded multiculturalists in cultural ones (Hannerz, 1990; Skrbis Kendall and Woodward, 2004), and -seeking free agents according to liberal perspectives (Bohman, 2007; Delanty, 2006).2 Uncovering the psychological dynamics of cosmopoli- tan allegiance, therefore, requires tapping into individuals’ core motives. Values offer one viable means of exploring human motivation. Values are cognitive representations of trans-situational motivational goals that function as reference points for individuals (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). The distinctiveness of values is that they operate at a higher and general level of cognition, are stable across different situations, and serve as evaluative standards. As Rohan (2000: 258) explains, a value is a higher- order ‘meaning-producing cognitive structure.’ Therefore, values are analytically prior to attitudes, preferences, and roles, and thus inform the latter (Feldman, 2003; Roccas et al., 2002; Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992). Specifically, as guiding principles in people’s lives, values influence which roles people find appealing. Individuals take on attachments that are congruent with their value priorities (Feather, 1994; Hitlin, 2003, 2007). To illuminate the psychological underpinnings of cosmopolitan allegiance, I apply the theory of personal values identified by Shalom Schwartz and derive testable hypotheses. Schwartz’s theory is considered to be the most systematic theory of individual values (Feldman, 2003; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). The structure of values theo- rized by Schwartz has been supported by a myriad of empirical tests in more than 300 454 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) empirical samples over the last few decades.3 Employing the Schwartz Value Theory (SVT) allows me to start with a strong theoretical foundation of values and examine the effect of different values on cosmopolitan allegiance within a single analytical frame- work (Roccas, Schwartz and Amit, 2010). Schwartz identifies 10 motivationally distinct values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2012; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004). Rooted in human needs, each value expresses a set of desirable motivational goals. The theory posits two main value conflicts pertaining to competing individual needs. Self-transcendence values, which include universalism and benevolence, stand in opposition to self-enhancement values, which include achievement and power. Conservation values composed of , tradition, and security stand against openness-to-change values composed of stimulation and self-direction (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). lies between self-enhancement and openness to change. Multinomial logistic regression analysis using WVS data (2005–2008) shows that self-transcendence, self-enhancement (except power), and openness-to-change values lead to cosmopolitan allegiance, while conservation values hinder this attachment. This finding indicates that world citizenship on the ground is a rich, multifaceted role attrac- tive to individuals with varied outlooks on life. In people’s perceptions, world citizenship is congruent with morality, diversity, and liberty as well as with self-interest. Cosmopolitan identifiers care about themselves and about others, and they endorse diversity. Yet, they resist the subordination of the individual to societal hierarchies and conventions, and the suppression of independent and action. The compatibility of world citizenship with egocentric motivational goals at the mass level indicates that the pessimism about individuals’ ability to be cosmopolitan may be misplaced. The emphasis that publics place on openness values suggests that freedom and diversity are critical components of legitimate global governance. By offering a psychological account of cosmopolitan allegiance, this study adds the missing micro-foundations to macro theories of cosmopolitanism and provides the needed empirical evidence to substantiate their claims. By illuminating what drives mod- ern world citizens, this research contributes to a richer understanding of the bottom-up cosmopolitanism crucial for global governance. In the sections that follow, I conceptualize cosmopolitan allegiance and explain why it makes sense to ground it in personal values. I then apply the SVT and derive testable hypotheses about how individual values affect world citizenship. The third section dis- cusses my findings. I conclude by summarizing the results and laying out their broader implications.

Cosmopolitan allegiance and values Cosmopolitan allegiance, as I employ it here, refers to an individual’s understanding of him-or herself as a citizen of the world (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).4 It taps a person’s self-view anchored in a sense of membership in the world as a collectivity (McCall and Simmons, 1996; Owens et al., 2010; Stryker, 1980; Tajfel, 1981). World citizenship is an acquired attachment that individuals voluntarily adopt. It could not be assigned. What underpins this attachment is self-categorization. To explain why people Bayram 455 see themselves as world citizens, accordingly, we need to examine the factors that lead to this self-categorization. Conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism abound (Archibugi, 2003; Brown, 2009; Brown and Held, 2010a; Fine, 2003; Heater, 2002; Kleingeld, 1999; Lu, 2000; Scheffler, 1999; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002a; Waldron, 2010). As a result, there is a lot of theoreti- cal discussion about what it means to be a world citizen. If we survey the literature with an analytical eye, however, we can identify four main ways to understand cosmopolitan motivation at the individual level. I categorize these as normative, economic, cultural, and liberal models. While each perspective is rich and not mutually exclusive with the others, stripped to its very core, each anchors world citizenship in a particular dominant motive. This taxonomy is, of course, a simplification, but it has analytical value. It approximates the four ideal-type images of world citizens prevalent in the literature (Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Delanty, 2006, 2012; Kleingeld and Brown, 2013; Nowicka and Rovisco, 2009; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002a). As such, this framework enables us to systematically study cosmopolitan motivation in practice. Normative accounts associate world citizenship with the desire to protect and advance the well-being of others. World citizenship is marked by a moral commitment to the welfare of all human beings, regardless of their race, ethnicity, gender, or nationality (Brown and Held, 2010b; Nussbaum, 1996; Pogge, 1992). It represents a sense of obliga- tion toward global compatriots. According to the universal moral logic of normative approaches, world citizens are other-regarding humanitarians. Conversely, critics see world citizens as the new economic elites. Scholars have argued that the globalized world economy has created a class of world citizens who are privileged elites, typically, business executives, pursuing success and wealth. Instead of contributing to global prosperity and justice as some economic cosmopolitans from to Milton Friedman had hoped (Kleingeld, 2012), the skeptical model pos- its that globalization and the liberalization of markets have primarily served the interests of ‘cosmocrats’ (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2000; see also Furia, 2005).5 Cosmocrats represent a global elite motivated by egoistic materialistic goals. They reap the benefits of free trade for self-aggrandizement (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2000). They have global experiences but no global moral or egalitarian aims. Unlike those striving for international financial justice, cosmocrats enjoy ‘the universalism of social and material self-interest that allows for the easy embrace of a consumerist cosmopoli- tanism’ (Cronin, 2006: 11). Thus, world citizenship looks very much like the ‘class con- sciousness of frequent travelers’ (Calhoun, 2002: 86). The cultural perspective sees world citizenship as the expression of pluralism and tolerance (Delanty, 2006; Hannerz, 1990; Skrbis et al., 2004; Waldron, 2010). Ulf Hannerz’s (1990: 239) frequently evoked view summarizes the essence of the cultural perspective: ‘cosmopolitanism in a stricter sense includes a stance towards diversity itself … [it] is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other.’ According to the cultural perspective, interlocking social networks (Castells, 1996; Cheah and Robbins, 1998), social mobility (Urry, 2000), hybrid cultures (Appiah, 2005), and allegiances (Benhabib, 2004) lie at the heart of transnational politics. Being a cosmopolitan therefore represents ‘two related abilities’: the ability to position oneself outside of one’s established territorial and cultural space and the ability to embrace new 456 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) traditions (Held, quoted in Cronin, 2006: 11). From this point of view, world citizens are global multiculturalists. Finally, the liberal perspective associates world citizenship with a search for inde- pendence (Bohman, 2007; Delanty, 2006; Nussbaum, 1996). Citizens of the world seek freedom from societal orthodoxies. Partly shaped by the assumption that individuals realize ‘the good life’ when they are free from interference (Bowden, 2003), this perspec- tive particularly relates world citizenship to opposition to the nation- and territorial politics. World citizens embrace liberty in a quest for new identities, experiences, and ways of life rather than conforming to imposed local attachments and obligations (Appiah, 1996; Delanty, 2006). They aspire to free agency.6 Each of these approaches characterizes world citizenship as the manifestation of spe- cific motives that map onto human values. To unpack these motives, I bring in values, translating these macro-assumptions about world citizenship into testable hypotheses. Philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have devoted a great deal of attention to values since the 20th century (Feldman, 2003; Rohan, 2000). Values constitute cognitive representations of context-independent goals (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). For Rokeach (1973: 5), a value ‘is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or an end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.’ A value system reflects ‘an enduring organization’ of these enduring beliefs (Rokeach, 1973: 5). According to Schwartz (1992: 4): ‘values 1) are concepts or beliefs, 2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, 3) transcend specific situations, 4) guide selection or of behav- ior and events, and 5) are ordered by their relative importance.’ Drawing upon the insights of scholars who have explored the nexus between values and identities, in particular, the works of Roccas, Schwartz and Amit (2010), Feather (1994), and Hitlin (2003), I argue that individuals identify as world citizens when they see congruence between this self-understanding and their values. They do so because a value-congruent view of the self provides a channel for the realization of the trans-situ- ational goals embedded in their values (Roccas et al., 2010). Self-view enables indi- viduals to stay true to the principles guiding their lives. It also satisfies the need to cognitively represent and express one’s values (Roccas et al., 2002). Stated simply, a value-congruent self-understanding allows people to live their values. A key mechanism underlying the human desire for congruence is self-verification (Swann et al., 2002). Individuals are motivated to verify their personhood and are thus attracted to different channels of validation, ranging from seeking self-consistent informa- tion (Robinson and Smith-Lovin, 1992) to choosing group memberships that validate their self-concept (Chen et al., 2004). A value-congruent attachment, therefore, evokes a sense of being true to oneself, and, as a result, enables individuals to verify their sense of who they are (Burke and Stets, 2009; Hitlin, 2007). Erickson (1995) refers to this phe- nomenon as ‘authenticity.’ The effect of values on identities has not gone unnoticed. Brewer and Roccas (2001: 225), for example, argue that the social self is shaped by the relative importance indi- viduals place on and values. Roccas et al. (2010) argue that values explain why some people are more likely to identify with the nation. Their results show that national attachment is positively associated with conservation values and Bayram 457

Figure 1. An overview of the Schwartz theory of values. Source: Schwartz (2012). negatively with openness-to-change values. Similarly, Hitlin (2007) demonstrates a relationship between values and volunteer identity, and Cleveland, Erdogan, Arikan et al. (2011) find a connection between values and cosmopolitan consumer traits.7 In the next section, I turn to Schwartz’s theory to explain how different values might relate to cosmopolitan allegiance.

Applying the SVT Schwartz and his colleagues have identified 10 values, each expressing a specific moti- vational goal (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2012; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004). The SVT posits that personal values form a circular structure marked by two conflicts, as captured in Figure 1. Self-transcendence values comprised of universalism and benevolence represent soci- otropic and humanistic concerns for others. These values rival self-enhancement values of achievement and power. Instead of concern for others, self-enhancement values emphasize promoting the interests of one’s self. The second conflict is between a prefer- ence for order and the status quo and a desire for change. Conformity, tradition, and security, namely, conservation values, stand in opposition to stimulation and self-direction, which make up openness-to-change values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2012). Hedonism, meanwhile, has mixed characteristics that are associated with both self-enhancement and openness to change. Values adjacent to each other tap parallel motives, and are thus 458 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) compatible with each other. Values located in opposite domains of the value circle tap divergent motives, and could conflict with one another. For example, tradition and con- formity emphasize deference to rules and submission to dominant ways of life. These values are compatible with each other. However, they clash with self-direction and stim- ulation values centered on freedom, creativity, and change. How, then, might personal values affect cosmopolitan allegiance?8 Self- transcendence values emphasize going beyond self-interest. Universalism is character- ized by other-regard and promoting the welfare of others. Benevolence is similar but bounded in scope. It represents care for the welfare of those closer to the self. Individuals who hold these values in high regard place emphasis on understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and care about the prosperity of other people. Commitment to these objectives, then, drives them to seek , equality, peace, environmen- tal conservation, friendship, forgiveness, and honesty. If the normative model of world citizenship is correct, universalism should move individuals to take on world citizen- ship. Since concern for the welfare of others is what defines the world citizen, those who score high on universalism should be highly attracted to world citizenship as an outlet to express and realize their values. Because benevolence emphasizes care for people in one’s closest network, I expect benevolence to exert a smaller effect on cos- mopolitan allegiance than universalism. Conversely, if the economic model of world citizenship is correct, self-enhancement rather than self-transcendence values be congruent with world citizenship. People who value achievement and power care about personal success and competence, status, and prestige, and seek to dominate and control others. Hedonists are focused on pleasure and gratification. Self-enhancers take pride in being successful, pursue wealth and social recognition, and appreciate enjoying life. If world citizenship is the brotherhood of trans- national capitalists motivated by self-regard, those who place emphasis on achievement, power, and hedonism will have reason to see themselves as citizens of the world. Thus, two hypotheses follow:

H1: The stronger self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence), the more likely cosmopolitan allegiance. H2: The stronger self-enhancement values (achievement, power, and hedonism), the more likely cosmopolitan allegiance.

Conservation values of tradition, conformity, and security stress individual restraint and conformity to convention, and mark a preference for order. Those who attribute impor- tance to these values prioritize the status quo over change, defer to social rules, and cen- sor their words and actions. They prefer impulse control, obedience, and discipline as well as care about security (security of the self, family, and the nation). Conformists honor the customs and norms that limit individual freedom for order. Traditionalists appreciate conventions and modesty. Those focused on security prioritize order. According to the liberal argument, the search for freedom and autonomy motivates world citizens. If so, conservation values should negatively relate to cosmopolitan allegiance. To the extent that world citizens are free agents, people who score high on conservation values will see a discrepancy between this role and their principles. Bayram 459

In contrast, openness-to-change values of self-direction and stimulation, should lead to cosmopolitan allegiance. Openness values feature intellectual and behavioral dyna- mism. Self-direction underscores independent thought and action; stimulation stresses diversity and novelty. Those who emphasize self-direction are curious, creative, and self- governing. Those who place importance on stimulation are attracted to novel experi- ences and discovery, and driven toward an exciting life. If the liberal account of world citizenship is correct, openness-to-change values should positively relate to cosmopoli- tan attachment. Individuals who prioritize openness will derive subjective utility from categorizing themselves as world citizens. In the same vein, if the cultural model of world citizenship is accurate, we should see a positive relationship between openness-to- change values and cosmopolitan allegiance. If being a citizen of the world involves a desire to engage people from different cultures, those who place emphasis on an exciting and diverse life, creativity, and change will be likely to accept world citizenship as self- descriptive. Therefore:

H3: The stronger conservation values (tradition, conformity, and security), the less likely cosmopolitan allegiance. H4: The stronger openness-to-change values (stimulation and self-direction), the more likely cosmopolitan allegiance.

Data, method, and variables I use data from the 2005–2008 wave of the WVS.9 This wave included measures of the Schwartz values for the first time. My unit of empirical analysis is the survey respondent. I estimate three models. The first two are additive models that analyze the discrete effects of values on cosmopolitan allegiance. The third examines how a set of core values jointly affects world citizenship. Schwartz (2009) urges scholars not to use all 10 of the value variables in a single model. Proximate values are theoretically expected to be highly cor- related with each other. Including strongly correlated values in a single model is not advisable because one cannot clearly differentiate the effect of one value on the outcome of interest from that of cognate values.10 Accordingly, the first two models focus on how values on the opposite domains of the Schwarz value circle influence cosmopolitan alle- giance. The first includes self-transcendence and self-enhancement values, and the sec- ond includes conservation and openness-to-change values.11 The third model investigates how universalism, benevolence, hedonism, achievement, stimulation, self-direction, and tradition values jointly shape cosmopolitanism.

Dependent variable The dependent variable is cosmopolitan allegiance. Participants were asked about how much they agree with the statement ‘I see myself as a citizen of the world.’ Response categories included ‘Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, or Strongly disagree.’ Cosmopolitan Allegiance is a four-category measure ranging from 4 (Strongly agree) to 1 (Strongly disagree). The response categories of the dependent variable are sequentially ordered from the lowest to the highest.12 This means that the ‘Strongly agree’ answer indicates a firmer 460 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) commitment to world citizenship than the ‘Agree’ one. When the categories of the dependent variable are ranked in this manner, an ordered logistic model (OLM) is the ideal method of estimation. It estimates the probability of a respondent being in one cat- egory versus a comparison category. However, this approach assumes that the distance between each category is equal; this is called the proportional odds assumption (Long and Freese, 2006). This assumption is often violated in practice. When this happens, a sensible alternative is to estimate a multinomial logit model (MLM). This model simi- larly predicts the likelihood of a respondent being in one category versus a baseline cat- egory but does not presume that the distance between each category is equal. Since the proportional odds assumption is violated, I estimate MLMs.13 The cosmopolitan allegiance measure has a number of advantages. First, it is clearly detached from the value variables used to predict the likelihood of cosmopolitan attach- ment, guarding against circular reasoning. Second, the world citizenship question does not force people to compare their sense of belonging to the world to that of belonging to the nation, region, or local community. Neither does the question force respondents to rank-order their attachments. This measurement is desirable because identities can be cross-cutting or nested (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Klandermans et al., 2004). Indeed, sev- eral theoretical studies of cosmopolitanism have long portrayed identities as ‘concentric circles’ (Brown, 2009; Tan, 2004; Waldron, 1992; see also Cicero, 1991). Third, the question lets the respondent interpret world citizenship for him-or herself, allowing for a pluralistic understanding of world citizenship. This is well-suited for cross-cultural analysis as individuals from different countries could attach different, albeit related, meanings to world citizenship. This is why the world citizen item is a com- monly used measure in the literature. Existing studies have consistently employed this measure or its variants offered by the WVS, and, on balance, results across different studies are consistent (Jung, 2008; Norris, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2009; Pichler, 2012). Finally, the cosmopolitan allegiance measure captures a respondent’s self-view as a world citizen. As such, it is removed from cosmopolitan policy preferences and attitudes. This has analytical merit. We do not have sufficient conclusive evidence to establish which policy orientations are part of a cosmopolitan self-understanding. For example, if one decides by theoretical fiat that such postures as positive feelings toward immigrants, support for international institutions, or care about the environment are dimensions of cosmopolitan allegiance, the concept becomes intertwined with preferences, making it impossible to explain why people choose this role for themselves in the first place. Further, this practice inhibits discerning the effect of cosmopolitan allegiance on policy orientations. A self-view-centered approach addresses these problems. Empirical analy- ses based on this approach promise to inspire richer and more refined theories of cosmo- politanism, thereby providing leverage to normative theorists.

Independent variables Value variables. The survey instrument included measures of each of the values identified by the SVT. Respondents were given a series of descriptions and asked to indicate how much the person portrayed in a description resembled them. Responses were measured Bayram 461 on a five-point scale ranging from ‘Very much like me’ (coded 5), ‘Like me,’ ‘Somewhat like me,’ ‘Not like me,’ or ‘Not at all like me’ (coded 1). ‘It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being’ evaluated Benevolence, and ‘Look- ing after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature’ tapped Univer- salism. Benevolence and universalism together captured self-transcendence. Self-direction and Stimulation, which made up openness-to-change values, were meas- ured by, respectively, ‘It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way’ and ‘Adventure and taking risks are important to this per- son; to have an exciting life.’ Three questions measured conservation values: ‘Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be danger- ous’ measured Security; ‘It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong’ captured Conformity; and ‘Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family’ measured Tradition. Conformity, security, and tradition together represented conserva- tion values. Finally, Power, Hedonism, and Achievement describing self-enhancement values were measured by the following items, respectively: ‘It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things’; ‘It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself’; and ‘Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s achievements.’

Control variables. Existing studies suggest that younger people are more likely to have supranational identities such as world citizenship or European identity. The backdrop of this claim is globalization. Living in a globalized world, it is argued, has enabled younger generations to immerse themselves in the world community, leading them to form supra- national identities. Scholars disagree whether age-related differences are caused by gen- erational (Norris, 2000) or life-cycle changes (Jung, 2008), but research shows that younger people are more likely to see themselves as world citizens. The variable Age measures a respondent’s age in years. I also take into account generalized trust. Generalized trust is a dispositional quality of individuals that represents the belief that others are largely trustworthy (Hardin, 2006; Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 2002; Yamagishi, 2001). It originates from the conviction that people are moral. As a result, trust leads to expectations of fair and honest exchange and cooperation (Messick and Kramer, 2001). There is reason to suspect that those who believe in the trustworthiness of people see themselves as world citizens, but those who question the integrity of others do not. World citizenship indicates some kind of human connection. This link may be moral, cultural, or even partly instrumental, but, at mini- mum, world citizenship implies some degree of shared category membership with stran- gers. The belief that others can be trusted is likely to be associated with cosmopolitan attachment. Trust is a binary variable coded 1 for ‘Most people can be trusted’ and 0 for ‘Need to be careful.’ Following conventional wisdom, I control for education, gender, income, political orientation, religiosity, and place of residence. It is typically assumed that educated peo- ple are more likely to have a sense of cosmopolitan identity because education enriches one’s worldview. Previous research has also found a positive association between higher levels of education and cosmopolitan orientations (Norris, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 462 European Journal of International Relations 21(2)

2009; Pichler, 2012). The WVS asked respondents to indicate the highest level of educa- tion they have attained; response categories range from ‘No formal education’ to ‘University-level education, with degree.’ The survey instrument also asked participants when they completed their education. Derived from these two questions, Education measures education in years (from 12 or less to 21 or more). Norris (2000) has observed that women have more localized attachments. To tease out the impact of gender on cos- mopolitan attachment, I use the dummy variable Male, coded 1 for males and 0 for females. Higher-income people, it has been argued, may be more likely to hold cosmo- politan orientations (Furia, 2005). Economic models indeed posit that world citizenship appeals to people from higher social classes. Income measures household income in deciles, as reported by participants. We still know little about how political orientation relates to cosmopolitanism. In some studies, individuals on the Right appear more likely to be cosmopolitan identifiers (Pichler, 2012); in others, it is those on the Left (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). Accordingly, there is good reason to further probe the relationship between ideology and cosmopolitanism. Left orientation is a measure based on the ques- tion that asked participants to place themselves on a 10-point scale anchored by Left and Right. Higher scores indicate stronger Left orientation. I also con- trol for religiosity. It is possible that religious individuals identify more with those who belong to the same faith rather than with global fellows. Yet it is also possible that religi- osity prompts a general sense of unity among all human beings, thereby facilitating world citizenship. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would describe themselves as ‘a religious person, not a religious person, or as an atheist’ regardless of whether they attend religious services. Religiosity is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent identified as a religious person and 0 otherwise. It is conceivable that indi- viduals who live in urban locations are more cosmopolitan than those living in rural areas because residents of urban areas have opportunities to interact with diverse groups of people. Thus, I control for the respondent’s place of residence. Urban measures whether an individual lives in a large or a small town. It is coded 1 if the respondent lives in a location that has 10,000 or less residents and 5 if 500,000 or more. Finally, I include dummy variables for continents (North America, Central/South America, Europe, Africa, Australia, and Asia) to get a clear picture of the relationship between values and world citizenship across different geographies.

Results Table 1 presents the percentage of respondents who see themselves as world citizens and those who do not across countries and continents. Overall, about 78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of the world. If we focus only on those who ‘Strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am a citizen of the world,’ we see that about 30% of the respondents see themselves as world citizens. If we focus on those who ‘Agreed’ with the world citizenship statement, we observe that a little over 47% of the participants see themselves as world citizens. About 22% of the respondents do not identify as world citizens. The finding that a large proportion of the respondents in the sample identify as world citizens is empirically intriguing. However, I take a cautious approach. When reporting Bayram 463

Table 1. Percentage of respondents who see themselves as world citizens by countries and continents.

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total 30.29 47.80 16.32 5.58 Continent/country Europe 23.61 43.42 23.43 9.55 Andorra 25.65 61.52 11.32 1.50 Bulgaria 18.32 27.15 32.93 21.59 Cyprus 36.84 37.99 20.77 4.40 Finland 18.48 45.45 28.79 7.27 Germany 16.54 34.20 30.43 18.83 Italy 20.41 41.52 30.05 8.02 Moldova 27.25 37.31 29.12 6.32 Norway 31.29 46.63 15.45 6.63 Poland 22.06 51.50 21.20 5.25 Romania 16.57 37.32 29.67 16.44 Serbia 31.75 46.19 18.25 3.81 Slovenia 18.41 55.84 18.61 7.14 Spain 23.57 55.46 16.43 4.54 Sweden 18.32 66.70 14.07 0.91 Switzerland 33.31 46.68 15.88 4.13 Ukraine 27.61 32.83 25.76 13.80 North America 26.99 52.59 17.29 3.12 Canada 30.97 55.73 11.46 1.85 USA 19.92 47.00 27.68 5.40 Central/South America 30.61 53.24 13.53 2.62 Argentina 16.22 52.11 25.41 6.27 Brazil 26.94 51.65 19.18 2.23 Chile 27.31 45.69 20.15 6.85 Columbia 41.01 55.15 3.10 0.74 Mexico 35.40 55.21 7.31 2.07 Trinidad &Tobago 25.99 48.42 23.34 2.24 Uruguay 18.65 59.98 18.85 2.52 Australia 22.91 57.75 17.89 1.45 Australia 22.91 57.75 17.89 1.45 Asia 29.75 51.83 13.33 5.09 China 13.41 70.70 14.31 1.58 India 36.75 41.31 17.91 4.02 Indonesia 30.83 61.15 6.98 1.04 Iran 29.90 51.73 16.06 2.30 Japan 14.57 79.08 5.64 0.71 Jordan 37.29 35.18 14.69 12.84 Malaysia 41.00 49.08 9.08 0.83 South Korea 15.67 67.75 13.83 2.75 Thailand 32.96 63.19 3.72 0.13 (Continued) 464 European Journal of International Relations 21(2)

Table 1. (Continued)

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Turkey 38.16 46.18 12.07 3.58 Vietnam 34.38 58.73 6.89 0.00 Africa 41.85 42.43 11.57 4.15 Burkina Faso 45.44 40.62 10.90 3.04 Egypt 28.61 28.91 23.68 18.79 Ethiopia 41.53 50.55 6.76 1.16 Ghana 46.30 39.76 12.68 1.27 Mali 61.80 32.77 4.55 0.88 Morocco 16.28 29.94 30.62 23.16 Rwanda 43.08 55.05 1.40 0.47 South Africa 42.25 44.29 10.17 3.28 Zambia 33.26 38.95 22.32 5.47

Note: Table entries represent the percentage of respondents who reported that they ‘Strongly agree,’ ‘Agree,’ ‘Disagree,’ or ‘Strongly disagree’ with the statement ‘I see myself as a citizen of the world.’ The total number of respondents who provided an answer was 65,269. the descriptive statistics in the following section, I only concentrate on the ‘Strongly agree’ answers.14 Filtering out the ‘Agree’ answers under-represents the total proportion of world citizens. Because this strategy guards against misappropriating potentially half- hearted world citizens as cosmopolitans, it should increase our confidence in the results. Cosmopolitan identification varies across continents and countries. About 42% of strong cosmopolitan identifiers live in Africa, 31% in Central and South America, 30% in Asia, 27% in North America, and about 24% and 23% in Europe and Australia, respec- tively. In Africa, Mali has by far the largest percentage, about 62%, of world citizens, whereas Morocco has the lowest, about 16%. In Ghana, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, South Africa, and Ethiopia, about 42% of the respondents identify as world citizens. Zambia and Egypt are on the lower end of the spectrum with 33% and 27%, respectively. In Asia, 41% of the Malaysian participants identify as world citizens. This is the highest on the continent. Percentages in Turkey, Jordan, India, Vietnam, and Thailand range from 38% to 33%. About 30% of the Indonesians and Iranians in the sample see themselves as world citi- zens. In contrast, world citizenship is not widespread in South Korea, Japan, and China. China has by far the smallest proportion of world citizens. In the Australian mainland, about 23% of the respondents are strong cosmopolitan identifiers. In Central and South America, Argentina has the lowest and Columbia has the highest percentages of world citizens, at 16% and 41%, respectively. Uruguay also has a relatively small percentage of cosmopolitans, about 19%. While percentages in Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, and Chile range from 26% to 27%, about 35% of the Mexicans in the sample see themselves as world citizens. In North America, Canada houses a substantially larger number of world citizens than the US. About 31% of the Canadian respondents strongly identify as world citizens, whereas only 20% of the US participants see themselves as cosmopolitans. Bayram 465

In Europe, Cyprus has the highest percentage, at 37%, of cosmopolitan identifiers, while Germany and Romania have the lowest, at around 16.5%. Percentages in Switzerland, Serbia, Norway, Ukraine, and Moldova range from 33% to 27%. In Spain, Poland, and Italy, slightly over 20% of the respondents identify as world citizens. In Finland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Sweden, the proportion of cosmopolitans drops to 18%. Which values drive world citizens across the globe? Table 2 presents the relative risk ratios obtained from three multinomial logistic regression estimations. The first two models analyze the discrete effect of values on the opposite sides of the Schwartz value circle on cosmopolitan allegiance. The third focuses on the joint effect of eight core val- ues. I first report the results from the additive models followed by a discussion of the findings from the joint model. As predicted, self-transcendence values positively relate to cosmopolitan identity (Model 1). Universalism is the main motivator of cosmopolitan attachment. The firmer the commitment to the well-being of all human beings, the stronger the sense of world citizen- ship. Going from the minimum to the maximum of universalism, the predicted probability of strong cosmopolitan attachment more than doubles. Benevolence also positively associ- ates with world citizenship. There is a 19% increase in the likelihood of strong cosmopoli- tan identification as we move from the minimum to the maximum of benevolence values. These two prime findings strongly support the normative model of world citizenship cen- tered on concern for the well-being of human beings. As the importance placed on moral obligations rises, the attractiveness of world citizenship increases. Yet what moves individuals to see themselves as world citizens is not merely other- regard. Self-interest-centered values also drive world citizens. Achievement and hedon- ism values are positively associated with world citizenship (Model 1). Moving from the lowest to the highest scores on achievement and hedonism, the probability that a respond- ent holds a strong commitment to world citizenship increases by 85% and 19%, respec- tively. These results indicate that values that reflect humanitarian and egoistic motivations are both compatible with cosmopolitan allegiance. Individuals who care about the wel- fare of others, as reflected in universalism and benevolence, are drawn to the role of world citizenship, but so are those who care about their personal interests and success, as evinced by achievement and hedonism values. These findings lend credence to both normative and economic understandings of world citizenship. Contrary to expectations, however, power is negatively related to world citizenship (Model 1). People with a strong power orientation are less likely to see themselves as world citizens. This is an important finding. It suggests that world citizens have a distaste for controlling and dominating people, for seeking success at the expense of others. World citizens are interested in personal success, wealth, and pleasure but they self- enhance without distressing others. This suggests that world citizenship attracts people who do not conceive of self-interest in zero-sum terms. As predicted, results show that conservation values negatively relate to cosmopolitan attachment (Model 2). Higher emphasis on tradition, conformity, and security inhibits cosmopolitan identity. For a unit increase in tradition, conformity, and security scores, the odds of strong attachment relative to no attachment decrease by about 15, 6, and 14 percentage points, respectively. For example, going from the minimum value to the max- imum value of security, the predicted probability that a person answers ‘Disagree’ to the 466 European Journal of International Relations 21(2)

1.312**** 1.022 1.036** 1.074* 0.976* 1.094* 0.932* 1.039 1.033 0.993 1.201**** (0.108) (0.077) Disagree (0.017) (0.041) (0.038) (0.013) (0.045) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) 1.792**** 0.925 1.030** 1.247**** 0.940**** 1.189**** 0.930* 1.129**** 1.155**** 1.047* 1.376**** (0.137) (0.065) Agree (0.016) (0.045) (0.035) (0.012) (0.045) (0.374) (0.032) (0.038) (0.32) 1.750**** 1.099 1.027* 1.453**** 0.934**** 1.231**** 0.926** 1.115**** 1.224**** 1.159*** 1.378**** (0.138) (0.080) Model 3 Strongly agree (0.167) (0.055) (0.036) (0.012) (0.049) (0.041) (0.33) (0.040) (0.039) 1.32**** 1.016 0.093* 1.03** 0.972 0.976* 0.9177** 0.991 1.141**** (0.034) (0.110) (0.077) Disagree (0.033) (0.017) (0.033) (0.013) (0.033) (0.034) 1.846**** 0.906 0.910*** 1.031** 0.9337** 0.944**** 0.875**** 1.049* 1.232**** (0.031) (0.142) (0.064) Agree (0.030) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.030) (0.034) 1.79**** 1.09 0.863**** 1.023 0.939* 0.941**** 0.853**** 1.076** 1.182**** (0.030) (0.141) (0.080) Model 2 Strongly agree (0.031) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.035) (0.034) 1.374**** 0.918 1.035* 1.028 1.041 1.028 0.975 1.032**** (0.113) (0.069) Disagree (0.017) (0.977)* (0.041) (0.013) (0.044) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) 1.959**** 0.757**** 1.029* 1.106*** 0.944**** 1.047 1.07*** 0.986 0.966 (0.150) (0.053) Agree (0.016) (0.042) (0.012) (0.041) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) 1.92**** 0.881* 1.027* 1.267**** 0.939**** 1.070* 1.053** 1.079** 0.947* (0.152) (0.063) Model 1 Strongly agree (0.016) (0.050) (0.012) (0.043) (0.027) (0.035) (0.029) Multinomial logistic regression results for the effect of values on cosmopolitan allegiance. Trust Religiosity

Urban Security Table 2. Universalism Left orientation

Benevolence Conformity

Hedonism Tradition

Achievement Self-direction

Power Stimulation Bayram 467 - 0.997 1.051**** 0.982 0.992**** 0.480*** 0.991 1.129 2.26** 0.390**** 0.520**** Disagree (0.011) (0.016) (0.064) (0.002) (0.080) (0.208) (0.219) (0.802) (0.071) (0.104)

0.990 1.106**** 0.931 0.989**** 0.562**** 1.470* 2.270**** 3.546**** 1.060 1.326* Agree (0.010) (0.016) (0.056) (0.002) (0.092) (0.301) (0.431) (1.235) (0.185) (0.255) 1.009 1.083***** 1.019 0.988 0.362**** 0.833 1.379* 1.745* 0.863 1.338* Model 3 Strongly agree (0.001) (0.016) (0.064) (0.002) (0.605) (0.174) (0.265)* (0.616)* (0.153) (0.262) 1862.29**** 24894 −27945.416 0.998 1.049*** 0.962 0.993*** 0.492**** 1.046 1.206 2.35** 0.380**** 0.503**** Disagree (0.011) (0.016) (0.062) (0.002) (0.082) (0.219) (0.232) (0.834) (0.068) (0.101) 0.994 1.10**** 0.898* 0.990**** 0.601*** 1.632** 2.64**** 3.81**** 1.049 1.213 Agree (0.010) (0.016) (0.054) (0.002) (0.098) (0.333) (0.497) (1.32) (0.182) (0.235) 1.017 1.074**** 0.982 0.990**** 0.384**** 0.932 1.61** 1.941* 0.835 1.192 Model 2 Strongly agree (0.11) (0.016) (0.061) (0.002) (0.193) (0.193) (0.307) (0.685) (0.146) (0.232) 1641.06**** 24894 −28089.762 0.999**** 1.058 1.026 0.989**** 0.488**** 1.066 1.145 2.472*** 0.357**** 0.544*** Disagree (0.011) (0.016) (0.066) (0.002) (0.082) (0.224) (0.223) (0.876) (0.065) (0.107) 0.997 1.12**** 1.010 0.984**** 0.570*** 1.623** 2.232**** 4.00**** 0.8925 1.451* Agree (0.010) (0.015) (0.060) (0.002) (0.093) (0.332) (0.423) (1.39) (0.155) (0.276) 1.018* 1.100*** 1.108* 0.982**** 0.366*** 0.925 1.354 1.983 0.706* 1.465* Model 1 Strongly agree (0.011) (0.016) (0.068) (0.002) (0.060) (0.192) (0.260) (0.698) (0.124) (0.281) 1602.69**** 24894 −28120.773

Notes : Table entries represent the relative risk ratios, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Values above 1 indicate a positive relationship and below nega tive relationship. ‘Strongly disagree’ is the reference category. Trust, religiosity, and continent variables are factor variables. Male a dummy variable. Missing values were dummied out. * p ≤ 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01; **** 0.001. Education

Income

Male

Age

Europe

North America

Central/South America

Australia

Asia

Africa

Wald chi2 Number of observations Log pseudo-likelihood Table 2. (Continued) 468 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) world citizenship question increases by about 36%. Similarly, the probability that a respondent answers ‘Agree’ decreases by about 11% when going from the minimum to the maximum of conformity. In the same vein, there is a 26% decrease in the predicted probability of cosmopolitan attachment when going from the lowest to the highest score on tradition values. Stimulation and self-direction values are also associated positively with cosmopolitan identity. The odds of strong attachment as compared to no attachment increase by 18% for a unit increased in stimulation and by about 8% for an increase in self-direction scores. For instance, the probability that a respondent answers ‘Disagree’ declines by about 33% and answers ‘Agree’ rises by 36.7% when going from the minimum to the maximum value of stimulation. Similarly, the probability that someone chooses ‘Disagree’ declines by about 36.5% and the probability that someone chooses ‘Strongly agree’ increases by 37% when going from the lowest to the highest degree of self-direction. These findings support the liberal and cultural models of world citizenship. As the importance placed on conformity, obedience, and order rise, the likelihood of cosmopoli- tan allegiance declines significantly. In contrast, the more a person values freedom, nov- elty, and openness, the more likely he or she is to identify as a world citizen. This implies that world citizens are both free agents and multiculturalists. They cherish independence and diversity alike. The importance of values is clear, but trust also emerges as a critical predictor. The odds of strong cosmopolitan attachment relative to no attachment are 90% and 79% higher for individuals who trust others as opposed to cynics, according to Models 1 and 2, respectively. This is important, if not surprising. Without trust, any kind of tie to stran- gers seems unlikely. What is crucial to note is that even after we take into account the obvious effect of trust, values remain significant drivers of cosmopolitan attachment. On average, demographic and political control variables have smaller effects on world citizenship. Urban residence, education, and income positively relate to cosmopolitan identity across both models. People who live in urban locations, are more educated, and have higher levels of income are driven toward world citizenship. This result is consist- ent with the findings in the existing literature. Individuals who are not religious, lean toward the Right, and are younger are also more likely to be cosmopolitan identifiers according to both models. Results for religiosity and age also echo the findings of earlier works (Norris, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2009). Thus far, findings on the role of ideol- ogy have been inconsistent. My analysis shows that Right political ideology is positively related to world citizenship (Pichler, 2012). The effects of education and gender are unbalanced. In Model 1, the effect of educa- tion is inconsistent across levels of cosmopolitan attachment. In Model 2, the effect of education is not significant across any of the categories of the dependent variable. Norris and Inglehart (2009) found that men are more likely to see themselves as world citizens. Comparing strong attachment to no attachment, this is indeed the case according to Model 1. Yet there is a reversal if we look at Model 2. Comparing medium identification to no identification, women are more likely to see themselves as world citizens. Results show that, in general, participants living in Africa, North America, Central and South America, and Australia are more likely to be cosmopolitan than those living in Europe and Asia. Continent effects across the additive models are largely consistent, and Bayram 469 using country dummies does not significantly change the substantive results. When I split the data by continents and estimate separate models, the value-driven logic of cosmopolitan allegiance is still supported even though certain values become non-significant. In Europe, universalism is the most important factor for explaining cosmopolitan alle- giance. However, stimulation, self-direction, and opposition to tradition also exert large effects on world citizenship. This suggests that the motivational calculus of European world citizens is multidimensional, encompassing morality, diversity, and freedom. In North America, resistance to conformity is the most critical predictor of a cosmopolitan self-view. However, universalism also drives North Americans, indicating that freedom and morality both shape world citizenship in the region. In Asia, cosmopolitan attach- ment is largely shaped by self-transcendence values. In Central and South America, world citizens are primarily motivated by hedonism and achievement values. Mainland Australia seems to be an outlier. Stimulation values are associated with world citizenship but generalized trust exerts a larger effect on cosmopolitanism than values. In Africa, benevolence has the largest effect on cosmopolitan allegiance. The effects of openness and conservation values are in the hypothesized direction. The only exception to this pat- tern is security. In Africa, emphasis on personal and group security is consistent with world citizenship. To summarize, results from Model 1 show that self-transcendence and self-enhance- ment values both motivate world citizens. Findings from Model 2 indicate that openness values contribute to world citizenship but conservation values hinder it. But how do alter- native value orientations jointly relate to cosmopolitan allegiance? Model 3 addresses this question. It includes universalism, benevolence, hedonism, achievement, stimulation, self-direction, and tradition values. This combination of values makes it possible to ana- lyze the motives hypothesized to inspire world citizens while evading the previously dis- cussed problem of including strongly correlated values in a single estimation.15 The far-right column of Table 2 presents the relative risk ratios obtained from the estimation of Model 3. Consistent with the previous findings, universalism, benevolence, hedonism, achievement, stimulation, and self-direction values lead to a sense of world citizenship but tradition values thwart this self-description. The risk that a respondent strongly identifies as a world citizen relative to the baseline category of no identification increases by a factor of 1.453 for a unit change in universalism and by a factor of 1.231 for a unit change in benevolence. These translate to over 100% and 50% increases when going from the minimum to the maximum of the universalism and benevolence scores, respectively. Achievement also has a substantial positive influence on world citizenship. The pre- dicted probability of strong identification rises to over 90% when moving from the mini- mum to the maximum of achievement. Hedonism exerts a smaller but significant effect. The odds of moderate attachment relative to no attachment increase by about 13% for a unit increase in hedonism. This corresponds to a 20% increase in the probability of world citizenship. Replicating earlier findings, stimulation and self-direction values also facili- tate world citizenship. The predicted probability of strong cosmopolitan attachment rises by 38% and 75.5% when moving from the minimum to the maximum of stimulation and self-direction values, respectively. In contrast, the importance placed on tradition 470 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) decreases the likelihood of world citizenship. For instance, the predicted probability of strong identification declines by about 5% when going from the minimum to the maxi- mum of tradition. Consonant with the earlier results, trust and urban residence positively relate to cos- mopolitan attachment, while Left orientation and age relate negatively. Respondents who trust others, live in urban locations, and have higher incomes are more likely to see themselves as world citizens. Similarly, those who are on the Right side of the political spectrum and are younger are more likely to be drawn to world citizenship. The coeffi- cients for religiosity, gender, and education are not significant in Model 3. Findings for continent effects are mainly consistent with those obtained from the pre- vious analysis. On balance, respondents from North America, Central and South America, Australia, and Africa are more likely to be cosmopolitan than those living in Europe and Asia. In Europe, universalism and achievement values have the largest effect on cosmo- politan allegiance compared to other values. Openness values of stimulation and self- direction are also critical motivators. However, hedonism has a negligible influence, and tradition is not statistically significant. In North America, universalism, benevolence, achievement, hedonism, and stimula- tion each move world citizens. In accord with previous findings, in Central and South America, world citizens are primarily motivated by hedonism and achievement. In main- land Australia, stimulation values and trust are the key predictors of cosmopolitan alle- giance. In Asia, universalism, hedonism, and stimulation values have large positive effects, and benevolence and self-direction have smaller positive effects on world citi- zenship. Interestingly, submission to tradition has the largest negative effect on world citizenship in Asia compared to other continents. The more an individual resists social orthodoxies, the more he or she is attracted to world citizenship. In Africa, values most conducive to cosmopolitan allegiance are benevolence and resistance to tradition. While regional differences should be further explored by future research, it is evident that val- ues anchor the psychological underpinnings of world citizenship across cultures. These findings show that cosmopolitan motivation in practice is complex. World citizens are driven by multiple motivations. Sociotropic and egoistic motives, as expressed by self-transcendence and self-enhancement values, and regard for diversity and independence, as expressed by openness values, jointly drive world citizens. Of course, I do not contend that every person with the relevant values will always identify as a world citizen. Rather, my analysis shows that in 57 countries across the globe, people with certain value priorities are more likely to see themselves as world citizens than others.

Conclusion This article offers and tests a value explanation of the psychological underpinnings of world citizenship. I find that self-transcendence, self-enhancement (except power), and openness-to-change values, along with generalized trust, lead to the internalization of world citizenship, while conservation values obstruct this self-categorization. Michael Walzer (1996: 126) famously noted that it is ‘odd’ for the world, the outer- most circle of identity, to be a source of allegiance. The explanation of value-driven Bayram 471 cosmopolitanism sheds light on this word puzzle. To my knowledge, my analysis is a first. Even though normative theorists have long associated cosmopolitan principles with certain values, no study has clarified and empirically tested the micro-motivational assumptions associated with these broad claims. The value analysis offered here contrib- utes to the literature on cosmopolitanism by illuminating people’s world citizenship and providing the missing empirical evidence. This study also helps establish an empirically grounded research agenda on cosmo- politanism. My analysis leads to a better understanding of who world citizens are and what they care about. I find that the normative, economic, cultural, and liberal models on world citizenship are all correct to different degrees. World citizenship is a multifaceted role compatible with varied outlooks on life. Self-transcendence values characterized by other-regard lead to the internalization of world citizenship, but so do self-enhancement values marked by self-regard. Openness-to-change values stressing change and inde- pendent thought and action also induce cosmopolitan identification. What hinders cos- mopolitan attachment are conservation values that call for self-restraint and obedience to authority as well as power values that legitimate dominating and controlling others. These findings indicate that world citizenship in practice is a rich role congruent with multiple motivational goals. Belonging to the world at the mass level encompasses morality, liberty, and diversity, as well as self-interest. My findings have important implications. Humanitarian and egoistic goals are some- times thought to be antithetical to each other. Results cast doubt upon the conventional dichotomy of self- versus other-regard. At the mass level, sociotropic and selfish motives are congruent with world citizenship. World citizenship is not the fellowship of saints, and self-love does not exclude world citizenship. World citizenship appeals to self- transcenders and self-enhancers alike. Only self-enhancers who dominate and control others for personal achievement do not see themselves as cosmopolitans. This finding should encourage the realist critics of cosmopolitanism to revisit their pessimistic assumptions about individuals’ ability to be cosmopolitan and support cosmopolitan politics (Beardsworth, 2010; Deudney, 2007; Zolo, 1997). Similarly, cosmopolitan the- ory will benefit from exploring why humanitarian and selfish motives are both consistent with world citizenship. Second, this study demonstrates that the universal morality of world citizenship is coupled with concern about liberty and diversity in the eyes of publics. In individuals’ minds, world citizenship extends beyond obligations toward global compatriots. It is also associated with independence, change, and diversity, as reflected in openness values. This finding provides critical empirical support for the claim that legitimate global gov- ernance must emphasize freedom and pluralism along with morality (Archibugi, 2008; Archibugi and Held, 1995; Brown, 2009; Franceschet, 2000; Held, 1997; Kaldor, 1999). The results of this study also open up new avenues of research. I find that world citi- zens can be humanitarians, multiculturalists, freedom seekers, and egoists at the same time. This finding should inspire inquiries into types of cosmopolitans. For example, people prioritizing universalism and benevolence values may support more egalitarian forms of cosmopolitanism, while those valuing achievement and hedonism may place less emphasis on equality. Uncovering types of cosmopolitans will enrich normative theories of cosmopolitanism and add to studies on bottom-up cosmopolitanism. 472 European Journal of International Relations 21(2)

My findings should also be of interest to scholars interested in how culture affects individuals’ commitment to world citizenship. For instance, Africa has the highest per- centage of strong cosmopolitan identifiers, whereas Europe has the lowest. It could be that the effect of personal values on world citizenship is smaller when there is a salient regional community, such as Europe. Similarly, individuals in Africa may be more likely to see themselves as world citizens because many of the boundaries in the continent were arbitrarily drawn in the second half of the 20th century. Future studies of public cosmo- politanism should explore these questions. The ideal of world citizenship is hardly new. It has existed for over 2000 years. The pos- sibility of world citizenship, however, became particularly important in the post-Cold War era. This was because, as Thomas Pogge (1992: 48) explained, ‘[t]he human future sud- denly seem[ed] open.’ Even though a number of cosmopolitan principles were enshrined in the post-Second World War international system, cosmopolitanism has gained new signifi- cance in international and politics since the early 1990s (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Cheah, 2006; Held and McGrew, 2002; Linklater, 1998). Today, it is an important dimen- sion of global governance. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the adoption of the first resolution on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the growing political will to democratize international institutions attest to this. Managing complex interdependence and addressing problems of common concern starts with effective institutions and collaboration between state and non-state actors (Held and McGrew, 2002; Nye and Donahue, 2000). Yet it does not end there politically, and normatively, it should not end there. Global governance also requires some sense of world citizenship at the public level, simply because ‘diffuse support’ is necessary for the health of the international system (Easton, 1965). Whether a ‘truly’ communal bond is feasible on a global level is a separate question. However, world citizenship is likely to increase public support for international institutions and inspire individuals to act as members of the world community. While more work is needed to determine how much world citizens support cosmopolitan ideals, the findings reported here could inspire cau- tious optimism. If individuals motivated by self- and other-care, as reflected in self- transcendence and self-enhancement values, both identify as citizens of the world, cosmopolitan politics does not require the arrival of selfless saints. If multiculturalists moved by openness-to-change values see themselves as world citizens, ‘unity in diver- sity’ seems feasible. If conservationism is the main foil of cosmopolitanism, emphasis on individual and in the discourse and practice of global governance could cultivate a sense of world citizenship.

Acknowledgments I thank Thomas Adam, Brian Rathbun, Daniel Sledge, Amy Speier, Matthew Wright, four anonymous EJIR reviewers, and the editors for very helpful comments. I am grateful to Jenna Green for research assistance. Special thanks go to Sevim and Ali Saip Bayram for support through multiple drafts.

Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Bayram 473

Notes 1. The literature on cosmopolitanism is extensive and cannot be cited here in full. For a very useful review, see Lu (2000). 2. As I explain in the following pages, this taxonomy represents the ideal-type images of world citizens. 3. Studies using the Schwartz Value Theory are too many to cite here in full. For example, see: Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) on contact with out-groups; Roccas and Brewer (2002) on social identity complexity; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz et al. (2002) on personality; Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione (2010) on political attitudes; Sagiv, Sverdlik and Schwartz (2011) on social dilemmas; and Feather (2004) on gender attitudes. 4. Even though I conceptualize cosmopolitan allegiance as an attachment rather than a clearly defined social identity, my treatment of cosmopolitan allegiance draws insights from both Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory. For a detailed comparison of these two approaches, see Hogg, Terry, and White (1995) and Stets and Burke (2000). 5. This critical economic cosmopolitanism is different from normative economic accounts focused on the relationship between free markets and global justice, which could partly be subsumed under the normative model. Economic cosmopolitanism is used to capture the criti- cal perspective throughout this article. 6. This emphasis is generally shared by cosmopolitan scholars. 7. In Hurwitz and Peffley’s (1987) model of foreign policy beliefs, a cosmopolitan international- ist attitude is also linked to a set of core values. 8. This discussion draws from various works by Schwartz and colleagues (e.g. Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2012; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987), as well as from Feldman (2003), Rohan (2000), and Hitlin and Piliavin (2004). 9. World Value Survey 2005 official data file. New release version v.20090901. See World Values Survey Association at: www.worldvaluessurvey.org. More information on survey methodology and weighting can be found on the official website of the WVS. 10. This is called multicollinearity. A supplementary technical appendix includes a detailed dis- cussion on this issue. This can be found at www.burcubayram.net 11. The results are robust to alternative combinations of values. I report the findings with alterna- tive combinations of values in a supplementary technical appendix. 12. Also consider this example of an ordinal variable: ‘How was your economic condition in 2013?’ ‘Poor, Good, Very Good, Excellent.’ Contrast this with a nominal variable such as reli- gion, where there is no order across categories of religions (Christian, Jew, Muslim, Buddhist, etc.). 13. X² (38, 24894 ) = 688.48, p < 0.001 for model 1; X² (38, 24894 ) = 765.57, p < 0.001 for model 2; and X² (42, 24894 ) = 806.83, p < 0.001 for model 3. A significant test result indicates vio- lation of the proportional odds assumption. I report the results from an OLM in the technical supplementary appendix. Substantive results do not change. An alternative approach is to estimate a binary logit model. However, collapsing across the categories of the dependent variables results in loss of information. 14. Table 1 reports the percentages for all levels of cosmopolitan allegiance. 15. Power, conformity, and security are excluded.

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Author biography A. Burcu Bayram received her PhD from the Ohio State University in 2011. She is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington in Texas, USA. Her research integrates insights from political and cognitive psychology into the study of international relations.