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Humanistic Network Journal

Issue 9 Article 6

2-1-1994 Mathematics and the : Taking Their Resemblances Seriously Frederick Reiner The Key School

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Recommended Citation Reiner, Frederick (1994) "Mathematics and : Taking Their Resemblances Seriously," Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal: Iss. 9, Article 6. Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj/vol1/iss9/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more , please contact [email protected] Mathematics and the Arts: Taking Their Resemblances Seriously

FrederickReiner The Key School Annapolis, Maryland 21403

[Though] mathematics is often excluded from the arts....such exclusion does not justify denial or neglect of the respects in which litl resembles the arts wedo recognize. - Francis Sparshott [53. pp. 145-146)

The above comment from a poet and philosopher To see this, consider the extent to which the expresse s an attit ude wi th which ma ny dominant mathematical of formalism would probably feel comfortable. concentrates on the rigorou s, analytic structure of From at least the time of Aristotle, writers of theories and results as opposed to the complex, various philosophical stripes have paid tribute to creative and often downright hazy methods by the aesthetic appeal of mathematical studies, and which these results are obtained. In the eyes of today there exists a co nsiderab le body of formalism this is not merely a matter of introspective on the affinities between emphasis-the latter notions are intentionally mathematics and the arts. Certainly the readers of a brushed aside as irrelelvent to the question "What journal devoted to humanistic mathematics should is mathematics?" (see, e.g., [HI ]). Can such an sympathize with any reaffirmation oftheir subject's approach possibly be consistent with the that mathematics fundamentally engages our aesthetic Interests, or that il proceeds in manners akin to For example, if we claim aesthetic those of ? If we truly feel these things about values are inherent to our doing mathematics, why do we cleave to a philosophy mathematics, can we in any way and to practices that deny them? specify what those values are or the Thus what I see Sparshott suggesting is that we role they play in our practice? take our generally unexamined beliefs on this issue and examine them seriously. For example, if we claim aesthetic values are inherent to our doing place among creative human activities.Indeed, to mathematics, can we in any way specify what some Sparshott's remark is surely overcautious: those values are or the role they play in our Isn't mathematics already an art? practice? If we claim mathematics to be an an by virtue of entailing properties X, Y and Z. are we I believe, however, that we should treat prepared to counter the charges that with regard to Sparshott' s comment more as a suggestion than as an itself, X is irrelevent, Y insuffucient or Z another (and actual ly rather weak) tribute to the actually antithetical? Do we know what an is any aesthetic of our subject By virtue of its not more than we know what mathematics is? To assuming mathematics to be an art it encourages us answer questions like these--even just to ask them to speculate on the issue. The results of such intelligently-requires a depth of analysis which speculation may well be fresh insights into the few from either the /art or mathematics nature of mathematics, its role among human sides of the issue have attempted. endeavors, and even the manner in which should proceed. While I make no claim ofattaining such a depth in what follows, I do hope I can indicate something

HMN Journal #9 9 of what is likely to be involved in the attempt, and philosopher of art may well be concerned with where some of the benefits to be obtained by the questions of ontology (What is a work of an? A effon may lie. physical object? A mental state?), epistemology (Is there such a thing as artistic knowledge? What is it Aesthetics. Art and Mathematics knowledge of? Is it somehow veriflable'f) or ethics (Can a work of an be morally neutral? Does its In keeping with a practice all too common among carrying any particular moral value affect its status writers on this issue, I have thus far been using as an?). Th ese are concerns whose connection two different terms-art and aesthetics-in a with aesthetics proper is not entirely clear. dangerou sly synonymous way. It is time for a Conversely, the aesthetician may well be interested distinction. By aesthetics I mean the particular type in our responses to nature or to dreams, or to the of inquiry that Scruton [52, p. 15] characterizes as incidents of our daily lives. One may argue that an the "philosop hic stud y of and ." is broad enough to embrace these notions as well, Similarly, by "aesthetic" I refer either to an attribute but this is certainly something to be demonstrated suc h an inqu iry would study (e.g., aesthetic and not assumed. distance) or to some system that embraces these notions in a particular way (e.g., a or era So wher~ doe s thi s put us with regard to with an aesthetic different from our own). mathematics? Ideally, we might wish to establish a relationship between aesthetics and the philo sophy An, on the other hand, is a trickier notion with of math ematic s analogous to that between which to come to grips. Too complex to take as a aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Problems primitive term, it is one of those concepts-like immediately arise, however. On the one hand, mathematics itselt!-for which we seem to have many of the concepts of aesthetics have developed enough of a sense to use with impunity and still be (even if controversially so) with specific reference to an, and applying these as they now stand to mathematics may be unwarranted. But even more Like the philosopher of art, we are troublesome difficulties arise from the side of the philosophy of mathematics itself, which in this not so interested in developing the century has so estranged itself from aesthetic concepts of beauty and taste per se concerns that prospects for an immediate dialogue as we are in applying these to a seem dim. The two disciplines apparently lack a particular-though very broad­ common language. type of activity, It is here that we might appeal to the philosophy of art. Like the philosopher of an, we are not so interested in developing the concepts of beauty and understood- at le ast among people with taste per se as we are in applying these to a backgrounds similar to our own. Yet a careful particular-though very broad-type of activity. delineation of the concept always seems beyond Similarly, we should be willing to admit that the our grasp. Perhaps we might regard this as good most important aspects ofour subject may well lie enough, but nagging questions of considerable outside the realm of aesthetics. Finally, we can import nevenheless keep arising: Is such-and- such note from the stan that several important concepts a wonhy enough work ofan to merit our attention? in the philosophy of art (e.g., , form, Does its maker merit our support? Should an itself the distinction between pure and applied activities) be publi cally supported? Should it be taught in bear prima facie resemblance with concepts in schools? Can it be taught at all? As might be mathematics. Possibly this is no more than a expected, the closer we get to the "edges" of the superficial coincidence, but again this is a point concept- to education, to ethics, to the boundaries requiring demonstration. (I suspect that in many of "non-art"-the tougher the questions get. instances the coincidence is not superficial.) In Hence arises the philosophy of art. keeping with the sense of Sparshon's suggestion, we should compare mathematics and an before we Although historical precedents for confusion are even consider equating them. We may even find ample, it is almost cenainly mistaken to equate this that such an equation may be the least illuminating laner field with aesthetics [see 54, pp. 15-16]. The of the insights we gain.

10 HMN Journal #9 Essentialist Theories I do not wish to imply that all essentialist theories fit snugly into these categories. Hybrid theories Traditional attempts to formulate of combining elements from each of these also exist. art have largely focused on the que stion of as do theories that strike otTin different. often quite definition-of finding those qualities which sophisticated and radical, directions (see, e.g., uniquelyconstitute the of art. As DeWitt [Til & [D3]). For introductory purposes, Parker stated in an influential article from 1939: however, this (which parallels that of [H5]) should be adequate, and will also serve to The assumption underlying every highlight the parallels between traditional philosophy of art is the existence of some philosophies of an and mathematics. Let us briefly common nature present in all the consider each in turn. arts....There is some... of marks which, if it applies to any work, applies to all works of art, and to nothing else....{This] constitutes the definition ofan. [P2. p. 61] For centuries realistic views had constituted the dominant theories of an, and although these Note that this essentialist approach-that of attitudes have generally fallen from favor, both reducing art to necessary and sufficient and alike continue to beinfluenced conditions-promises a result not unlike those by their appeal. While a broad spectrum ofrealistic formulas for the identity of mathematics (e.g., views are possible, these theories in general "Mathematics is logic". or "Mathematics is the identify art as a system of knowledge with a status study of formal systems") that have arisen in our claim not entirely unlike that of . Most own field. The resemblance is deeper than this, explicitly, Leonardo declared that, "Truly however. The very attempts to specify these is a science, the true born child of nature" and qualities in each subject have themselves paralleled some three centuries later the landscapist Constable each other in remarkable and significant manners. reaffirmed: "Painting is a science, and should be pursued as an inquiry into the laws of Nature." By Although any atte mpt to classify diverse theories these lights (which can be clearly discerned in the runs the risk of oversimplification, I shall deal here works of Aristotle), the reveals to us with three general forms of essentialist arguments. through ab stract representations of its various The first, realism, involves identifying this essence aspects-aspects incapable of such revelation by any means but art. In some variations of the theory, these revelations are actually of a "higher" Leonardo declared that, "Truly plane of reality than mere physical existence. For painting is a science, the true born example, viewed his skeletal child of nature" and some three arrangements of lines and solid colors as presenting ima ges of "true reality and true life," a centuries later the landscapist position more akin to nee-Platonism than the Constable reaffirmed: "Painting is a inductive reali sm of Ari stotle. These views are science, and should be pursued as an linked, however, by a conception of art as inquiry into the laws of Nature." essentially a means of discovering truth. Have attitudes such as these ever been displayed in some relationship between a constructed object toward our mathematical "artifacts," and are they (or "") and a world exterior both to that still likely to exert an influence on us today? To object and its maker. By contrast, expressioni sm both questions the answers are definitely yes. For concentrates on relationships between the artifact centuries Euclidean did not stand as one and a world interior to either its maker, or of a multitude of formal geometric systems but was both. Fin ally, formalism identifies the essence of regarded as representing the Real geometry of Real art strictly in terms of qualities contained within the Space, based on inductively self-evident truths artifact itself-e.g., the lines , colors or shapes in a abstracted from reality and developed through the painting, the arrangem ent of tones in a musical unassailable method ofdeduction. (Writing before composition, etc. , Aristotle accurately observed some of the

HMNJournal #9 II consequences of rejecting the assertion that the sum former it seems to be of practical value to of the angles in any triangle was two right angles. individual mathematicians [see. e.g., TI]; as a He abandoned these conclusions because of their it seems as suspect as Mondrian's "obvious" inability to square with the evidence of supposed ability to envision "true reality." Did art experience. Spherical geometry, of course. had experience its own "non-Euclideanrevolution?" In already developed a long history, but this was Real a sense it did, even if its occurence cannot be as geometry on a Real surfaco--not a of a non­ prec isely specified as that of mathematics. Euclidean system. See [T3J.) True, the insistence (Although the late-18th and early-19th centuries upon logical deduction may appear outwardly to be figure prominently in the revolutions in both fields. difficult to reconcile with an, but I believe this See [AI].) The process in this case involved-at largely arises from simultaneous least in pan-the realization that representation tendencies to downp lay the role of logical itself was neither a necessary nor sufficient development in an and to overplay its role in condition for art. Its insufficiency (long mathematics. The logical "flaws" in Euclid's recogni zed) can be ascertained simply by geometry or 's were recognized as considering common occurences of representation profoundly troublesome, but these problems were that do not qualify as art: courtroom records, as little compared to the practical insights and plastic anatomical models, or snapshots (the successes the systems as a whole presented (see history of 's status as an art provides [KIl). The knowledge gleaned from mathematics an interesting trial case of realistic theories). But was looke d upon as genuine knowledge even more telling is the apparent case for nonetheless, and throughout this period there was unnecessity. Not only do non-representational little doubt that this knowledge was that of reality. artworks exist. but entire branches of art appear to be non-representational by nature. Debussy's La The rise of non- required Mer may be taken to represent the sea, but does not abandonment of this geometry-as-the-science-of­ this conclusion follow primarily by virtue of the real-space conception, but by no means did it spell work's title alone? Without this title. would the the end of realist conceptions of mathematics. By work still be perceived as resembling the sea more one view. different or systems of than it does anything else? Would we even mathematics could be conceived as separate entities consider the work in representational terms? of a Platonic world of forms, with the Would we still consider it a work of an? (For this regarded as a sort of suprascientist example see [H5, p. 708J.) who discovers the properties of these entities. And Emile Zola-one of the late 19th century's most prominent exponents of realism through his ideal Thus while we may be accustomed of the naturali stic "experimental novel"-once to referring to the itself characterized art as life seen through a "temperment." But even from before the time of as a , the work of art Zola it had become increasingly apparent that proper lies in the imaginative realistic theories had been in error in not placing constructions that resulted in more emphasis on the role of this "ternperment" Leonardo's painting it and in our itself. In the philosophies of expressionism this role would lie at the very heart of the matter. interpreting it. Expressionism although this position ignores seve ral not inconsiderable aspects of ' s thought on For an example of an extreme expressionist view. mathematics, the belief that any well-framed consider the theory developed in the first half of mathematical question has a definite answer this century by the philosophers Benedetto Croce independent of our existence characterizes the [C2J and R. G. Collingwood [CI). (These are position known as mathematical Platonism. actually separate theories, but close enough in both Phrased in this manner, the position becomes as spirit and detail to be regarded as one for our much the creed of a mathematical theology as it purposes.) In this theory an is taken as being does the basis of a descriptive philosophy. As the identical with expression. the revealing of an

12 HMN Journal #9 internally construc ted mental state. Even more It may seem unlikely that there could be an overall simply. art is realized imaginative activity. and in view of mathematics correspo nding to an fact stands as the most basic fonn of human expressionist theory ofart-particularly a theory as language. Although this is a panicularly broad extreme as that of Croce and Collingwood. It is pronouncement. it is accompanied by explicit somewhat startling to find. therefore. that it is not statements of what an is not. First (and possibly difficult to find particular passages in these writer's most difficultly) it is not any set of existing works which are virtually identical to ones found in physical or symbolic artifacts such as . the work of such figures as poincare. Brouwer and texts or . These are simply the necessary embodiments of the imaginative constructions that Collingwood calls the "work[s] ofan proper" [CI, it is above all mistaken to confuse p. 37]. Thus while we may be accustomed to matbematics with its final symbolic referring to the Mona Lisa itself as a work of art, the work of art proper lies in the imaginative forms, These, rather, are merely constructions that resulted in Leonardo's painting it the manifestations of the internal and in our interpreting it. (Along the se line s constructive processes that Collingwood approvingly quotes Coleridge 's "we constitute the proper identity of know a man for a poet by the fact that he makes us poets" [CI, p. 1I 8J.) Similarly, an should nOI be mathematics. confused with any particular kinds of media. These. rather, are simply the necessary channels through which particular expressions flow. (Again late r members of the constructivist school. from CoIlingwood: "Every gesture that each one of Consider Brouwer's intuitionism [B]. To Brouwer us makes is a work of an" [C I, p. 285]) Finally, it is above all mistaken to confuse mathematics art should not be ide ntified with any activity with its final symbolic fonns. These. rather, are engaged in for a specific purpose or outcome. Art merel y the manifest ations of the internal may be used to represent reality, entertain us or constructive processes that constitute the proper persuade us, but it does these things en passant, identity of mathematics. Other mathematicians may Indeed. if any specific purpose guides the use their interpretation of these symbols as a basis production of a work we are dealing not with an at for their own constructions, but their interpretation all, but with craft or techno-what Collingwood is itself a personal construction. (Sparshott notes calls "an falsely so-called." that both he and H. S. M. Coxeter know the Pythagorean theorem, but that what "he knows in This last may seem to place art in a paradoxical knowin g it is something I cannot even imagine" position. On the one hand it is equivalent to the [S4, p. 33].) To Brouwer, logical rules do not most basic human attribute (communication) and guide the process of mathematical construction; on the other it is divorced from purposive human rather. a pragmatic logic is effectively created along activities. This is resolved through the nature of the way. Similarly, Collingwood notes that the the internal constructions of emotions, intuitions artist does not create rules so much as construct an d ex periences that re sult in successful them. These viewpoints do not leave expressions. Colli ngwood explains that to attain in either activity purely subjective. however. In these the arti st mu st "experience what all mathematics, such judgements are constrained by experience" and commen ts that "in ivory towers art the requirement ofconstructive existence; in art by lan guished" [CI, p. 119]. Similar ly, Croce the conunonality of actual human experience. Even disposes of the romantic notion of the artist as on the point where the theories apparently diverge necessarily being a specimen of genius (a view most severely- the conception of language-the which also haunts mathematics) by noting that difficulty reduces to a difference in terminology . "inspiration is not something from heaven, but is in Croc e and ColHn gwood conclude that art is the essence of humanity itself." and that «the man language, whereas Brouwer vinually declares that of genius who poses as that...finds his punishment mathematics is anything but language. But to in becoming somew hat " [C2, p. 16]. In Collingwood, language is any expression of this theory artists are born and not made, but we intern al constructions; to Brou wer language is are all born artists. Differences are of degree, not primarily sym bolic notation (which Collingwood of kind. refers to as "lan guage falsely so-called" and Croce

HMN Journal #9 13 as "the mere grammatical"). Langer IL] or [02]---<:volve largely into "meta-theories" of syntactic and Though these theories may assumedifferent names semantic rules , and thus to a large extent diverge in different fields-expressionism in art, from pure formali sm, Simultaneously, however, intuitionism or constructivism in mathematics-all they also seem to diverge from the actual share a focus upon the freedom and constraints of experi ence of creating and appreciating an. the creative process as essential to the activity at Wri ting with regard to Langer's theory, Scruton hand. In an. expressionism has been particularly comments that her "analysis gives no procedure for criticized for its apparen t disregard for the artistic product as an entity onto itself-the theory's notion of art istic exi stence appears skewed [H4}. Whether in mathematics or in art, Similarly, mathematical constructivism establishes formalism in its purest state is a a criterion of existence often viewed as unnecessarily severe ([ill]). In response to these philosophy of detachment. charges in both areas , philosophies of fonnalism--­ Artworks and mathematical systems already present in each field-have arisen as are viewed as independent alternatives. phenomena standing apart from their creators, their audiences and Formalism any external world, Whether in mathematics or in art. formalism in its purest state is a philosophy of detachment. Artworks and mathematical systems are viewed as interpretation, nothing that would give application independent phenomena standing apan from their to the claim that in understanding a work of art we creators, their audiences and any external world. understand it as a symbol" [52, p. 22]. Meanings or values can be considered only with reference to elements contained within the work In mathematics, pure fonnalism---comparable to itself. And although ideal formalist criticism may aesthetic absolutism-is that view which takes be difficult to achieve in practice, in that ideal mathematics to be strictly the study of formal works stand apart even from the history of their systems (see [HI]). Where the formalist in art very construction. As Werhane puts it, a work seeks internal structure, the mathematical formalist exists virtually " in spite of its creator...and its seeks consistency. Where the former detaches audience" [W4, p. 99J . meaning or expression from form. the latter constructs "uninterpreted" systems. I should make at least one distinction among formal theories, however-particularly with respect to an. I feel compelled here to mention that Hilbert (the In the pure state described above-a position "father of formalism") was not a formalist in this sometimes referred to as absolutism-the meaning sense, as his introduction to Geometry and the of a work is entirely separated from any not Imagination [H3] makes abundantly clear. The within the work itself. Thus to recognize a work metamathematical strategy of Hilbert's Program of an is to recognize such qualities as , required him to treat mathematical systems as internal dynamics or the relationships ofcolor and uninterpreted for the sake of a consistency proof­ shape; to create an is to impose these qualities on hardly the same as believing mathematics itself to an artifact. How ever, in another brand of be fundamentally uninterpretable or meaningless. formalism it is important that one look at both the Curry, one of the leading exponents of formal structure of a work as well as any meanings mathematical formalism, has himself stated that "it that may be expressed by that structure. Art is unfortunate that many persons identify effectively becomes defined as symbolic fonn. BUI fonna1ism with what should be called Hilbertism" unless one wishes to regard virtuall y everything [C3, p. 156]. Indeed, it would be interesting to from everyday language through, say, mathematics determi ne the degree to which the aims and as art. a more precise descriptio n of what methods of in general parallel constitutes artistic forms is needed. Such those of, say. Goodman's strategy in Languages of theories-as for example those of Suzanne K. Art [02J.

14 HMNJournal #9 In both formalism has become Weitz bases his discussion in Wingenstein's notion the most established theoretic view of this century. of family resemblance [W5, pp. 31-331_ To use (In both fields , in fact, it has independently Wittgenstein's example, if we are confronted with acquired the descriptive phrase ".'} In the question "What is a game?" we shall find mathematics education, its influence-under the ourselves unable to provide a satisfactory set of pervasive guidance of Bourbaki and the New necessary and sufficient conditions. Not all games Math-has been nearly universal. However, as have rules, not all involve competition, not all are Davis and Hersh ([D4, pp. 343-344]) note, cracks purely recreational, etc. What we can do is point have begun to show in the formalist wall. The out resemblances between those entitities which we underlying theme of both [D4] and [D5] is in have chosen to call games. If a new candidate for essence an assa ult on mathematical formali sm, as gamehood presents itself, we base our decision are the selections in [T4]. Similarly. many of the whether to expand the concept to embrace it on the essays in Arthur Dante ' s recent collection [D2] resemblances we perceive between the new activity constitute strong cases against aesthetic formali sm and those previously admitted. Weitz notes that and its separation from human experience and with regard to an we could always choose to "close meaning. the concept" by legislating strict standards of admittance, but to do so would, as he puts it, Non-Essentialism "foreclose on "-a seemingly self­ defeating decision. In an often anthologized paper, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" [WI] the philosopher Morris This last approach-that of choosing to close the Weitz argued that the entire essentialist approach to concept-is the option foundational philosophies the philosophy of an is fundamentally misguided of mathematics seem to offer. But when (see also [W3] for an elaboration). To Weitz, an is mathematics is regarded primarily as an activity an example of what he call s an inherently (i.e.. historically. culturally and in actual practice) undefineable open concept. He develops this more this option as well seems to be a particularly self­ fully by referring to what he calls the perreniel defeating decision. Viewed this way, in fact. flexibility and debatability of art. Art is perennially mathematics increasingly presents itself as a flexible and debatable open concept. As an example, consider the attitudes mathematicians In mathematics, pure formalism­ have historically held regarding the existence of infinitesimal s. Does the long history of this issue comparable to aesthetic between the times of Eudoxus and modem non­ absolutism-is that view which standard analysis suggest anything but the takes mathematics to be strictly the perennial flexibility and debatabiliry of this study of formal systems. Where the concept? What of "dimension," "continuity," or "real number?" Perhaps most teIlingly. consider formalist in art seeks internal the notion of "proof." Is this a closed concept, or structure, the mathematical have our criteria of what constitutes a valid formalist seeks consistency. mathematical argument themselves been (and continue to be) flexible and debatable? Consider the positions available with regard to the use of flexible in that it is always capable of expanding its computers in proof. Tymockzo [T4, pp. 243-266] scope to embrace previou sly unconsidered asks whether if we regard the a-color theorem as artifacts, styles , media, etc. It is perenially having been proved. must we not also admit that its debatable in that not only are the criteria by which proof is of an entirely different nature from any that new works are judged subject to continual criticism have come before it? and reevalu ation, but even establi shed works continue to fall under such scrutiny. Oedipus Rex Although Weitz considers essentalist arguments to may be established as a masterpiece of , but be misguided in purpose, he does not consider the the matter of exac tly which of its qualities grant it particular issues they raise to be irrelevant. These that status continues to be contentious. theories provide, in fact, "a series of invaluable...directions for attending to art," and concludes that:

HMN Journal #9 15 If we take aesthetic theories literally...they equivalent to expression, while the latter is all fail; bur if we reconstrue them, in terms identified with activities engaged in to attain a of function and point...as recommendations specific result Even without wholly accepting this to concentrate on certain criteria [they are] theory, the desire for such a distinction seems far from wonhless. [They] teach us what desirable. Techne is composed of specific, to look at in art. ([W I]. p. 156) trainable skills; an not only marshals these skills. but transcends them in some not clearly defmeable Similarly. if we demand of our philosophies of manner. Mixing paints or mastering scales is mathematics a sec ure foundation capable of techne; The Madonna of the Rocks or an original supporting the entire structure of the subject we jazz improvisation is art. Propaganda as may well be fundamentally misguided. However, propaganda is tecbne; propaganda in the fonn of foundational philosophies have been successful in Eisenstein's Potemkin somehow becomes art. raising relevant issues and thereby provoking us to fresh insights. In both art and mathematics, non­ A similar distinction seems valid in mathematics, essentialism move s us toward a pluralistic view of and could well be crucial in education. Finding the our endeavors, one that recognizes that there is not greatest common divisor of two numbers through a single, absolute but many-possibly following some recipe is techne; deriving a process not even mutually consistent- viewpoints. By no along the lines of Euclid's , convincing means, however, should pluralism be confused oneself and others that it works, or deve loping a with a kind of bland eclecticism or---even worse-­ geometric interpretation of it (in short, blind subjectivism. On the contrary. the holding of understanding it) is mathematics. Even a brief finn ind ividual views is probably necessary to sal of most secondary level textbooks or create the productive tensions that dri ve ou r examinations reve als a tremendous emphasis on activities as a whole. One can be generally non­ techne. But to what degree are " skills" nonetheless pluralist with regard to one 's own philosophy and necessary , and which particular ones? Can and generally pluralist with regard to mathematics or an should these be approached in a more as a whole. (For a discussion of this stance with "mathematical" manner? If mathematics proper is regard to an see Danto's "Learning to Live with something that cannot bedirectly taught. how can it Pluralism" in [02]). The recognition of both an and mathe matics as In both art and mathematics, non­ open concepts leaves behind it a curious casuality. essentialism moves us toward a The claim that mathematics is an an seems to have lost its meaning. But in its place has arisen the pluralistic view of our endeavors, prospect of a much more active agenda-that of one that recognizes that there is not seeking family resemblances between the two a single, absolute perspective but fields. That any resemblances we find are indeed many-possibly not even mutually familial ones I do not find objectionable-e-rhe underlying conceptions of the essentialist theories consistent-viewpoints, in each fiel d just ifies their membershi p in a common philosophical "family." In the remainder of this article] would like to address just a few of be productively devel oped? Approaching these the areas where some useful resemblances of this issues seems to require a sharper disitnction kind might be sought. between " math proper" and "math falsely so­ called" than now exists. (Consider: To what degree is formal proof a matter of techne '1 Is much Family Resemblances between Art of the "mathematics proper" completed by the rime and Mathematics we reach this stage?) Mathematics and Techne A final open note on this subject: The mathltechne di stinction appears to cut across that of One of the central points in the Croce-Collingwood pure/, and in certain respects theory is the distinction between art and techne, or may prove to be more a fruitful one. Consider craft. Rec all that in this theory the form er is . Is this pure or applied art? Is it art or

16 HMNJournal #9 techne? Which question gives us a more useful One funhe r note along these lines: In [D4, p. 318], perspective in contrasting Frank Lloyd Wright 's Davis and Hersh point to the relative permanence Fallingwater with tract housing? Now what of. of mathematical results as opposed to scientific say, the theory of relativity, or the activity of ones. This suggests a further stylistic affinity mathematicalmodelling? between mathematics and the arts. Just as Picasso did not relegate to the attic, modem geometry does not invalidate Euclid. (Note the curren t state of Aristoteli an physics. however.) Among the most perplexing questions concerning Still, just as we can no longer look upon the nature and are those involving the Rembrandt with anything but modem eyes, we issue of style. Why have different individual must reinterpret Euclid in light of our current artists. or the artists of different , nations position. The development of mathematics has and ages represented the world in such different certainly been allied closely with that of science; ways? How is it even possible for them to have however. the nature of the subject's history itself done so, and then for others to be able to recognize may bear more with that of art. (This and apprec iate their works? How do es an point is suggested by Thomas Kuhn [K2, p. 345].) approach to these issues regarding representation A conception of the in terms translate into the perception of style among non­ representational works? Could art have evolved in only one possible way? What is the significance of Just as Picasso did not relegate style? (The first questions are broached by Rembrandt to the attic, modern Gombrich [G l]; the last by Goodman [G3]) geometry does not invalidate These top ics have not been entirely alien to Euclid. Still, just as we can no mathemati cs, even if they have not bee n longer look upon Rembrandt with approached in terms of the overriding concept of anything but modern eyes, we must style. Compari sons of Greek and modern reinterpret Euclid in light or our mathematic s have often been approached with regard to wha t are effec tively stylistic current position. considerations, and from at least the time of Poin care writers have contrasted individual geomeoic "styles" with or analytic ones. of stylistic change might provide a better handle on However, style has not played the unifying role in this phenomenon than one which views the historical or philosophical studies of mathematical development of mathematics as analagous to that of thinking that it has in art. Possibly this is due to an science. attitude which views mathematical in a deterministic, unitary manner-a great chain of Ethics mathematical being, so to speak. If the philosophy of art often seems a rather dry There have been indications ofchange. Educators and erudite affair, there is at least one set ofissues speak of the role of "cognitive styles" and "multiple over which it becomes both heated and public­ representations" in the learning of the subject, and that of censorship and the moral obligations of the Oue has written of a "complementary" relationship artist. Are there general topics from which the between arithmetic and geometry which is as artist. or particular works from which the public, suggestive of corresponding artistic styles or media should be restricted access? Similarly. is the artist as it is of modern physics [O J. Furthermore, the obliged to deal with any particular topics or emerging field of ([011& [A2]) situations? If each of the opposed paths of strict seems to offer a particularly fresh approach to the moralism and unrestricted appear nature of mathematical styles developed outside undesireable, what positions are left open to us? traditonal academic settings. Possibly all these These have been among the most discussed issues workers may have something to gain from the in the philosophy of art, and can be traced from methods and results of and psychology such figures as Confucious and Heraclitus through with respect to style.

HMNJournal #9 17 current commentators on the role of the National decades. (Though some interesting development is Endowment for the Arts, attained in [Pt].) This is not to imply that the artistic literature has itself resolved the problems Issue s of a similar nature have arisen more posed by the creative imagination, but it has frequently in mathematics in recent years. (Davis approached them directly and arrived at apparently and Hersh [D4, pp. 87-89] contrast the extreme useful distincti ons and insights. This same ethical positions of"Mathematical Maoism" and a literature may provide a fertile starting ground for form of mathematical aestheticism derived­ mathematical investigations. For an introduction to perhaps inaccurately-from Hardy.) In general, these issues from philosophical and psychological however, mathematics (and to a slightly less persepctives, see [SI] and [P3], respectively. extent, science) has been disappointingly slow in embracing such topics. As more mathematicians 1would like to mention briefly one aesthetic value and educators enter into such discussions, it may which does seem to be pervasive in the well be to their advantage to acquaint themselves mathematical literature-that of . As with the manners in which the corresponding aesthetic values go, this seems to be rather peculiar issues have been approached with respect to art. It might be worthwh ile to point out here one particular area in which the functioning of each of If we were to adopt a strictly mathematics, art and science have gro wn Platonic view of either art or tremendously similar:All to a large degree depend primarily for support on governmental or industrial mathematics we might account for support (""). The time is ripe for a this simply through invoking Keats: genuine dialogue between these areas on this issue Beauty is truth. truth beauty. alone.

Aesthetic Issu es to mathematical studies. (Indeed, the word actually canies a somewhat negative connotation in, say, Oddly enough, purely aesthetic considerations have painting or .) Far from being able 10separate made few appearances in this discussion. If we the positive or negative effects this concept has had were to adopt a strictly Platonic view of either art on development, mathematical writers have not or mathematics we might account for this simply even been particularly clear on just what elegance is through invoking Keats: Beauty is truth, truth or how it stands in relation to such other concepts beauty. Thou gh a simplification, this formula as clarity, conviction, understanding or nonetheless captures much of the attitude that significance. It is, however, an aesthetic value (or allowed realistic views of art and mathematics to at least an apparent aesthetic value) with some coexist for centuries with formal conceptions of degree ofcurrency in the mathematical community, beauty (as outli ned in Plato's Philebus). To a and as such may provide an entry point for modem day formalist, on the other hand, aesthetic approaching the nature of mathematical aesthetics considerations may well be deemed irrelevant, in general. My own suspicion is that an overly either relegated to the "emotive" qualities of the formal conception of elegance-say one strictly in positivists, or actually defined as the meeting of terms ofefficiency-s-could hinder development as certain formal criteria. Neither of these positions, much as it motivates it, whereas a pluralistic view however, is particularly helpful in ascertaining the of various attitudes could be genuinely productive . role or nature of aesthetic judgements in actually I would greatly appreciate hearing others' views on creating art or mathematics. mathematical elegance-particularly examples of what they find to be elegant and some (however This is a topic on which the mathematical literature imprecise) description of what leads them to say is vinually mute. Poincare [P4, p. 392J wrote of so. (Questions: Does your conception of elegance aesthetics as serving the role of the "delicate sieve" primarily involve results or procedures? Does through whic h successful mathematical visualization have anything to do with it? Are there "combinati ons" passed on their way to arguments which you find convincing but still not consciousness, but his suggestive metaphor has satisfying?) remained little more than that for some nine

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• Conclusion [03] Davies, S. Definitions of Art, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. Perhaps the most appropriate way to close this article is to referagain to the epigraph with which it [D4] Davi s, P. J. and Hersh , R.. The opened. Superficially, mathematics may appear as Mathematical Experience , Boston : Houghton­ the most austere of human endeavors: rigorous, Mifflin, 198I. analytic and precise. Moredeeply, it reveals itself as one of the most mysterious. aspiring to aspects [05] Davis, P. J. and Hersh, R., Descartes of experience most commonly associated with Dream: The World According to Mathematics, San philosophy or (both of which, incidentally, Diego: Harcoun Brace Jovanovich, 1986. Hegel concluded art eventually becomes). To understand mathematics at this deeper level- to grasp it as a human activity which itself [G l] Gombrich, E. H., An and Illu sion, humanizes-c-requires a perspective that embraces Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. other humanist endeavors. An- in its richness, its mysteries and its humanism-offers an abundant [G2] Goodman, N., Languages of Art: An wealth of experience and insight from which Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapoli s: mathematics may have much tolearn of itself. Hackett, 1976. [G3] Goodman, N., Ways of Worldmaking Refe rence s Indianapolis: Hackett 1978. '

[AI] Abrams, M. H., The Mirror and the Lamp, [HI] Henle, J. M.. "The Happy Formalist" The New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Mathematical Intelligencer, 13(1), pp. 12-18, 1991. [A2] Ascher, M., Eth nomathematics:A Multicultural View of Mathematical Ideas. Pacific [ill] Hilbert, D ., "The Foundations of Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991. Mathematics;' in From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in , Heijenoort, J., [BJ Brouwer, L. E. J., "Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. Philosophy and Mathematics," in Philosophy of 464-479,1967. (orig. 1927) Mathematics, Benacerraf, P. and Putnam, H. (eds.), Englewood Cli ffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, [H3] Hilbert, D. and Cohn-Vossen, 5. , pp.78-84, 1964. (orig. 1948) Geom etry and the Imagination, New York: Chelsea, 1990. (orig. 1932) [CI] Collingwood, R.G., The Principles of Art, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938. [H4] Hospers, J., "The Croce-Collingwood Theory of An," Philosophy, 31, pp. 209-308, [C2J Croce, 8., The Aesthetic as the Science of 1956. Expression and of the Linguis tic in General, Cambridge: Cambrid ge Univ ersity Press, 1992. [H5] Hopsers, J., "Philosophy of Art," in (orig. 1902) "Philosophies of the Branches of Knowledge; ' Encyclopedia Brittanica (Vol. 25), 15th ed., pp. [C3] Curry, H., Foundations of Mathematical 703-719, 1989. Logic,New York, Dover: 1963. [KI ] Kline, M., Mathematics: The Loss of [OIJ D'Ambrosio, U., "Ethnomathematics and Certainty, New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, its Place in the History and of 1980. Mathematics," For the Learning of Mathematics, 5(1), pp. 44-48 , 1985. [K2] Kuhn, T. 5., "Comment on the Relations of Science and An ," in The Essential Tension, [02] Dante , A. C., Beyond the Brillo Box, Kuhn, T. S., Chicago: University of Chicago New York: Farrar, Stauss, Giroux, 1992. Press, 1977.

HMN Journal #9 19 [L] Langer, S. K, Philosophy in a New Key, [TI] Tatarkiewicz, W., "What is Art? The Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957 Problem of Definition Today:' British Journal of Aesthetics, 11, pp. 134-153,1971. [0] Otte, M., " Arithmetic and Geometry : Notes on the Concept of Complementarity," IT2] Thorn, R.. '''Modem' Mathematics: An Studies in Philosophy and Education, 10, pp. 37­ Educational and Philosophical Error?" American 62, 1990. Scientist, 59, pp. 695-699, 1971.

[] Papert, S. (197 8). "The Mathematical [TIl Toth, I., "Non-Euclidean Geometry before Unconscious," in On Aesthetics in Science, Euclid," Scientific American, 221(5), pp. 87-98, Wechsler, J. (ed.), pp. 105-120, 1978. 1969.

[n] Parker, D. H.. "The Nature of Art," in [T4] Tymoczko, T., New Directions in the [W2, pp. 61-76J, 1939. Philosophy of Mathematics. Boston: Birkhauser, 1986. [P3] Perkins, D.N., The Mind's Best Work, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. [WI] Weitz, M., "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," in [W2, pp. 145-156], 1956. [P4] Poincare. H, The Foundations of Science, New York: Science Press, 1913. (orig. 1903, [W2] Weit z, M., Problems in Aesthetics: An 1905, 1908) Introductory Book of Readings, NewYork: Macmillan, 1959. [51] Scruton. R.. Art and Imagination. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. [W3] Weitz, M., The Opening Mind: A Philosophical Study of Humanistic Concepts, [52] Scruton, R,; "Aesthetics," Encyclopedia Chicago: Universit of Chicago Press, 1977. Brittanica (Vol. IS), 15th ed., pp. 15-28, 1989. [W4] Werhane, P. H., Philosophical Issues in Art, [S3] Sparshott, F., The Structure of Aesthetics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. [W5] Witt genstei n, L. , P hilosophic al [S4] Sparshott, F., The Theory of the Arts, Investigations, 3rd ed., New York: Macmillan, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. 1958.

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