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Caught in the India-China Rivalry: Policy Options for Nepal

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Caught in the India-China Rivalry: Policy Options for Nepal Issue Brief # 249 March 2014 Innovative Research | Independent Analysis | Informed Opinion Caught in The India-China Rivalry Policy Options for Nepal Pramod Jaiswal SAARC Doctoral Fellow, Center for South Asia Studies, JNU Nepal is strategically located between India and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which plays an China, which also is a paramount concern for her important role in China’s South Asia Policy. Tibet security and stability (Bhattarai, 2005:10). issue, which is China’s major security concern, Slightest of stir in Nepal will have spillover effect has become a major determinant of Chinese on these two fastest growing economics. Apart foreign policy towards Nepal specifically to from the economic and trade interest of both reiterate a historical fact that the Khampa rebels the countries, they also have interest in of Tibet used Nepalese territory in 1959. Both containing the US influences in the region. Both the countries want to keep Nepal under their countries consider the other as competitor and sphere of influence. Though Nepal is a separate the trust deficit between them is ample after sovereign political entity, it has always remained the 1962 war on border dispute. in India’s security system (Ray, 1983: Preface). After the loss of Tibet as a buffer state in 1950 China is concerned about Nepal being used by when China took control over it, Nepal has other external powers to challenge its strategic become strategically important for both the interests. Chinese security analysts argue that countries. Nepal is the gateway to the sensitive Nepal is being used by the United States in its larger strategy of encircling China (Wolfe, 2006). During the 1960s, there were several demonstrations in Kathmandu as well as in Tibet Pramod Jaiswal is a SAARC Doctoral Fellow at the by Tibetan separatists who had bases in Nepal. Center for South Asia Studies in Jawaharlal This led China to be skeptical on external Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He also a engagement in Nepal. The Chinese Ambassador writes a column for the IPCS on Nepal. Zheng Xianling raised this issue and remarked that foreign forces were actively engaged in instigating the anti‐China activities in Nepal. He strongly condemned the French parliamentarians meeting with Tibetan leaders in 1 POLICY OPTIONS FOR NEPAL 2 Nepal and the US senate resolutions on the China by openly supporting China during the Tibet issue. thirteenth summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Prior to 1950, when Tibet was not a part of in Dhaka. Moreover, Gyanendra indicated at the China, Nepal had closer relations with Tibet. Dhaka summit that Nepal would veto There were very limited relations with China. Afghanistan's entry into SAARC unless China After Tibet became a part of China, Nepal was to be given an observer status (Kharel, established diplomatic relations with China in 2005). 1955. A close scrutiny of Nepal – China relations divulges that the economic aspects have always According to their pro‐establishment policy, regulated the sphere of diplomatic relations China maintained relationship with the between the two countries. Kathmandu, being establishment, rather than with any party or a the center point of Trans‐Himalayan trade from leader. When Girija Prasad Koirala shared the the medieval period to the turn of this century; benefits of multiparty democracy in Nepal, added a significant dimension to Nepal – Tibet Chinese bluntly replied, “Mr. Prime Minister, relations. China does not care what system you have in I your country, our relation is state‐to‐state, not party‐to‐party relations” (Peoples’ Review, 8 Nepal – China Relations April 2010) China has always adopted a pro‐establishment After Nepal became a republic in 2008, China policy towards Nepal, which highlights three lost its most reliable partner (Monarchy). King, determinants. First, the relationship stands on being the Commander in Chief of the Army, Five Principles, or the Panchsheel. Second, China used to serve the security interest of China. would not intervene in Nepal's domestic China needed a trustworthy partner in Nepal. It politics. Third, it would expect Nepal's support became obvious that it has to choose between on issues concerning China's sovereignty and two major political forces in Nepal ‐ the national interests, including the issues of Tibet, democratic parties, which were mostly pro‐ Taiwan, and human rights (read – One China India, and the Maoists, a large party with anti‐ policy). India and anti‐US sentiments. China also found it Monarchy adopted a close relationship with expedient to cultivate the Maoists because of China to counter the Indian influence, as India the growing tensions in Tibet, particularly after was perceived to have closer relations with the March 2008 uprising when Tibetans strongly democratic forces in Nepal. China was a crucial started its anti‐China protest around the world factor in King Mahendra’s foreign policy. King on the eve of the Olympic Games to embarrass Mahendra discerned that China could be a China among the international community. balancing factor against India’s influence in China wanted to curb the underground activities Nepalese politics. King Mahendra effectively of some 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in played the ‘China card’ during the 1950s and Nepal. 1960s to counter Indian influence in Nepal. King Nepal has the most accessible entry point to Gyanendra reinforced Nepal’s proximity to Tibet and it has the second largest Tibetan refugee community in the world. China has traditionally alleged that international forces are operating against China, through Tibetans based A close scrutiny of Nepal – China relations divulges in Nepal. In this context, China was deeply perturbed when six Nepalese Parliamentarians that the economic aspects have always regulated the visited Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in February sphere of diplomatic relations between the two 2009 (Nayak, 2009). Only after this China haS countries. Kathmandu, being the center point of started establishing good relations with Trans-Himalayan trade from the medieval period to traditional political parties like the Communist the turn of this century; added a significant Party of Nepal‐United Marxist‐Leninist (CPN‐ dimension to Nepal – Tibet relations. UML) along with new emerging political forces like Madhesi People’s Rights Forum 2and 2 IPCS ISSUE BRIEF # 249, MARCH 2014 Communist Party of Nepal‐ Maoist (CPN‐ Maoist). China supported the Maoist party only after they Interestingly, China supported the Maoist party emerged as the single largest party in the only after they emerged as the single largest Constituent Assembly election of April 2008. In party in the Constituent Assembly election of fact, China was the only country to supply arms April 2008. In fact, China was the only country to supply arms to King Gyanendra to quell the to King Gyanendra to quell the Maoist Maoist insurgents when India, the US and the insurgents when India, the US and the UK had UK had refused to provide help of that nature refused to provide help of that nature. (Jaiswal, 2010). China developed its links with the Maoists to serve its security interests in Nepal. The Maoists in Nepal are sympathetic to China due to Nepal while India, US and UK had suspended ideological affinities. Maoists extended hand military assistance to Nepal since February 2005 towards China as they were in dire need of which was after King Gyanendra seized power. support from a strong power. China accepted it Again, in December 2009, China agreed to as Maoists view India and US as ‘imperialist provide military aid worth 20.8 million Yuan power’ and stated that they were fighting (approximately Rs 220 million) to Nepal for the against their interference in Nepalese politics. In supply of "non‐lethal" military hardware order to form an impression on Chinese, including logistics and training the Nepal Army. Prachanda accepted the invitation of Chinese to As per the agreement, China had to supply 20 attend the Closing ceremony of the Olympics. million Yuan worth of "non‐lethal" military He became the first Prime Minster to break the hardware to Nepal and the remaining 800,000 trend of going to India for the first foreign visit Yuan would go into construction of a after holding the chair. India took this act of "friendship building" in the Nepali territory Prachanda very seriously (Verma, 2009). Indian along the Nepal – China border analysts stated that it was the clear inclination (Nepalnews.com, 16 December 2009). of Maoist towards China. Indian Media went on to report that India lost Nepal from its sphere of This assistance to Nepal came when there were influence and that it would affect India’s reports of Tibetans fleeing from Tibet through security (Singh, 2010). Nepal and then Chief of Nepal Army, Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, was in India meeting Indian Though Maoist leaders pose themselves as anti‐ foreign and defense ministers, senior Indian, most of them understand that ultimately government officials and army top brass to push they will have to deal with India, and that they for better military and civil relations between cannot deter from the geographical, historical, the two countries including additional military cultural and socio‐economic linkages between aid. the two countries. It is almost certain that they will temper their policies towards India once In September 2008, during the then Nepalese they come to power. However, for the moment, Defence Minister, Ram Bahadur Thapa’s visit to the Indian policy of preventing Maoists from China, Beijing declared to provide Rs 62.5 million coming to power and the Maoist’s counter‐ as military aid to Nepal. China in turn expressed tactic of mobilizing popular opinion on the basis desire that Nepal would restrict any activities of growing anti‐India sentiments in Nepal, against China on its territory.
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