Mechanisms of Social Cognition
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PS63CH12-Frith ARI 31 October 2011 11:58 Mechanisms of Social Cognition Chris D. Frith1,3 and Uta Frith2,3 1Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging and 2Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, WCIN 3AR United Kingdom, and 3Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark; email: [email protected], [email protected] Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012. 63:287–313 Keywords First published online as a Review in Advance on observational learning, imitation, reputation, teaching, mentalizing, August 11, 2011 meta-cognition The Annual Review of Psychology is online at psych.annualreviews.org Abstract This article’s doi: Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that 10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100449 are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning Copyright c 2012 by Annual Reviews. from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. All rights reserved Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputa- by Victoria University of Wellington on 09/28/12. For personal use only. 0066-4308/12/0110-0287$20.00 tion, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:287-313. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org prediction of others’ changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflec- tion, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests col- lide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct. 287 PS63CH12-Frith ARI 31 October 2011 11:58 Contents Reputation and Audience INTRODUCTION.............. 288 Effect...................... 297 What Is Social About Social Tracking Mental States . 298 Cognition?................. 288 Tracking Other Points TheImportanceof ofView.................... 299 Comparative Studies........ 289 Tracking False Beliefs . 299 The Importance of Implicit COSTS AND BENEFITS OF Processes.................. 289 LEARNING ABOUT LEARNING THROUGH OTHERMINDS............. 300 OBSERVINGOTHERS...... 291 The Dark Side of Learning About Places. 291 Mentalizing . 300 Learning About Objects . 292 Helping Behavior . 300 Learning About Actions . 292 MutualTrust................. 300 Learning About Agents . 292 EXPLICIT PROCESSES IN NEURAL MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL COGNITION AND LEARNING THROUGH THEIR MECHANISMS . 301 OBSERVATION............. 293 Top-Down Modulation of Association Learning . 293 Competing Implicit Reward Learning . 293 Processes.................. 301 Gaze Following . 294 Executive Control of Social Mirroring..................... 294 Cognition.................. 301 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF VerbalInstruction............. 302 OBSERVATIONAL Teaching . 302 LEARNING.................. 294 SHARING EXPERIENCES: Self-Interest and Copying. 294 THE IMPORTANCE OF Prosocial Effects of Copying . 295 META-COGNITION........ 303 Alignment.................... 295 Reflective Discussion . 303 Group Decisions . 295 Reflective Discussion of Action GroupIdentity................ 296 Changes Behavior . 304 LEARNING ABOUT OTHER Reflective Discussion of MINDS...................... 296 Sensations Creates a More TakingAccountofOther Accurate Model of the World..................... 304 by Victoria University of Wellington on 09/28/12. For personal use only. Individuals . 296 Tracking Past Behavior to The Neural Basis of Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:287-313. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Predict Future Actions. 297 Meta-Cognition . 304 CONCLUSIONS................ 305 INTRODUCTION complete isolation, apart from the brief inter- actions necessary for reproduction. And yet What Is Social About they can learn to perform a difficult detour task Social Cognition? simply by observing an experienced conspecific Consider the red-footed tortoise. These are (Wilkinson et al. 2010). Imagine a hive of not social animals. They live lives of almost bees. Bees are undeniably social animals. 288 Frith · Frith PS63CH12-Frith ARI 31 October 2011 11:58 Remarkably, their social behavior is governed emerged as the end result of a long evolutionary by rules that allow them to share knowledge process. and make group decisions (Visscher 2007). Mentalizing: implicit Like the tortoise, human beings can learn a lot The Importance of or explicit attribution from simply observing others even when this of mental states to behavior has no deliberate communicative in- Comparative Studies others and self (desires, tent and when social information is being used Neural mechanisms, which have evolved to al- beliefs) in order to just like any other publicly available informa- low social interaction, need to be studied sys- explain and predict what they will do tion in the environment (Danchin et al. 2004). tematically across species, and most of this work But also, like bees, human beings cooperate still remains to be done. In this review we do Meta-cognition: reflection on mental and can make group decisions that are better not go into details of such mechanisms when states, including own than those made by individuals (Couzin 2009). pertinent reviews already exist. This is the case mental states Gaining benefit by watching and interacting in particular for general learning mechanisms, (introspection); others’ with conspecifics—and even other species—is which are also fundamental to social learning. mental states (popular widespread among animals, including humans These involve conditioning and associative and psychologizing); mental states in (Galef & Laland 2005, Leadbeater & Chit- instrumental learning (see, e.g., Schultz 2008). general (philosophy of tka 2007). We review work that shows that This comparative approach to social cogni- mind) by following others and by observing their tion can identify processes in common across choices it is possible to learn not only about species. It can also help identify the nature places, but also about actions, objects, and of those processes that are dramatically more other agents. This is very useful because by highly developed in humans. observing what happens to others, we can learn We passionately believe that social cogni- without experiencing potentially disastrous tive neuroscience needs to break away from a errors. We also discuss cognitive processes that restrictive phrenology that links circumscribed enable deliberate communication, teaching, brain regions to underspecified social processes. and cooperation but are beyond the capacities Although we build on such links, as shown in of tortoises and bees. These are processes that Table 1, we are committed to the idea that it is enable individuals to understand one another necessary to develop a mechanistic account of with a high degree of precision. They are often these processes. In this review we provide some referred to as mentalizing or having a theory pointers toward such accounts. of mind. A largely implicit form of mentalizing is likely to be involved in perspective taking and tracking the intentional states of others, The Importance of Implicit Processes and this has been claimed for a variety of social One of the proudest achievements of human by Victoria University of Wellington on 09/28/12. For personal use only. animals as well as humans (e.g., Clayton et al. beings is the ability to reflect on themselves and Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:287-313. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org 2007). It is only the explicit form of mentaliz- their past, present, and future. This tends to ob- ing that appears to be unique to humans (see scure the fact that most of our cognition occurs Apperly & Butterfill 2009 for a discussion of automatically and without awareness. It comes the two forms of mentalizing). We point out as a surprise that even such sophisticated social that explicit mentalizing is closely linked to processes as group decision and mentalizing can meta-cognition: the ability to reflect on one’s occur automatically and can happen without action and to think about one’s own thoughts. a deliberate attempt to achieve that decision, This ability, we argue, confers significant ben- individually or collectively. Here we follow the efits to human social cognition over and above tradition of cognitive psychologists who make a the contribution from the many powerful fundamental distinction between implicit (au- implicit processes that we share with other so- tomatic, unconscious) processes and processes cial species. However, these abilities also have that generate explicit, conscious products (e.g., www.annualreviews.org • Mechanisms of Social Cognition 289 PS63CH12-Frith ARI 31 October 2011 11:58 Table 1 Neural mechanisms underpinning processes relevant to social cognition∗ Relevant brain Mechanism regions Social processes 1. Reward Updating estimated value of Ventral striatum Social rewards learning reward through prediction error signals, whether about primary reinforcers or money (e.g., Peters & Buchel 2010) Ventromedial PFC/ Smiling face (Lin et al. 2011) medial OFC Gaining status (Zink et al. 2008) Gaining