Enduring Elements of Strategy for Irregular Warfare
By
Gary Kemister
Thesis submitted in partial requirement for the degree of Masters of Philosophy (MPhil) School of Humanities and Social Sciences University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy 2013
1 Table of Contents Introduction ...... 3 Chapter 1 Selected History of Conventional Warfare and Related Theories of Warfare ... 8 Ancient European Warfare ...... 9 Ancient Rome ...... 9 Ancient China ...... 10 Renaissance Italy ...... 12 The Napoleonic Era ...... 13 Modern Warfare ...... 17 Proposed Inputs to Warfare ...... 21 Chapter 2 Selected History of Irregular Warfare ...... 23 Revolts in the Roman Empire - Judea ...... 24 United States War of Independence ...... 25 The Spanish Guerrilla War against Napoleon ...... 26 The Arab Revolt in World War 1 ...... 28 The Chinese Civil War 1927-1950 ...... 29 Malaya – 1948-1960 ...... 31 The Vietnam War 1947-1975 ...... 32 El Salvador ...... 34 Iraq ...... 36 Discussion...... 37 Chapter 3 Review of Selected Theories of Irregular Warfare ...... 42 Charles. E. Callwell ...... 42 T E Lawrence ...... 44 Mao Zedong ...... 45 Sir Robert Thomson ...... 48 David Galula ...... 50 John Nagl ...... 52 David Kilcullen ...... 53 Discussion...... 54 Chapter 4 – Identification of the Enduring Elements of Strategy for Irregular Warfare . 55 An Optimised Approach to Irregular Warfare ...... 56 Enduring Elements of Strategy for Irregular Warfare ...... 64 Conclusion: Review of Thesis and Future Work ...... 68 Bibliography ...... 71 Diagram references ...... 74
2 Introduction
History is replete with human conflict ranging from the personal to the international, from the instinctive to the calculated. A large amount of effort in many communities and civilisations has been expended trying to understand why and how these conflicts come about and how to influence these conflicts for the benefit of the community. In the area of personal conflict the efforts have been to try and minimise or even eliminate these conflicts. In the area of national or international conflict, however, most effort has been expended in trying to maximise the chances of the nation winning any conflict. This has led to a large body of work on the theory of warfare and the overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to this body of work. The aim of this thesis is to identify underlying common themes or principles that apply to irregular warfare in an enduring manner. A framework for identifying these enduring elements of strategy will be developed by reviewing the understanding of conventional warfare including the well-understood theories of how to conduct a conventional warfare campaign. This framework will then be used to systematically analyse historical examples and significant theories of irregular warfare to identify enduring elements of strategy that apply to irregular warfare. The enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare will allow for an improved understanding of how irregular warfare should be approached in any specific circumstance.
This approach to irregular warfare is an attempt to use a broad analysis of both conventional and irregular warfare to develop a general understanding of how irregular warfare has been (and by inference is likely in the future to be) conducted. This is in contrast to the majority of work on both conventional and irregular warfare which operates from an inductive or hermeneutic approach that relies heavily on a single or a few examples from which to extrapolate a general understanding. Examples of the inductive approach used in the theory of irregular warfare are the works of Robert Thompson (Malaya) and John Nagl (Malaya and Vietnam). The inductive military approach is usually used by practitioners who have a deep knowledge of current operations and who can appreciate how the current operations differ from preceding operations. This approach is especially noticeable during times of transformative warfare, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the World Wars and the rise of Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. The broad analysis approach used in this thesis is similar to the approach of Vasquez1 to analyse the reasons why war occurs or a type of meta-analysis used by John Hunter2 but without the statistics.
Military theory generally combines an historical analysis of military campaigns and a generalisation of that analysis to give a projection of how best to approach a military problem both now and in the future. Historical analysis, as one of the social sciences, usually follows the hermeneutic approach3, that is, gaining an understanding of events through an interpretation of the meanings of various actions. This implies that the approach must be subjective in nature as “an action can only be interpreted because it is based on a radically subjective attribution of meaning and values to what one does”. 4 Military theory developed using the hermeneutic approach can place strong and
1 John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 2 John E Hunter and Frank L Schmidt, Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias in Research Findings, Newbury Park, California, 1990. 3 See for example, Sherratt, Yvonne. 2006. Continental philosophy of social science: hermeneutics, genealogy, critical theory. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 4 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/ accessed 7th March 2013.
3 sometimes undue emphasis on the analysis of the most recent military campaigns which is perhaps the basis for the old adage that “generals are always prepared to fight the last war”.5 If the future war is not significantly different from the most recent war then this approach can be a reasonable and valid method in trying to maximise the chance of success. If the future war is significantly different than the most recent war then such an approach can be misleading or even disastrous in its outcomes. Scientific empiricism, by contrast, focuses on determining causal relationships in any situation and relies on the testing of any hypothesis against observations either in experiments or in the real world. Scientific empiricism aims for “a theory which is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in the world, is true”. 6 Although some thinkers (such as Wilhelm Dilthey7 or Max Weber8) believe that these approaches are incompatible, more recent thinking is that hermeneutics and scientific empiricism are compatible and complementary.9 If the historical analysis (using a hermeneutic approach) of war is considered as a set of observations of real world events then this allows the application of an empirical approach to the development of an understanding of irregular warfare. It should be noted however that the set of observations for irregular warfare is relatively sparse compared to conventional warfare and is only well-documented over the last one hundred years. Conventional warfare has been documented for several thousand years and in much greater detail and this thesis uses the greater body of knowledge for conventional warfare as a launching pad for the understanding of irregular warfare. A selected range of cases and theories will be examined from a subset class (conventional warfare) of all the possible occurrences of warfare and the predominant inputs in these cases and theories will be determined. It will then be determined if these inputs are sufficient to adequately explain the contributing factors of another ‘class’ of warfare (‘irregular’ warfare) since the validity of these inputs to a different class of warfare can not be assumed. If these inputs can be used to adequately explain a different class of warfare (irregular warfare) to the class from which they were derived then it can be expected that these inputs would be sufficient to explain both of the classes (‘conventional’ and ‘irregular’) and any combination of the two classes (now known as ‘hybrid’ warfare). This would give confidence that an understanding of a particular class of warfare can be gained by studying a different class, meaning that there is a certain amount of commonality between the different classes of warfare. These inputs will be used as a framework to develop a better understanding of irregular warfare and will facilitate, in scientific terminology, the proposal of the hypothesis of enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare which is the aim of this thesis.
It may be prudent now to clarify the terminology used in this thesis. The term ‘input to warfare’ refers to a thing that can be used in the conduct of warfare but which exists independently of that warfare. Examples of inputs to warfare can be military forces, their state of readiness for warfare and the equipment they may use, the economic resources of the opposing sides, the political objectives of the opposing sides, the prevailing theory on how military forces should be used and the quality and expertise of the political and military leaders. Any of these inputs can have a significant
5 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/01/the-perils-of-moralism-understanding-the-libyan- intervention-in-the-context-of-american-idealism/ accessed 16 Jan 2014. 6 B. C. van Fraassen, 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press as quoted in http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ accessed 7th March 2013. 7 Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1989. Introduction to the human sciences. Edited by R. A. Makkreel and F. Rodi. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 8 Weber, Max. 1949. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Free Press. 9 Davidson, Donald. 1963. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
4 influence on the success of any warfare either positively, such as von Bismarck’s political manoeuvrings during the unification of Germany or negatively, such as the US determination to fight a conventional war in Vietnam. This leads to the proposal of several broad categories of inputs to warfare namely:
Military forces Non-military capability Military leadership Political leadership Military theory ‘unforeseen’ inputs
Note that while these inputs will be developed in a scientific manner, the way in which the inputs are used to produce an outcome, that is the tactics or strategy used, can not be determined scientifically as this is where the subjective decisions by the ‘actor’ or ‘actors’ in the situation will turn the inputs into meaningful actions. Once the recurring inputs to warfare have been determined, the understanding generated can be used to identify how those inputs have been used in a consistent way across a variety of circumstances, that is the enduring elements of strategy. The identified elements of strategy are to be considered enduring since they will have been deduced from a range of examples of irregular warfare and so are likely to be present to some degree in any occurrence of irregular warfare in the future. Note that this thesis is focussed on the enduring elements of strategy for a particular type of warfare, namely irregular warfare, as it is considered that the enduring elements of strategy for conventional warfare are already well known.
The role of armed forces in conventional warfare is well understood and is based on the work of Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz amongst others who laid out the foundations of modern combat between concentrated forces. The role of armed forces however, in irregular warfare, is still open to debate with differences occurring in approach and emphasis and in many cases the actual aims or success criteria of the combat as well. Although many of the European theorists for the last several hundred years have made a clear distinction between conventional or regular warfare and irregular warfare, in reality warfare is not usually that clear cut and many campaigns throughout history have combined aspects of conventional and irregular warfare in varying degrees depending on the situation at the time. The convention of distinguishing between conventional and irregular warfare is made in this thesis for simplicity although Vasquez10 amongst others has discussed the complexity of classifying wars and the need for a typology of wars. A discussion of the typology of war is beyond the scope of this thesis and so a binary approach using the common terminology of conventional and irregular warfare will be used. The well-developed understanding of conventional warfare and the close relationship between conventional and irregular warfare in history suggests that a re-examination of the conventional warfare theories and their possible application to irregular warfare could be beneficial. The combining of the aspects of the theories of conventional warfare applicable to irregular warfare with the current theories for irregular warfare offer the possibilities of new insights into the understanding of irregular warfare. It should be noted here that this thesis is focussed on the nature of irregular warfare and the enduring strategic elements which are important in formulating an approach to the specific instantiation of irregular warfare under consideration and not on irregular warfighting, that is, the specific way in which an irregular
10 John A. Vasquez, op.cit., Ch 2, pgs 52-89.
5 campaign should be fought. Identifying the enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare will allow for the future exploration on the implications of these elements of strategy on irregular warfighting in both general and particular circumstances.
Warfare, both conventional and irregular, does not occur in isolation and the exact conditions involving a particular occurrence of warfare are highly unlikely to ever be repeated. A better understanding of any situation is generally developed through an appreciation of the context surrounding the particular circumstances and an appreciation of similar events and how they may relate to the current situation. In science theories can be developed by repeating experiments and observing the results. The variations in the conditions of the experiment allow for an understanding of the behaviour of the system. If all the conditions under which the experiment is conducted are known then it is possible to develop a determinate theory, that is, one in which the final state of the system can be predicted exactly. Exact predictions are generally only possible when there are a relatively small number of entities in the system being studied. When there are a large number of entities in the system then science can develop theories based on the group behaviour of the entities without knowing the individual behaviour of each element. An example of this type of theory is the kinetic theory of gases, which through a limited knowledge of the type of gas involved, can predict the change in conditions of the gas without the detailed knowledge of the behaviour of each individual gas molecule. This type of prediction or understanding of an overall system, without predicting individual behaviour, is the type of understanding that has been developed for conventional warfare. Irregular warfare, which typically involves much smaller overall numbers, is consequently more difficult to predict or understand as the smaller size increases the dependence of the system on the initial conditions, that is, the context of the situation. In other words military conduct of irregular warfare is more highly coupled to the surrounding conditions at the time than the military conduct of conventional warfare. This does not preclude the development of the theory or the understanding of the situation but can make it more complex and dependent on more knowledge of the individual elements involved. That is, whereas conventional warfare theory can be framed in general terms which can be implemented across many situations, the theory for irregular warfare is likely to be more conditional on elements such as the social and economic conditions in the country as well as potentially the individuals involved in the combat.
Warfare, whether conventional or irregular, is representative of a desire to change the current situation. Changing the current situation, for example through warfare, can however require significant effort and history would suggest that people would prefer to retain the status quo unless there is some pressure to change. This pressure to change (analogous to Newton’s Equations of Motion) could be through outside forces such as famine, disease, or war or could be through internal forces such as the desire for a better life, the desire for conquest or local politics. The less pressure on a society, particularly in the social and economic conditions, means the less pressure for war or ‘revolutionary’ change. If there is limited pressure on a society and this pressure is not resisted then it is likely to manifest itself in ‘evolutionary’ change rather than ‘revolutionary’ change. Some of the pressures that a society faces , such as the internal politics and economics of a society and the use of military and allied forces, are largely under the control of the society (although not necessarily the political leadership of the society). Other pressures on a society, such as international politics and economics and opposition military forces, are not under the control of the society but may be influenced to a greater or lesser degree. Finally there are unforeseen events, such as phenomena of nature, unexpected economic shocks or surprise attacks by unexpected opponents, which can
6 significantly affect the outcome of any conflict and which may increase or decrease the pressure for change. Note that how any of these inputs is viewed can change over time along with the amount of control or influence that can be exercised over that input by a particular actor in the situation.
In the two preceding paragraphs the following ideas have been introduced: that irregular warfare in any specific occurrence is strongly influenced by the prevailing conditions at the time; and that all the conditions or pressures at any time are not controllable by any participant. These ideas led to the realisation that any theory for irregular warfare cannot be prescriptive or ‘determinate’ but must necessarily be given in terms of ‘guidelines’ to be adapted and changed depending on the prevailing conditions. We find this reflected in von Clausewitz’s thinking “In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry.”11 Von Clausewitz does not give prescriptions for winning a battle or war but explains the basis for conventional warfare along with the difficulties (friction) involved in conventional warfare and then determines ways of improving the chances of winning a battle or war. Galula, in his analysis of irregular warfare, stated that “Revolutionary war, on the other hand, represents an exceptional case not only because, as we suspect, it has its special rules, different from those of the conventional war, but also because most of the rules applicable to one side do not work for the other”. 12 This leads to the question of the interrelationship between conventional and irregular warfare, how connected are they and can the approach to one (conventional warfare) be used to inform the approach to the other (irregular warfare). The framework of inputs to warfare developed for conventional warfare will be shown to be applicable to irregular warfare and then used to develop an improved understanding of irregular warfare through the identification enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare.
The first chapter of this thesis analyses the selected cases and theories of the class of conventional warfare and extracts a framework of inputs into warfare. The framework of inputs is derived from the broad categories of inputs identified in the Introduction. The second chapter examines selected cases of irregular warfare and determines whether the framework of inputs to warfare derived in Chapter 1 can adequately explain those cases. The framework of inputs is found to contain all the inputs required to encompass the selected cases of irregular warfare. Chapter 3 examines the theories for irregular warfare in light of the framework of inputs to warfare determined previously to verify that they are compatible and to further illuminate the theories of irregular warfare. Chapter 4 brings these analyses together to propose enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare. The enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare identified through the process of determining the inputs to warfare across both conventional and irregular warfare are:
1. The details of each insurgency, for both sides, depend on the specific situation at the time; 2. Political, social and economic considerations are paramount; 3. Population support is vital; 4. Limited role for the military; and 5. Adaptation is important.
11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Howard and Paret, Everyman’s Library, 1993, p86. 12 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pg x, http://armyrotc.missouri.edu/pdfs- docs/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf, accessed 11th June 2013.
7 Chapter 1 Selected History of Conventional Warfare and Related Theories of Warfare
“If I have seen farther it is by standing on the shoulders of giants”13
Throughout history war has rarely fallen completely and exclusively into the categories of either conventional or unconventional/irregular warfare. Many of the wars that have been considered as conventional have also included an irregular component even though that irregular component may not have played a significant part in the outcome of the conflict. For example both the world wars were predominantly conventional wars however World War 1 included the Arab irregular conflict with the Turkish Empire and the actions of Capt. T. E. Lawrence, known as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ and World War 2 included the harassing actions of various national resistance movements. Conversely many conflicts that have been considered as irregular have included a conventional component. The Vietnam War, while largely irregular, included significant conventional campaigns and was concluded by conventional forces from North Vietnam invading South Vietnam. This recognition has recently led to the introduction of the term ‘hybrid’ wars to signify that war can be, and in fact, is likely to be a mixture of conventional and irregular components with the proportions decided by the particular situation facing the combatants at the time. Although most wars are ‘hybrid’ that is a mixture of conventional and irregular warfare, for analysis purposes it is easier to study the limiting cases of ‘purely’ conventional warfare and ‘purely’ irregular warfare.
Conventional warfare has been extensively studied especially over the last two hundred years and the practice of conventional war is now well understood14. Modern theories of conventional warfare based on the writings of Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz mean that these battles and wars follow well recognised lines of development. This chapter briefly examines selected historical occurrences of conventional war and the corresponding development of theories of conventional war with the aim of examining how the inputs to conventional warfare have changed throughout the ages. The specific inputs will be derived under several broad categories, namely
Military forces Non-military capability Military leadership Political leadership Military theory ‘unforeseen’ inputs
These categories allow for the clear distinction between inputs even though the inputs are interconnected, for example, the relationship between military leadership and political leadership or the relationship between military leadership and military theory can be vitally important.
13 Isaac Newton, Letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675, see for example, http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/OTHE00101, accessed 15th Jan 2012. 14 For an analysis of European warfare over the last two hundred years see John Gooch, Armies in Europe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, or Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1983.
8 Ancient European Warfare
The introduction of farming and the establishment of permanent settlements in the Middle East around about 5000 years ago allowed for the growth of many new skills and for the specialisation of roles within the civilisation. The concentration of the population, the introduction of new political structures and the development of new weapons led to changes in warfare and the use of armies to defend and conquer territory. Any changes in these inputs into warfare usually led to the rise and fall of cities, states and empires. Although technological changes, such as the use of iron weapons instead of bronze, gave an advantage to one side or the other, many of the successes and failures in battles and campaigns can be attributed to the fervour and morale of the army or to the ‘genius’ of the leader. A leader such as Alexander the Great could forge an empire spanning from Greece to India within ten years through his use of tactics, that is, his understanding of the inputs of warfare. Alternately a competitive advantage could be sustained for an extended period of time due to the natural conditions of the area, for example, Ancient Egypt maintained an empire for several thousand years because of its large population which was due to the fertility of the Nile River providing abundant food. The development of warfare in Ancient Europe demonstrates the effect that advancements in non-military capability can have on the conduct of warfare. The increase in economic resources and technological capability enabled larger, better equipped armies to take the field, gaining the advantage over weaker opponents. Leaders, such as Alexander the Great, demonstrated that exceptional military leadership abilities, through the skill in fighting a battle and in organising an ongoing campaign could significantly influence the outcome of warfare.
Ancient Rome
In contrast to the experience under Alexander the Great, the emergence and then the dominance of Ancient Rome over the known world was not due to the individual brilliance of a single general or group of generals. The establishment of what was to turn into the Roman Empire was due to the development of a political system which rewarded excellence and which encouraged the participation of the general population. The political system of the Roman Republic separated out the military and political structures particularly at the strategic level giving effective control to the citizenry. The political structure of the state, in this case Ancient Rome, is one of the inputs that a state can control and it can have an impact at the strategic level of warfare.
The Roman political system was able to maintain the growth of Rome from the beginning of the Republic (509BC) until it reached its greatest extent under the Emperor Trajan (about 100AD) (Diagram 1).
Diagram 1 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 1. Roman Empire, c.117 A.D.15
During this time Rome was able to subdue and assimilate the population of diverse countries such as Egypt with its natural resource advantage or Carthage which had the services of one of the greatest
15 http://www.culturalresources.com/MP_Century13.html, accessed 5th April 2012.
9 generals in history, Hannibal. The maintenance of the Republic and then the Empire was in part due to the integration of the conquered populations into the Roman way of life and their participation in the Roman method of government. The establishment of the Roman Empire, however, led to an increased influence by the military and a reduced influence by the citizens on the political leadership resulting in less flexibility in the political process. These difficulties plus the large geographical size of the Empire led to the break up of the political control and the establishment of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires during the 4th Century AD. Whilst the political structures were one aspect under the control of the Romans, a new uncontrolled force was beginning to assert itself, that is, an ‘unforeseen’ input. The ‘Barbarian’ invasion of Europe involving nomadic tribes from Eurasia was putting pressure on the Empire across a wide front (Diagram 2).
Diagram 2 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 2. Invasions of the Roman Empire16
The failing political and military system of the Western Empire was unable to react sufficiently to this new situation leading to the downfall of the Western Empire in the late 5th Century AD. The Eastern Empire, however, was able to adjust to the new environment and although it suffered reverses, it was able to survive for another thousand years until it too was unable to react to a new threat, namely the rise of Ottoman Turks. This example demonstrates that although a competitive advantage in warfare can be gained through the way the society is organised, this advantage can diminish over time either through internal developments or through the introduction of an ‘unforeseen’ or an external input. Ancient Rome illustrates how the skill and organisation at the political level of the society can significantly influence the conduct of warfare. The Romans developed a political system that was sufficiently robust and resilient such that even an exceptional general in Hannibal could not overcome the Roman advantages. The history of the Ancient Rome also demonstrates the importance of geography and terrain in the conduct of warfare.
Ancient China
The Age of the Warring States was a period of over two hundred years of almost continuous warfare, beginning in the 5th century BC and ending with the unification of ancient China in 221 BC. The period was marked by the changes in both society and warfare including the introduction of iron, the centralisation and bureaucratisation of governments (moving away from the hereditary aristocracy) and the move from the militia levies to the professionalization of the military. The changing nature of warfare during this period due to the changing inputs available to the military strategists led to the development of several guides to the best military strategy, the most notable of these being The Art of War17 attributed to Sun Tzu around the start of the Age of the Warring States. It is important to note that The Art of War was written as a manual to guide the political and military elite on how to operate what would now be called conventional forces in the political and military environment
16 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2d/Invasions_of_the_Roman_Empire_1.png accessed 5th April 2012. 17 See, for example, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.
10 existing at that time. The exceptionality of the treatise is shown by applicability across a wide range of political and military environments and the way its maxims have been adapted to areas far beyond its original intention.
Sun Tzu – The Art of War
The Art of War is set out to expound the best way in which a kingdom in ancient China could maintain and improve itself in a situation of fluid political and military alliances and with a newly established professional army. Sun Tzu sets out five factors, given in priority order, that are important in warfare: moral influence, weather, terrain, command and finally doctrine. Moral influence is given the primacy of importance and as stated by Sun Tzu, “By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.”18 Moral influence would in today’s terms include the morale of the troops in terms of fighting for a cause and also, for democratic states, the popular support of the people for the military operation.19 Three of the five factors set out by Sun Tzu are inputs that the state can control, namely moral influence, command and doctrine. The other two factors, weather and terrain, can be used to advantage to some extent and, the greater the level of control through strategy and tactics, then the more advantageous it is in achieving the military and ultimately political outcomes.
In a similar approach to Ancient Rome there was expected to be a separation of the political process and the military. As stated by Sun Tzu “Now the general is the protector of the state. If this protection is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak”.20 The general is expected to be a trained and experienced professional in the art of warfare. The status of the political and military control within a state can, as noted before, influence the ability of the state to conduct warfare.
The statement by Sun Tzu,“All warfare is based on deception.”21, points to the importance of trying to influence the inputs outside your control that are a factor in warfare. Inputs such as the opposition military forces can be influenced by providing misleading information or impressions underscoring the importance of accurate information. This is best summarised by Sun Tzu’s own words “Therefore I say: ’Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.’”22
The influence of Sun Tzu demonstrates another input into warfare that is the use of theory or doctrine to manage the behaviour of both the military and the political leadership. A nation with a better understanding of military theory can gain an advantage over an opponent through better use of its resources and management of its military forces. Sun Tzu also emphasises the importance of understanding the opponent and trying to influence the inputs they control, that is the opponent’s resources and military to gain an advantage. It is important to also recognise the synergy that can occur between periods of intense military activity and the progression of the state of the military
18 Ibid, p64. 19 Sanu Kainikara, The Art of Air Power, Air Power Development Centre, 2009, p21. 20 Sun Tzu, op.cit., p81. 21 Ibid., p66. 22 Ibid., p84.
11 theories which has as a corollary that the military theories can not remain static as developments in military capabilities will require corresponding changes in the theories.
Ancient China, in a similar way to Ancient Europe, demonstrates how the development of non- military capability including politics can materially affect the conduct of warfare. Ancient China also stands out through the efforts of Sun Tzu who produced a seminal work on military strategy. Sun Tzu included aspects of each of the inputs to warfare in his book23 emphasising the importance of moral influence in all aspects of the state and the military but particularly in the military and political leadership. The Art of War by Sun Tzu demonstrates how the development of military theory can significantly influence the understanding and application of how war is fought.
Renaissance Italy
After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, most of Europe fell into what has been termed the ‘Dark Ages’. The destruction of the Roman system of culture and Empire and the introduction of the feudal system of government meant a loss in the level of sophistication in military affairs. Large armies would only be gathered in times of need through each feudal lord providing his contingent of men and arms. In the 14th century in northern Italy there began a rediscovery of the classical Roman ideas and the development of a new cultural style that came to be known as the ‘Renaissance’. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 brought an additional impetus to the Renaissance in Italy with an influx of scholars and texts from the Eastern Roman Empire.
The political situation in Italy at the time was complex, as illustrated in Diagram 3, with many states of varying size and different types of government.
Diagram 3 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 3. Renaissance Italy - 149424
The governments ranged from feudal kingdoms through religious states led by prince-bishops to republics of various flavours. There was a significant period of instability on the Italian peninsula in the period 1494-1529 with several invasions and changes in the governments of various states. It was in this ever-changing scenario that Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) proposed his ideas on politics and the military, incorporating the ideas of Ancient Rome into the context of Renaissance Italy.
Machiavelli – The Art of War25
Machiavelli, a native Florentine, wrote to address the political and military challenges facing Florence at that time. Machiavelli was an official of the Florence Republic between 1498 and 1512 until the overthrow of the republic by the Medici during the Spanish invasion. Machiavelli, as is shown through his writing on both politics26 27 and the military28, considered them to be inextricably linked “No state, therefore, can support itself without an army”29. As summarised by Neal Wood30, “Machiavelli evidently believes that the basic relationships between the arts of war and politics are
23 Ibid. 24 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Italy_1494_v2.png accessed 3rd May 2012.
12 as follow:
1. Military power is the foundation of civil society. 2. A well-ordered military establishment is an essential unifying element in civil society. 3. A policy of military aggrandizement contributes to the stability and longevity of civil society. 4. The military art and the political art possess a common style. 5. A military establishment tends to reflect the qualities of the civil society of which it is a part.”
In the Italian states at the time many of the armed forces were supplied by mercenaries, the Condottieri, whereas Machiavelli recommended the citizen army approach of the Ancient Romans. A citizen militia would have the benefit of having a vital interest in the defence of their country as well as providing a respect for authority and civil obedience through the military training. Although a citizen army may be less effective than a professional mercenary army, Machiavelli considered that the overall benefits to the state to be worthwhile as the mercenary army is disconnected from the society that it served.
The close connection between the military and the civil society also carries over to the leader(s) of that society. For Machiavelli it is essential that the civic leadership also have a mastery of the art of war. The ‘principe’ (the military and civil leader) also needed the personal quality of ‘virtu’31 which includes attributes such as boldness, bravery, resolution and decisiveness and this is usually strengthened through training and conditioning by education both civic and military. Machiavelli moved the thinking of both politics and war away from the medieval style and, basing it on the ideas of the Ancient Roman thinkers, launched a new approach to the study of warfare in Europe.
Warfare in Renaissance Italy was reshaped by the rediscovery and development of the military theories of Ancient Rome. An important military theorist of Renaissance Italy was Machiavelli who, combining the roles of military and political leadership in the position of ‘principe’, emphasised the importance of ‘virtu’ in the leader as an example for both the population and military forces to follow. Machiavelli also believed in the importance of a citizen army which was well organised and trained where the morale or ‘virtu’ in defence of their city would be increased. Machiavelli emphasised the interaction between the military forces, the population and the political control where each part should reflect and support the others.
The Napoleonic Era
In 1789 famine and social unrest precipitated into the French Revolution which was to send repercussions throughout Europe for the next twenty-five years. The French people and their government were to become increasingly radicalised over the next three years culminating in the declaration of the French Republic on 20 September 1792 and the execution of King Louis XVI on 21
25 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. by Ellis Farneworth, Da Capo Press, 1965. 26 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm, accessed 19th May 2012. 27 Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827.html, accessed 19th May 2012. 28 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, op.cit. 29.Ibid., p30. 30 Ibid., xlvii. 31 Ibid., 76-81.
13 January 1793. Some of the factions in the French government wished to export the revolution to other countries in Europe and to stabilise the revolution in France, leading to a declaration of war against Austria in April 1792. After the execution of the King Louis this war expanded to include most of the states in Europe. The need for soldiers to defend the nation both externally and internally was beyond the normal means of recruitment so on 23 August 1793 the French government issued its levee en masse decree.32 The use of mass conscription and the call for what would become known as ‘total war’ was to change the nature of warfare from that time. The use of small professional armies that had characterised the ‘cabinet wars’33 of the previous age gave way to large armies made up of citizens defending the honour and interests of their country, supported by the nation’s resources organised by the state bureaucracy34.
The military pressure from the other European countries and government maladministration continued to put France in a state of political instability. This led to the coup by a group including Napoleon Bonaparte on 9 November 1799 and to Napoleon’s eventual proclamation as Emperor. Napoleon was a professionally trained military officer who used his extraordinary military skill to take advantage of opportunities that presented themselves during the wars that France was engaged in at the time. Napoleon, in his career over the next fifteen years, consolidated his control of France and conquered or controlled the majority of Europe (as shown in Diagram 4 below). Napoleon was able to do this not only through his military successes but also through his political and economic reforms. The attempts at explaining Napoleon’s military successes were to have a significant effect on the theory of warfare in the years following his final defeat.
Diagram 4 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 4 - Europe 181235
Von Clausewitz – On War
Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in Prussia and became a professional military officer serving throughout the Napoleonic Era. Following the end of the Napoleonic Era, he was able to develop his work on the theory of warfare and wrote his most famous work On War36. Von Clausewitz, in this work, was trying to determine the principles behind warfare and how warfare should be approached across a range of situations. Von Clausewitz’s audience for On War was the Prussian professional military officer, not the political analyst or government official; consequently he concentrated on the military aspects of the campaign rather than the political interactions. Von Clausewitz’s aim was to put warfare in its proper context and then show how it should be approached with the aim of educating professional officers. Von Clausewitz, perhaps with his audience in mind, concentrated
32http://www.wadsworth.com/history_d/special_features/ext/world_hist/unbound/product/wawc2m01c/content/ wciv2/readings/rev_levee.html accessed 29 May 2012. 33 The ‘cabinet wars’ involved limited warfare between princes and their small armies with a mostly restricted effect on the population as a whole. For a discussion of the cabinet wars see John Gooch, op.cit., Ch 1, or Hew Strachan, op.cit., Chs 2 & 3. 34 Michael Howard, War in European History, Oxford University Press, London, 1976, p79. 35 Accessed from http://www.britannica.com/bps/media-view/1635/1/0/0 on the 31 May 2012. 36 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Howard and Paret, Everyman’s Library, 1993.
14 what is now known as conventional warfare between competing nations and armies, not, what is now known as irregular warfare. Von Clausewitz did consider ‘popular uprisings’ but even though he conceded that they could defeat a regular army, he relegated them to the ‘last resort after a defeat or as a natural auxiliary before a decisive battle’37. Thus von Clausewitz was looking at the range of the inputs used in considering the behaviour of states and the operation of armies in a restricted type of warfare, namely conventional warfare.
In On War von Clausewitz first of all deals with the general nature of warfare, placing it in its social and political context, leading to the celebrated quote; “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. 38 It is also in this section that von Clausewitz introduces the concept of friction whereby uncertainties, accidents or the unforeseen work to impede the military and their plans. These can represent either an imperfect control over the inputs or ‘unforeseen’ events if they are beyond the planning of the political/military leadership. Von Clausewitz also identified the trinity that make up war, that is, “primordial violence”, “the play of chance and probability” and the “element of subordination, as an instrument of policy”. These three elements von Clausewitz assigned, in order, to the people, the general and his army and to the government. Von Clausewitz recognised the importance of popular support for any military action, particularly in an age where conscription provided a large section of the military forces.
Although von Clausewitz’s analysis concentrated on conventional warfare and he was quite dismissive of ‘popular uprisings’, his analysis can, in a general sense, be broadened to apply to all types of warfare. The idea that war is merely a continuation of government policy is crucial to the understanding of any war, including its aims and the method by which the military should be employed. Von Clausewitz also showed that ‘friction’ can play a major part in any military campaign such that the military actions need to be flexible and respond to the occurrences in warfare rather than be predetermined and inflexible. Von Clausewitz also identified the ‘trinity’ that is essential to the military capacity of any nation or group of people: the people, the armed forces and the political leadership. If any of these three are lacking then the war is unlikely to end favourably.
In considering the nature of warfare von Clausewitz stated that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”. 39 Von Clausewitz noted that, in theory, there is no limit to the quantity or quality of force that would be applied to achieve the military aims escalating the conflict to a ‘total’ war by both sides. Von Clausewitz points out, however, that reality intervenes in these theoretical calculations in that there are practical limits on concentrating military forces, limits on the national resources and uncertainty or ‘friction’ which prevents the ‘perfect’ application of military force. Military strategists and leaders need to be flexible and adaptable to be able to achieve the overall aim of the campaign.
Von Clausewitz, however, was not the only celebrated military theorist to emerge from the Napoleonic Era, Antoine Henri de Jomini also postulated an approach to warfare culminating in his book The Art of War40 (Precis de l’Art de Guerre) published in 1838. Jomini proposed a similar approach to von Clausewitz but with a significant difference, namely that the military objectives
37 Ibid., p578-584. 38 Ibid., p87. 39 Ibid., p75. 40 Antoine de Jomini, The Art of War, Greenhills Books, London, 1992.
15 should have priority over the political objectives. Jomini also advocated for the moral capability of the military leader and, like von Clausewitz, on the importance of attacking the decisive point. Jomini’s rules based approach had more appeal to the military professional and gained a significant following in the years after the Napoleonic Era. This was to change however when von Moltke41, Prussia’s chief of the General Staff between 1857 and 1888, adapted the work of von Clausewitz and gained quick and decisive victories in the wars against Austria-Hungary and France leading to the unification of Germany.
The French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic Era were to have a major effect on the conduct and understanding of conventional warfare. The strength of the conscripted citizen’s army fighting for the ideals of the nation overwhelmed the smaller professional armies which had previously been employed by kings and princes. The political and military bureaucracies developed to enable warfare during the ‘cabinet’ wars were expanded so that a significant proportion of the non-military capability of France was redirected to support the war effort unlike previously where the population was largely unaffected. France was also endowed with a leader of unusual military and political capabilities in Napoleon Bonaparte whose skill and organisational abilities led to unexpected military victories and to the eventual domination of the majority of Europe. The new ways of using military forces and the change in military and to some extent political leadership led to an outbreak of military theorists such as Jomini and von Clausewitz. Von Clausewitz developed and expanded the theories of Machiavelli, placing warfare in its social and political context. Von Clausewitz identified the trinity of the people, the general and his army and the government when considering the conduct of warfare. Von Clausewitz also proposed the concept of ‘total’ war whereby all the resources of the combatant, both military and non-military, would be utilised to maximise the chance of success but recognised that limited political objectives would only require ‘limited’ warfare. Von Clausewitz also introduced the concept of ‘friction’ (fog of war) to explain the limitations on the military leadership in conducting real war as opposed to an idealised concept. The ideas introduced and developed by von Clausewitz have formed a basis for understanding modern conventional warfare since their effectiveness was shown by von Moltke in the wars for unifying Germany. Von Clausewitz did, however, focus on the military aspects of the conduct of war and while recognising the political aspects, steered away from detailed analysis of the politics of war.
41 Daniel Hughes, ed., Moltke On the Art of War, Selected Writings. Presidio Press, Novato, CA, USA, 1993.
16 Modern Warfare
World War 1
Following the unification of Germany after the rapid and unexpected defeats of Austria and France, there developed an alliance system covering all the major powers of Europe. The two opposing alliances were centred around the Allies, based on the United Kingdom, France and Russia and the Central Powers, based on Germany and Austria. Italy, although allied with the Central Powers, eventually entered the war on the Allies side. The geographical reality meant that the Central Powers were facing a two front war. To overcome this, Germany, in particular, aimed for a rapid defeat of France in a similar fashion to 1870-1 and to then face Russia with its full military capability. The von Schlieffen plan was designed to sweep through the neutral countries of Belgium and Luxembourg which had the political effect of ensuring the United Kingdom’s entry into the war and smoothing the USA entry into the war in 1917. The von Schlieffen plan was flawed in that both the political and the military situation had changed since 1870 with the alliance system and significant advances in military technology and also in the scale of warfare. The inputs into warfare both political and military were different in 1914 than they were in 1870. Technologically World War 1 saw advances in communications through telephones and radios, significant developments in artillery with indirect fire becoming the major means of delivery, improved infantry weapons including rifles and machine guns, and the introduction of the internal combustion engine enabling the development of armoured vehicles including the tank and the rapid development of the aeroplane. World War 1 also saw developments in the types of artillery shells used, the use of submarines, the introduction of gas attacks, the use of flamethrowers and the newly developed capital ships.
The uninspired application of von Clausewitz’s and von Moltke’s approach to warfare (with a bit of Jomini thrown in) to a new technological situation and to the vast conscription armies of France, Germany and the United Kingdom led to the stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front. The attempt to fight a decisive battle that would quickly win the war led to the massed battles such as the Somme and the attack on Verdun. It is interesting to note that the situation on other battlefields in World War 1 was much more fluid with significant movements possible by the armies and concentration at a decisive point still being possible such as the Battle of Tannenburg on the Eastern Front. On the Western Front the war would drag on in the trenches for four years with the crucial event being the introduction of the USA into the war. The USA entered the war after several years of neutrality due to the military actions of Germany including the invasion of Belgium and the unrestricted submarine warfare conducted by Germany in the Atlantic. The political effect of military actions in a ‘total’ war was a significant reason for the defeat of Germany in 1918. An important technological development during World War 1 was the rapid advance in the capability of aeroplanes. Aeroplanes offered military strategists the chance to include three dimensions in their calculations rather than be limited to the surface of the earth. More importantly aeroplanes now offered the chance to bypass the main military strength of the opponent and to strike directly at one of the parts of von Clausewitz’s trinity that previously had been relatively safe, that is the people of the opposing nation.
17 Guilio Douhet – The Command of the Air
The dramatic development of the aeroplane during World War 1 brought forward advocates who theorised on how airpower could be used to change warfare. Three leading advocates for airpower after World War 1 were the Italian Guilio Douhet, the Englishman Hugh Trenchard and the American Billy Mitchell, all with direct experience of airpower during the war. Each of these advocates was to have a significant impact in their own countries but the seminal book was published by Douhet in 1921 with his Command of the Air42. Based on the experiences of the World War 1, Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell saw the difficulty of intercepting air attacks and the increased bombing capacity of larger aircraft and advocated the use of mass bombing of enemy cities as a way of destroying enemy civilian morale. In this approach the prime target of warfare had moved from defeating or destroying the enemy’s military to forcing the enemy to surrender due to the collapse of the civilian morale. The introduction of the aeroplane into warfare represented one of the most dramatic and far-reaching changes in the inputs to warfare. The aeroplane offered the chance to win a campaign in an entirely new way attacking the enemy in a way previously unimagined. These theories were to be behind the strategic bombings campaigns of World War 2 however, the developments of air defence capabilities in the 1930s meant that, in most cases, potential targets were prepared for any attacks by bomber aircraft and the simplistic notion that the civilian population would collapse under the initial attack was shown to be far from the truth. The use of morale boosting techniques in the home population became a significant input into their war effort for each nation during the war.
World War 2
Although World War 1 was idealistically sometimes called the “the war to end all wars”43, it soon became apparent that the political resolution achieved after World War 1 was not a long-term solution to the pressures that existed in Europe. World War 1 had led to the break-up of the Austria- Hungary, Ottoman and Russian Empires and the establishment of the Soviet Union changing the political landscape particularly in Eastern Europe. The Paris peace treaty of 1919 had also punished Germany as an instigator of the war leading to lasting resentment throughout that country. This allied with the significant economic problems caused by the Great Depression in the early 1930s led to the rise of Nazi government in Germany which was to ally itself with other totalitarian governments in Italy and Japan (the “Axis”). Reclaiming lost territories and territorial expansion became a significant driver in the aims of these countries. Several wars in the late 1930s, such as the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Axis support of the Spanish civil war and the Japanese invasion of China, were precursors to the global war that was to start in September 1939. These precursor wars gave the Axis a chance to refine their inputs into warfare with events such as the bombing of Guernica (April 1937), widely seen as the way that civilian bombing would occur in any future war.
Although World Wars 1 and 2 were both close to the ‘total’ war extreme of von Clausewitz and fought only twenty years apart, the way in which the wars were fought were greatly different. Technology and military theory had both advanced significantly in the intervening period. The rapid
42 Guilio Douhet, Command of the Air, www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100924-017.pdf, accessed 17th June 2012. 43 Perhaps based on the writings of H. G. Wells “The War that will end War”, Duffield & Company, London, 1914.
18 developments in tanks combined with the German doctrine of ‘blitzkrieg’ meant that the next war would not be bogged down in trench warfare like World War 1 but would involve rapid manoeuvres over large distances. Naval warfare had changed dramatically with the introduction of the aircraft carrier which led to the first naval battle where the opposing fleets were neither sighted nor directly fired upon but in which all attacks were carried out by fleet based aircraft (Battle of the Coral Sea, 1942). There were also significant developments in the capabilities of submarines leading to the development of technological counters to submarines through the use of SONAR and Radar. The promise of airpower from World War 1 was largely realised in the capabilities seen in World War 2. The changes in the capabilities of aircraft in terms of speed, manoeuvrability, range and payload made air superiority crucial to the success of any ground operation. Strategic bombing attacks, similar to those envisaged by Douhet, were carried out but less successfully than had been expected due to several factors, including integrated defences using radar to identify any attacks, the absence of poison gas to attack the population and limited size of the air fleets, particularly early in the war. Rapid advances were made in airpower during the war as well with the first introduction of jet aircraft and the use of long-range missiles such as the V-1 and the V-2. Finally there was the development of the atomic bomb which helped to bring World War 2 to a close and which could be argued as a vindication of the approach of Douhet.44
Recent Limited Warfare
The conflict in Korea was fought as a limited conventional war with victories and defeats on both sides, however, the introduction of an ‘unforeseen’ input in terms of the intervention of the Chinese Army had the military commander of the Allies considering, possibly even advocating the use of atomic weapons. The Allied political leadership would not allow nuclear weapons to be used even though the direct opposition did not have that capability and would not extend the conflict into Chinese territory. Similarly biological weapons have not been used since World War 2 and there are moves to restrict other weapons such as anti-personnel mines and incendiary weapons.45 Thus the inputs into warfare that a nation controls can also be limited by its internal political stance or by its agreement to international conventions. In recent wars this can be seen in the attempts to limit civilian casualties in both the first and second Iraq wars.
John Warden – The Enemy as a System46
The disparity between the promise of the airpower theorists and the reality of airpower success in World War 2 led to further developments in the theory of warfare. In 1995 John Warden published his theory on treating The Enemy as a System47 in which he outlines his approach to the strategic level of warfare. In his approach Warden took the concept of ‘centre of gravity’48 of von Clausewitz
44 See United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War) and United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War) for a summary of the effect of strategic bombing (http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm) 45 See the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cprccc/cprccc.html 46 John Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, accessed from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html on 21 Jun 2012 and John Warden, The Enemy as a System, Airpower Journal, Spring 1995 http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj95/spr95_files/warden.htm, accessed on 16 July 2013. 47 John Warden, The Enemy as a System, op.cit., accessed on 16 July 2013. 48 Carl von Clausewitz, op.cit., p294.
19 and applied it to the new strategic situation which now included the ability to hit targets with precision. The centre of gravity for von Clausewitz was the battle whereas for Warden “it describes that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive”49 and may not involve a military target at all. Warden explained his theory by using a five ring model, shown in Diagram 5, whereby the closer the target is to the centre then the more influence it has over the decisions the leadership makes. For example, if the system essentials, which are “facilities or processes without which the state or organisation cannot maintain itself”50 such as the power supply for a nation, are damaged or destroyed it can lead to the collapse of the ability of the system to function. Warden noted that attacking all the rings in ‘parallel’ would be the preferred approach as it could cause ‘strategic paralysis’ to the enemy system. Such an approach was demonstrated in the first Iraq War in 1991 leading to the rapid defeat of the Iraqi military forces and their withdrawal from Kuwait.
Diagram 5 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 5 – Warden’s five ring model51
Warden introduced a new hierarchical model in which to manage the inputs of war allied with the technological advances which made the implementation of his concept possible. Early airpower made it possible to attack the population ring of the opposing nation and further technological advances have increasingly made it possible to target the rings progressively closer to the centre and, if the resources are available, to target the rings simultaneously. When the opponent has a centralised structure with significant infrastructure supporting his capabilities then this model represents the current state of the theory of conventional warfare.
World War 1 and 2 demonstrated the concept of ‘total’ war where all the resources of the states were used in an all-out effort to achieve success however the Western Front also demonstrated that the uninspired understanding and application of military theory led the drain of attritional trench warfare. The coordination of the military, political and social aspects of society meant that large military forces and large amounts of military equipment were available to conduct the war. The morale of both the military and the population were channelled to supporting the war effort along with the entire economy of the state being diverted onto a war footing.
The most significant change to the inputs of warfare, however, was the introduction of the internal combustion engine allowing the development of the tank and the aeroplane. The aeroplane has proven to be the most far-reaching of the advances in that it carries warfare into the third dimension and offers the chance to bypass the main military strength of the opponent and to strike directly at the opposing nation and its population. The introduction of airpower into warfare led to theories of how to exploit airpower to the maximum advantage and the most notable of these was by Douhet. This theory advocated that airpower could be used in a massed way to destroy entire cities,
49 John Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Pergamon-Brassey International Defense Publishers, Virginia, USA, 1989, p7. 50 John Warden, The Enemy as a System, op.cit., accessed on 16 July 2013. 51 John Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, op.cit., accessed on 21 Jun 2012.
20 wrecking the morale of the enemy population and that the attacked nation would be forced to admit defeat. All too quickly World War 2 gave an opportunity to test these theories however, in the short time between when the theories were proposed and the start of the war, technology had already moved on and defences had been developed to mitigate the effect of the mass bombing raids. World War 2 however, showcased more rapid technological advances across most areas of warfare including communications, highly mobile tanks, the use of radar and Sonar and towards the end of the war jet aircraft, long range missiles and the first use of the atomic bomb. Following World War 2 it is interesting to note that some weapons have not been generally used in warfare, namely atomic or biological weapons and that there are political moves to restrict the use of other weapons such as anti-personnel mines.
The ability to attack beyond the immediate military forces has been formulated into a theory by Warden and his five rings model. This model extends beyond the traditional von Clausewitz by recognising that there are elements in the opposing nation which can be much more important to them than their fielded military.
Proposed Inputs to Warfare
It should be noted that the inputs to warfare can vary in importance over time and within different situations. The difference between the inputs on the opposing sides will have an influence on how important that input is likely to be. If both sides possess the same technology levels then the morale of the troops or the leadership skill of the commanders may be the determining factors. Sometimes morale or leadership can overcome a deficit in another input. The most useful theories of warfare will be applicable to a wide range of situations rather than the specific circumstances prevailing at the time of their development. Although theorists like Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz were developing their theories for the inputs of the time and for their target audience, elements of their theories have been successfully adapted across a wide range of wars. This implies that these inputs into warfare have an enduring importance even though their relative importance may vary in each situation. A generalised list of the inputs into warfare have been listed below, noting that these inputs operate on both sides of the conflict and that this listing neglects the interaction that exists in real world between the various inputs.
21 Military forces o Strength o Organisation/training o Morale or ‘virtu’ o Technological skill and ability Non-Military Capability o Terrain o Economic resources o Politics including alliances o International agreements o Morale or ‘virtu’ o Technological skill and ability Military leadership o Skill/organisation o Ability to handle ‘friction’ (fog of war) o ‘virtu’ Political leadership o Skill/organisation o ‘virtu’ Military theory o Development o Understanding o Application ‘Unforeseen’ inputs o Adaptability/flexibility o Training for ‘unforeseen’ inputs o Resilience
These inputs will be used as a framework for understanding the conduct of warfare in the following chapters and tested against selected historical occurrences of irregular warfare as well as various theories of irregular warfare with the aim of augmenting the list if necessary. These inputs, gleaned by studying the ‘easier’ case of conventional warfare, will be used to provide useful insights into understanding how irregular warfare is conducted.
22 Chapter 2 Selected History of Irregular Warfare
In Chapter 1 selected cases and theories from a particular class of warfare, namely conventional warfare were analysed and a framework of the inputs to warfare was developed. Chapter 2 examines selected cases of another class of warfare, namely irregular warfare, with the aim of determining whether the framework of inputs to warfare developed in Chapter 1 can describe the contributing inputs to irregular warfare or whether there are other inputs to warfare for this class of warfare. Irregular warfare has in some ways been the ‘poor cousin’ to conventional warfare with less attention, both historical and theoretical, being applied to it. Von Clausewitz considered it ‘a phenomenon of the nineteenth century’52 and his discussion of popular uprisings ‘has been less an objective analysis than a groping for the truth’53. Jomini was quite dismissive of irregular warfare, saying that ’as a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organised assassination’54. There are many accounts of the glorious military campaigns waged by armies throughout recorded history; however the ‘popular uprising’ or irregular war has not been as well served, particularly before the twentieth century. This chapter will begin by examining the popular uprisings in Judea as part of the Roman Empire in the first century and then examine more modern examples of irregular warfare starting with the United States War of Independence and the Spanish Peninsula during the Napoleonic Era. It will proceed to examine more recent examples of irregular warfare, in many cases where irregular warfare has been adopted as a deliberate choice in the means of conducting warfare. Irregular warfare has occurred in a wide range of circumstances and has been conducted in a variety of ways, particularly in the last one hundred years. In each of these selected cases the inputs into the irregular warfare will be determined and compared to the framework of inputs to warfare outlined in Chapter 1 with the aim of determining whether conventional warfare and irregular warfare have a common set of inputs to warfare.
To attempt to cover the diversity of irregular warfare this chapter will examine nine occurrences of irregular warfare and will include cases where the warfare is about;
an invasion from outside the country (e.g. the Spanish Peninsula, Iraq); rebelling against a long standing occupation of the country (e.g. Judea, Vietnam); internal civil wars (e.g. the Chinese revolution, El Salvador); how international actions can influence events (e.g. the US War of Independence, the Chinese Revolution); irregular warfare as part of a larger war (e.g. World War 1); setting the situation for a conventional warfare campaign (e.g. China, the Spanish Peninsula); successful irregular warfare campaigns (e.g. Vietnam, China); unsuccessful irregular warfare campaigns (e.g. Malaya); negotiated ends to irregular warfare (e.g. El Salvador); and recent irregular warfare campaigns (e.g. Iraq).
A number of other occurences of irregular warfare have also been analysed but, due to limitations on the size of this thesis, have not been included here. These examples of irregular warfare are the Vendee in 1793, the ‘Resistance’ in World War 2, Somalia (1991-), Indonesia (1945-1949), Thailand
52 Carl von Clausewitz, op.cit., p578. 53 Carl von Clausewitz, op.cit., p583. 54 Antoine de Jomini, op.cit., p34-35.
23 (1965-1982) and Afghanistan(1979-) and the analysis is consistent with the examples included in this chapter.
Revolts in the Roman Empire - Judea
Ancient Rome, as the leading empire of its day, suffered a number of revolts in the lands that it claimed. Primarily these revolts occurred as “an uprising among people who are regarded as basically conquered and in the process of Romanization”55 such as the revolts of Vercingetorix (53BC), Arminius (21AD), Boudicca (60AD) and the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt (6-9AD). Each of these revolts were characterised by a strong leader drawing together forces to fight battles with the Roman legions in what could be considered conventional war for that era. The Jewish uprisings (66- 73AD and 132-135AD) and in particular the first of these, the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73AD) as described by Flavius Josephus56, have a different character to them. Judea had first come under the influence of Rome about 100 years before when Judea became a client kingdom and in 6AD was made a Roman province. The Jewish revolts, according to Josephus, were caused in part by the corruption of the Roman rulers and in part by the ethnic and religious conflicts in the area. The mismanagement of the country produced an environment where the religious and ethnic tensions could spark into a full rebellion. The Emperor responded to the conflict by sending a large military force with new military and political leadership which, over the course of several years defeated the rebellion using conventional military means. The result of the defeat of the rebellion was the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem and the dispersion of most of the Jews away from Judea, many of them as slaves. Following further revolts (the Kitos War, 115-117AD and the Bar Kokhba revolt, 132-136 AD) the Jews were banned from entering Jerusalem and the Emperor Hadrian tried to remove Judaism from the area entirely, forbidding the practice of the Jewish faith.
The combination of the mismanagement of the Roman administration in the Judea province with the sometimes fanatical religious views of some of the population led to clashes between societies which soon escalated into a full civil war. While the Roman Empire faced many other revolts ranging from newly conquered provinces to slave revolts to civil wars between political factions, the Jewish rebellion presented a different situation to the Roman leaders. The Jewish rebellion was not characterised by a strong leader trying to unify the people behind him to achieve common goals but it was a general uprising across the area with a range of leaders, with each of them leading a fraction of the overall insurrection, meaning that a single battle would not decide the outcome of the rebellion. In terms of the inputs to warfare indentified in Chapter 1, the Jewish rebellion was caused by, first of all, a failure in the political leadership of the Romans and, secondly, by the politics (including religion) and morale of the Jewish people. The failure of the Roman political leadership was spread across the skill/organisation of the structure that the Romans used to govern Judea and the ‘virtu’ of the Roman leadership in Judea at the time. This was combined with the religious views contained in the Jewish faith which had political overtones with the Jews considering themselves as separate and for many of the Jews as independent from all others. The Romans primarily used
55 Native Revolts in the Roman Empire, Stephen L. Dyson, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Bd. 20, H. 2/3 (2nd Qtr., 1971), pp. 239-274 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag, Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435194, accessed 24th July 2012. 56 The Antiquities of the Jews, Flavius Josephus, accessed from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2848, accessed 24th July 2012, The Wars of the Jews, Flavius Josephus, accessed from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2850, accessed 24th July 2012.
24 military force to subdue each of the rebellions but when military force proved only a temporary measure in gaining control, they used the political measure of dispersing the Jews away from Judea and repressing their religion as a means of preventing a rebellion occurring again. This combination of military and political capabilities was used to defeat the rebellion and to prevent the re- occurrence of any conflict.
United States War of Independence
There are many examples of irregular warfare following the Jewish revolts, ranging from social banditry to revolts of national identity and to peasant revolts against the ruling elite (eg Wat Tyler’s rising in 1381 and the German Peasant War in 1525). 57 The tactics used in the warfare varied between the mass risings of untrained peasants, usually leading to a rapid defeat, to the avoidance of direct combat and the use of hit and run tactics to wear down what was usually a militarily superior force. An example of the mixture of conventional and irregular warfare is the American War of Independence (1775-83). The American War of Independence began through a dispute which is characterised by the slogan “no taxation without representation”. The Revolution broke out in 1775 with confrontations between the local militia and the British Army at Lexington and Concord. The situation was exacerbated by the British declaring the Continental Congress as traitors to which they responded by declaring the independence of the United States of America on July 4 1776. Note that a significant proportion of the American population (known as the Tories) was loyal to the British crown at the beginning of the war. The war, which began as a dispute of taxation between Britain and one of its colonies, expanded with the involvement of French, Dutch and Spanish who were supporting the revolutionaries and, more importantly for them, opposing the British. The French, openly after 1778, provided a significant naval element on the revolutionaries’ side, counterbalancing the British dominance at sea.
The warfare of the American War of Independence varied from large battles fought in a conventional manner (Battle of Long Island, August 1776, Battle of Monmouth, June 1778), mostly fought in the north, to a largely irregular war being fought in the south. The character of the war was largely due to the distribution of the population (see diagram 6) and the terrain in the colonies. Large military operations were impractical in a logistics sense unless they able to be supported by sea or by extensive land transport58 as the low population density produced little food and required few roads. The quality of the British professional soldiers was superior to the American soldier59 but this was not to be decisive. Although the irregular warfare in the south was not the crucial factor in the success of the American War of Independence, it was important in preventing its failure.
Diagram 6 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 6. Population Density in the American Colonies in 177560
57 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1998, Chapter 1, pgs 3-50. 58 Ibid, pg 19. 59 Jac Weller, Irregular But Effective: Partizan Weapons Tactics in the American Revolution, Southern Theatre, Military Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Autumn, 1957), pg 119. 60 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Population_Density_in_the_American_Colonies_1775.gif, accessed 21 August 2012
25 The tactics of the American continental army generally followed the European model, which relied on having large masses of disciplined infantry. Cavalry and artillery, due to the reasons given above, were difficult both to support and to use and played a much smaller role in America than in Europe.61 The irregular tactics of the American patriots or partisans were based on their considerable experience gained in the Indian wars. The American partisans would use hit and run tactics or accurate aimed shooting to wear down the British rather than the conventional tactics of a mass volley from the infantry followed by a bayonet charge. 62 The irregular tactics of the American partisans led to insurmountable difficulties for the British Army. The irregular tactics isolated the British troops and made it difficult to supply any logistics support as well as maintaining a significant count of casualties. Harsh counter-tactics by the British alienated the population of the area which in the end meant that there was little hope of maintaining British control of the colonies.
An analysis of the American War of Independence shows several of the inputs of warfare identified in Chapter 1 to be important in the conduct and outcome of the war. The war began because of a lack of political skill on the side of the British in handling the discontent caused by “taxation without representation”. One of the inputs to warfare that the British had trouble in countering was the intervention in the war of its European rivals. This intervention spread the war beyond the American mainland, provided a counterbalancing naval force to prevent total British domination of the seas and provided a source of supplies and a small amount of manpower to the American cause. The inputs to warfare which were to have some of the most significant effects were the terrain and population density (a factor in the economic resources) in the American colonies. The terrain made the movement of large military forces difficult and the low population density meant that large military forces could not live off the land but had to carry the majority of their supplies. This became a problem when the British relied largely on the military tactics developed in the European theatre without sufficient adaptation to the American environment as they could not field an overwhelming number of troops to swamp the American military forces. The quality and training of the British troops, while superior to the American forces, did not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war. The American military leadership, in particular George Washington, recognising their weaknesses, adopted a defensive strategic approach to conduct of the war and were wary of forcing a ‘decisive’ battle. 63 The irregular warfare approach of the Americans particularly in the south drained the resources and the morale of the British and eventually the British, realising that victory was not achievable, ended the war with the Treaties of Paris (the US) and Versailles (the European allies of the US) in 1783.
The Spanish Guerrilla War against Napoleon
The excesses of the various revolutionary governments in France resulted in 1799 with Napoleon Bonaparte taking political control of the country. Napoleon embarked on a series of wars across Europe and by the middle of 1807 Napoleon had defeated the major European powers of Austria, Prussia and Russia, which led to the French domination of the continent (see Diagram 7).64 The
61 For example, George Washington in a letter to Governor Jonathon Trumbull, Head Quarters, New York, July 9, 1776 accessed from http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer- new2?id=WasFi05.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=all on 23 August 2012 62 Walter Laqueur, op.cit., pg 21. 63 Ibid, pg 21. 64 Charles Eisdale, The Peninsular War, Penguin Books, London 2003, pgs 1-3.
26 remaining major power opposed to France and Napoleon was Great Britain. Unable to attack the English militarily due to several naval defeats, Napoleon instituted the Continental Blockade to prevent any trade between Great Britain and the countries of Europe aiming to weaken the British economically. Europe in 1811. Colors indicate (from dark blue to light blue) : Diagram 7 has been removed due to - Dark blue - French Empire, Copyright restrictions. - Light Blue - French Satellite States, - Blue grey - Countries applying the Continental System.
Diagram 7 Map of Europe showing French domination and the extent of the Continental blockade65
Unfortunately Napoleon’s control over Europe was not absolute and the weakest spot in the Blockade was the Iberian Peninsula, in particular Portugal which had both historical and major trade links with the English. This resulted in Napoleon invading Portugal in late 1807 and by the end of November Napoleon’s troops had occupied Lisbon. Unnerved by the instability with the Spanish monarchy and expecting a similarly easy victory, Napoleon orchestrated a move against Spain itself and by May 1808 Napoleon was in direct control of the whole of the Iberian Peninsula. However, when Napoleon forced the abdication of the Spanish royal family and installed his brother Joseph as King of Spain, the population of Spain began a revolt which, in the end, was to prove devastating for the Napoleonic Empire.66
After initial difficulties, by the end of December 1808 most of Spain was under French control and, as stated by Laqueur “By 1809 the Spanish regular armies had virtually ceased to exist and it was in that year that the guerrillas first appeared on the scene”67 - it was these guerrillas which were to present such a problem for the French over the next five years. The remaining conventional military force opposing the French on the Iberian Peninsula was the British Army, commanded by Wellington with support from the Portuguese. However the French could not defeat Wellington, as stated by Laqueur, “The French had a four-to-one superiority in regular soldiers in the Peninsula and it was the guerrillas’ diversions that prevented a mass concentration of these forces against Wellington, with what well might have been fatal results”. 68 The guerrillas of Spain did not defeat Napoleon; this was brought about by the disaster of the French invasion of Russia and the combined strength of the armies of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia. “The real achievement of the Spanish guerrillas was political and psychological, the fact that popular resistance continued and that it constituted a serious problem for the occupiers”. 69
In terms of the inputs to warfare the Peninsular War shows similarities to the previous examples. The Spanish patriots did not have an efficient or effective political organisation. The Spanish patriots
65 Accessed from http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Europe_map_Napoleon_Blocus.png on the 6 June 2013 66 For a history of the Peninsula War see either, Charles Eisdale, The Peninsular War, Penguin Books, London 2003 or David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War, Guild Publishing, London, 1986. 67 Walter Laqueur, op.cit., pg 31. 68 Ibid, pg 39. 69 Ibid, pg 41.
27 did not have an effective army or military leadership that could stand up to the quality of the French troops but by using guerrilla tactics, the Spanish could tie up vast numbers of French troops and reduce the French numbers and morale through attrition. This worked well in conjunction with the British intervention in the conflict through their military forces as well as the general aid they supplied to the Spanish. The Spanish population did show a determination to resist the French occupation of their country due to a sense of nationalism which the French could not overcome. The French, on the other hand, possessed effective political and military organisations which had dominated the majority of Europe. However a grave political miscalculation of removing the Spanish royal family provoked a general rebellion throughout the country. The French, although led by the military genius of Napoleon, could not or did not want to adapt to the political and military situation in Spain. For the French the answer remained in the conduct of conventional military operations to remove any threats to their control. As admitted by Napoleon “that unfortunate war destroyed me; it divided my forces, multiplied my obligations, undermined my morale….All the circumstances of my disasters are bound up in that fatal knot”. 70
The Arab Revolt in World War 1
World War 1 was predominantly a European war fought on the Western and Eastern fronts. There were however, military actions in Africa and Asia, in particular over the colonial possessions of the German Empire. One of the major theatres of war outside Europe was in the Middle East where the Ottoman Empire, an ally of the Axis powers was battling a small Allied force over the control of the region (see Diagram 8).
Diagram 8 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 8 The Ottoman Empire in 191471
During World War 1 the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Axis powers. To aid Russia militarily and to protect its strategic links to both its oil interests in the Middle East and to its interests in southern Asia, mainly India, Britain and the Allies began a campaign based in Egypt. The failure of the Gallipoli campaign in 1915 saw the start of the Palestine campaign, attacking the Ottoman Empire from the south. As part of this campaign the British planned to use the nationalistic feelings to promote an insurrection by the Arab tribes in the Middle East.72 One of the more successful officers used to promote this insurrection was Major T. E. Lawrence who had extensive pre-war experience in the Middle East (the approach to irregular warfare of T E. Lawrence will be considered in Chapter 3). Lawrence became symbolic of the British coordination of the Arab guerrilla attack, mainly against the railway supply line and several attacks on smaller garrisons, thus tying up many Ottoman troops which otherwise could have been used to greater effect against the British Army in Egypt.
70 As quoted in John L. Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain, University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 71 http://lostislamichistory.com/how-the-british-divided-up-the-arab-world/, accessed 31st Aug. 2012. 72 For more detail on the Arab Revolt see for example, David Murphy, The Arab Revolt 1916-18: Lawrence sets Arabia ablaze, Osprey Publishing, 2008.
28 An analysis of the inputs to warfare for the Arab Revolt in World War 1 shows that the Arabs possessed little in terms of cohesive political organisation, with more loyalty to each tribe than a national identity, minimal military skills and organisation and, at times, suspect morale. The political skills and military organisation were supplemented and in some cases supplied by the British liaison officers who manoeuvred the Arab revolt to achieve the Allied war aims without achieving any Arab nationalistic aims. It was the alliance with the Allies through the liaison officers and the logistics support that they provided that enabled the Arab revolt to succeed as well as it did. The Ottomans lacked sufficient military strength in the theatre to both defend their existing positions and to overwhelm the Allied forces in the Middle East. The declining Ottoman Empire could not provide enough resources to win the campaigns that it embarked upon and could not sufficient rouse its troops to overcome the difficulties that they faced.
The Chinese Civil War 1927-1950
The Qing dynasty of China fell in 1912 after years of decline due to external pressure and the failure of reform and modernisation measures within the country. By 1923 the Kuomintang (KMT) party had formed an alliance with the recently formed Communist Party of China (CPC) and both parties, under the ‘First United Front’ and supported by the Soviet government in Russia, aimed to create a new China. However in 1927 the alliance between the KMT and the CPC collapsed, initiating the Chinese Civil War which was to last for essentially the next twenty years. The KMT leader, General Chiang Kai-shek, proceeded to unite China by the end of 1928 through specific military battles but more importantly, by convincing many warlords to join the KMT in a unified China. This allowed Chiang Kai-shek to concentrate, apart from several internal conflicts against specific warlords, on the campaign against the CPC. After a series of unsuccessful campaigns against the CPC, Chiang Kai-shek finally developed an approach in the fifth campaign which involved the systematic encirclement of the communist area with fortified blockhouses approximately every five miles which effectively cut off the source of supplies to the CPC. This brought about the retreat of the CPC army, by this time led by Mao Zedong, and began the ‘Long March’ across China (see Diagram 9). The Long March was achievable as many of the warlords refused to confront the CPC army when it was in their area so as to preserve the warlord’s own military strength. The final destination, Shaanxi province, was sufficiently remote from the KMT areas of strength and strategically of lesser importance, to make it difficult for the KMT to pursue the communists. Chiang Kai-shek was in the process of consolidating his power in China by eliminating warlords and the CPC, however, there was a growing threat from the north where Japan was expanding its control. By the end of 1936 Chiang Kai-shek was forced into an alliance with the CPC, the Second United Front, to fight the Japanese invaders who proceeded to occupy most of coastal China (see Diagram 9).
Diagram 9 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 9. China 1934-4473.
73 Accessed from http://chinabetweencommunismandcapitalism.wikispaces.com/Capialism+and+Communism on the 1st October 2012.
29 The CPC, in keeping with its reduced military capabilities, only maintained a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese, whereas the KMT, as the recognised government of China and under direct threat fought a conventional war against a superior opponent. The war against the Japanese was to prove costly for the KMT in terms of troops and popular support whereas the CPC used the war years to improve both its military capabilities and its support amongst the population. The confrontation between the CPC and the KMT renewed itself as the war against the Japanese came to its end and the CPC, receiving considerable supplies from the surrendering Japanese as well as covert support from the Soviet Union, was now in a vastly improved position. The CPC were also promising significant land reforms whereby the Chinese peasants would be able to take farmland from their landlords thus generating solid support in the rural areas. By 1946 the final phase of the Chinese civil war had begun with a conventional military campaign between two large armies. By late 1949 the Chinese communists controlled all of mainland China and the KMT had retreated to the island of Taiwan.
A number of inputs to warfare are evident in the conduct of the Chinese civil war which could be expected given the time span and geographical range of the conflict. The military forces on the KMT side consisted of conventional armies organised along traditional military lines however the difficulty was that a number of the armies were controlled by local warlords who would look after their own interests first and not necessarily commit their forces to the advantage of China and the KMT. The military forces for the CPC ranged from lowly trained guerrillas to conventional armies with weapons and skills comparable to the KMT conventional forces, particularly near the end of the civil war. As this was a civil war the internal economic resources available to both sides were based on the Chinese population and thus depended on the control of the particular area and the allegiance of the population to their leaders. The ability of the CPC to appeal to the population through its offer of significant land reforms played a major role in it achieving a dominant position near the end of the war. The political leadership offered by the CPC across China turned out to be much more effective than that offered by the KMT. In fact Chiang Kai-shek believed that “the Kuomintang had failed, not because of external enemies but because of disintegration and rot from within”. 74 International politics and events also played an important role in the eventual outcome of the Chinese civil war: at various times both the CPC and KMT were allied with Soviet Russia; it could be argued that if it were not for the Japanese invasion of China during the 1930s that the KMT may have been able to defeat the CPC insurgency75 particularly following the success of its fifth encirclement campaign; the fight against the Japanese materially drained the military capabilities of the KMT particularly in comparison to the CPC; the surrender of the Japanese significantly bolstered the military equipment available to CPC; and the decision by the US to limit the aid to the KMT after the defeat of the Japanese due to concerns about corruption within the Chinese government. The CPC was able to adapt and use the invasion by Japan to both politically and militarily gain an advantage in the civil war with the KMT.
74 Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for China by Tom Bethell in the Hoover Digest, 2007 No 1, accessed from http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5835 on the 2nd October 2012. 75 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 2006, pg 200; Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1974, pg 118.
30 Malaya – 1948-1960
Japan had occupied Malaya during World War 2 and after the war ended the Malayan economy was significantly disrupted. The British re-established control of the country after the war, however the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), aiming for independence under a communist government and which had formed the main guerrilla resistance to the Japanese, formed the Malayan National Liberation Army and the confrontation broke out in July 1948. The support for the MCP was mainly from the ethnic Chinese which constituted about 40% of the Malayan population.76 The government response to the violence was to instigate a ‘search and destroy’ policy aimed at eliminating the insurgents and their supporters through large scale sweeps across the countryside. The heavy- handed tactics involved in the search and destroy approach not only failed to intercept many insurgents but also antagonised the sections of the population where the operations occurred thereby increasing the support for the insurgents. By 1952 it was recognised that the strategy needed to be changed and the British government installed General Gerald Templer as the High Commissioner of Malaya. Templer brought about a new approach to the insurgency and as stated by Stubbs “For Templer, the key to defeating the Communists lay in administrative, political, economic, cultural, spiritual, and military factors. The campaign he envisaged was to be all out and on all fronts – the counterinsurgency equivalent of ‘total war’”.77 Templer did this by retraining and refocusing the police and home guard to protect the community, by improving the civil administration of the country leading to a better standard of life for the population and elections and independence in 1957, by resettling villages away from the insurgency areas denying the insurgents easy access to basic supplies and by improving the intelligence gathering on the insurgents. This approach became known as ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population and within two years the insurgency was under control and was declared over in July 1960.
In terms of the inputs to warfare, the MCP had several disadvantages. The support for the MCP was centred in the Chinese proportion of the population (less than 40% of the total population) with little or no effective international support (in the early 1950s Chinese attention was focussed on the Korean War). Militarily the MCP was never large enough to launch conventional attacks on Malayan military targets and its overall military approach was not designed to achieve popular support across the total population. Politically it did not succeed in indoctrinating large sections of the population and it was not able to project the insurgency as a nationalistic independence movement. The resources of the MCP were heavily dependent on accessing the Chinese villages in the areas that the MCP operated and when the government instituted a resettlement program for those villages, the MCP lost access to the majority of its basic supplies such as food. Note that the MCP did not have any access to cross border bases or logistics during its insurgency.
The government initially responded to the insurgency with a military search and destroy campaign which was ineffective and counterproductive. The government achieved greater success once it began a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign involving improving the standard of living for the population through economic development and security improvements. The government set about isolating the insurgency by removing villages in the contentious areas and resettling them into a safer, more
76 Richard Stubbs, ‘From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60’ in ‘Counterinsurgency in Modern Wars’, D. Marston and C. Malkasian, eds, Osprey Publishing, 2008, pg 113. 77 Ibid, pg 121.
31 controlled location. The government undermined the morale of the insurgent fighters by offering generous amnesty conditions to entice them to give up the fighting. The Malayan government was also aided by the economic conditions at the time where the mines and rubber plantations were doing well amongst the general world economic expansion of the 1950s. The granting of independence to Malaya, taking effect in 1957, removed any of the nationalistic support for the insurgency and the ‘hearts and minds’ policy was well managed politically once it was instigated. Overall the Malayan government was able to outmanoeuvre the MCP in the political, economic and military fronts to ensure the defeat of the insurgency in Malaya.
The Vietnam War 1947-1975
The domination of Asia by Japan during World War 2 and the collapse of its empire at the end of the war had, as shown in previous sections, left power vacuums across the Asian region and French Indochina, (including Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (see diagram 10)) was a prime example of this vacuum.
Diagram 10 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 10 French Indochina78
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) was officially formed in 1930 and, when the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the CPV (and their military arm, the Viet Minh) were well placed to seize control of Vietnam. However China, under Chiang Kai-shek, intervened and, in exchange for French concessions in China, forced an agreement between the French and the CPV, ensuring that French control of the region was possible from March 1946. The French attempted to re-establish their influence in the region but due to the devastation of France in Europe and the limited resources available, this was only possible in a limited way. Guerrilla fighting soon broke out between the CPV and the French and by 1947 a full rebellion had begun.79 There was a similar trend to the other insurgencies in the area where the insurgents controlled the countryside and the French controlled the major cities with their interest centring on the south of the country. The success of the Chinese revolution in 1949 changed the situation with the CPV now having a major supporter bordering to the north. In 1950, in line with the Truman doctrine80 and the ‘domino theory’ which was prominent in the US political debate, the US started to support the French against the spread of communism.
By 1950 the CPV had also developed regular troops to fight against the French and while they were not a match in larger battles, they focussed on mobile warfare and attacked smaller units. The French gradually began to lose control of the country and by 1954 were defeated in the major battle at Dien Bien Phu. This led to an agreed armistice at the Geneva Conference dividing Vietnam into two separate countries at the seventeenth parallel.
78 Accessed from http://prioryworldhistory.wikispaces.com/file/view/indochina.gif/122863085/indochina.gif on the 14 October 2012. 79 Corum, J. S. and Johnson, W. R., ‘Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists’, University Press of Kansas, 2003, pg 146. 80 For the text of Truman speech supporting Greece and Turkey against insurgency see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp accessed 15 Oct 2012
32 After an election scheduled for July 1956 with the aim of re-unifying the two parts was not held, an insurgency began in South Vietnam led by the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong insurgency slowly gained momentum and by 1958 it presented a threat to the South Vietnamese government led by Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem responded with a repressive approach to the insurgency however the corruption in his government meant that the repression and the reforms that he attempted, in particular land reform, were doomed. This failing of the administration was further exacerbated by the policy of the Viet Cong to assassinate the village officials in the countryside81 undermining the control of the Diem government. The US involvement in the counterinsurgency gradually increased, however the US military were determined to approach the insurgency as a conventional warfare campaign. In November 1963, there was a military overthrow of the government and Diem was assassinated. There followed a succession of military governments and the seeming failure of the South Vietnamese military to be able to control the situation - note that the military had been trained and equipped by the US military for conventional warfare and so the failure is perhaps understandable.82 After providing air and naval support in the previous years, in 1965 the US committed its first ground troops into the conflict. The focus of the US military was to destroy the enemy and its measure was the body count. Any attempts to modify this approach to achieve a more political or population centric approach were stifled by the US military leaders.83 The misunderstanding of the aim of the Vietnamese revolutionary leaders by the US military and politicians was demonstrated by the Tet offensive in 1968 whereby the Viet Cong launched a general assault in the major cities of South Vietnam. The Tet offensive was soundly defeated by the US military however the fighting had the effect the Viet Cong were seeking in that the perception of the war by the population of the US changed dramatically. The US approach soon changed to one of ‘Vietnamisation’ of the conflict, that is, turning the fighting back over the South Vietnam forces, with firepower support being provided by US air power. The last US ground troops were withdrawn in 1972 and it was that year that North Vietnam launched a conventional invasion which was defeated with the support of the US airpower. When North Vietnam invaded next in 1975, the US was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal and did not provide air support to South Vietnam and the war was over in a few months.84 In quick succession both Cambodia and Laos fell to communist revolutions.
The inputs to warfare for the Vietnam War can be divided into two time periods for the counterinsurgency actors – the French period (1947-1954) and the US period (1955-1975). The military forces and the political organisation required for French control of Indochina had been severely weakened or eliminated by the Japanese occupation of the region during World War 2. The aftermath of the war in Europe meant that France did not have the capability to put either the economic resources or the military forces into the restoration of the colonial status of French Indochina. The skill level available to the French in both the political and military ranks were not suitable to the challenge of nationalistic insurgency encouraged by both the reverses of France during the war and the successes of the Chinese communist revolution to their north. The French tried to control the country using conventional military forces and tactics and the growing communist insurgency was eventually able to defeat them even at this level.
81 Walter Laqueur, op.cit., pg 271. 82 Corum, J. S. and Johnson, W. R., op.cit., pg 240. 83 Nagl, J. A., ‘Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organizational Culture and Learning’ in ‘Counterinsurgency in Modern Wars’, D. Marston and C. Malkasian, eds, Osprey Publishing, 2008, pgs 138- 140. 84 Ibid, pg 146.
33 During the US period the counterinsurgents, the US and the South Vietnamese, were able to field overwhelming military forces with a vastly superior technological ability compared to their opponents. The US was able to defeat any conventional military attack by the Viet Cong with minimal casualties. In the 1950s and early 1960s the US was willing to put in a large amount of resources into the counterinsurgency to stop the progression of communism as outlined in the ‘domino theory’. This situation had changed however by the late 1960s when popular opinion in the US turned against the war and the failure of the communist insurgencies in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia had meant that the ‘domino theory’ could no longer be used to justify the US’s participation in the war. This was also aligned with a failure in military leadership and the application of appropriate military theory by the US who, like the French, attempted to fight the war as a conventional campaign.
In contrast to the counterinsurgents, the insurgency of the CPV was based on mobilising the population throughout the country and, if necessary, eliminating any local opposition. The CPV had the advantage of fighting a nationalistic insurgency and, when fighting against South Vietnam, fighting against a ‘corrupt’ military and political leadership. The military forces of North Vietnam were only able to defeat the South Vietnamese when the US withdrew all air support and the South Vietnamese were not able to organise effectively, either politically or militarily. The political and military leadership of the insurgency had accepted from the beginning the Maoist concept of protracted war and were willing to outlast in particular the US commitment to the war.85 The CPV also relied on military and political support from the Chinese during the insurgency. In the end the communist insurgency was successful because the military and political leadership understood the theory and application of an insurgency better than the leadership of their opposition, the French, the US and the South Vietnamese.
El Salvador
El Salvador is a small country in Central America in which conflict broke out in the 1970s due largely to the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few wealthy landowners. The major rebel factions formed an alliance, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), named after the leader of a rebellion in 1932. The government and the right factions responded with repression and an assassination program using ‘death squads’86 resulting in escalating violence on both sides. As the insurrection gained momentum the US government, alarmed at a possible communist victory, overcame its reluctance to support such an oppressive regime and supplied aid to the Salvadoran government. The US government, in response to the lessons learnt in Vietnam, was to have a different approach to the insurgency and rather than try to win the war militarily, it‘s aim was to win the war politically, based on the four principles of democracy, development, dialogue and defence.87 In 1981 the FMLN attempted to achieve total victory with a major attack and while they were unsuccessful, they made significant gains over the next couple of years. The US military aid and training began to pay off and by 1984 the Salvadoran Army was regaining the initiative. However the ‘American counterinsurgency policy focused on accomplishing three principal tasks: the reform
85 Walter Laqueur, op.cit., pg 268. 86 Corum, J. S. and Johnson, W. R., op.cit., pg 329. 87 Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, RAND Report R-4042-USDP, 1991, pg 10, accessed from http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4042.html on 24th Oct 2012.
34 of the Salvadoran armed forces, land redistribution, and democratization’88 and while the Salvadoran military was able to operate effectively as a counterinsurgency force, the other aspects of the US policy were not being achieved. ‘Death squads’ were still operating across the country and land and political reforms were stalled or watered down. By 1989 the Salvadoran military was an effective counterinsurgency fighting force however, in November 1989 the FMLN launched a major offensive especially in the cities with the hope that most of the population would support it.89 The Salvadoran military responded strongly and the fighting caused many civilian casualties as well as significant losses on both the FMLN and government sides. Both sides realised that the other side still possessed a significant and effective fighting force with neither side likely to be able to gain a military victory in the foreseeable future. As stated by Schwarz ‘After a decade of conflict, most Salvadorans are not politically engaged in the war and dislike both the armed forces and the guerrillas’.90 Negotiations began between both sides the following year and a ceasefire was agreed in 1991 and the peace accords were signed in 1992. The war ended in a compromise: the FMLN members were granted amnesty; the FMLN itself disarmed and became a political party; a large part of the Salvadoran military were demobilised; and the more notorious security forces were disbanded. The US aim of defeating the insurgency by political and economic reform were not realised as ‘the United States perhaps did not consider sufficiently that human character, history, culture, and social structure are highly resistant to outside influence’.91 However El Salvador has evolved into a stable democracy in the twenty years after the ceasefire with peaceful transitions of power between the left and right political parties.
The inputs to warfare for the Salvadoran government and for the FMLN varied over time. The Salvadoran military, with significant aid from the US, evolved from a small force prepared for conventional combat into an effective counterinsurgency force. The FMLN developed into an effective fighting force but did not have significant outside assistance and were never able to grow sufficiently to defeat the Salvadoran military. Both sides maintained the support of a significant section of the Salvadoran population but were not able to gain an overwhelming majority. The Salvadoran government had a major advantage through the amount of economic and military aid that the US was contributing to the counterinsurgency effort. The FMLN never had anywhere near the same level of backing from an external backer. In the end neither side could see the likely prospect of victory either militarily or in terms of popular support and the war resulted in a stalemate and a political compromise acceptable to both parties. In terms of counterinsurgency theory the US, after failing to defeat an insurgency through pure military force in Vietnam, shifted to trying to defeat an insurgency by political and economic reform, but ‘the United States has thus taken on a most daunting task: if its policy is to succeed, it must be able to persuade a foreign nation to transform itself’.92 The US failed, during the insurgency, in its stated aims to either defeat the insurgency or to win over the population through economic and political reform. However it did achieve the longer term aim of preventing the insurgency from winning and allowing a democratic government to develop within El Salvador.
88 Benjamin C. Schwarz, op.cit. 89 Corum, J. S. and Johnson, W. R., op.cit., pg 340. 90 Benjamin C. Schwarz, op.cit. 91 Ibid 92 Ibid
35 Iraq
Modern Iraq was established after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War 1 and from 1968 was under the control of the Ba’ath Party, led by Saddam Hussein after 1979. Although Iraq has primarily an Arab population, it is split between two branches of Islam, the Shia majority and the Sunni minority. In 2003 the US invaded Iraq and, although controversy exists about whether its reasons were justified, the stated aims of the US and its allies were ‘our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people’.93 In essence the aim of the war was to achieve regime change in Iraq and the conventional military defeat of the Iraqi government was achieved in two months (March-April 2003). The US democratisation program saw a transfer of power from the Sunnis to the majority Shiites and this was one of the factors that led to the breakout of an insurgency. As stated by Malkasian, ‘in general, the insurgents sought to compel the United States, viewed as an occupier, to withdraw from Iraq; and to recapture some of the political and economic benefits that the Sunnis had lost to the Shi’a Arabs with the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime’.94 This was further compounded when Al Qaeda became active in Iraq with the aim of destabilising Iraq and attacking the US troops and also when some regional countries provided support to different factions within the power struggle. The US military, which had excelled in the conventional war to oust the Hussein regime was not prepared for an insurgency – ‘no comprehensive doctrine existed for counterinsurgency’.95 The insurgency developed as a civil war between the Sunnis and the Shiites over the distribution of political power in the country exacerbated by the provocative acts of Al Qaeda. Slowly the US military began to learn how to fight a counterinsurgency with an emphasis on protecting the community and training the local police and military on how to provide security in their own country. Once the various factions began to realise that their aims were unlikely to be achieved by military means such as an insurgency then the violence began to decrease and the US and its allies were able to withdraw their troops over a period of two years (2009-2011). Although the sectarian tension and violence has by no means ceased, the Iraqis are now militarily self- sufficient and hopefully will be able to progress politically and ensure an equitable distribution of power between the rival factions.
The Iraqi insurgency was reasonably well armed from the weapons left after the defeat of the Iraqi army in 2003, however, as the insurgency was in response to the ‘unforeseen’ invasion by the US and its allies, the rebels were not well prepared in terms of training or organisation either politically or militarily. The population of Iraq was split along religious lines supporting the different sects within Islam with the US and its allies seen as supporting the majority sect, the Shiites. As Iraq was a reasonably wealthy nation, this economic power was applied to both military capability and reconstruction of damaged facilities enabling a return to normalcy in a shorter time span that would otherwise have been possible. The intervention of other nations or groups did not play a decisive role in the insurgency although the presence of Al Qaeda did complicate the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign. For the US and its allies the conventional war in 2003 was effectively and quickly handled however the political and military leaders were unprepared for the insurgency
93 George W. Bush Presidential Radio Address, March 2003, accessed from http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html on 31 Oct 2012. 94 Malkasian, C., ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May2003-January 2007’ in ‘Counterinsurgency in Modern Wars’, D. Marston and C. Malkasian, eds, Osprey Publishing, 2008, pg 241. 95 Ibid, pg 242.
36 that developed soon after. It took time for the political and military leaders to adapt to counterinsurgency warfare and to modify their approach away from chasing the insurgents to protecting the population and assisting the development of the Iraqi military as well as the political negotiations that were required. The US had vast military and economic resources that could be applied to Iraq but they needed to be applied in the best way to achieve an acceptable result. As stated by Malkasian, ‘Iraq highlights the effect that social or political constraints, in this case the sectarian divide, have on the success of attempts to adapt and on the kind of strategy that will be most effective……any successful strategy must conform to the social and political environment in which a conflict is ensconced’.96
Discussion
The examples of irregular warfare analysed in this chapter show the range of circumstances that can exist for irregular warfare. Irregular warfare can occur as a response to an invasion from a power outside the country such as when France overthrew the Spanish king in 1808 or as a rebellion against an established occupation of a country such as the Roman Empire in Judea or the French in Vietnam. Irregular warfare can occur as a result of internal civil wars such as the Chinese revolution and the war in El Salvador or as part of a larger conventional war such as World War 1. Irregular warfare campaigns can be successful such as Vietnam and the Chinese revolution, they can be unsuccessful such as Malaya or they can have negotiated outcomes such as El Salvador. Irregular warfare campaigns can also be heavily influenced by international actors or events such as the intervention of the European powers in the US War of Independence, the effect of the Japanese invasion during World War 2 on China and Vietnam or the intervention of the US in Vietnam or El Salvador.
The analysis in this chapter has so far considered each occurrence of irregular warfare in its context, determining the inputs to warfare that have influenced the conduct of that warfare (in line with the hermeneutics approach). This section will analyse each input to warfare drawing on the chosen examples to explore whether there are any indications of causal relationships between the inputs to warfare and the outcome of the irregular warfare.
Military forces
The relative strength of military forces in irregular warfare campaigns is usually asymmetric in that the insurgents typically only have a fraction of the military forces available to the counterinsurgents. It is this asymmetry that usually leads to the use of an irregular warfare campaign by the insurgents as a way of competing against the strong number of forces on the opposing side. In some cases the counterinsurgency forces are numerically overwhelming and, if this numerical superiority is allied with appropriate tactics, then the insurgency can be defeated as shown by the history of the campaigns in Judea. However numerical superiority by itself is not sufficient to defeat an insurgency as is shown by the US campaign in Vietnam and the French campaign in Spain. In these two cases the armies were trained to deal with the type of conventional combat at the time and they were ill- equipped to handle the requirements of irregular warfare. Starting the irregular campaign with incorrectly trained troops does not necessarily mean defeat for the counterinsurgency forces as the troops can develop their abilities through experience and modified training to handle the insurgency
96 Ibid, pg 259.
37 correctly as has been shown by the experiences in China, Malaya and Iraq. However where the counterinsurgency does not have sufficient troops in the campaign then the outcome is likely to be a success for the insurgents as is shown by the French in Vietnam, the British in the US War of Independence and the Turkish in the Arab Revolt in World War 1. The insurgents, due to the nature of the campaign are usually inferior in training and organisation compared to the counterinsurgents as well as having a lesser ability in technological skill and ability. The insurgents, however, usually have better morale or ‘virtu’ through their belief that they are fighting for a ‘cause’ and this can help to sustain the fighting against large asymmetries. It is obvious from the examples of irregular warfare cited in this chapter that military forces are insufficient by themselves to win against an insurgency unless an extreme policy of annihilation or ‘genocide’ is followed to remove all possible opponents.
Non-Military Capability
Irregular warfare usually occurs as part of an internal conflict within a nation or in an ‘occupied’ nation where conventional warfare is not possible or has little chance of success. As is the case with the military forces there is typically an asymmetry between the economic resources available to both sides with the insurgency generally having greatly reduced resources available to it. This difference can however be greatly reduced by the use of political alliances and international agreements on the side of the insurgents. For civil wars the economic resources of the government and the insurgents can be specific targeted by the opposing side as a way of reducing their capacity to fight. This can be mitigated on either side if there is international support in terms of money or logistical resources. In Malaya the rebels had no significant international support and one of the main tactics of the Malayan government was to attack the economic resources available to the rebels by relocating whole villages away from the area of contention to prevent any support, whether voluntary or coerced, from reaching the insurgents. In Spain the French could not control the economic support flowing to the rebels even with a large numerical superiority of troops in the country and this was further exacerbated by the intervention of the British to support the Spanish guerrillas. In Vietnam the Viet Cong were supported by the North Vietnamese and their communist allies whilst the South Vietnamese government was supported by the US government. In the end the South Vietnamese government fell after the political, economic and military support was withdrawn by the US government.
In terms of political alliances and international agreements, the intervention of outside countries can have a decisive effect on the success or failure of an insurgency. In cases of an civil war with no or little effective international intervention on either side, such as the wars in Judea or Malaya, the government using effective tactics and overwhelming numbers can crush the rebellion. In civil wars with significant international intervention affecting the government capabilities, such as the Chinese revolution, the insurgency can be successful. In civil wars with significant international intervention supporting the government capabilities, such as El Salvador and Iraq, the insurgency can be controlled. In wars of occupation with significant international intervention on the side of the insurgency, such as the wars in the Spanish Peninsula, the Arab revolt in World War 1 and Vietnam, then the insurgency can be successful. From this analysis of the cases studied in this chapter it can be seen that if there is no significant international intervention or if the intervention is to support the government then it is likely that the insurgency can be defeated. However if there is significant international intervention on the side of the insurgency then it is likely that the insurgency can be
38 successful. (Note that counter examples to these general conclusions exist such as the revolution in Cuba where the government fell apart due to a lack of political and military leadership or the Palestinian insurgency has been unable to reclaim Palestine which demonstrate that international intervention is not the sole determining factor in the success or failure of an insurgency.)
The maintenance of morale or ‘virtu’ is necessary in all types of warfare, both conventional and irregular. In irregular warfare, however, it is important on the insurgent side to maintain not only the morale of the fighters but also of the supporters of the irregular campaign. In the irregular campaign in Malaya it was possible to separate the insurgent fighters from their support, weakening their morale and leading to the defeat of the insurgency. In irregular campaigns such as the Judea, it was possible to politically and militarily repress both the fighters and their supporters to control the insurgency. In other irregular campaigns, such as the US War of Independence, the Chinese revolution and Vietnam, the separation between the fighters and their supporters was not achieved and the insurgency was successful. In irregular campaigns such as El Salvador and Iraq, although the separation of the fighters and their supporters was largely not achieved, the situations have been able to be controlled and normalised. These results may cast some doubt over the requirement of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population before it is possible to defeat an insurgency. Note that the US involvement in Vietnam presents an unusual case where the loss of morale in the supporting nation led to the reduction of international support for the South Vietnamese and increased the possibility of the Viet Cong winning the campaign.
Political Organisation
The political organisation of the sides in an irregular warfare campaign usually show an advantage to the counterinsurgents in that, in a civil war they represent an established government or in a war of occupation the government of the nation has been defeated and removed from power and the political and military control is with the occupier. In wars such as Judea, Malaya and El Salvador, political and military control was used effectively to ensure that the insurgents did not succeed. Although political control confers an advantage to the counterinsurgents, it is not enough to guarantee success. In wars such as South Vietnam, Britain in the US War of Independence and France in the Spanish Peninsula the politics was not handled well, leading to the success of the insurgency. On the insurgent side, due to the nature of an insurgency, it is difficult to achieve a high level of organisation under the repression of the government. The wars where the insurgents achieved a good level of organisation tend to be wars of considerable length such as Vietnam or the Chinese revolution or wars where the government has been weakened or removed by outside events such as the effect of the Japanese invasion of South East Asia in World War 2 which effected the governments of China and Vietnam. In some cases an insurgency war is used as a political tool to achieve other ends such as the Arab revolt in World War 1, the European intervention in the US War of Independence and the British involvement in the Spanish Peninsula. For these actors the success or failure of the insurgency/counterinsurgency may not be the prime motivator in their actions but those actions may still play a decisive role in the irregular war.
Military Organisation
As with the political organisation in any irregular warfare, the military organisation occurring in any insurgency campaign usually reflects the advantage that the controlling power has over the insurgents. Generally the military supporting the government has access to more resources and
39 training than an insurgent group however it does not mean that the counterinsurgency military are organised in the appropriate way to handle irregular warfare. In wars such as the French in the Spanish Peninsula, the British in the US War of Independence and the US in Vietnam the militaries were organised for conventional warfare and did not adapt their strategies and tactics to handle an insurgency. In wars such as the Chinese revolution, Malaya, and the US in Iraq, the militaries started out with a conventional approach to the war but adapted over time to the circumstances of each specific irregular war. In wars such as the Judea the militaries did not greatly adapt their conventional warfare approaches as they assumed any sympathy or support for the insurgency was sufficient to justify heavy repression of the population until all opposition was removed. On the insurgent side the military organisation was dependent on the length of the conflict and the amount of support the insurgency was obtaining from outside sources. Training bases in ‘safe’ areas or neighbouring countries enabled a much greater level of organisation as shown by the Chinese revolution and the Vietnam War. In line with the maxim of von Clausewitz, it is important that the military organisation be aligned with the political organisation otherwise they will each undermine the effectiveness of the other. In Vietnam the US military was not aligned with the overall aims of the US political leaders whereas in Malaya there was good alignment at the political and military levels.
Military Theory
In order for the political and military organisations to be aligned in any irregular warfare campaign it is important that there is a good understanding of how the insurgency is to be counteracted. If there is a poor understanding of the military theory behind the conduct of an irregular war then a successful outcome is more likely to be the outcome of a fortuitous chance or an ‘unforeseen’ event. The first explicit irregular warfare theory was published by Callwell97 in 1896 and theories of irregular warfare have underpinned many of the irregular wars in the twentieth century such as the Chinese revolution, the Vietnam War, Malaya, El Salvador and Iraq. The theories of how to approach an insurgency, both from the insurgents and the counterinsurgents point of view, will be examined in the next chapter.
97 C. E. Caldwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
40 Unforeseen events
‘Unforeseen’ inputs can significantly change to course of events in an insurgency. The Japanese invasion of South East Asia changed the situation in China (and in Indochina generally) to such an extent that it allowed the Chinese communists to gain the advantage and to succeed in their revolution. As stated by Thompson, “It was the war which established communism as a major force in the area”. 98 In Vietnam the Japanese removed the French and their administration and the effect of World War 2 in Europe meant that France was unable to re-establish its previous position by military means. In the Spanish Peninsula the ‘unforeseen’ input was the emergence of the guerrilla war itself. The French had previously conquered and occupied many countries without an equivalent problem however the specific circumstances of Spain meant that the population would not accept what was happening in their country and would fight to change it.
In this chapter selected cases of irregular warfare have been examined and it has been found that all of the contributing factors in these wars can be explained in terms of the inputs to warfare developed in Chapter 1. This gives confidence that conventional warfare and irregular warfare are inherently the same although the weight given to the different inputs to warfare may vary greatly between conventional and irregular warfare. The understanding provided by the inputs to warfare can now be compared against the various theories of irregular warfare that have been postulated over the last one hundred years. Chapter 3 examines selected theories of irregular warfare in the light of the inputs to warfare approach as well as the examples used in this chapter.
98 Robert Thompson, Defeating communist insurgency: experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in International Security:10, Chatto &Windus, London, 1974, pg14.
41 Chapter 3 Review of Selected Theories of Irregular Warfare
“The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” — Henry A. Kissinger99
In Chapter 1 conventional warfare was analysed using selected historical occurrences and published theories as a means of searching for ‘common threads’ in understanding why and how warfare occurs. This analysis led to the development of a framework of inputs to warfare which can be, either singularly or in conjunction, determining factors in warfare depending on the specific situation at the time. In Chapter 2 selected historical cases of irregular warfare were analysed and compared to the list of inputs to warfare developed in Chapter 1. It was found that the framework of inputs to warfare correspond to the contributing factors in irregular warfare although the relative importance of each of the inputs is different from that found in the conventional warfare. Chapter 3 examines selected theories of irregular warfare, with a particular focus on how they address the inputs to warfare. As is the case with the history of irregular warfare, there has been less attention paid to the theory of irregular warfare in the past with significant theories only being developed in the last one hundred and twenty years. The first theory of irregular warfare to be examined was published in 1896 by C. E. Callwell and was focussed on the problem of ‘colonial’ wars, that is, a modern European military fighting against largely ill-organised natives generating an asymmetric combat. The next approach to irregular war to be considered is that of T. E. Lawrence who was instrumental in organising the Arab revolt during World War 1. A significant development in the theory of irregular war came with the development of the theories of Mao Zedong who was the first among several theorists to integrate irregular warfare into revolutionary and nationalist insurrections. The effect of the revolutionary irregular war (seen in countries such as China, Malaya and Vietnam, considered in Chapter 2) brought about the development of theories on counterinsurgency. The first significant theory to deal with counterinsurgency in revolutionary war was by Robert Thomson who developed the successful approach to defeating the insurgency in Malaya. The French who had faced difficult rebellions in South East Asia and Northern Africa also developed approaches to counterinsurgency and this chapter will examine the approach of David Galula, who served in these regions and who introduced modern counterinsurgency to the US. Following this, two recent approaches to counterinsurgency will be examined, the theory of John Nagl, based on a comparison of Malaya and Vietnam and the theory of David Kilcullen, based on experiences in South East Asia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Charles. E. Callwell100
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
99 Henry Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 214 100 Picture reproduced from the file of Experiences of a Dug-out 1914-1918 downloaded from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/21833/21833-h/21833-h.htm, accessed 27th Nov. 2012.
42 Charles Callwell was the first significant military theorist to address the problem of irregular warfare in modern times. His book Small Wars101 was first published in 1896 and, when trying to define ‘small wars’ Callwell stated “Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organised armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and conditions”. 102 Callwell is demonstrably a product of his times with his attitudes to ‘savages and semi-civilised races’ and with his preference for conventional war. While Callwell is a 19th Century British officer with all the prejudices that entails, he does address the problem of irregular warfare with admirable thoroughness drawing on a wide range of examples in his work. Callwell approaches the problem of irregular warfare from the perspective of the regular troops trying to fight an irregular war, that is, from a counterinsurgency viewpoint.
Callwell examined a range of potential opponents ranging from well organised, well disciplined military forces such as the Zulus or the Afghans in the late 19th century, to highly determined guerrilla fighters such as the Maoris or on the North-West Frontier of India to armies of ‘savages’ fighting without organisation or discipline. Callwell emphasised the need to understand the ‘hostile mode of war’ – ‘It is that in small wars the habits, the customs, and the mode of action on the battlefield of the enemy should be studied in advance’103 – to ensure that there are no military disasters during the campaign. In line with the approach of von Clausewitz, Callwell acknowledges the political objective for small wars – ‘Military operations are always undertaken with some end in view, and are shaped for its achievement’.104 According to Callwell to achieve success in irregular warfare the military may be required to use any means possible to defeat the opponents even though these actions may not be acceptable in either normal society or conventional warfare.105 Callwell advocated boldness and vigour in attacking the irregular forces, stating that “tactics favour the regular army while strategy favours the enemy – therefore the object is to fight, not to manoeuvre”. 106
In terms of the inputs to warfare identified in Chapter 1, Callwell focuses on the military forces and the military leadership of the counter-insurgency side. He deals with the asymmetric situation where the counter-insurgency has, in general, the advantage in organisation, training and technical skill and ability. He assumes that the ‘virtu’ of the military forces and their leadership is better than the insurgents in line with the prejudices of his upbringing and circumstances. Callwell only deals with the national resources of both the insurgents and counterinsurgents in terms of the military importance usually as potential military targets to achieve ‘a decisive victory’. Callwell does not
101 C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, University of Nebraska Press, 1996. 102 Ibid, pg21. 103 Ibid. pg 33. 104 Ibid. pg 35. 105 Ibid, pg 40. 106 Ibid, pg 85.
43 consider the politics including the international agreements that may impinge on his military campaign but assumes an imperial position of the military forces of the empire dealing with an errant colony or potential colony. Callwell thus only deals with a subset of the possible insurgency situations, that is, an imperial power using military force to handle irregular warfare in one of its ‘colonies’ or the neighbouring vicinity. However Callwell was addressing the prevalent form of irregular warfare of his time and developed his approach through the examination of a large number of irregular warfare campaigns and it is this method which sets his book as noteworthy in the development of any approach to irregular warfare.
T E Lawrence107
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Thomas Edward Lawrence achieved fame after the World War 1 for his role in the Arab Revolt against the Turkish forces in the Middle East in the period 1916-1918. With the outbreak of World War 1, Lawrence, an archaeologist with experience in the Middle East, was commissioned into the British forces on the Intelligence Staff. In 1916 he was assigned, as were other Intelligence Staff, to liaise with the Arabs in coordinating an Arab uprising against the Turkish in conjunction with the British military strategy. Lawrence used his position to gain the trust of the Arab leadership and, realising that the Arabs were no match for the Turks in conventional warfare, promoted a hit and run, irregular approach by the Arabs to tie down as many Turkish troops as possible. Lawrence’s approach to irregular warfare, from the insurgent point of view rather than the counterinsurgent (e.g. Callwell), was first summarised in the Army Quarterly in October 1920108 and then published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1926 under the heading of the Science of Guerrilla Warfare. Lawrence stated that “Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain”. 109
In terms of the inputs to warfare Lawrence was limiting the success of the insurgency to specific conditions which may be applicable only in limited circumstances. In regard to the military forces he considered a limited strength for the opposing force which was unable to dominate the area from fortified posts, that was limited in its intelligence and surveillance so it could not anticipate the insurgents attacks, limited in its mobility to be able to respond to the insurgent attacks and for the opposing military to be an ‘alien enemy’ separating it from the local population. The local conditions where Turkey was involved in World War 1 and fighting on several fronts provided temporarily the conditions that Lawrence was seeking. For the insurgent force they must have ‘the qualities of
107 Picture reproduced from Seven Pillars of Wisdom, downloaded from http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100111h.html, accessed 17th Jan 2013. 108 T. E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt, as reproduced in Evolution of a Revolt: Early Postwar Writings of T. E. Lawrence, edited by S. and R. Weintraub, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, USA, 1967, pg 100-119. 109 T. E. Lawrence, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed, 1929, reproduced at http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~eshaw/lawrence.htm, downloaded 17th Jan 2013.
44 speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply’110, none of which is easy to achieve or guarantee over a period of time. In regard to the non-military capability Lawrence requires an ‘unassailable base’ from which to launch the insurgency which in this case was provided by the desert and by the presence of the British Army and Navy in the region. Note that the ‘unassailable base’ as described by Lawrence could be either a physical location or in the hearts of the population who would support the insurgency. The British also provided economic resources and technical skill to the insurgency without which the insurgency would not have been as successful. Thus the alliance between the Arabs and the British was crucial to the success of the Arab rebellion. The political and military leadership of the Arab rebellion was also greatly enhanced by the help of the British as demonstrated by Lawrence and the other officers like him who liaised throughout the campaign. The Turkish military and political leadership were limited in the responses that they could make to the insurgency due to the British Army and the potential and, in time, actual threat that it presented to the Turkish Army. Lawrence developed his approach to irregular warfare under specific circumstances and it was very successful on that occasion. Unlike Callwell, Lawrence did not consider a range of conditions and insurgencies when developing his approach to irregular warfare but based it on a single, albeit successful, occurrence in which he was personally involved. The following theorists expand on the ideas of T. E. Lawrence and bring to it an ideological, rather than just nationalistic, basis on which to fight the irregular warfare.
Mao Zedong111
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Mao Zedong led the Chinese Communist party from the mid 1930s and in 1949 achieved the overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist Government and established the Communist government of China. Mao Zedong was a Chinese nationalist and a radical from an early age having been involved in the Xinhai Revolution against the Qing dynasty at age 18. Mao Zedong gradually converted to the Marxist-Leninist approach to revolution and by 1921 he was involved in the establishment of the Communist Party of China. His experiences over the next fifteen years were to lead to the development of his own approach to revolutionary irregular war sometimes in opposition to the other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Along the way Mao espoused in many speeches and writings112 his thoughts on revolutionary warfare, develop by first of all fighting the Nationalists, then the Japanese and again the Nationalists until their final retreat. Mao created his approach to irregular warfare based on the study of many political and military writings which he then tailored to the situation in China. As stated by Mao Zedong in December 1936: “We are now engaged in a war; our war is a revolutionary war; and our revolutionary war is being waged in this semi-colonial and
110 Ibid.. 111 Picture reproduced from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mao_Zedong_portrait.jpg, accessed 3rd Dec. 2012. 112 For example, Problems of War and Strategy or On Protracted War, both available from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/military-writings/index.htm, accessed 22nd Jan 2013.
45 semi-feudal country of China. Therefore, we must study not only the laws of war in general, but the specific laws of revolutionary war, and the even more specific laws of revolutionary war in China.” 113
Mao created the doctrine of the People’s War to address the situation in China at the time and much of his writing was addressed to the other leaders of the Communist Party of China on how to progress in the war for the control of China. Mao changed from the approach of the Russian Communists that is, organising the proletariat of the industrialised cities to enmeshing the Communist Party and its army with the peasants in the countryside. Being militarily weak in the beginning of the campaign, Mao established a close connection between the communist army and the population, using the army as a means of improving the situation of the peasants through its agrarian revolution. As described by Mao Zedong “……the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it”. 114 Initially Mao employed the guerrilla tactics embedded in the ‘Sixteen Character Formula’, “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.”115 The central idea was to build up the communist army while weakening the enemy army until a conventional campaign could be fought to establish control. Generally known as the three phase model (as outlined in On Protracted War116) Mao’s approach to warfare involved the different stages: the ‘stage of contention, stage of equilibrium, and stage of counteroffensive’.117 The stage of contention involved mobilising the people by both propaganda and by attacking the oppressors, usually through guerrilla warfare. The stage of equilibrium involved putting the oppressor on the defensive using ‘primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare’.118 The stage of the counteroffensive involves the transition to more conventional warfare to ‘recover our lost territories…… Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance’.119
In terms of the inputs to warfare Mao recognised that the strength, organisational training and technological skill of the government forces would probably be greater than the capabilities of the insurgents. As a balance to this Mao relied on the morale advantage that the ideology of the revolution would impart. The idea was that the revolutionary warrior was superior in ‘virtu’ to the counterinsurgent fighter and that revolutionary would be able to endure long enough to wear down the opposition. A key aspect of the revolutionary approach to irregular warfare was to gain the support of the majority of the population providing the economic resources and the intelligence to sustain the irregular forces. In the Mao approach to irregular warfare, the importance of gaining a ‘safe haven’ for the irregular forces to operate from, whether a physical location or the protection of the population, was critical to the success of the insurgency. Mao recognised the importance of
113 Mao Zedong, Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm on 24 Jan 2013. 114 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, available from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm, accessed 24th Jan 2013. 115 See A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire, available from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/military-writings/index.htm, accessed 25th Jan 2013. 116 Mao Zedong, On Protracted War, available from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected- works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm, accessed 25th Jan 2013. 117 Vo Nguyen Giap, ‘People’s War, People’s Army’, in People’s War, People’s Army (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961, pg104. 118 Mao Zedong, On Protracted War, op.cit.. 119 Ibid.
46 both the military and political leadership understanding how a revolutionary war should be fought both on a military theory level and also in being able to apply the theory to specific circumstances. There needed to be close interaction between the military and political leadership to optimise the progress of the war as well as a good understanding of the political ideology by the military forces overall to further the revolutionary cause amongst the population. Mao also required the military and political leadership to be adaptable in their approach and hence the communists were able to take advantage of the situation when the Japanese invasion of China occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. As noted in the section on the Chinese Civil War in Chapter 2, the Japanese invasion of China significantly altered the balance of power between the communists and the Chinese Nationalists culminating in the communists gaining power in China in 1949.
47 Theorists for Counterinsurgency
The success of the communist revolution in Russia in 1917-19 through conventional warfare and then the success of the Chinese communist revolution in 1949 using three phase approach to revolutionary warfare (including irregular warfare) prompted a dramatic increase in the interest of counterinsurgency as a way of fighting the threat posed by the new approach to warfare. The new approach to revolutionary warfare was used in the insurgencies following World War 2 and various approaches to counterinsurgency were tried with varying degrees of success. These experiences prompted a new wave of theorists in counterinsurgency several of which have been selected below.
Sir Robert Thomson120
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Sir Robert Thompson was an influential member of the British administration in Malaya during the ‘Malayan emergency’. Serving as Director of Operations to Harold Briggs and then Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioners in Malaya, he was intimately involved in the implementation of the counterinsurgency policies which led to the defeat of the communists. Following on from his time in Malaya, he spent time in an advisory role in Vietnam with only limited success in getting the counterinsurgency approach developed in Malaya implemented in the new environment. His approach to counterinsurgency is detailed in his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency.121 Thompson begins his book by outlining the situation in both Malaya and Vietnam, explaining how the insurgencies were developed over time. As described in Chapter 2 Thompson noted that “The Second World War, then, and its aftermath, gave the Communist Parties in both countries the opportunity to build up strength based on the resistance movements to the Japanese and to collect an initial stock of weapons with which to arm their guerrilla units”. 122 After setting the scene Thompson then outlines his five basic principles for a counterinsurgency123:
1. The government must have a clear political aim. 2. The government must function in accordance with law. 3. The government must have an overall plan. 4. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas. 5. In the guerrilla phase of the insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.
For Thompson, the first principle was clear in Malaya, as stated by Miller “Sir Robert Thompson, the Permanent Secretary for Malaya was clear that his task was to ‘establish a free, independent, and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable’, not win wars”. 124 In developing his approach to counterinsurgency Thompson noted that “there are three main forces
120 Picture reproduced from http://www.powerbase.info/index.php/Robert_Thompson, accessed 19th Feb 2013. 121 Robert Thompson, Defeating communist insurgency: experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in International Security:10, Chatto &Windus, London, 1974 122 Ibid., pg21. 123 Ibid., pgs 50-57. 124 Sergio Miller, Malaya: The Myth of Hearts and Minds, Small Wars Journal, April 16, 2012.
48 which influence the people of a country: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, material well-being and progress”. 125 The counterinsurgency campaign of the Malayan Emergency had several advantages over many of the contemporary campaigns in that the communist insurgency was mainly identified with the Chinese section of the population rather than the majority Malay. Thompson also noted that, compared with Vietnam “we have, then, a Malaya in comparison smaller, more prosperous and better administered: all great advantages in counter-insurgency. But perhaps the greatest advantage of all was that Malaya was completely isolated from outside communist support”. 126 Thompson outlines the four stages used in the basic operational concept: clearing, holding, winning and won.127 It is important to note that while clearing and holding an area are important steps in the process, they will not by themselves defeat the insurgency. As stated by Thompson, “Security by itself is not enough to make the peasant willingly choose to support the government….He can only be made to choose freely to support the government if the government can show him that what it has to offer is something better than the insurgent can offer him”. 128 It is also important to note that Thompson’s approach to counterinsurgency is not designed to defeat an insurgency quickly and easily but “It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down……There are no short cuts and no gimmicks”. 129 The overall aim of the counterinsurgency is to remove the connection between the insurgent and the population or in Mao’s terms to separate the ‘water’ and the ‘fish’.
In analysing Thompson’s approach to counterinsurgency through the framework of the inputs to warfare it is important to note the subsidiary role that the military forces play in the conflict. The military forces must have good organisation and training and operate with ‘virtu’, that is they must maintain discipline and operate within the legal framework given to them. These aspects are vital, according to Thompson, in ensuring that the military operations do not antagonise the population, leading to greater support for the insurgents. Note that this does not necessarily prevent strict laws being implemented to control the movement of people or resources but does require that any laws are implemented fairly. In Thompson’s approach to counterinsurgency the key is the non-military capability available to the government and the development of that non-military capability in such a way as to demonstrate that the population will be better off supporting the government rather than the insurgents. In Malaya’s case this included the movement towards national independence, the development of the economic resources of the country to improve the well-being of the population, the use of terrain to isolate the insurgents from the population and the ‘virtu’ of the administration providing a well-ordered society and of course all of this was done within a security framework, led in Malaya’s case, by the police force. The military leadership in Malaya had the skill and organisation to accept a secondary role behind the political leadership and the political leadership, both by the British and the Malays, was of a high standard. Having the political and military leadership with the ability to develop an overriding plan and to be able to see the plan through to completion is critical in Thompson’s approach – “It is essential, too, that there should be a proper balance between the military and the civil effort, with complete coordination in all fields”. 130 While Thompson was an adviser in Vietnam it was the failure of the political and military leadership in that country to deal
125 Robert Thompson, op.cit., pg 63. 126 Ibid., pg 19. 127 Ibid., pg 112. 128 Ibid., pg 143. 129 Ibid., pg 171. 130 Ibid., pg 55.
49 with the insurgency, although admittedly more complex than the one in Malaya, in an appropriate and consistent way which led to the failure of the counterinsurgency. Whilst the unforeseen event of the Japanese invasion in World War 2 spurred on the Malayan communist insurgency, the political and military leadership in Malaya were sufficiently adaptable to adjust from a conventional war to a counterinsurgency operation whereas the communist insurgency, not wanting to deviate from Mao’s outline of revolutionary warfare, were not sufficiently adaptable to maintain the insurgency when faced with a new type of counterinsurgency approach.
David Galula131
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
The British Empire was not the only colonial power to face the problem of an insurgency in the 19th and 20th centuries. The French, with the colonial possessions in North Africa and Indochina, also faced a rising tide of nationalism. The French, in their response to ‘colonial’ warfare were to adapt their styles to the conditions that they faced in the field. Bugeaud, in Algeria in the 1840s, and Gallieni and Lyautey, Gallieni’s subordinate, in Indochina in the early twentieth century introduced new approaches to colonial warfare. The theoretical heritage of Lyautey et al was carried on, particularly in the English speaking part of the world by David Galula132. In 1962, after observing the Chinese revolution and leading a company in Algeria where he successfully applied counterinsurgency tactics, Galula moved to the U.S. In the U.S. the interest in counterinsurgency was growing rapidly in line with the developments in Vietnam and it was during this time that Galula wrote his two major works Pacification in Algeria133 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice134. Galula starts his analysis by examining the nature and characteristics of revolutionary warfare and his estimation of the prerequisites for a successful insurgency. His prerequisites can be summarised as “(1) a cause, (2) a police and administrative weakness in the counterinsurgent camp, (3) a not-too-hostile geographic environment, and (4) outside support in the middle and later stages of an insurgency— these are the conditions for a successful insurgency. The first two are musts. The last one is a help that may become a necessity”. 135 Galula then develops his approach in counterinsurgency which can be summed up in his four “Laws and Principles of Counterinsurgency Warfare”136:
131 Picture reproduced from http://coincentral.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/galula.jpg?w=150&h=213, accessed 27th Nov 2012. 132 Note that Galula was not the only French theorist active at that time; another prominent theorist was Roger Trinquier, who was known for his advocacy of the use of torture to gain information from captured insurgents. Trinquier’s approach to irregular warfare is detailed in his book: Robert Trinquier, Modern Warfare, available from http://armyrotc.missouri.edu/pdfs-docs/Roger%20Trinquier%20-%20Modern%20Warfare.pdf, accessed 23 Jan 2014. 133 Available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf, accessed 27th Nov 2012. 134 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, available from http://armyrotc.missouri.edu/pdfs- docs/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf, accessed 27th Nov 2012. 135 Ibid., pg 31. 136 Ibid., pg 53.
50 1. The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent – the tacit support, submission to law and order and the consensus of the population are essential to the success of any counterinsurgency; 2. Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority – the majority of the population can be rallied against the insurgent by an active counterinsurgent group within the population; 3. Support from the Population Is Conditional – the counterinsurgent needs to demonstrate that he has the will, the means and the ability to win to gain the support of the population; and 4. Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential – demonstrating the counterinsurgent ability to win requires an intensive and extended set of operations.
Galula expanded his approach in further detail with a step-by-step procedure to achieve the strategy outlined above137 which involved a more central role for the military in the counterinsurgency as compared to Thompson who always emphasised the dominance of the civilian authorities. The difference is in the balance of forces and the required effort to train and sustain the civilian and military forces. Galula advocates more of an interaction role for the military than Thompson although Galula still emphasises the importance of the political aspects, stating “’A revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political’ is a formula that reflects the truth”. 138 Galula was in general agreement with Thompson about counterinsurgency and gave his definition of victory for the counterinsurgent as: “A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization…A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population”139, a definition that Thompson would surely have agreed with.
Analysing Galula’s approach to counterinsurgency via the framework of the inputs to warfare shows the importance that Galula places on the military forces. The military forces should not only be trained to perform the required military functions but must also be able to be “a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, or a boy scout” providing an exemplary level of ‘virtu’ for the surrounding population.140 The organisation and technical skills and abilities extend well beyond the standard infantry training in most military forces around the world. Whilst these skills can be provided by the addition of specialist units (such as engineers), this multiplies the number of troops needed in any location and places additional pressure on the military forces in handling the insurgency. In terms of the non-military capability inputs to warfare that the nation provides Galula acknowledges the importance of the alliances on both the insurgents and counterinsurgents sides and the use of economics and politics to influence the population in supporting the government in the fight against the insurgency but this seems to assume a secondary role in supporting the military in providing the necessary security for the population and in eliminating the insurgents. The military leadership will bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign and will need to have the highest level of skill, organisation and ‘virtu’ to produce the required results whilst maintaining the correct interaction with the population. In Galula’s approach the political leadership need to understand the approach to the counterinsurgency and to optimise
137 Ibid., pg 59. 138 Ibid., pg 66. 139 Ibid., pg 55-58. 140 Ibid., pg 65.
51 the country’s efforts against the insurgency. Both the political and military leadership need a good understanding of the application of the counterinsurgency theory to ensure that it is applied consistently and not in a way that will alienate the population. As always the flexibility to handle ‘unforeseen’ inputs may be vital in particular situations, especially where the insurgents or outside forces may force an adjustment to the approach through unexpected moves.
John Nagl141
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
John Nagl, in a reversal of the usual experience, first of all wrote his book on counterinsurgency, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam142 (published in 2002) and then gained first hand experience in counterinsurgency, serving in Iraq in 2003-4. Nagl’s book, however is not aimed at producing a theory of counterinsurgency per se but is aimed at the military organisation that is conducting the counterinsurgency and how it should operate in an uncertain environment – “This book explains how to build military organizations that can adapt more quickly and effectively to future changes in warfare”. 143 In his book Nagl contrasts the two approaches to counterinsurgency, the direct (“A war is a war is a war”144), America’s strategy in Vietnam and the indirect (separate the fish from the water), Britain’s approach in Malaya as outlined in the section above on Thompson. Obviously the British approach in Malaya was much more successful than the American approach in Vietnam, however to imply that the British approach, if it had been fully implemented in Vietnam, would have necessarily been successful does not follow for the reasons pointed out by Galula in his work relating to the deficiencies in the Malayan revolutionary cause and its lack of external support145 whereas Vietnam was in a very different situation. That is not to say that Nagl’s conclusions about an organisation needing to be a learning institution are not valid but that determining such a conclusion by examining only two wars may be a simplification that can be misleading.
In the framework of the inputs to warfare Nagl’s analysis is focussing on the inputs concerned with military leadership, military theory and the handling of ‘unforeseen’ inputs. Since Nagl’s work is focussed on the improvement of the US military, he assumes that the military forces have obtained a certain level of skill and competency for whichever type of operations they are conducting. The emphasis is then on the ability to adjust and learn the correct type of operations for the particular situation, that is being a learning organisation. There is minimal attention paid to the type and nature of the inputs to warfare that the economics and politics of the nation can play in the conflict. Nagl’s emphasis is on ensuring that the military leadership have the skill and understanding to develop a military approach that is specific to the circumstances as they find them rather than
141 Picture reproduced from http://www.cnas.org/files/images/experts/high-res/NaglJohn_HiRes_PT.jpg, accessed 21st Dec 2012. 142 Nagl, J.A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam [Paperback]) (2005) Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005. 143 Ibid., pg xxi. 144 Colonel Harry Summers quoted in Nagl, J.A., op.cit., pg 27. 145 David Galula, op.cit., pgs15,30.
52 following a prescribed approach and assuming that a conventional warfare approach will guarantee success in all situations.
David Kilcullen146
Photograph has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
David Kilcullen, an Australian who gained his counter-insurgency experience in East Timor and the Middle East, has also gained a Ph.D. in political anthropology based on analysis of guerrilla warfare in Indonesia in the period 1945-99. Kilcullen has applied his military and academic training to develop an approach to insurgencies and published his ideas in the books The Accidental Guerrilla147 and Counterinsurgency148. Kilcullen developed his approach to counterinsurgency through the lens of political anthropology, stating that “Counterinsurgency is, simply, whatever governments do to defeat rebellions. Thus, the character of any particular conflict is impossible to understand without reference to three defining factors: the nature of the insurgency being countered, the nature of the government being supported, and the environment—especially the human environment—in which the conflict takes place”.149 The importance of understanding the human environment is vital to Kilcullen’s approach as shown by: “the imperative is to understand each environment, in real time, in detail, in its own terms, in ways that would be understood by the locals—and not by analogy with some other conflict, some earlier war, or some universal template or standardized rule-set”.150 In other words Kilcullen definitely advocates a hermeneutic approach to irregular warfare.
Kilcullen’s approach treats each insurgency as a unique situation and he believes that a bottom up approach is the most effective.151 Kilcullen identifies that the population is the ‘centre of gravity’ for the insurgency such that “without access to a mass base, an insurgent movement suffocates, so cutting the insurgent off from the population is a critical task in counterinsurgency”.152 Kilcullen also identifies the causality of the support between the insurgent and the population, stating that “The insurgents aren’t strongest where people support them: rather, people support them where they are strongest. Likewise, people support the government in areas where government presence is strongest. In other words, support follows strength, not vice versa”.153 Kilcullen views each insurgency as a unique situation requiring a unique combination of political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, and informational efforts to counteract it. His approach is demonstrated in diagram 11 below.154
146 Picture reproduced from http://www.cnas.org/files/imagecache/portrait- full/images/experts/Kilcullen_Dave_WEB_PT.jpg, accessed 27th Feb 2013. 147 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009. 148 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. 149 Ibid., pg 2 150 Ibid., pg 2. 151 Ibid., pgs 159. 152 Ibid., pg 8. 153 Ibid., pg 151. 154 David Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, accessed from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf, pg4, on 4th April 2013.
53 Diagram 11 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 11 Killcullen’s Framework for Counterinsurgency
Kilcullen’s aim is to develop an unique approach for each insurgency which is suited for the local political and social environment and which will provide the local population the necessary security and sufficient incentive to support the counterinsurgency forces.
Discussion
The theorists examined in this chapter demonstrate the development of the theory of irregular warfare over the last 120 years. The theorists started with Callwell who approached irregular warfare as a colonial problem that was required to be dealt with by the British Empire and used a punitive style to control the ‘savages and semi-civilised races’. The next development came with Lawrence who showed how the ‘hit and run’ tactics of guerrilla warfare could wear down troops using conventional tactics and, when used in conjunction with a traditional army, could help being about the defeat of a significant enemy. One of the most significant theorists of irregular warfare was Mao Zedong who developed his approach to irregular warfare as part of his overall aim of the revolutionary overthrow of the government of China. For Mao the insurgent should be as a fish in the water of the population, that is part of the environment and closely aligned with the people that he was trying to free from oppression. In line with von Clausewitz, Mao aimed to use warfare to achieve a political end. For Mao the aim was to destabilise the existing government and to convert the population to the side of the insurgency – in other words the control of the population became the primary aim of both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. The development of the revolutionary insurgent approach to irregular warfare brought a corresponding development of counterinsurgency theory. Thompson detailed the approach used to defeat the communist insurgency in Malaya, the first time a significant revolutionary insurgency had been stopped. The approach used was centred on the population with any military actions coordinated with the political considerations. While the specific circumstances of Malaya have proved to be exceptional, it still demonstrated that with the right approach and conditions, a revolutionary insurgency could be defeated. The next development in counterinsurgency theory was by Galula with his “Laws and Principles of Counterinsurgency Warfare” and his step by step approach to achieve a winning strategy against an insurgency. The loss in Vietnam, even though in the end South Vietnam was conquered using conventional warfare, precipitated a move away from counterinsurgency theory and practice in the US until the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nagl identified the requirement for a military fighting an insurgency to be adaptive and agile, that is, a learning organisation, which the majority of the US military was not during the Vietnam War. The latest addition to counterinsurgency theory is by Kilcullen who proposes that each insurgency is such a combination of specific circumstances that it requires a specific combination of countermeasures, including political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, and informational efforts, to be able to defeat the insurgency. In Chapter 4 a synthesis of the theories for counterinsurgency will be developed using the framework of the inputs to warfare developed in Chapter 1 and the insights into irregular warfare developed in Chapter 2 and 3.
54 Chapter 4 – Identification of the Enduring Elements of Strategy for Irregular Warfare
“You must know everything you can about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the problems of our time have ... been solved by military power alone.” — John F. Kennedy (1961)155
It has long been recognised that there has been a much better understanding of conventional warfare than there has been of irregular warfare. In attempting to develop a better understanding of irregular warfare Chapter 1 examined selected examples and theories of conventional warfare throughout history. Changes in the inputs under direct control of the belligerents, including military and non-military technology, the organisation of both the military and the society and the theory of warfare, led to advancement of conventional warfare and improvements on how large armies could combat each other. Military theory at the time focussed on conventional combat as that was the way of imposing the desired political outcome on an opponent as there was no direct method of influencing either the people or the political leadership of the opponent. It was von Clausewitz who identified this trinity of the people, the army and the political leadership as important in any theory of warfare as well as putting warfare into context as a part of the political process. The development of airpower in the twentieth century changed the situation dramatically with the direct targeting of the population now a possibility. The direct targeting of the population was first expounded in the theories of Douhet and the mass bombings of World War 2 were an attempt to destroy the civilian morale and the industrial backbone of the enemy as a way of winning the war. The escalation of warfare, beyond the direct contact of the military forces and the further increase in weapon capability with the development of nuclear weapons, has worked to reduce the incidence of total war, particularly between nuclear armed states.156 The understanding of the conduct of warfare throughout the ages, going from the methods and understanding of ancient Rome and ancient China through the Renaissance and the upheavals of the Napoleonic Era to the scientific and technical development of the modern era can be facilitated by the use of a framework of the inputs to warfare. A framework of the inputs to warfare, based on the analysis of selected examples of conventional warfare and its theories has been proposed at the end of Chapter 1 and can be summarised into the following categories:
Military forces
Non-Military Capability
Military leadership
Political Leadership
Military theory
‘Unforeseen’ inputs
155 As quoted in David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, op.cit., pg 227. 156 Robert Rauchhaus, Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach, Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 2009, vol 53 no 2, pgs 258-277, accessed from http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/53/2/258.short, 15 Apr 2013.
55 A number of selected examples of irregular warfare were examined in Chapter 2 and it was found that the proposed framework for understanding the conduct of conventional warfare was also applicable to the understanding of the conduct of irregular warfare. In Chapter 3 the framework was used to interpret the significant theories of irregular warfare that have been advanced over the last one hundred years and demonstrated the changing emphasis in the approach to irregular warfare in that time. In this chapter each category of the framework will be considered using the understanding developed in each of the previous three chapters to try to optimise the approach to irregular warfare. Once the various theories and examples have been synthesised into an optimised approach to irregular warfare, the new approach will be contrasted against the selected examples from Chapter 2 to test the validity of the approach.
An Optimised Approach to Irregular Warfare
Military forces
Irregular warfare has been chosen throughout the ages as the means of warfare when there is a significant asymmetry between the opposing sides in a conflict and this may occur after conventional warfare has been attempted or is ongoing. In the cases of the Spanish Peninsula and the US War of Independence (see Chapter 2), irregular warfare began after several defeats of the conventional forces while in the Arab Revolt in World War 1, irregular warfare was used in the occupied areas but as a complicating factor for the invaders who were still focussed on conventional warfare in other theatres. In more modern cases of irregular warfare (for example, China, Vietnam) the warfare began as an irregular combat and transitioned to conventional warfare as it progressed. Irrespective of the order of progression of the types of warfare, in the overwhelming majority of cases the insurgent forces are less numerous than the counterinsurgent military forces at least when the insurgency breaks out. Also in the overwhelming majority of cases of irregular warfare, the counterinsurgent forces are better trained and organised than the insurgents but are usually organised to fight a conventional war rather than being optimised for a counterinsurgency type campaign. When the asymmetry is reduced, whether by the insurgency campaign or by other outside factors (cf. the Chinese revolution) then the irregular war is likely to escalate to a conventional war (such as Vietnam, China). Commonly the insurgency forces are less well equipped than the counterinsurgency forces although this asymmetry may be less pronounced if there is significant external support for the insurgents. In the cases of the Spanish Peninsula or the US War of Independence for example, it is unlikely that the counterinsurgents possessed a significant equipment advantage when fighting the insurgents due to this external support. The aspect of the military force where the insurgent does try to claim an advantage, particularly in the early stages of irregular warfare is in the morale or ‘virtu’ of the insurgent through the identification of the insurgent with the goals and aspirations of the surrounding population. Mao Zedong used the analogy that the revolutionary fighter should be to the population as a fish is to water, that is, the revolutionary fighter should be living as part of the population rather than separate from it.
As has been seen in Chapter 2, historically (such as Judea), the counterinsurgents have used overwhelming military power to eliminate the opposition. This approach was expounded by Callwell, in his case for the situation of imperial control of rebellious colonies, where the main military aim was to bring the opposing side to a conventional battle and to use whatever means necessary to achieve that. The aim was to eliminate any military opposition and to punish any that
56 would not submit to government control. It should be noted that while the British relied on military force in the case of an insurrection, the success of the British imperial system relied more on an efficient and effective administrative structure than on oppressive military force. Writing from the side of the insurgent Lawrence articulated the approach (hit and run) to be used to defeat a larger, more organised opponent. Importantly Lawrence stated for the first time the importance of the support of the population in an insurgency and the difficulty that an occupying force has in gaining the acceptance and cooperation of the population (historical examples of this include the Spanish Peninsula and the US War of Independence). Mao Zedong further developed the idea of the population being central to any insurgency and blended the insurgency approach into the communist revolutionary ideals, developing his model of the three stages of revolution. In this the revolutionary insurgent military force was first of all to act as a political force from within the population, like a fish in water. The primary aim of the revolutionary military was not to defeat the counterinsurgent military, although that would be highly beneficial if it occurred, but to disrupt and destroy the administration and control of the population by the government. It was only at the later stages of the revolution that the insurgent military would be called on to fight and defeat the counterinsurgent military, generally in a conventional campaign. As stated by Fall, “When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front.”157 Once this was understood by the counterinsurgent theorists, such as Galula and Thompson, they developed approaches aimed at protecting the population and the government administration from the insurgents (winning ‘hearts and minds’) with only a secondary aim of defeating the insurgency militarily. In fact in Malaya the protection of the population and the government was handled by the paramilitary police and as stated by Miller “Hearts and minds was a civil, political and economic policy. The Army had no mission to win hearts and minds, or to protect the population, and it did neither”158. This is not to say that the counterinsurgency military does not play a role – it has an important part to play in defeating any significant military actions by the insurgents, that is by preventing the revolution reaching the third stage in Mao’s model, and by destroying any insurgent military bases as well as limiting as much as possible any external logistical support reaching the insurgents. This can delay, perhaps indefinitely, the building of the insurgency to where it can launch a conventional campaign and can give time for the political and administrative aspects of the counterinsurgency to gain traction with the population.
History suggests, as seen by the examples in Chapter 2, that both an insurgency and a counterinsurgency take a significant time to take effect and are unlikely to achieve their aim in a short space of time except in exceptional circumstances. The outcome of this is that the both the insurgency military and the counterinsurgency military will be vying to gain and keep the ‘respect’ of the population and this is usually achieved by the ‘virtu’ shown by each of the forces. The technical efficiency and military capability of the forces may be secondary considerations in determining the outcome of the irregular campaign. In regards to the respect of the population, Kilcullen also identified the phenomenon of the ‘accidental guerrilla’, who will take up arms against any ‘invader’ (that is foreign military) to his country, in many cases irrespective of the ‘virtu’ of the ‘invader’, sometimes even to the eventual detriment of the ‘accidental guerrilla’. This effect can be
157 Bernard Fall, The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Naval War college Review, Winter 1998, accessed from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w98.htm on 6th Mar 2013. 158 Sergio Miller, op.cit..
57 accentuated by significant social and cultural differences between the foreign military and the population and can become more pronounced over time. A study by Fitzsimmons159 from the Iraq counterinsurgency on who governs rather than how they govern suggests that in some cases ethno- religious identity can be more important than level of governance to the population. To return to Mao’s analogy, sometimes it can be more important to have a native fish than a ‘better’ imported fish. This section, in line with the quote at the beginning of the chapter, is outlining the importance of understanding the capabilities and limitations of military power and that those capabilities and limitations are not absolute but relative to the context that they are in. In conventional warfare the size, organisation and technical skill of the military are of primary importance, however in irregular warfare these characteristics, while still important, are of lesser importance than the ‘virtu’ that the military presents to the population and furthermore, this ‘virtu’ is decided by the population and is not solely an intrinsic characteristic the military force itself.
Non-Military Capability
When wars are of short duration the military force of the opponents can be the determining factor in the majority of campaigns, however as the duration of the war extends, the non-military capability of the opponents increases in importance. The ability to maintain the war effort (including the support of the population) in a protracted military campaign can be a crucial factor in deciding the outcome of the conflict. (Note that the opposing sides can vary greatly in size and capability – in conventional warfare involving nations, each opposing side generally comprises a country or group of countries whereas in a civil war it can refer to the sections of the population within a country that support each side.) In general the counterinsurgency has more economic resources available to conduct the campaign against the insurgency than the insurgents have to conduct their campaign. The counterinsurgents usually have a taxation base which provides a steady supply of resources to fund the necessary services required in a counterinsurgency campaign such as protection provided by the police and the military. Subverting the economic base of the nation is a prime target for the insurgent and this is usually done through attacking the administrative arms of the government and then imposing their own administration including some form of taxation to support the insurgency. In many cases a crucial aspect of any insurgency is the continuing support of external parties. An insurgency is more likely to be successful if provided with outside support such as the US War of Independence, the Spanish Peninsula, China (through the Japanese surrender of war materiel) and Vietnam. When there is no significant outside support for the insurgency or that support is withdrawn at some stage, it is more likely that the insurgency will fail, for example, Judea, Malaya and El Salvador. The politics of the insurgency has not only an international aspect but also an internal dimension as well. The support of the population has rightly been identified as a crucial element in any insurgency or counterinsurgency. The support of the population should not be taken for granted by either side. As proposed by Thompson “While the insurgent strength both in armed units and in active supporters may be one per cent or less of the population, the hard core on which the government can definitely rely is also likely to be quite a small percentage of the population, perhaps 10 per cent and probably never more than 20 per cent. The remaining 80 or 90 per cent of
159 Michael Fitzsimmons, Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Ramadi and Tal Afar, accessed from http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1150, 9 Apr 2013.
58 the population is neutral or near neutral as between the government and the insurgents” 160. Kilcullen has taken this further by identifying the passive support that is behind an insurgency (see diagram 12), “Complex systems analysis shows that active fighters are only the “tip of the iceberg” in insurgent systems and that counterinsurgency must therefore address the whole system in a coordinated fashion”.161
Diagram 12 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.
Diagram 12 Surface and Subsurface Elements of an Insurgency162
The aim of any counterinsurgency is to target the supporting infrastructure and sympathizer networks of the insurgency to remove the support base of the active insurgents. In other words working with the percentages identified by Thompson, a counterinsurgency needs to maintain the support of the 10-20 per cent that are actively working for the counterinsurgency, it needs to gain the acceptance and then win the support of the 80-90 per cent of the population that is neutral and it needs to change the ‘hearts and minds’ (or eliminate) the 1 per cent that is actively supporting the insurgency. The politics of the counterinsurgency needs to ensure that the population is safe from the insurgency and that the people will actively choose to support the counterinsurgency. Thompson identified that “There are three main forces which influence the people of a country: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, material well-being and progress”.163 This brings out the importance of the morale or ‘virtu’ of the population in that the country that has a unified sense of identity (whether nationalistic or religious) will be easier to unify behind a common cause. Examples of this include the Jewish rebellion in Judea, the US War of Independence, the Spanish Peninsula, Vietnam, and Malaya. Note that in some insurgencies there may only be a short period where the majority of the population is ‘neutral’ and that various ethnic, religious or even ideological divides may quickly push various sections of the population to support a particular side in the campaign. In the US War of Independence, the Spanish Peninsula and the Arab revolt the ideology of nationalism played an important role in the insurgency. In the insurgency in Iraq a mixture of nationalism and religion complicated the counterinsurgency campaign. The third force identified by Thompson is that of material well-being and progress which can be classified under the heading of technology for the non-military capability. The technological capability of the country is important in that a higher technology level for the population makes it easier for the counterinsurgency to be provided with the necessary requirements to be successful as well as the technology level making it easier for the political message to be delivered and for the population to be happier with the general situation in the country. Technology in itself, however, is only an enabler to the political and economic program that is required in a counterinsurgency.
160 Robert Thompson, op.cit., pg 63. 161 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, op.cit., pg 215. 162 Ibid., pg 8. 163 Robert Thompson, op.cit., pg 63.
59 Military leadership
Outstanding military leadership has been shown in conventional war to be one of the most significant inputs into warfare. Leaders such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal and Napoleon had the military skills and the organisational abilities to achieve victories where they were not normally expected. Conversely the lack of military skill and organisational ability, including underestimating the enemy, has led to many defeats in both battles and whole campaigns. The skilful military leader will understand the capabilities of both his military forces and the opposing military forces – as stated by Sun Tzu “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” 164 In irregular warfare understanding the enemy military forces becomes more of a challenge as one of the strategies of the insurgents, especially in the earlier stages of an insurgency, is to remain undetected for as long as possible, to strike quickly and to then fade back into the population as soon as possible. It is only in the later stages of an insurgency that an identifiable military force is likely to become apparent. In irregular warfare the military leadership need the skill and organisation to be able to handle the opaqueness of the campaign, or as termed by von Clausewitz, the ‘friction’ of conducting a battle or campaign. The skill and organisation to be able to handle the ‘friction’ of the campaign is more important in irregular warfare as the political consequences of military action during an insurgency can be of much greater significance. Since much of the effort in both insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns centre around gaining the support of the neutral majority of the population, it can be counterproductive if military actions alienate the part of the population that is the focus of the campaign. In this the military leadership need to acknowledge the largely secondary role that the military campaign will play in any irregular warfare campaign. The required approach of the military leadership can be summarised by the term of ‘virtu’ whereby the leadership need great military skill and organisational ability but not necessarily in just defeating the enemy forces, but in defeating the enemy forces when they are encountered in such a way that it will enhance the overall outcome of gaining the support of the majority of the neutral population. This needs to be done in the recognition that the military campaign is probably not the primary focus of the counterinsurgency effort - “General Rene Emilio Ponce, the defense minister at the height of the insurgency in El Salvador during the 1980s, was often quoted as stating that ‘90 percent” of countering insurgency “is political, social, economic and ideological and only 10 percent military.’”165
Political Leadership
164 Sun Tzu, op.cit., p84. 165 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif. USA, 2004, pg 5.
60 In many cases of protracted insurgency and counterinsurgency, the relative quality of the political leadership between the two sides over an extended period of time will be the determining factor between success and failure. The political leadership of Mao Zedong in China and the political leadership in Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap) are examples of successful insurgency leadership while the leadership in Malaya (Briggs, Templer) are examples of successful counterinsurgency leadership. Ineffective political leadership can also affect the chance of success, such as the French political leadership in the Spanish Peninsula, the British political leadership in the US War of Independence, and the Jewish political leadership in the Judea. While the quality of the political leadership is important in any insurgency, it is also important to retain the idea of the overall aim in the contest. As expressed by Kilcullen for a counterinsurgency, “The aim in counterinsurgency is to return the parent society to a stable, peaceful mode of interaction—on terms favourable to the government”.166 Based on the experiences in El Salvador and Malaya, this can be summarised as the acceptance of a multiplicity of political views (pluralism) within acceptable limits and a means of non-violent resolution of political disputes. A similar aim can be expressed for the insurgents; however, depending on the political affiliation of the insurgents, the acceptable limits for the pluralism may be more restrictive. This implies that what is required is good administration not necessarily good politics to convince the neutral majority of the population that their support of the counterinsurgency is warranted. Kilcullen stated that “Bernard Fall, a French counterinsurgency theorist of the 1950s and 1960s, wrote in 1965 that ‘a government that is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed.’ This is one of the neater expressions of an insight that is fundamental to classical counterinsurgency theory, namely that insurgents challenge the state by making it impossible for the government to perform its functions, or by usurping those functions—most commonly, local-level political legitimacy; the rule of law; monopoly on the use of force; taxation; control of movement; and regulation of the economy”.167 There are many cases where the insurgents made effective administration impossible for the governing forces, such as Vietnam, China (after World War 2), the US War of Independence, the Spanish Peninsula and the Arab Revolt with the insurgents usually setting up an alternate administration to restore the governance of the area and the people. Where the effective administration of the country was maintained and hopefully improved, such as Malaya, El Salvador, Judea, Iraq and China (before World War 2) and an alternate administration was not established then the counterinsurgency usually prevails.
Political leadership, as with military leadership, is naturally dependent on the circumstances that surround it at the time168. It is important that the approach to any counterinsurgency retains the overall political aim of influencing all sections of the population as was done in Malaya “Templer’s hearts and minds was first an economic and social policy, laced with political promises that also served a military purpose”.169 The aim to combine all aspects of the counterinsurgency approach has long been recognised as being more cohesive if it is unified through a single person, ensuring a cohesive political and military strategy (with Vietnam being an obvious counterexample). The political leadership of an insurgency also need to ensure that their actions are aimed at furthering their cause with the population. Although historically insurgents have tended to rely on intimidation
166 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, op.cit., pg 216. 167 Ibid., pg 149. 168 Ibid., pg 1. 169 Sergio Miller, op.cit..
61 to ensure their acceptance by the population, this approach will only work if the counterinsurgency can not provide the required protection for the population. It is preferable for the political leadership of the insurgency to be able to align the aims of the insurgency with the feelings of the population, such as occurred in the Spanish Peninsula and the US War of Independence, or to ‘educate’ the population as is the approach of the ‘revolutionary’ leaders such as Mao Zedong. The cases of the Spanish Peninsula and the US War of Independence show that the nationality or other identifying traits can be important in the population accepting or rejecting one of the sides, a phenomenon later characterised by Kilcullen as the ‘accidental guerrilla’. A study of the insurgency in Iraq by Fitzsimmons found that “The cases examined here yield ample evidence that ethno- religious identity politics do shape counterinsurgency outcomes in important ways, and also offer qualified support for the argument that addressing identity politics may be more critical than good governance to counterinsurgent success”.170
Military theory
In Chapter 1 it was established that the military theory for conventional warfare is well understood and relatively stable, although not static due to advances in areas such as technology and economic capability. Chapter 3, in examining the leading theorists on irregular warfare, shows that the theory for irregular warfare has not yet reached such an equilibrium state. As stated by Kilcullen in his book on Counterinsurgency, “Indeed, if this book has a central theme, it is that our knowledge of counterinsurgency is never static, always evolving”.171 Any military action or approach for irregular warfare must first of all be considered as part of the overall political approach and so a military theory can not be developed in isolation. The theories examined in Chapter 3 have shown this in each stage of their development with the developing emphasis on gaining population support during the insurgency. Chapter 1 reviewed the Warden strategic approach to conventional warfare where he modelled the enemy system by the five rings: fielded military, population, infrastructure, system essentials and the leadership. In developing his approach Warden separated into two distinct categories the ‘physical’ and ‘morale’ and stated that “the morale side (the human side) is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other. Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side”172. However, in irregular warfare it is precisely this ‘morale’ or population support that is the primary aim for the two contending sides. It is the ‘morale’ or population support that binds the five ring model into a cohesive whole and can enable the system to operate even with severely degraded physical systems. During the insurgency in the Spanish Peninsula, most of the fielded military, the infrastructure and the system essentials were lost to the Spanish forces but with the support of the population, the leadership were able to mount an insurrection. If however, the support of the population is lost this can be disastrous for the leadership irrespective of the state of the fielded military, the infrastructure and the system essentials as was demonstrated during the French Revolution, by Mussolini’s downfall during World War 2 and by the Russian Revolution during World War 1. The challenge for the military is to target the support of the opponent’s population in a way that is beneficial and not counterproductive and this has to be carefully considered when directly attacking the military, the infrastructure or the system essentials.
170 Michael Fitzsimmons, op.cit.. 171 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, op.cit., pg 3. 172 John Warden, The Enemy as a System, op.cit..
62 While it is important to recognise the limitations that are placed on the military actions, it is also important to realise the scope of possibilities that military action present in an integrated political approach to an insurgency. For a counterinsurgency the military forces can prevent the escalation of the insurgency to the civil war stage (Mao’s third stage), giving longer for the political actions to achieve their aim of convincing the ‘neutral’ majority of the population. One of the major activities for a counterinsurgency military force is to ensure that there is adequate border control, preventing external resources from making their way to the insurgency forces. The counterinsurgency military forces can also play a role in ensuring that the insurgents are not able to mass sufficient forces to militarily dominant any section of the population as well as offering protection to the administration running the government and to the population. The military however, is not well suited to policing the population and for gaining and acting on intelligence to eliminate the ‘revolutionary fish’ that are swimming amongst the population. The role of the military forces can also be dependent on whether the local population easily identify with them by means of nationality, culture, religion or other grounds. As seen in the political leadership discussion the identification of the population with the military forces can be an important consideration and can influence the role that the military play. It is important for the military leadership to recognise and accept their limited role in an insurgency while maximising their military actions under the control of the political leadership. This was not done in Vietnam where the military theory for insurgencies was not well understood by the US military forces with the consequent collapse of the whole political approach to fighting the insurgency. For a ‘revolutionary’ insurgency the military forces play an important part in spreading the message of the ‘revolution’ to the population and it is vital to ensure that the population identifies with the insurgents. The military forces for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents can play an important part in the overall political approach of which a central part is the gaining of the support of the ‘neutral’ section of the population. The details of the use of the military forces in an insurgency depend on the circumstances in that location at that time and should always be secondary to the political approach used to achieve overall victory.
‘Unforeseen’ inputs
Totally unforeseeable inputs to warfare are very rare and can be argued to be limited to natural events such as weather catastrophes. ‘Unforeseen’ inputs, that is inputs which would not be reasonably expected to happen, while not common, can occur more regularly and can determine the outcome of any campaign. Examples of unforeseen inputs into warfare can arguably include the unusual severity of the winter of 1708-9 on the invasion of Russia by Charles XII of Sweden and the effects of the severe storms on the Mongol fleets in their invasion of Japan in 1274 and 1281. In the case of irregular warfare unforeseen inputs can include the effect of World War 2 on the Chinese revolution and the change in relative strength between the Communists and the Nationalists. The fact that there was even an insurrection in both the US War of Independence and on the Spanish Peninsula could be seen as an unforeseen input. There was no expectation that the conventional warfare in either of these campaigns would be followed by irregular warfare as this was not commonplace in preceding wars (cf. the Cabinet Wars). While it can be debated as to whether the insurgency in Iraq should be considered as unforeseen or simply ‘bad planning’, the possibility remains that unforseen inputs can occur and that, although the unforeseen input itself can not be predicted (otherwise it is not unforeseen), it is prudent to prepare to handle, in the best way possible, the unforeseen input. This relates back to the work of Nagl where he advocated that the
63 US military should aim to be a ‘learning’ organisation with the ability to adapt as the changing circumstances demand. This should be expanded to include the political leadership as well, although by nature politics tends to be more adaptable and flexible. To be adaptable and flexible requires a cultural attitude throughout the military forces, the political leadership and the military leadership and an understanding of the military theory underpinning the warfare which allows a change in approach to respond to the change in circumstances. In many cases this can be promoted by the use of training in handling the dramatic changes that can occur in any campaign, allowing the whole insurgency or counterinsurgency organisation to become a ‘learning’ organisation. This will encourage the development of resilience in the mental approach across the organisation meaning that any unforeseen inputs are less likely to be catastrophic to the overall campaign.
Enduring Elements of Strategy for Irregular Warfare
In the preceding section an optimised approach to irregular warfare has been developed through the framework of the inputs to warfare outlined in Chapter 1. From this optimised approach and based on the examples and theories examined in Chapters 2 and 3, the enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare will now be identified. The term ‘elements of strategy’ is borrowed from von Clausewitz who used it to describe the underpinnings of his book On War.173 The elements of strategy are considered enduring as they have been found across a wide range of examples of irregular warfare throughout history and so are likely to be present in any occurrence of irregular warfare in the future. Theorists such as Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz are widely considered to have identified enduring elements of strategy for conventional warfare in that their elements of strategy have been recognised across a wide range of instances of conventional warfare even though the methods of war fighting have drastically changed over time. The first enduring element of strategy for irregular warfare is:
1. The details of each insurgency, for both sides, depend on the specific situation at the time. As identified by Kilcullen “There’s no standard set of techniques in counterinsurgency. In fact, the precise approach any particular government takes to defeat an insurgency depends very much on the character of that government”.174 This can be demonstrated from the range of examples considered in Chapter 3. Whereas a successful approach to defeating an insurgency was used in Malaya a few years later, even with Thompson advising the South Vietnamese government, the insurgency in South Vietnam was successful due to the different circumstances in that country. The revolt on the Spanish Peninsula occurred as a result of the specific circumstances in that area whereas, even though Napoleon had conquered the majority of Europe, he did not face an equivalent problem anywhere else. The Arab Revolt during World War 1 stands apart from the other considered examples of an insurgency in that it was used in conjunction with a major war effort and was in some ways ‘manufactured’ by the British Army. In Iraq the religious divisions have segmented the population and have been used as a way of fomenting the insurgency. In each of the examples considered in Chapter 3 the specific circumstances involved in the irregular warfare means that the ‘precise approach’ by both sides has to be customised in order to achieve the best chance of success. However, even though each example of irregular
173 Carl von Clausewitz, op.cit., p71. 174 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, op.cit., pgs 154-5.
64 warfare is different in detail, there are certain characteristics which are common (to a varying extent) across each occurrence.
2. Political, social and economic considerations are paramount. Whilst most conventional wars are decided on the battlefield through a clash of arms, most irregular wars are determined through political, social and economic considerations. The political approaches of both sides can be crucial in determining the outcome of an irregular campaign. For example the anti- colonial independence movements after World War 2 provided fertile ground for many irregular campaigns, particularly in South East Asia. The insurgencies in Vietnam and Malaya (as well as others in Thailand and Indonesia) were fuelled by the desire for sovereignty and aided by the weakness of the colonial powers following World War 2. The successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya recognised the desire for independence and incorporated it into the political program whereas the insurgency in Vietnam was able to portray itself as a struggle against colonial powers, first of all France and then the U.S.A. Politics is also important in maintaining the backing of external supporters. Many of the post World War 2 insurgencies were based on the communist ideal and supported by the Soviet Union and Communist China in political, economic and sometimes military ways. The political and military support of the American revolutionaries by several European nations was significant in the American War of Independence. Similarly the support of Britain was vital to the insurgency on the Spanish Peninsula against Napoleon. Social factors can also play a vital role in an insurgency. The insurrection in Judea was solely based in the Jewish section of the population and was centred on their religious beliefs, making it almost impossible to expand the campaign to the entire population. The insurgency in Malaya was centred in the ethnic Chinese minority of the population which made it easier to defeat. The religious divide in Iraq however, has complicated the resolution of the insurgency particularly with the provocation provided by the actions of Al Qaeda. Each of the political, social and economic considerations has one primary aim which provides the next element of strategy for irregular warfare.
3. Population support is vital. The outcome of any insurgency is usually decided by the gaining of the support of the population whether active or passive. In Judea the Romans eliminated the insurgency by removing completely the section of the population that supported it, that is the Jews were taken from Judea and sold into slavery across the empire. In the American War of Independence the British lost the support of the population through their political and military actions. On the Spanish Peninsula Napoleon set off the insurgency by replacing the Spanish monarch with his own brother. During the Arab Revolt the flames of Arab nationalism were fanned by Lawrence and others as a tactic against the Ottomans. The Communists in China were able to convince the population with offers of land reform and by highlighting the corruption of the Chinese warlords (as well as taking advantage of the intervention of Japanese during World War 2). In Malaya the counterinsurgents were able to isolate the insurgents from their support base in the population through a policy of resettlement and political reform. The Communists in Vietnam were able to portray the insurgency as an independence movement against the colonialists. In El Salvador neither side were able to gain the overwhelming support of the majority of the population and, with both sides recognising this, a political compromise was achieved. In Iraq, where a complex interaction of social and political effects occurred, the religious divide meant that a political
65 compromise was the only way likely to achieve an end to the insurgency. In each of these cases the population support, or the lack of it, has played a crucial role in determining the outcome of the irregular campaign. As noted in the previous element of strategy the political, social and economic considerations play a significant part in determining who gains the support of the population. Other factors can also play a part (either positive or negative) in determining the population support which leads to the next enduring element of strategy
4. Limited role for the military. In any irregular warfare situation it is important that the leaders of either side correctly use their military capability to advance their overall aims. As population support is crucial, any actions by the military have to be supportive of achieving that support. Major military activity, which may achieve military objectives, but which alienates the population are in fact counterproductive. The US military in Vietnam achieved most of its military objectives, clearing areas of the Viet Cong and reaching prescribed body count targets but in the process did not gain the population support for the South Vietnamese government. In Malaya, where military action was subsumed into the political agenda, military objectives were chosen to support the overall aim of the counterinsurgency. In El Salvador both sides aimed for a military solution before realising that the overall population support was lacking for both sides and settling for a political solution. The military, although limited in its effect on determining the outcome of the insurgency, can still play a significant role in supporting the political aims of either side. For the insurgents the military can provide a substantial destabilising force by attacking the symbols of the counterinsurgents such as administrative centres, courts, economic targets and the police or paramilitary. Such attacks can reduce the confidence of the population in the government and weaken the control or influence of the government over the population. For the counterinsurgents the military can protect the other branches of the government as well as search out and remove the insurgents when they achieve a sufficient concentration. The counterinsurgent military can also be useful in controlling the flow of resources to the insurgency as long as it does not alienate the population during its actions. An important aspect of the counterinsurgent military is to gain time for the counterinsurgent political, social and economic program to gain support within the population leading to the final identified element of strategy.
5. Adaptation is important. As most insurgencies take a relatively long time compared to conventional warfare, there is more scope for the characteristics of the situation or for the approaches to the situation to change over time. A strong example of the variation with time is the Chinese civil war which spanned over 23 years and included the intervention of World War 2. The approaches of the insurgents and the counterinsurgents changed over time with Mao Zedong developing his approach to revolutionary insurgency during this time and with Chiang Kai-shek trying various approaches to defeat the insurgency. Both sides were required to adapt to the dynamic details of the situation in an effort to optimise the chance of achieving their overall aims. In Malaya the British showed significant adaptation when their initial efforts at defeating the insurgency failed. In Vietnam both France and the US were insistent on fighting the war in a conventional style and, being unwilling to adapt, were not able to defeat the insurgency. In Iraq the US has had to learn how to adapt from fighting a conventional war to irregular warfare so as to further the counterinsurgency campaign. Adaptation, or as Nagl phrased it ‘be a learning organisation’, can play a
66 significant role in determining the success or failure of an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign. Although adaptation occurs in conventional wars as well (examples include both World Wars), it is the long time-span characteristic of insurgencies that ensures that adaptation becomes an element of strategy for irregular warfare.
67 Conclusion: Review of Thesis and Future Work
"A theory is a good theory if it satisfies two requirements: It must accurately describe a large class of observations on the basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite predictions about the results of future observations." 175
This thesis has set out to generate an improved understanding of irregular warfare by identifying its enduring elements of strategy. This has been done through an approach that combines hermeneutics and scientific empiricism. Selected examples and theories of conventional warfare have been examined through historical analysis in Chapter 1 and have been used to propose a framework of inputs to warfare. The framework of the inputs to warfare that was proposed was categorised as follows:
1. Military forces.
2. Non-Military Capability
3. Military Leadership
4. Political Leadership
5. Military Theory
6. ‘Unforeseen’ Events
This framework of the inputs to warfare has then been compared to selected examples of irregular warfare in Chapter 2 and it has been found that the framework explains the contributing factors for irregular warfare albeit with varying emphasis on the importance of particular inputs. In Chapter 3 the framework was used to interpret selected theories of irregular warfare that have been developed in modern times since Callwell published his book Small Wars. The outstanding contribution of these theorists has been to emphasise the importance of gaining the population support in contesting irregular warfare. The framework of the inputs to warfare has then been used to gain a better understanding of irregular warfare and, from that understanding, to identify the elements of strategy for irregular warfare which have been consistently observed in the examples chosen in Chapter 2. This framework was chosen to allow the closer examination of separate aspects of the conduct of warfare, in particular irregular warfare. The use of this framework allowed the identification of the following enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare:
1. The details of each insurgency, for both sides, depend on the specific situation at the time.
2. Political, social and economic considerations are paramount.
3. Population support is vital.
4. Limited role for the military.
175 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History in Time, see for example, http://www-history.mcs.st- and.ac.uk/Quotations/Hawking.html, accessed 18th Apr 2013.
68 5. Adaptation is important.
The elements of strategy for irregular warfare have been identified using a selected range of instances of irregular warfare. This work mirrors the work of Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz in that it has developed general guidelines for approaching one type of warfare, in this case irregular warfare whilst realising that all warfare is complex and not amenable to a simplistic specified approach which will guarantee success through following a defined set of procedures. The next step in this work, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, is to verify that these elements are enduring and common to other occurrences of irregular warfare by analysing other examples of irregular warfare outside of the previously used selection. The proposed other occurrences of irregular warfare to be used to confirm the enduring elements of strategy are:
Northern Ireland (1967-2007) Greek Civil War (1943-49) Hukbalahap Insurgency (Philippines) (1946-56) Philippines (1899 - ) Algeria (1954-62) South Africa (1899-1902) Hezbollah (2000 - ) Mexico (1926-29) Rhodesia (1962-80) The verification of the elements of strategy for irregular warfare will show that the elements have a useful role to play in interpreting the conduct of insurgencies. Furthermore by understanding the enduring nature of the elements of strategy competing organisations in an irregular warfare campaign will be better placed to apply military force to the situation at hand. This will improve (but not guarantee) the chance of success in conducting irregular warfare. The identification of the enduring elements of strategy will also have implications for the various aspects of the military force and how warfighting in irregular warfare can be better applied. Future work will include the examination of the impact of the enduring elements of strategy on the following aspects of the military force:
Force structure Training Land Maritime Air Joint The consideration of the enduring elements of strategy on these aspects of military force will allow the ‘optimisation’ of the military force to handle irregular warfare notwithstanding the variation that exists for each occurrence of irregular warfare depending on the situation at the time. Also, given that many military forces are configured for conventional warfare, the consideration of the enduring
69 elements of strategy for irregular warfare can improve the understanding of how these forces can be transitioned from a conventional warfare footing to an irregular warfare configuration. Since this transition usually takes an appreciable amount of time (e.g. El Salvador, Iraq and Malaya), the enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare can inform the military leaders on how conventional military forces can be used initially in a developing irregular warfare campaign. It is envisaged that the identification of the enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare will improve the understanding of the nature of irregular warfare as well as how to conduct irregular warfare with either an military force ‘optimised’ for irregular warfare or with a ‘conventional’ military force that requires to be adapted as the campaign progresses.
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