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Taiwan Policy Under the Biden Administration Biden and the Future of US-Taiwan Relations

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Taiwan Policy Under the Biden Administration Biden and the Future of US-Taiwan Relations Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 22 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 22 Taiwan Policy Under the Biden Administration Russell Hsiao Biden and the Future of US-Taiwan Relations: A Shared Vision for a Democratic Future J. Michael Cole Taiwanese Perspectives on the Next US Administration’s Taiwan and Cross-Strait Policies Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Alan H. Yang Next President’s Priorities for the Partnership with Taiwan Shirley Kan Taiwan Policy under Biden: The First Six Months, The First Year, and Beyond Michael Mazza The Future of US-Taiwan Economic Relations: Lessons from the Past Riley Walters Taiwan Policy Under the Biden Administration The Global Taiwan Brief is a By: Russell Hsiao bi-weekly publication released every other Wednesday and pro- Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the vides insight into the latest news on Taiwan. Global Taiwan Brief. All the major US media networks now forecast that former Vice President Joseph Biden— Editor-in-Chief Russell Hsiao the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party—has won the 2020 presidential election Staff Editor and will become the 46th president of the United States. In a full-blown dash out of the Katherine Schultz gate in preparation for assuming the highest political office, President-elect Biden has al- Copy Editor ready taken the step of forming his agency review teams, including for defense and foreign Marshall Reid policy. As the president-elect and his transition team take a fine-tooth comb to review the The views and opinions expressed agencies—as well as policies of the current administration—one area they will certainly in these articles are those of the look at is Taiwan policy. In part because of the high-profile and openly confrontational tack authors and do not necessarily re- taken by the Trump administration in its approach to China policy, Taiwan has been in the flect the official policy or position headlines almost constantly over recent years. In turn, this has created a misperception of the Global Taiwan Institute. that adjustments in US policy towards Taiwan were driven primarily by policy towards To view web sources cited in the China. It is of course the prerogative of any incoming administration to review the policy published papers (underlined and practices of its predecessor. In this special issue of the Global Taiwan Brief, we asked in printed text), visit https:// several of our research fellows and advisors to weigh in on what they think will be—and globaltaiwan.org/2020/11/vol-5- what they think should be—the priorities for the incoming Biden administration. issue-22/. But before diving into the expert assessments of what we might have to look forward to Global Taiwan Institute over the next four years under the Biden-Harris White House, it is worthwhile to take a 1836 Jefferson Place NW, look at how we got to where we are today. Washington DC 20036 [email protected] Despite expectations—and perhaps overstated concerns—of a fundamental change in US Taiwan policy, four years of the Trump administration did not alter the legal framework To subscribe, visit https://global- taiwan.org/subscribe/. and policies that form the basis of US policy towards Taiwan—which remains firmly root- ed in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the Six Assurances. The US “One-China Policy” © 2020 · Global Taiwan Institute remains intact—although it has arguably been stretched. Indeed, its elasticity has always Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 22 2 been a durable feature of the US-Taiwan-China rela- 1. A phone call between the President-elect Trump tionship and a function of Beijing’s actions. and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). As President Ronald Reagan made clear in a 1982 2. Regularizing the arms sales process to Taiwan. memo that has been recently declassified, the US 3. Routinizing and publicizing naval transits through commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense is “conditioned the Taiwan Strait. absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differenc- 4. Resuming cabinet-level visits and interactions by es.” As China’s actions have grown increasingly aggres- senior officials such as the US national security ad- sive vis-à-vis Taiwan and the world, especially in recent viser and the secretary-general of Taiwan’s Nation- years, the United States has had to take a hard look at al Security Council. updating its policies and practices to better reflect ob- jective reality. Justifying the adjustment in the admin- 5. President Trump’s signing of two landmark Tai- istration’s approach to Taiwan policy over the past four wan-related bills. years, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and 6. Permitting the president of Taiwan high-profile Pacific Affairs David Stillwell noted in a major Taiwan visit-like transits through the United States. policy speech in late August 2020: 7. Declassification of internal policy documents “What we are doing […] is making some import- that guide US policy towards Taiwan, such as Pres- ant updates to our engagement with Taiwan ident Reagan’s memos on the Six Assurances and to better reflect these policies and respond to arms sales to Taiwan. changing circumstances. The adjustments are significant, but still well within the boundaries of 8. High-level public support for expanding Taiwan’s our “One-China Policy.” […] We feel compelled to international space, as demonstrated by the cam- make these adjustments for two reasons. First, paign to include the island in the WHO. because of the increasing threat posed by Bei- 9. Elevating the Global Cooperation and Training jing to peace and stability in the region, which Framework (GCTF) to include new official partners is a vital interest of the United States. […] The and hosting the forum in different regions of the second reason we have been focusing on our world. engagement with Taiwan is simply to reflect the growing and deepening ties of friendship, trade, 10. Launching the New Economic Prosperity Dia- and productivity between the United States and logue. Taiwan.” These actions all objectively reflect the upward trajec- Also instructive of just how views of Taiwan are chang- tory in US-Taiwan relations during the Trump adminis- ing in the United States, it is noteworthy that the de tration. While agency certainly matters for how policy facto US ambassador to Taiwan and long-time diplo- is conducted, there are structural components of the mat, AIT Director Brent Christensen, pointed out at US-Taiwan relationships that have a bearing on how GTI’s 2020 annual symposium: “I believe the US-Tai- policy will be conducted. This is especially true in the wan partnership underwent a subtle but powerful case of Taiwan policy given the centrality of the TRA—a shift this year. This is the first time in my memory that domestic law that establishes the legal framework for influential voices […] began to discuss the US-Taiwan the unofficial relations with Taiwan. That US-Taiwan partnership more on its own merits than solely in the relations have withstood and even thrived under pre- US-China context.” So what are some of the visible carious conditions since the change in diplomatic rec- manifestations of these adjustments in the Trump ad- ognition—despite expectations of the contrary—is a ministration’s upgraded engagement with Taiwan and strong testament to the robust, flexible legal and policy the content of US Taiwan policy in general? framework provided by the TRA and the Six Assuranc- es. These measures mandate reciprocal American and Taiwanese obligations and commitments that have Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 22 3 helped to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan marred the Trump administration’s broader policies, Strait for the past 40 years. Taiwan policy has been one of its clear bright spots. As such, it behooves the incoming administration to con- While any potential political transition injects a degree tinue to expand on these policies, working to demon- of uncertainty into policy, it is important to remember strate that the US approach to Taipei and Beijing is bi- that the pro-Taiwan legislation signed into law over the partisan and enduring, and that the US commitment past four years—including the Taiwan Travel Act, TAI- to Taiwan’s democracy does not change with elections. PEI Act, Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, and the various National Defense Authorization Acts—was passed with An old idiom applies: Don’t throw the baby out with overwhelming bipartisan support in the US Congress, the bathwater. some even with unanimous consent. These accom- The main point: As the incoming Biden administration plishments are remarkable political feats for a deeply reviews the policies and practices of the departing ad- divided Congress and should provide reassurance that ministration, one area it will certainly look at is Taiwan Taiwan policy continues to enjoy robust bipartisan sup- policy. It behooves the incoming administration to port in the United States. Moreover, that the president demonstrate that the US approach to Taipei and Bei- signed these bills into law—giving them the full politi- jing is bipartisan and enduring by continuing the pos- cal force of the US government—is a rare and powerful itive elements of the Trump administration’s Taiwan demonstration of unity in US policy. policy. Perhaps more importantly, these pieces of legislation *** help to broaden and deepen the foundation of US-Tai- wan relations by reinforcing key commitments in the Biden and the Future of US-Taiwan Rela- Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances and even ex- panding them in certain ways. More specifically, they tions: A Shared Vision for a Democratic extend the policy role and oversight function exerted Future by Congress as a co-equal branch of government, en- suring that American interests and values as defined By: J.
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