Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 1996 Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical Deliberators? Heidi Li Feldman Georgetown University Law Center,
[email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1719 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 885 This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons ARTICLES CODES AND VIRTUES: CAN GOOD LAWYERS BE GOOD ETHICAL DELIBERATORS? HEIDI Li FELDMAN* INTRODUCTION Regardless of its specific contents, any black letter statutory codi- fication regulating lawyers' conduct will be flawed as an instrument of ethics for lawyers. This is the central thesis of this Article. It is moti- vated by the idea that typical statutory prohibitions and permissions are likely to stunt sentimental responsiveness, a key feature of good ethical deliberation. Additionally, a certain technocratic mode of legal analysis heightens this tendency. Although other styles of law- yering might better engender sentimental responsiveness, statutory codes of lawyers' ethics do not invite this style as readily as a well- developed common law of lawyers' ethics would. If these ideas are correct, they suggest that there is some basis for the popular perception that lawyers are distinctly unethical.' On a * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1986, Brown University; J.D. 1990, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan. Thanks to Lucy Clark, Jeff Ballard-Brand and Sam Feder, for important research assistance.