1
The Effect of Black Enfranchisement On the Policy Positions of Congressmen from Florida and Louisiana, 1958-1982
Clay Halsey Santelman
Honors Thesis University of Oregon
Primary Advisor: Professor William Terry
April 29, 2013 2
I. Introduction
This paper aims to debunk the notion that Southern elected officials voted and acted as a bloc for white racial solidarity in response to the civil rights movement. I do this by comparing the policy response of politicians in Florida and Louisiana. I attempt to understand the impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and previous efforts to increase black voting on southern representatives by comparing the congressional voting patterns of members from these two states. I focus primarily on U.S. House members because these have not received sufficient attention in the literature. Figure 1 demonstrates the dramatic increases in black participation for presidential elections after the VRA. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the rise of the GOP in the states studied. An appendix at the end of the paper provides supplemental information.
Figure 1: Nationwide African American Voter Participation After the VRA
60.0 54.0 48.0 42.0 36.0 30.0 24.0 18.0 12.0 6.0 0 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984
Nationwide African American Voter Participation 3
Figure 2: Rise of the GOP in Louisiana
70.00% 63.00% 56.00% 49.00% 42.00% 35.00% 28.00% 21.00% 14.00% 7.00% 0% 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
1st-8th Congressional Districts (Popular Vote Percentage) 1st-8th Congressional Districts Republican
Figure 3: Rise of the GOP in Florida
80.00% 72.00% 64.00% 56.00% 48.00% 40.00% 32.00% 24.00% 16.00% 8.00% 0% 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
1st-15th Congressional Districts (Popular Vote Percentage) 1st-8th (1958-1962), 1st-12th (1963-1972), 1st-15th (1973-1982)Congressional Districts Republican 4
I demonstrate that, contrary to the theory that southerners voted solely to save “the southern way of life”, disproportionately urban and black regions throughout Louisiana and
Florida faced a “push-pull dilemma” (Hood, Kidd, & Morris 2001). Incumbent politicians were
“pulled” by newly enfranchised blacks and “pushed” by an increasingly mobile Republican party. The aim of my research is to provide evidence regarding the VRA’s tendency to pull legislators to the left, and evidence of legislators that were pushed to the right by an emerging conservative Republican party. I seek to explain the observed rightward or leftward responses in terms of the Americans for Democratic Action liberal quotient score change variance.
I present the two following types of evidence in support of my claims. First I present
“liberal quotients” based on Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores. I relate movements in these scores to the racial composition of the district electorate. Secondly, I conduct case studies chosen by the following three criteria: 1. the percent registered black, 2. GOP strength, and 3. the percent change of African Americans.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains how the Voting Rights Act has effected southern legislator behavior from the view point of other authors. In particular, Andrews
(1997, 2002) produces regression models and the research strategy that I will use as the basis for study in the paper. Section II discusses Hood, Kidd and Morris’s (2001) reasons for researching the Senate as opposed to the House. Highly concentrated black populations affected representatives’ voting patterns. This paper takes a look at those effects in relationship to the
Voting Rights Act’s passage. The last portion of section II is designed to give supplementary and anecdotal accounts that highlight personal experiences which may have had an effect on representative decision making processes. Section III explains the theoretical effects of a 5 mobilized black electorate and the potential changes in southern representatives’ voting behavior.
The section will provide important definitions for opponent-push and constituency-pull and explain their pertinence this. Section IV describes the ability of Louisianan and Floridian House representatives to institute legislation. I present analysis of aggregated data regarding voting patterns in the House and accompanying liberal quotient scores produced by the ADA. I look specifically for representative behavioral changes indicative of constituency-pull and opponent- push theories. Section V concludes the study.
II. Literature Review and Historical Context
The literature on the civil rights era and post-civil rights era is vast. In this section I focus on key research that is important for my study. I rely heavily on Hood, Kidd, and Morris’s (2001) work because it demonstrates Senate findings that are consistent to my House findings. Studies by Davidson and Groffman (1994), and Alt (1994) are also useful for my analysis of Florida and
Louisiana.
A. House versus Senate
Most of the literature that explicitly links poling outcomes to black registration and voting rates has focused on the policy response in the Senate, not the House. Hood Kidd and
Morris (2001) operate under the premise that “...liberalization of voting patterns in Southern
Democrats in the Senate [is sufficient], the focus on the House is...unnecessary.” (2001). This presumes that analyzing the Senate is a sufficient test for the degree of liberalization in Congress.
Hood Kidd and Morris (2001) further justify their Senate study over a study of the House by citing constant redistricting and reapportionment of congressional districts. 6
House members in both Louisiana and in Florida were either reappointed to another district or given a newly created district to preside over; southern House representatives were constantly reelected, albeit in varying districts as Hood Kidd and Morris (2001) have pointed out.
House representative continuity becomes apparent which belies their stance concerning redistricting1 . Hood, Kidd and Morris’ (1999) study of Senators is important as is their methodology which yields perspective of change over time. I follow this research design. Finally,
Hood Kidd and Morris (1999) point out that work on the House that attempts to represent change of “...black mobilization and an increase in Republican Party strength...” is lacking (1999).
My data regarding Congressional representatives, liberal quotient scores, statewide black registration rates collected from Florida’s and Louisiana’s Secretary of States, GOP presidential vote shares, and precent house delegates Republican yield a perspective on the degree to which the VRA affected Floridian and Louisianan House members. These sources, accompanying graphs, and tables may be found at the end of the text. Hood, Kidd, and Morris (1999), using many of these same data sets find that “…liberalization of Democratic Senators from the South was a result of the interaction between the rise of the Republican Party and the mobilization of the black electorate” (1999). I wish to find similar results in this study of the House representatives.
B. Post-VRA Registration
Louisiana’s history is associated with measures to limit black voter registration and candidacy 2. Litigation intended to eliminate these rules began to deconstruct barriers to
1 See appendix A.
2 White primaries in which only white candidates for office were allowed to partake, racially segregated schools, publications of black candidates’ names resulting in home evictions as well as firings, and literacy tests are only a few examples of such measures. 7 participation in the franchise, however as Davidson and Groffman (1994) indicate, the struggle continued; the potential for black Americans in the state of Louisiana to vote after the Voting
Rights Act was severely weakened by violent and non-violent measures. An “NAACP secretary in Concordia Parish was shot and wounded in her home a few months after she began coordinating a voter registration drive.” (2013). Most sources indicate that the VRA
“...advanced...toward the ideal expressed in the Fifteenth amendment that ‘the right of citizens...to vote shall not be denied or abridged...on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” (1994). The assertion that the VRA liberalized representatives is one that I am attempting to prove worked equally well for elected candidates of Florida and Louisiana in the
House of Representatives.
James E. Alt (1994) provides support for this assertion. He shows the effect of the presence of registered black and white voters, but he also supplies a paradigm for statistical analysis that I will follow in my study of the House. His work focuses on the percent of the amount of black and white voters registered in a given county and proves this to be a significant indicator of how a legislator will vote on a bill regarding the civil rights of the electorate at the local level. Findings that highlight “...change...cutting the white disproportionate advantage
[legislatively speaking] by more than half.” in towns and local county level positions is encouraging (1994).
C. Case Studies
Southern representatives in office before the Voting Rights Act maintained white racial solidarity bloc voting to demonstrate uniformity. There were, however, exceptions. Badger’s work highlights early influences on figures such as Dante Fascell of Florida’s 4th congressional 8 district3, who sought “...black support in daylight...actively canvassing the black community.” (Badger 1999). Factors that played a role in their decision making processes include circumstantial, moral, and electoral. This section is designed to account for outliers and unique representatives while also providing for an ideologically wide spectrum of characters.
Consequently, providing case studies for individual house members is significant because it provides an explanation for the discord post and pre VRA between them. It is well known that southern House representatives were the front to the passage of civil rights. The objective here is to account for those who were removed from office, presided over districts with many African
Americans or influxes of African Americans, and had inordinate liberal quotient scores but whom also remained in office4. In sum, these three criterion yield studies for representatives who demonstrate change as a factor of the VRA as well as particular circumstances that give reason for their tenure, or lack thereof, in office. Research into the personal lives and political climates of the representatives’ districts will yield a broader perspective pertaining to liberal or illiberal voting patterns.
III. Theories
A. The Expected Effect of a Mobilized Black Constituency
Kenneth Andrews’ (1997, 2002) quantitative work is an exemplary model because he uses a structural argument to demonstrate how institutions (e.g., The United States House of
Representatives, white citizen councils, anti-integrationist measures) were created. The OLS regression model that he employs to gauge the effect of physical assaults on freedom summer volunteers and the growth of segregationist academies is the paradigm I will use to analyze
3 See appendix A for Fascell’s high LQ score consistency.
4 This would suggest that redistricting, gerrymandering, or an especially particular district was present. 9 behavioral change5 in House delegates from Florida and Louisiana. Andrews finds that “…when there is a credible threat that desegregation will be implemented (implicitly signaling the
“success of the movement)…” there is an indication of the VRA’s efficacy (2002). I seek the same results in my study of House Representatives. I will focus on two predominant tracks to achieve this: 1. the House vs. Senate response, and 2. the tenets of opponent push-constituency pull theories.
B. Liberal Quotient Scores and House vs. Senate Explanation
The American Democratic Association liberal quotient score provides liberal ratings on a scale from 0-100 (0 being very illiberal and 100 being liberal). Further studies on southern state
Senate responsiveness to a mobilized black electorate demonstrate that “...black constituency size has a significant, positive impact on legislative support for issues of interests to blacks.” (Herring 1990). This indicates that the degree to which a particular district was populated by blacks would dictate the extent of liberalization on issues regarding civil rights. A concentration on House state level data is crucial to discovering if the VRA had the same impact it had on the Senate. The two tables in the appendix document the liberal quotient scores for all representatives who served in Louisiana and Florida from 1956-1980. These tables represent the change these scores underwent over time and they aid my goal of finding a discernible liberal voting pattern. Their insights do not tell the whole story of why an elected representative increasingly or decreasingly voted liberally, why they were redistricted, or why they were voted out of office. However, they provide important clues that lead my research into discovering how the VRA influenced these events.
5 As gauged by the ADA’s liberal quotient score 10
Liberal quotient scores lend a broader view of a representative’s profile. This includes a) party affiliation, b) congressional districts, and c) duration in office supplement the liberal quotient scores. Appendix A lists all of these components for Floridian representatives and appendix B does the same for Louisiana representatives6.
Additional study on this subject in Southern Politics provides a historical impetus. V.O.
Key (1949) postulated that “...the black belt has been the center of racial and economic conservatism and has exerted a disproportionate influence on the politics of individual states and the South as a whole.” (Key 1949). The VRA’s passage impacted districts with large black constituencies, implicating those districts located in the rural black belt7. These counties demonstrated a pattern of representative (liberal) voting. The limiting factor of “...the effects of the presence of white race organizations...[interacting] with black population concentrations...
[as] more prevalent...in the counties with highest black voting age populations.” is a key factor to my initial assertion that black voter mobilization was, in fact, stronger in these areas as well
(Davidson, Grofman 1994). I contend that although the resistance white race organizations enacted as a stumbling block to black voter registration and involvement was rigorous, a spike in voter participation can still be expected. Due to increasingly frequent federal encroachments into state affairs and a shifting political spectrum8, House representatives from predominantly black districts would respond liberally. An indication of an overall trend that is indicative of a continued racial stance post-VRA may be found.
6 The appendices for Florida and Louisiana are located on page 34 and 35 instead of sporadic placement throughout this paper because they are frequently referenced.
7 the strip of land running from the far northeastern portion of Texas
8 The constituency-pull theory in tandem with an increasingly involved Republican party (opponent-push theory) at work; it was no longer socially permissible to base policy on an overtly racist foundation. 11
Findings that indicate “...a conflict between the desire to elect liberals and the desire to elect Democrats to congress, will be found in southern jurisdictions.” (Grofman et al. 1992). That is, Louisiana and Florida will indicate a pattern commensurate to other southern districts. These conclusions have major implications for change over time and impediments including redistricting and reapportionment. I believe that a discernible pattern of increasing liberalization will present itself through statistical analysis of the percent registered black voters as a portion of the total voting population. Although a liberalization in policy is likely to present itself, this does not mean that, “...blacks seeking descriptive representation is [likely]...since the creation of black majority districts at the congressional level by the size of the black population needed to form a majority black House district.” (Grofman et al. 1992) is too small. There was a large enough presence of blacks in certain districts9 to make a large enough impression on House members who represented them to vote for policies that were in the electorate’s interests, but, not enough blacks in these districts to force the election of their preferred candidate.
C. Constituency Pull and Opponent Push Theories
Hood Kidd and Morris’ work focuses on the constituency pull theory and the opponent push theory (Hood et al. 1999). These two conjectures provide a separate range of factors to explain the variation of southern representative behavior. They are not however in support of a study of southern members of the House for the same reasons provided for in section II part A. It is implicitly inferred that constituency pull and opponent push are not compatible with a study of the southern members of the House. I believe this to be false and it is the intent of this thesis to prove that. The “...leftward pull of an increasingly mobilized black electorate.” and of a
9 Especially along the black belt 12
“...growing Republican Party.”, as representations of constituency pull and opponent push theories respectively, are as much relative to Senatorial members as they are to their counterparts in the House (Hood et al. 1999).
Constituency-pull is not exclusive to Hood Kidd and Morris, it is simply nomenclature to a phenomenon extrapolated upon by Key (1949) in Southern Politics in State and Nation when he stated that the conundrums of Southern political ongoings regarded the degree of concentration of blacks in a given geographical area. For Key, this was the primary factor in his attempt to rationalize political interaction in the South and it would be this factor Key would use to provide an answer for the inquiry of this project. Given that his work was written before the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, it was impossible for him to have known the impact such an event would have on southern political interactions. The assertion that the amount of blacks in a given area had a discernible effect on Southern political behavior is still pertinent with Key’s position as he too placed great importance on the concentrated degree of black populations.
Hood Kidd and Morris (1999) further state that one component to their two-part analysis is “...the ability of newly mobilized Southern blacks to pull Democratic Senators10 closer to their end of the ideological spectrum.” (Hood et al. 1999). The evidence provided for by the
Civil Rights Commission belie the assertion that an increasingly enfranchised black electorate forced southern politicians to pay attention to their demands. It requires acknowledgement that where Democrats formerly occupied the conservative right by themselves, the Republicans then also occupied that position, pushing them to the left. Opponent push theory in conjunction with constituency pull theory will therefore be necessary to this thesis. The definitions of these two
10 House members for the purposes of my work. 13 key terms are important to properly understand the goals of this project. They will explain the base assertions of this paper amidst the abundance of numerical representations of the same phenomenon.
Statewide data is represented for the percent of registered African Americans in Louisiana below. The data sets pertain to House of Representative election cycles every two years and they demonstrate an increasing trend in voter registration.
Figure 4: Percent Registered African American - Louisiana
30.00%
27.00%
24.00%
21.00%
18.00%
15.00%
12.00%
9.00%
6.00%
3.00%
0% 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 14
D. The Hotelling-Downs Model
Constituency pull and opponent push theories are not independently sufficient to explain southern representative policy shifts. Hood et al. (1999) assert that “…the combined11 pressures of these phenomena may be enough to generate a leftward shift in Democratic roll-call voting behavior. We argue that Southern Democrats facing both an increase in black mobilization and a significant Republican threat were driven towards a new constituency.” These electoral occurrences explain the Hotellings-Downs model of firm location. This spatial model of party competition dictates that “…two competing firms would converge toward adjacent positions at the middle of the market. If one firm is farther from the middle than its competitor, it can increase its share of the market by moving toward the middle; and so on, until equilibrium is reached. Substituting voters for consumers, parties for firms, and the "costs" of ideological distance for transportation costs…” it is possible to apply Hotelling’s model (1929) to electoral politics (Stokes 1963).
The model is directly related to some southern representatives’ responses that resulted from the implementation of the VRA. Representatives that experienced change did so in three important ways: 1) change in party affiliation, 2) congressional redistricting, and 3) election loss.
These three components mirror features of appendices A and B on pages 33 and 34 and the case study section on page 19 indicates four specific instances of these adjustments. In sum,
Hotelling’s model (1929) explains general electoral phenomena in the post-VRA South. The electoral rules of the American system resultantly demand brief examination with regard to the
Hotelling-Downs model.
11 original italics 15
The single member, two party electoral system provides for an arena in which it is permissible to assume that all actors will take the action that maximizes their expected payoffs
(reelection). Expected utility maximization suggests that challengers and incumbents will cater to their electorate’s policy preferences and shift to the left. African-American voter enfranchisement importantly changed electoral rules; they reorient the importance of constituency policy preference and they do this in two important ways: 1) in those spaces where black population concentration is highest, and 2) where GOP mobilization is prevalent. These two factors are tied to constituency pull and opponent push theory; they are the agents that push or pull candidates either right or left of center in accordance with the median vote theorem.
D. The Role of Organizational Capacity, Counter-Movements, and Reactionaries
The Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights movement induced counter-movement reaction. This terminology is often confused with reactionary measures of a conservative nature.
Andrews (2002) states that “...a counter-movement is a movement that makes contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original movement.” (2002). Understanding counter-movements in this way is key because it allows for a historical interpretation that is necessary to the analysis of pre-Voting Rights Act legislative behavior.
Andrews (2002) presents information in a quantitative analysis that represent counter- movements and their impacts on black voter participation. He attempts to respond to the principal inquiry of this paper by exploring resistance strategies used by whites against black attempts to vote, register, and to run as candidates after 1965. Black candidacy was for the most part unheard of before 196512. The possible explanations for this are key to explaining patterns
12 Except during the period directly after the Civil War and before Southern redemption beginning in 1875 16 that demonstrate what he calls “vote dilution tactics”...[including and most importantly] redistricting...[and] purging of voter registration records.” (Andrews 1997). These two aspects are obstructions to a study on the voting patterns of the South due to the fact that the Federal
Government does not monitor election counting, Secretaries of States, do13. Redistricting and purging voter registration records are two measures of counter-movement tactics that were effective as the numbers and analysis will indicate. Herein lies one of the main reasons for taking sample data from the House as opposed to the Senate. The House has numerous statistics from the varying districts and can lend interpretation of change over time in specific regions of Florida and Louisiana, as well as the states themselves. I find that where efforts to gerrymander took place, there is often explanatory and supportive contextualization as well. White racial solidarity voting presumes the exclusion of certain the peculiarities in specific southern regions. It is the goal of this thesis to provide explanations for specific regions that are sufficiently different to portray the unique complexity of southern legislative behavior. I expect that there will be representatives who do not fit the presumed characterization of a southern legislator. However, these are the representatives who I believe will best represent the change that the VRA is expected to bring due to their formerly unbending nature.
IV. Data Empirical Analysis
In this section I will present two types of empirical evidence: (A) Quantitative analysis of
ADA liberal quotient scores and (B) in depth case studies of particular US House members from
Florida and Louisiana.
13 Many Southern Secretaries of State are discernibly wary of releasing such damning empirical evidence or simply do not have these records out of purposefully negligent book keeping. Some States are worse than others, Louisiana and Florida are on the less extreme end of this spectrum. 17
A. ADA Evidence
The American Democratic Associations’ liberal quotient scoring scheme is a good indicator of progressive voting by members of the House. The decision to use it as the liberal degree measure was made because it is both credible and extensive. Their use in tracking specific congressional district liberal quotient score data predominantly demonstrate the ratings’ role in this study, however, appendices A and B continue to demonstrate this pattern more broadly. The
LQ scores’ most important contribution is the perspective that they lend of change over time once the scores for each member of congress are ordered according to year. From the conclusions that chronological ordering yield (represented on pages 36-42), it is possible to distinguish particular House members of interest from Louisiana and Florida; by analyzing their voting patterns on civil rights issues before and after the Civil Rights Act of 1965, initial conclusions are made regarding that legislation’s efficacy. I was able to establish these findings as one criteria by which I would make my case study selections from. From these preliminary conclusions I am able to pinpoint research for additional factors that may have changed voting patterns as a result.
Tables that include congressional districts in Florida and Louisiana, the years between and including 1958-1980, the representatives of those districts, those representatives’ ADA
Liberal Quotient Scores (Americans for Democratic Action), the statewide percentage of black registrants, House delegates Republican, and the GOP’s presidential vote share are necessary to see when, where, and how change occurred. After consolidating the aforementioned data, aggregated scores that utilize conglomerated data will be used in order to indicate the degree to which the dependent variable was effective or not. The dependency on empirical data from reliable sources such as the Secretaries of State from Louisiana and Florida drive this study on 18 the House. It is because they are reliable and therefore not subject to interpretation that they are invaluable.
B. Case Study Evidence
Figure 5: Case Study Selection Components
HIGH Influx African-American LOW Influx African-American
HIGH GOP Prediction may be ambiguous Right Shift Threat 1. Hale Boggs 3. William Cramer
LOW GOP Left Shift Remains right or left depending on Threat 4. William Lehman initial partisan preferences 2. Claude Pepper
There are two general approaches to case selection. The first selects cases based on values of explanatory variables - e.g., the percent registered black, and GOP strength. A second approach to case selection chooses cases based on the outcome variable of interest - e.g., the percent change of registered African Americans.
The utilization of two sets of data, one constant, the other independent, are important as well because they form the basis of the blueprint that I will use in my paper. My goal is to uncover the motives of specific legislators in Florida and Louisiana, a divergence from
Andrews’ (1997) paper into a specifically regional argument that is particular to motives of that geographic space. I will supply data that completes tables which will then be used to match years and congressional districts with the representative from the House who belongs there. This process will necessitate analysis of “...the dynamics of counter-mobilization.” and its effects on 19 southern legislators (Andrews 1997). Did they make a drastic change in an anti-black discriminatory manner? Or, did they vote in favor of the changing times (i.e. Voting Rights Act)?
What can be factually proven qualitatively can only go so far given the varying points of view, even scholarly, on the subject. Quantitatively, however, objectively based conclusions may be found through the use and study of the raw data.
Analyzing each of the thirteen states that comprise the South seems to be the principal methodology to an inquiry such as this. However, to do so would be overly exhaustive and inexact. Incomplete and inaccurate data for some components surrounding state legislative efficacy such as state and district Civil Rights Commission reports’ voting pattern numbers both pre and post VRA, number of voter registrations, and ADA scores14 make this difficult. It is therefore prudent to analyze data from Florida and Louisiana which exhibit more complete bookkeeping. This aspect is vital to explain how effective discriminatory state legislative measures were in given counties with specific representatives and effects they had on the legislators’ voting behavior. Furthermore, Florida and Louisiana are distinct from one another with regards to white resistance and geographical location. Choosing two varying states such as these is intentional because they represent differing southern reactions to the VRA.. Furthermore,
Florida and Louisiana are distinct from one another with regards to white resistance and geographical location. Choosing two varying states such as these is intentional because they represent differing southern reactions to the VRA. To account for such variation is crucial as a comprehensive study of all thirteen southern states is overly demanding.
14 ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) 20
Hale Boggs (Democrat, 4th District - LA, 26 years in office)
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana are the states that compose the deep south. The correlation between the civil rights movement, white voter backlash (both violent and non-violent), and this region are non-coincidental. “The desegregation of the schools in St. Helena Parish, Louisiana, provides…” representation of this pattern of interaction and more importantly demonstrate how a unique southern House member handled the issue (Levine 2005). Hale Boggs represented the second congressional district of Louisiana from
1947 until his mysterious death15 in 1973, achieving acclaimed status within the Democratic party as majority whip in the early 1960’s and as House speaker until his death. Boggs’ achievements aside, it was his long tenure in office combined with his thoroughly liberal voting record16 that add to his intrigue and is the main purpose for which I take a more in depth look into his character.
Table 10’s aggregated liberal quotient score for all years in office indicate a continuity in highly liberal voting by Boggs during the tumultuous period leading up to the voting rights act of
1965, the VRA itself, and post VRA. While I do not believe that Boggs was a genuine barer of the civil rights mantle, I do contend that he had the foresight - as his colleague and leader, LBJ, had - to understand that the southern way of life and its protection was a failing endeavor out of touch with the popular sentiment of the rest of the nation. Boggs’s voting record supports this contention; he signed the Southern manifesto of 1956 in opposition to the Brown v. Board of
Education supreme court case for the integration of southern schools, however he received a
15 The circumstances of Hale Boggs’ death are uncertain; it is known that he was flying over Alaska when the passenger plane he was in went down.
16 See appendix A for Boggs’ liberal quotient scores, party affiliation, years in office, and district represented. 21 moderately progressive liberal quotient score in the same year (a 56/100 by the Americans for
Democratic Action17). These findings suggest that Boggs voted according to what Hotelling
(1929) stated as “stability in competition…of all the purchasers of a commodity, some by from one seller, some from another, in spite of moderate differences in price…” (Hotelling 1929).
Hotelling’s economic model does not preclude its use in a study of electoral politics; his finding applied in this manner states that representatives will occupy a left-centrist or right-centrist position in order to gain the most votes across the left right political spectrum18.
Further research reveals that representative Boggs’s 2nd congressional district’s size was reduced, “...reducing the size of an over-populated district quite often transformed the district from midurban to urban status. This was especially true in the Border and Southern regions.” (Noragon 1972). If the usual presumption that urban districts vote comparatively more progressive than rural or “midurban” ones, it is then plausible that Hotelling’s (1929) model may be used to explain Boggs’s peculiar behavior. Boggs behaved to the extent of his means, withstanding the push factor of the rise of the GOP in the state while still able to vote as he did without fear of voter backlash (an incumbency reelection loss)19.
Boggs dealt with the aforementioned problem of desegregating public schools in his district before the Voting Rights Act. I believe that this anecdotal support best upholds my position that push theory, concern for civil rights, and reelection best explain Boggs’s comparatively unusual voting patterns. Harold Fleming, a CBS correspondent, later interviewed
17 See table 10
18 It is not in the voters interest to vote for a more ideologically aligned candidate in relation to themselves because that candidate will assuredly not garner a vote share large enough to gain representation in the House. The voter, therefore, votes for the candidate who is moderately left or moderately right because those candidates have a higher probability of winning election or reelection.
19 described by Hood, Kidd, and Morris (1999) on pages 9 and 10 22
Boggs about the issue in which “…Fleming wrote: He made no bones about his political stake in the situation. Yet…he was concerned about more than his own political fortunes…He wanted the law of the land to prevail, but not at the needless price of his defeat and all that would entail.” (Levine 2005). Hale Boggs voted a year later for the passage of LBJ’s Voting Rights Act and subsequently sold out the south along with the president elect.
GOP forays into formerly Democratic policy positions after LBJs passage of the VRA add to Boggs’s surprising ability to hold on to his seat as a loyal servant to the Democratic party.
White southerner flight to the Republican party 20 after 1965 suggests that southern Democrats failed to represent their constituencies’ policy preferences and consequently violated their own goal to get reelected. Boggs is interesting because he was “…more strongly attached to the national Democratic party…[his] records were more liberal than those of most Democratic representatives from Louisiana and the South. Hale Boggs, by contrast…consistently supported the national party…” (Ferrell & Haydel 1994).
Of further importance was Boggs’s status as majority whip of the Democratic party. His duty was to make sure that all of LBJs proposals were pushed through. If Boggs failed in his reelection bid, which was under pressure on more than one occasion by various sets of virulent racist-segregationists, LBJ would not have succeeded as he did when he passed the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, changing American politics and the status of civil rights for millions of African
Americans in the process. A major implication of Boggs’ success, therefore, in calming down segregationist passions and preventing violence in the St. Helena parish is the fulfillment of
20 Nixon’s “southern strategy” earned him the presidential election of 1968. The strategy …used school reform as a means to attract parents away from making further efforts to send their children to desegregated schools… Individuals who have done everything possible to prevent school desegregation now preach educational reform as the cure for failing public schools.” amongst other issues such as law and order (Brown 2004). 23
Hubert Humphrey’s wish sixteen years previous to “…get out of the shadow of states' rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights.” Suffice it to say, Boggs’ success was integral to the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.
Claude Pepper (Democrat, 3rd, 11th, and 14th Congressional District - FL, 25 years in office)
Like Boggs, Claude Pepper received comparatively high liberal quotient scores from the
Americans for Democratic Action. Such an indication is normally sufficient to invoke intrigue in any of the House members from either Louisiana or Florida, however, Claude Pepper is particularly interesting for two other factors. First, representative Pepper’s voting record became decreasingly liberal over time. Second, he was a representative in the House from 1964 until his death in 1989; the coincidence of the civil rights era and of Pepper’s Senate loss in 1950 suggest that his lenient reaction to racial tensions was the cause. However, alternate conclusions indicate that “…Pepper himself was the real culprit, considering his "apologetic" stances toward the
Soviet Union.…Pepper simply grew too liberal for his home state…” (Danese 2000). This observation lends perspective to Pepper’s character and is one brief explanation for why his voting patterns were consistently liberal. I propose that this aspect of his character in tandem with the racial makeup of the various counties he represented are the preeminent reasons for his liberal voting patterns. Furthermore, I contend that as he moved from the 3rd district
(1964-1966), to the 11th district (1967-1972), and then to the 14th district (1973-198221) he voted increasingly illiberal as a factor of changing demographics either due to gerrymandering or redistricting.
21 Because this study concerns the years including and between 1958-1982, the 14th district demarcation accounts for those years only, although he represented that district until his death in 1989. 24
Pepper’s voting record remained constant concerning “equal rights for women, protection of labor unions, increases in the minimum wage, a federally sponsored universal health care system, an end to the poll tax, and other liberal measures.” (Kabat 1993). The inquiry thus remains, where and why did Pepper’s voting record become more illiberal? A look into his voting record provided for by the Americans for Democratic Action may best provide the answer.
Pepper’s election to the House of Representatives in 1964 is opportune because of the impending civil rights legislation in the same year. Pepper helped to organize an “…efficient Democratic
Study Group whip system, organized by liberal House Democrats…Southern attempts to weaken the Civil Rights bill failed.” (ADA 1964). Of the thirteen issues voted upon in that year, Pepper voted liberally in all but two22. Pepper did vote for the civil rights bill which passed 290-130.
Perspective of his change over time comes from evidence that he voted liberally early in his House career. Contrastingly, Pepper voted differently in the 90th congress of 1967 in which he received a liberal quotient score of 67 (an 18 point decrease from Pepper’s first score in
1964). Due to his district’s change, as mentioned previously, one must assume that his constituencies' policy preferences became more conservative and that the issues voted on were not as close to him personally. Of particular concern is the fifth issue regarding congressional redistricting--passage of committee bill setting congressional redistricting standards which
Pepper voted for, earning him a negative rating on that issue. The decision to vote for greater redistricting leniency suggests that representative Pepper was under pressure to vote against his own preferences and consequently sought to change the parameters of the game.
22 The two issues - 1. the motion to recommit Library Services Act and thereby delete all funds for library services to urban areas, and library construction funds to urban and rural areas. and 4. FCC prohibited from setting standards governing length and frequency of radio and television commercials - he did not vote liberally for were officially counted as absent. 25
Claude Pepper based many of his decisions on strong personal ties to civil rights justice but within practical reelection standards. This description best pertains to voting patterns and, unsurprisingly, expected utility maximization. Representative Pepper’s strongest beliefs were only so strong as his arguably progressive congressional district's constituents allowed him to be.
More specifically, Pepper’s biggest county in his district (Dade) was comprised of 440,733 registered Republican and Democratic voters, 55,666 of which were African American (Florida
Secretary of State 1967). This accounts for only 12.6% of the total electorate and may therefore be considered to be a factor for Pepper’s comparatively illiberal voting patterns because that few voters would not have been able to swing his decision.
A further look into Pepper’s voting record for years in which he received a score of 50 or lower indicate that civil rights remained one of his top priorities. In 1969, Pepper received his lowest liberal quotient score (47) from the ADA, however, Pepper did vote for the 14th issue concerning the five year renewal of the voting rights act. The issues he voted illiberally for concerned mostly war protest issues. Additionally, Pepper received a liberal quotient score of 50 in 1972. The issues he voted illiberally on, again, focused on the war effort; Pepper voted for a renewal of the fiscal 1973 defense appropriations and a rejection of a bill that would have eliminated a $445 million 1973 appropriation for research on the B-1 bomber. Pepper did, however, vote for a bill that “…reopened past school desegregation court cases to bring them into conformity with the busing restrictions in the bill.” (ADA 1972). This last issue notwithstanding, the illiberal portions of Pepper’s voting record indicate that they were not factors of any change brought on by the VRA, but by authorization and appropriation of funds 26 allocated for the weapons research and supply presumably designed to please his progressive yet defense conscious elderly electorate.
William Cramer (Republican, 1st, 8th, and 12th Districts - FL, 16 years in office)
The House representative choice preference model (figure 5) indicates that GOP strength in a given district will yield a more conservative representative after the passage of the voting rights act. The Democratic voting contingency began to shrink as representatives of that party began to uphold liberal positions in the face of an emerging conservative Republican base. GOP forays into formerly Democratic policy positions therefore held electoral consequences for longstanding Democratic districts. William Cramer is the best representative of this threat because he became the first Republican congressman in Florida since Reconstruction, “…he was the Republican’s undisputed leader in Florida…”, and he maintained a consistently illiberal voting record throughout his 16 years in office (Saxon 2003). Cramer’s election in 1954 is compelling because it came before the voting rights act of 1965 when the South was still solidly
Democratic. An injection of Republican voters whose preferences were “…personality-oriented within narrow ideological boundaries” would shift the electorate to the right (Key 1949). This electoral shift is an early function of the opponent push theory advocated by Hood, Kidd, Morris
(1999); it serves as one of the two major explanatory factors for changing representative policy preferences23.
Cramer’s case represents both Key’s summation (1949) of voting according to an “… idiosyncratic play of issues and personalities…” and Campbell’s (1977) assertion that American voters are inclined to vote according to “…ideology rather than party loyalty” (1977). These
23 See Hood, Kidd, and Morris (1999) on page 10. 27 theories suggest that the American voter pays at least enough attention to representative’s and media’s cues to discern leaders’s and party’s policy positions. These findings are key to a comprehension of opponent push theory because they necessarily assume that voters are sensitive to policy shifts over party loyalty. The crucially important factor that permits the opponent push theory to work is the in-migration to Florida of conservative Republican voters.
Both Converse (1966) and Campbell (1977) assert that “…at least from the period from
1956-1960, change in partisanship in the South can be attributed to the rapid influx of non-
Southerners who happened to be strongly Republican compared to the region which they were entering” (1977). Cramer’s election in 1954 precedes this sample size and does not conclusively determine why Cramer won and continued to win for sixteen years. Consideration of racial voting patterns completes this view. Campbell’s (1977) data indicates that white voters continued a slow Republican voting trend while black voters followed suit until 1964 when Democrats began to prioritize their interests. These factors are pertinent to the 1st congressional district which contains the northwestern portion of the state bordering Alabama; the data on the win margins of presidential elections in this district overwhelmingly favor Republican candidates since 1954. The northwestern portion of the state yielded the first Republican House representative since reformation because of in-migration of Republican voters from other conservative southern states. The 1st congressional district’s proximity to those states considered to be deeply southern (Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina) concentrated emerging conservative Republicans and pushed policy positions to the right. Cities such as Pensacola became popular retiree destinations which concomitantly ensured predominate conservative policy positions. 28
Voter composition variance in given districts yields a complex Floridian mosaic.
Attention to this general description of the state is important because it demonstrates how varied interests interact within a diverse polity. Representative William Cramer represents an outcome indicative of liberal voter dilution as a result of in-migration and a lack of African-American policy preference support; the amount of voters needed to elect a Republican before 1960 can be represented through the expected Democratic vote of the native southern electorate by race in six presidential election years. Campbell (1977) has conveniently demonstrated this pattern of change:
Figure 6: Expected Democratic Vote Share of Native Southern Electorate by Race in Six Presidential Elections
90
81
72
63
54
45
36
27
18
9
0 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972
Whites African Americans 29
While Key’s (1949) estimation of Floridian voter behavior as idiosyncratic is correct within specific congressional districts and their according representatives, the voting behavior on a congressional level follows that of other southern states. Native southern electorates, regardless of migration patterns, seem to vote congruently in presidential elections. The distinction between the two levels of electoral politics were disparately oriented. This finding is important because it belies a common perception that American politics has been polarized into strict two-party lines on both the congressional and presidential levels. A grander and unexpected conclusion from a study on Cramer provides a broader view of southern politics both before and after the Voting
Rights Act.
William Lehman (Democrat, 13th Congressional District - FL, 20 years in office)
William Lehman’s case study attributes include an ADA score that fluctuated within twenty points of a base score of 75, an increasing trend of that score, and status as a member of a group of highly liberal representatives24. These characteristics indicate that upholding liberal policy positions was not only acceptable but encouraged in certain districts; Lehman’s ADA score never dipped below the 76 mark throughout his time as a representative and reached a peak of 95 on one occasion. His 20 year tenure in office is a result of a supportive electorate in a newly created congressional district25.
It is reasonable to surmise that this success rate is correlative to an influx of African-
American voters or the creation of a district that contained a large African-American voter contingency. Shaffer (1982) supports this contention as he notes that “… party differences were
24 The usage of liberal in this context is a reference to a leftward political orientation on the American uni- dimensional scale; not a strictly ideological term.
25 The 13th district was created in 1973 when Lehman was elected. 30 most pronounced from 1973 on, as a result of the addition of several liberal Democrats after
1972.” His finding that ADA party score deviations grew between Republicans and Democrats by 23.8 points in 1973 supports the stance that thoroughly left leaning Democrats began to emerge in some of the southern states (Shaffer 1982). This thesis’s inquiry inquires whether the election and tenure of a very liberal representative is indicative of a constituency pull.26 Census figures and African-American influx statistics indicate that there is a positive relationship between the election of William Lehman and a constituency pull factor at work.
The steady increase of African-American and Hispanic population concentrations in the
13th district beginning in 1960 demonstrates an inverse relationship to that of non-hispanic white and other demographics. To be sure, U.S. census data (1961) indicates that 747,748 (80.0%) non- hispanic whites inhabited Miami-Dade County - what was to become a large part of the 13th district - to 137,299 (14.7%) African-Americans in 1960. The 1970 census data (1971) shows a slight increase in the African-American population (189,042 - 14.9%), a very large increase in the Hispanic population (296,820 from 50,000 - or 5.3% to 23.4%), and a remarkable dilution of the non-hispanic white population (from 80.0% to 61.7% albeit with an increase of 33,825 people in the ten year span). 1980 U.S. census data (1981) yielded a non-white plurality for the
13th district’s first time as the African-American population increased by 91,316 (an increase of
2.3%), the hispanic population increased by 283,520 (an increase of 12.3%), and the non- hispanic white population decreased by 5,659 (a decrease of 14%). Thomas D. Boswell’s (2007) graph of these developed figures is reproduced below:
26 See page 10 for a description of constituency pull theory. 31
Figure 7: Population Percentages by Race and Hispanic Origins Miami-Dade County: 1930-2000
90.00%
81.00%
72.00%
63.00%
54.00%
45.00%
36.00%
27.00%
18.00%
9.00%
0% 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
African-Americans Hispanics Non-hispanic whites
The constituency pull factor references an influx stimulus that forces a political actor to uphold the incoming constituencies’s policy preferences. The theory does not have a particular demographic reference, although it was originally intended for African-American source designation. This finding indicates that in-migrating Hispanic populations were Democratically inclined and would suggest that African-American voter populations were as well; conventional wisdom, as well as Shaffer’s (1982), and Campbell’s (1977) findings support this position. The implementation of a voter contingency with liberal policy preferences ensured William Lehman’s election and reelection and is a proper demonstration of the constituency-pull factor at work. 32
V. Conclusion
This research has questioned the Voting Rights Act’s effect on southern House representatives from Florida and Louisiana. I hypothesized that the reintroduction of African-
American voters would influence representatives to shift their policy positions, especially those regarding civil rights, to the left. My evidence supporting this position was based on the reliance of Hood, Kidd, and Morris’s (1999) constituency pull and opponent push theories which state that re-enfranchised African American voters would pull representative policy positions to the left and arouse right-oriented reactions from conservative position holders respectively. The combined evidence suggested that two strongly vested interests, concurrently pushing and pulling from opposite ends of a unidimensional political scale, would yield a noticeable leftward shift. These two pieces of evidence led me to use the Hotelling-Downs’s model of median voter theorem placement to explain an overall leftward shift.
My findings indicate that my hypothesis is correct. A net net increase in average liberal quotient scores and an inclining trend of GOP representation in both Florida and Louisiana support this assertion; this is especially true for GOP presidential vote shares which indicate an increasing trend in GOP popularity for each state. My conclusion is that the Voting Rights Act of
1965 had a liberalizing effect on Floridian and Louisianan House members. 33
Appendix A: U.S. Representatives and their ADA scores for the State of Florida 1956-1982 34
Appendix B: U.S. Representatives and their ADA scores for the State of Louisiana 1956-1982 35
Louisiana’s Liberal Quotient Scores by District
Louisiana’s ADA liberal quotient scores are a good measure of voting patterns for two consistent reasons. First, the districts themselves remain unchanged over the course of the study period because there was no redistricting during the selected years (1958-1980). Second, they feature representatives who are in office for long periods of time. It is possible to construct an accurate depiction of liberal quotient scores as they change over time because parishes are not excluded from certain districts, included into others, or done away with entirely. The liberal quotient score graphs for all eight districts reflect this, however, scores for 1977 and 1981 are missing because of their unavailability on the ADA’s databanks. The missing points are not detrimental to the picture the graphs attempt to portray because there is a lack of quotient score fluctuation between the scored for years.
Louisiana’s 1965 Congressional District Map (How should I cite .jpg references?)
36
Louisiana’s Liberal Quotient Scores by District (1958-1980)
Louisiana’s 1st Congressional District
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 1
Louisiana’s 2nd Congressional District
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 2 37
Louisiana’s 3rd Congressional District
70 63 56 49 42 35 28 21 14 7 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 3
Louisiana’s 4th Congressional District
20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 4 38
Louisiana’s 5th Congressional District
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 5
Louisiana’s 6th Congressional District
90 81 72 63 54 45 36 27 18 9 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 6 39
Louisiana’s 7th Congressional District
70 63 56 49 42 35 28 21 14 7 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 7
Louisiana’s 8th Congressional District
70 63 56 49 42 35 28 21 14 7 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 8 40
Florida’s Liberal Quotient Scores by District
Louisiana’s consistently shaped districts and lengthy tenured representatives are a stark contrast to those of Florida. Florida’s congressional districts and representatives changed often between 1958 and 1980; county to district change variation in the majority of the congressional districts is complex to the extent that it was impractical to fix for. I choose districts that experienced small liberal quotient and minimal redistrict change to demonstrate proper liberal quotient score change over time.
It is important to note here that the 9th-12th congressional districts were created in 1963 and the 13th-15th were created in 1975. The late inclusion of these districts seems to qualify their inclusion in this study because of a plausible lack of change related to their short existence.
Unfortunately, all but the 13th were redistricted a minimum of two times each between 1958 and
1980. They are still the most viable options for study selection because they do not undergo the drastic change that older districts do.
The coincidence of dramatic redistricting and the VRA is an indication of both a newly enfranchised group of voters as well as a high rate of latin immigration into urban locales27. This finding indicates that the VRA had the expected liberalizing effect that my research proposed.
While this result is an important indicator of legislative and demographic efficacy that accord to my reliance on the median voter theorem, it also presents a shortcoming for this regionally specific section of the paper.
I have selected the 13th, 14th, and 15th districts because they demonstrate a minimum redistrict change rate and low variation in LQ score. The small set of reliable data presented
27 see Section IV, B. William Lehman 41 below indicates a liberalizing trend for three representatives in these congressional districts.
William Lehman, Claude Pepper, and Dante Fascell of the 13th, 14th, and 15th congressional districts respectively demonstrate this pattern because of their already left oriented policy positions; their consistent voting patterns suggest left policy position security that accords to their electorates’ policy preferences.
Florida’s 13th Congressional District
100
97
94
91
88
85
82
79
76
73
70 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 13
42
Florida’s 14th Congressional District
70 67 64 61 58 55 52 49 46 43 40 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 14
Florida’s 15th Congressional District
90 81 72 63 54 45 36 27 18 9 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
LQ Score Congressional District 15 43
Works Cited
Andrews, Kenneth T. (2002) "Movement-Countermovement Dynamics and the Emergence of New Institutions: The Case of "White Flight" Schools in Mississippi." Social Forces 80.3: 911-36. Andrews, Kenneth T. (1997) “The Impacts of Social Movements on the Political Process: The Civil Rights Movement and Black Electoral Politics in Mississippi.” American Sociological Review , Vol. 62, No. 5 (Oct.), pp. 800-819. Americans for Democratic Action. (2012) “Voting Records”
Ferrell H., Thomas. Hayden, Judith. (1994). “Hale and Lindy Boggs: Louisiana’s National Democrats”. Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, pp. 389-402. GovTrack.us: Tracking the U.S. Congress. (2012) "Easily Track the Activities of the United States Congress."
Noragon L., Jack. (1972). “Congressional Redistricting and Population Composition” Midwest Journal of Political Science, pp. 295-302. Saxon, Wolfgang. “William C. Cramer, 81, a Leader Of G.O.P. Resurgence in South.” The New York Times 27 Oct. 2003: 1. nytimes.com web. 28 March, 2013. Shaffer, William R. (1982). “Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives” The Western Political Quarterly, pp. 92-106. Stokes E., Donald (1963). “Spatial Models of Party Competition” The American Political Science Review, pp. 368-377