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Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Adjudication Andrej Kristan† & Giulia Pravato‡ 1. Introduction Consider the Followi

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Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Adjudication Andrej Kristan† & Giulia Pravato‡ 1. Introduction Consider the Followi XXI Seminario Hispano-Franco-Italiano de Teoría del Derecho Alicante, 12-13 June 2015 Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Adjudication Andrej Kristan† & Giulia Pravato‡ [ ra!t !ro" #a$ 2015. &e 'elco"e co""ents and criti(ues%* ) *e +a+er !ocuses on le,al +redicates -.constitutional/, .obli,ator$/ etc.1 and t2eir so-called !aultless disa,ree"ent e3ects% *e aut2ors argue t2at a"on, such +redicates, .bindin,/ +resents a novel challen,e even !or se"antic t2eories t2at 2ave recentl$ been +ut !ort2, or construed, to deal 'it2 !aultless disa,ree"ent in areas o! discourse d'ellin, on "atters o! taste, aest2etics, et2ics and 4no'led,e% A!ter +uttin, a nu"ber o! such t2eories to test, t2e$ find t'o st$les o! solution% *e +a+er t2us serves a t'o!old ai" o! addressin, bot2 se"anticists and le,al t2eorists% 6n t2e one 2and, it introduces in t2e literature on !aultless disa,ree"ent a !res2 bone to bite on% 6n t2e ot2er 2and, it criticall$ discri"inates bet'een various se"antic "odels t2at 2ave been understood so !ar as 2avin, a +articular a++eal !or la'$ers% 1. Introduction 7onsider t2e follo'in, fra,"ent fro" an overrulin, +recedent e8+licitl$ referrin, to t2e overruled one9 Bowers 'as not correct '2en it 'as decided and it is not correct toda$% :t ou,2t not to re"ain bindin, +recedent% Bowers v. Hardwick s2ould be and no' is overruled. Lawrence v. Te as, 539 <%=% 559 -2003) †> andrej%4ristan?,"ail.co" | Universit$ of Girona (S+ain), Universit$ of Genoa -:tal$). ‡ ,iulia+ravato?,"ail.co" | Universit$ of Barcelona (S+ain), Universit$ CaB Coscari, Denice (Ital$1% E A +revious version of t2is +a+er was +resented at t2e Harvard !rad"ate Le#al $hilosoph% &ollo'"i"m in 7a"bridge -#A) on Fov. 8 and 9, 2014. &e t2an4 its audience for t2eir co""ents and criti(ues, es+eciall$ Aoris Aabić, #icha Glaeser, and David L$ons. 1 :n Bowers,1 t2e =u+re"e 7ourt of t2e <nited =tates of A"erica u+2eld t2e Geor,ian anti-sodo"$ la's as constitutionall$ not +ro2ibited. :t t2us con5r"ed t2e attorne$ ,eneral Ao'ers’ clai" t2at anti-sodo"$ la's are not unconstitutional% Ko'ever, seventeen $ears later t2e sa"e court declared in Lawrence t2at an$ la' a,ainst certain inti"ate se8ual conduct is unconstitutional—t2erefore con5r"in, a clai" of citiMen Jo2n Ja'rence% Nven t2ou,2 Att$% Gen% Ao'ers and citiMen Jo2n Ja'rence -or 2is defence attorne$1 never entered into a lin,uistic e8chan,e 'it2 one anot2er -i%e% a dis+ute1, one "a$ s+eak of a rational conOict of attitudes, sa$ -1a1 and -1b), '2ich t2e$ +ut on dis+la$92 -1a1 Att$% Gen% Ao'ers9 (nti-sodom% laws are not "nconstit"tional. -1b) Jo2n Ja'rence9 (nti-sodom% laws are "nconstit"tional. *is is '2at 'e take to be a cris+ le,al e8a"+le of a .faultless disa,ree"ent/ -KPlbel 2004a1—t2at is, a +2eno"enon vi,orousl$ discussed in lin,uistics and t2e +2iloso+2$ of lan,ua,e in t2e +ast ten $ears, but al"ost un2eard o! in these terms in juris+rudence,3 des+ite t2e fact t2at .disa,ree"ent’ is a"on, t2e blue chi+s of conte"+orar$ le,al-+2iloso+2ical debate%H Given t2e se"inal de5nition of faultless disa,ree"ent discussed in t2e literature -KPlbel 2004a9 53–4), 'e s2all start 0$ sa$in, t2at9 FD A$e and Aee )aultlessl% disagree just in case -i1 A$e believes t2at p and Aee believes t2at not-p, and $et -ii1 neit2er A$e nor Aee is at !ault in an$ relevant sense of t2is ter" -'2ich is to be s+eci5ed, of course1% &e 'ill later 5ne-tune t2is de5nition, but for no' let us sa$ '2$ is it t2at -1) is, in our vie', a clear e8a"+le of faultless disa,ree"ent% Ro be sure, t2e .disa,ree"ent/ -1) is not one over t2e actual +ur+ose and +otential use of anti-sodo"$ la'sS if $ou read t2e case "aterials, $ou 'ould ra+idl$ conclude t2at bot2 +arties to t2e disa,ree"ent 1 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 2 7a++elen and Hawt2orne (2009: 60-61) would sa$ t2is case e82ibits a disa,ree"ent as a state, rat2er t2an a disa,ree"ent as an activit%% 3> N8ce+tions t2at we know of are Moreso (2009), Ferrer BeltrVn (2010), Kristan & Di,nolo (2012ur), and Ju(ue SVncheM (2013). 4> *e i"+ortance of t2is to+ic is a conse(uence of Dwor4in/s disa,ree"ent-based ar,u"ent a,ainst Hart/s positivis" and in favour of his own inter+retivis". &e will s4i+ t2e o0vious references here, for we choose to put our debate on di3erent ,rounds. 2 2ad t2e sa"e understandin, of t2eir contents and conse(uences% =o, t2ere is no e"+irical disa,ree"ent bet'een t2e"% :nstead, -1) is a disa,ree"ent over t2e correct inter+retation of t2e constitutional docu"ent and it is .faultless/ inas"uch as neither o) the parties had violated an% norm that it was s"*+ect to -cf% KPlbel 2008: 12 et passim1% :ndeed, t2e contents of bot2 clai"s, -1a1 and -1b), ,ot con5r"ed 0$ 5nal court decisions in t2eir res+ective cases as le,all$ correct and are t2erefore 0indin, inter partes litigantes,i%e% bindin, on t2e +arties of t2e case% *is is +recisel$ '2at an$ clai" "ade in t2e court of la' in a conte8t of a concrete dis+ute is ulti"atel$ ai"ed at% 6ne 'ould not sa$ t2at a clai" 'as successful, if it did not ,et con5r"ed in t2e 5nal court decision as le,all$ correct and 'as t2erefore bindin, on t2e +arties of t2e case% Aut if a clai" 'ere con5r"ed as correct and is t2us bindin, inter partes, 'e 'ould sa$ t2at it 'as successful even if 'e +ersonall$ considered t2at it is le,all$ incorrect% *is ar,u"ent leads to t2e conclusion t2at a clai" "ade in t2e court of la' in a conte8t of a concrete case is not subject to t2e nor" -na$1 to assert onl$ '2at is le,all$ correct, but rat2er -and onl$1 subject to t2e nor" -$ea1 t2at t2e clai" in (uestion be con5r"ed as le,all$ correct in t2e 5nal court decision%5 An$ clai" co"+l$in, 'it2 -$ea1 'ill t2erefore "ake t2e a,ent .faultless/ in accordance 'it2 our de5nition of faultless disa,ree"ent in "atters of adjudication% &e 'ill later distin,uis2 ot2er senses of faultlessness in t2e cases at 2and,U and ot2er varieties of faultless disa,ree"ent in ,eneral, but t2is one 'ill re"ain of our "ain concern% *e ke$ "essa,e to retain fro" t2is e8a"+le is t2at '2en t2e adjective .-un1constitutional’ is used, disagreement and +oint correctness -i%e% correctness in t2e sense of co"+liance 'it2 t2e relevant nor"s1 can be co"+atible +ro+erties of eit2er t2ou,2t -beliefs1 or talk -assertions and so"e ot2er t$+es of clai"1% Fo', of course, .-un1constitutional’ is not t2e onl$ adjective of t2is sort% #an$ "ore 2ave been identi5ed in t2e areas of discourse dwellin, on "atters of taste, aest2etics, et2ics, and kno'ledge% *e literature on t2is lin,uistic +2eno"enon is e82austiveT and t2e fact t2at so"eone adds a le,al e8a"+le to t2at list s2ould be unsur+risin,% &2at is interestin,, t2ou,2, is t2at t2e +roble"s +osed s+eci5call$ 0$ le,al +redicates dis+la$in, faultless disa,ree"ent e3ectsG could 2ave an i"+ortant i"+act on t2e ,eneral debate 5 7!. Kristan & Di,nolo 2012ur% 6> C!. MacFarlane (2014) for four senses of faultlessness and Ferrari & Ze"an (2014) for yet a fift2 one. One could easil$ multi+l$ t2e" even furt2er, t2ou,2. 7> :t goes back to &ri,2t/s (2001) .dis+utes of inclination/% 8> N%,. ‘le,all$ per"itted/, ‘le,all$ obli,ator$/, ‘le,all$ forbidden/% 3 -or so 'e 'ould 'a,er1% *e +a+er is structured as follo's% :n X2 'e introduce a 'ell-kno'n challen,e to t2e ver$ +ossibilit$ of .faultless disa,ree"ent/% &e t2en distin,uis2 bet'een two senses o) correctness in +la$ in -1) and su0"it t2at 'e ca+ture t2e" 0$ disa"0i,uatin, .correctness’ into one relevant for e8+lainin, t2e lin,uistic be2aviour of +redicate uses of t2e adjective .bindin, inter partes/ and anot2er one relevant for e8+lainin, t2e lin,uistic be2aviour of +redicate uses of t2e adjective .0indin, erga omnes’ -i%e% bindin, on ever$one, re,ardless of t2eir bein, +art of t2e concrete case at 2and)% &e clai" t2at t2ese t'o +redicates +ut in +lace anot2er +iece of t2e faultless disa,ree"ent +2eno"enon -'e call it t2e PuMMle of Aindin,ness1 and one t2at a sound se"antic "odel of le,al discourse s2ould take into account% After 2i,2li,2tin, so"e +articularities of faultless disa,ree"ents in "atters o f adjudication vis-Y-vis ot2er kinds of nor"ative -and non-nor"ative1 faultless disa,ree"ents, 'e take u+ our "ain task in XX3-7 t2rou,2 a critical evaluation o! di3erent se"antics of le,al lan,ua,e 'it2 res+ect to t2eir abilit$ to res+ond to our t'o +roble"s -to 'it, faultless disa,ree"ent and t2e +uMMle of bindin,ness1% &e 5nd t'o st$les of suitable solutions and conclude in X8 'it2 so"e broad "eta-t2eoretical considerations concernin, t2eor$ choice% 2.
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