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Tim Pawl CV August 2020 TIMOTHY J. PAWL Curriculum Vitae August 2020 University of St. Thomas, JRC 241 Office: JRC 243 2115 Summit Avenue Phone: (651) 962-5364 Saint Paul, MN 55105 Fax: (651) 962-5340 Webpage: http://timpawl.wordpress.com/ Email: [email protected] Philpapers: http://philpapers.org/profile/97 ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND EMPLOYMENT Professor of Philosophy, University of St. Thomas, 2019- Senior Research Fellow, Logos Institute for Analytic and Exegetical Theology, University of St. Andrews (Scotland), 2019 Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Saint Thomas, 2014-2019 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Saint Thomas, 2008-2014 Visiting Assistant Professor through the Analytic Theology Residential Fellowship, funded by the John Templeton Foundation and the Center for Philosophy of Religion, at the University of Notre Dame, 2012-2013 Dissertation Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, 2007-2008 Instructor, Saint Louis University, 2006-2007 Research Assistant, Alvin Plantinga, 2005-2006 Henle Research Assistant, Eleonore Stump, 2004-2005 EDUCATION Ph.D., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, October 2008 Dissertation: A Thomistic Account of Truthmakers for Modal Truths Committee: Eleonore Stump (Chair), Scott Berman, and Joseph Salerno M.A., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, August 2007 Graduate coursework as a visiting student at the University of Notre Dame, Department of Philosophy, 2005-2006 B.A., Philosophy and Theology, Magna Cum Laude, Valparaiso University, May 2003 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION AND COMPETENCE Specialization: Analytic Metaphysics, Thomistic Philosophy (esp. Metaphysics), Philosophy of Religion, Analytic Theology Competence: Medieval Philosophy, Moral Psychology PUBLICATIONS: BOOKS 3. The Incarnation. Cambridge Elements Series. Cambridge University Press (Under Contract). 2. In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay. Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford University Press, 2019. 1 1. In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay. Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford University Press, 2016. PUBLICATIONS: ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS (PEER-REVIEWED UNLESS NOTED) 30. “The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Christ’s Human Nature,” in: Herausforderungen des klassischen Theismus. Bd. 2: Inkarnation (eds. Thomas Marschler and Thomas Schartl̈ (Hg.): (STEP, 16/2), Munster̈ 2020: Aschendorff): 131–148. 29. “Conciliar Trinitarianism, Divine Identity Claims, and Subordination,” TheoLogica (invited; peer-reviewed). 28. “Explosive Theology: A Reply to Jc Beall’s ‘Christ – A Contradiction,’” Journal of Analytic Theology, 7 (2019): 440-451 (invited for a symposium on Beall’s work; not peer- reviewed). 27. “In Defense of Divine Truthmaker Simplicity,” Res Philosophica, 96.1 (2019): 63-75. 26. “A Reply to ‘The Antinomy of Future Contingent Events,’” Annals of Philosophy [Roczniki Filozoficzne] 66:4 (2018): 149-157 (invited for a special issue of the journal; not peer- reviewed). 25. “Conciliar Christology and the Consistency of Divine Immutability with a Mutable, Incarnate God,” Nova et Vetera, 16.3 (2018): 913-937. (invited for a symposium on immutability and incarnation; not peer-reviewed). 24. “Nine Problems (And Even More Solutions) for Powers Accounts of Possibility” in Causal (ed. Jonathan D. Jacobs, Oxford University Press, USA, 2017): 105-123. 23. “Paradise and Growing in Virtue” (coauthored with Kevin Timpe) in Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays about Heaven (eds. T Ryan Byerly and Eric Silverman, Oxford University Press, USA, 2017): 97-109. 22. “Truthmaking and Christian Theology,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 89 (2016): 181-194 (winner of the 2015 Young Scholar Award from the ACPA). doi: 10.5840/acpaproc201610548 21. “Free Will and Grace” in The Routledge Companion to Free Will (eds. Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy, Routledge, USA, 2016): 531-542. 20. “Freedom and the Incarnation” (coauthored with Kevin Timpe), Philosophy Compass, 11 (2016): 743-756. 19. “Temporary Intrinsics and Christological Predication,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion vol. 7 (ed. Jon Kvanvig, Oxford University Press, 2016): 157-189. 18. “Christologically Inspired, Empirically Motivated Hylomorphism” (coauthored with Mark K. Spencer), Res Philosophica, 93.1 (2016): 137-160. 17. “Brian Hebblethwaite’s Arguments Against Multiple Incarnations,” Religious Studies 52:1 (2016): 117-130. 16. “A Thomistic Truthmaker Principle,” Acta Philosophica, 25:1 (2016): 45-64 (invited and peer-reviewed). 15. “Thomistic Multiple Incarnations,” The Heythrop Journal 57.2 (2016): 359-370. Abridged and translated into Finnish by Simo Lamponen: https://www.academia.edu/39425400/Timothy_Pawl_Tomistiset_multippelit_inkarna atiot?source=swp_share 14. “Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications,” Scientia et Fides, 3.2 (2015): 85-106 (invited and peer-reviewed). http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/SetF/article/view/SetF.2015.019/7160 2 13. “Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92.3 (2014): 539-550. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.839726. 12. “A Solution to the Fundamental Philosophical Problem of Christology,” The Journal of Analytic Theology, 2 (2014): 61-85. http://journalofanalytictheology.com/jat/index.php/jat/article/download/jat.201 4-1.190824150011a/226. 11. “The Freedom of Christ and The Problem of Deliberation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 75.3 (2014): 233-247. DOI 10.1007/s11153-014-9447-4. 10. “The Freedom of Christ and Explanatory Priority,” Religious Studies, 50.2 (2014): 157-173. DOI:10.1017/S0034412513000309. 9. “Stone's Evidential Atheism: A Critique,” Faith and Philosophy, 30.3 (2013): 317-329. 8. “Heavenly Freedom: A Response to Cowan” (coauthored with Kevin Timpe), Faith and Philosophy 30.2 (2013): 188-197. 7. “The Five Ways” in The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Aquinas (ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, Oxford University Press, USA, 2012): 115-131. 6. “Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism,” The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4.1 (2012): 197-218. 5. “Transubstantiation, Tropes and Truthmakers,” The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86.1 (2012): 71-96. 4. “Aquinas’s Five Ways” in Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy (ed. Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011): 9- 17. 3. “The Possibility Principle and the Truthmakers for Modal Truths,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.3 (2010): 417-428. 2. “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven” (coauthored with Kevin Timpe), Faith and Philosophy 26.4 (2009): 398-419. 1. “St. Thomas Aquinas on Blameworthiness and the Virtue of Faith,” Journal of Postgraduates in Wuhan University 21.4 (2005): 21-26 (invited). PUBLICATIONS: ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES 2. “Divine Immutability”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009 [ http://www.iep.utm.edu/div-immu/ ] 1. “St. Thomas Aquinas” The Literary Encyclopedia. 2009 [ http://www.litencyc.com/php/speople.php?rec=true&UID=135 ] PUBLICATIONS: REVIEWS AND BOOKNOTES 10. John A. Keller, ed., Being, Freedom, & Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. The Review of Metaphysics, 71:3 (2018): 581-582. [booknote] 9. Thomas Joseph White, O.P.’s The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology. The Catholic University of America Press. 2015. The Journal of Analytic Theology, 6 (2018): 766-770. 8. Jeffrey Brower’s Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, & Material Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 89:4 (2015): 723-727. 3 7. Paul M Gould, ed., Beyond the Control of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014; Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93:3 (2015): 627-628. [booknote] 6. James E. Dolezal’s God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness, Pickwick Publications, 2011; Faith and Philosophy, 30.3 (2013): 480-486. 5. Lukáš Novák, Daniel D. Novotný, Prokop Sousedík, and David Svoboda (eds.) Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic, Ontos Verlag, 2012; Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36444-metaphysics-aristotelian-scholastic-analytic/ 4. Paul Weingartner’s God’s Existence: Can it be Proven? A Logical Commentary on the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas, Ontos Verlag, 2010; The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3:1 (2011): 243-248. 3. Mark Ian Thomas Robson’s Ontology and Providence in Creation: Taking Ex Nihilo Seriously, Continuum, 2008; Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2009. http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=16708 2. Peter van Inwagen’s The Problem of Evil (O.U.P, 2006), in Religious Studies Review 36.1 (2010): 52-53. [booknote] 1. Christian Moevs’ The Metaphysics of Dante’s Comedy (O.U.P., 2005), in Religious Studies Review 32.2 (2006): 115. [booknote] POPULAR AUDIENCE, INTERVIEWS, ETC. 25. “Foreword” in Is Christ Human and Not Divine by Dale Tuggy and Christopher Date. Aeropagus Books, Apollo, Pennsylvania, 2020. 24. “Conciliar Christology with Tim Pawl” with The London Lyceum, Interview with Jordan Steffaniak and Brandon Ayscue, April, 2020. 23. “In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology” with Classical Theism Podcast, Interview with John DeRosa, April 2020. 22. “The Mother of God” interviewed with Faith Pawl by Chandler Warren, December 2019. 21. “Simplicity
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