Imphal and Kohima: March–July 1944
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
302 Chapter 9 Chapter 9 Imphal and Kohima: March–July 1944 Introduction In early January 1944, IGHQ ordered the 15th Japanese Army’s three divisions to destroy the Commonwealth forces near Imphal and occupy strategic points along the Burma-India border. Simultaneously, the 33rd Japanese Army (three divisions) was to drive the Chinese out of north-east Burma. The 28th Japanese Army (with two divisions and one division in reserve) was to attack on the Akyab front in order to draw the Allied reserve from Imphal. The Japanese objective was not conquest of India (except certain border points) but to ham- per the Allied preparations for re-conquest of Burma. The 5th Japanese Air Division was already weakened due to continuous transfer of aircraft to New Guinea and the Philippines. And many engineer units, which were required to build and repair roads and bridges, were also transferred to New Guinea.1 As the IJA geared up for its last offensive along the Burma-India border, the Commonwealth troops’ battlefield effectiveness registered a slow and steady rise due to better hardware and training. This is the subject of the first section. The second section describes in a narrative framework combat in the Imphal- Kohima sectors. The focus is both on big and small scattered actions, which together constituted the dynamics of combat in Burma. Due attention is given to the terrain to highlight the relationship between tactics and geography. The third section puts the military operations of Burma in 1944 within a broader perspective. Training, Equipment and Force Structure GHQ India emphasized the setting up of the training infrastructure to train the recruits entering the 14th Army. In mid-1944, the Kitchener College at Nowgong was reconstituted as a Pre-Cadet School along the lines of HFTC Dunbar. The Tactical Training Centre was set up at Dehra Dun. It absorbed the Tactical School, the Platoon Commanders and Battle Schools. It taught common tacti- cal doctrine based on lessons learnt and experience gained by the 14th Army in 1 Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009), pp. 236–37. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004306783_012 Imphal and Kohima 303 Burma, Assam and the AIF in the South-West Pacific. An officer from the Australian Army was lent to the staff of the Tactical Training Centre. The Tactical Training Centre had headquarters and comprised a Senior Tactical School, Junior Tactical School and Battle School. The latter had a Rifle Platoon Wing, Mortar Platoon Wing and Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) Wing. The first course of the Battle School started on 15 May 1944 and terminated on 10 June of the same year. The Senior Tactical School opened on 26 June 1944. The Tactical School at Poona was closed and the entire establishment was absorbed into the new Tactical Training Centre. In June 1944, the Jungle Warfare School at Sevoke was closed and the entire establishment was transferred to the 14th Army School at Shillong.2 W. Murray notes that friction, horror and the chaos of combat made it dif- ficult for a military organization to draw clear and unambiguous lessons from combat which could then be turned into coherent training programmes for those who were exposed at the FEBA.3 The Indian Army had certain lessons to learn and simultaneously certain lessons to unlearn. The training cur- riculum was continuously updated to reflect the changing nature of combat. Adaptation to new combat conditions also required unlearning some of the past lessons taught to a military organization. On the transfer of the Platoon Commanders School and the Battle Course from the Infantry School in Saugor (in central India) to the new Tactical Training Centre, the syllabus was revised. For the programme of 1944–45, several courses that were followed during 1943–44 were omitted. The courses that were omitted were as follows: Platoon Commanders Course, Battle Course, Battle Inoculation Course, 2-pdr. Anti- Tank Course, 4.2-inch Mortar Course and the Carrier Course.4 The recruits for the Indian artillery were trained at Mehgaon near Jubbulpore.5 The ISF’s mountain artillery recruits were trained at Ambala. A JOSH team visited the princely states to advise on the inculcation of aggressive spirit among the infantry of the ISF. The ISF officers were also taught fieldcraft and minor tactics and selected officers were sent to the Tactical School courses.6 2 Correspondence, Liaison Letters from DMT India to DMT War Office, Liaison Letter No. 14, 15 June 1944, pp. 4–6, L/WS/1/1302, IOR, BL, London. 3 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 120. 4 Liaison Letter No. 14, 15 June 1944, p. 5. 5 To the CIGS London from GS Branch GHQ India, 9 Aug. 1944, Appendix 6, p. 15, L/WS/1/441, IOR, BL. 6 To the CIGS London from GS Branch GHQ India, 19 May 1944, Indian States Forces, Appendix 14, p. 97, L/WS/1/441..