An Investigation of the Moral Stereotype of Scientists Master Thesis Alessandro Santoro

Evil, or Weird? An investigation of the moral stereotype of scientists Master Thesis Alessandro Santoro Student Number 10865135 University of Amsterdam 2015/16 Supervisors dhr. dr. Bastiaan Rutjens Second Assessor: dhr. dr. Michiel van Elk University of Amsterdam Department of Social Psychology Evil, or Weird? An investigation of the moral stereotype of scientists Alessandro Santoro University of Amsterdam A recent research by Rutjens and Heine (2016) investigated the moral stereotype of scientists, and found them to be associated with immoral behaviors, especially purity violations. We developed novel hypotheses that were tested across two studies, integrating the original findings with two recent lines of research: one suggesting that the intuitive associations observed in the original research might have been influenced by the weirdness of the scenarios used (Gray & Keeney, 2015), and another using the dual-process theory of morality (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) to investigate how cognitive reflection, as opposed to intuition, influences moral judgment. In Study 1, we did not replicate the original results, and we found scientists to be associated more with weird than with immoral behavior. In Study 2, we did not find any effect of reflection on the moral stereotype of scientists, but we did replicate the original results. Together, our studies formed an image of a scientist that is not necessarily evil, but rather perceived as weird and possibly amoral. In our discussion, we acknowledge our studies’ limitations, which in turn helped us to meaningfully interpret our results and suggest directions for future research. Keywords: Stereotyping, Moral Foundations Theory, Cognitive Reflection How far would a scientist go to prove a theory? In 1802, et al., 2015) has shown a lack of interest in people to a training doctor named Stubbins Ffirth hypothesized pursue a science related career. Additionally, nega- that yellow fever was not an infectious disease, contrary tive perceptions of scientists can influence the extent to to popular belief. To prove his theory, he poured in- which people adhere to their recommendations. This fected vomit into his open wounds. When the wounds influence is perfectly illustrated by the discrepancy be- healed without problems, he continued to experiment tween popular opinion and scientific evidence regarding on himself: he dropped additional ‘fresh black vomit’ genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Regardless of into his eye, swallowed pills made from it, and even the available scientific evidence in favor of GMOs, the drank it in a solution with water. Ffirth never got sick public opposition remains strong due to several factors from his disturbing series of experiments, but it was related to the way the GMOs are perceived as danger- not because the disease was not infectious: it just re- ous and immoral (Blancke, Van Breusegem, De Jaeger, quires direct transmission into the bloodstream, usually Braeckman, & Van Montagu, 2015). In turn, these through the bite of a mosquito (Herzig, 2005). negative representations yield a large impact on both The stereotype of the ‘evil scientist’ is quite per- national and international development of regulatory vasive in popular culture. Examples of such evil or frameworks concerning the import and cultivation of immoral scientists can be found in contemporary se- GM crops. It seems therefore important to directly ad- ries such as Dexter from Dexter’s Laboratory or Rick dress the issue of whether scientists are in fact perceived Sanchez from Rick and Morty, which are probably due as immoral as they are depicted in popular culture. to real cases of unscrupulous scientists such as Stub- The stereotype of the immoral scientist was the main bins Ffirth. Such a negative stereotype can have serious focus of a recent study by Rutjens and Heine (2016), consequences, as people might decide to distance them- which is central to the current research. They investi- selves from scientists (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). gated this moral stereotype by looking at the intuitive This is even more important when considering that a re- associations that people hold towards the morality of cent report from the European Commission (Hazelkorn scientists. Indeed, they found that scientists were intu- 2 ALESSANDRO SANTORO itively associated with a variety of moral violations (es- ena, such as differences in moral judgments among var- pecially purity violations), as compared to various con- ious cultures or political ideologies (for a review of the trol targets. The current project aimed to replicate and existing empirical findings, see Graham et al., 2012). extend their findings in order to understand the true na- MFT research has identified (at least) five moral foun- ture of such a negative stereotype, which in our research dations – Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Pu- was operationalized as intuitive associations (Study 1) rity – and has used the Moral Foundations Question- and as explicit judgments (Study 2) of scientists’ moral- naire (MFQ; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) to assess ity. the extent to which they are endorsed by individuals. We developed novel hypotheses that were tested Additionally, research in this field uses scenarios that across two studies, integrating the original findings with describe violations specific to each moral foundation recent lines of research, one suggesting that the intu- (Davies, Sibley, & Liu, 2014). In their research, Rutjens itive associations observed by in the original research and Heine (2016) investigated how scientists’ morality might have been influenced by the weirdness of the sce- is perceived using both scenarios taken from the MFT narios used (Gray & Keeney, 2015), and another using literature and the MFQ. dual-process theory of morality (Greene et al., 2004) to Our first study draws on the studies 1-7 from Rut- investigate how cognitive reflection, as opposed to in- jens and Heine’s research (2016), in which they exam- tuition, influences moral judgment. In the first study, ined the stereotype of scientists’ morality by looking at we looked at the nature of the intuitive associations the intuitive associations people hold towards scientists. observed by Rutjens and Heine (2016), investigating More specifically, they used a design that combined whether scientists are perceived as immoral or rather moral scenarios with the conjunction fallacy (Tversky as weird. In the second study, we tried to replicate & Kahneman, 1983), a reasoning error that occurs when the explicit associations observed by Rutjens and Heine it is assumed that specific conditions are more likely (2016), while exploring whether these can be influenced than more general ones (described below). Rutjens and by an induced and/or dispositional reflective state. Heine (2016) initially presented participants with a scenario describing a particular moral violation, such as Study 1 – The moral stereotype of scientists: the following: intuitive associations On the way home from work, Jack decided Rutjens and Heine (2016) based their investigation to stop at the butcher shop to pick up some- of the perception of scientists’ morality on the Moral thing for dinner. He decided to roast a Foundations Theory (MFT), which is a central theoret- whole chicken. He got home, unwrapped ical framework in morality research. MFT is rooted in the chicken carcass, and decided to make anthropological research and aims to understand why, love to it. He used a condom, and fully ster- even though morality differs across cultures, recurrent ilized the carcass when he was finished. He themes and similarities can also be found. It was shaped then roasted the chicken and ate it for din- into its present form by Haidt and Joseph (2004), who ner alongside a nice glass of Chardonnay. argued that morality is composed of universal and in- (Supplements, p. 1) nate moral foundations. A metaphor used to explain this concept is that After the reading the scenario, participants had to in- morality is like a human tongue with its taste receptors dicate which option was more probable: A) Jack is a (Haidt, 2012). In the same way we all have the same sports fan or B) Jack is a sports fan and a [condition receptors but different tastes in food, MFT argues that target]. Depending on the condition the participant was we also have the same cognitive modules, or founda- in, the target of option B would be either a scientist or tions, but different ‘tastes’ in morality. The extent to one of several control targets (e.g., an atheist, a Mus- which these foundations are cultivated across cultures lim). Since it is impossible for a subcategory (option B) makes them more or less sensitive, which then results to be more likely than the whole category (option A), in different patterns of morality. Since its formulation, selecting option B would be a reasoning error (i.e., the MFT has been used to account for a variety of phenom- conjunction fallacy). The likelihood to make such an EVIL OR WEIRD? 3 error is based on the participant’s intuitive associations al., 2004). In accordance with this model, research has between the description of the person in the scenario shown that deontological judgments (i.e., judgments and the target selected. Therefore, these fallacies can be concerned with rights and duties) are associated with adopted as a measure of the people’s moral stereotype intuitive responses, whereas utilitarian judgments (i.e., towards the target. judgments concerned with maximizing utility) are asso- To distinguish which moral foundations are associ- ciated with more pondered responses (for an overview, ated with scientists the most (or the least), Rutjens and see Paxton, Bruni, & Greene, 2014). To test this the- Heine (2016) used different moral scenarios taken from ory, researchers have often employed the Cognitive Re- the MFT literature, with each scenario depicting a vi- flection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), a test designed to olation to a particular moral foundation. They found assess participants’ ability to suppress intuitive and in- that except for fairness and care violations, scientists correct answers in favor of a deliberative and correct were consistently associated with immoral behavior, in answer.

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