Implications for Chile and Colombia
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UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) The exploitation of plant genetic information: Political strategies in crop development Pistorius, R.J.; van Wijk, J.C.A.C. Publication date 1999 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Pistorius, R. J., & van Wijk, J. C. A. C. (1999). The exploitation of plant genetic information: Political strategies in crop development. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:28 Sep 2021 The Exploitation of Plant Genetic Information Chapter 6 International Division of Labour in Crop Development: Implications for Chile and Colombia In the previous chapter we examined the main tendencies in crop development that seem to give shape to the emerging Third Agro-Food Order. We have shown that a small number of industrial conglomerates is replacing the state as main organizer of crop development. They have successfully influenced the strategies for conser vation and IPR protection, which have a worldwide impact. However, being the dynamic force of crop development, the industrial conglomerates meet with con siderable opposition, not only in the OECD but also in developing countries. In the international division of labour in agriculture, developing countries gener ally take a position that is different from most OECD countries. Overall in develop ing countries, the level of industrialization of the agricultural sector is lower than in OECD countries, which is reflected in a lower productivity and a larger part of the population depending on agriculture. As a result, the share of developing countries in the world's imports of some major staple crops has continuously increased in the past, while the share of OECD countries in the world's agricultural exports has risen (two tendencies that we have shown earlier). In crop development there are also wide differences. The industrial crop develop ment conglomerates have their home base invariably in one of the OECD countries, while nearly all genetic engineering research takes place in these countries as well. In developing countries, the main breeding organizations are generally public institu tions, whose budgets have been reduced in the past decade. As the domestic private breeding industry is not very well developed in these countries, the role of nation al government in crop development tends to be taken over by the transnational industrial conglomerates, at least for a number of commercial staple crops. Considering these rough indications of differences in agricultural production capacity between OECD and developing countries, it is obvious that the effects of the prevailing agricultural production strategies, including specific crop develop ment policies, will be different for both groups of countries as well. In this chapter we examine the agricultural sectors of two Latin American 157 International Division of Labour in Crop Development countries, Chile and Colombia in more detail. We explore their specific position in the international division of labour in agriculture and in crop development. Some of the major political dilemmas in the agricultural production strategy since the 1980s are discussed. The main argument we develop in this chapter is that at the root of controversies on conservation and IPR protection lie rival views on how the agricultural sector should be organized. It is the increasing economic marginaliza- tion of the poorest rural population that constitutes the basic reason for opposition to conservation and IPR protection policies. The chapter consists of three sections. In the first, we explain three agricultur al production strategies and relate them to the various agricultural sectors and poli cies in Chile and Colombia. Then we focus on the question of how the various pro duction sectors and agricultural policies are related to respectively conservation and plant-related IPR protection policies. 6.1 Conflicting interests in the organization of agriculture Those who travel through rural Colombia will experience great contrasts in agri cultural production. The sight of large, well-equipped flower production plants and extensive plantations near Bogota is soon replaced by one of very poor subsistence farmers in more mountainous regions. Similar contrasts can be found in Chile. In this chapter we argue that the main causes for the PGR conflict must be sought in these contrasts. The present section is devoted to the question of how these large differences in agricultural production can be interpreted. We start off with a discussion on the agricultural production strategies in the Third Agro-Food Order; strategies which refer to the more or less consistent sets of policies for the organization of agriculture. In OECD countries most agriculture follows one fairly uniform, usually highly industrialized production strategy. In Chile and Colombia, and in most other developing countries, the picture is far more fragmented: agriculture follows more than one production strategy, and the advo cates of each strategy have a particular view on how conservation and IPR regula tion should support agriculture. 6.1.1 Three agricultural production strategies In the first chapter of this book we distinguish three alternative and conflicting strategies for the organization of agriculture: 'market-led' and 'state-led' agro- industrialization strategies, and a third strategy directed at non-industrial, farmer- oriented agricultural production (Figure 6.1). These rival strategies must be inter preted as ideal-types in the Weberian sense. They are an exaggeration of some essential features of agricultural production strategies of public and private organi zations. 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