Aviation Safety Digest for Almost 30 Years

-~1 Number 101 1978 Aviation Safety Digest For almost 30 years. the unmistakable profile of tile Bristol Freighter has been a familiar sight 1n Australian skies. Now. with reti rement for the last remaining examples JUSl around the corner. the Digest pays tribute on the covers of this issue to one of the true workhorses of av1alion. Though by toda/s standards slow and relalively unsophisticated. when 1t went into produclion in 1946 the F re1ghter was ahead of its time as a short haul. high capacity cargo transport. With large clamshell doors prov1d1ng nose loading capability. it has a carrying capacity unmatched even today by some aircraft of similar size. The Freighter was produced 1n several versions. The aircraft featured Aviation Safety Digest 1n our cover pictures 1s a Mk. 21. unique in that 11 1s believed to be the only Freighter of this model slill flying anywhere in the world. Now owned by the Essendon-based cargo airline Air Express Lid .. the aircraft first flew in March 1949. After a brief two weeks w ith the RAF. the aircraft Number 101 1978 was acquired by the RAAF. who operated it until August 1969. Released then by the RAAF. the aircraft began civil operations. first with a newly formed charter company and finally with Air Express. who bought the aircraft in April 1971. With the introduction of newer aircraft types and more specialised cargo handling techniques. the Freighter 1s becoming outclassed 1n the highly compet1live world of air cargo transportation. Two Freighters however. CONTENTS the Mk. 21 and a later Mk. 31. have been retained 1n the fleet of Air Ex press to operate shorter flights such as the services across Bass Strait Disastrous Indecision ................................................ 2 :o King Island and Tasmania. and also to cope with any unusual items 0f load that cannot convenientl y be earned in other types. You - and Low Level Jet Routes ............................ 5 Operating mainly at night. the Freighter continues to perform an What Can Go Wrong - Will I ..........•.....................••.. 7 unglamorous but vital task for which its basic advantages as a cargo Cherokees Collide Head-on ...................................... 8 aircraft. though to some extent superseded by other types. are still uniquely suited. Ooopsl ....................................................................... 10 Eyesight Is Precious ................................................ 11 A Nasty Situation ..................................................... 12 'What! You Threw Away the Ripcord?' ................. 14 It's Good Advice For Us, Tool ................................ 17 The Wrong Side of the Power Curve ..................... 18 A Close Calll ............................................................. 19 Dust Devils and Aviation ......................................... 20 Ask For Help - While You Still Can! .................... 22 The Breath of Life .................................................... 23 Counting Sheep? ..................................................... 24 Incredible! ................................................................. 25 Recognising and Handling Dangerous Goods ..... 26 Your Role In Search and Rescue ........................... 28 Aviation Safety Digest is prepared in the Air Safety Investigation Bra~ch and published for the Department ef Transpurt through. the Australian Government Publishing Service, in pursuance qf Re.i:ulat1on 283 ef ~he Air Navigation Regulations. It ~s distribu~ed fru .ef charge to Australian licence holders (except student ptlots), regtstered atrcraft owners, an~ cer tain other persons and organisations having a vested operational interest in Australian civil a1~ation . A viation Safety Digest is also available on subscription fiom the Australian Government Publishing Service. Enquiries should be addressed to the Assistant Director (Sales and D istribution), Australian Gooemment Publishing Service, P. 0. Box 84, Canberra, A.G. T. 2600. @ Commonwealth ef A ustralia 1978. The contents ef this publication may not be reproduced in whole or in part, without the wrilltn authonty ef the Department ef Transport. IVkere material is . indicated lo . b~ extracted from or based on another publication, the authonty of the ongrnator should be sought. The views expressed by persons or bodies in articles rtf'.roduced in the Aviation Safety Digest from other sources are not necessanly those ef the D epartment. Change ef address: Readus on the Department's. free distributi~n list should notify their nearest Regional Office. Subscrzbers should notify the Australian Government Publishing Service. Printed by Ruskin Press, 39 Leveson Street, North M elbourne, Victoria. RM76/30216(1) Cat. No. 78 9098 S. Note: Metric units art used except for airspeed and wind speed which are given in knots; and for elevation, height, and altitude where measurements are given in feet. While landing at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, after a flight from Rhode Island, U.S.A., a Boein~ 727-100 * * * that a go-around might be necessary and the captain's over-ran the end of the runway and crashed. The aircraft caught fire and was destroyed. The flight crew Guidelines issued to pilots flying the company's Carib- thought processes were probably orientated to control of survived but 37 of the 88 occupants were killed. Thirty-nine others, including one person on the ground, bean routes lay down the company policy concerning the aircraft on the the ground. fl ap usage, aiming p oint, touchdown point and go T he flight data recorder showed two airspeed aberra were injured. The captain, con cerned that he would not be able to around, and point out the possibility of encountering tions had occurred when the aircraft was slightly beyond Although visual meteorological conditions prevailed, stop in this remaining distance, decided to go-around. I t downdraughts on the approach. T hey emphasize the the 300 metre marker, which were probably the result the crew elected to fl y the ILS to assist in vertical then seemed to him that the engines were not accelerat necessity of being in the 'slot', the importance of the goo of a gust. T his caused a lateral upset of the aircraft suf guidance during the approach. Witness observations, ing quickly enough, so he again closed the power .levers metre aiming point, and the possibility of wind shear ficient to cause an exclamation of surprise which was crew statements, and information derived from the fl ight and attempted to bring the aircraft to a stop. The aircraft which could produce a float if the aircraft is landed be audible on the cockpit voice recorder. The airspeed yond the goo metre point. T hey also point out the neces increased about five knots, the aircraft rolled to the right data and cockpit voice recorders all indicate that the over-ran the end of the runway a nd the 155 metre over sity of executing a go-around if the approach is not in and as a result the captain was unable to land before cor aircraft approached the 1420 metre 09 runway in a nor run tore its way through the perimeter fence, crossed a mal profile which would result in a touchdown goo road, destroying several cars as it did so, and finally c~me the slot, if the landing is going to be appreciably beyond recting the upset. More critically, the aircraft was still metres or slightly more beyond the threshold. Instead of to rest in a service station where it burned to destruct10n . the goo metre point, or if a bounce occurs on touchdown. ten feet above the runway and well beyond the normal The use of 40° of flap is standard practice; however, the touchdown point. The Board believes the gust encounter touching down as expected, however, the aircraft floated Subsequent investigation e~ t ablished_ that had the cap use of either go0 or 40° flap 'with strong, gusty winds' is fi ve to ten feet above the runway and touched down tain continued with the landmg, the aircraft could have added to the lift already produced by the rotation of the optional. The use ofgo0 flap is recommended with a wind aircraft in the flare, and caused a prolonged float. T he about 850 metres beyond the threshold, leaving some 570 been brought to a stop in about 54~ metres, b ~t the run component of20 knots or more. In this case the crew had captain was thus faced with an immediate decision to metres of runway and 155 metres of over-run in which way length remaining was insufficient to achieve a safe go-around. been told that the surface winds at St. Thom as were from land or to initiate a go-around and at that stage he forced to stop. 120° at 12 to 14 knots . No gusts had been reported. the aircraft on to the runway. But though he knew he was The captain said , however, that he knew that any past the normal touchdown point, the extent of the air south-east wind at St. T homas would be gusty and there craft's progress down the runway became evident to him fore decided to use go0 of flap. H e said that with go0 of only after touchdown when his visual appraisal of the run fl ap the a ircraft is more controllable, is easier to manage, way made him change his mind and initiate a go-around. a nd that, 'you have a greater margin for what is ahead'. T he captain had extensive operating experience into St. But having made the decision to use the non-standard Thomas. In this case the aircraft was about 150 metres flap setting there was no evidence that the crew had short of the point at which it would normally be rotated checked their landing analysis chart to see if the landing fo r take-off and the airspeed was at or within three or four rn~~ffi~TIWW[]J~ INDECISION was permissible. Had they done so they might have been knots of rotation speed. Thus, tl1e captain 's experience led reminded that a 20 knot headwind component was him to believe that a go-around was a viable course of (Co11densed.from report published by National Tra11sportatio11 Safety Board, U.S.A.) required for a goo flap landing.

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