The Ashland Oil Spill, Floreffe, Pa — Case History and Response Evaluation
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THE ASHLAND OIL SPILL, FLOREFFE, PA — CASE HISTORY AND RESPONSE EVALUATION Cdr. E. A. Miklaucic U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Pittsburgh Suite 700, Kossman Building Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 J. Saseen U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Wheeling Field Office 303 Methodist Building Wheeling, West Virginia 26003 ABSTRACT: On January 2, 1988, a storage tank at the Ashland Oil the first time in that location. Fuel height in the tank was less than Terminal, Floreffe, Pennsylvania, near the Monongahela River 24 2 inches from the maximum 46 foot depth, representing 3,857,384 miles upstream of Pittsburgh, suffered an instantaneous and complete gallons of product. failure, releasing 90,000 barrels (about 3.9 million gallons) ofdiesel oil At approximately 5:02 p.m., while returning to the terminal office, into the environment. The speed and volume of the release made ''first the operator described hearing a sound like thunder and turned to aid" almost impossible. Within hours, an estimated 18,000 barrels observe the roof of No. 1338 collapse and a cloud of mist surround the (750,000 gallons) ofdiesel had entered the river. Responders were faced tank area.5 The resulting wavelike surge of diesel fuel crossed facility with a power and communication lines shutdown, contaminated pota- containment berms, inundating the terminal and adjacent property, ble water intakes, oil dispersion from river currents and turbulence creating one of the nation's largest inland oil spills (Figure 1). Large resulting from numerous river dams, and life-threatening weather con- quantities of fuel pooled in a low-elevation area of the adjacent ditions, with temperatures often below 0°F. With the U.S. Coast Guard Duquesne Power Plant. It then drained through a storm sewer where as first federal official on scene (FFOS) and the Environmental Protec- the oil was emulsified with cooling water from the river, which had tion Agency acting as on-scene coordinator (OSC), a thoroughly inte- been used by the power plant. Subsequently, the oil was discharged grated response organization of federal, state, local, and interstate into the river via a spillway. Currently, it is estimated that 750,000 agencies evolved. gallons entered the river, and that 204,600 gallons were recovered. Once the situation was stabilized, aggressive restoration of the Ash- Ashland employees provided prompt and thorough notification land site by traditional removal techniques began. However, significant of the tank rupture to local emergency response agencies and the factors challenged the scientific community throughout river recovery National Response Center (NRC). The NRC notified local U.S. areas. First, as contamination became suspended throughout the water Coast Guard, Marine Safety Office (USCG MSO), Pittsburgh, who column, water supply intakes at all depths were affected, resulting in further notified the local Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) water shortages for most of the population downstream as far as 200 field office in Wheeling, West Virginia, and other agencies of the spill. miles. Supplying potable water and technical assistance to water au- Immediately following the tank collapse, involved agencies at all thorities prompted questions about the use of 311 (k) for activities not levels dispatched personnel to collect information and confirm de- clearly defined as cleanup. Additionally, cold weather caused extensive tails. Because all communication and power lines at the Ashland freezing, and ice cover limited full use of absorbent materials and terminal had been shut off as a precautionary safety measure at the equipment. Finally, river access points also hampered boom deploy- time of the spill, communications from the scene were hampered. ment and surface oil recovery. Local and county agencies responded quickly in establishing a tempo- This case demonstrated the benefits of contingency planning and rary command post in the Floreffe Fire Hall, and took positive steps revealed areas where additional coordination might be accomplished. to ensure site safety and to evaluate and contain the spill. The associated Ashland site restoration continues to the present time. Initial efforts were well thought out and executed without mishap; however, the instantaneous nature of the casualty made first aid con- tainment virtually impossible. Attempts to stem the flow of oil to the storm sewer inlet, 10 feet or more under the oil surface, were fruitless Through the day of January 2,1988, three barges of diesel fuel were until the flow subsided and the sewer inlet was located. Truck loads unloaded at Ashland Oil Company's Floreffe, Pennsylvania, water- of gravel and road material dumped at the 24 inch storm sewer inlet front facility, at Mile 25 on the Monongahela River, and pumped into were swept away by the force of oil flow. Tank No. 1338 at the terminal. This 4 million gallon tank had been Action was further severely impeded by darkness, extremely cold reconstructed at the site in 1987; it had originally been constructed in temperatures, and later, by public safety considerations resulting 1940 and used at Whiskey Island (Cleveland), Ohio. Its current loca- from detection of gasoline vapors at the site. The fire and explosion tion at the Floreffe terminal is approximately 15 air miles from the threat from the discharge of gasoline require site operations to be Point in Pittsburgh. suspended until the threat had been mitigated. Evacuation of the site At 4:58 p.m., the terminal operator completed a gauging visit to the and nearby residents was effected by the local fire chief.6 tank top of No. 1338, just prior to filling it to maximum capacity for By 8:00 p.m., local and county responders were well established 45 46 1989 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE MILE 24.98 Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 LOADING DOCKX Figure 1. The Ashland oil spill (land limits) in a command post at the Floreffe Fire Hall. Allegheny County Between 12:30 and 2:30 p.m. January 3, the FFOS coordinated Emergency Management authorities ensured notification to down- river cleanup operations with Ashland, its cleanup contractors, and stream facilities, provided response equipment, and supported local state and federal agency representatives. These operations focused on personnel using planned agreements. Despite difficult communica- the following tasks: tions with persons on scene, enough details had been confirmed that • Contractor acquisition of all available pollution recovery equip- the Coast Guard and EPA established the appropriate federal pos- ment ture. Having roughly defined the location, amount, source and spread • Selecting effective and accessible containment and recovery areas of the oil, USCG MSO Pittsburgh and EPA Wheeling agreed to • Extending the 12 mile closure of the Monongahela River to 26 miles jurisdiction determined by the existing USCG/EPA Memorandum of • Mobilizing additional federal forces (the National Strike Force's Understanding. EPA would assume on-scene coordinator (OSC) re- Atlantic Area Strike Team, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric sponsibilities. USCG MSO Pittsburgh would assume first federal Administration, and air support) official on scene (FFOS) duties, then be relieved by the OSC upon the • Identifying and mobilizing local commercial, industrial river re- latter's arrival at first light on January 3,1988. By 10:00 p.m., USCG sources (e.g., tow boats, tank barges, and deflection barges) MSO Pittsburgh exercised control of river traffic by closing the • Notifying and mobilizing Pittsburgh Public Safety Department Monongahela River, mobilized the National Strike Force, arranged resources air support, ensured cleanup contractor response, and began monitor- • Requesting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACOE) Pittsburgh ing Ashland's response and assessing its effectiveness. District lock operations to contain oil in the locks (and then direct- Ashland Oil Corporation accepted full responsibility for cleanup ing contractors to those sites for recovery). operations and contracted for all phases of containment and cleanup. Pennsylvania state agencies, the Department of Environmental Its cooperative response to guidance by federal officials monitoring Resources (PADER) and Fish Commission (PFC), began assessing the response contributed to the response's overall effectiveness. the impact on water quality of downstream water intakes (Figure 2). Pending resolution of site safety issues by the fire scene commander The cleanup and recovery of the No. 2 diesel fuel from both the and recognizing the excellent site control by local authorities, the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers was the responsibility of the Ashland USCG FFOS established a separate command post at the Ashland Oil cleanup contractor, O. H. Materials, Inc. (OHM), who hired terminal. Communication constraints at the original command post many subcontractors to perform this task. USCG MSO Pittsburgh and a need to separate long-term oil recovery planning and control and the National Strike Force's Atlantic Area Strike Team (USCG/ from the immediate local response activity were prime factors in the LAST) closely monitored river cleanup activities and monitored Ash- decision. land throughout the duration of the emergency. CASE HISTORIES 47 GATEWAY %\V*^— CLIPPER FLEET #^liiiliiPlTTSBURGH MT VASHINGTW\