THE ASHLAND , FLOREFFE, PA — CASE HISTORY AND RESPONSE EVALUATION

Cdr. E. A. Miklaucic U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Suite 700, Kossman Building Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 J. Saseen U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Wheeling Field Office 303 Methodist Building Wheeling, 26003

ABSTRACT: On January 2, 1988, a storage tank at the Ashland Oil the first time in that location. Fuel height in the tank was less than Terminal, Floreffe, Pennsylvania, near the Monongahela River 24 2 inches from the maximum 46 foot depth, representing 3,857,384 miles upstream of Pittsburgh, suffered an instantaneous and complete gallons of product. failure, releasing 90,000 barrels (about 3.9 million gallons) ofdiesel oil At approximately 5:02 p.m., while returning to the terminal office, into the environment. The speed and volume of the release made ''first the operator described hearing a sound like thunder and turned to aid" almost impossible. Within hours, an estimated 18,000 barrels observe the roof of No. 1338 collapse and a cloud of mist surround the (750,000 gallons) ofdiesel had entered the river. Responders were faced tank area.5 The resulting wavelike surge of diesel fuel crossed facility with a power and communication lines shutdown, contaminated pota- containment berms, inundating the terminal and adjacent property, ble water intakes, oil dispersion from river currents and turbulence creating one of the nation's largest inland oil spills (Figure 1). Large resulting from numerous river dams, and life-threatening weather con- quantities of fuel pooled in a low-elevation area of the adjacent ditions, with temperatures often below 0°F. With the U.S. Coast Guard Duquesne Power Plant. It then drained through a storm sewer where as first federal official on scene (FFOS) and the Environmental Protec- the oil was emulsified with cooling water from the river, which had tion Agency acting as on-scene coordinator (OSC), a thoroughly inte- been used by the power plant. Subsequently, the oil was discharged grated response organization of federal, state, local, and interstate into the river via a spillway. Currently, it is estimated that 750,000 agencies evolved. gallons entered the river, and that 204,600 gallons were recovered. Once the situation was stabilized, aggressive restoration of the Ash- Ashland employees provided prompt and thorough notification land site by traditional removal techniques began. However, significant of the tank rupture to local emergency response agencies and the factors challenged the scientific community throughout river recovery National Response Center (NRC). The NRC notified local U.S. areas. First, as contamination became suspended throughout the water Coast Guard, Marine Safety Office (USCG MSO), Pittsburgh, who column, water supply intakes at all depths were affected, resulting in further notified the local Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) water shortages for most of the population downstream as far as 200 field office in Wheeling, West Virginia, and other agencies of the spill. miles. Supplying potable water and technical assistance to water au- Immediately following the tank collapse, involved agencies at all thorities prompted questions about the use of 311 (k) for activities not levels dispatched personnel to collect information and confirm de- clearly defined as cleanup. Additionally, cold weather caused extensive tails. Because all communication and power lines at the Ashland freezing, and ice cover limited full use of absorbent materials and terminal had been shut off as a precautionary safety measure at the equipment. Finally, river access points also hampered boom deploy- time of the spill, communications from the scene were hampered. ment and surface oil recovery. Local and county agencies responded quickly in establishing a tempo- This case demonstrated the benefits of contingency planning and rary command post in the Floreffe Fire Hall, and took positive steps revealed areas where additional coordination might be accomplished. to ensure site safety and to evaluate and contain the spill. The associated Ashland site restoration continues to the present time. Initial efforts were well thought out and executed without mishap; however, the instantaneous nature of the casualty made first aid con- tainment virtually impossible. Attempts to stem the flow of oil to the storm sewer inlet, 10 feet or more under the oil surface, were fruitless Through the day of January 2,1988, three barges of diesel fuel were until the flow subsided and the sewer inlet was located. Truck loads unloaded at Ashland Oil Company's Floreffe, Pennsylvania, water- of gravel and road material dumped at the 24 inch storm sewer inlet front facility, at Mile 25 on the Monongahela River, and pumped into were swept away by the force of oil flow. Tank No. 1338 at the terminal. This 4 million gallon tank had been Action was further severely impeded by darkness, extremely cold reconstructed at the site in 1987; it had originally been constructed in temperatures, and later, by public safety considerations resulting 1940 and used at Whiskey Island (Cleveland), Ohio. Its current loca- from detection of gasoline vapors at the site. The fire and explosion tion at the Floreffe terminal is approximately 15 air miles from the threat from the discharge of gasoline require site operations to be Point in Pittsburgh. suspended until the threat had been mitigated. Evacuation of the site At 4:58 p.m., the terminal operator completed a gauging visit to the and nearby residents was effected by the local fire chief.6 tank top of No. 1338, just prior to filling it to maximum capacity for By 8:00 p.m., local and county responders were well established 45 46 1989 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE

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Figure 1. The Ashland oil spill (land limits) in a command post at the Floreffe Fire Hall. Allegheny County Between 12:30 and 2:30 p.m. January 3, the FFOS coordinated Emergency Management authorities ensured notification to down- river cleanup operations with Ashland, its cleanup contractors, and stream facilities, provided response equipment, and supported local state and federal agency representatives. These operations focused on personnel using planned agreements. Despite difficult communica- the following tasks: tions with persons on scene, enough details had been confirmed that • Contractor acquisition of all available pollution recovery equip- the Coast Guard and EPA established the appropriate federal pos- ment ture. Having roughly defined the location, amount, source and spread • Selecting effective and accessible containment and recovery areas of the oil, USCG MSO Pittsburgh and EPA Wheeling agreed to • Extending the 12 mile closure of the Monongahela River to 26 miles jurisdiction determined by the existing USCG/EPA Memorandum of • Mobilizing additional federal forces (the National Strike Force's Understanding. EPA would assume on-scene coordinator (OSC) re- Atlantic Area Strike Team, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric sponsibilities. USCG MSO Pittsburgh would assume first federal Administration, and air support) official on scene (FFOS) duties, then be relieved by the OSC upon the • Identifying and mobilizing local commercial, industrial river re- latter's arrival at first light on January 3,1988. By 10:00 p.m., USCG sources (e.g., tow boats, tank barges, and deflection barges) MSO Pittsburgh exercised control of river traffic by closing the • Notifying and mobilizing Pittsburgh Public Safety Department Monongahela River, mobilized the National Strike Force, arranged resources air support, ensured cleanup contractor response, and began monitor- • Requesting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACOE) Pittsburgh ing Ashland's response and assessing its effectiveness. District lock operations to contain oil in the locks (and then direct- Ashland Oil Corporation accepted full responsibility for cleanup ing contractors to those sites for recovery). operations and contracted for all phases of containment and cleanup. Pennsylvania state agencies, the Department of Environmental Its cooperative response to guidance by federal officials monitoring Resources (PADER) and Fish Commission (PFC), began assessing the response contributed to the response's overall effectiveness. the impact on water quality of downstream water intakes (Figure 2). Pending resolution of site safety issues by the fire scene commander The cleanup and recovery of the No. 2 diesel fuel from both the and recognizing the excellent site control by local authorities, the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers was the responsibility of the Ashland USCG FFOS established a separate command post at the Ashland Oil cleanup contractor, O. H. Materials, Inc. (OHM), who hired terminal. Communication constraints at the original command post many subcontractors to perform this task. USCG MSO Pittsburgh and a need to separate long-term oil recovery planning and control and the National Strike Force's Atlantic Area Strike Team (USCG/ from the immediate local response activity were prime factors in the LAST) closely monitored river cleanup activities and monitored Ash- decision. land throughout the duration of the emergency. CASE HISTORIES 47

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Figure 2. Immediate response area for the Ashland oil spill on the Monongahela River, with intakes, facilities, and other features

The EPA OSC arrived on site early Sunday morning, assumed now threatening the public drinking water supplies of numerous com- the central role in response coordination, and provided advice to the munities that utilize both rivers. The water quality crisis became the Ashland Oil Company. Shortly thereafter, the first water treatment third and most pressing focus of federal, state, and local response, plant closed its intakes, creating a new emergency. The oil spill was significantly affecting public health and dramatically increasing per- 48 1989 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE sonnel and equipment resource requirements. Throughout the follow- lASHLANDl 1 OSd 1 STATES! ing week the OSC was assisted by all elements of the USCG/LAST, Environmental Response Team (ERT), Regional Response Team (RRT), and participating state and local agencies. This coordination RIVER CLEANUP) [SITE CLEANUP) [WATER QUALITY] led to a long-term response plan focused on water quality, river recov- ery, and site cleanup. The following response tasks were coordinated ^HUSCG] [EPA] [HEPAI by the OSC and performed or monitored by the full spectrum of local, 3 [EPA| county, state, and federal agencies (Figure 3): | PAPER] | USCG] • Site cleanup 1 NOAAl EIRE CO] 1 PADERl • Tracking leading edge \-\ PADERl LOCAL PEMA • River traffic control OEEICIALS • Congressional/political liaisons IWVDNRl WVDOHl • Facility inspections • River cleanup jORSANCOl OHIO EPA • Environmental impact HEALTH • Water quality sampling AGENCIES! Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 • Potable water delivery Figure 3. Organization of the response to the Ashland spill • RRT • Enforcement • Public affairs The original criteria used to select oil recovery sites was ease of • Cost tracking. access to river edge and capability for deployment, recovery, and The incident-specific Regional Response Team (RRT) was formally storage of massive amounts of spill equipment. The sites initially activated Monday, January 4, 1988. Many of the RRT member selected were left descending bank (LDB) Mile 2.2, Southside Park agencies were closely involved in the initial response. The following (boat ramp and cemented area), and right descending bank (RDB) agencies participated in RRT activation: Mile 0.5 to 0.8, Monongahela River wharf, both on the Monongahela • U.S. Coast Guard (Second and Fifth District, MSO Pittsburgh, River near the Pittsburgh Point. Multiple deflection and collection National Strike Force LANTAREA Strike Team) booms, assisted by strategically placed barges used for oil deflection, • U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Regions III, IV, V) were in place early on January 3. These sites recovered the largest • U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Pittsburgh, , Hunting- amounts of fuel. ton, Louisville) The first effective deployment of contractor resources was to L/D • U.S. Department of Interior (, ) No. 2, Mile 11.2 RDB, at 1:00 a.m., January 3. This site also proved • National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Ann Arbor, very efficient due to ease of equipment deployment and use of the Rockville, Seattle) lock as a collection basin. By maintaining upper lock gates open and • Occupational Safety and Health Administration the downstream gates closed, the lock formed a natural backwater • Federal Emergency Management Agency enabling significant product recovery. • Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources After USCG LAST visual inspection by air, more equipment was • Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency deployed to major natural collection points: Mile 15.8 Monongahela • West Virginia Department of Natural Resources River; Mile 2.7 back channel Brunot's Island, Ohio River; and later, • West Virginia Department of Health Miles 6.8 and 7.8 back channel Neville Island, Ohio River. Numerous • Ohio Environmental Protection Agency smaller recovery efforts occurred at points throughout the 38 mile • Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission river recovery area as the oil gathered in eddies behind bridge piers, • Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection. vessel mooring areas, and natural riverbank prominences. The RRT provided advice and guidance to the OSC, while RRT To increase oil recovery further, two BUDA self-propelled suction members acted as conduits of information to and from their respective barges were deployed. While underway, the BUDA deploys boom to agencies. Conducted on a regular basis, RRT teleconferences focused collect oil product, and simultaneously vacuums the product and on the political, programmatic, and statutory implications of agency stores it in the vessel's 5,000 gallon tanks. This recovery method has actions. They also maintained continuity of information to all agen- been considered the best and most flexible alternative to boom sys- cies involved. Recommendations for appropriate response actions tems for river spills of this nature. However, the system did not reach were made. Emergency response actions continued through January full potential due to mechanical problems from extreme cold weather. 15, 1988 with EPA, USCG, and state and local agencies on scene.4 Furthermore, ice clogged the suction intakes. Other than the sites initially selected, few suitable locations for oil collection downstream from the spill site were found by the cleanup crews. River access was impossible at most points due to steep, heav- River cleanup ily treed or rocky banks, sometimes at a distance from roads. Extremely cold weather during the first weeks of 1988 not only Nearly all the oil entered the river via a single 24 inch drainage compounded mechanical problems, but affected all aspects of person- pipe on the adjacent Duquesne Power Company property. This pipe nel response, monitoring, and cleanup activities. The frigid conditions joined Duquesne's cooling water discharge, which flowed into the increased the risk of hypothermia for river cleanup crews and led to river. Once the entry point was identified, the fire department in- demobilization of all river personnel on the fourth day after the spill. stalled an underflow dam to prevent the oil from flowing into the For several days ice cover on the rivers ranged between 50 and 90 river. However, due to delays caused by darkness, loss of power and percent. The ice, which contained some of the oil, interfered with the communications, and evacuation of the area, the dam was not in- placement of booms and sorbent materials and complicated estima- stalled until 9:00 p.m. on January 2, after most of the oil had already tions of plume movement based on river velocity. Cold temperatures reached the river. This first containment was replaced by an inflatable may have stabilized the oil emulsion, which in turn reduced oil recov- plug, which failed early the next morning, releasing an additional ery and increased the potential of water intake contamination. 4 50,000 gallons into the river. Efforts to contain and recover oil at this enormous spill included During this spill, Monongahela River current was 1.1 mph, and the more than 150 people, 11 vacuum trucks, 3 cranes, 10 barges and flow rate continued to decrease as temperatures fell in the days that towboats, dozens of small work boats, and 20,000 feet of river boom. followed. Predictions of plume movement were difficult to make due Three USCG and three private helicopters were used for air surveys to the changing river flow rate. The spill occurred in the Lock and and to transport personnel and equipment quickly over long dis- Dam (L/D) No. 3 pool at river mile 25. As the plume quickly reached tances. During extreme weather conditions, extensive use of sorbent L/D No. 3, the first in a series of locks and dams along the Monon- materials was prevented because ice cover prevented the sorbent ma- gahela and Ohio Rivers, it apparently became emulsified and dis- terials from contacting the oil. In addition, the ice cover and high risk persed throughout the water column. As a result, containment booms of injury for work crews prevented the placing of booms in some retained only the oil that was not emulsified. otherwise strategic locations. CASE HISTORIES 49

Traffic in the Monongahela River was prohibited for 58 hours fol- toring system at eight sites on the Ohio River and commenced sam- lowing the Ashland spill and was restricted for seven days to enable pling on January 7. Analyses tested for TOC, O&G, and organics.4 cleanup crews to move about freely in the river. Daily evaluations of On January 13, USACOE Huntington District took over the down- the restrictions on river traffic were made by the USCG MSO Pitts- stream tracking of the spill. They continued to perform the track- burgh, acting as Captain of the Port. ing, using their own boat and a flowthrough fluorometer through On January 4, a local economic problem resulting from the January 23, when the spill left their jurisdiction at the river's Mile 436. Monongahela River closure was addressed in discussions on improv- USACOE's Louisville District continued the tracking until February ing oil recovery. When the river is open, 17 million tons of coal and 2, when the spill was no longer detectable by the boat-mounted fluo- coke transit this region, supplying energy requirements for numerous rometer. steel and related heavy industries.1 The closure left some with as little From January 19 through 23, a towboat was again employed to as 10 days operating supply. While largely administrative, the river assist in the tracking and to provide samples requested by downstream closure was physically enforced by deflection boom crossing the river water users. Five gallon samples were collected at the indicated peak in four major recovery areas. By 10:00 p.m., a USCG buoy tender set for use by the utilities performing treatability studies. The spill buoys and moored the deflection boom so that a 200 foot mid-stream reached Kentucky on January 22. The Kentucky Division of Water gap was opened for traffic. Vessel turbulence resulting from the re- successfully used fluorometers at water intakes, combined with sam- opening was estimated to have little effect on the already emulsified ple analysis, at Maysville and Louisville, then moved the fluorometers Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 oil. However, the boom's increased angle of incidence to shore recov- downstream to provide intake monitoring at Evansville, Indiana, and ery points greatly accelerated the rate of oil recovery by reducing oil Cairo, Illinois. By that time, spill dispersion led to inconclusive re- entrainment. sults. Monitoring at Cairo, just above the mouth of the Ohio River, Constant river cleanup monitoring by air, road vehicles, and small was concluded on February 12.4 boats shifted oil collection resources and emphasis on a daily basis. In general, cold weather hampered the river monitoring. Poor navi- Major recovery efforts continued up to January 18, when no further gation conditions forced the monitoring crews to use slow-moving tug recoverable oil pools dictated a phasedown. Final river cleanup efforts boats for personnel safety, which often delayed the reporting of re- were completed on February 5, 1988. Cleanup operations continued sults. on site at the Ashland terminal, monitored by the EPA OSC until Sampling and assessment at water intakes. Water supply plants EPA's demobilization on February 26, 1988. downstream from the Ashland terminal were promptly notified of the January 2, 1988, spill via county and state health and emergency management agencies. However, the presence of oil, top to bottom in the water column, and its corresponding impact on water supplies, River monitoring was not recognized until early on January 3. The actions taken by individual water suppliers for water supply facilities in many cases Three types of monitoring took place: defining the spill mass and reflected the degree of technical expertise and equipment used in tracking its movement, sampling and assessment at water intakes to processing river water. This situation played a significant role in water protect water supplies and public health, and gauging the effects on treatment. The information provided by emergency response agen- fish and wildlife. Initially, flow and velocity forecasts by the National cies was also critical in enabling downstream water suppliers to imple- Weather Service (NWS) were used to predict oil plume location. ment various treatment procedures and increase storage volume be- Later, USACOE velocity data were supplied daily. fore the spill affected their intakes. Public confidence in the water Spill mass and tracking. Oil plume tracking began on January 4, purveyors and in the responding agencies was maintained because using data from overflight observations, taste and odor reports from water quality never deteriorated. treatment plant operators, and lock and dam workers. Flow and Coordination of raw and finished water quality testing and report- velocity data and weather forecasts were obtained from appropriate ing was critical. Accelerated testing and results through use of private agencies. On January 5, PADER and the PFC commenced sampling laboratories verified the effectiveness of carbon treatment and con- on both rivers at three depths in the water column. River bank sedi- firmed drinking water quality. Vital water plant operation decisions ment was also sampled. Analyses performed were for oil and grease hinged on the speed and accuracy of sample results. In affected com- (O&G) and total organic carbon (TOC). PADER, in cooperation munities, specially modified emergency water tankers were set up with the Allegheny County Health Department, also initiated sam- quickly. Refill operations were well organized and staged indoors pling of surface and groundwater intakes along the rivers in Pennsyl- due to cold temperatures. Supplemental bottled water was provided vania, with analyses for volatile organics, TOC, and fuel oil per- by dairies and breweries who were given water quality guidelines by formed by the PADER laboratory in Harrisburg.4 health agencies. The plume tracking group at the Ashland command post consisted In a parallel effort underwritten by Ashland Oil Company, USCG of representatives from EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric LAST mobilized teams and pumping equipment flown from Mobile, Administration (NOAA), PADER, and the Ohio River Valley Water Alabama, to barge water. By loading fresh water from uncontami- Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO). They set up a sampling pro- nated sources (the Allegheny River and Wheeling Creek) into clean gram at the first eight water supply intakes downstream of the spill 400,000 gallon tank barges, a temporary freshwater supply to river site. Three samples per day were taken at each intake, but were cut water plant intakes was made available. However, for several days, back to two per day for logistic considerations. Analyses were first the extreme cold froze the pumps and water contained in the barges, performed at a local contract laboratory (NUS), but suffered from delaying delivery. backlog delays. A mobile laboratory was set up by the cleanup con- The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued a Water Conservation tractor, O. H. Materials, Inc., on January 6. Analyses tested for Order for three counties during the incident. Public cooperation with volatile organics, base neutrals, and No. 2 fuel oil. this order allowed three of the four affected water suppliers in Penn- On January 6 the OSC coordinated efforts with EPA, West Virginia sylvania to avoid water loss to their customers. A summary of the Department of Natural Resources (WVDNR), and ORSANCO to experiences of the major water supply facilities and users affected by track the spill using fluorometers on tow boats. One fluorometer- the Ashland oil spill follows in detail. Excerpts from the report con- equipped towboat moved upstream from Wheeling, while a second cerning those plants most affected are reprinted here:4 towboat equipped with a TOC analyzer moved downstream. By the West Penn Water Company (Becks Run), PA (Monongahela River end of January 6 it was apparent that the fluorometer provided useful Mile 4.5). West Penn Water (WPW) was notified by the Allegheny results for characterizing the plume, while the TOC analyzer did not. County Health Department (ACHD) about the spill at approximately Thereafter, one fluorometer-equipped towboat was operated by per- 7:00 p.m., January 2. Little information was available on the spill sonnel from Ohio EPA, WVDNR, and ORSANCO. Samples were location, size, volume (estimates ranged from 30,000 to 3 million collected at the point where the fluorometer indicated the leading gallons), or travel time to intake. The Hays Mine plant intake was edge and the peak concentration of the spill. WVDNR's Guthrie closed early January 3, and testing began immediately using the Laboratory analyzed for volatile organics, base neutrals, and fuel oil. ORSANCO-ODS gas chromatograph. Additional samples were sent On January 6, 7, and 8, USACOE Pittsburgh collected samples to a local lab for GC/MS [gas chromatography/mass spectrometry] at several locations including the New Cumberland, Montgomery, verification. Samples were also taken by EPA, PADER, and ACHD. Emsworth, Elizabeth, and Braddock Dams. Ohio EPA set up a moni- Attempts were made to determine the chemical composition of the 50 1989 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE fuel oil. Consideration was given to blocking off the two upper water with oil. Reliable concentration and health effects data from upstream intakes and operating with the lower intakes. However, when oil was monitoring were not readily available during the spill's first week. observed at depths greater than 15 feet the effort was abandoned. Alternative water sources were obtained from the communities of On Monday, January 4, WPW pilot tested a carbon feed process Martins Ferry and Bridgeport and water barges brought in by Ashland that proved successful in removing the oil. Subsequently, four of the Oil coordinated by the USCG LAST. These barges were filled from five Pennsylvania water companies affected by the spill used this Wheeling Creek, a tributary of the Ohio River. The plant went off process. The fifth water company, Sewickley Borough, utilized alter- Ohio River water the evening of January 8 and reopened by blending native well water sources. On January 6, treatment and analysis with barge water on January 10. Prior to reopening, a filter blanket schedules were established and the Hays Mine plant started operating was placed over the intakes by divers. at 25 percent capacity. Excellent public relations efforts helped to American Electric Power, WV (Ohio River Miles 76.5,111.1,111.51). maintain public confidence throughout the water emergency. Power plants utilizing the river for cooling water are vulnerable to City of Pittsburgh Water Authority, PA (Allegheny River Mile 7.4). high levels of oil. Since the period immediately after the spill saw near The City of Pittsburgh draws its water from the Allegheny River, record demands for electricity due to heating needs, the threat of which was uncontaminated by the spill. The excess capacity of the power plant disruption was a grave concern. The fact that there was Pittsburgh system provided 15 to 20 million gallons per day (mgd) to no disruption is noteworthy; however, plans for water treatment were West Penn and West View Water Companies. in place. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 West View Water Authority, PA (Ohio River Mile 4.5). West View Sistersville Water Works, WV (Ohio River Mile 137). There was much Water Authority was notified of the spill the evening of January 2, and concern regarding potential difficulties in providing adequate water immediately implemented their emergency contingency plan. This supplies at Sistersville because there were no alternative supplies. plan included increasing carbon feed capacity, topping off reservoirs During the crisis, Ashland provided barged water to Sistersville while and tanks, activating well fields, and establishing water line connec- the plant's intakes were closed from January 13 to January 21. tions with the City of Pittsburgh. Use of the developed wells was de- Huntington Water Treatment Plant, WV (Ohio River Mile 306). Hunt- layed pending lab evaluation of raw water quality. ington was hampered by a water hysteria in fear of a water shortage Regulatory agencies approved operation on January 10, at which prior to spill arrival. Diesel pumps were installed in a nearby, un- time the plant started to blend 25 percent river water with well water. affected stream as an alternative water supply in anticipation of po- The primary factors that enabled West View to provide water to its tential river contamination. Intakes were closed on January 22 and customers were the use of well water, the connections with the City water from the Guyandotte and Ohio Rivers was blended for treat- of Pittsburgh's system, and the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage- ment until 100 percent Ohio River water treatment resumed on ment Council's conservation order. January 25, 1988. Robinson Township Authority, PA (Ohio River Mile 8.6). Robinson Effects on wildlife. Determinations of this spill's long-term impact Township was the only water company that had customers without on mussel beds and fish are incomplete, partly due to lack of back- water during the incident. Approximately 17,000 customers were ground data against which to view new sample data. However, two oil without water for up to 48 hours. Two thousand (2,000) customers impact studies designed by aquatic toxicologists from the WV DNR were without water for up to 5 days, and 200 customers were without took mussel samples and a census before and after the spill. Sepa- water for an entire week. The Authority focused on development of rately caged mussels and catfish were suspended in the river ahead of interconnections with other water supply plants. It opened its river the spill, then collected after it passed. Analysis of the organisms will intakes eight days after the spill, on January 10, following conversion be used to determine effects of the diesel fuel. from a potassium permanganate feed system to a carbon feed system. Pennsylvania and West Virginia authorities conducted shoreline Midland Water Authority, PA (Ohio River Mile 36.2). Midland Water counts to determine the number of fish killed. In the week following Authority received 24 hours notice of the spill. The inriver intake shut the spill, several censuses of dead and stressed fish were taken in dam down at 6:00 p.m. on January 4, with 4 million gallons of water in re- pools along the river. More recently, annual fish collection surveys serve. No interconnections were possible. Local industry was ordered conducted by ORSANCO, in conjunction with state agencies, are to cut consumption to a minimum. On January 7, divers completed expected to yield further information regarding ecological effects. the installation of oil filter blanket material around the intakes, and Significant efforts by the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Au- plant startup procedures began. A 600-pound/million gallons pow- dubon Society, and dozens of volunteers to retrieve oil-endangered dered activated charcoal water treatment produced acceptable results waterfowl met with limited success due to weather conditions. Ice and and the plant went back on line at 2:00 p.m. on January 7. very low temperatures kept rescue workers on shore, hampering re- East Liverpool Water Treatment Plant, OH (Ohio River Mile 41). East covery. Although many birds were saved, waterfowl mortality esti- Liverpool water treatment plant shut its intakes at 3:00 a.m. on mates ranged from 2,000 to 4,000 ducks, loons, cormorants, and January 5, 1988, even though the plant had not yet been affected by Canada geese, among others. the spill. Officials of the plant determined that they could not afford the risk of contaminating the facility. In the interim, reserves and water conservation were relied upon until river water treatment could Evaluation of response and commence. A creek outflow aided in minimizing the spill's effects by diverting oil from collecting near the facility's intake. By noon on recommended improvements January 7, East Liverpool was back on line treating water with acti- vated carbon. Ashland's mobile laboratory was utilized to test water This evaluation considers three critical elements: coordination, samples on a 24-hour basis to ensure water quality. communications, and resources. Toronto Water Treatment Plant, OH (Ohio River Mile 60). At 11:00 Coordination. The initial 18 hours of response to the emergency p.m. on January 5, 1988, Toronto, Ohio, closed its intakes. A large could be characterized as a loosely organized, but relatively effective reservoir, coupled with water conservation efforts, provided sufficient attempt to minimize the dangers and damage from the spill. As local, water supplies until the plant reopened its intakes and began treating county, state, and federal agencies responded, each exercised its own river water at 10:30 p.m. on January 9, 1988. responsibilities independently as liaison was established at the scene. Steubenville Water Treatment Plant, OH (Ohio River Mile 65). Steu- At no time in the initial hours did any agency deem it necessary to benville's storage capacity had been maximized and provided an ade- "take charge" of the entire response effort. By 8:00 a.m. on January quate supply of water. The quality of water was monitored at 15 to 20 3, all responding agencies were on scene and had established liaison minute intervals. When odor became apparent on January 6, 1988, with the others. A response organization then developed, which, the water intake was closed for 10 to 11 hours. After the contamina- while not without some temporary shortcomings, served as an effec- tion passed, the intake was reopened at 10:25 p.m. tive structure throughout the response period. This response organi- Wheeling Water Treatment Plant, WV (Ohio River Mile 86.8). This zation included the assignment by the OSC of specific areas of re- plant monitored for oil in water using the Hanby Test, fluorometric sponsibility, such as site cleanup, water monitoring, oil recovery, and analysis, threshhold odor, and gas chromatography, due to useful assistance to water suppliers, to appropriate agencies.2 information from upstream utilities. The GC was used to confirm the During the Ashland response, there appeared to be a constant presence or absence of low-level organics in raw and finished water. tradeoff between the need to have all response personnel in a single Treatment schemes were evaluated using jars of river water spiked command center, enhancing coordination, and the need to limit the CASE HISTORIES 51 number of people present to minimize confusion. A single, very large member should be assigned an E-mail box under each system. For command post would have enhanced response effectiveness; how- EPA-lead responses an RRT E-mail distribution system should be ever, no site for such a center could be located in the first 12 hours, established at the Regional Response Center in Philadelphia. Such a and the locations of the multiple response activities (spill site cleanup, system can promptly deliver hard copy reports and improve the qual- river oil recovery, water supply protection) were widely separated. In ity of RRT teleconferences. retrospect, perhaps an effective future arrangement would be to es- River monitoring data, distributed using ORSANCO's electronic tablish a central command post staffed by personnel responsible for bulletin board and direct telephone, was widely used and worked each aspect of the response and separate operations centers for each well. Procedures for RRTs to use this system more effectively, or aspect. alternately, should be evaluated. Connected to river water utilities, The Region III Regional Contingency Plan states: "The RRT shall essential data could be distributed via EPA or NO A A E-mail. Util- be activated automatically in the event of a major or potential major ities could then provide daily updates on their operations. discharge or release," but the RRT was not activated until Monday, Resources. A lack of immediately available resources, such as con- January 4, 1988. The RRT could have provided assistance to the tainment and monitoring equipment, hindered the response to the responding agencies sooner, had it become involved in the response Ashland oil spill. Federal response equipment is housed in widely during the first 24 hours following the spill. It is recommended that separated locations and so was not easily accessible for use. No cur- the RRT become active as soon as possible after future large spills rent inventories of equipment and resources controlled by govern- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 occur. In addition, the RRT should consider designating an RRT mental or industrial entities existed. Delays were caused by the need Coordinator to facilitate communications among responding agen- to locate and transport needed equipment and by the necessity of cies. Such an individual could be the liaison between the OSC and diverting valuable personnel from actual cleanup efforts to do so. 4 developments at emergency operations centers (EOCs). For example, considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining Water monitoring coordination and communication suffered ini- fluorometers for spill monitoring. Though quickly identified as a tially because no lead agency was assigned. ORSANCO ultimately means of tracking, fluorometers were not commercially available. By accepted the lead, but because there was no legal basis for OR- chance one was found with the proper light wavelength filters for SANCO's role, this was made possible only by an informal agreement oil-in-water analysis. But when the decision was made to use the of the agencies involved. In the future, the early establishment of a instruments in multiple locations (mobile and stationary), no informa- single water monitoring data coordinating agency can serve to im- tion was available on appropriate instrument suppliers. More fluo- prove the focus on communications so that efficiency and data rele- rometers were eventually located, but by then several days' of data vance are optimal. Furthermore, the lead agency can take steps to were lost.4 determine the availability of resources and to standardize analysis A warehouse of available containment and monitoring equipment among the agencies. in the Pittsburgh area would have been ideal. However, the ware- While cooperation among the agencies was high, they operated housing of equipment for emergency responses is not mandated by independently, so that analyses were not standardized. For example, any local, state, or federal agency; nor is it cost-effective. Inventories fluorometers were calibrated with different standard solutions, and of locally available equipment would have assisted emergency re- sample results were quantified in different ways. Naturally, it would sponded in quickly locating essential equipment. Such inventories be optimal for agencies to use identical measures and procedures to could be developed through a cooperative arrangement among local compare analyses. The measurement techniques to be used for spe- industries and government. cific situations should be standardized. Analytical methods for deter- During the initial days of response, the required turnaround time mining contaminant concentrations should also be standardized. The for water analyses to make critical decisions, could not be met. Later Organics Detection System (ODS) gas chromatographs were invalu- the mobile laboratory reduced this problem, but delays were frus- able in providing on-site analysis with minimal sample turnaround trating. The ability to provide this information, either through private time. GC/MS was used for verification of raw and finished water contracts or mobile analytical laboratories, is important to response quality data, and was required by some regulatory agencies before efficiency. State or local contingency plans should contain a list of approval was given to water plants to return to operation. Consid- local laboratories certified to perform necessary emergency testing, eration should be given to standardizing portable GCs, with sub- approved sampling and analysis protocols, and information on the sequent GC/MS verification, for incidents of this type.4 location of contingency water and equipment supplies. Communications. Communications during the initial stages of the incident were very difficult. The fact that all electrical power and communications were immediately shut off at the spill site due to References safety considerations contributed to this problem. Even so, the sheer number of agencies involved in an incident of this magnitude would strain any communications system. 1. Baer, G. A., Jr., 1987. Ohio River Navigation System 1987 Statis- Some problems were encountered in reaching RRT members dur- tical Supplement. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Cincinnati, ing off-duty hours. A list of 24-hour phone numbers for RRT mem- Ohio bers should be regularly updated and made available to all RRT 2. Miklaucic, E. A., 1988. Evaluation of Initial Response to the members. In addition, numbers to newly installed or rented portable January 2, 1988, Ashland Oil Spill, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania phones should be gathered and aggressively disseminated to response 3. Saseen, J., 1988. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal groups. Cellular phones are a necessity for rapid, efficient response. On-Scene Coordinators report on the Ashland Major Oil Spill, If not on hand, temporary rental of these phones is possible through Floreffe, Pennsylvania, January 2 through March 5, 1988 some car rental companies. Backup installation of a large number of 4. Voltaggio, T. C, et al., 1988. Incident Specific Regional Response phone lines to the command post is essential during a response of this Team—Ashland Major Oil Spill. Evaluation of the Response to size. Cellular phone use can become a problem if system capacity is the Major Oil Spill at the Ashland Terminal, Floreffe, Pennsyl- exceeded, which may happen in a major disaster. Conventional phone vania. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region III, Phila- service should be installed as soon as possible. The use of hand-held delphia, Pennsylvania radios should continue, especially those that allow multiple frequency 5. Welks, K., et al., 1988. Report of the Investigation into the Col- selection. In addition, use of packaged communications trailers, avail- lapse of Tank 1338. Tank Collapse Task Force, Commonwealth of able through some phone companies and local agencies, should be Pennsylvania encouraged. 6. Withers, D., 1988. Report by the Floreffe Volunteer Fire Chief on EPA's and NOAA's electronic mail systems can be efficient the Ashland Floreffe Site Tank Collapse. January 2, 1988 mechanisms for communication among RRT members. Each RRT Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1989/1/45/1741384/2169-3358-1989-1-45.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021