Marc Baumgartner air traffic controller and supervisor at the Geneva en-route air control centre, former president of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations (IFATCA). Pierre Andribet et Jean-Marc Garot former directors of the Experimental Centre. 10th January 2021

Take advantage of the crisis to reinvent European .

Executive summary of EUROCONTROL and for the initiatives of the (EC) in the The motivation for writing this article domain. But the fact that international comes from the conviction that, even if on legislation (International Civil Aviation the overall, Air Traffic Control (ATC) in Organisation ICAO) recognizes that every fulfils its role, especially, from a State has complete and exclusive safety standpoint, it is suffering structural sovereignty over the airspace above its inefficiencies that become unbearable with territory explain why these initiatives did the current crisis. An ambitious vision needs not fully succeed. As such the to be developed by the decision makers at EUROCONTROL history is the symbol of States and pan European level (including the these ups and downs of the European EU). Using the current construction. crisis as a starting point, one should significantly improve the efficiency of ATC As underlined by the European Court in Europe both in operational and financial of Auditors, the legislative attempt of the terms in the interest of the airspace users European Commission to reform ATC in and passengers, with a motivating project Europe, with the successive packages of The that users and staff of this industry would Single European Sky (SES) has contributed support. to incremental improvements in the performance and modernisation of the The article provides avenues in order European Air Traffic Management (ATM) to achieve it. system. But it has not generated the Air traffic is unlikely to recover in the expected paradigm change and has not coming months and the organisations sufficiently reduced its fragmentation. The providing air navigation services (Air resulting gridlock is detrimental to European Navigation Services Providers ANSP) in air transport. Europe are facing a “financing wall”. With a While recognising the value of the fixed cost and less traffic, either the States recent EC legislative proposal, the authors subsidise their ANSP or the user charges per of this document propose a more ambitious flight will significantly increase, which approach, based upon the Wise Persons undoubtfully will trigger strong reactions Group Report: a transition towards a pan- from airlines already severely hit by the European ATC with EUROCONTROL crisis. reinvented. The main root reason for the structural The idea is to address fragmentation weaknesses mentioned, is the fragmentation from the operational and technical of the air traffic system in Europe. It has standpoints. been recognised for more than fifty years and was the main rationale for the creation For the latter one, if anything else is done, at least one could choose the

Page 1/32 minimum option of common procurement This should foster the harmonisation preferably “« standardised commercial and, even more, the modernisation of products” products for the Communication, operational procedures which are all out of Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) date. infrastructure and common A more ambitious option could be a development/procurement of Air Traffic single service provider for Europe, Management (ATM) systems. reinventing the vision of the founders of A more ambitious option could be to EUROCONTROL. consider the CNS infrastructure as a service In both cases, taking the existing and no longer as an investment and, delegation of control (Maastricht, Zurich therefore, the total virtualisation of ATM and Geneva) as examples, it could easily be systems. Under an “infrastructure manager”, demonstrated that this does not jeopardise with EU funds (a fraction of the money the State’s sovereignty nor its air defence. spent in the SES technology pillar, SESAR, deployment), this could be second genuine In both cases under a stronger political European infrastructure after Galileo. decision maker, the European Union Centrally funded, it would remove Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) will retain significant financial risk from the its role as safety manager but there is a need operational units, unbundling operational for a more powerful Network Manager. and financial systems. A single service provider for Europe For the former, as far as the airspace paid by European funds would provide a management is concerned, one can robust financing and relieve the States from implement a top-down design to group Air subsidising their ANSPs. Traffic Control Centres (ACC), User charges will no longer pay the independently from country borders, as was costs but the service. Nevertheless, they will the initial objective of the Functional continue to be collected by the Central Airspace Blocks (FAB). Route Charges Office (CRCO) of EUROCONTROL

Page 2/32

Table of content

1. How did we get here? ...... 4 1.1 There is no sign of the air transport crisis to diminish ...... 4 1.2 Since the Chicago convention, air traffic control is a public service enabling the “Freedoms of the air” ...... 7 1.3 EUROCONTROL history is a concentrate of the ups and downs of the European Union ...... 7 1.4 In Europe, the cost of ATC is fully recovered by user charges...... 9 1.5 The Single European sky was a legislative attempt of the European Commission to reform ATC in Europe ...... 11 2. The current situation ...... 13 2.1 SES did not achieve its initial objectives as acknowledged by several official reports ...... 13 2.2 The reasons for this gridlock ...... 14 2.3 The gridlock is detrimental to European air transport ...... 15 3. Where do we go from here? ...... 21 3.1 A Wise Person Group to shape the future ...... 21 3.2 The EC legislative proposal to implement these ambitions ...... 22 3.3 The authors’ proposal for a transition towards a pan European ATC with EUROCONTROL reinvented ...... 24 3.4 A new financing scheme ...... 31 3.5 A roadmap for change ...... 31

4. Documents worth reading ...... 32

Page 3/32

1. How did we get here? in fighting the novel Coronavirus might 1.1 There is no sign of the air bring a cure in form of a vaccine or a transport crisis to diminish treatment, the societal and economic impact The unprecedented impact of the cannot yet be assessed in its full magnitude. COVID 19 crisis created by the SARS The COVID-19 crisis is making all CoV2 Virus on all aspects of our society has industries and businesses go through not spared aviation. Whereas past economic unparalleled times, with the aviation crises were of a punctual and less dramatic industry being one of the worst affected nature, the current crisis will leave its trace (90% traffic reduction during the crisis, and for a much longer duration and, in a much only 50% at the end of August 2020), the deeper way, than anything experienced financial consequences for the various before. Although possible medical progress players are catastrophic.

Council International (ACI): The • Even before the crisis, very few airline airports facing insolvency are mainly companies were profitable, and even regional airports which serve - and are fewer have the cash flow to get through integral to - local communities. The this predicament. Despite the support potential ripple-effect upon local some states have provided (worldwide employment and economies is clear. the massive support was in the order of Financial support from Government 120 billion USD) only the strongest will be crucial in averting rising airlines will survive. Vey likely, they geographic inequality and damaged will demand an efficient ATM system social cohesion. At the same time, managed at a European level. larger European airports and hubs are • With a decrease of more than 80% of not immune from the critical financial passenger traffic (or 1.29 Billion risk. They have cut costs to the bone passengers) the airports are hit and have resorted to the financial extremely hard. According to Airports markets to shore up balance sheets and

Page 4/32

build emergency war chests. This along with the fact that these airports sudden increase in debt - an additional had to make thousands of highly skilled €16 billion for the top 20 European workers redundant, clearly jeopardises airports - is equivalent to nearly 60% of their future. their revenues in a normal year. This,

EUROCONTROL Agency Director General, Eamonn Brennan, presentation for the 26 November 2020 Provisional Council It shows the % of flights in 2020 infrastructure. This crisis highlights how versus 2019 sorted by flight average vulnerable the current air navigation system numbers for airlines and airports. is to fluctuations in demand. During times like these, we are The revenues of ANSPs collapsed as reminded of the importance of a well- shown in the following picture showing the functioning air navigation system as a difference between the planned and actual critical part of the national readiness and the user charges: backbone of national and global

Figure 1 PRC Dashboard update 15.11.2020 Some initiatives have been taken to European ANSPs (e.g., EUROCONTROL guarantee the short-term survivability of States have agreed to a € 1.1 billion carry-

Page 5/32 over program to help airlines. And the Based upon EUROCONTROL French Directorate General of Civil forecast: Aviation was permitted to make a loan of more than one billion euros).

These are only short-term measures requesting individual state support to and states are facing a "financing wall". compensate ANSPs deficits or even, as They have now to decide how to maintain proposed by Michael O'Leary, CEO of the long-term service while not excessively Ryanair Holdings in: increasing the fees as of 2021 and beyond. How can we build back better If one makes some rough European Aviation after COVID-19? computations based on the optimistic This request by the CEO of the major scenario N°1: intra-European airline has the merit to be • 2021 traffic = 70% of 2019 traffic and studied but such a possible assistance to a 2022 traffic = 80% of 2019 traffic quicker recovery will have to be carefully assessed. • With ANSPs costs remaining at the same level (i.e, 8 B€ in 2021 and In this document, we stress that the 2022), the deficit will be current financing wall that ANSPs are 0.3*8+0.2*8 = 4 B€. leading to a currently facing, finds its roots in the significant increase of user charges. organisation of the European system and its financing. In addition, as explained in §1.4, the route charges mechanism foresees that the 2020 deficit (est. 5B€) should be recovered in 2022. Since it would entail an unbearable burden in 2022, it has been agreed that the recovery of the 2020 deficit will be spread over 10 years. In front of this situation, and already facing huge financial difficulties, airlines are

Page 6/32

1.2 Since the Chicago convention, their air navigation facilities with relevant air traffic control is a public ICAO regulations. service enabling the Most importantly, under Article 28 of “Freedoms of the air”1 the Convention, a member state has the obligation to provide, as far as practicable, In November 1944, the American an infrastructure that meets the needs of an government invited 55 States to an interoperable and seamless sky. The same international civil aviation conference in state is also responsible to allocate licenses Chicago. The resulting “Chicago to operate to airspace users. Convention” set the foundations for the rules and regulations concerning air Consequently, the ICAO has navigation in all its aspects and enabled a “globally” harmonised its approach to all the common and global air-navigation system to domains of aviation including ATM. be created. The Chicago Convention also However, technology and standards established the International Civil Aviation are being developed by different actors. Organisation (ICAO). Today ICAO, While standards are global in nature and headquartered in Montreal, manages all should be harmonised (by ICAO), aeronautical spheres, and establishes world technology is being developed by industry standards. It currently has 191 member (manufacturers), typically for the different states that all remain sovereign over their national air traffic service providers. national airspace, a principle that still Commercial Off the Shelf ( -COTS) systems applies today (Part I chapter I article 1: The are only lately being introduced into ATC. contracting States recognize that every State Multiple technologies used by ATC have has complete and exclusive sovereignty over been prototyped by industry due to some the airspace above its territory). historical and localrequirements by the It requires member states to provide states or their Air Navigation Service air navigation facilities over their territory, Providers, therefore creating a piecemeal which comply with ICAO Standards and of systems. Recommended Practices. More precisely, the purpose of Article 28 is to secure a 1.3 EUROCONTROL history is a comprehensive, seamless and continuous concentrate of the ups and network of air navigation services around downs of the European Union the globe and to support the safety, regularity and efficiency of international air Based on the ICAO principles and transportation. standards, all contracting states were fulfilling their duties by providing the However, the obligations for states corresponding services individually as part under Article 28 are neither strictly nor of their governmental administration. narrowly defined. The States retain considerable discretion and individual However, in 1958, the Director of the appreciation regarding the means by which French Air Navigation Directorate, René they intend to fulfil their obligations. Bulin, had the “vision” that civil jet aircraft would have to share the “upper airspace” Each contracting State must declare which so far was only used by military the level of infrastructure and service they aircraft and that the wish to make available to international coordination/management would be more aviation, and the degree of compliance of efficient at a European level. He convinced the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and

1 Luxembourg, the six member States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedoms_of_t he_air

Page 7/32 founders, to sign the EUROCONTROL system of control in the upper airspace. The Convention in December 1960. German and Irish governments later re- nationalised these last two, and the Dutch 1.3.1 1960 is therefore the beginning of government did not hand over the EUROCONTROL organisation and the Amsterdam upper sector to Maastricht until Agency March 1986. One can read the official history of At the same time, the EUROCONTROL as a essence of the ups EUROCONTROL Central Route Charges and downs of the European union, with a Office (CRCO) was set up. mismatch between successive EUROCONTROL conventions and its 1.3.2 Eventually the member states actual missions and with a fight on political embarked on a process of redefining of competency between this states organisation the Organisation’s mandate and the European commission. Assessing the failure of Article 14 to The Article 14 of this Convention “entrust to the Agency the air traffic services said: “The Contracting Parties shall entrust in the [upper] airspace” and to give to the Agency the air traffic services” in the EUROCONTROL Agency the role of [upper] airspace. “coordination”, an amended Convention signed in 1976, took a further ten years to be The Convention was ratified in 1963, ratified. but in the meantime, even if the Convention had been signed by a “pro-European” hand, At the same time, the world economy the other “anti-European” hand in France was emerging from a decade of recession, and United Kingdom, with the issue of which, together with the effects of the national military airspace control, refused to deregulation of air transport in Europe, hand over the Upper Airspace. resulted in such growth in air traffic that the fragmented ATM system was unable to René Bulin became the first Director cope. General. Delays reached such levels that Nevertheless, the other four Member thousands of passengers were stranded for States (the Federal Republic of Germany, hours at European airports, making the Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) headlines for several days. agreed in 1964 to set up a single international, air traffic control centre to ATM, which until now had been manage their upper airspace in Maastricht. totally ignored by the public and politicians, aside from a few air traffic controllers In June 1963, these states agreed to strikes from time to time, found itself at the establish the EUROCONTROL top of the political agenda overnight. Experimental Centre and later-on the institute in Luxembourg in 1970, therefore Miraculously, an organization which turning a part of the Agency into an ANSP until now was practically unknown has in its full-fledged dimensions, with emerged as the bearer of a European headquarters, a centre, a research centre and solution to a European problem: The an academy. European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), an intergovernmental organisation Two EUROCONTROL upper-level which was established by the International control centres were developed and built at Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Karlsruhe (Germany) and Shannon Council of Europe. (Ireland). However, the commitment of these states to the Agency operational At that time, Daniel Tenenbaum, the division was difficult to maintain in the face ECAC chairman, called upon the ECAC’s of a lack of universal support for a common Ministers of Transport with a series of

Page 8/32

MATSE (Meetings on ATS in Europe with In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty Europe as ECAC), the EUROCONTROL implemented the co-decision of the agency was just called on to provide the Parliament and the Council and the “right of secretariat and meeting facilities. initiative “of the European commission. The first implementation of the co-decision was • In October 1988, MATSE/1 agreed to the R&D framework programme in which create the Central Flow Management there was a budget for ATC. Unit and to entrust the EUROCONTROL Agency with its It meant that for the first time ATC development and management, thus R&D was no longer only paid by user giving this agency a particularly charges only but as well by community important operational role, in taxpayer budget. contradiction with its just ratified The European Commission became a convention. member of EUROCONTROL with an • In April 1990 MATSE/2 initiated the Accession Protocol to the revised European ATC Harmonisation and Convention on October 8, 2002. Integration Programme (EATCHIP), the beginning a long series of Plans. 1.4 In Europe, the cost of ATC is Discussions began in 1991 on fully recovered by user charges changing the Convention again, but then the European Commission Historically speaking the route decided to get into the “game” by charging mechanism dates back to 1958 becoming a “member” of when ICAO held its first Route Facilities EUROCONTROL Charges in Montreal to “formulate principles on the way in which charges for • In 1992 MATSE/3 updated route air navigation facilities should be EATCHIP in EATMS (European imposed where they are found to be ATM system) with an ATM 2000 necessary”. Strategy and APATSI (Airport/ Air Traffic System Interface) The 1967 ICAO conference laid the foundation for today’s route charging • In 1994 MATSE/4 “prepared for new mechanism which is in place in the institutional arrangements “ EUROCONTROL area. • In 1997 MATSE/5 the revised The guiding principles were as Convention and the Central European follows: Air Traffic Services CEATS were signed in 1997 and ATM 2000+ • in general, the Conference believed Strategy was launched with EATMP, that States should exercise caution in European ATM Management their charging policy, and that the Programme. charges imposed on users should consider the effect both on the aircraft 1.3.3 Today operators and on the economy of the countries concerned; Twenty-three years later, the revised Convention is not yet in force waiting for • for route navigation charges, the the ratification by the last state (Turkey) - system of charges must be non- unanimity being required for revising discriminatory, both between foreign EUROCONTROL convention. users and those of the State or States providing the route air navigation During the same period, the number of facilities and services, and between EUROCONTROL members increased, now two or more foreign users; coinciding with the perimeter of ECAC (i.e. 41 Member States)

Page 9/32

• as far as possible, there should be only charges and the calculation of the unit a single charge per flight, and this rates”: charge should be based essentially on For each flight, the formula for the flight distance and aircraft weight, route charge is as follows: combined with any other aircraft characteristic capable of affecting the nature of the service rendered. The Service Unit (SU) is calculated as Until 1970, the so-called "en-route" air a function of the maximum take-off weight traffic control, a public service, was funded (MTOW) and the distance (D) flown:

MTOW D SU = ∗ by the states and therefore free for "users". 50 100 A political /economical /philosophical MTOW D question, not necessarily explicit: should SU = ∗ 50 100 infrastructures be paid for by the public budget since they participate in the development of the economy or by users? It is worth explaining that not all traffic pays route charges and that there is a The answer is not the same according certain level of cross subsidy from airlines to the modes of transport, railways, towards General Aviation and military highways, etc. flights. 1970 was the turning point for air In year N, the Service provider transport politically, when it was seen as the forecasts for year N + 1 the traffic it will transport of the “wealthy", which is no control and therefore the number of SU, it longer the case. Then, at that time the forecasts its costs and deduces its Unit Rate second option was chosen for air transport: from these elements. infrastructures to be paid for by the users. For the unit rate computation, there Based on the system adopted by are rules to define what can be put in what is ICAO, the seven member states of called the "cost base, roughly the operating EUROCONTROL signed the multilateral costs, depreciation charges as well as the agreement on the collection of "charges" for interest on their unappreciated assets. In the use of en-route air navigation services addition, EUROCONTROL Member States and equipment. In addition, the non- add to the costs of en-route control their EUROCONTROL member states signed contribution to the Agency's budget. The bilateral agreements empowering operating costs are, mainly, the salaries of EUROCONTROL to collect route charges. the staff and the maintenance of the In 1971, the Central Route Charge Office technical infrastructure (main part being the (CRCO) began operations. In accordance bespoke ATM computer systems specific to with ICAO recommendations that full cost each organization) and the ANSPs have the recovery should be gradual, the recovery right to add the cost of their National rate for EUROCONTROL route charges Supervisory Authorities (NSA). started at 15% from November 1971. This rate was increased to 30% on November Based on these elements, the unit rates 1973, then doubled to 60% on November of each ANSP are submitted at the autumn 1975. In October 1981, the rate rose to CRCO enlarged committee2 for approval 100%. 2 The Enlarged Committee for Route Charges The principles for establishing the supervises the operation of the route charges system and route charge base and the principles for reports to the EUROCONTROL enlarged Commission via the Provisional Council. It determines the principles for calculating unit rates are detailed in the establishing the costs incurred by States in respect of en- EUROCONTROL document “Principles for route services and determines the common rules for establishing the cost-base for en route calculating the route charges. EUROCONTROL’s Member States are all represented, as are airspace user organisations.

Page 10/32 and in year N + 1, the CRCO collects the Baumgartner, Matthias Finger Utilities fees with a global periodic invoice per Policy, 31, 289–301. airline and pays each ANSP its due. All major intergovernmental Depending on the reality of traffic and costs, initiatives in Europe to modernize ATM there is an adjustment in year N + 2. have been triggered by major crises So, for 50 years and until the crisis, affecting the travelling public, and thus one of the advantages of this collection of politicizing the issue. The Balkan War in charges by the CRCO is that if an aircraft 1999 was a major crisis for European operator has not paid the amount due, aviation, and airspace users complained measures may be decided to enforce because delays in 1999 were 30 percent recovery, with obligation for the contracting higher than in normal times. states to implement these measures, The Commission commented on the including, as the last resort, blocking flights delay situation and indicated that there was of the defaulting operator on departure. a need to act in order to permit the The single European sky (see below) management of the airspace, regardless of legislation introduced a novel approach to the countries’ borders (EC COM 614/1999, cost efficiency target setting mechanism and “The creation of a Single European Sky” a new risk sharing mechanism was SES). introduced. SES States/ANSPs operate The SES was progressively under the determined costs method which implemented in three steps, namely SES I comprises specific risk-sharing (2004), SES II (2009) and an unsuccessful arrangements aiming at incentivising attempt to go further in 20013 with the so- ANSPs economic performance. As part of called SES IIþ package. the determined costs method, the costs planned for the reference period (RP) are set The SES is accompanied by an in advance and frozen for the length of the ambitious technological deployment RP. If actual costs are lower than the roadmap, called DEPLOY, which later determined costs, then the State/ANSP can became SESAME, and still later SESAR. keep the difference. On the contrary, if actual costs are higher than determined, then 1.5.1 Single European Sky I (2004) the State/ANSP must bear a loss. This This package took the form of four mechanism provides incentives for regulations, namely (a) EC Regulation States/ANSPs to effectively control their 549/2004, which laid down the framework costs and to flexibly adapt to unforeseen for the creation of the SES (the so-called changes in traffic volumes. (ACE report Framework Regulation), (b) EC Regulation 2017) 550/2004 on the provision of air navigation services (ANSs) in the SES (the Service 1.5 The Single European sky was a Provision Regulation), (c) EC Regulation legislative attempt of the 551/2004, on the organization and use of European Commission to airspace in the SES, including the creation reform ATC in Europe of so-called Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) (the Airspace Regulation), and (d) The Single European sky was a EC Regulation 552/2004, on the legislative attempt of the European interoperability of the European Air Traffic Commission to reform ATC in Europe. Management network (the Interoperability Regulation). More details can be found in For technology, a Single European The Single European Sky gridlock: A Sky ATM Research (SESAR) master plan difficult 10 year reform process, Marc was drawn up, whereas for safety, the

Page 11/32

European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 1.5.2 Single European Sky II (2009) was declared responsible. This package identified fragmentation Moreover, when initiating the SES, as the major bottleneck in improving the Mrs Loyola de Palacio, who was at that time performance of the European aviation vice-president of the EC in charge of system. Transport, considered that the development of a common foreign and security policy The SES II package puts the delivery within the EU had provided opportunities of the SES under the overarching objective for organizing the involvement of the of performance, and is now structured into military. five pillars, namely (a) technology with SESAR as its key element, (b) a legislative The intention was to assess the real pillar, which sets a target date for the impact of military operations on civil air implementation of the FABs and creates the traffic, as well as to better understand the role of the network manager attributed to military requirements and needs (Fartek and EUROCONTROL, (c) safety of ATM and 3 Rivet, 2011). The involvement of national Communication Navigation Surveillance defence representatives within the EC (CNS) attributed to EASA, (d) the airport working structures was an important step pillar, and (e) a cross-cutting human factor forward, yet it was premature. Indeed, the pillar vision was too advanced, and the member states remained reluctant to establish a link Even if this aspect was already between civil and military ATC. prominently mentioned in the so-called “Performance Report” dated 2006, through As with all other sectors, the EC EC Regulation 1070/2009, the foundation periodically reviews the application of its for an increased performance in ATM was actions (EC COM 845/2007 final, “First laid, with Implementing Rule (EU) report on the implementation of the Single 691/2010 establishing a performance Sky Legislation: achievements and the way scheme for ANSs and network functions forward”). under the responsibility of the PRB. Consequently, it requested the newly For the performance reference period created Performance Review Commission starting 1 January 2012 and ending 31 (PRC) to assist in this evaluation. The PRC December 2014, the EU-wide performance delivered its report in December 2006, targets are as follows: recommending, among other things, acceleration of the FABs, corresponding • Environment target: an 0.75 increase technology development (SESAR), as well of the average horizontal en-route as empowering EUROCONTROL, flight efficiency indicator in 2014, as especially in its pan-European functions and compared to the situation in 2009; ATM network design. As a result, the • Capacity target: an improvement of Commission proposed, in 2009, an SES II the average en-route ATFM delay so package. as to reach a maximum of 0.5 min per flight in 2014; • Cost-efficiency target: a reduction of the average EU-wide determined unit rate for en-route ANSs from 59.97

3 Fartek G., Rivet F., The Introduction of EUR in 2011 to 53.92 EUR in 2014 Military Dimension into the SES: A new Paradigm (expressed in real terms, EUR 2009), for the European Commission, in Achieving the with intermediate annual values of Single European Sky: Goals and Challenges, Editors 57.88 EUR in 2012 and 55.87 EUR in Daniel Calleja Crespo and Pablo Mendes de Leon, 2013. Wolters Kluwer ISBN 978-90-411-3730-2 Amsterdam 2011

Page 12/32

There will be a second reference euros are wasted annually due to period (RP2), starting January 2015 and inefficiency. lasting until the end of 2019 (EC COM On 11 June, 2013 the EC published 390/2013 article 8). COM 408/2013, “Accelerating the The PRB has published a implementation Single European Sky”, or comprehensive (http:// www.eurocontrol.in) SES IIþ. The proposed regulation (EC COM advice to the Commission on the setting of 2013/410 e COD 213/186) further aims to EU-wide performance targets for RP2. remove the fragmentation of the European ATM system by enabling industrial 1.5.3 Towards SES IIb (2013) partnerships (namely in FABs) and The plan for SES II plus was explicitly reinforcing the role of the network manager. stated by Commissioner Siim Kallas in his The European Parliament did not speech in Limassol in October 2012, entitled pursue this proposal. “10 years and still not delivering”. Some of the implementation He noted that Commission Decision of regulations were adapted (Performance and 21 February 2011, setting the European Charging 2018 check details) and the Union-wide performance targets and alert Performance Review Body saw a new set up thresholds for the provision of air navigation which was independent from services for the years 2012-2014 (OJ L 48, EUROCONTROL'S PRC (on the ex-post February 23 2011, p. 16). the targets, evaluation of the Single European Sky especially in matters of costs and delays, Performance and Charging Schemes in have not been reached and that five billion Reference Period 1 and first year of Reference Period 2.).

2. The current situation proceedings have been initiated 2.1 SES did not achieve its initial against 23 Member States”. objectives as acknowledged by several official reports • The European Court of Auditors (ECA) conducted an evaluation of the In 2015 the EU institutions decided to SES and issued the Special report n° conduct an evaluation of the SES 11/2019 “the EU’s regulation for the implementation: modernisation of air traffic management has added value – but the • The SES unit itself organised a funding was largely unnecessary” workshop (05/05/2015) on this highlighting that: subject and issued a report to the parliament (16/12/2015) both It must be recognised that if efforts to highlighting that “the FAB operational accommodate demand are not objectives have not been achieved successful and airspace congestion regarding the optimisation of airspace continues, not only would this have a and resources, which in turn detrimental effect on passengers and generates inefficiencies in the entire other stakeholders. European air traffic management The fact that the European ATM system and extra costs of close to €5 system comprises a patchwork of billion a year. These costs are passed national ATM systems operated by on to airlines and their customers and national ANSPs means that result in increased journey times, interoperability and network efficiency delays and emissions. Infringement is a serious challenge.

Page 13/32

The SESAR programme has delivered 2.2.1 Lack of political strength to face new concepts and technologies but diverging interests of the actors involved: this has not translated into technology Basically, there are too many actors uptake at a sufficiently rapid pace, involved, with too diverging interests to find partly due to the challenge of common ground for agreement. availability of the required standards. The SES has contributed to • one must consider the following two incremental improvements in the underlying factors, which are performance and modernisation of the preventing speedy realization of the European ATM sector but because it SES: Some states have seen the SES does not take sufficient account of the initiative as a direct attack on their state interdependencies has not generated sovereignty and in particular the need the expected paradigm change in for the National State (under article 28 terms of performance by ANSPs and Chicago Convention) to take ultimate has not sufficiently reduced legal liability for Air Traffic fragmentation of the European ATM management over its sovereign system airspace. This has resulted in very lukewarm responses by the national In short, while the EC had been quite states when changes were proposed by successful at liberalizing air transport, and the EC to delegate more decisions somewhat successful at regulating access to power away from the national state to airports, it is currently in gridlock when it the European Commission and its comes to realizing the Single European Sky, possible associated Agencies (e.g., which is a centrepiece in overall air EASA). transport liberalization and performance. • ownership of the ANSPs: ANSPs are either fully or partly owned by nation 2.2 The reasons for this gridlock states, which have few incentives to As highlighted at the Budapest Air change this context, given that they Forum: Single European Sky, the way benefit from the ANSPs’ revenues. forward 9 November 2018 in the Fundamentally, the airspace users presentation “The Single European Sky – (airlines) and the EC are the only actors who why is its implementation late?” by Marc have a clear interest in the SES. However, Baumgartner: the airlines have diverging interests and the The reasons of why the SES Commission appears to be too weak to implementation is late. First, there exists impose its vision, given in particular the diverging interests of the actors, which are power and the interests of the manufacturers fighting for power. Second, EC has become and the member states. Indeed, the a micro-technical regulator instead of policy aggregate interest of these member states is maker. Third, institutional fragmentation not in favour of the creation of an SES, has been created and increases and considering the interests of their ANSPs, the investments continues into old technologies. unions, the airports and the military. Moreover, the current route charging 2.2.2 EC has become a micro-and mechanism hinders the network-centric technical regulator instead of policy approach. Yet, there needs to be a change in maker the business model of the manufacturing industry. Technical and operational issues have been addressed by legislation at political level instead of being developed in a harmonized and technical and operational

Page 14/32 level. Two significant examples can be This objective of defragmentation has mentioned: been at the heart of the European agenda, since the creation of EUROCONTROL, and • The introduction of Controller Pilot reinforced by the EC since the beginning of Datalink (CPDLC) has mandated an old the 2000’s with a sequence of legislative technology with known performance packages as explained in previous chapters. limitations instead of moving to the next generation of available technology Unfortunately, due to diverging the users were forced to invest in interests and despite several attempts, the retrofitting a new fleet of aircraft with a path towards this de-fragmentation has not e.g. a new digital technology delivered as expected, and the system is now • The EC has mandate Free Route facing fundamental issues: Airspace without addressing the • The technological infrastructure is underlying elements of revenue streams expensive (30% higher costs in Europe which might be lost for the national than the FAA in the USA), obsolete ANSP. With the introduction of a new (the technologies of the European charging regime (actual route flown and system have evolved only slightly, and not the filed Flight plan route) is are obsolete with regard to the state of hindering an efficient deployment of the art in the digital field), and has such a free route airspace suffered major failures in terms of 2.2.3 Unproductive use of EU funds modernization. cemented fragmentation and • Even if there is an operationally perpetuation of old technologies competent Network Manager, When SESAR Joint Undertaking was regulatory weakness prevents it from created the idea was to pool the research being truly effective. This has been funds of the European Union for the ATM particularly visible when the traffic sector. EU Funds were made available and a grew in 2017-2019 and the delays roadmap (ATM Masterplan) was created to exploded. modernize the ATM technology. A SESAR • The institutional level has become more deployment manager composed of industry complex and fragmented with the was created by the European Commission to inherent problem of efficiency distribute the research funds into selected (governance, political decision- Pilot Common Projects. Instead of working making), and additional costs. together for the deployment of new technology the funds were used to upgrade • The performance approach had national systems and sometimes old unforeseen counter-productive effects. technology (see TRAN committee report on 2.3.1 An inefficient technological SESAR). This has led to an increased infrastructure fragmentation of the service delivery as the funds used to improve the national systems Technological infrastructure covers increased the barriers to interoperability. the three segments C, N and S (Communication Navigation Surveillance) 2.3 The gridlock is detrimental to as well as ATM systems: European air transport • Communication: this infrastructure is The situation as presented in previous made up of Ground-to-Ground chapters can be considered as shared by all networks (mainly data and voice aviation stakeholders: the European ATM networks between control centres, but system is a too fragmented system unable to also between centres and Radars, Radio meet its operational, financial, and now Antennas, etc.) and Ground-to-Air environmental performance objectives. networks (data and voice

Page 15/32

communication between aircraft and systems (Collaborative Decision control centres). With a rapidly growing Making CDM, ….) and finally at airline extension of communications between level with ATM systems in support of aircraft and AOCs -Airline Operations operations in AOCs. Centres-, as well as dedicated passenger communications, these three segments are currently segregated but must be The consequences in terms of ATM considered globally in view of the system performance are far from negligible: possible synergies. • At the economic level, the comparison • Navigation: means of navigation in between the European ATM system and support of aircraft (excluding on-board systems in other geographical areas, equipment) such as landing aids (ILS, shows that for equivalent operational MLS, GBAS, etc.) or means of complexity the costs of this navigation en-route and in the approach technological infrastructure are 30% zone (VOR -DME, GNSS, ...) higher in Europe compared to the FAA in the USA. • Surveillance: whether dependent, ie requiring cooperation from the aircraft • Another aspect, that is also an economic (secondary radar, ADS-B, cooperative problem, is the waste of spectrum. The multi-lateration, etc.) or non-dependent, aviation sector is taking advantage of its ie without interaction with the aircraft requirements in terms of safety, to (primary radar, multi- active or passive block a spectrum of frequencies valued non-cooperative multi-lateration…). commercially and financially at For all 3 domains C, N and S, the amounts largely exceeding the means of infrastructure was until the 90s essentially aviation. The technologies used are well ground-based, the use of satellite resources below current technological standards developed considerably in the last 30 years and we can anticipate an increasing and will continue to develop, in a pressure to release frequencies or to complementary way, or even as interesting make aviation pay, at market price, the alternatives, both in terms of economy and cost of using these frequencies. performance (ADS-B by satellite by • Disconnect between ground and AIREON, Ground-on-board communication airborne technology. Rules, procedures, via various services such as Iridium, etc, have not evolved with time and Inmarsat, etc.). have not been adapted to the technology available. For instance, when a VOR is • ATM systems: cover the systems out of service, ATCOs must necessary for the work of Air Traffic communicate that information and take Controllers (ATCO). Historically, they mitigation measures such as telling were limited to the systems in the aircraft to hold somewhere else, while control centres (Radar Processing all aircraft are flying RNAV and could Systems, Flight Plan Processing or continue navigating as planned despite processing of ancillary information - VOR breakdown. e.g., Weather, AIM / NOTAM, as well as Controller workstations). Nowadays, • Rigidity of the system in Europe: the many interconnected systems contribute proliferation of equipment and their to air traffic control, such as centralized heterogeneity make the possibilities for systems at European level (Initial Flight pan-European evolution more complex. data Processing System - IFPS, This is due to: Network Management Systems -NMS, ◦ the obligation to synchronize European Aeronautical Database, deployments while each ANSP puts EAD,..), but also Airport management forward its own priorities that are

Page 16/32

rarely compatible with each other. performance (we therefore manage to do This is particularly true in the case less well for more money). The two most of difficulties experienced by obvious cases are: systems renewal programs which put the finalization of their • surveillance where over-equipment at development as a first priority over ground level leads to over-interrogation any other development (we can site of on-board systems far beyond the as example 4Flight in France as maximums provided for in the “Safety mentioned in the Report from cases” of these systems. French senator M. Vincent CAPO- • Weather forecast (or even nowcast). It CANELLAS). is noticeable that weather has more and ◦ the additional cost of deployments more impact on the delay in summer due to the need to upgrade as many season. Recent PRR report (PRR2017) systems as there are ANSPs in showed that there is no standard how to Europe. cope with weather. Nearly all states have mandated the ANSP to get the This prevents the systems from being weather data from the national weather adapted to the changes that are service, preventing any kind of operationally necessary, at an affordable European wide weather forecast. This cost, even though these changes have fragmentation is detrimental on the way been demonstrated to be technically the ATM system is managing adverse possible. We can clearly see the weather situations especially in terms of consequences in the difficulties of delay. deploying the solutions developed and validated within the framework of 2.3.2 A toothless Network Manager SESAR. As already mentioned, this The main mission of the Network sub-optimal deployment was also Manager (NM) is to find the optimal balance strongly underlined by the "European between the capacity of the system and the Court of Auditors" (ECA) in its 2019 demand coming from the Airspace Users report on the deployment of SESAR. (mainly the airlines but also the business • Weaknesses in systems interoperability, aviation and Military Air Force). Another detrimental to operational efficiency: mission related to this Demand Capacity Balancing (DCB) management is crisis ◦ data exchange between Control management (e.g., the Eyjafjallajökull Centres are based on technologies volcano crisis). and protocols dating from the 80’s, This search for the optimum is carried ◦ the flight plan format which, even if out continuously at 3 timescales: upgraded in 2012, is still based on extremely limited data exchanges, • Strategic (from 3 years to 6 months not allowing all the information before the actual flight) available in airline systems to be exchanged with ATM systems, • Pre-tactical (from 6 months to the which could contribute to a morning of operations) significant improvement in the • Tactical (just before - a few hours - and processing of ATM systems, in during the flight) particular in terms of flight This function is based on a technical trajectory forecasting. infrastructure made up of a set of powerful Finally, it should be emphasized that modelling, simulation, and optimization this fragmentation leads in some cases to a tools, as well as of a very significant data deterioration in technical and operational warehouse enabling the most accurate

Page 17/32 demand forecast at the different timescales commonly the most appropriate mentioned above. The analysis is then measures. reflected in the Network Operation Plan • At tactical phase: up to the mid 2000’s (NOP) and the NOP Gateway which is the the sole tool available was to allocate reference tool to support collaboration in all slots for take-off and thus to impose the three phases. ground delays to the airlines. These At each of these timescales, NM slots were allocated two hours before estimates when and where there is a risk of take-off, to allow users to be able to imbalances between demand and capacity manage the consequences of these and takes measures to reduce these delays. R&D in the 2000’s based on the imbalances, or if this is not possible to experience of the US FAA Air Traffic minimize operational impacts. Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) showed that this allocation The measures available to the network of slots two hours before take-off was operator are largely specific to each phase: sub-optimal (due to the many events • At the strategic phase: using the tools that may happen during these two mentioned above, the network manager hours). As a consequence, new more establishes the best forecast of demand dynamic methods have progressively (by city pairs, by time slots) as well as been designed and deployed, reducing the capacity of the system (airport, use of ground delays in favour of airspace, etc.). In the event of an tactical measures just before take-off imbalance, the Network Manager (some minutes delays or slight route assesses the possible measures (mainly changes) or in flight (flight level the optimization of the airspace design: capping, dynamic rerouting, speed - route network, military areas, control, management by flows, slot sectorization, delegation of airspace, swapping…). All these dynamic etc.) and negotiates with all the players measures requiring specific CDMs (mainly ANSPs, airports and military), between all actors involved (Airlines, the best measures to adapt capacity to Military, Airport, ANSPs) in a specific demand. If this is not possible identified hot-spot. (generally for particular periods of All these measures are fundamentally heavy traffic such as major sport events, based on the technical infrastructure and or particular tourist periods) a availability of data at the level of the Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) Network Manager but also Collaborative process with Airspace users and Decision Making requiring a global win-win providers is engaged to find the less spirit. Unfortunately, Air Transport is highly damaging options on demand. competitive at the level of airlines, and to a • At pre-tactical phase: the main tool is a lesser, but non-negligible extent, at ANSP CDM between actors, with measures level (mainly due to the performance easier to implement (sector opening approach and the strong pressure to protect scheme, balance between military needs national Airports Hubs and Airlines). This and the civil needs with adapted sometimes hampers the implementation of a opening scheme of military reserved global optimum (it is a well-known problem areas, reduction of demand to cope with that the global optimum is not the sum of reduction of runway capacity is case of local optima). bad weather...). The ultimate case is to Since the Network Manager does not organise a dedicated conference with have the legal power to impose solutions, actors concerned by specific there are situations where no compromise is congestions (e.g. weekly conference found, leading to sub-optimal situations for during summer 2019) to decide the European Network.

Page 18/32

This is particularly true for Airspace 2.3.3 A fragmentation at institutional design at the strategic phase where there are level well known cross-border hotspots where the While the two SES legislative optimal solution at European level would packages were intended to strengthen generate some losers and some winners European management of ATM, this (even if limited to impact on route charges). actually resulted in the reverse with an over- This equally exists at pre-tactical and complexified and fragmented institutional tactical phases. landscape of the European ATM system. Problems also exist at a data level, The following diagram schematically where some actors are reluctant to share represents the current landscape, essentially their data (here also to preserve own based on a clear delineation between interests against potential perceived regulatory functions and services: competitors).

Figure 2: from a slide made by Pierre Andribet for DASC conference 5 years ago in Prague

With for the regulatory functions a services (such as the Network Manager) separation between: which are certified by EASA. • the development of regulations: And for the Service provision: formally under the responsibility of the • National Air Navigation Service European Commission (EC) but providers, generally one per state, practically delegated to the European which provides the following services Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) which to airspace users: develops “opinion” which are then ◦ Air Traffic Management (ATM) enforced as regulation by the European ◦ Communication navigation and Commission following its normal surveillance systems (CNS) comitology process. In these functions, ◦ Meteorological service for air both the EC and EASA rely partially on navigation (MET) EUROCONTROL expertise. ◦ Search and rescue (SAR) • the certification process, which is under ◦ Aeronautical information services/ the responsibility of the EU states, Aeronautical information which are required to delegate this management (AIS/AIM). power to independent entities called A variety of organisation types exist National Supervisory Authorities for ANSPs, from part of governmental (NSA), except for Pan-European administration to a purely private company.

Page 19/32

A majority of ANSPs are state-owned independent, allowing economy of scale companies. and an optimised management of Airspace. Instead, it has led to the • Exceptionally, some of these services creation of an additional unproductive are provided at a multinational level: layer between the Network Manager ◦ Maastricht Upper ATC Centre and individual ANSPs (Over time it has (MUAC) provided by become more and more silent and thus EUROCONTROL to control upper just useless). airspace of Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg and part of • the Performance Review Board, an Germany) independent entity in charge of defining ◦ GSSP to provide enhanced GNSS performance objectives and monitoring service (Navigation service) at performance on behalf of the European European level using the EGNOS Commission. This should be replaced system by an independent economic regulator. ◦ AIREON providing satellite based • the SESAR Joint Undertaking (with EC ADSB service (Surveillance and EUROCONTROL as co-founders service) and 19 selected industrial partners) in ◦ ARINC and SITA providing charge of maintaining the ATM Master Datalink service (communication Plan, and of coordinating and co- service) funding the R&D assessed as necessary • The Network Manager, a pan-European to implement this Master Plan. service provided by EUROCONTROL • EASA with an extended mandate of the as described above. basic regulation gained competence in

the field of ATM/ANS in 2018 (EU In addition to this complex landscape, 2018/1139). we should add some key actors with: Even it is not the model to follow, this • The FABs which were initially institutional setup should be compared to the proposed to group national ANSPs in significantly simpler landscape in USA as bigger entities that were operationally depicted in following picture:

Figure 3: from a slide made by Pierre Andribet for DASC conference 5 years ago in Prague

With an administrative (called in being part of the same administration (The Europe: Functional) separation between the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA) regulator and the service provider, but both

Page 20/32

2.3.4 A counter-productive performance Moreover, he indicated that FABs approach had not been fully implemented because, in This was particularly true with the economic terms, there was no incentive to way the objectives on costs were handled adopt them or penalty for not doing so. with harmful effects blocking the required Penalising ANSPs for not delivering increase in staff recruitment, which was optimal capacity was a solution also nevertheless necessary to cope with the proposed by IATA (2018) in response to a resumption of traffic in 2017. This was also growth in summer delays of over 130 true when the requirement to overhaul the percent compared with 2017. project completely for RP3 for reasons of Moreover, Finger and Serafimova COVID has highlighted the weaknesses and (2019) indicate that the financing and fragility of the current set up during a crisis incentives (or conversely, penalties) must be situation. performance- and objective-based, with a In addition, (Njoya et al., 2020 ) firm commitment from the Member States Button (2019) as cited in Finger and to make appropriate investments. Serafimova (2019) pointed out at the 10th Florence Air Forum that the problems with FABs are indicative of the lack of incentives.

3. Where do we go from here?

3.1 A Wise Person Group to shape • reinforce the accountability of the SESAR JU; the future • prioritize EU support to R&D In the ECA report already mentioned, solutions that promote the auditors developed some defragmentation and a competitive recommendations: environment.

The EU’s regulation for the modernisation of air traffic Following this report and management has added value – but the recommendations, in 2019, the European funding was largely unnecessary Commission (DG MOVE) created a Wise which issued the following Persons Group (Report of the Wise Persons recommendations: Group on the future of the Single European Sky 2019) and tasked this group to reflect The Commission should: on the future of the Single European Sky • review the SES high level goals; (SES) to produce recommendations for the • analyse other policy options direction that European ATM should take, in targeting defragmentation; order to deliver better performance and • ensure full independence and better services while taking into account the capacity of NSAs and cover the continuous growth of air traffic. inspection gap at the level of the The 15 members of this group charging scheme; produced the following recommendations. • streamline the performance These recommendations could easily be scheme; seen as the roadmap for the European • review certain key performance Commission for the future of Single indicators; European Sky. • review the EU’s support structure The recommendations were: to R&D in light of its objectives; A network-centric approach

Page 21/32

◦ Recommendation 1: Confirm and full involvement of staff strengthen EUROCONTROL representatives. Network Manager role by Simplifying the regulatory providing it with the necessary framework executive powers to manage the ATM network, including by ◦ Recommendation 7: Simplify and managing European capacity strengthen economic regulation, and infrastructure based on while relying on a market-driven standardized technology, while approach wherever possible. ensuring a clear division of ◦ Recommendation 8: Establish a responsibilities between the strong, independent and Network Manager and ANSPs. technically competent economic ◦ Recommendation 2: Fully regulator at European level. integrate airports into the ◦ Recommendation 9: Establish a network on the basis of linking Seamless European (Upper) the Network Operations Plan Airspace System including a and Airport Operation Plans, common route charge. using extensive Collaborative ◦ Recommendation 10: Encourage Decision Making. airports to procure tower Implementation of a digital services through competitive European sky tender or contract, where operationally feasible and ◦ Recommendation 3: Implement a positively impacting users Digital European Sky based on an agreed roadmap building on the recommendations described in the Airspace Architecture 3.2 The EC legislative proposal to Study, managed by the implement these ambitions Infrastructure Manager, Following the recommendations from ensuring resilience of the system. the Wise Persons Group, the European ◦ Recommendation 4: Create a Commission initiated in the second half of new market for ATM data service 2019, the process to develop a legislative providers as recommended by package to amend SES accordingly. The the Airspace Architecture Study. objective was to launch consultation in ◦ Recommendation 5: Use the 2020. performance and charging Unfortunately, the COVID-19 crisis scheme to support the happened. The revenues of ANSPs digitalisation of air traffic collapsed, and if there was no obligation to services, and public funding to ensure the continuity of air traffic control, support deployment only where European ANSPs would have gone necessary from a network bankrupt. Short term actions as described in perspective. chapter 1, needed to be taken. This delayed Evolving role for people the development of the planned legislative delivering the ATM services revision of SES. ◦ Recommendation 6: Facilitate The European Commission took on the transition towards the Digital board the impact of this crisis, and the latest European Sky by reviewing environmental priorities as expressed in the current licensing and training new European Green Deal4, and decided to requirements for ATCOs, with 4 European Commission, “The ‐ COM(2019) 640 final,” 12 2019.

Page 22/32 progress in the process of amending SES the correct application of regulations at the end of 2020 summer. In procurement requirements of the EC press release ‘Single European Sky: CNS, AIS, ADS, MET and for a more sustainable and resilient air terminal ATS services, and traffic management’ Commissioner for certifying these services vis-à-vis Transport, Adina Vălean, declared: “Planes performances regulation, and are sometimes zig-zagging between different monitoring en-route services blocks of airspace, increasing delays and performances. fuel consumed. An efficient air traffic 3. Strengthened role of the Network management system means more direct manager. routes and less energy used, leading to less emissions and lower costs for our airlines 4. Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) should no longer be regulated, The European commission published on the 22nd of September 2020 the amended 5. Unbundling of CNS, AIS and ADS proposal for a regulation on the infrastructures, and of MET and implementation of the Single European terminal ATS services, subject to Sky,5 and the proposal for a regulation market conditions. amending Regulation 2018/1139 as regards 6. a possibility of introducing a common the capacity of EASA to act as Performance unit rate for en-route air traffic Review Body of the Single European Sky. services across the Single European The main points of this proposal are: Sky airspace, with a focus on "clean technology" and modularity to foster 1. New approach to the performance investments. The unit rates should be scheme with an independent PRB set by the NSAs, rather than by agency (hosted by EASA) in charge of Member States, after verification and assessing and approving the approval of the Agency acting as PRB. performance plans for en-route air Possible modulation of charges to navigation services. incentivise implementation of new technologies (decision at EU level) 2. There should be now two national entities clearly delineated and 7. common information services for independent from the service provider: unmanned aircraft (i.e. drones) The ambition remains the same as the • NCA National Competent Authority 2013 proposal: The main objective of the in charge of safety oversight 2013 SES2+ proposal was to (SWD (safety certification of service 20201871-SES) “improve the providers) and other tasks competitiveness of the European aviation described in the EASA Basic system vis-à-vis other comparable regions, Regulation. and in particular developing further the SES • NSA National Supervisory initiative, which implies de-fragmenting the Authorities in charge of issuing European airspace, reducing delays, economic certificates, overseeing increasing safety standards and flight efficiency as to reduce the environmental footprint of aviation and the costs related to 5 For a better understanding of the proposal service provision. two documents are worth mentioning: Questions & answers – Single European That same objective should be Sky: for an efficient and sustainable air traffic maintained, with an even greater emphasis management on delay reduction and flight efficiency, in Commission staff working document ‘A order to contribute to reducing aviation’s fresh look at the Single European Sky’ carbon footprint, while maintaining the

Page 23/32 goals of cost-efficiency and de- independence from providers and economic fragmentation. Safety in ATM is a regulator. paramount constant objective and is being The rest of this legislative proposal by effectively addressed and managed under the European Commission is a step forward, Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (‘EASA Basic but, the authors of this paper believe that it Regulation’) and at national level. Clear will not be sufficient to solve the latent links between the two Regulations should issues that the COVID crisis has therefore be established”. dramatically underlined. Whilst the political discussions on the This paper is therefore proposing a EC proposal for a SES 2+ legislative step even further in terms of proposal have started in the Council and defragmentation, that would require Parliament, the proposal has highlighted the significant organisational changes of the divergence of views of the Airlines and user European ATM system, mainly along the six organisation (IATA 2020) on the one side following axes: and the Air Navigation Service Provider Community (CANSO 2020). TThe proposed • A stronger political decision maker, recast fails to create a common agreed and with significantly increased transfer shared vision and many of the proposal by of competence to the EC in the ATM the EC are not actually proposing a reform domain, of the sector, but rather a request for more • A Network Manager with stronger competence at the European Level versus power in terms of Airspace design the national competence in the matter of Air and capacity management. Traffic Control. The proposal does as well • A defragmentation of Air Navigation put the Economic Regulator at EASA and Service provisions. Even though the therefore blurs the line between safety, Functional Airspace Blocks finally certification and economical regulation. failed, the rationales behind their Even if a functional separation for the creation are still valid, and it is more performance regulator is proposed, it the implementation (bottom-up nevertheless blurs the lines of the approach) that should be revised. independence. The SES 2+ recast legislative • An infrastructure manager not only proposal is a proposal for more competence in charge of the management of pan- been handed to the EC and has the potential European programmes, but also to delay the much needed reform of the responsible for standardisation (in ATM sector. cooperation with industry through standardisation bodies such as 3.3 The authors’ proposal for a EUROCAE but not limited to) and transition towards a pan gradually taking over the overall European ATC with procurement at European level of the EUROCONTROL reinvented ATM/CNS infrastructure according to the market rules, including the As explained in previous chapters, the deployment of new data-services. new initiative from the European • A strengthened R&D setup for Commission is a step forward, in line with Europe, more agile, less bureaucratic the recommendations from the ECA report and facilitating innovations in a and of the Wise Person Group conclusions. significantly more digital In particular, in terms of safety, the current environment. position of EASA and the National • A real pan-European Performance Competent Authorities (NCA) has proven its Manager with expertise allowing for efficiency and will be further strengthened a holistic approach towards with the new proposal requiring full performance regulation.

Page 24/32

• Putting the Network Manager in a position to manage the capacity 3.3.1 A stronger political decision maker brokering process, including the Policy decisions made in Europe possibility to facilitate delegation of should be based on a clear transfer of Airspace. competence from the states on certain areas. To go further, the Network Manager Its role should not be limited to regulations should be empowered with four key pan- development and to co-funding of national European roles: projects, but should cover following roles: • Airspace Manager: allowing a Top- • the focal point for ICAO with the down Airspace design to avoid support of the Network Manager and current lose – lose fights at the well- of the infrastructure manager. known hot-spots. • A decision maker for route charges • Capacity manager: based on pan- (modulations, unique en-route route European DCB analysis, decision on charges). the best measures for a better • Owner of a binding master plan balance including mandatory which is no longer the repository of delegation of airspace from all technical ideas coming from all congested ANSPs to less congested actors, but a tool to give a strong neighbouring ANSPs. direction on the targeted system in • Control Command centre role: terms of organisation and similar to the role performed in the modernisation, and the transition US by the Air Traffic Control steps to implement this target using System Command Center with a new technology to create a single final say on dynamic Demand standard. Capacity Balancing measures. • Owner of the overall investment • Weather forecast, both in term of plan. technical system with a centralised approach (as currently done by the The issue of the geographical scope of US ATCSCC) to ensure a coherent EU, especially in the context of information available for all should be addressed. Possible solutions operators (from airlines to ANSPs could be: and Airports) and to organise an • Two-layered governance: efficient Collaborative Decision- intergovernmental (ECTL Council) Making approach to cope with at a pan-European level and an EC adverse weather (especially in decision maker for EU states, summer during strong convective • Aviation agreement with non-EU situations) states to centralise at an EC level pan-European dimension. 3.3.3 A defragmentation of Air Navigation Service provisions 3.3.2 A more powerful Network The failure of the Functional Airspace manager Blocks should not prevent any kind of The recent regulation proposes to optimisation of the service provision reinforce the role of the Network Manager organisation, considering that current mainly in two aspects which is already a fragmentation is sub-optimal (too many good step forward: ANSPs below the critical size). • Making the Network Operation Plan New models should be investigated: binding for all service providers,

Page 25/32

• A single service provider for Europe, pan-European implementation programme reinventing the vision of the (such as RVSM 20 years ago). This would founders of EUROCONTROL. solve the issue underlined by the ECA • Top down design of ACCs concerning the SESAR Deployment (operationally meaningful) with programme that did not permit the designated ANSPs with possible implementation of the solutions developed periodic competition (would need by SJU and is widely considered as separation of the infrastructure promising. manager of service) a common This regulation also foresees a ground-to-ground network with a separation between operational services and gate-to-gate perspective. technical services considering that the later should be subject to market competition, but 3.3.4 A real pan-European Performance only as an option and leaving the final Manager decision at a national level. The reform of the performance The authors of the paper consider that scheme proposed by the recent legislative this would be insufficient to solve the package, with an equivalent position current inefficiencies identified above, due between a central, independent and powerful to fragmentation. They recommend that all Economical Regulator agency (hosted by the CNS/ATM infrastructure should be EASA) and national Supervisory authorities managed at pan-European level to achieve a seems theoretically achievable, provided real improvement to the current system. This that this PRB and NSA are fully will become important in the coming years, independent from any providers, and from in particular to accommodate the new safety regulation. It will, however, must pass airspace users such as drones (at low, a revision of the EASA's Basic regulation medium and very high altitude). In order to and will have to start from scratch as it does face the challenges of the newcomers, the not have any data, nor has the staff to incumbent (current ATM system) will have provide the needed expertise and it will to adapt in a harmonised way. reduce to a limited geographical scope. Instead of starting from scratch it would Several options are possible for this make much more sense to build the future overall management of the CNS independent economic regulator around the infrastructure. There are two principal expertise of the Performance Review Unit possibilities: (PRU) and the performance Datawarehouse • The first option and the easiest one to of EUROCONTROL. A mixed committee progressively implement would be to for the governance of the independent move from a model of purchasing regulator shall include EU and non-EU specific solutions by each ANSPs to EUROCONTROL Member States. common procurement of preferably off The proposed scope of the future the shelf” products. It can be economic regulator introduces a new emphasized that this is the model fragmentation of performance and shifts followed by airlines, which rely entirely safety into the field of "resilience on aircraft manufacturers to define performance". This will be a challenging products. The obvious advantages undertaking as the interdependencies would be a reduction in costs by between the various Key Performance Areas promoting reuse, but also would allow have not been catered for. manufacturers to invest in innovation, which is a marker of differentiation. 3.3.5 A real infrastructure manager Finally, the existence of European The recent regulation foresees this role standards deployed in Europe at an should be limited to the management of the

Page 26/32

operational level would help the export loss of sovereignty over a critical area of European industrial products. and the risk of resistance by the • A more ambitious option, but with technical services currently in charge greater benefits, would be to see the of these missions. CNS infrastructure as a service and no longer as an investment. This is partly Until now for ATM systems, included in the recent regulation but standardisation and interoperability have only at a national level, while this paper been considered as the solution. On paper, considers that real benefits will appear the current relationship between ICAO only if this is applied at a pan-European defining high level orientations and level. This applies to all of the CNS RTCA/EUROCAE working together to domain, for example: refine the standards before they are endorsed ◦ For surveillance, the regrouping of by ICAO is correct. However, in reality it the entirety of surveillance does not work as it is a purely bottom-up infrastructure (Radars, and also the approach with ANSPs using the EUROCAE multi-lateration infrastructure, ADS tool to prevent any attempts that would B , etc..) to the infrastructure defragment the system. It was claimed that Manager (transfer of ownership and interoperability standards (IOP) would be financial compensation to be sufficient. 15 years later, if we look at the defined), would allow optimisation results however, they have spent tens of of this infrastructure including a millions of Euros (hundreds?) with at the progressive transfer to a service end a failure and no implementation in sight. oriented contract (maintaining possible competition where Therefore, we suggest three necessary but in an optimal manner possibilities: benefiting of economic of scales). • The first possibility would be the ◦ This kind of model would also be delegation of management of technical possible for Navigation where the systems which technically no longer interest to maximise efficiencies need to be collocated with control also has synergies with satellite positions. This already exists at the means of navigation. level of Maastricht which manages the ◦ The same method could be used for technical systems of the military air Communications and mainly traffic services of the Netherlands and regarding air-ground Belgium from the Maastricht ATC communications where a synergy is centre, while the control positions are to be found with other types of A/G still located in the respective national communication such Airlines military centres. A more ambitious operations and passengers’ experiment was carried out here too by communications. the Maastricht centre with the Slovenian control centre. This It is worth mentioning that the experiment tested the feasibility of feasibility of service-oriented service installing and operating the central has been demonstrated with well- systems (Radar processing and flight known implementations, such as plan) by the Maastricht control centre ADS-B surveillance to ITT, by the using the same software as the systems FAA, EGNOS in Europe to ESSP, and at the Maastricht centre, while the ADS-B by satellites to AIREON. The Control positions remained in Slovenia main risk would be to create counter- and were operated by Slovenian productive industrial monopolies both controllers. The experiment economically and technologically. demonstrated its technical and Other difficulties will be the fear of

Page 27/32

operational feasibility and is still in terms of sizing where it would be waiting for political approval. easy to better adapt the infrastructure to the needs. As for CNS as a service, the • The second option would be to rely on main risk would be the creation of common development/procurement of industrial giants or even a monopoly. ATM systems. This already exists, at When relying on new technological least partially, with examples such as platforms or network there is a risk that ARTAS (advanced Radar processing the winner will take it all. Currently system procured by EUROCONTROL there are only very few companies and deployed in a significant number of worldwide which have the computing ANSPs), or such as COOPANS which power to realise such an undertaking is a “Purchasing group” of several and none of them is in Europe. ANSPs which together specify the evolutions of their system, jointly All these options would require a purchase and simultaneously put into strong infrastructure manager to take the service the new versions of systems. All lead, the authors considering that the unique of these examples have demonstrated solution would be to designate the feasibility of common procurement, EUROCONTROL in that role as they are as well as the benefits in economic the sole organisation that can provide the terms, but also in terms of required expertise and overview needed for standardization of human-machine such a continent-wide undertaking. interfaces (it is thus shown that the problem of national specificities is 3.3.6 An agile and efficient setup for rarely an ATCO issue). R&D • The last option and certainly the most SJU has been a particularly good tool ambitious and which was identified in to pool European funds and justify the the Wise Person Group investment of research money in the sector, recommendations as the final goal, however as R&D is co-funded by its consists in the total virtualisation of the members it has shown its limitations: systems. This virtualisation consists • Priorities were always a compromise first of all in moving from a very between national interests driven by monolithic systems architecture to an their individual strategies linked to an open, standardized and modular uncoordinated investment plan (despite architecture. This would then make it the attempt of the Master Plan to steer possible to completely review the R&D along a shared vision). overall architecture of the ATM system in Europe and even its economic model • High administrative burden and by setting up ATM data server service bureaucratic procedure drastically providers (maybeone or two radar data impeded the required agility of R&D. service providers with the ANSPs as a Sometimes three years were spent from client, idem for flight plan data, weather the agreement on a new idea to the data, aeronautical data servers, etc.). initiation of the research project. The various experiments carried out so • No possibility to stimulate innovation far have demonstrated the technical exists outside the signed partnership feasibility of such an approach. The and in order to embark easily in this benefits in terms of costs, due to partnership, new actors must be economies of scale, appear obvious, we recognised for their added value. also see that in terms of scalability this would greatly simplify the functional The authors of this paper propose that improvements with a very limited a new technological pillar be set up by number of systems to upgrade, but also EUROCONTROL and the European Commission, merging the SESAR JU and

Page 28/32 the EUROCONTROL R&D into a Joint urgencies such as the capacity issues in Research Centre such as the ones that 2018 and 2019 and more recently the already exist in other domains. pandemic crisis. A Joint Research Centre would have • Animate a European innovation hub for the advantage to: the ATM sector. This hub would be • Really focus R&D budget (mainly EU close to the needs and close to the R&D funds) on common interest R&D, network of R&D centres of excellence aligned with an ATM Master plan in our domain and above all, to other vision, avoiding spreading these funds domains which will naturally come to to sponsor particularism and fragmented ATM which can bring the state-of-the- R&D. art expertise lacking in the standard ATM R&D network (digital industry, • Increase flexibility and agility of R&D, machine learning/ artificial intelligence, allowing quick re-orientation to answer cybersecurity, drones etc.,). 3.3.7 Summary of the options The recommendations made above can be summarised as follows: • On the operational side:

Possible evolutions Benefits / Concerns

NETWORK MANAGER

Stronger roles for the Network Manager • Final say of NM in all Efficiency: increase of en-route capacity (elimination of cross-borders CDM processes: hotspots) • Airspace manager Better management of adverse weather situations • Capacity manager Global optimum for all stakeholders • Command centre role in a Political: Global optimum may imply losers in the current dynamic DCB performance scheme. • Weather forecast central Possible impact on ANSPs revenues management Operational service provision

Option 1: Top down design of ACCs • Optimal design of ACCs Efficiency: increase of en-route capacity to best serve European Shorter routes (operational and environmental efficiency) traffic flows, Cost efficiency (Economy of scale) • Designation of service Political: Sovereignty providers based on competition or the merger Social: issues with ANSP staff to be addressed with appropriate of existing ANSPs harmless transition measures Option 2: A single service provider for Europe • Self-explanatory Efficiency: Idem as above with higher flexibility in terms of Airspace design beneficial to all aspects Political: Sovereignty Financial risks shared at European level Social: issues with ANSP staff to be addressed with appropriate harmless transition measures

Page 29/32

• On the technical side:

Possible evolutions Benefits / Concerns

CNS

Option 1: Standardised commercial products common procurement

• As airlines, ANSPs should Efficiency: Cost reduction (no more specific developments) buy standard ‘off the European Standards might help European industry to shelf’ products develop products for global market • Performance based Ability to define an acceptable standard, simply and procurements efficiently (avoid over-specification sometimes induced by “consolidating” experts’ opinion) Social: resistance to change by technical staff

Option 2: CNS as a service (not anymore an investment): • C, N and S domain Efficiency: Economy of scale managed at European Scalability level by Infrastructure Global optimisation manager Easier evolution • Procured as a service Creation of technical monopolies Political: Sovereignty Social: issues with ANSP technical staff to be addressed with appropriate transition measures

ATM systems

Option 1: Delegation of management of ATM technical systems • Subcontracting of ATM Efficiency: Savings in investments, maintenance, and technical systems operation, as operations experimented by MUAC Political: Sovereignty with Slovenia, and implemented operationally Social: issues with ANSP technical staff to be addressed with for Dutch MIL by MUAC appropriate transition measures Option 2: Common development/procurement of ATM systems

• Extension to all systems Efficiency: Savings in investments, maintenance, and validation and subsystems of existing Harmonisation of HMI Joint procurement Ability to define an acceptable standard, simply and initiatives (ARTAS, efficiently (avoid over-specification sometimes induced by COOPANS, …) “consolidating” experts’ opinion) Social: resistance to change by technical staff

Page 30/32

Possible evolutions Benefits / Concerns

Option 3: Open and modular architecture and ATM Data Service providers • From current monolithic Efficiency: Cost efficiency system approach to a Flexibility modular architecture Scalability • Service-based model (e.g. Opening opportunities for additional added-value services common - centralised Ability to define an open architecture satisfying all data-servers such FDPS, stakeholders Transition from current systems without disruption RDPS…) Social: issues with ANSP technical staff to be addressed with appropriate transition measures Research and Development

Merge of SJU with EUROCONTROL R&D in a single European Joint Research Centre

The authors of this paper propose that 3.4 A new financing scheme part or all of the activities involved in the The COVID 19 Sanitary crisis has had provision of ANS are funded independently a catastrophic impact on the air transport of the current “airspace users pay all” sector. Despite a recent increase in traffic in principle. the European region, which is currently The possibility of creating an levelling out at about 50-60% of the 2019 infrastructure fund at multinational level to traffic, it is forecasted that this reduction in finance ANS provision should be traffic will continue for some time. considered. Such an approach would prevent The multilateral agreement of the a situation where states have to step in to CRCO area has been based on two main financially support ANSPs which run out of components, weight and distance flown. funds when traffic significantly decreases This has led, in the current situation, to a (experienced in 2001 and during the current break away from those components, leaving pandemic). ANSPs cash-strapped. This should not This new type of financing would be happen anymore if we want a resilient, easier to implement in the context of the flexible and efficient ATM system going options described above which will take forward. In order to achieve that, we significant elements of the ATM propose that a review of the current route infrastructure as common European assets or charging arrangements in the CRCO area is services. The ultimate step being a single undertaken. The members of the CRCO ATM provider with a single ATM/CNS multilateral agreement should reflect infrastructure managed as European urgently on the current situation and ensure infrastructure. that the ATM critical infrastructure is appropriately funded in the future to cover 3.5 A roadmap for change the essential services provided by ANSPs, as shown by this pandemic (search and rescue, The Wise Persons Group repatriation, medical cargo and supply recommended that the role for the people flights). delivering the ATM services should evolve in order to facilitate the transition towards Analysis of different route charging the Digital European Sky. Whereas the mechanisms used by other States of regions recommendation proposes to look into the should also be considered in this review. current licensing and training requirements

Page 31/32 for ATCOs, one of the biggest challenges to required for every ATCO in OPS in Europe. achieve the above recommendations is to In 2018 (ACE Benchmarking report 2018) take the current staff along on this journey 56 718 staff were employed by ANSPs. An towards a more efficient pan-European additional 2000 staff work in the various ATM system. European institutions such as EUROCONTROL, EASA and EUROCAE Some 17 799 staff (31%) were ATCOs in the matters which will be affected by our working on operational duty, split between proposal. It is therefore urgent that a ACCs (55%) and APP/TWR facilities roadmap for change is created to assist the (45%). On average, 2.2 additional staff were evolution of the system.

4. Documents worth reading Baumgartner, M. (2007). The Schubert, F. (2011). The liability of air organisation and operation of European navigation services providers: some lessons airspace. In A. Cook (ed.), European Air from the single European sky. In P. Mendes Traffic Management. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. De Leon and D. Calleja Crespo (eds), 1–34. Achieving the Single European Sky: Goals https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e and Challenges. Amsterdam: Kluwer Law /9781315256030/chapters/10.4324/9781315 International. 256030-11 Tytgat, L., 2011. In: Calleja Crespo, Baumgartner, M., Finger, M., The D., Mendes, P. (Eds.), Achieving Single Single European Sky gridlock: A difficult European Sky. Goals and Challenges. 10 year reform process, Utilities Policy Kluwer International, London, pp. (2014), 95E106.The Relationship between http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2014.03.004 Eurocontrol and the EC:

Dumez, H., Jeunemaître, A., 2010. All the current legal texts are available under: The management of organizational https://trainingzone.eurocontrol.int/doc/seslex.ht boundaries: a case study. M@n@gement 13 m (3), 151e171. Fartek, G., Rivet, F., 2011. The introduction of military dimension into SES: a new paradigm for the European Commission. In: Kluwer, W. (Ed.), Achieving SingleEuropean Sky, 130. Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands. Finger M., Baumgartner M., Zeki E., The need to evolve air traffic management: Europe as a laboratory, chapter 17 in Air Transport Liberalization a critical assessment, 2017 Finger Button Elgar 2017 https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/17375_1 7.html Mendes de Leon Pablo Living Apart Together International Organizations Law Review (2007) 305–320

Page 32/32