Gerald D. Feldman. and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. xxi + 568 pp. $60.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-80929-0.

Reviewed by Marc Engels

Published on H-German (February, 2004)

Business history of the Third Reich is con‐ The key problem of a company-sponsored stantly attracting greater scholarly attention. The business history is the degree of independence en‐ pressure of class actions fled by Nazi victims in joyed by its author. Feldman's introduction deals the United States and of international public opin‐ at length with this issue, claiming the complete ion forced German companies to put considerable absence of any infuence on design, scope, and re‐ amounts of money into historical research. The sults of his work. The plan of the research dis‐ projects have grown notably in numbers and cussed by the author makes this statement con‐ quality since 2000. Although, in the past, projects vincing: the company is explicitly not studied tended to be conducted by single researchers, from a purely "economic perspective." Feldman more recently research teams have become larger wants to examine the "political and moral econo‐ and have been headed mostly by prominent, non- my of entrepreneurial behaviour ... for 'economic German historians: companies chose them to pre‐ logic' does not exist independently of business vent any complaints of partisan historiography ethics and basic moral standards" (p. x). Feldman from the beginning.[1] Following this trend, the seeks to fnd out whether, when and why these Allianz AG Insurance Group commissioned Gerald standards were kept or violated. The author re‐ E. Feldman, professor at the University of Califor‐ jects, therefore, any viewpoint that judges person‐ nia at Berkeley and a well-known expert on the al and company activities solely from the stand‐ 's economic history to present an point of their economic rationality, according to account of the frm's activities from 1933 to 1945. which any action is seen as acceptable as long as [2] Thus, although the Nazi past of Allianz was not it enhances profts. even mentioned in the frm's ofcial anniversary In the book, the company, its structure, eco‐ celebrations of 1990 [3], eleven years later a volu‐ nomic performance and policy are explored minous study has been published simultaneously chronologically. The book starts with the develop‐ in English and German.[4] ment of the Allianz concern and its leadership H-Net Reviews from 1918-33, the period in which Allianz became of Jews constitute the red line drawn in the book 's largest insurance company. The young between acceptable and unacceptable business and energetic managers of this success, Kurt rationality. Feldman traces the steps over this line Schmitt, Eduard Hilgard and Hans Hess, are paint‐ in a detailed manner, from the treatment of Jew‐ ed as self-conscious experts with conservative but ish employees and agents over the acquisition of not extreme right-wing backgrounds. Generally "Aryanized" property, the fate of Jewish life insur‐ their political perspective was limited to pursuing ance policies, the frm's response to the events of the interests of the insurance industry; nonethe‐ the Reichskristallnacht, and the insurance poli‐ less, General Director Kurt Schmitt became a cies of IG-Farben employees employed at prominent business fgure during the Great De‐ Auschwitz. By the outbreak of war, business pression. The Reich Chancellors Bruening and von ethics had, in Feldman's eyes, "not only evaporat‐ Papen both ofered him the position of Economics ed but given way to a goodly measure of cynical Minister. Schmitt, who had been building his Nazi opportunism" (p. 147). Such cynicism becomes ob‐ connections since 1930-1931, turned down both vious in the frm's behavior during the aftermath ofers. of the Reichskristallnacht. The insurance industry Three chapters analyze how Allianz leaders faced a complicated situation because Jewish (and and the frm made connections with the Nazi's "Aryan") property destroyed by the mob was of new political and economic system from 1933 to course insured. Initially, Goering demanded that 1939. From June 1933 to January 1935, Allianz AG insurance companies assume complete liability. General Director Kurt Schmitt joined the Hitler "Aryan" policyholders were to receive full reim‐ government as Economics Minister, which gave bursement while payments for damages to Jewish the revolutionary government the blessing of big property were to be made directly to the state. But business. After his resignation, he exploited his German insurers refused to assume any liability. connection to Nazi and SS leaders like Hitler, Go‐ They simply did not want to pay either the state ering, and Himmler in favor of the insurance in‐ or their policyholders. It was the Allianz executive dustry. Another Allianz Director, Eduard Hilgard, Hilgard, seconded by Schmitt, who took a frm joined the Nazi system by acting as "Fuehrer" of stand in the ensuing debate. He did not hesitate to the Reichsgruppe Versicherung, transmitting the employ anti-Semitic arguments. Negotiations be‐ demands of the Nazi economic administration to tween the insurance companies and the govern‐ the private insurance industry and lobbying for ment resulted in an enormous reduction of Jewish the latter at the same time. Business went very claims, which were then directly paid to the Re‐ well in this period, not at least thanks to political ich. From an economic perspective this solution connections that helped Allianz AG to receive and was a complete success because the insurers maintain a group insurance contract with the saved an immense sum. From a moral stand Prussian police, for example. The interested histo‐ point, however, Feldman judges this result as an rian will fnd much information here about the example of business ethic's corruption, because it role and problems of the insurance industry in was reached at the "expense of the Jewish in‐ the Nazi economy and especially in fnancing sured" (p. 229) and by participating actively in the rearmament. Moreover, the role of big business in "legal chicanery" against Jews (p. 231). bringing the new regime to power and stabilizing The fate of Jewish life insurance policies in it is discussed thoroughly. this atmosphere of chicanery is the topic of Feld‐ Allianz's involvement in the policy of exclu‐ man's sixth chapter. The claim that Jewish clients sion, expulsion, expropriation and extermination did not receive appropriate compensation for life insurance policies which they were forced to cash

2 H-Net Reviews out from Allianz to cover the costs of emigration, insurance industry. In the East a diferent strategy as well as the presumption that many death bene‐ was followed: Polish companies, for example, fts from deceased Jewish policy holders were not were eliminated or taken over. All the time, Al‐ paid to their relatives, was one of the charges lianz maintained close connections with Swiss in‐ against Allianz in the U.S. class actions. It there‐ surers. Unfortunately, comparatively little room is fore receives the author's special attention. Ana‐ dedicated to the Second World War and the com‐ lyzing a number of cases, Feldman concludes that pany's business in the East. The occupied territo‐ the company at least attempted to treat its Jewish ries in the Soviet Union are completely left out. customers fairly and that it did not directly proft Nonetheless the chapter may stimulate historians from policies cashed out before maturity. Though to (re-)focus on the wide spectrum of business this may be true, like all German insurers Allianz and insurance involvement into exploiting coun‐ did work closely with the government's fnancial tries under German rule. administration and the Gestapo to identify poli‐ The study ends with observations on denazif‐ cies of Jews that were deported to extermination cation and restitution, thus providing valuable in‐ camps.[5] formation about continuity in the German busi‐ During World War II Allianz became even ness elite. It is not very surprising to discover that more involved in the dictatorship's atrocities. company leaders avoided confrontation with the Feldman's study shows that German authorities past. Refections on the ethical responsibility of a insured valuables of deported Jews with Allianz. company and its leaders were omitted in favor of An Allianz subsidiary insured the construction of an exaggeration of contacts to German resistance the Lodz ghetto against fre and theft; a consor‐ circles and the insistence on acts of actual or tium headed by the same frm provided insurance imaginary personal courage. Standard excuses re‐ coverage of material and facilities in a Jewish lating to economic necessity or "preventing the slave labor camp in Crakow; another consortium, worst" prevailed. What should one think of a de‐ also led by Allianz, insured facilities in Dachau nazifcation process according to which Hilgard and Auschwitz; Allianz also insured IG-Farben en‐ was classifed as a Mitlaeufer and even Kurt gineers working at Auschwitz. Feldman character‐ Schmitt, a former Minister of Hitler's government, izes the probability that company inspectors had was categorized as "exonerated"? direct contact with all stages of the extermination Even though Allianz's archive did not survive process as extremely high: risks had to be estimat‐ the war, Feldman and his research team pieced ed, fre safety regulations had to be met and con‐ together a comprehensive company history from trolled. This activity was considered as "business over sixty international archives that goes far be‐ as usual," and demonstrates how moral standards yond the centennial anniversary company history decayed completely. of 1990.[6] Presumably due to the lack of sources, In the areas under German occupation, Al‐ the book displays certain gaps with regard to the lianz pursued a strategy of expansion and domi‐ company's agents and employees, as well as the nation that ran parallel to the general German World War II era. Especially the latter occupies a policy. In the West a "soft" method was applied: relative small portion of the book. Some chapters, with the help of collaborators and occupation au‐ on the other hand, seemed somewhat voluminous thorities, English competitors were driven out. to this reviewer. Packed with detailed legalities Markets were to be dominated by Allianz (and its relating to insurance matters, such sections were closely connected re-insurer Muenchener Rueck) sometimes hard to read. without destroying the French, Belgian, or Dutch

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Feldman ofers an interesting and thorough [3]. 100 Jahre Allianz. Festansprachen 9. study about an important German company of the Maerz 1990 ( 1990). tertiary sector in the Third Reich. Allianz AG's his‐ [4]. Published in German as: Gerald D. Feld‐ tory provides an example of how big business man, Die Allianz und die deutsche Ver‐ grew into the political system, and how the dicta‐ sicherungswirtschaft 1933-1945 (Munich: C.H. torship changed business behavior. By insisting Beck Verlag, 2001). on a moral perspective, Feldman explores the lim‐ [5]. Stefan Laube, "'Nach einer Mitteilung un‐ its and possibilities of entrepreneurial activity in serer Geschäftsstelle vom 20. Mai soll Herr Op‐ a dictatorship. He is not interested in common penheimer Jude sein'. Ueber den Umgang mit place counterfactual questions like "should they Lebensversicherungspolicen im Dritten Reich," have stopped doing business at all" but asks at Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 51 (2003), pp. each individual moment whether a specifc action 339-361. was necessary. On the other hand, this strength constitutes the book's weak point. By renouncing [6]. Peter Borscheid, 100 Jahre Allianz (Mu‐ a theoretical framework, the author sometimes nich 1990). runs the risk of operating on a descriptive and [7]. See for example: Laube; Arno Surminski, even personalized basis. Versicherungen unter dem Hakenkreuz ( This pilot study sets standards in the feld and 1999); and Ingo Boehle, "Die Judenfrage in der Pri‐ has already inspired new research. Insurance his‐ vaten Krankenversicherung (PKV) im National‐ tory in the Third Reich has become--thanks to the sozialismus," Zeitschrift fuer Un‐ compensation discussion and Feldman--an ex‐ ternehmensgeschichte 48 (2003), pp. 164-195. panding feld of study for business historians.[7] Copyright (c) 2004 by H-Net, all rights re‐ Due to the immense role the tertiary sector played served. H-Net permits the redistribution and and continues to play in daily life, this emphasis reprinting of this work for nonproft, educational must be welcomed. purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the Notes author, web location, date of publication, originat‐ ing list, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences [1]. Mark Spoerer's website lists up to twenty- Online. For other uses contact the Reviews editori‐ two research projects from 1995 to the present. Cf. al staf: [email protected]. http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/~www570a/spoer‐ er/biz_hist.htm. Feldman forms, together with Harold James, Avraham Barkai, Lothar Gall and Jonathan Steinberg, the Deutsche Bank's Commis‐ sion of Historians for Research on the Bank's His‐ tory during National Socialism (cf. http:// www.deutsche-bank.de/geschichte/). He partici‐ pated as an expert in the London Gold Conference in 1997 and the US Conference on Holocaust as‐ sets in 1998, and served as an advisor to the Presi‐ dential Commission on Holocaust Assets. [2]. Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German In‐ fation, 1914-1924 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

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Citation: Marc Engels. Review of Feldman, Gerald D. Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945. H-German, H-Net Reviews. February, 2004.

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