Working Paper No. 80/03 Bureau Competition and Economic Policies in Nazi Germany, 1933-39 Oliver Volckart © Oliver Volckart Department of Economic History London School of Economics December 2003 Department of Economic History London School of Economics Houghton Street London, WC2A 2AE Tel: +44 (0) 20 7955 7084 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 E-mail:
[email protected] Bureau Competition and Economic Policies in Nazi Germany, 1933-39* Dr. Oliver Volckart Abstract This article examines the hypothesis that in the “Third Reich”, bureaucratic agencies engaged in economic policies competed with each other. First, a model of competition is constructed whose predictions are then compared with actual political processes in Nazi Germany. This shows that the bureaus indeed competed with each other, supplying Hitler with political support in exchange for politically relevant property rights. However, in contrast to what the model predicts, they did not adapt their policy supply to the dictator’s wishes. In order to explain this outcome, the paper examines how Hitler protected himself against competitors to himself and how his choice of strategy affected bureau competition. * I presented earlier versions of this paper at the Economic History Colloquium of the Free University Berlin (November 2002), at the Session of the Economic History Section of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Berlin (March 2003), at the European Public Choice Society Conference in Århus (April 2003), and at the Conference of the European Historical Economics Society in Madrid (July 2003), and I would like to thank all participants in the discussions for their suggestions, help, and advice.