University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 12-1968 Andrew Johnson and the Patronage James Lewis Baumgardner Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the American Politics Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Baumgardner, James Lewis, "Andrew Johnson and the Patronage. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 1968. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1874 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by James Lewis Baumgardner entitled "Andrew Johnson and the Patronage." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in History. LeRoy Graf, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: John Muldowney, D. H. Carlisle, Harold S. Fink, Richard C. Marins Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) November 22, 1968 To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by James Lewi s Baumgardner entitled "Andrew Johnson and the Patronage . " I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a maj or in History. We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance : Accepted for the Council: Vice Chancellor for Graduate Studies and Research D!: S SEi:T.r\TIOf,: Blr:n :. :: 6639 �:\EE:� ANDREW JO�SON AND THE PATRONAGE A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of The University of·Tennessee In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree .. Doctor of Philosophy by James Lewis Baumgardne� December 1968 ABSTRACT The Constitution bestows upon the president the right to make appointments "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" to federal posi tiona at home and abroad. Over the passage of time, through free use of this power and the implied power of removal, the several chief executives constructed a vast patronage system, ot which one primary goal was to reward the party tai thf'ul for their services. The purpose of this dissertation is to determine how well Andrew Johnson, the unexpected successor of Abraham Lincoln, used the seemingly powerful patronage weapon. and the reasons why he used it as he did. Prior to his elevation to the presidency, Johnson had been a Jacksonian Democrat with a great faith in the wisdom of the masses of people. As such, he had subscribed to the spoils system with its attend­ ant principles of loyalty to the party and rotation in office. There is little evidence to indicate that he subsequently changed his views, despite the tact that they were of questionable validity in the unbal­ anced postwar political context of 1865-1869. Andrew Johnson was also a decided individualist, a characteristic which showed itself on several occasions during his presidential career . This trait at times overshadowed his political co�victions and, increas­ ingly during the course of his presidency, dictated his actions. Nowhere was this tact more clearly evident than in his use of the patronage . As president, Johnson initially was allowed a tree patronage hand, but as he and the dominant element of the Republican party, the Radicals ; ii 81:Jl62 iii increasingly clashed on the issues of reconstruction, the latter moved to wrest control of the system trom him. Seeking endorsement for his policies, he appealed to the people in the 1866 congressional campaign. Many of his supporters urged that he use the federal patronage to affect the outcome of the elections , and a number of changes were made, but the Radicals emerged victorious. Some observers, both at that time and later, charged that this result occurred because Johnson misused his patronage powers , but he probably realized that he could not have changed the outcome of the elections regardless of how he might have used his powers of removal and appointment. Having failed to win popular support for his position, Johnson then faced the alternative of either turning to the Democratic party and bolstering it with the federal patronage or becoming politically isolated. The leaders of that party .both expected and encouraged him to return to the fold, but the chief executive steadfastly refused to do so. The people had not elected a Democratic president in 1864 and Johnson's integrity and honesty dictated that they were not to receive one against their will. While becoming increasingly politically isolated, Johnson sought to reward those who had remained faithful to him. Close supporters were appointed to office, and despite demands from Democrats that changes be made, he refused to remove loyal cabinet members from their posts. At the same time, however, the president would not tolerate disloyalty. Wh�n his secretary of war proved unfaithful, Johnson, defying Radical legislative �fforts to secure Edwin M. Stanton in his position, removed iv him-from office. This move led to the chief executive's impeachment and trial, a process which the Radicals unsuccessfully attempted to turn into a condemnation of his entire patronage policy. Both primary and secondary sources were used for this study. Heavy dependence was placed upon certain manuscript collections, parti­ cularly those of Andrew Johnson, Senators John Sherman and Lyman Trum­ bull, and Representative Elihu B. Washburne. The Congressional Globe, the United States Senate Executive Journal, and the official account·of the impeachment trial were also of considerable value. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION 1 I. PATRONAGE : THE PRE-PRESIDENTIAL VIEW 13 II . A TIME OF CONSENSUS 36 III . FOR WANT OF A POLICY • 61 IV. LAME DUCK PATRONAGE 96 V. THE INHERITED FAMILY • 114 VI . PRESIDENTIAL PATRONAGE ON TRIAL 136 VII. IN SEARCH OF A POLICY 155 BIBLIOGRAPHY 167 APPENDIX 175 VITA ••• 179 v INTRODUCTION Two clauses of the Constitution relate to the subject of execut ive patronage . The first provides that the president shall nominate , and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate , shall appoint Amb assadors , other public Ministers and Consuls , Judges of the supreme Court , and all other Officers of the United.States , whose Appointments are not herein other­ wise provided for , and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers , as they think proper , in the President alone , in the Courts of Law , or in the Heads of Departments.1 Wh ile the Constitution thus gave the president an extensive role in the process of appointment to federal office , it ·failed to make any provision for removals . Under what circumstances and by whom were removals to be made? This question became the center of a prolonged discussion in·the First Congress when the bill establishing the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs (later State Department ) came before that body in June , 1789 , with the provision that the secretary was "to be removable by the President ." During the course of the debat e in the House of Representatives several greatly variant ideas were aired, but the central issue for the maj ority of the members was whether the right to remove was an � officio power of the president or an incident of the power to 2 appoint and therefore to be shared by the president and the Senate. !united States Constitution, Art icle II , Section 2, Clau se 2. The only restriction placed on this provision was that incumbent congress­ men could not hold other federal offices . Ibid. , Article I, Section 6 , · Clause 2. -- 2virtually unsupported was the position of William Smith of South Carolina who insisted that the only provision made by the Constitution 1 2 The latter view was presented clearly by Alexander White of Virginia, who maintained that , since the Constitution divided the power of appointment between the president and the Senate , "they ought also to 3 be associated in the dismission from office. " In support of the view, John Page , a fellow Virginian , gave expression to a thought which undoubt- edly also was troubling some of his colleagues. Arguing that leaving the power of removal with the president alone would encourage the growth of an organization of civil servant s loyal to him, Page warned that "con- ferring this power , so far from making the President more responsible , diminishes his responsibility , and inclines to establish him an independent 4 monarch. " The chief spokesman for the president 's right to remove from office was James Madison, who had argued in an earlier House discussion on this subject that to divide the removal power between the president and the Senate would have the effect of diminishing the president 's 5 responsibility for the actions of those officials under him. He now summarized his position : for removal was impeachment , thereby implying that offices were to be held during good behavior or at least for terms fixed by law. Annals of Congress , First Congress , 475. A view receiving some moderate sup­ port was presented by Sherman of Connecticut , who maintained that office was the creation of Congress and therefore within the limits of the Con­ stitution could be regulated in any manner Congress saw fit . Ibid. , 511. 3 Ibid.' 473. 4 Ibid. ' 540-41. 5 !bid. , 387 , 394-95. 3 Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the President , and you abolish at once that great principle of unity and responsibility in the executive department , which was in­ tended for the security of liberty and the public good.