The Principal Actors in the Drama of Reconstruction Were President Abraham Lincoln, Radical Republicans Sen
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LINCOLN SUMNER STEVENS w JOHNSON w GRANT HAYES The principal actors in the drama of Reconstruction were President Abraham Lincoln, Radical Republicans Sen. Charles Sumner of Massa- chusetts and Rep. Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, President Andrew Johnson, and President Rutherford B. Hayes, elected in 1876. Reconstruction The Reconstruction era after the Civil War has been called "the bloody battleground of American historians1'-so fierce have been the scholarly arguments over the missed opportunities fol- lowing black emancipation, the readmission of Southern states to the Union, and other critical developments of the 1865-1877 period. The successes and failures of Reconstruction retain a special relevance to the civil rights issues of the present day. Here, three noted historians offer their interpretations: Armstead L. Robinson reviews the politics of Reconstruction; James L. Roark analyzes the postwar Southern plantation econ- omy; and James M. McPherson compares the first and second Reconstructions. THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION by Armstead L. Robinson The first Reconstruction was one of the most critical and turbulent episodes in the American experience. Few periods in the nation's history have produced greater controversy or left a greater legacy of unresolved social issues to afflict future gener- ations. The postwar period-from General Robert E. Lee's surren- der at Appomattox in April 1865 through President Rutherford B. Hayes's inauguration in March 1877-was marked by bitter partisan politics. In essence, the recurring question was how the @ 1978 by Armstead L. Robinson The Wilson QuarterlyISpring 1978 107 RECONSTRUCTION Northern states would follow up their hardwon victory in the Civil War. The downfall of the Confederacy not only assured the permanence of the federal union but also confirmed the destruc- tion of the "peculiar institution" of slavery. How to readmit 11 former Confederate states and how to guarantee the rights of 3.5 million former slaves became the central issues of Reconstruction. To the extent that our society, a century later, continues to experience racial crises, and that our national politics must reckon with the remnants of a self- consciously "Solid South," it is clear that the first Reconstruc- tion failed to resolve these central issues completely. Thus, the ambiguous heritage of this failure remains relevant to contem- porarv America. he partisan battles in Washington during Reconstruction raised very basic questions, questions then focused around Southern readmission and emancipation. The struggle between Congress and the President for control over the process of read- mission foreshadowed the subsequent political crises generated by conflicts between an expansive modern Presidency and the statutory powers of the legislative branch. Reconstruction also produced America's first truly national political scandals, especially the Credit Mobilier and the Whis- key Ring episodes. These scandals forced the country to wrestle with the conflict arising when certain practices condoned in the world of business were transferred to the arena of public trust. And, lastly, Reconstruction raised the question of how far the government would go in the resolution of racial inequality in America. Confusion and conflict marred the nation's post-Civil War years. What renders Reconstruction such an enigma is the per- vasive sense that somehow American society bungled the proc- ess of national reconciliation. So complete was the Northern military victory in 1865 that the way seemed clear to make good on Abraham Lincoln's promise, in his second inaugural, of reunification "with malice toward none and charity toward all." Yet malice proved to be the stock in trade of many Reconstruc- tion politicians, and charity is difficult to discern amid the fury Arrnstead L. Robinson,31, is assistant professor of history at the Univer- sity of California, Los Angeles. Born in New Orleans, he was educated at Yale (B.A. 1968) and the University of Rochester (Ph.D. 1976). Before joining the UCLA faculty, he taught at the State University ofNew York. He is the editor of Black Studies in the University: A Symposium (1969)and author of Bitter Fruits of Bondage: Slavery's Demise and the Collapse of the Confederacy, 1861-1 865 (forthcoming). The Wilson QuarterlyISpring 1978 108 RECONSTRUCTION of Ku Klux Klan violence. Far from generating a national politi- cal consensus, Reconstruction was marked by confusing discon- tinuities as first Lincoln, then Andrew Johnson, then the Radical Republicans, and then Ulysses S. Grant and Rutherford B. Hayes took turns directing and misdirecting Washington's ef- forts to cope with the ebb and flow of the intertwined national and local struggles over readmission and emancipation. We normally think of Reconstruction as beginning with the end of the Civil War. However, the political struggles of the postwar period make no sense whatsoever unless viewed as part of a sustained debate whose roots lay in the war itself. Both emancipation and readmission influenced the conduct of the Civil War. Indeed, much of the postwar bickering between the President and Congress must be understood as an attempt to resolve questions raised during the war but left unresolved at its conclusion. The Spoils of War The struggle between Lincoln and some of the Republicans in Congress for control over the readmission process opened almost as soon as the war began. In July 1861, a sharp debate arose over a proposal by Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull that would have given Congress the right to control military governments established in areas recaptured from the Confederacy. The battle over emancipation followed a similar course. The prominent New York abolitionist Lewis Tappan, for example, published a pamphlet on May 14, 1861 that insisted, 'Slavery is the cause of the present war . What then is the remedy? . Immediate Universal Emancipation." Thus, pressure from antislavery radicals to transform Lin- coln's struggle to save the Union into a war against slavery went hand in hand with congressional insistence that the legislature ought to control readmission of the rebel states. Paralleling the military struggle to win the Civil War were a series of disputes about how best to conduct it and how to get the most from the hoped-for victory. The wartime argument within the ruling Republican Party over the readmission question turned upon the theoretical issue of how to describe the process of secession. Radicals such as Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania argued that secession ought to be viewed as "state suicide," while Lincoln insisted that se- cession was the result of treasonous political leadership. Be- neath these semantic differences lay the substance of their dis- The Wilson QuarterlyISpring 1978 109 RECONSTRUCTION pute. For if the state suicide theory prevailed, then Articles I and IV* of the Constitution gave Congress the obligation to establish the terms upon which these former states could be re-created. But if the treasonous leadership concept was accepted, then all a president had to do was use his power as commander in chief to punish the traitors and restore civil order. Having done so, he could then empower loyal Union men to revive the state and restore it to its former status. By recognizing a phantom government headed by Francis H. Pierpont at Wheeling as the legitimate government of Vir- ginia, Lincoln actually began presidential Reconstruction in June 1861. This regime had no power. However, Lincoln hoped that the Northern army would install Pierpont as Virginia's governor as soon as Richmond fell. But the Confederacy blocked this plan by clinging stubbornly to its national capital. In the end, Lincoln found himself compelled in late 1862 to accept the creation by Congress of a new state, West Virginia, which was carved out of Virginia's territory. Pierpont was replaced. The new state clearly owed its legitimacy to congressional action and not to presidential dispensation. Lincoln's inability to coerce Congress on the readmission question dogged his wartime Reconstruction efforts. He could and did appoint military governors to manage civil affairs in states conquered by the Union army. However, he could not compel Congress to accept representatives elected by these gov- ernments. And as long as Congress refused to accept these repre- sentatives, the states would continue to be excluded from the federal government. The Price of Readmission The process of wartime presidential Reconstruction went furthest in Louisiana because the Union army managed to cap- ture the state's capital at Baton Rouge as well as its major commercial center, New Orleans. In Louisiana, representatives elected in 1863 were actually seated by Congress. Heartened by apparent congressional acquiescence, Lincoln proceeded in December 1863 to promulgate his famous 10 per- cent amnesty plan, a plan that offered readmission whenever a number of voters equal to 10 percent of the state's vote in the 'Article I, Section 5-"Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifica- tions of its own members. ." Article IV, Section 3-"New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdic- tion of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress." The