Liberal Democracy's Crisis of Confidence

Liberal Democracy’s Crisis of Confidence Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf

Journal of Democracy, Volume 29, Number 4, October 2018, pp. 136-150 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/705724

No institutional affiliation (18 Oct 2018 14:30 GMT) Liberal Democracy’s Crisis of Confidence

Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf

Richard Wike is director of global attitudes research at the Pew Re- search Center in Washington, D.C. Janell Fetterolf is a research as- sociate at the Pew Research Center.

Liberal democracy is experiencing a crisis of confidence. Scholars and pundits may disagree about the nature and depth of the problem, but few would argue that nothing is amiss. Commentators decry an increas- ingly familiar list of trends, including weakening civil liberties, erod- ing democratic norms, rising nativism, and growing support for parties and leaders whose commitment to democratic values and practices seems shaky. Progress toward democracy has been stalled or reversed in many emerging and developing nations, while several wealthy, sup- posedly “consolidated” democracies have experienced significant and unexpected setbacks. These anxieties are being driven not only by subjective observations of political dynamics, but also by a growing body of data. Indices de- signed to measure the health of democracy generally tell a similar and dispiriting story. Freedom House’s 2018 Freedom in the World report found democratic declines in 71 countries, while only 35 registered im- provements, marking the twelfth year in a row in which the organiza- tion has documented a deterioration in democracy around the world.1 The Economist Intelligence Unit likewise reported a global decline in democracy in 2017, with particularly worrisome trends for free speech and media freedom.2 Public-opinion data have also supplied plenty of reasons for concern. In these pages and elsewhere, Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk have used World Values Survey (WVS) data to document declining support for democracy and growing support for nondemocratic forms of government among the publics of established democracies.3 The recent success of populist parties in Europe has spawned numerous studies that delve into the forces underlying this antiestablishment wave. And in the

United States, Bright Line Watch and Democracy Project surveys have found that, although Americans continue to want democracy, many are frustrated with the way the country’s political system is functioning. A recent Democracy Fund survey also showed widespread support for democracy in the United States, but revealed that notable minorities dis- play at least some fondness for authoritarian approaches.4 Recent surveys by Pew Research Center shed further light on global public opinion regarding democracy. The results suggest that democracy remains a broadly popular idea and that publics in regions around the world largely endorse democratic rights and institutions. Yet these surveys also find in many nations a surprisingly high degree of openness to nondemocratic modes of governing. And even though people tend to believe it is important to live in a country where democratic rights are respected, support for these rights is often tepid. Moreover, it is clear that people around the world have very different understandings of individual rights and the boundaries of individual liberty. In short, liberal democracy is popular among average citizens, but their commitment to this system of government is frequently underwhelming.

Representative Democracy and Its Rivals

To explore these issues, Pew Research Center in 2017 conducted a 38-nation survey that asked respondents about five different approaches to governing: representative democracy, direct democracy, rule by experts, military rule, and rule by a strong leader who “can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts.”5 For each of these options, respondents were asked whether the approach in question would be a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad way of governing their country. These questions are similar to items that have been asked on previous waves of the WVS, although there are differences. For instance, the WVS asks about “democracy” in general, whereas the Pew survey included separate items on representative and direct democracy. This survey thus allows us to examine attitudes specifically toward representative democracy, as well as four potential alternatives to this system. The results show that representative democracy has wide appeal (see Figure 1 below). Across the 38 nations surveyed, a median of 78 percent of respondents say that “a democratic system where representatives elected by citizens decide what becomes law” is a very or somewhat good way to govern. More than half hold this view in every nation polled. Still, the intensity of support for representative democracy is often limited. The median share of respondents who say it is a very good way to run a country is just 33 percent, and there are only five nations in which half or more give this response. Reservations about representative democracy are especially common in Latin America: More than 30 138 Journal of Democracy

Figure 1—Support for Representative and Direct Democracy Representative Democracy - % responding “a democratic Direct Democracy - % responding “a system where representatives elected by citizens decide what democratic system where citizens, not becomes law” is a very or somewhat good way to govern their elected officials, vote directly on major country. national issues to decide what becomes law” would be a very or somewhat good “Very Good”“Somewhat Good” way to govern their country. North America Total (%) Total (%) Canada 43 44 Canada87 25 42 67 CanadaU.S. 4348 4438 Canada86U.S. 2529 4238 67 Canada 43 44 Canada 25 42 EuropeSwedenU.S. 4854 3838 SwedenU.S. 15 29 42 38 U.S. 48 38 U.S. 29 38 GermanySwedenCanada 434654 444438 GermanySwedenCanada92 152532 42 42 42 57 SwedenU.S. 4854 3838 SwedenU.S. 15 29 42 38 GermanyCanadaUK 434346 414444 GermanyCanada90UK 192532 37 4242 74 Germany 46 44 Germany 32 42 Sweden 42 54 42 38 Sweden 1517 3842 NetherlandsCanadaU.S.UK 434348 414438 NetherlandsCanada84U.S.UK 192529 37 4238 56 GermanyUK 4346 4144 GermanyUK 19 32 37 42 NetherlandsSwedenFrance 23 42 54 58 42 38 NetherlandsSwedenFrance84 151728 3842 46 55 NetherlandsU.S. 4248 4238 NetherlandsU.S. 17 29 38 38 CanadaUK 29 4343 50 4144 CanadaUK 192531 37 4240 GermanySwedenFranceItaly 23 4654 58 4438 GermanySwedenFrance81Italy 152832 42 4642 74 NetherlandsFranceU.S. 23 4248 58 4238 NetherlandsFranceU.S. 172829 38 3846 GreeceItalyUK 2931 43 5047 41 Greece79ItalyUK 193139 37 40 39 71 GermanyItaly 29 46 50 44 GermanyItaly 3132 4042 SwedenFrance 2326 54 5258 38 SwedenFrance 152028 42 47 46 NetherlandsHungaryGreeceUK 31 4243 47 4241 NetherlandsHungaryGreece78UK 1719 39 3837 39 78 GermanyGreeceItaly 2931 46 5047 44 GermanyGreeceItaly 313239 404239 HungaryPolandFrance 202326 575258 HungaryPolandFrance78 202228 4747 46 67 NetherlandsHungary 26 42 52 42 NetherlandsHungary 1720 38 47 GreeceUK 31 43 4347 41 GreeceUK 19 3839 37 3739 PolandFranceSpainItaly 202329 575850 PolandFranceSpain77Italy 222831 47 4640 69 NetherlandsHungaryPoland 2026 42 5752 42 NetherlandsHungaryPoland 172022 38 4747 RussiaGreeceSpain 263131 424347 RussiaGreeceSpain74 383939 353739 75 SpainItaly 2931 4350 SpainItaly 3138 4037 PolandFrance 2023 43 5758 45 PolandFrance 222528 3947 46 AustraliaHungaryRussiaGreece 262631 425247 AustraliaHungaryRussiaGreece 20 3939 47 3539 RussiaSpainItaly 262931 424350 RussiaSpain68Italy 313839 403735 74 AustraliaVietnamPoland 203343 57 5445 AustraliaVietnamPoland 222528 394745 AustraliaHungary 26 43 52 45 AustraliaHungary 2025 4739 Asia-PacificRussiaGreece 263134 42 4752 RussiaGreece 17 3939 45 3539 IndonesiaVietnamPolandSpain 203133 5743 54 IndonesiaVietnamPolandSpain 222838 4745 37 AustraliaHungaryVietnam 263343 52 5445 AustraliaHungaryVietnam88 202528 473945 64 PhilippinesIndonesiaRussia 263234 42 5052 PhilippinesIndonesiaRussia 1723 39 4544 35 IndonesiaSpain 3134 43 52 IndonesiaSpain 17 38 45 37 VietnamPoland 192033 5957 54 VietnamPoland87 222228 475445 73 SouthPhilippinesAustralia RussiaKorea 2632 43 42 50 45 SouthPhilippinesAustralia RussiaKorea 2325 39 4439 35 PhilippinesIndonesiaSpain 323134 435052 PhilippinesIndonesiaSpain86 1723 38 4544 37 62 SouthVietnam KoreaJapan 1922 33 5955 54 SouthVietnam KoreaJapan 192228 46 5445 SouthAustralia Korea 19 43 59 45 SouthAustralia Korea 2225 3954 PhilippinesRussia 263244 42 5031 PhilippinesRussia82 23 3951 44 3525 67 IndonesiaVietnamJapanIndia 22 3334 55 5452 IndonesiaVietnamJapanIndia 171928 4546 45 SouthAustralia KoreaJapan 1922 43 5955 45 SouthAustralia KoreaJapan78 192225 463954 76 PhilippinesIsraelIndia 324144 503146 PhilippinesIsraelIndia 2423 51 3644 25 IndonesiaIndia 3444 3152 IndonesiaIndia 17 51 45 25 VietnamJapan 22 33 51 55 54 34 VietnamJapan77 1928 48 46 45 35 65 SouthPhilippinesLebanon KoreaIsrael 19 3241 59 5046 SouthPhilippinesLebanon KoreaIsrael 222423 364454 IndonesiaIsraelIndia 344144 315246 IndonesiaIsrael75India 1724 51 4536 25 76 LebanonTurkeyJapan 22 4351 55 37 34 LebanonTurkeyJapan 19 4853 46 3531 SouthLebanon Korea 19 51 59 34 SouthLebanon Korea 22 48 54 35 PhilippinesIsrael 22 3241 39 5046 PhilippinesIsrael 162423 25 3644 MiddleTurkeyJordanIndia East 22 4344 55 3137 TurkeyJordanIndia 19 5153 46 2531 TurkeyJapan 43 37 TurkeyJapan 53 31 SouthLebanon Korea 1922 51 31 59 34 SouthLebanon Korea 12 22 2148 54 35 TunisiaJordanIsraelIndia 22 4144 39 3146 TunisiaJordan87IsraelIndia 1624 5125 36 25 60 TurkeyJordanJapan 2222 43 39 55 37 TurkeyJordanJapan 1619 5325 46 31 LebanonTunisiaGhana 22 5162 31 3423 LebanonTunisiaGhana85 12 214648 21 35 83 TunisiaIsrael 22 41 31 46 TunisiaIsrael 12 24 21 36 JordanIndia 22 4453 39 31 28 JordanIndia 16 36 5125 26 25 TanzaniaLebanonTurkeyGhana 435162 37 3423 TanzaniaLebanonTurkeyGhana80 464853 21 3531 84 TunisiaGhanaIsrael 22 41 62 31 46 23 TunisiaGhanaIsrael 12 24 2146 36 21 TanzaniaNigeriaJordan 22 4853 39 3028 TanzaniaNigeriaJordan61 16 3136 25 3026 41 TanzaniaTurkey 4353 3728 TanzaniaTurkey 36 53 26 31 LebanonGhana 535162 243423 LebanonGhana 434648 2321 35 SenegalNigeriaTunisia 22 48 3139 30 SenegalNigeriaTunisia53 1216 31 2125 30 33 NigeriaJordan 48 30 NigeriaJordan 31 30 TanzaniaTurkeyKenya 424353 353728 TanzaniaTurkeyKenya 36 5253 26 2831 Sub-SaharanSenegalTunisiaGhana Africa22 5362 31 24 23 SenegalTunisiaGhana 12 432146 2321 SenegalNigeriaJordan 22 4853 39 3024 SenegalNigeriaJordan 16 3143 25 30 23 SouthTanzania KenyaAfrica 3442 53 32 35 28 SouthTanzania KenyaAfrica 2936 52 28 26 28 KenyaGhana 42 62 35 23 KenyaGhana85 4652 21 28 67 SenegalTunisia 2231 53 31 40 24 SenegalTunisia 1226 4321 35 23 SouthVenezuelaTanzaniaNigeria Africa 34 4853 32 3028 SouthVenezuelaTanzaniaNigeria Africa81 293136 283026 62 South KenyaGhanaAfrica 3442 62 32 35 23 South KenyaGhanaAfrica 29 4652 28 21 28 VenezuelaArgentinaSenegal 3132 53 3740 24 VenezuelaArgentinaSenegal 2628 43 3535 23 VenezuelaNigeria 31 48 40 30 VenezuelaNigeria78 2631 3530 61 SouthTanzania Africa 8 34 5351 32 28 SouthTanzania Africa 10 2936 42 28 26 ArgentinaSenegalKenyaBrazil 324253 37 3524 ArgentinaSenegalKenyaBrazil77 28 4352 35 23 28 66 VenezuelaArgentinaNigeria 3132 48 3740 30 VenezuelaArgentinaNigeria 262831 353530 South AfricaBrazilPeru 8 3134 51 27 32 South AfricaBrazilPeru 10 2933 42 2825 KenyaBrazil 8 42 51 35 KenyaBrazil77 10 5242 28 80 ArgentinaSenegal 2232 53 36 37 24 ArgentinaSenegal 283443 3531 23 SouthVenezuela AfricaChilePeru 313134 27 3240 SouthVenezuela AfricaChile66Peru 262933 283525 57 KenyaBrazilPeru 8 31 42 51 27 35 KenyaBrazilPeru 10 33 5242 25 28 ArgentinaMexicoChile 9 2232 49 36 37 ArgentinaMexicoChile 16 2834 46 3531 LatinVenezuela ChileAmerica2231 36 40 VenezuelaChile 2634 3531 South AfricaPeru 313234 2127 32 South AfricaPeru 293341 2825 22 ColombiaArgentinaMexicoBrazil 98 32 4951 37 ColombiaArgentinaMexicoBrazil 1016 28 42 46 35 VenezuelaMexicoChile 9 2231 49 36 40 VenezuelaMexicoChile71 162634 463531 61 ColombiaBrazilPeru 8 3231 51 2127 ColombiaBrazilPeru 10 3341 42 2522 ArgentinaColombiaMexico 9 3232 49 21 37 ArgentinaColombiaMexico69 16 2841 46 3522 63 ChilePeru 2231 3627 ChilePeru 3334 2531 ColombiaBrazil 8 32 51 21 ColombiaBrazil59 10 41 42 22 52 MexicoChile 9 22 49 36 MexicoChile 16 34 46 31 Peru 31 27 58Peru 33 25 58 ColombiaMexico 9 32 49 21 ColombiaMexico 16 41 46 22 Chile 22 36 58Chile 34 31 65 Colombia 32 21 Colombia 41 22 Mexico 9 49 Mexico58 16 46 62 Colombia 32 21 Colombia53 41 22 63 Source: Pew Research Center, 2017 Global Attitudes Survey. Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf 139 percent in Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Peru consider it to be a very or somewhat bad approach to governing. While publics around the globe largely say that representative democracy is a good thing, there is also considerable support for direct democracy. A median of 66 percent across the 38 countries believe that “a democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law” would be a very or somewhat good way to govern their country. Direct democracy is broadly appealing across regions and among nations in all income cat- egories (high, middle, and low). There are only two countries (Tunisia and Jordan) in which majorities say it would be a very or somewhat bad approach. Perhaps notably, support for direct democracy is relatively low in the post-Brexit United Kingdom, where 56 percent consider it a good way to make national decisions. Nondemocratic approaches to governing are less popular globally than either representative or direct democracy (see Figure 2 below). Nonetheless, there is significant support for nondemocratic alternatives in many nations. In fact, the survey finds global publics almost evenly divided on the virtues of expert rule. A median of 49 percent across the 38 nations polled say that a system in which “experts, not elected officials, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country” would be very or somewhat good. This approach holds particular appeal in several emerging and developing nations, including Lebanon (where 70 percent say it is a good idea), Vietnam (67 percent), India (65 percent), and Nigeria (65 percent). Fewer respondents in higher-income nations endorse expert rule. Still, at least about four in ten believe this could be a good way to govern in the United States, Canada, Spain, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Although autocracy is less popular, it also has its supporters. “A system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts” is considered a very or somewhat good way to govern by a median of 26 percent across the 38 nations. Half or more of those surveyed in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines say this is a good system, as do 48 percent of Russians. Across the six sub-Saharan African nations polled, a median of 39 percent hold this view, and in South Africa the figure is a strikingly high 44 percent. The strong-ruler model is again less popular in wealthier nations, but it nonetheless receives notable levels of support in many of these countries: In the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Japan, and South Korea, more than 20 percent believe that government by a strong leader could be a good approach. Finally, a median of 24 percent across the countries surveyed believe that “a system in which the military rules the country” would be very or somewhat good. This option enjoys particularly high support in Vietnam and Indonesia, where roughly seven in ten say it could be a good way 140 Journal of Democracy to govern. Elsewhere in Asia, 53 percent of Indians and 41 percent of Filipinos share this opinion. In Africa, positive views of military rule are especially common in South Africa (52 percent), Nigeria (48 percent), Ghana (46 percent), and Kenya (45 percent). Four-in-ten or more also hold such views in Tunisia (42 percent), Mexico (42 percent), and Peru (40 percent). Even in long-established Western democracies, military rule has a significant number of supporters: Fully 17 percent—nearly one-in-five—in the United States, Italy, and France believe a political system where the military is in charge could be good. Another way of gauging the popularity of nondemocratic alternatives is to calculate the percentage of people in each country willing to en- tertain at least one such alternative. In 34 of 38 countries, half or more of the public views at least one nondemocratic approach—expert rule, autocracy, or military rule—as a good way to govern. The percentages are highest in certain emerging and developing nations, such as Vietnam (88 percent) and Nigeria (85 percent), although many in economically advanced nations also endorse at least one nondemocratic option. This includes 64 percent of respondents in Japan, 60 percent in South Korea, 59 percent in Israel, 57 percent in the United Kingdom, 56 percent in France, 56 percent in Spain, 55 percent in Australia, 53 percent in the United States, 51 percent in Italy, and 50 percent in Canada. Although few people actually reject representative democracy, many appear open to multiple options when it comes to types of government. Particularly large shares of respondents in India (34 percent) and Indo- nesia (31 percent) say all five approaches could be good. Among the 79 percent of Italians who believe representative democracy is a good approach, roughly eight in ten believe the same about direct democracy, while notable minorities say this about expert rule (45 percent), autocracy (28 percent), and military rule (17 percent).

Ideology, Demography, Democracy To explore the factors that correlate with opinions about democracy, we examine the bivariate relationships between a range of at- titudinal, ideological, and demographic variables on the one hand and attitudes toward various forms of government on the other. For example, we categorize respondents as either high-income or low-income depending on whether their household incomes fall above or below the median for their country. Then we compare the percentages of people who hold a political attitude—say, support for representative democracy, or openness to one of its alternatives—in each of the two income groups. Where we find a statistically significant difference between the two groups in the same direction across many countries—for instance, if people with lower incomes are less supportive of representative democracy in many countries and few if any countries show an Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf 141

Figure 2—Support for Rule by Experts, a Strong Leader, or the Military Rule by Experts - % responding Strong Leader - % responding Military Rule - % responding that “a system in which experts, “a system in which a strong “a system in which the military not elected officials, make deci- leader can make decisions rules the country” would be sions according to what they without interference from par- very or somewhat good. think is best for the country” liament or the courts” would would be very or somewhat good. be very or somewhat good. “Very Good” (%) North America “Somewhat Total (%) Good” (%) Total (%) Total (%) Canada 8 33 Canada41 3 14 Canada17 3 7 10 Canada 89 3133 Canada 3 14 CanadaU.S. 34713 CanadaU.S. 8 33 CanadaU.S.40 35 1417 Canada22 3 7 17 EuropeHungaryU.S. 920 31 48HungaryU.S. 45 1720 HungaryU.S. 241213 CanadaU.S. 89 3331 Canada 3 14 CanadaU.S. 43 713 HungaryPoland 920 41 48HungaryPoland68 24 1320 HungaryPoland24 12812 14 HungaryU.S. 920 31 48CanadaU.S. 35 1417 HungaryU.S. 241213 CanadaPolandSpain 9817 334132 Poland50 2 13 CanadaPolandSpain15 135876 9 Poland 9 41 PolandSpain 24 13920 Poland 18 Hungary 20 48HungaryCanadaU.S. 35 1417 HungaryU.S. 241213 CanadaFranceSpainU.S. 68917 38333132 FranceSpain49 24109 CanadaFranceSpain13 357612 11 PolandSpain 917 4132 HungaryCanadaPolandSpainU.S. 2435139141720 PolandSpain 1586 GermanyHungaryCanadaFranceU.S. 678920 38373331 48 France44 210 GermanyHungaryCanadaFranceU.S.12 1234531271312 17 France 6 38 GermanyFrance 1245109 France 5 12 PolandSpain 917 4132 HungaryPolandSpainU.S. 245131720 PolandSpain 1586 GermanyHungaryU.S.UK 78920 343731 Germany48 UK44 157 19 GermanyHungaryU.S.UK6 12453121013 4 GermanyFrance 67 3837 GermanyHungaryPolandFranceSpain 12451013920 GermanyFrance 135 12 HungaryPolandSpainUK 7891720 33344132 48 UK42 7 19 HungaryPolandSpainItalyUK26 12581215106 15 ItalyUK 8 34 ItalyUK 67 1923 UK 5 10 GermanyFrance 76 3738 GermanyPolandFranceSpain 124510139 GermanyFrance 153 12 SwedenPolandSpainItaly 78917 33324132 SwedenItaly40 168 23 SwedenPolandSpainItaly29 12358156 17 ItalyUK 78 3334 GermanyFranceSpainItalyUK 124675109 1923 ItalyUK 251510 NetherlandsGermanySwedenFranceSpain 586717 3432383732 Sweden40 18 NetherlandsGermanySwedenFranceSpain9 1357612 4 Sweden 8 32NetherlandsSweden 16589 23 Sweden 13 GermanyItalyUK 778 333437 GermanyFranceItalyUK 2710 19 ItalyUK 125371510 NetherlandsGreeceFrance 56 263438NetherlandsGreece39 1597 NetherlandsGermanyGreeceFrance10 157 12 8 NetherlandsSweden 58 3432NetherlandsGermanySwedenItalyUK 167589 1923 NetherlandsSweden 137 GermanyGreeceRussiaItalyUK 578 2626333437 40Greece31 5 7 GermanyGreeceRussiaItalyUK12 123587151019 8 Greece 5 26 GreeceRussia 159197 29 Greece 17 NetherlandsSwedenItaly 578 343332NetherlandsSwedenItalyUK 1678 1923 NetherlandsSwedenRussiaItaly 123871519 VietnamRussiaUK 81726 34 5040VietnamRussia 919 3329 VietnamUK 5 1029 41 GreeceRussia 5 2626 Netherlands40SwedenGreeceRussiaItaly66 15689197 23 29 GreeceRussia48 187 19 27 NetherlandsVietnamSwedenIndiaItaly 5781733343332 50Vietnam32 9 33 NetherlandsVietnamSwedenIndiaItaly 1237152930 2341 Vietnam 17 50VietnamIndia 91927 332928 Vietnam 8 2919 41 NetherlandsAsia-PacificGreeceRussiaIndia 5 26332634 Netherlands4032SwedenGreeceRussia 15897 NetherlandsGreeceRussiaIndia 17 30 23 PhilippinesSweden 818 32 Philippines44 India 1627 3428 PhilippinesSweden 1314 27 VietnamIndia 1733 Netherlands50Vietnam32GreeceIndia67 159919727 332928 VietnamIndia42 3029 23 41 70 NetherlandsPhilippinesGreeceRussia 51318262634 464440Russia NetherlandsPhilippinesIndonesiaGreeceRussia 187142119 27 47 PhilippinesIndonesia 18 Philippines44Indonesia 1216 4034 Philippines 14 27 India 33 PhilippinesVietnam32GreeceRussiaIndia65 591619727 33342928 India55 2930 2341 53 SouthIndonesiaVietnamGreece RussiaKorea 6513172626 4646Indonesia5040 12 40 SouthIndonesiaVietnamGreece RussiaKorea 1872119 47 Indonesia 13 South46Indonesia Korea 51218 40 Indonesia 1421 27 47 SouthPhilippinesVietnam KoreaIndia 6181733 46Philippines4450Vietnam32RussiaIndia62 9161927 33342928 SouthPhilippinesVietnam KoreaIndia50 17 2930 2341 41 RussiaJapan 8 26 41South40 Korea 56 1825 RussiaJapan 2813 19 SouthIndonesia Korea 613 46South46Indonesia KoreaJapanIndia59 5129 2718 3340 28 SouthIndonesia Korea52 17 21 47 68 PhilippinesVietnamJapanIndia 681718333541Philippines4450Vietnam32 16 34 PhilippinesAustraliaVietnamJapanIndia 2314139 2930 27 23 41 AustraliaJapan 8 41 AustraliaJapan 6 1325 Japan 2 13 SouthIndonesia Korea 613 46SouthPhilippines46Indonesia KoreaJapanIndia52 561216182725 403428 SouthIndonesia Korea23 1721 47 8 PhilippinesAustraliaLebanonIndia 6 18333335 44Australia3237 6 13 PhilippinesAustraliaLebanonIndia 311149 3016 27 23 AustraliaJapan 68 3541 AustraliaLebanonJapan49 61281325 40 AustraliaJapan31 32 139 15 SouthPhilippinesIndonesiaLebanon Korea 613182133 46South31Philippines4644Indonesia37 Korea 51618 34 SouthPhilippinesIndonesiaLebanonTurkey Korea 121171421 16 27 47 LebanonTurkey 33 Lebanon37Turkey 6 208 20 Lebanon 11 16 AustraliaJapan 68 3541SouthIndonesiaAustraliaLebanon KoreaJapan41 56128131825 40 AustraliaJapan19 23 139 12 SouthIndonesiaTurkey KoreaIsrael 6131321 46353146 Turkey 20 20 SouthIndonesiaTurkey KoreaIsrael 127821 47 LebanonTurkey 2133 31 37TurkeyIsrael 67 20818 20 LebanonTurkey 2117 16 SouthMiddleAustraliaJordan KoreaIsraelJapan East56138 3435414635SouthAustraliaLebanon KoreaJapan 56 131825 SouthAustraliaJordan KoreaIsraelJapan 123978139 12 Israel 13 35 JordanIsrael 107 1822 Israel 2 8 AustraliaLebanonTurkey 6213335 31AustraliaLebanonTurkey37JapanIsrael70 6 2081325 20 LebanonTurkey14 2311979 1216 27 TunisiaJordanJapan 5814 342241 Jordan 10 22 AustraliaTunisiaJordanJapan 2 1322 20 JordanIsrael 513 34 35 TunisiaJordan 1017 2216 JordanIsrael 298 12 AustraliaLebanonNigeriaTunisiaTurkey 6142133333522 31AustraliaLebanon32Turkey37Israel52 67 2081318 20 AustraliaLebanonNigeriaTunisiaTurkey40 231179222816 2020 9 Tunisia 14 22 NigeriaTunisia 1720 1618 Tunisia 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SouthTanzania Africa 2129 15 23 SenegalNigeriaTunisiaGhanaKenya 1420293334222822Tanzania2332SenegalNigeriaTunisia65 81719208 162018 SenegalTunisiaNigeriaGhanaKenya38 2224252830 1420202016 48 South GhanaAfrica 2329 3022 GhanaKenya 1719 1322 SouthGhana Africa 3029 1623 TanzaniaSenegalMexicoNigeriaKenya 920233334 44South2831Tanzania2332SenegalNigeria Africa57 81920228 201822 TanzaniaNigeriaSenegalMexicoKenya16 8 21242528 3415142020 38 GhanaKenya 2029 2822 MexicoKenya 2 1725 22 GhanaKenya 2530 2016 SouthTanzaniaSenegalMexico AfricaPeru 9 232834 44South303124Tanzania23Senegal GhanaAfrica54 819228 132022 SouthTanzaniaSenegalMexico AfricaPeru39 8 21222429 34151814 23 36 MexicoKenya 920 4428 MexicoPeru 2 152512 MexicoKenya 8 25 34 20 SouthTanzania GhanaAfricaChilePeru 18232829 South2930312422Tanzania GhanaKenyaAfrica53 171922 13222022 SouthTanzaniaGhana AfricaChilePeru44 122122293015 15181623 52 MexicoPeru 9 28 44 24 ChilePeru 6158 12 MexicoPeru 822 3418 SouthArgentina GhanaKenyaAfricaChile 1618202329 30South29283022 Mexico GhanaKenyaAfricaPeru51 2 17192225 132222 SouthArgentina KenyaGhanaAfricaChile32 10122529301415 201623 46 ChilePeru 1828 2924ArgentinaChile 6 118 ChilePeru 122215 18 VenezuelaArgentinaMexicoGhanaKenya 149162029 3230442822 MexicoGhanaKenyaChilePeru48 215171925121322 VenezuelaArgentinaMexicoGhanaKenya39 1078 2530171434 2016 45 ArgentinaChile 1618 3029VenezuelaArgentina 46 1311 ArgentinaChile 1012 1415 LatinVenezuelaColombiaMexicoKenya AmericaPeru 149202628 3244172824 MexicoKenyaChilePeru 2615178251222 VenezuelaColombiaMexicoKenyaPeru 7819222517 34121820 VenezuelaArgentina 1416 3230 VenezuelaColombia 410137 VenezuelaArgentina 710 1714 ColombiaMexicoBrazilChilePeru 3918262828 442917VenezuelaArgentina24 MexicoChilePeru53 24615131182512 ColombiaMexicoBrazilChilePeru27 78121922 1531123418 42 VenezuelaColombia 1426 3217ColombiaBrazil 210 257 VenezuelaColombia 71917 12 ArgentinaBrazilChilePeru 3 16182828 3029Venezuela24ArgentinaColombiaChilePeru52 410615131187 12 ArgentinaBrazilChilePeru27 1071222141531 18 40 ColombiaBrazil 3 2628 17 Brazil 2 25 ColombiaBrazil 7 19 3112 VenezuelaArgentinaChile 141618 323029VenezuelaArgentinaColombiaBrazilChile47 24106 13118257 VenezuelaArgentinaChile14 10712 171415 27 Brazil 3 28 Brazil 7 31 VenezuelaArgentinaColombia 141626 323017VenezuelaArgentinaColombiaBrazil46 24106 1311257 ArgentinaVenezuelaColombia17 10719171412 24 7 31 VenezuelaColombiaBrazil 3142628 3217VenezuelaColombiaBrazil46 241013257 VenezuelaColombiaBrazil17 71917 12 24 ColombiaBrazil 3 2628 17ColombiaBrazil43 210 257 ColombiaBrazil17 719 3112 31 Brazil 3 28 Brazil31 2 25 Brazil27 7 31 38 Source: Pew Research Center, 2017 Global Attitudes Survey.

142 Journal of Democracy association in the opposite direction—we take that as a sign of a broad cross-national pattern. One such pattern emerges when we look at respondents’ ideological beliefs: Support for nondemocratic approaches, specifically autocracy and military rule, is often greater on the political right. In 22 countries, the survey asked respondents to place themselves on a left-right spec- trum.6 The results show that in several nations people on the right are more likely to favor a government with a strong leader who can make decisions without interference from parliament and the courts. Those on the right are significantly more likely to endorse this model (with a double-digit gap between right and left) in Italy, the United Kingdom, Israel, the United States, Canada, Chile, Greece, and Germany; the difference between right and left is 20 percentage points in South Korea and Australia. In the former, 35 percent of those on the right say the strong-leader model would be good, while only 20 percent in the center and 15 percent on the left take this position. There is also a double-digit gap in Venezuela, ruled for many years by left-wing autocrat Nicolás Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez, but here the difference runs in the opposite direction: Just 9 percent on the right and 10 percent in the center back autocracy, compared with 40 percent on the left. Venezuelans on the left are also more likely to support military rule (45 percent of these respondents say it would be a good approach, while just 21 percent in the center and 16 percent on the right agree). Hungary is the only other country polled where those on the left are more likely to endorse military rule. In 11 nations, people on the right are significantly more likely than those on the left to favor having the military in charge. The divide is especially large in two countries that have had right-wing military dictatorships in the relatively recent past: Among Chileans on the right, 41 percent back military rule, compared with 17 percent in the center and 20 percent on the left. In Spain this form of government receives support from 17 percent on the right, but only 9 percent in the center and 6 percent on the left. The survey data also show an association between attitudes toward populist parties (on both the right and left) and support for certain alternatives to representative democracy. People with a favorable view of the extreme-right National Front in France, for example, are more likely to offer positive opinions about military rule, and the same is true in the United Kingdom among supporters of the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP). Direct democracy is also particularly popular among supporters of UKIP, which strongly backed the Leave position in the Brexit referendum. Supporters of populist parties in other European countries are similarly more likely to endorse direct democracy. In the Nether- lands, 77 percent of people with a positive opinion of Geert Wilders’s right-populist Party for Freedom favor a system in which citizens would vote directly on major national issues, compared with just 49 percent Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf 143 among those who give the party a negative rating. In Spain, 88 percent of Podemos supporters approve of direct democracy, while just 68 percent among those with an unfavorable view of the left-wing populist party share this attitude. Many populist parties have featured calls for direct democracy in their campaigns, and the concept clearly resonates among their supporters, many of whom subscribe to these parties’ pre- ferred narrative of “the people” confronting a corrupt elite. Education is a major dividing line in attitudes toward types of government. People with lower levels of educational attainment are less supportive of representative democracy in 19 nations.7 Among the nondemocratic approaches featured in the survey, the education gap is especially wide regarding military rule. Those with less education are more likely to consider military government a good thing in 23 countries, and in 18 of these countries the difference is at least 10 percentage points. The largest gap exists in Peru, where 55 percent of those with less education view military rule positively, compared with 32 percent among Peruvians in the higher education group. There is an education gap on this question in the United States as well: 24 percent of Americans with a secondary education or less say rule by the military would be good for their country, compared with 7 percent of those with more than a secondary education. Americans with less education are also likelier than those with more education to favor the strong-leader model (28 percent versus 13 percent). Significant divides along educational lines on the question about autocracy are present in the United Kingdom, Poland, South Korea, Peru, France, and Japan as well. There are few education divides in opinions about direct democracy, although people with higher levels of education are more likely to say this is a good way to govern in six of the seven Latin American countries surveyed. In the few countries in other regions where education differences emerge, however, those with more education are less likely to support direct democracy. For example, 70 percent of Americans with a secondary education or less say governing through referendums is a good approach, compared to 64 percent of those who have at least some college education.

Class and Income

At least since the publication of Seymour Martin Lipset’s research on “working-class authoritarianism” more than half a century ago, scholars have debated the role that class and income play in shaping attitudes toward democratic and authoritarian rule.8 This survey finds that differences between income groups are more frequent in advanced—rather than developing or emerging—economies. People with incomes below the median for their country are less likely to support representative democracy in the United States, Canada, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, South 144 Journal of Democracy

Korea, and the United Kingdom. Those with lower incomes are also more likely to support rule by a strong leader in twelve countries and military rule in eighteen countries. In France, for instance, 19 percent of those with household incomes below the median endorse the autocratic model, and 26 percent believe military rule could be good; the corresponding numbers for the higher-income group are 8 percent and 11 percent, respectively. The relationship between age and views about democracy has recently been the subject of considerable debate, sparked by Foa and Mounk’s research showing that young people in a number of Western nations tend to see democracy as less essential for their countries than do their elder compatriots.9 Overall, the Pew survey finds relatively few consistent differences between older and younger adults in their views on systems of government. When differences arise, younger adults (those ages 18 to 29) are often more likely than those ages 50 and older to view the approach in question—whether democratic or nondemocratic—as a good way to govern. For example, young Mexicans are likelier than those ages 50 and older to support both direct (69 percent versus 53 percent) and representative democracy (66 percent versus 46 percent), but they are also more likely to say that autocratic rule would be a good option for their country (33 percent versus 19 percent). And there are signs that young people in some countries are particularly open to alternatives to representative democracy. For instance, in the United States, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan, people ages 18 to 29 are more likely than those 50 and older to support expert rule, while in Canada, Spain, Sweden, South Korea, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela younger people are especially likely to say direct democracy would be good for their countries. Beyond the 2017 survey on attitudes toward different types of government, other Pew Research Center polling sheds light on the limits of global support for democracy. In many nations over the years the Center has asked the following question: “Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country’s problems. Oth- ers feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country’s problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?” Results have consistently shown that significant minorities, and occasionally majorities, believe a leader with a strong hand would be better positioned to deal with national challenges. In 2012, for example, 61 percent of Paki- stanis and 57 percent of Russians expressed this opinion. Surveys also show that publics are often willing to prioritize economic progress over democracy. When asked, “If you had to choose between a good democracy or a strong economy, which would you say is more important?” significant numbers of respondents in many countries say the economy is more important. For instance, when this question was asked in post–Arab Spring North Africa in 2014, Egyptians were evenly divided in their responses (49 percent opted for a good democracy, 49 Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf 145 percent for a strong economy), while nearly 73 percent of Tunisians said they would choose a strong economy. A 38-nation Pew survey in 2015 found that support for democratic rights and institutions was widespread, but sometimes lukewarm.10 Al- though the results showed broad global approval of the ideas of religious liberty, gender equality, multiparty elections, free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom on the internet, these sentiments were not always very intense. Views regarding freedom of expression illustrate this pattern. Survey respondents were asked how important it is to live in a country where “people can say what they want without government censorship,” “the media can report the news without government censorship,” and “people can use the internet without government censorship.” Globally, medians of greater than 80 percent say all of these are very or somewhat important—but the share who rate these conditions as very important is much smaller. Only 56 percent say free speech is very important; just 55 percent say this about media freedom; and only half take this stance regarding free use of the internet. Free expression and the other principles mentioned on the survey tend- ed to be more popular in the United States, Latin America, and Europe than in the Asia-Pacific region, sub-Saharan Africa, or the Middle East. For example, 71 percent in the United States said it is very important that people can say what they want without government censorship, as did medians of 69 percent in Latin America and 65 percent in the European Union. Yet the median share of respondents who held this view was just 50 percent in Asia, 46 percent in Africa, and 43 percent in the Middle East. The study also highlighted the very different ways in which people around the world conceive of free expression and its parameters. Publics tend to support free speech in principle, but they also want limitations on certain types of speech. While a global median of 80 percent believe people should be allowed to freely criticize government policies, only 35 percent think they should be allowed to make public statements that are offensive to minority groups or that are religiously offensive. Even fewer support allowing sexually explicit statements or calls for violent protests.11

Economics, Culture, Politics Democracy continues to have wide appeal, but commitment to it is not always very deep. This low level of commitment can create an envi- ronment of relative tolerance for actions that bend or break democracy’s rules. It may open the door to restrictions on free expression, the overuse of executive power, or even military intervention in politics. Democratic institutions may be challenged and democratic norms may erode. In their recent book How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt 146 Journal of Democracy have made a persuasive case that norms such as mutual toleration and forbearance are crucial for a well-functioning democracy. These “soft guardrails” prevent democratic competition from becoming a fight to the death, and they place checks on leaders and parties with authoritarian ten- dencies.12 But if citizens are open to nondemocratic approaches, would-be autocrats may find opportunities to transgress the unwritten rules that help to hold democracies together. Among the multitude of factors shaping this unsettling moment in global public opinion are economic anxiety, cultural conflict, and political dysfunction. The link between economics and attitudes has been debated for decades, but many scholars have found a relationship between economic progress and the likelihood that a country will have a successful liberal democracy. The 2017 Pew survey finds that negative views about the economy are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with how democracy is functioning and less commitment to the principle of representative democracy. The poll asked about satisfaction with democracy in 36 nations, and in all but one of these, people who said the national economy is in bad shape were more likely than those who said it was in good shape to be dissatisfied with how democracy is working in their country. (The exception is Greece, where there are not enough people who say the economic situation is good to allow for analysis.) When it comes to representative democracy in principle, people who think the state of the economy is poor are less likely to believe this system is good for their country in 19 of 38 nations, including the United States, Canada, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In the other half of the countries surveyed, views of the economy are not related to support for or opposition to representative democracy. There is also less enthusiasm for representative democracy among people who are pessimistic about the long-term economic future. In 16 of 38 nations polled, support for this system is lower among those who believe that children growing up in their country will be worse off finan- cially than their parents. For instance, among Peruvians who think that the next generation will be worse off, just 45 percent say representative democracy is a good thing, compared with 68 percent among those who expect today’s children to be better off than their parents. Even in emerging nations that have performed relatively well economically over the past decade, there are concerns that the spoils of economic growth are not being shared equitably. Meanwhile, in West- ern countries economic anxieties in the wake of the Great Recession have been one factor driving the rise of populist leaders and parties on both the left and the right. In different ways, these parties have ap- pealed to voters’ frustration by crafting narratives around economic injustice. Culture also undoubtedly plays a role in the current crisis of confidence in liberal democracy. Liberal democracy’s principles include the Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf 147 idea that all citizens should be treated equally regardless of race, reli- gion, or ethnic background; yet in many nations immigration, growing diversity, or the empowerment of previously excluded groups has given rise to tensions that threaten these principles. Public-opinion data In surveys, many people say suggest that opposition to diver- that their vote does not give sity and pluralism is linked with a them an adequate voice in lack of commitment to representa- national politics, that elected tive democracy. A 38-nation Pew poll in 2017 asked respondents, officials do not care what “Overall, do you think having people like them think, and people of many different back- that average citizens could grounds, such as different ethnic do a better job than elected groups, religions and races, makes officials of dealing with their our country a better place to live country’s problems. or a worse place to live?” In thir- teen nations, people who think diversity makes their country worse are less likely than those who believe it makes their country better to say representative democracy is a good system. The difference is roughly 10 percentage points or greater in Spain, Israel, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and the United States. In South Africa, a nation with a tragic history of racial oppression and division, nearly three-in-four respondents (73 percent) who see diversity as an asset endorse representative democracy; among those who say diversity makes South Africa worse, just 54 percent hold this view. Another five nations show a similar, though only marginally significant pattern, while in the remaining countries views of diversity are not related to support for or opposition to representative democracy. Culture figures prominently in the nostalgic rhetoric common among some contemporary populist movements. In their study of nostalgia as a cultural and political force in the United Kingdom, France, and Germa- ny, Sophie Gaston and Sacha Hilhorst of the British think tank Demos recently described “an omnipresent, menacing feeling of decline; that the very best of their culture and communities has been irreversibly lost, that the nation’s best days have passed, and that the very essence of what it means to be French, or German, or British is under threat.”13 These views tie in to anti-immigrant sentiment: Polling data make clear that many in Europe have restrictive, exclusionary notions of national identity that could be threatened by the recent wave of immigration. In a 2016 Pew survey, majorities in Hungary, Greece, Poland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom said that to be truly Hungarian, Greek, Polish, and so forth, one needs to have been born in the country.14 Polling also shows how views about the past can shape attitudes toward democracy. The 2017 global survey found somewhat less enthu- 148 Journal of Democracy siasm for representative democracy among those who feel that people with whom they identify have not made progress in recent decades. In 23 of 38 nations, those who say that life in their country is worse than it was fifty years ago for people like them are less likely to say representative democracy is a good thing. For instance, 83 percent of Poles who think life is better than it was fifty years ago for people like them believe representative democracy is a good approach; among those who say life is worse, just 62 percent support this form of government. The negative reaction to increased immigration has clearly had a cultural component in many nations, and fears about growing diversity and immigration from the Middle East and other regions have helped fuel recent upheavals in European politics. As Ronald Inglehart has recently noted, “The immediate cause of rising support for authoritarian, xeno- phobic populist movements is a reaction against immigration (and, in the United States, rising racial equality).” And as Inglehart also notes, “Economic insecurity can exacerbate these cultural pressures toward authoritarianism.”15 Recent debates about the relative power of economic and cultural dynamics as drivers of the rise of authoritarian populism may sometimes miss the degree to which these factors interact with, reinforce, and multiply one another. The economics versus culture debate may also miss another source of discontent: politics. Survey findings illustrate the many ways people are unhappy with the current functioning of their political systems. When respondents in 36 countries in the 2017 global survey were asked whether they were satisfied with the way their democracies were working, a median of 52 percent said no, while 46 percent say yes. The same survey’s findings regarding the wide appeal of direct democracy further highlight public frustration with representative systems. People generally like representative democracy in theory, but many are frustrated with it in practice. In surveys, many say that their vote does not give them an adequate voice in national politics, that elected officials do not care what people like them think, and that average citizens could do a better job than elected officials of dealing with their country’s problems.16 Moreover, this frustration with the political system is shaping attitudes on a variety of issues. A recent eight-country Pew poll conducted in Europe shows that negative opinions about economic issues and immigration are more common among people disillusioned with representative systems (those who feel that politicians do not care what they think and that ordinary citizens could do a better job than elected officials). And these respondents are considerably more frustrated than others with institutions such as parliaments, banks, the media, and the EU. Economic and cultural factors—not to mention advancing technol- ogy and geopolitical influences—may be contributing to the current Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf 149 backlash against democracy, but there may be more explicitly political causes at work as well. Although few average citizens seem to have given up on representative democracy or the fundamental rights and institutions of liberalism, their frustrations with how political systems are working are clear. These frustrations are manifesting themselves not only in support for new parties and leaders, but also in a willingness on the part of discontented citizens to consider other, sometimes less democratic approaches to governing.

NOTES

1. Michael J. Abramowitz and Sarah Repucci, “The Freedom House Survey for 2017: Democracy Beleaguered,” Journal of Democracy 29 (April 2018): 128–42; Michael J. Abramowitz, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018.

2. Democracy Index 2017: Free Speech Under Attack (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018), http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf.

3. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect,” Journal of Democracy 27 (July 2016): 5–17. See also Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

4. “Bright Line Watch Report on American Democracy,” Bright Line Watch, 1 May 2018, http://brightlinewatch.org/wave5; “The Health of American Democracy: Compar- ing Perceptions of Experts and the American Public,” Bright Line Watch, 5 October 2017, http://brightlinewatch.org/blw-survey-wave3; “Reversing a Crisis of Confidence,” The Democracy Project, 2018, www.democracyprojectreport.org/report; Lee Drutman, Larry Diamond, and Joe Goldman, “Follow the Leader: Exploring American Support for De- mocracy and Authoritarianism,” Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, March 2018, www. voterstudygroup.org/publications/2017-voter-survey/follow-the-leader.

5. Richard Wike et al., “Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct De- mocracy,” Pew Research Center, 16 October 2017, www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-for-representative-and-direct-democracy.

6. This question was asked in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. In the United States, the question asked was: “In general, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?”

7. For the purpose of comparison across countries, we standardize education levels based on the UN International Standard Classification of Education. The lower education category is below secondary education and the higher category is secondary or above in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The lower education category is secondary education or below and the higher category is postsecondary or above in Australia, Canada, France, Germa- ny, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

8. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960). 150 Journal of Democracy

9. Foa and Mounk, “The Democratic Disconnect.”

10. Richard Wike and Katie Simmons, “Global Support for Principle of Free Expres- sion, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech,” Pew Research Center, 18 November 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression- but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech.

11. For more numbers on these questions, see www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global- support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/democracy-report-46.

12. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018).

13. Sophie Gaston and Sacha Hilhorst, At Home in One’s Past: Nostalgia as a Cultural and Political Force in Britain, France and Germany (Demos, 2018), www.demos.co.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2018/05/At-Home-in-Ones-Past-Report.pdf.

14. Bruce Stokes, “What It Takes to Truly Be ‘One of Us,’” Pew Research Center, 1 February 2017, www.pewglobal.org/2017/02/01/what-it-takes-to-truly-be-one-of-us; Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” Pew Research Center, 11 July 2016, www. pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism- fewer-jobs.

15. Ronald Inglehart, “The Age of Insecurity: Can Democracy Save Itself?” Foreign Affairs 97 (May–June 2018): 20–28.

16. Katie Simmons et al., “In Western Europe, Populist Parties Tap Anti-Establishment Frustration but Have Little Appeal Across Ideological Divide,” Pew Research Center, 12 July 2018, www.pewglobal.org/2018/07/12/in-western-europe-populist-parties-tap-antiestablishment-frustration-but-have-little-appeal-across-ideological-divide.