E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the Viability of the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic
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Department of Political and Social Sciences E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the Viability of the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic Andrew Glencross Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Florence, May 2007 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE Department of Political and Social Sciences E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic Andrew Glencross Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Science of the European University Institute Jury Members: Professor Friedrich Kratochwil, European University Institute (Supervisor) Professor Daniel Deudney, Johns Hopkins University Professor Sergio Fabbrini, Università degli Studi di Trento Professor Alexander H. Trechsel, European University Institute © 2007 Andrew Glencross No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 ii Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 ABSTRACT As a novel and complex polity, also subject to endless proposals for institutional reform, the viability of the EU is an open but under-theorized question. This thesis conceptualizes EU viability from an internal perspective, that is, the viability of the process of integration rather than Europe as a viable actor in international politics. Adopting the concept of a compound polity to understand the tensions inherent in the EU, viability is defined in relation to the “rules of the game” of this compound system. This gambit has a twofold purpose. Firstly, it permits an analogy with another historical case of a compound system, the antebellum US republic. Secondly, it enables the specification of two scenarios of viability in a compound polity: dynamic equilibrium and voluntary centralization. Four aspects of the rules of the game (institutions, expectations, competence allocation and representative functions) are analysed to determine which scenario the EU follows. The analogy with the early US and its own conflicts over these four elements of the rules of the game is then contrasted with the EU experience. Five differences in how these disputes arise and the means for trying to settle them are singled out to explain the differing problems of viability in both compound polities. The results of this analogical analysis are then used to explore the appropriateness of certain proposed changes to the rules of the game in the EU, notably in the area of political representation. In a system accustomed to dynamic equilibrium, enhancing the representation of individuals is often seen as a condition for favouring more voluntary centralization. However, the analysis of conflicts over the rules of the game in two compound systems suggests a more cautious approach is required in the interests of viability. Hence this study presents itself as a significant, if incomplete, initial step in the process of identifying what makes the EU viable. iii Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 iv Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. The Problem of Viability in a Compound Republic / 1 1.1 Defining the Concept of Viability / 3 1.2 Viability as Defined in Relation to the “Rules of the Game” of Politics / 6 1.3 Three Scenarios of Viability in a Compound Polity: How Context Shapes Viability / 16 1.4 Conclusion: The Structure of the Thesis / 23 2. Finding a Satisfactory Methodology: An Analogical Comparison with the American Compound Republic / 27 2.1 Political Science and the EU: Awkward Bedfellows / 28 2.2 The Preoccupation with Explaining the How and Why of Integration vs The Problem of Praxis and the Formulation of Interesting Research Questions / 34 2.3 How to Address the Question of EU Viability: Comparison via an Analogy with the American Compound Republic, 1787-1861 / 42 2.4 Conclusion / 52 3. The Concept of the Compound Republic: An Introduction to the Analogical Analysis / 53 3.1 The Theory of the Compound Republic / 54 3.2 Viability and the Conflict Over the Rules of the Game of Politics in the Antebellum Era / 65 3.3 How the EU fits the Compound Model: The Problem of Defining the Rules of the Game of European Politics / 76 3.4 Five Differences in the Conflict over the Rules of the Game in Europe and America / 82 4. The Struggle to Maintain a Compound System: Creating and Contesting the Rules of the Game in European Integration / 91 4.1 The Construction of the Rules of the Game of European Politics, from the ECSC to the EEC / 93 4.1.1 The Coal and Steel Community / 93 4.1.2 The European Economic Community / 98 4.2 After the EEC: Unexpected Constitutionalisation (ECJ), the First Enlargement (UK) and Democratic Consolidation (Mediterranean Enlargement) / 102 4.2.1 The Impact of the Court on the Rules of the Game / 103 v Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 4.2.2 British Accession: Opening up the Pandora’s Box of Domestic Politics / 108 4.2.3 The Mediterranean Enlargement Round: Defining the Community’s Democratic Values / 119 4.3 After Maastricht: Questioning the Purpose and Nature of Integration / 123 4.3.1 The Maastricht Treaty: The Construction of a Democratic Union, Demarcating Competences and the Struggle to Define a Common Identity / 125 4.4 Conclusion: Two Steps Forward But How Many Back? European Integration’s Dynamic Equilibrium / 136 5. Contrasting and Explaining the Viability of Two Compound Systems / 143 5.1 American Dual Federalism (with the highest functions of government) v. European Joint Federalism (with the most numerous) / 145 5.2 A Constitution For Popular Government v. a Treaty System / 152 5.3 A Project for freedom (the union as means to an end) v. A Project for undefined ever closer union (integration as an end in itself) / 162 5.4 A Single Fault Line v. Multiple Fault Lines / 171 5.5 A Party System and Supreme Court Arbitrator v. Referendum Politics and Council Arbitration / 181 5.6 Conclusion: Recognising What Makes the EU Viable / 192 6. Elements of a Viable Compound Europe: The Implausibility of Voluntary Centralisation / 195 6.1 The EU as a Means to an End: The Problem of Incorporating Social Policy into the Rules of the Game / 197 6.2 Compound Polities and the Problem of Representing both States and Citizens: The Theory and Practice of Antebellum Resistance to Party- Based Majoritarianism / 206 6.3 How Could Voluntary Centralisation be Justified and Managed? / 215 6.4 Conclusion / 227 7. Conclusions: Implications for Theory and Practice / 229 8. Bibliography / 235 vi Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 Chapter One The Problem of Viability in a Compound Polity “The most unambiguous signs are now being overlooked, or arbitrarily and lyingly misinterpreted, which declare that Europe wants to become one.” Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 256. Introduction The sui generis interpretation dominant in mainstream EU studies is often accompanied by a blithe assumption that the European Union has the political wherewithal and willpower to keep its show on the road.1 Hailed as unique among international treaty organisations, it has even been described by one recent commentator as the embodiment of a ‘new European Dream’ that ‘dares to suggest a new history, with an attention to quality of life, sustainability, and peace and harmony.’2 If deficiencies or deficits are identified in this polity, then it is usual to think there is an institutional solution: increasing the power of the EP, turning the Council into a second parliamentary chamber or some other novel form of bicameralism, having a directly elected Commission president etc.3 But whereas textbooks on the “democratic deficit” contain these familiar, pious suggestions for improving the EU’s democratic credentials they shy away from discussing the likelihood of these changes occurring. What is not problematised is firstly, whether in the medium-term the EU political system is actually capable of resolving current crises and secondly, if so, whether it has any real potential for greater centralisation. There are at least two very good reasons why the viability of the EU should be questioned. Most generally, federalism, of which the EU is a “species” as David McKay puts it, is not considered a ‘notably successful governmental form’.4 In 1991, a study of political stability in federal systems emphasised the ‘glaring fact that twenty-seven of the forty-four federations 1 The EU itself likes to emphasise its uniqueness. In the famous ENEL case, the ECJ referred to the creation of “an independent legal order”. Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 2 Rifkin (2004). 3 Proposals such as these invariably can be found in works with suitably worthy titles and displays of federal European piety. For instance, Sidjanski (1992: 436-8); Dehousse (1997); van Gerven (2005: 375-384). 4 Quoted in Filippov et al. (2004: 3). 1 Glencross, Andrew (2007), E Pluribus Europa? Assessing the EU Compound Polity by Analogy with the Early US Republic European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/11888 formed in the past two hundred or so years have failed either by breaking apart or by becoming fully centralised, unitary states.’5 In the specific case of the EU, moreover, there exist evident tensions between and within the member states over a multitude of European issues and policy debates: the Constitutional Treaty, budget negotiations, the transatlantic relationship, the question of Turkish accession.