A Piece About CONTEXT and Its Important for HI

Program in Comparative-Historical Social Science (CHSS)

Northwestern University Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies

Working Papers

Academic Year 2006-07 Working Paper 3 March 2007

CONTEXT AND CAUSAL HETEROGENEITY IN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS *

Tulia G. Falleti** Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania [email protected]

Julia Lynch Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania [email protected]

* Authors are listed alphabetically and both contributed equally to the elaboration of this paper. We are greatly indebted to Bear Braumoeller, Steven Hanson, Evelyne Huber, and Ian Lustick for their extensive and very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (in Philadelphia, PA, August 31 - September 4, 2006) and at the Comparative Historical Analysis Study Group, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, November of 2006. **Ph.D., Northwestern University Department of Political Science, 2003.

About the Program in Comparative Historical Social Science (CHSS):

Co-sponsored by the Departments of Political Science and Sociology, the Program in Comparative-Historical Social Science (CHSS) provides an institutional setting for faculty collaboration and graduate student training in comparative historical research. Students in the program complete their Ph.D. in either political science or sociology, but also receive a certificate from the University for expertise in the interdisciplinary area of CHSS. The program provides students with a common coursework structure integrated with their departmental curricula; resources for student research, including travel abroad; interdisciplinary venues at which to present work in progress and receive feedback; and opportunities for collaborative research. For additional information consult the program website at http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/GPCHS_Home.html

The CHSS Working Paper series will offer CHSS students and faculty a venue to have their work in progress formally available to scholars within and outside of Northwestern University. The series will be directed by Professors Edward Gibson and James Mahoney. It will feature papers focused on comparative and/or historical work, very broadly defined. Students and faculty who would like to have their papers considered for this series should contact Gibson at [email protected] and Mahoney at [email protected]

Working Papers:

Academic Year 2006-07

• No. 1/07 Edward Gibson , Associate Professor, Political Science Department Julieta Suarez-Cao, Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department

"Competition and Power in Federalized Party Systems." January 2007 • No. 2/07 Arthur Stinchcombe, Professor, Sociology Department

"Competition and Power in Federalized Party Systems." March 2007 • No. 3/07 Tulia G. Falleti, Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, University of Pennsylvania Julia Lynch, Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, University of Pennsylvania

"Context and Causal Heterogeneity in Historical Analysis." March 2007

Abstract: Political scientists largely agree on the usefulness of causal mechanisms to open the black box that connects inputs and outcomes. Yet often overlooked in discussions of causal mechanisms is their particular relationship to context and the impact that context has on explanation. In this paper, we define causal mechanisms as portable concepts that can travel from one context to another. In turn, we define context as the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which an array of initial conditions leads to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or a set of causal mechanisms. Drawing from these definitions, we study the ways in which causal mechanisms and layered contexts interact, discussing the implications for causal explanation and theory-building of different approaches to periodization in historical analysis.

Keywords: Causal mechanism, context, critical juncture, historical institutionalism

Truth does not have to be timeless.1

Ignoring context can be highly misleading, as can leaving the notion of context too vague.2

In the years since the publication in 1983 of Jon Elster’s Explaining Technical

Change, a stimulating discussion of causal mechanisms has taken place in the social sciences. While there is little consensus on the appropriate definition of the concept3, we

see (and in the first part of this paper advocate) some convergence upon a notion of social

mechanisms as something other than intervening variables filling in the black box

between inputs and outputs. Rather, social mechanisms should be viewed as relatively

abstract concepts that can travel from one specific instance or “episode” (Tilly 2001, 26)

of causation to another. In this paper we seek to demonstrate that this understanding of

mechanisms implies that it is not the mechanism itself that causes an outcome, but rather

the interaction between a mechanism and a given context. We then ask what are the

consequences for historical institutionalist analysis of this understanding of social

mechanisms. We focus in particular on the problems that arise for historically-oriented

scholars in periodization and selecting starting points, both of which are central to

specifying the temporal context within which a causal process plays out. And we

emphasize the particular difficulties that attend to these tasks when we understand

context to be composed of multiple, unsynchronized layers of institutions, policies, and

background conditions. We close the paper by offering some partial and rather tentative

1 Paul Diesing (1991) How Does Social Science Work? Reflections on Practice, 91, cited in Davis (2005, 168). 2 Bunce (2003, 184). 3 In fact Norkus (2005, 350) bemoans the proliferation of definitions and warms that ill-informed “mechanisms talk” may come to replace theoretically-informed discussion of the concept – a charge of which, we hope, we remain innocent.

1 solutions to these problems, centering on the goal of building middle-range theories by

making theory-guided choices about contextualization and periodization.

CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND CONTEXT

Despite a growing interest in causal mechanisms in the social sciences, expressed equally by scholars who subscribe to different epistemological and methodological traditions, there is very little consensus in the literature about what causal mechanisms are. Mahoney (2001, 579-80) identifies twenty-four definitions of causal mechanisms proposed by sociologists, political scientists, and philosophers of science in the last thirty five years, and even more definitions can be added to that list, some of which we discuss below.

In political science, the plurality of definitions of causal mechanisms has, however, disguised some underlying similarities.4 First, causal mechanisms are most

often conceptualized as links between inputs, or independent variables, and outcomes, or

dependent variables. They serve to open the black box of law-like or probability

statements that simply state the concurrence or correlation of certain phenomena or

events. Statements of the type “if I then O” (I Æ O) become “if I, through M, then O” (I

Æ M Æ O). Second, most definitions of causal mechanisms sustain that they should

apply to units of a lower level of aggregation than the level of the phenomena the

researcher seeks to explain. In other words, a macro-input through the operation of a micro-mechanism leads to a macro-output (Macro-I Æ Micro-M Æ Macro-O). Finally,

4 In other disciplines such as history, sociology, and even public policy, debates about causal mechanisms seem to have followed slightly different contours, perhaps reflecting historical differences in the dominant ontological and epistemological positions held in these disciplines as compared to political science.

and partially as an extension of the second common trait, most definitions of causal

mechanisms used in political science are embedded in the methodological individualist

paradigm, such that explanations of macro-level phenomena ultimately rest on

mechanisms that apply to individual agents, their psychologies, or their cognitive skills.

In this section we discuss each of these common factors, explain our position toward them, and elaborate what we see as a more tenable definition of causal mechanism and its

relation to context.

From I Æ M Æ O to I Æ M + C Æ O

There is little disagreement, even among scholars subscribing to different research

traditions within political science, about the usefulness of causal mechanisms for opening

the black box that connects inputs and outputs. For example, King, Keohane, and Verba

argue that “an emphasis on causal mechanisms makes intuitive sense: any coherent

account of causality needs to specify how its effects are exerted” (1994, 85-6), and

Kitschelt sustains that “[t]o accept something as a cause of a social phenomenon, we

must identify the mechanism(s) that brought it about” (1999, 8). For King, Keohane, and

Verba, the identification of mechanisms is an “operational procedure” (1994, 87)

consisting of connecting the original posited cause and the ultimate effect in a causal

chain of intervening variables. Thus, “greater minority disaffection under a presidential

regime” and “lesser governmental decisiveness under a parliamentary regime” are some

of the hypothetical mechanisms that explain the effect of a political system type

(presidential or parliamentary) on democratic stability (King et al. 1994, 86). Interested in

explaining the increasing polarization of regime types among post-communist

countries—some moving toward becoming full democracies while others slide into

increased authoritarianism—Kitschelt argues that “the first mechanism leading to

different post-communist regime outcomes … has to do with the presence or absence of

ingredients of professional versus patronage bureaucracy in communist polities,” and

“the second chain of conditions and mechanisms … ha[s] to do with the organization of

civil society before and under communism” (1999, 24, 27). Although the two works draw

from different methodologies (King, Keohane, and Verba’s cite a large-N study and

propose the use of experimental design in their example, whereas Kitschelt utilizes

historical narrative combined with typological and path dependent analyses), they

similarly treat causal mechanisms as intervening variables that can be directly observed

and measured.

However, as Mahoney convincingly argues, this notion of mechanisms as

intervening variables ultimately falls back on correlational assumptions: “[A] variable’s

status as a ‘mechanism’ as opposed to an ‘independent variable’ is arbitrary … a

correlation is ‘explained’ simply by appealing to another correlation of observed

variables” (Mahoney 2001, 578). In our view, as in Mahoney’s, mechanisms cannot

simply be an attribute of an input, not even an intervening input – e.g. something

describing the size, situation, orientation, etc. of something else that is (even very

proximate to) an outcome. Rather, mechanisms are relational and processual -- they link inputs and outputs by explaining how you get from one to the other. Both attributes of inputs in a causal chain (independent and intervening variables) and the causal

mechanism(s) that link these inputs to the outcome (dependent variable) are often lumped

together casually as “causal factors.” However, it should be clear from the preceding

discussion that while we see all causal mechanisms as causal factors, not all causal

factors are causal mechanisms.

While we agree with Mahoney’s (2001) claim that causal mechanisms are not

reducible to intervening variables, we take issue with some of the implications he derives from this axiom. In seeking to move away from the notion of mechanisms as variables,

Mahoney requires that a causal mechanism be an “unobserved entity that—when

activated—generates an outcome of interest.” This definition “assumes that […] if the

mechanism actually operates, it will always produce the outcome of interest” (Mahoney

2001, 580). Two implications derive from this definition. First, as unobserved entities,

“[c]ausal mechanisms are posited relations or processes that the researcher imagines to

exist; they do not refer to any particular set of empirical conditions” (Mahoney 2001,

581). Second, mechanisms, according to Mahoney, are the bases of deterministic law-like

statements. While we agree with Mahoney that causal mechanisms cannot be reduced to

intervening variables without losing their explanatory leverage, we differ from him as to

whether mechanisms are (a) necessarily unobservable and (b) deterministic in their

operations.

We understand causal mechanisms to be portable concepts that can travel from

one sequence or trajectory of events or context to another. As such, mechanisms are of a

higher level of abstraction than intervening variables and they are not specific to any

singular type of process. They refer to the underlying logic that connects initial

conditions and outcomes and accounts for how processes evolve. The same mechanism

can thus operate in different contexts. But because mechanisms interact with the context

in which they operate, the outcomes of the process cannot be determined a priori by

5 knowing the type of mechanism that is at work. Several implications derive from our definition.

1. Causal mechanisms are portable concepts. Hedström and Swedberg (1998) provide a good example of an individual-level mechanism that serves as the explanatory link connecting behavior and outcomes in three different sociological theories. First,

Merton’s (1968 [1948]) theory of self-fulfilling prophecy states that an initially false situation evokes behavior that eventually makes the false conception come true. Second,

Coleman, Katz, and Menzel’s (1957) study of the diffusion of a new drug found that physicians’ position in various professional networks influenced the diffusion process of the new drug being introduced. Finally, Granovetter’s (1978) threshold theory of collective behavior argued that an individual’s decision whether or not to participate in collective behavior often depends on how many other actors have already decided to participate. According to Hedström and Swedberg, the same individual-level causal mechanism, namely belief-formation, operates in the three theories as well as in the different contexts and the effects that they evoke. In their own words: “the core characteristic of these theories … is the general belief-formation mechanism which states that the number of individuals who perform a certain act signal to others the likely value or necessity of the act, and that this signal will influence other individuals’ choices of action. It is this belief-formation mechanism that is at the heart of the self-fulfilling prophecies of Merton, the network effects of Coleman, and the bandwagon effects of

Granovetter. On the fundamental level of mechanisms, the run on the bank, the prescription of the drug, and the emergence of the collective movement, all are analogous” (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 21).

Another example of a portable causal mechanism is boundary control. Rokkan

(1983) proposed this concept to analyze the defensive strategy of cultural peripheries against encroachments from the center. In a recent article, Gibson (1995) adapted and further elaborated upon the same concept to refer to the strategies of subnational authoritarian leaders in maintaining their regional hegemonic power in the context of nationally democratic polities. Finally, although he does not use this concept, the same mechanism of boundary control could be applied to explain the strategies of the “barons” of the Italian academic system in keeping it fairly insulated from the rest of the world, as described by Gambetta (1998, 108). In all these cases, the same concept is used to refer to the strategies of either individual or collective actors who play in different contexts.

Despite radical differences among the three contexts, they all constitute subunits of larger entities, in which those who exert local domination seek to protect themselves from external influences. Although the specific contexts are different, for the purposes of the causal explanations advanced by the authors, the contexts are analytically equivalent.

Hence, whereas boundary control is not a universal mechanism, it is portable; and what makes it portable is precisely the analytical equivalence of the contexts to which the mechanism can be applied.

As can be appreciated in these two examples of causal mechanisms, they are neither context-specific nor reducible to intervening variables. The Appendix provides some further examples of causal mechanisms found in recent works of political methodology and comparative politics.

2. Causal mechanisms do not have to be unobservable. Scholars have different opinions on the issue of observability of mechanisms. If causal mechanisms are defined

as intervening variables, they will tend to be operationalizable and measurable. They can

be observed. If, instead, mechanisms are defined as the “final movers of outcomes in the

world” (Mahoney 2003, 5) or as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or

psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate” (George

and Bennett 2005, 137), then unobservability is inevitably related to a higher ontological status assigned to mechanisms when compared to variables. According to the latter

conception, if improvement of measurement techniques makes it feasible to observe

mechanisms, they stop being mechanisms and become variables. At that point, the border

between the observable world and the unobservable ontological level where causal mechanisms reside has moved, and explanations via causal mechanisms should be sought

at a lower (or at least different and unobservable) level (George and Bennett 2005, 143).

While we disagree with any view that reduces causal mechanisms to intervening

variables, we argue that unobservability is not a definitional element of causal

mechanisms. Whereas many causal mechanisms are indeed unobservable (e.g. adaptive

expectations, belief-formation, or power reproduction, just to name a few), others can be measured empirically. Take for example the positive feedbacks mechanisms considered by Pierson (2000). Mechanisms such as “coordination effects” or “large set-up costs”

(see the Appendix for definitions) could easily be operationalized and measured. The same could be said of social system mechanisms such as “technical interrelatedness” or

“system scale economies” proposed by David (1985). Yet, none of these four concepts is reducible to a context-specific indicator. They can be measured and observed, but they also maintain their portability property and travel to different contexts and situations.

3. The same causal mechanism can lead to different outcomes. We depart from the view that mechanisms lead to deterministic outcomes (Bunge 1997; Mahoney 2001).

While we are interested in mechanisms as portable concepts and what is constant in them, we agree with Elster that they are “triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences” (1998, 45). To us, the interaction between mechanism and context is what determines the outcome. Given an initial set of conditions, the same mechanism operating in different contexts may lead to different outcomes, as represented in schematic form in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The I Æ M Æ O model in Different Contexts

Context A Context B

I Æ M Æ Oa I Æ M Æ Ob

In other words, the indeterminacy is not in the mechanism but in the context.

Pawson (2001) takes a similar approach when he states that “[w]hether [a] mechanism is triggered depends on context” (5), and warns policy-makers about the risk of mechanically transferring successful policy programs to contexts in which the underlying mechanism may not lead to the same outcome. This is the reason why it is so important to disentangle causal mechanisms from context, and at the same time provide very clear definitions of the mechanism(s) at work and the context in which they are operating.

Degree of conceptual abstraction

Having defined mechanisms as portable concepts, we recognize that a hierarchy

of mechanisms by their level of conceptual abstraction can be established.5 There are

“umbrella” mechanisms of higher levels of conceptual abstraction that may encompass

other portable mechanisms. For example, “increasing returns” is a more general

mechanism than “positive feedback,” which in turn is more general than “path-dependent

technological innovation” or “large set-up costs.” Or, to return to the example of

“boundary control,” this mechanism is more general than those of “parochialization of

power,” “the nationalization of influence,” or “monopolization of national-subnational

linkages” identified by Gibson (1995, 11) in the relationships between centers and

peripheries.

In our view, the most appealing causal explanations are those that open two

“boxes.” First, they open the “black box” that connects inputs (I) and outcomes (O).

Second, they also open the “box” of higher level of abstraction mechanisms and identify the mechanisms of lower levels of abstraction (or sub-mechanisms) that offer a more accurate depiction of how we get from I through “sub-M” to O. But this “sub-

mechanism,” while closer to the events of interest than the “umbrella-mechanism,”

remains a portable concept and cannot be simply reduced to an intervening variable.

Clearly, mechanisms, like other social science concepts, suffer from the intension- extension tradeoff identified by Sartori (1970). Our preference for identifying mechanisms at a lower level of abstraction is linked as well to our conviction that

because the outcomes of mechanisms are linked to the context within which the

5 Note that this is a different issue than whether or not mechanisms should always apply to units of lower level of analysis than the phenomena we are interested in.

mechanism operates, middle-range theorizing is the appropriate goal for mechanismic explanations.

From Methodological Individualism to Scopes of Application

Many of the scholars who seek to unearth the mechanisms that link causes and effects work within a paradigm of methodological individualism (e.g., Boudon 1998;

Elster 1998, 47; Kitschelt 1999, 8). Boudon writes: “[a]nalyzing social mechanisms requires—at least ideally—making them the outcome of individual beliefs, actions, attitudes” (1998, 199). In political science, the concept of “rationality” as an individual- level mechanism permeates a large body of literature. More recent studies in public opinion and electoral behavior are also moving toward the identification of cognitive and psychological individual-level mechanisms (such as learning) that explain macro-political effects.

However, those working outside of a strictly methodological individualist paradigm are more apt to recognize that not all causal mechanisms must operate at the level of the individual. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (2001, 25-6) “relational,”

“environmental,” and “cognitive” mechanisms may occur at a variety of levels of analysis. Similarly, Ekiert and Hanson (2003, 15-48) identify different causal mechanisms according to the level of analysis (structural, institutional, or interactional) and type of context (temporal or spatial) to which they refer. And George and Bennett

(2005, 142) argue that the appropriate level of analysis of causal mechanisms will vary depending on the particular research question and the objectives under investigation. As

Mahoney (2003, 5) writes, “mechanisms need not be specified at any particular level of

11 analysis, and … micro mechanisms are not necessarily superior or more basic than macro mechanisms.” Stinchcombe proposes “methodological collectivism” and states this position even more forcefully when he writes: “Where there is rich information on variations at the collective or structural level, while individual-level reasoning (a) has no substantial independent empirical support and (b) adds no new predictions at the structural level that can be independently verified, theorizing a the level of [individual] mechanisms is a waste of time” (Stinchcombe 1991, 380). In the Appendix, we identify a number of causal mechanisms and order them according to the level of analysis to which they refer. Some are strictly individually based (such as adaptive expectations or belief- formation), while others apply to collective actors (power reproduction, policy-ratchet effects, layering) or to social systems (large set-up costs, functional consequences). There are also mechanisms that are equally applicable to two contiguous levels of analysis, such as those listed under the “individual or collective actors” and “collective actors or social systems” subheadings in the Appendix.

Causal Mechanisms in context

So far we have defined what we mean as a causal mechanism and have discussed how our definition relates to previous ones. We have established that a causal mechanism may apply to individual or collective actors; it may be unobservable or not; it may be of a higher or lower level of abstraction; but above all, it is portable. That is, it is sufficiently distinct from the context in which it operates to merit the ontological status of a mechanism, rather than simply another set of intervening variables that link input to outcome.

It should be noted that defining a mechanism as a portable concept does not mean

that it will operate in every context. Some mechanisms (e.g. rationality, in the sense of

individuals acting to maximize their perceived utility) seem quite general, and are even

presumed by some to operate universally. But many other mechanisms are not nearly so

ubiquitous. In some cases, contextual factors may allow for some mechanisms to apply,

but not others. For example, Lynch (2006) argues that a positive feedback mechanism

links particularistic political competition to elderly-oriented welfare state spending in a

context in which welfare state programs are linked to labor market status; but this

mechanism does not function fully in a context defined by universal social welfare programs. Other mechanisms may apply only to a subset of all possible contexts.

Boundary control, as discussed above, is one such example; another is the “circular flow of power” in Leninist regimes.6

Additionally, as we have seen in Figure 1 above, the same mechanism operating

in different contexts may produce different results. Hence, the scope of application of a

mechanism and the mechanisms essential indeterminacy make context as important in

generating the outcome of interest as the mechanism itself. If we view mechanisms as

portable concepts that produce indeterminate outcomes, as we argue they should be

viewed, then only context and mechanism taken together constitute a full causal

explanation. In the next section we define what we mean by context, and problematize

the use of critical junctures as a marker of context in historical institutionalist analysis.

CONTEXT AND TEMPORALITY

What is context?

6 Thanks to Steven Hanson, personal communication, for the latter example.

Pawson’s (2000) “middle-range realism” posits context as causal mechanism’s

“partner concept” (296). Outcomes of causal mechanisms are not fixed, but rather dependent on the context within which they occur. Pawson illustrates with “a favourite physical science example of contextual contingency:” gunpowder. Gunpowder has a chemical makeup that gives it the potential to explode in the presence of a spark, but it only does so when certain contextual conditions (eg. the amount of humidity in the air or gunpowder) are conducive (296). But what are the elements of context that are likely to affect social mechanisms? If theorizing about social life requires attention to context, to what, precisely, are we supposed to pay attention?

Bunge’s (1997) notion of “systemness” provides some clues. According to Bunge mechanisms operate within systems, which are defined by their composition (the set of parts that make up the system), their environment (which Bunge does not define), and their structure (how the constituent parts are connected to each other and to “things in the environment that influence or are influenced by” the constituent parts) (416). Aspects of

Bunge’s notion of systemness – particularly “environment” and “structure” -- contribute to our definition of context. We find it quite useful to note that elements that are not directly on the I-M-O path, but rather reside in some other aspects of the system, may nevertheless affect the functioning of a mechanism and hence the nature of O.

Drawing on Pawson and Bunge, we define context broadly as the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms. From this definition it follows that a causal explanation requires the analyst both to specify the operative causal mechanism, and to

14 delineate the relevant aspects of the surroundings -- i.e. those that allow the mechanism to produce the outcome.

Herein lies the rub. How can we know what aspects of the context are relevant to the outcome until we have an explanation for the outcome? Our view of causation depends on a definition of context that is tied to the outcome. Does this not simple give researchers license to “explain” something by selecting in an ad hoc way the contextual factors that contribute to its occurrence? If it were not for the fact that researchers make these kinds of decisions routinely (albeit often in a less than fully conscious way), we might worry. But the case-based research paradigm has at its disposal a variety of tools for determining before the fact what aspects of a context are likely to be relevant to the outcome under study. We turn our attention now to one specific aspect of context, the temporal context within which causal processes play out. We argue that paying more attention to how we define and select the causally relevant aspects of a temporal context will aid us in constructing valid causal explanations.

Causation in time

Historically-oriented political science research is notable for its theoretically- based expectation that the temporal aspects of the context within which a causal process plays out matter for explaining outcomes. Sequencing -- when things happen --, either in world-historical time (Wallerstein 1974), in relation to signal events in political development like the development of working-class parties, or to more contingent events or processes closer at hand (e.g. the availability of certain policy models), may affect how and whether a specific mechanism works. For example, Falleti (2005) shows that if a

process of decentralization begins with a “political decentralization” type of reform, the

process will likely produce a policy-ratchet effect (mechanism)—namely, the creation of

a group of subnational supporters—that will affect the second round of decentralization

reforms. This mechanism, however, will most likely be absent if political decentralization

occurs after administrative decentralization has taken place.

Tempo and duration -- how long things take -- may suggest a likely set of

plausible mechanisms. Outcomes that come about slowly, gradually, or after a long lag

are likely to be produced by different kinds of mechanisms (policy drift, friction,

increasing returns) than those that occur swiftly or suddenly (tipping points, rational choice) (see Pierson 2004, Chapter 3). Indeed, those political scientists who focus on

longue durée processes have tended to emphasize structuralist, systems-oriented, and/or

macro-social causal mechanisms while scholars interested in the consequences of shorter-

term processes often are more attuned to mechanisms posited at the level of the

individual or collectivities of individuals (see the Appendix for examples).

Our focus here, however, is concerned with a third aspect of temporality: when

things start. Starting points have had particular relevance for historical institutionalists

because the notion of path dependence, which is at the center of many historical

institutional analyses, relies on a well-specified starting point. Historical institutionalist

scholars typically use starting points and critical junctures to delineate one context,

"before," in which a mechanism (often path-dependent) does not function, from a second

context, "after," in which it does function. We argue, however, that the act of periodizing

as a way of marking shifts in context is often insufficiently theorized in historical

institutionalism, and runs into particular difficulties when confronted with causal

mechanisms that operate at the aggregate- or structural-level rather than the individual

level.

Context and periodization

If causal mechanisms are themselves portable, but operate in a context-dependent

fashion, then in order to develop causal theories we must be able to identify analytically

equivalent contexts as well as specify where one context ends and another begins. For historical researchers, the passage of time is often the most obvious indication that a context has changed. So it is no surprise that in historically-informed analyses,

periodization plays an important role in the development of causal theories. But even

self-consciously methodological works examining periodization in causal analysis often

fail to adequately specify how to place the markers that designate contextually homogeneous periods in time, or to specify which aspects of a context must be constant

within a given period and which may be allowed to vary.

Büthe (2002), for example, issues a plea for more careful attention to the

placement of starting- and ending-points in research that utilizes historical narratives as

case material. Büthe sees a tension between formal models, which provide “an explicit,

deductively sound statement of the theoretical argument, separate from a particular

empirical context” (482), and the analysis of complex causal processes over time, which

often involve feedback loops or other forms of endogeneity. Decontextualized formal

models may lead to invalid causal claims if they fail to consider the sequencing (when

things happen) with which a specific causal mechanism plays out. Büthe sees the

analysis of historical narrative as a solution to this problem, but recognizes the difficulty

of knowing where to start and end a narrative. In particular, he asks “… how do we delineate a sequence of events so as to justify the imposition of a narrative beginning and

end onto a continuous empirical record? How does the imposition of a narrative closure affect the generality of our conclusions?” (482). Ultimately, however, he is only able to

offer the advice that “the specification of the explanandum … provides the criteria for

choosing the beginning and end of the narrative” (488). Where the process to be

explained does not have a “clear starting point (e.g. an exogenous shock)” and/or has not

“run its course,” Büthe himself notes that even this advice will prove inadequate (487).7

Büthe advocates delineating the beginning of a new context with reference to the

onset of the causal mechanism that produces the outcome. Analyses that use critical junctures to delineate the beginning of a period are one example of this strategy. Critical junctures are often defined ex post as the starting point of a path dependent causal

mechanism that leads to the outcome of interest. Many analyses situate the critical juncture at the point of some exogenous shock (war, depression, shift in commodity prices, etc.); nevertheless, the most widely read classic examples of critical junctures analysis (e.g. Collier and Collier 1991; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Moore 1966) embed critical junctures in a richly detailed context, and make it clear that the outcome of the causal process that begins with the critical juncture may also be influenced by a variety of other features of the environment. Collier and Collier (1991, Chap 1), for example, note that the duration of a critical juncture need not be short, and that longer critical junctures

7 Büthe also does not address the issue of how one might periodize within the grand historical narrative in order to achieve more causal leverage.

often incorporate background conditions and cleavages into the production of the

outcomes in question.8

Some more recent analyses employing critical junctures also recognize that

although a juncture may be the starting point of a new "path," it is also a product of what

came before (see for example Hacker 2002). However, a new strain of theorizing about

critical junctures tends to emphasize the contingency of such moments, which highlights

their status distinctive break-points with the previous context. Mahoney (2000), demands

that the start of a path dependent process be "contingent", by which he means that the probability of any one particular path/outcome being chosen at the critical juncture is

equal to the probability that any other (plausible) path/outcome will be chosen (514).

Mahoney eschews the notion that critical junctures represent truly random choices,

instead noting that "In the actual practice of research, social analysts will consider an

event to be contingent when its explanation appears to fall outside of existing scientific theory," e.g. an unpredictable exogenous shock or a particular decision made by a political actor with a proper name. (514). Regardless of whether we think of critical junctures as truly random or as simply not predictable, however, this formulation departs significantly from Collier and Collier's (1991) notion that critical junctures may have strong links to the past.

Similarly, Capoccia and Keleman (2005) emphasize the delinking from context

that occurs at a critical juncture: "Critical junctures are characterized by a situation in

which for a relatively short phase the 'structural' (i.e. economic, cultural, ideological,

organizational) influences on political action are substantially relaxed" (3). Capoccia and

8 In some analyses (e.g. Capoccia and Keleman 2005; Collier and Collier 1991), critical junctures are labeled as “causes” of the outcomes of interest, but we believe this designation to be inconsistent with notions of causality employed by these same authors.

Keleman distinguish their conception of a critical juncture, quite rightly, from Lipset and

Rokkan's (1967) and Collier and Collier's (1991), both of whom "embed" their critical junctures in antecendent conditions (Capoccia and Keleman 2005, 5) and in so doing downplay the agency of individual actors.

The periodization strategies advanced in both Büthe’s (2002) framework and in critical junctures analysis following Mahoney (2000) and Capoccia and Keleman (2005) implicitly or explicitly define the initiation of a (path dependent) causal mechanism as the starting point of the context within which the causal process unfolds. In other words, the context surrounding the IÆ M Æ O pathway is bounded precisely by the beginning and

end of the causal mechanism (M) of interest. This conceptualization of a starting point is

a useful tool for identifying the beginning of a path dependent process and may also

highlight mechanisms that take place at the level of individuals or groups of individuals.

It is not a good guide, however, to continuity and change in other important aspects of the

context in which the causal mechanism plays out and that may have an important effect

on the outcome of interest.

Lieberman (2001), in an article devoted to periodization strategies in historical

institutionalist analysis, helpfully goes beyond critical junctures in his search for possible

starting points. Lieberman's typology identifies four types of starting points: the

origination of a new institution (which for him equals the independent variable) of

interest, or an important change in such an institution; an exogenous shock that changes

the conditions in which the institution operates; or a change in some "rival independent

variable" present in the “background” (1019, Table 1). This typology usefully points to

the variety of potential markers of the beginning of a new context, which need not all

20 coincide with the onset of the mechanism presumed to be responsible for the outcome of interest. It also emphasizes that periodization may be based on activity in numerous layers (proximate institutions, background, truly exogenous events) of the context within which a causal process plays out, a point to which we will return in a moment.

But while Lieberman introduces the idea that changes in a variety of different aspects of the context surrounding a causal mechanism may be consequential for the outcome of interest, his typology does not leave room for causal processes that might be generated by interaction or friction between the different aspects of the context. Yet, as Orren and

Skowroneck (1994, 321) note, the multiple layers or "orders" of institutions that constitute the polity or context at any given time are not "synchronized in their operations." Rather, these orders "abrade against each other and, in the process, drive further change." Lieberman's strategies for periodization focus the attention on

"important events, changes or turning points that can be conceptualized as markers of variation in a potentially important explanatory variable" (1017), which have "potentially important impact on the outcomes under investigation." Lieberman notes that such events are relatively rare: "Within a mass of historical observations, only a few events define a period, whereas most other events and processes are explained as taking place during a period" (1017). This relatively narrow definition is nicely operational, but it also seems to us to simultaneously raise and fail to grapple with the central fact about context, i.e. its multi-layered character.

Causation in multi-layered contexts

Social processes take place in a context characterized by multiple overlapping layers of institutions and structures that govern the relationships between inputs and outcomes. Pawson (2000) cites as an example of this layered social reality the process of writing a check. Checks are "routinely accepted for payment only because we take for granted [their] place within the wider (institutional) rules of the banking system. The capacities that bring custom and order to the transaction do not reside solely with particular objects (checks) or agents (cashiers) but also belong to the institutional regulations (credit), legal constitutions (charters) and organizational structures

(chancelleries)" (294). In historical institutionalist analysis, we are likely to be concerned with a variety of contextual layers: those that are quite proximate to the input (I) -- for example the electoral system in a study of the emergence of radical right wing parties --; exogenous shocks quite distant from (I) that might nevertheless effect the functioning of the mechanism and hence the outcome (eg. a rise in the price of oil that slows the economy and makes voters more sensitive to higher taxes); and also the middle-range context that is neither completely exogenous nor tightly coupled to (I) and that may include other relevant institutions and structures (the tax system, social solidarity, demography) as well as more atmospheric conditions such as the rate of economic growth, flows of immigrants, trends in partisan identification, and the like. Lieberman

(2001) conceives of this “background” context as the locus of "rival causes." However, we believe that recent research (e.g. Hacker 2002; Lynch 2006; Streeck and Thelen 2005) bears out Orren and Skowroneck’s (1994) contention that the interaction of different layers of context may itself generate important outcomes.

Steinmo and Thelen (1992, 16-7) illustrate how changes in background conditions may affect the outcome of an institutionally-structured process, even if the direct institutional inputs do not themselves change. Changes in the social, economic, or political context may make previously marginal institutions more central to political life; bring new actors into play who use the same institutions to achieve different ends; or cause the same actors to pursue new goals through existing institutions. In all of these cases, the institutional inputs do not change, the mechanism may or may not change, but the institutional outputs do change because the context has changed.

Expanding her view beyond the operation of formal institutions, Lynch (2006) provides an extended illustration of how the multiple layers of context within which a path dependent causal mechanism operates play an essential role in generating the outcome of interest – in this case, the extent to which social policies in different countries privilege the elderly over working-aged adults and children. Lynch begins by observing a correlation at the level of the nation-state between the age-orientation of social policies and the way that politicians use social programs to compete for votes. But this correlation is not linked to an obvious causal mechanism, suggesting that a time- dependent process may be at work.

With a nod to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Collier and Collier (1991), Lynch presents her argument as a classic branching tree. Two critical junctures mark choice points in the development of welfare state institutions, with the mode of political competition in a polity pushing towards particular institutional choices and reinforcing those choices over time through positive feedback mechanisms until the next critical juncture arrives. But the outcomes in question, the age-orientation of social policies in

different countries, cannot be satisfactorily explained within a framework that specifies

critical junctures as moments of radical discontinuity. Rather, Lynch argues that

processes occurring in three separate layers of context over the relatively longue durée of

the twentieth century interact to produce the age-orientations observed in ca. 1990.

The layer of context closest to the causal mechanism in Lynch's argument is the

political arena, where the policy preferences of parties and unions take shape, informed in

part by the mechanism of voter recruitment (particularistic versus programmatic

competition) in a polity. Following a critical juncture around the time of World War II,

the political arena is linked via a path-dependent process of increasing returns to a second

layer, the institutional arena of social policy programs. Changes in institutional structure over time shape the boundaries of labor market "insider" and "outsider" groups, in a process that shapes the relative weight of spending on different age groups. But the balance of pensioners, workers and children that fall into these groups is ultimately determined by what happens in a third layer of context, composed of slow-moving background processes: population aging, the gradual closure of many Continental

European labor markets to younger job-seekers, and the development of public and private markets for old-age insurance.

Lynch's explanation for the age-orientation of social spending shows how a single outcome may be determined by the interaction of multiple layers of context, including very slow-moving processes quite far removed from the institutional dynamics that originate in the critical juncture This analysis suggests that in addition to the causal mechanism driving the path-dependent processes of institutional choice following critical junctures, there is another important causal mechanism at work: "policy drift" (Hacker

2004; 2005), a mechanism that can in fact only operate in a system characterized by multiple layers of relevant context.

If political contexts tends to be layered, with processes occurring at different speeds in different layers; and if some mechanisms are characteristic of the interaction of separate layers; then periodization in historical institutionalist analysis should be attuned to the start- and end-points as well as the tempo and duration of multiple processes in multiple layers. Consider a causal process that begins at time tI (for input) with a change in the main institution of interest, which is found in contextual layer L1, as in Figure 2. A

critical junctures analysis would start the clock at time tI, tracing the outcome occurring

at time tO (for output) back to the change in the institution in L1. In this case, the change

in this institution follows closely (but not instantaneously) upon an exogenous shock E,

which itself spans considerably less time than most other elements in this diagram, but

does have some measurable duration. Preceding the exogenous shock and lasting well

past the critical juncture at time tI, background condition B exerts a continuous influence

on the unfolding of our causal process. A second causal process linked to a change in

contextual layer L2 also predates and persists through the critical juncture, although it

should be noted that its start and end points do not coincide neatly with B, either.

Another process of potential relevance to O occurs in L3. Strictly speaking, portable

causal mechanisms require that, under the same initial conditions, identical contexts produce identical outcomes. But which context is the relevant one in this diagram? Only the temporal context marked C5 captures all of the major contextual layers, but it excludes the exogenous shock and resulting critical juncture. Context C3 includes the

critical juncture, but misses the beginning and end points of some processes that might

prove important. [Figure 2 on facing page]

It is clear from this schematic representation of unfolding causal processes in a

layered context that a perfect periodization scheme may prove elusive, and that care must

be taken when making decisions about periodization to specify which layers of context are relevant and how. The use of critical junctures as starting points may pose particular

problems in multi-layered contexts when important processes are not synchronized with

start point of I Æ M Æ O pathway to which the critical juncture pertains.

Figure 2: Periodization in Multi-Layered Contexts

Because the multiple layers of context that affect the outcomes of causal

processes cannot all be expected to change at the same moment, dividing a historical

narrative into periods based on the starting or ending point of a single causal process risks

hiding from view precisely those interactions between layers moving at different speeds

that can generate change over time. The crucial points here are two. First, critical

junctures and other starting points that hone in on the initiation of a single I Æ M Æ O pathway miss the causal impact of things that don’t change at all, or don’t change at the same time as the critical juncture; and second, interactions between layers may be as important in producing outcomes of interest as any single causal mechanism.

CONCLUSION

If the context within which a social mechanism operates has many different institutional (or cognitive, or ideational) layers that may be relevant to the functioning of the mechanism, then periodizing as a method for generating contextually (and hence causally) homogeneous sub-units of a narrative, as Büthe (2002) recommends, becomes fraught with difficulties. If, as we argue, causal mechanisms are relatively abstract portable concepts whose causal force is given by the contours of the environment in which they operate, and if the contours of this environment change over time, then we must divide time into pieces within which the relevant context is constant in order to observe the causal mechanisms at work.

But when there are many layers of context that may affect the outcomes in which we are interested, whose properties may change at different rates, that may be affected or not by different types of exogenous shocks, and that may or may not change at the same

27 moment that the causal process we are observing begins, then how do we know where one context leaves off and another begins? By way of a conclusion to this paper, we propose that as researchers we allow our theories about the social world to guide more strongly the selection of a relevant temporal context, rather than relying on “natural” starting points like major critical junctures or other historical breaking points.

First, we advocate periodizing based on important moments in those layers of the contextual environment that are considered most relevant to the outcome of interest from an explanatory point of view. Within the mass of all possible aspects of the environment that could be interconnected to the outcome, we must use theory to identify those that are most salient to the research question and hypotheses to be tested. Our research question, hypotheses, and the nature of the outcome of interest will determine which institutions, events, or background conditions are the most crucial. In Figure 2, for example, which of all the possible eight contexts (or their combinations) we choose to focus on will depend on which one that our theories tell us is most likely to yield an “efficient” explanation for the outcome of interest.

An important corollary of this piece of advice is that no one type of starting point is ontologically superior to any other. Critical junctures or exogenous shocks are not inherently more interesting, or more causally important, than moments of institutional creation, or than the slow-moving changes that sometimes occur in the “background.”

The context we choose may start with any one of these elements, it may contain some or all of them, or it may cut across the linear temporalities initiated with events, institutions, and background conditions. (It is worth noting this “contextualizing” strategy is very closely related to the “periodization” strategies discussed in the previous section.)

A second strategy for identifying the appropriate context for a causal explanation

consists of specifying context in such a way that it derives from the definition of the

object of study. For example, the way in which we define important concepts related to

our dependent variable -- “industrial relations,” or “social revolution,” or “party system”

– will have implications for how we select the key elements of the environment that are

considered to be so closely related to the definition of our object that once those elements

change, we can confidently say that we find ourselves in a different context. If we see a

party system, for example, as fundamentally a reflection of the rules governing the access

of politicians to legislative seats, we are likely to highlight a different set of contextual

layers than if we see party systems as a reflection of the development of class identities in

the electorate.

Another example, drawn from Falleti's work, illustrates how we might specify the

appropriate context within which to study decentralization of government policies. If we define decentralization as a process of state reforms composed by a set of public policies that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government (Falleti 2005, 328), then the type of state in which these policies take place is crucial for the identification or contextualization of the policies of interest. Because decentralization is a process of state reform, a transition to a different type of state necessarily will imply the commencement of a new process. In other words, we could argue that the contents, goals, or meanings of the decentralization policies and their interaction with the broader political and economic systems are highly determined by the type of state they seek to reform.

In this example, “type of state” (oligarchic, developmentalist, neoliberal) is the relevant context within which to analyze the process of interest. “Type of state,” which in this example corresponds to distinct world-historical time-frames, provides us with the temporal start and end points of our context. Decentralization policies that may look formally alike, and that may interact with similar mechanisms, will have different meanings and consequences as they unfold in different contexts or types of state. In Latin

America, for example, in the context of the oligarchic states of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, decentralization policies sought to consolidate or balance power

among regional elites (Ansaldi 1992, 17). In the context of developmental states in the

1960s and 1970s, decentralization policies sought to strengthen certain regions or

subnational institutions to make them more adequate for private investment (González

1990, 75). Finally, in the context of market-oriented or neoliberal states in the 1980s and

1990s, decentralization policies largely sought to reduce the size of central governments

by offloading responsibilities to subnational units, regardless of the consequences for

local institutions. In all three types of states decentralization policies entailed the

devolution of resources, responsibilities, or authority to subnational actors. But did these

formally similar decentralization policies have the same effects on the balance of power

among presidents, governors, and mayors?

Because the decentralization policies described above took place in contexts that

were not analytically equivalent, their effects on the balance of power between national

and subnational officials were radically different, even when the same causal mechanisms

(policy-ratchet effects, power reproduction) were at play. While in the context of

oligarchic states decentralization policies allowed for the simultaneous strengthening of

national and subnational authorities and made it possible for countries to “hold together;”

in the context of developmentalist states, decentralization policies strengthened subnational authorities by professionalizing their bureaucracies and consolidating their

institutions (this was the case with subnational state public enterprises in Brazil, for example, during the 1960s and 1970s). Finally, in the context of neoliberal states, decentralization policies (particularly those belonging to the administrative type of decentralization reforms) largely had the effect of weakening subnational authorities and bureaucracies, making them more dependent on the fiscal transfers that emanated from the center (see Falleti 2005). Thus, the same policies operating in different contexts led to different outcomes.

A corollary of this strategy for contextualizing by paying close attention to the nature of the outcome of interest is that comparativist scholars must be acutely attuned to the analytical equivalence of the contexts they study. Whether the researcher decides to focus on micro- or macro-level causal mechanisms, or whether she prioritizes short-durée or longue-durée explanations, contextualizing is always necessary to draw valid conclusions. Formally similar inputs, mediated by the same mechanisms, can lead to different outcomes if the contexts are not comparable. As Locke and Thelen (1995) argue, the same policies may have different meanings depending on the context in which they are applied, and therefore, are not directly comparable. Comparing apples with oranges may indeed be the right way to proceed, because the apples of one context, even if formally diverse, may be the analytical parallels of the oranges of another. Like Locke and Thelen, then, we argue in favor of a more contextualized approach to the study of comparative political institutions and processes.

The strategies we propose here suggest that by allowing theory to guide our decisions about what aspects of the environment in which a causal process occurs are

“relevant” scholars can meaningfully define and operationalize the contexts that make their causal explanations valid and relevant. This kind of explanation allows us to identify causal mechanisms that are portable and generalizable; and yet not so universal or abstract as to deprive the analysis of any real social meaning. In other words, this type of causal explanation allows us to construct the middle-range theories that Sartori

(1970)and others have argued are so essential to the social sciences.

Appendix. Examples of Causal Mechanisms by Scope of Application 9

I - Individuals as Causal Agents

Adaptive Expectations “...[I]ndividuals may feel a need to ‘pick the right horse.’ ... It derives from the self-fulfilling character of certain kinds of expectations” (Pierson 2000, 77).

Belief-formation Mechanism It “states that the number of individuals who perform a certain act signal to others the likely value or necessity of the act, and this signal will influence other individuals’ choice of action. It is this belief-formation mechanism that is at the heart of the self-fulfilling prophecies of Merton, the network effects of Coleman, and the bandwagon effects of Granovetter. On the fundamental level of mechanisms, the run on the bank, the prescription of the drug, and the emergence of the collective movement, all are analogous” (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 21).

II – Individuals or Collective Actors as Causal Agents

Coordination Effects “These occur when the benefits an individual receives from a particular activity increase as other adopt the same option.” (Pierson 2000, 76-7)

Legitimation “...[I]nstitutional reproduction is grounded in actors’ subjective orientations and beliefs about what is appropriate or morally correct.” “Increasing legitimation processes are marked by a positive feedback cycle in which an initial precedent about what is appropriate forms a basis for making future decisions about what is appropriate” (Mahoney 2000, 523).

Boundary Control a defensive strategy against cultural encroachments from the center (Rokkan 1983). “The leaders of a provincial authoritarian regime … will be engaged constantly in strategies of “boundary control.” These are strategies aimed at limiting the scope of provincial conflict, minimizing [national] incumbent influence over local politics and depriving local oppositions of access to national allies and resources.” “Boundary control in a large-scale system of territorial governance is played out in three spheres of political action: subnational arenas, national arenas, and the institutional links between them. Here I will identify three common strategies of boundary control: a) the parochialization of power, b) the nationalization of influence, and c) the monopolization of national-subnational linkages.” (Gibson 1995, 10, 11)

III – Collective Actors as Causal Agents

Social Learning It refers to the accumulated experience of administrators and experts in a policy area. “The best grounds of a new programme to become durable are if it is chosen

9 All the mechanisms listed in this table are self-reinforcing causal mechanisms, with the exception of those marked with double asterisks (**), which are reactive type of mechanisms or mechanisms that produce institutional change.

33 as a consequence of what Heclo (1974: 340ff.) calls social learning, that is, the accumulated experience of administrators and experts in a policy area.” (Rose 1990, 275)

Political Learning Political actors draw lessons from political experience. “Political learning ... cuts both ways. Perhaps democrats find consolidation easier when they can rely on past traditions, but anti-democratic forces also have an experience from which they can draw lessons: People know that an overthrow of democracy is possible, how it happens, and how to bring it about” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 127).

Power Reproduction Institutions replicate themselves to the degree that powerful people secure successors of the same persuasion by controlling (a) selection of their successors, (b) their socialization, (c) their conditions of incumbency, (d) heroe-worshipping. “Powerful people determine the structure of social activity” (Stinchcombe 1968, 117-8). “In the political realm, where certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the employment of power often generates positive feedback. Actors can utilize political power to generate changes in the rules of the game... designed to enhance their power” (Pierson 2000, 77).

Organizational Inertia (or Organizational Bias) It is the result of entrenched constituencies. “...policies create political constituencies for their defense, the beneficiaries of the policies, and thus we should expect resistance to cutbacks” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 22).

Ideological Hegemony It may operate through public opinion formation, for example: “...the strong social democratic labor movements developed ideological hegemony in society and so thoroughly dominated public opinion formation on social policy that the only way for a bourgeois coalition to win elections was to adopt social democratic policies” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 11).

Policy Ratchet Effect It operates by shaping “policy configurations.” “In the period of welfare state expansion, it was rare for secular conservative parties to roll back welfare state reforms instituted by social democratic or Christian democratic parties. Indeed they generally accepted each new reform after it had been instituted. The reason for the change in posture of the conservative parties was that the reforms were popular with the mass public. The new center of gravity of the policy agenda became defined by the innovations introduced by the progressive forces in society” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 10).

** Replacement of relevant political actors, change in distribution of generations in the general population over time. “Partisan realignment therefore often works through the extremely gradual replacement of political generations, as old members die off and are replaced with new ones who lack the old attachments” (Pierson 2003, 190).

** Layering Institution builders work around the power of the incumbent constituencies by adding new institutions rather than dismantling the old. “...[I]nstitutional innovators accommodate and in many ways adapt to the logic of the preexisting system, but their

actions do not push developments further along in the same direction, as suggested by the increasing returns arguments” (Thelen 2000: 106). “Layering involves active sponsorship of amendments, additions, or revisions to an existing set of institutions. The actual mechanisms for change is differential growth; the introduction of new elements setting in motion dynamics through which they, over time, actively crowd out or supplant by default the old system as the domain of the latter progressively shrinks relative to that of the former” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 24 emphasis added).

** Conversion “In many cases, we observe a situation in which exogenous processes or shocks produce or empower new actors, who—rather than challenging existing institutions outright—harness existing organizational forms in the service of new ends” (Thelen 2000: 104-5). Institutions are redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 26).

IV – Collective Actors or Social Systems as Causal Agents

Distribution of Power Resources The impact of state structure, mobilization of women, or other combinations of variables that have an impact on the distribution of power resources among social and political actors (Huber and Stephens 2001: 4-5).

** Displacement “From the perspective of whole systems (or what sociologists call ‘organizational fields’) change can occur through displacement … as new models emerge and diffuse which call into question existing, previously taken-for-granted organizational forms and practices” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 19). “Institutional configurations are vulnerable to change through displacement as traditional arrangements are discredited or pushed to the side in favor of new institutions and associated behavioral logics. Such change often occurs through the rediscovery or activation—and, always, the cultivation—of alternative institutional forms. As growing numbers of actors defect to a new system, previously deviant, aberrant, anachronistic, or ‘foreign’ practices gain salience at the expense of traditional institutional forms and behaviors” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 20).

** Drift Change is the result of non-decisions, of not actively working to maintain the institution and allowing it to decay (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 24-26).

V – Social Systems as Causal Agents

Large Set-Up Costs “These create a high pay-off for further investments in a given technology” (Pierson 2000: 76). “When set-up or fixed costs are high, individuals and organization have a strong incentive to identify and stick with a single option” (Pierson 2000, 76). Also referred to as quasi-irreversibility of investment (David 1985, 334).

Technical Interrelatedness “or the need for system compatibility between keyboard ‘hardware’ and the ‘software’ represented by the touch typist’s memory of a particular arrangement of the keys” (David 1985, 334).

System Scale Economies decreasing cost conditions due to positive network externalities, or in the case of keyboards’ adoption due to de facto standardization through the predominance of a single keyboard design (David 1985, 335).

Structural Limitation (or Institutional Constraints) “specifically the concentration or dispersion of political power resulting form constitutional provisions... high dispersion of power, or the availability of multiple veto points, has very strong effects on welfare state development, slowing welfare state expansion” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 4).

Functional Consequences The institution is reproduced because it serves a function for an overall system. “In the strong version [of functionalism] ... institutional reproduction is explained specifically because of its functional consequences (e.g., integration, adaptation, survival) for a larger system within which the institution is embedded” (Mahoney 2000, 517).

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