The Holy and Great Council and Its Implications for Orthodox Unity

THE HOLY AND GREAT COUNCIL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ORTHODOX UNITY

The Perspectives of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Greece

Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová*

The newspaper headlines referring to the first pan-Orthodox council after more than 1200 years, which took place in Crete in June 2016, suggested that one was witnessing a unique historical event – or even a new era – in the Orthodox world. Some even considered its importance to be comparable to the Second Vatican Council. According to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which was the central power initiating the Council, the goal was to demon- strate Orthodox unity and the readiness of the Orthodox Church to face the challenges of the contemporary world as well as to address disputed issues in Orthodox ecclesiastical jurisdiction. However, the absence of four autocephalous Orthodox Churches, among them the world’s largest (the Russian Orthodox Church) affected the initial purpose of the pan-Orthodox meeting. What has the Holy and Great Council (hereinafter the Council) exposed if not a proclaimed unity, and what does it mean for individual Orthodox churches and their mutual relations? By analyzing primary sources that include official documents released by Orthodox autocephalous churches, Orthodox presses and literature, and finally the statements of hierarchs in other media outlets, we assess the stances of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) towards the Council in particular and modern pan-Orthodox conciliarity in general. We focus on the period between

* Department of Russian and East European Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Research for this study has been supported by the Charles University, project GA UK No. 12415 and project PRIMUS/HUM/12. 146 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

2015 and 2017 when the discussions about the Council were the most intense, first regarding its preparations and later its course of action as well as the documents to be adopted. The three churches seem to be the ideal cases to illustrate different attitudes towards the Council as they opted for negotiation strategies ranging from a positive approach to pan-Orthodox conciliarity, over its conditional support, to its eventual denial. After this, we deal with possible implications of the Council for the position of these churches in the Orthodox world and their future interaction. Based on our academic background, we investigate these issues primarily from the social scientific perspective by considering their historical, political and social context.

1. The Great Councils: a Historical Perspective

The Orthodox Church presents itself as a united organism existing through conciliarity,1 a principle already known by the Apostles whereby the faith was to be maintained by local churches. The consensus, unity and coherence among these local churches were to be secured by the councils.2 Since the Roman Empire adopted a hostile attitude towards Christianity for more than three centuries, the councils – which also appointed bishops, solved internal disputes and kept ecclesiastical order – had to be unofficially organized on the local level. The radical transformation of relations between the Christian Church and the Roman Empire during Emperor Constantine’s rule in the fourth century enabled the Church to call councils of an ecumenical character, i.e., assemblies of all representatives from church jurisdictions convoked for the settlement of ecclesiastical or doctrinal problems.3

1 On the principle of conciliarity in the Orthodox Church, see P. Valliere, Conciliarism: A History of Decision-Making in the Church (New York, 2012); M. Vasiljević, ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’, in Synodality a Forgotten and Misapprehended Vision: Reflections on the Holy and Great Council 2016, eds. M. Vasiljević and A. Jeftić (Alhambra, 2017), pp. 99-128; L. J. Patsavos and E. I. Patsavos, Primacy and Conciliarity: Studies in the Primacy of the See of Constantinople and the Synodal Structure of the Orthodox Church (Brookline, 1995). 2 J. Meyendorff, ‘What Is an Ecumenical Council?’, St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 17 (1973), pp. 259-273, on p. 261. 3 J. Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today (New York, 1981), p. 29. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 147

The Orthodox churches acknowledge seven ecumenical councils to date.4 All of these were held under the specific historical circumstances of the Christian Roman (Byzantine) Empire and designed to clarify and articulate the Church’s visible organization. They also set up a clear framework of dogmatic and canonical norms to prevent ‘heresy and errors’.5 The ecumenical councils were convoked by the emperors and conciliar decisions were legally binding within the Empire. The Church had autonomy in decision-making while the Empire assumed responsibility for protecting the results of the councils.6 While the number of participants was not crucial, bishops had the right to vote whereas lower clergy played a consultative role, assisting bishops in studying particular topics; laity, theologians, philoso- phers and others familiar with the issues under discussion were likewise allowed to participate in meetings.7 The councils, however, frequently brought doctrinal and political disagreements rather than unity. While it was agreed that ecumenical councils established international law and protocol for all Christians, which of the great councils counted as ecumenical was often a source of heated debate.8 The Christological controversies ‘resolved’ at the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451), for example, separated the so-called Oriental Orthodox (Non-Chalce- donian Orthodox) from the ‘imperial’ Church, which was de facto reduced to the Greco-Roman world.9 From the Orthodox perspective, the conflict

4 They are the First Council of Nicaea (AD 325), the First Council of Constantinople (AD 381), the Council of Ephesus (AD 431), the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451), the Second Council of Constantinople (AD 553), the Third Council of Constantinople (AD 680) and the Second Council of Nicaea (AD 787). 5 K. Ware, The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to Eastern Christianity (London, 1993), pp. 18-42. 6 Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church (see n. 3), pp. 28-29. 7 M. Vasiljević, ‘Conciliarity in the Church History and Today’, Lecture, Montreal, 29 April 2017; C. Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’, in Synodality — A Forgotten and Misapprehended Vision: Reflections on the Holy and Great Council 2016, eds. M. Vasiljević and A. Jeftić (Alhambra, 2017), pp. 81-98, on pp. 83-84; R. Radić, ‘Vaseljenski Sabor [The Ecumenical Council]’, Peščanik, 26 June 2016, pp. 1-2, https:// pescanik.net/vaseljenski-sabor/. 8 Eds. P. Kalaitzidis et al., Orthodox Handbook on Ecumenism: Resources for Theological Education (Oxford, 2014), p. 5. 9 Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church (see n. 3), p. 40. For more on the Oriental Orthodox churches referred also as ‘Non-Chalcedonian’ or Monophysite, see Kalaitzidis et al., Ortho- dox Handbook on Ecumenism (see n. 8), pp. 545-546. 148 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová between Latin and Byzantine churches was probably more fatal, again having two layers (political and theological), as it escalated into the ‘Great Schism’ in 1054, further dividing Christendom into the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches.10 The Orthodox Church claims to remain faithful to the ancient councils, making her the ‘One Church’. Despite Eastern Christianity often being char- acterized by antiquity and timelessness, the Church had to react to external incentives and keep up with historical developments. Conciliarity, as the main instrument of dealing with Orthodoxy-wide issues, has been preserved, yet the ‘modern’, pan-Orthodox councils – lacking full conciliarity – have typically not qualified as ecumenical.11 Certain local churches have argued that the Orthodox world should respect some councils on dogmatic or canonical questions and should proclaim them ecumenical in a future council. However, other Orthodox churches or distinctive factions within them have often opposed such calls.12 At the beginning of the twentieth century, serious discussions on a council enjoying full conciliarity and addressing the new political, social and ecclesiastical problems were launched: for instance, the ecclesiastical irregu- larities of the Orthodox diaspora, the emergence of new autocephalous churches, the question of primacy and diptychs, the lack of a common stance between the Orthodox Church and other Christian churches and religions, the fasting rules, canonical obstacles to the Christian Orthodox marriage and the reform of the calendar. These issues simultaneously represented the main impediments to inter-Orthodox dialogue and created tensions between and

10 See S. Runciman, The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches During the XIth and XIIth Centuries (Oxford, 1955); A. E. Siecienski, The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy (New York, 2010). 11 The rediscovery of the principle of conciliarity was connected particularly with the work of Russian theologians of nineteenth century, especially Aleksei Khomiakov, who argued that conciliarity (sobornost’) was essential in the life of the Church. See J. Erickson, ‘Over- view of History and Difficulties in Preparing for the Council’, in Orthodox Christianity at the Crossroad: A Great Council of the Church When and Why, ed. G. E. Matsoukas (Bloom- ington, 2009), pp. 19-39, on p. 22 and Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 7), p. 93. For more on Khomiakov and his successors’ understanding of sobornost’, see K. Ware, ‘Sobornost and Eucharistic Ecclesiology: Aleksei Khomiakov and His Successors’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 11, no. 2-3 (2011), pp. 216-235. 12 Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church (see n. 3), p. 37. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 149 within autocephalous churches. In combination with the reality of the Cold War complicating dialogue among churches, fundamental disagreements over the crucial pan-Orthodox problems slowed down preparations for the Council for more than half a century.13 The Council’s long-lasting and uneasy preparatory process confirmed existing biases and a rivalry between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Patriar- chate of Moscow. It also illustrated various perspectives towards conciliarity as well as the expectations for the Council among Orthodox churches. On the other hand, pre-conciliar dialogue revealed that churches were willing to coop- erate and express unity since all of them were actively involved. In 2014, it was finally decided that the Council would be convened for Pentecost 2016, with each church sending a delegation consisting of its Primate and 24 bishops and all decisions being taken unanimously.14 The Synaxis of the Primates in Janu- ary 2016 then agreed on the final agenda of the Council limited to six topics: the mission of the Orthodox Church in the contemporary world, the Ortho- dox diaspora, autonomy and the manner of its proclamation, the sacrament of marriage and its impediments, the importance of fasting and its observance today, and lastly, the relationship of the Orthodox Church with the rest of the Christian world.15 The vast majority of Primates signed all drafted documents.16 Hence, when four autocephalous churches (the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate of Antioch, the Georgian Orthodox Church and the ROC) announced one by one at the beginning of June that they would not participate in the Council, the Ecumenical Patriarchate presented this as surprising and unfortunate since it diminished the authority and pan-Orthodox validity of the Council in advance.17 Despite the proposals to postpone the

13 For more about Council’s preparations, see N. Ruffieux, ‘Das Panorthodoxe Konzil: Vor- bereitung, Durchführung und Rezeption’, Cath(M), 67 (2013), pp. 101-120; and Archbishop Job of Telmessos, ‘Towards the Council - The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’, https://www.holycouncil.org/towards-the-council (accessed 17 May 2018). 14 Telmessos, ‘Towards the Council’ (see n. 13). 15 Ibid. The problematized issues of autocephaly and diptychs, as well as calendar reform, were excluded for the time being from the program of the forthcoming Council. 16 Ibid. The document on marriage was not signed by the Churches of Antioch and of Georgia; the former also did not sign the decisions of the 2016 Synaxis. 17 The Ecumenical Patriarchate, ‘Communiqué (06/06/2016) - Announcements’, 6 June 2016, https://www.patriarchate.org/-/anakoinothen-06-06-2016 (accessed on 24 January 2019). For details, see Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Diocese of the USA, Canada and 150 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová event because of the lack of the Church’s unity, the Council took place on the previously set dates (June 19-26, 2016), with only ten out of fourteen autocephalous churches in attendance.18

2. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Holy and Great Council

The SOC actively participated in all essential meetings organized with the prospect of the future Council, such as the 1923 congress in Istanbul,19 widely considered to be the commencement of modern efforts to display conciliarity at the pan-Orthodox level,20 and the last preparatory session, the

Australia, ‘DECISION of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church – Bulgarian Patriarchate’, 1 June 2016, http://bulgariandiocese.org/decision.html (accessed on 24 January 2019); Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and All the East, ‘Statement of the Secre- tariat of the Antiochian Holy Synod’, 7 June 2016, http://www.antiochpatriarchate.org/ en/page/statement-of-the-secretariat-of-the-antiochian-holy-synod-on-the-6th-of- june-2016/1436/ (accessed on 24 January 2019); Georgian Orthodox Church, ‘The Decree of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Georgia’, 10 June 2016, http:// patriarchate.ge/geo/the-decree-of-the-holy/; The Russian Orthodox Church - Department For External Church Relations, ‘On the Situation Caused by the Refusal of Several Local Orthodox Churches to Participate in the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’, 13 June 2016, https://mospat.ru/en/2016/06/13/news132897/ (accessed on 24 January 2019). 18 The postponement of the Council was first suggested by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church followed by the Church of Antioch, the SOC, the Georgian Orthodox Church and the ROC. See Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Statement of the Holy Synod of the Rus- sian Orthodox Church’, 15 June 2016, http://www.spc.rs/eng/situation_caused_refusal_ several_local_orthodox_churches_participate_holy_and_great_council_orthodox (accessed on 24 January 2019). 19 P. Viscuso, A Quest for Reform of the Orthodox Church: The 1923 Pan-Orthodox Con- gress: An Analysis and Translation of Its Acts and Decisions (Berkeley, 2006). 20 The SOC seemed to consider the 1930 pan-Orthodox meeting in Vatopedi, Mount Athos, to rather be the beginning of the preparatory process. G. Gajić, ‘Vatopedsko sabranje 1930. i Veliki Sabor 2016.- Poredjenje početka i završetka neobične saborske pripreme [The Vatopedi commission 1930 and the Great Council 2016 - Comparison of the beginning and conclusion of a special conciliar preparation]’, in Svepravoslavni Sabor: Bogoslovski Doprinos Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve, ed. G. Gajić (Cetinje, 2016), pp. 163-177; V. Radović, ‘Sveti i Veliki Sabor Pravoslavne Crkve: Kolimvari, Krit, Pedesetnica - 19-16. Jun 2016 [The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church: Kolymbari, Crete, Pentecost-19-16. June 2016]’, in Sveti i Veliki Sabor Pravoslavne Crkve, ed. K. Bojović (Cetinje, 2016), pp. 11-33, on p. 11. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 151

Synaxis of the Primates, held before the Great Council in January 2016 in Chambesy.21 Furthermore, it briefly, yet regularly, informed its believers on the preparatory process and the respective SOC’s activities. Nonetheless, the SOC hesitated until the last minute to confirm its attendance at the Coun- cil. ‘The preparation of the SOC to take part in the Holy and Great Council’ was the most important theme at the regular meeting of the Holy Assembly of Bishops from May 14 to May 25, 2016. At the meeting, bishops adopted a text expressing the SOC’s official position towards key issues related to the Council.22 Yet, this text was only made public on June 9 through the article ‘Referring to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’. While the SOC voiced awareness of the magnitude and importance of the Council, it was explicitly worried whether it ‘fulfills the criteria and measures of true councils from the history of the Orthodox Church’.23 The SOC, therefore, offered several viewpoints to be considered by ‘Primates and Holy Synods of Local Orthodox Churches’. The first worry concerned the Code of Regulations for organizing the work of the Council, which could introduce an unknown practice into the councils of the Orthodox Church because of ‘the imparity and inequality of all bishops at the Council’. The SOC found the proposed Council’s limited number of participants and the lack of unilateral voting rights for all bishops unjustified since ‘the conciliar Tradition of the One Church presupposes the right to vote of each bishop in the Council, from [a] regional to [an] ecumenical one’.24

21 For more about various perceptions of particular pan-Orthodox meetings within the SOC, see Gajić, Svepravoslavni Sabor (see n. 20) and Sveti i Veliki Sabor Pravoslavne Crkve: Učešće i Svedočenje Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve [Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church: Participation and Testimony of the Serbian Orthodox Church] (Cetinje, 2017) 22 Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Communiqué of the Holy Assembly of Bishops’, 27 May 2016, http://www.spc.rs/eng/communique_holy_assembly_bishops (accessed on 24 Janu- ary 2019). 23 Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Referring to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’, 9 June 2016, http://www.spc.rs/eng/referring_holy_and_great_council_ortho- dox_church (accessed on 24 January 2019). 24 Ibid. For more on the number of participants at the councils, see Vasiljević, ‘Synodal- ity: A Misinterpreted Vision’ (see n. 1), pp. 103-104; or R. Perşa, ‘The Canonical Tradi- tion of the Orthodox Church and the Holy and Great Council: Between Reception and Rejection’, in Theologia Orthodoxa, 62, no. 1 (2017), pp. 39-72, on pp. 48-60. 152 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

The SOC also called for the re-inclusion of autocephaly into the Council’s program, along with the conciliar confirmation of the autocephalous status of fourteen Orthodox churches. The six prepared texts were, according to Serbian bishops, basically good, but the documents entitled On the Mission of the Church in the Contemporary World and On the Relations with the Chris- tian World needed some amendments. Last but not least, the SOC stressed that ‘the question of Diaspora should be solved according to the conciliarity principle, by agreement and pan-Orthodox consensus, under the presidency of the Primate of Constantinople, but, with equal participation of throne co-holders, Orthodox Primates, and their Holy Assemblies or Synods’.25 Despite objections, the SOC did not seem to consider an actual withdrawal from the Council. However, the text adopted in May 2016 at the Holy Assem- bly of Bishops was not the only one published on the SOC’s official website in the article ‘Referring to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’. A letter – dated June 6 – by the Holy Synod of Bishops of the SOC addressed to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew followed the conciliar text. In the letter, the SOC expressed that it felt conflicted participating in the Council for various reasons. For starters, there were the decisions of the Bulgar- ian Orthodox Church and the Church of Antioch to abstain. Second, the SOC pointed to tensions between particular Orthodox churches related to autocephaly and canonical territory (including activities of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Eastern Serbia condemned by the SOC as non-canonical) and complained about the decision not to discuss them at the Council. Finally, the unwillingness of the mother-church in Constantinople to reflect on the SOC’s proposals presented by the Holy Assembly of Bishops in May 2014 and 2016, and thereby not including them in the Council’s program, was also stressed as a reason. Therefore, the SOC suggested that the Council ‘be postponed for a certain time: while pending gathering at Crete, with the help of God, would be regarded as a pre-Synodal inter-Orthodox consultation with the aims of additionally preparing the Synod and improving its texts’.26 The last turning point in the SOC’s stance towards attendance came when the extended Holy Synod of Bishops published a communiqué on June 15, 2016. It announced that the Serbian delegation would conditionally travel to

25 ‘Referring to the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 23). 26 Ibid. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 153

Crete. Through the communiqué, the SOC requested that the ‘problems and matters not only of the SOC but also of the other most Holy Churches that canceled their participation in the Council, be considered at that Coun- cil’. Additionally, it insisted that ‘the gathering on the island of Crete be [only] a beginning of a conciliar process’. The Holy Synod also stated that in case the Council did not reflect on these demands, the SOC would be forced to leave the Council at any time and join the already absent churches.27 Referring to an alleged informer close to the Serbian Patriarchate, the Ser- bian media claimed that the SOC’s changeable stance towards its attendance at the Council stemmed from serious disagreements among Serbian bishops along the division between Greek and Slavic (Russian) streams in Orthodoxy. Journalists even asserted that the internal tensions resulted in a coup within the SOC whose main protagonist, under the guidance of the ROC, was Irinej, the Bishop of Bačka. Bishop Irinej was said to have sent a letter to the Ecu- menical Patriarch, unbeknownst to the Serbian Patriarch Irinej or the Holy Synod of Bishops, announcing that the SOC would not join the Council. However, as stated by the media, Patriarch Irinej received a letter in response from Archbishop of Ohrid Jovan, signed by dozens of bishops who distanced themselves from the efforts of one bishop [Irinej of Bačka] to diminish the Patriarch’s authority as well as the conciliarity of the SOC and pursue the Russian influence within the SOC.28 By convening a meeting of the extended Synod and adopting the communiqué on June 15, the Patriarch allegedly averted the coup and demonstrated the independence of the SOC from the pressures of other Orthodox churches, mainly the ROC.29

27 Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Communiqué’, 15 June 2016, http://www.spc.rs/eng/com- munique_12 (accessed on 24 January 2019). 28 ‘Drama zbog Sabora na Kritu: Patrijarh Irinej sprečio puč u SPC [Drama because of the Council at Crete: Patriarch Irinej averted a coup in the SOC]’, Blic.rs, 15 June 2016, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/drama-zbog-sabora-na-kritu-patrijarh-irinej-sprecio-puc- u-spc/2892ebr (accessed on 24 January 2019). 29 B. Jakšić, ‘Zašto se srpski patrijarh optužuje da poslušuje đavola [Why is the Serbian patriarch accused of listening the devil]’, Al Jazeera Balkans, 18 June 2016, http://balkans. aljazeera.net/vijesti/zasto-se-srpski-patrijarh-optuzuje-da-poslusuje-davola (accessed on 24 January 2019); ‘Drama zbog Sabora na Kritu’ (see n. 28); ‘Epilog sukoba oko sabora: Patrijarh Irinej sprečio puč u SPC [Epilogue of the conflict over the council: Patriarch Irinej averted the coup]’, Kurir.rs, 16 June 2016, https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/ drustvo/2310633/epilog-sukoba-oko-sabora-patrijarh-irinej-sprecio-puc-u-spc (accessed on 24 January 2019); R. Dragović, ‘Sukob među vladikama, SPC će ipak ići na Krit [The 154 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

The Eparchy of Bačka officially denied the accusations, calling them ‘fac- tories of constructed affairs’.30 Despite the speculations in the media, Bishop Irinej was eventually among the 24 bishops accompanying Patriarch Irinej to Crete.31 Porfirije, Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana, revealed that the final decision concerning the SOC’s attendance was taken unanimously.32 Clearly, the SOC was trying to restore the image of unity harmed by disagreements among Serbian bishops that had leaked to the public. Addition- ally, the SOC adopted an image of being a bridge between Moscow and Constantinople. After the Serbian delegation came to Crete, it asked Ecu- menical Patriarch Bartholomew to plead with the Primates of the four absent autocephalous churches to reconsider their position. However, Patriarch Bartholomew’s call fell on deaf ears.33 Despite concerns of an early departure, the Serbian delegation stayed on Crete until the end of the Council with active and vocal participation. The SOC’s official website, giving brief daily updates on the Council’s progress, highlighted the key role of Serbian bishops in document preparations and conciliar discussions.34 Most attention was given to the SOC’s successful pursuit

Conflict between bishops, the SOC will yet go to Crete]’, Novosti.rs, 15 June 2016, http:// www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:610388-Delegacija-SPC-na- Kritu-ali-uz-garancije (accessed on 24 January 2019). 30 D. Bokan, ‘Mediji o Pravoslavnoj Crkvi [Media about the Orthodox Church]’, 15 June 2016, http://www.eparhija-backa.rs/sr/novosti/mediji-o-pravoslavnoj-crkvi (accessed on 24 January 2019). 31 Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Patrijarh srpski Irinej otputovao na Sabranje pravoslavnih Crkava na Kritu [Serbian Patriarch Irinej traveled to the Council at Crete]’, 16 June 2016, http://www.spc.rs/sr/spisak_jerararha_spc_koji_tshe_uchestvovati_u_sabranju_pravo- slavnih_crkava_na_kritu (accessed on 24 January 2019). 32 Eparchy of Bačka, ‘Izjava mitropolita Porfirija za Dnevnik RTS [Statement of metropolitan Porfirije for RTS News]’, 15 June 2016, http://www.eparhija-backa.rs/sr/novosti/ izjava-mitropolita-porfirija-za-dnevnik-rts-15-jun-2016 (accessed on 24 January 2019). 33 D. Džalto, ‘Razgovor o Saboru: Rat između Istanbula i Moskve je jasan i glasan [Inter- view about the Council: The war between Istanbul and Moscow is clear and loud]’, Nedeljnik.rs, 22 June 2016, //www.nedeljnik.rs/nedeljnik/portalnews/razgovor-o-saboru- rat-izmedu-istanbula-i-moskve-je-jasan-i-glasan (accessed on 24 January 2019). 34 Metropolitan of Montenegro and Litoral Amfilohije was involved in drafting the ‘Encyclical of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’. See M. Vasiljević, Diary of the Council (Alhambra, 2016) p. 41; Radović, ‘Sveti i Veliki Sabor’ (see n. 20), pp. 11-12. The final document ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’ ‘thanks to the Serbian suggestions became precise and the SOC has gained significance’: V. Tatalović, ‘Usvojene primedbe Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve na sadržinu prvog saborskog The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 155 of its previously established proposals and conditions from the Holy Synod’s communiqué. Furthermore, more detailed information, with all adopted documents translated to Serbian, was available on a special website.35 The first five texts of the Council (The Mission of the Orthodox Church in the Contemporary World, The Orthodox Diaspora, Autonomy and its Manner of Proclamation, The Sacrament of Marriage and its Impediments and The Significance of Fasting and its Application Today) were accepted by the Ser- bian delegation without serious objections by the bishops.36 Each of these texts was signed by Patriarch Irinej, who had the right to vote, and the attending Serbian bishops.37 However, the last document discussed (Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World), specifically due to a disagreement over the use of the word ‘Church’ for non-Orthodox Christians, proved to be one of the most problematic topics considered.38 The majority of the twenty-four Serbian bishops, including the influential Bishop of Bačka Irinej and Metropolitan of Montenegro and Litoral Amfilo- hije, did not sign the document.39 Only later did Bishop Irinej explain why he chose not to sign the ‘ecumenical document’. He stated his belief that the content was questionable and ecclesiologically ambiguous, even verging on heretical teaching in some places. While complaining about voting restrictions in the Council in an

dokumenta [The SOC’s objections to the content of the first conciliar document adopted]’, 21 June 2016, http://www.spc.rs/sr/usvojene_primedbe_srpske_pravoslavne_crkve_na_ sadrzhinu_prvog_saborskog_dokumenta (accessed on 24 January 2019). 35 ‘Beleške sa Sabora [Notes from the Council]’, http://beleskesasabora.blogspot.com/ (accessed on 6 July 2018). 36 ‘Ziva Istina, Gost: Amfilohije, Mitropolit crnogorsko primorski [Living Truth, The Guest: Metropolitan of Montenegro and Litoral]’, Atlas TV Montenegro, 4 July 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lql_R4NYUwI (accessed on 6 July 2018). 37 Under each document, there are names of all members of the delegations. We can learn who abstained only in the cases where bishops publicly admitted it. ‘Metropolitan Amfilo- hije of Montenegro and Litoral Did Not Sign Controversial Document at Crete’, OrthoChristian.Com, 7 July 2016, http://orthochristian.com/95154.html (accessed on 24 January 2019). 38 Vasiljević, Diary of the Council (see n. 34), p. 68. 39 A. Shishkov, ‘Two Ecumenisms: Conservative Christian Alliances as a New Form of Ecumenical Cooperation’, State, Religion and Church, 4, no. 2 (2017), pp. 58-87, on p. 60; ‘Ziva Istina, Gost’ (see n. 36); ‘Majority of Serbian Bishops Refused to Sign the Controversial Document in Crete’, OrthoChristian.Com, 22 July 2016, http://orthochristian.com/95596.html (accessed on 24 January 2019). 156 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová interview, Bishop Irinej stated that it ‘would be a real miracle if the Council meets the desired all-church recognition as Holy and Great’. ‘I am afraid’, he said, ‘that the Council in Crete will enter the history of Church as a provincial assembly of the participating churches, without a more significant scope and influence’.40 Amfilohije, Metropolitan of Montenegro and Litoral also did not sign the last document, but he did not share Bishop Irinej’s critical view of the Coun- cil. According to the Metropolitan, the Council was indeed a historical and ecumenical event whose importance lay in displaying the conciliarity (sobornost’) of the Church rather than in adopted texts.41 Most of the top representatives of the SOC stuck with general statements that the Council in Crete was one of the most significant events in the modern history of Ortho- doxy. However, only a future Great council would be able to accept, inter- pret and develop final documents in addition to assessing the importance of the Crete Council in the history of the Church.42 While some Orthodox churches reconsidered conciliar documents, officially declaring their position on them,43 the SOC stated at the regular

40 ‘Episkop bačskij Irinej. O kritskih dokumentah [Bishop of Bačka Irinej. About the Cretan documents]’, Pravoslavie.ru, 23 July 2016, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/95586.html (accessed on 24 January 2019). 41 A. Radović, ‘Sveti i Veliki Sabor - projava jedinstva Crkve [The Holy and Great Coun- cil - the manifestation of the Church’s unity]’, in Sveti i Veliki Sabor Pravoslavne Crkve, ed. K. Bojović (Cetinje, 2016), pp. 67-79, on p. 76. 42 See for example ‘O Saboru na Kritu: Episkop braničevski dr. Ignatije [About the Coun- cil in Crete: Bishop of Braničevo Ignatije]’, TV Hram, 1 February 2017, http://www. tvhram.rs/emisija/licnost-zajednica/406/saboru-kritu-episkop-branicevski-ignatije (accessed on 24 January 2019). 43 The Romanian Orthodox Church re-considered the adopted documents during the Holy Synod working session on the 28th-29th of October 2016. A. Iftimiu, ‘Conclusions of the Holy Synod Regarding the Proceedings and the Decisions of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Crete, 16-26 June 2016)’, Basilica.ro, 31 October 2016, http://basilica.ro/en/conclusions-of-the-holy-synod-regarding-the-proceedings-and-the- decisions-of-the-holy-and-great-council-of-the-orthodox-church-crete-16-26-june-2016/ (accessed on 24 January 2019). The Church of Greece and the Patriarchate of Alexandria shortly evaluated the Council in their messages to believers. See Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘Pros ton lao. Gia tin Agia kai Megali Synodo tis Kritis [To the People. On the Holy and Great Council of Crete]’, 17 January 2017, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/prostolao/47.pdf (accessed on 24 January 2019); Patriarchate of Alexandria, ‘Deu- teri imera synedriaseos tis Ieras Synodou tou Patriarcheiou Alexandreias [The second day of the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Alexandria]’, 16 November 2016, The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 157 meeting of the Holy Assembly of Bishops in May 2017 that ‘the assembly accepted the report on the work of the Crete Council, the Great and Holy Council’ without providing any further assessment.44 The conciliar decision of the SOC on the documents adopted at the Council is therefore missing or unavailable to the public. According to Bishop of Western America Maksim, the reception (teaching and accepting) of the Council thus depends mainly on the work of each local bishop among believers.45 The Serbian public at large has seemingly perceived the Council rather cautiously and suspiciously. These uncertainties were perhaps related to the absence of a conciliar and clear message from the SOC in the post- council period along with differences among particular bishops and lower clergy.46 The understanding of the Council in Serbia has further been influenced by the activities of a segment of the clergy, mainly monks connected to conservative, nationalist and often pro-Russian media who harshly condemned the Council and the last ‘ecumenical document’ in particular.47 Concluding how the SOC officially evaluated the Council and the adopted documents in addition to its questionable transmission to the laity, clergy

http://www.patriarchateofalexandria.com/index.php?module=news&action=details &id=1207 (accessed on 24 January 2019). 44 Serbian Orthodox Church, ‘Communique of the Holy Assembly of Bishops’, 1 June 2017, http://www.spc.rs/eng/communique_holy_assembly_bishops_0 (accessed on 24 Janu- ary 2019). 45 Bishop Maxim made notes during the Council which were turned into a book published both in Serbian and English to make better sense of this event to believers. Vasiljević, Diary of the Council (see n. 34). 46 The SOC published several books on the topic, but they got rather limited public attention. See Gajić, Svepravoslavni Sabor (see n. 20); Vasiljević, Diary of the Council (see n. 34); Bojović, Sveti i Veliki Sabor (see n. 20). 47 Among the websites criticizing the Council were, for example, www.svetosavlje.org, www.fsksrb.ru, www.sputnik.rs, www.borbazaveru.info, www.православнапородица. орг.срб, www.koreni.rs, www.intermagazin.rs, www.pravoslavie.ru, www.srbin.info etc. Serbian mass news media also contributed to the suspicious perception of the Council in Serbia by publishing sensationalist articles based on various conspiracy theories. See ‘Sabor na Kritu je početak kraja sveta: mračne prognoze svetskih teoretičara zavere! [The Coun- cil in Crete is the beginning of the end of the world: Dark prognosis of theoreticians of conspiracy]’, Kurir.rs, 20 June 2016, https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/drustvo/2316015/sabor- na-kritu-je-pocetak-kraja-sveta-mracne-prognoze-svetskih-teoreticara-zavere/komentari (accessed on 24 January 2019). 158 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová and believers in all dioceses is, therefore, very complicated and probably still too early to assess. However, by analyzing the SOC’s decision process as well as the media’s coverage of the Council, it is possible to make several infer- ences related to the internal situation of the SOC and its position in the Orthodox world. The tensions and high levels of confusion related to the SOC’s participation in the Council revealed the strong presence of anti-ecumenical sentiments among Serbian hierarchs, clergy and laity. It additionally illustrated a division between those belonging to the so-called Greek and Slavic (Russian) streams in Orthodoxy. These tensions also pointed to external pressures exerted on the SOC by the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Consid- ering internal divisions, the only possible way to settle the rivalry between Moscow and Constantinople seems to be skillfully balancing in-between. Consequently, the SOC often presents itself as a middleman mediating a dialogue between the two streams. The position of a mediator has enabled the SOC to keep good relations with both Moscow and Ecumenical Patri- archates. From the SOC’s perspective, having powerful allies in the Ortho- dox world is vital for defending its interests, especially in relation to other Orthodox churches. The SOC has been facing the activities of unrecognized Orthodox churches in Montenegro and North Macedonia as well as disputes with the Romanian Orthodox Church over its – according to SOC – non- canonical activities in territories under the SOC’s jurisdiction. Although the problematic inter-Orthodox relations have not been solved at the Council, the conciliar confirmation of the SOC’s autocephalous status and its ecclesiastical borders has been crucial for the SOC. In this respect, it could be argued that its presence at the Holy and Great Council and the increase of pan-Orthodox conciliar awareness strengthened the SOC’s position among Orthodox churches.

3. The Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) and the Holy and Great Council

The OCG informed its followers of the proceedings and preliminary conclusions of the Crete Council in July 2016 when it published the final texts approved by the Council in the official monthly magazine Ekklisia, with speeches introducing the issues from the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 159 and the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Ieronymos.48 The accomplish- ments were further commented on in the public statement made by the Holy Synod of the OCG in January 2017. In this document, the role of the Council in the strengthening and manifestation of Orthodox unity was emphasized, as well as in the dealings with various contemporary issues. According to the Holy Synod of the OCG, ‘conciliarity serves and inspires the organization of the Church, the manner how its decisions are taken and determines its course’.49 The Synod identified itself with the idea that the ‘Orthodox Autocephalous Churches do not form a confederation of churches, but the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church’.50 The dialogue with non-Orthodox Christians was understood as ‘the Church’s duty to witness truth and apostolic faith in every direction’ and an opportunity to spread the Orthodox tradition, while not at all being ‘a compromise on matters of faith’.51 Finally, the Synod of the OCG assumed that the conclusions of the Council would become the subject of further theological study; the believers were called upon to disregard expressions of fanaticism and attempts to create schisms inside the Church.52

48 Ekklisia, 7 (2016), pp. 581-636. Prior to the convening of the Council, the issues to be discussed were closely observed and commented on by Greek theologians; for example, see the works published in the special issues of Theologia, 86, 4 (2015), pp. 1-212 and Theologia, 87, 1 (2016), pp. 1-458. The preparations for the Council were the subject of the report by Metropolitan of Ileias Germanos to the Extraordinary Synod of Hierarchy of the OCG that took place in March 2016: Metropolitan of Ileias Germa- nos, ‘I Agia kai Megali Synodos tis Orthodoxou Ekklisias [The Holy and Great Coun- cil of the Orthodox Church]’, 29 February 2016, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/hleias_2016.pdf (accessed on 16 January 2019); or of the report by Metropolitan of Serres and Nigriti Theologos to the Holy Synod of Hierarchy of the OCG: Metro- politan of Serres and Nigriti Theologos, ‘Enimerosis peri ton diexachtheison ergasion tis Agias kai Megalis Synodou tis Orthodoxou Ekklisias [Announcement on the ongoing preparations of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church]’, 24 November 2016, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/eisigiseis/serron_ierarxia.pdf (accessed on 16 January 2019). 49 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘Pros ton lao. Gia tin Agia kai Megali Synodo tis Kritis [To the People. On the Holy and Great Council of Crete]’, 17 January 2017, http://www. ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/prostolao/47.pdf (accessed on 16 January 2019), pp. 1-3, on p. 1. 50 Ibid., p. 1. 51 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 52 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 160 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

Despite the conciliatory spirit of the announcement, many issues surfaced and critical voices were heard during the process of the Council preparations and then later in its aftermath. The 2016 Synaxis of the Primates that pre- ceded the Council itself was marked by the absence of the Archbishop of the OCG Ieronymos. Ever since May 1992, when Ecumenical Patriarch Bartho- lomew convened the Synaxis of the Primates for the first time with the aim of expressing Orthodox unity, none of the OCG Archbishops had been absent. This time Ieronymos asked the OCG Metropolitans to replace him during the meeting, thus indicating the tense relationship between him and the Ecumenical Patriarch. He explained his decision in the following manner: ‘I could say a lot. And make continuous statements. People have many problems and they cannot bear seeing us quarrel. Yet they need to count on the Orthodox Church of Greece’.53 The attitude of the Archbishop of Athens towards the Ecumenical Patri- archate has been tarnished by the activities of the Office of the Representa- tive of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Athens, and its head, Metropolitan of Adrianopolis Amphilochios. Amphilochios, similar to his predecessor in this position, Metropolitan of Pergamon Ioannis, belongs to the main sup- porters of the cause of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and has allegedly been seeking to enhance its position inside Greece by raising the formal status of the office as well as operating a church in Athens under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.54 Furthermore, the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to invite representatives of the so-called ‘New Territories’ of Greece to the 2016 Synaxis of the Primates to the Orthodox Church was seen as yet another attempt by the Patriarchate to intervene in the internal affairs of the OCG.55 Later, during the gathering of the Crete Council,

53 M. Antoniadou, ‘Se “oriako” simeio oi scheseis Ieronymou - Vartholomaiou [The relations between Ieronymos and Bartholomew at marginal point]’, To Vima, 14 January 2016, http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=768704 (accessed on 16 January 2019). 54 N. Sverkos, ‘Ola ta exapteryga tis Ekklisias [All the seraphs of the Church]’, efsyn.gr, 19 November 2016, http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/ola-ta-exapteryga-tis-ekklisias (accessed on 16 January 2019). 55 ‘Se “oriako” simeio oi scheseis Ieronymou’ (see n. 53). The ‘New Territories’ are those areas in Greece that were liberated from the Ottoman Empire after 1912; they are formally subject to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate but in practice came to be administered by the OCG by the 1928 Tome. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 161

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew refused to plan for the return of the ‘New Territories’ to the immediate jurisdiction of the Phanar.56 New controversies were brought to the fore by the extraordinary session of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the OCG in May 2016. Several OCG representatives expressed their fear that the upcoming Council would pro- mote ecumenism and a dialogue of Orthodoxy with other Christian denominations.57 Shortly before the meeting, one of the strongest critics of the procedural and thematic focus of the Council, Metropolitan of Piraeus Ser- aphim, had announced his decision not to participate in the Crete conven- tion. He underlined the factual disunity of the OCG that went against the conclusions of the 2014 Synaxis of the Primates.58 Already in March 2016, Metropolitan Seraphim published a judgmental letter, addressed to the Permanent Holy Synod of the OCG, discussing the Council. In this letter, he expressed his indignation over the newly established system of representation of Hierarchs in the Council which he called an ‘unprecedented innovation unknown to the two-thousand year conciliar tradition of our Orthodox Church’.59 He assumed that the size of delegations of autocephalous churches should not be restricted, each bishop should have the right of vote and the principle of unanimity should be preserved. Moreover, Metropolitan Seraphim refused the reasoning of the Ecumenical Patriarch that the Council could only be recognized as ‘pan-Orthodox’ (and not ‘Ecumenical’) due to the non-participation of the Catholic Church.

56 A. Loudaros, ‘Vartholomaios pros Ieronymo: Den diekdiko tis Nees Chores [Bartho- lomew towards Ieronymos: I do not claim the New Territories]’, Orthodoxia.info, 22 June 2016, http://orthodoxia.info/news/βαρθολομαιοσ-προσ-ιερωνυμο-δεν-διεκδ/ (accessed on 16 January 2019). 57 A. Lakasas, ‘I Megali Synodos dichazei tin Ekklisia [The Great Council divides the Church]’, Kathimerini, 24 May 2016, http://www.kathimerini.gr/860901/article/epikai- rothta/ellada/h-megalh-synodos-dixazei-thn-ekklhsia (accessed on 16 January 2019). 58 Ecumenical Patriarchate, ‘Synaxis ton Prokathimenon Orthodoxon Ekklision (Fanar- ion, 6-9 Martiou 2014) [Synaxis of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches (Phanar, 6-9 March 2014]’, 9 March 2014, https://www.patriarchate.org/messages/-/asset_ publisher/9mdbt2FJgbY0/content/synaxis-ton-prokathemenon-orthodoxon-ekklesion- phanarion-6-9-martiou-2014-menyma?inheritRedirect=false (accessed on 16 January 2019). 59 Metropolitan Seraphim of Piraeus, ‘Anakoinothen peri tis Agias kai Megalis Synodou [Communiqué on the Holy and Great Council]’, 2 March 2016, https://www.impan- tokratoros.gr/8035EA58.el.aspx (accessed on 16 January 2019). 162 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

According to Metropolitan Seraphim, other Christian denominations, apart from Orthodoxy, should be labelled heretical and denied the status of Church since the Orthodox Church is ‘One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic’. Metropolitan Seraphim finished his letter with a categorical objection to the Council: ‘A Council that does not distinguish profane from sacred ..., Orthodoxy from heresy, the truth of Christ from devilish delusion, ecclesi- astically legalizing the heresy, cannot be truly Orthodox, but declines into a false Council [pseudosynodos]’.60 In May 2016, to justify his refusal to participate in the Council, Metro- politan Seraphim argued that the Council did not manage – despite the preparations lasting nearly one century – to address the most important issues. According to him, problems such as fasting and marriage have been – in a general sense – sufficiently clarified based on the Orthodox Patristic and Canonical tradition, while issues like the Orthodox calendar remained unresolved. As a critic of ecumenism, he rejected the participation of the Orthodox Church in the World Council of Churches and denounced mixed marriages as allegedly leading to the ‘so-called popular syncretic ecumenism’.61 Moreover, he condemned the Filioque and the primacy of the pope as heretical. Metropolitan Seraphim claimed that the Patriarchate of Rome and the West had been ‘seized’ by Catholic popes which – in his understanding – put current Pope Francis in the position of a heretic who should have been replaced by a new pope elected by the Orthodox Church. His attitudes to Judaism and Islam were even more hostile. This resulted in his rejection of the text on the Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World as it presup- posed mutual relationships with these denominations. Regarding the text on Autonomy and the Means by Which it is Proclaimed, Metropolitan Seraphim claimed that autonomy leads to the fragmentation of states as well as the division of nations and that ethnophyletism, i.e., ecclesiastical nationalism, is heresy. As for the issue of the Orthodox diaspora, he suggested the estab- lishment of new autocephalous churches in Europe, the United States,

60 Ibid. 61 The Holy Metropolis of Piraeus, ‘Αnakoinothen: logoi paraitiseos apo tin symmetochi stin Agia kai Megali Synodo [Communiqué: Reasons for the withdrawal from the participation in the Holy and Great Council]’, 20 May 2016, http://www.imp.gr/2012-03- 27-20-22-23/ 1066-α-ν-α-κ-ο-ι-ν-ω-θ-ε-ν-λογοι-παραιτησεωσ-απο-την-συμμετοχη-στην- αγια-και-μεγαλη-συνοδο.html (accessed on 16 January 2019). The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 163

Canada and Australia. In his view, the problem of overlapping jurisdiction reportedly supports the ‘heresy of ethnophyletism’, which cannot be solved by measures such as episcopal assemblies.62 Further critical remarks were made by Hierotheos, Metropolitan of Naf- paktos and Agios Vlasios, who decided to participate in the Council to support the consensus within the OCG. However, he then refused to sign the text on the Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World. Metropolitan Hierotheos pointed out some weaknesses in the document’s inner argumentation, as well as the absence of a clear definition of what a church and its followers mean and, finally, the lack of unanimity between the OCG representatives that arose during the Synod.63 Subse- quently, he became one of the protagonists of a dispute over the use of the term ‘church’ for non-Orthodox denominations. Earlier, the OCG belonged to the main critics of the document and was supported in this regard by the SOC, the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Polish Orthodox Church.64 The stance of the OCG was called into question, especially by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus but also by the Patriarch of Alexandria and Metropolitan John of Pergamon from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Archbishop of Cyprus Chrysostomos stated that the negative attitude of the OCG might put the Council in the position of a ‘hostage’.65 Furthermore, in his argu-

62 Ibid. The episcopal assemblies have been introduced following the 2009 Fourth Pre- Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference in Chambesy with the aim of tackling the issue of the Orthodox diaspora. Thirteen assemblies of bishops were established in different regions of the Orthodox diaspora, each being endowed with the authority to lead the entire Church within the respective region. See Fourth Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference in the Orthodox Centre of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, ‘Kanonismos leitourgias ton episkopikon syneleuseon en ti Orthodoxo diaspora [The canonical organization of the episcopal assemblies of the Orthodox diaspora]’, Chambesy, 6-13 June 2009, http://www. assemblyofbishops.org/assets/files/docs/chambesy/rules-gr-pdf.pdf (accessed on 16 January 2019). See also Ruffieux, ‘Das Panorthodoxe Konzil’ (see n. 13), p. 104. 63 I. M. Nafpaktos, ‘Nafpaktou Ierotheos: Giati den ypegrapsa [Hierotheos of Nafpaktos: Why I did not sign]’, Romfea, 30 June 2016, http://www.romfea.gr/epikairotita-xronika/9157- naupaktou-ierotheos-giati-den-upegrapsaMetropolitan (accessed on 16 January 2019). 64 C. Hovorun, ‘The Panorthodox Council: A Fragile Hope for Aggiornamento?’, The Catholic World Report, 10 July 2016, http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/4910/ the_panorthodox_council_a_fragile_hope_for_aggiornamento.aspx (accessed on 16 Janu- ary 2019). 65 A. Loudaros, ‘Se klima entasis i synedriasi tis ISI gia tin Synodo tis Kritis [In a tense atmosphere the meeting of ISI on the Crete Council]’, Orthodoxia.info, 23 November 2016, 164 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová mentation, he emphasized that the term ‘church’ has been traditionally used to name other Christian confessions, such as the Roman Catholic Church. In search of a negotiable solution, Archbishop Ieronymos suggested the following reformulation: ‘The Orthodox Church accepts the historical name of other non-Orthodox Christian Churches and Confessions that are not in communion with her’, which was positively received by the Council.66 Despite that, in protest against this rather inclusive understanding of the relationship between the Orthodox Church and other Christian denominations, certain hierarchs from Greece, Cyprus and Serbia refused to add their signature to the document.67 The issue continued to resonate within the OCG and was again discussed during the first meeting of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy in November 2016. While Archbishop of Athens Ieronymos opened the discussion in a conciliatory way, the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Anthimos and the Met- ropolitan of Peristeri Chrysostomos expressed their conviction that the respective texts and decisions of the Council should not be questioned, nor even discussed.68 On the other hand, Metropolitan Hierotheos insisted that the new version of the disputed text, which avoided the term ‘other churches’ and referred to the ‘historical names’ of the non-Orthodox churches instead, did not contribute to the resolution of the issue. According to him, there could not be a name without a previous existence of the subject. Therefore the text legitimizes the term ‘churches’ for non-Orthodox denominations. His speech produced a negative reaction from other Metropolitans who appealed to him to change his opinion, a move that he strictly refused.69 Metropolitan of Chalkida Chrysostomos and Metropolitan of Kastoria Sera- phim provided the Synod with further theological examples in an attempt

https://orthodoxia.info/news/σε-κλίμα-έντασης-η-συνεδρίαση-της-ισι-γ/ (accessed on 16 January 2019). See also ‘Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus accused Bishops, Theo- logians, and Laity Critical of Holy and Great Council of Fundamentalism in Speech at Opening of Crete Synaxis’, Orthodox Christianity, 23 June 2016, http://orthochristian. com/94598.html (accessed on 16 January 2019). 66 Vasiljević, Diary of the Council (see n. 34), pp. 79-80; Hovorun, ‘The Panorthodox Council’ (see n. 64). 67 L. N. Leustean, ‘Eastern Orthodoxy, Geopolitics and the 2016 “Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church”’, Geopolitics, 23, 1 (2018), pp. 201-216, on p. 212. 68 Loudaros, ‘Se klima entasis i synedriasi tis ISI gia tin Synodo tis Kritis’ (see n. 65). 69 Ibid. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 165 to prove that the use of the term ‘churches’ was of a technical character and did not imply a recognition of the phenomenon. Their arguments were once again rejected by Metropolitan Hierotheos, according to whom technical terms should be avoided in documents of such significance.70 Furthermore, Metropolitan Hierotheos objected to the manner in which individual Orthodox churches were represented at the Council. In his view, the Council resembled ‘an extended Council of the Primates’ by its format and as such it could be seen as the continuation of the meetings of the Patri- archs of the East that took place under the Ottoman rule. Yet, Metropolitan Hierotheos denied the frequent criticism that the hierarchs did not have enough space to express their opinions to the detriment of the Primates favored by the rules of the Council.71 As for the issue of the Orthodox diaspora, he assumed that ‘on the one hand it is not possible to condemn ethnophyletism as heresy (as had happened in 1872) and on the other hand to create an ecclesiastical ethnophyletism’ of episcopal assemblies, which he regards as ‘extraordinary’ and disruptive to ecclesiastical unity.72 Similarly, he perceived the text on autonomy as a potential threat to the unity of the Church, creating ecclesiastical problems, especially if interpreted within national and cultural processes. In November 2016, the persistent disputes within the OCG provoked a reaction from Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, who decided to address a letter to the Archbishop of Greece Ieronymos. While emphasizing the necessity of preserving the unity of the Orthodox Church and following the principle of conciliarity in decision-making, the Ecumenical Patriarch expressed strong criticism towards certain OCG members who were continuously questioning the proceedings and results of the Council. In particular, Bartholomew denounced the activities of Protopresbyter and professor at the Theological School at Aristotle University in Thessaloniki Theodoros Zisis, who was allegedly stirring up opposition against the Council among OCG representatives as well as the faithful. Zisis – accompanied by a group of like-minded clergy and laity – was even paying visits to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church,

70 Ibid. 71 ‘Nafpaktou Ierotheos: Ligo meta tin Agia kai Megali Synodo [Hierotheos of Nafpak- tou: Shortly after the Holy and Great Council]’. 72 Ibid. 166 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Metropolis of Chișinău with similar aims.73 Moreover, Bartholomew disapproved of the stances of Metropolitans Seraphim of Piraeus and Amvrosios of Kalavryta and Agialeias who, ‘through their objectively extreme words spoken both prior to and following the Coun- cil, conspired with this well-known group against the canonical Church and the decisions of the Holy and Great Council’.74 Bartholomew called upon Ieronymos and the Holy Synod of the OCG ‘to enforce the decisions of that Council which decreed that these texts are binding upon all Orthodox faithful - clergy and laity alike’; he also called for them ‘to take appropriate measures and to issue the necessary admonitions to the aforesaid clergy and to the specific roots of this group that they might cease from their anti-ecclesiastical and non-canonical activities, cease from scandalizing souls “for whom Christ died”, and cease from causing problems in the united Orthodox Church’.75 Metropolitan of Kalavryta and Agialeias Amvrosios, published a letter to the Holy Synod of Hierarchy of the OCG on 23 November 2016 following its first meeting.76 He claimed that the reason why he decided to break his silence was not the letter from the Ecumenical Patriarch but the situation that emerged during the gathering of the OCG hierarchy. He disapproved of the behavior of certain members of the hierarchy who – as mentioned above – interrupted the speech of Metropolitan Hierotheos. Metropolitan Amvrosios accused them of acting in favor of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and denounced the conduct of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Finally, he refused

73 ‘Patriarch of Constantinople’s Letter to the Archbishop of Greece: Defrock and Sever Communion with those Opposed to our Council in Crete’, Orthodox Ethos, 18 November 2016, https://orthodoxethos.com/post/patriarch-of-constantinoples-letter-to-the-archbishop-of-greece-defrock-and-excommunicate-those-opposed-to-our-council-in-crete (accessed on 16 January 2019); as for the works of Zisis on the Crete Council see: Th. N. Zisis, ‘Agia kai Megali Synodos. Prepei na elpizoume i na anisychoume?’ [The Holy and Great Council. Shall we hope or worry?], Fili Orthodoxia, 14 (Thessaloniki, 2016); Th. N. Zisis, ‘Meta tin «Synodo» tis Kritis. I diakopi mnimosynou kai i dikastiki mou dioxi’ [After the Crete «Council». The interruption of the requiem and my judicial prosecution], Fili Orthodoxia, 16 (Thessaloniki, 2017). 74 ‘Patriarch of Constantinople’s Letter to the Archbishop of Greece’ (see n. 73). 75 Ibid. 76 Metropolitan of Kalavryta and Agialeias Amvrosios, ‘Dilosis enopion tis Ieras Synodou tis Ierarchias [Statement in front of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy]’, 23 November 2016, https://www.katanixis.gr/2017/05/blog-post_47.html (accessed on 16 January 2019). The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 167 to recognize the Crete gathering as a ‘Holy and Great Ecumenical Council’ because not all hierarchs were allowed to participate and some of the local churches refused to send delegations.77 On 25 April 2017, Metropolitan Amvrosios also addressed a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch himself. Met- ropolitan Amvrosios warned him that his endeavor to strengthen the Ortho- dox unity and organize the Council in Crete only created a new schism inside the Orthodox Church.78 The Holy and Great Council found the OCG hierarchy divided between a moderate majority that followed Archbishop of Athens Ieronymos, thereby supporting the efforts of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to foster Orthodox unity, and a radical minority that denounced these efforts. The Orthodox diaspora represents an important issue for the OCG as well, as the Greek diaspora worldwide is plentiful with the largest group, located in the US, counting between 1.3 and 3 million members.79 Unlike the Serbian or Rus- sian Orthodox diaspora, the Greek Orthodox diaspora belongs under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which places it outside the authority of the OCG.80 This affects the already troublesome relationship between the OCG and the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the OCG would like to exert greater influence on the Greek Orthodox community outside of Greece. The character of the attitude towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate

77 Ibid. 78 ‘Kalavryton Amvrosios ston Oik. Patriarchi: «Odigoumaste se Schisma, stamatiste tis dioxeis» [Amvrosios of Kalavryta to the Ecumenical Patriarch: “We are heading towards a Schism, stop the prosecutions”]’, Vima Orthodoxias, 3 May 2017, https://www.vimaor- thodoxias.gr/eipan/kalavriton-amvrosios-ston-ik-patriarchi-odigoumaste-se-schisma-stamatiste-tis-dioxis/ (accessed on 16 January 2019). 79 The statistical data ranges depending on the definition of who a U.S. citizen of Greek descent is; see for example: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘U.S. Relations With Greece’, 17 April 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3395.htm (accessed on 16 January 2019); or ‘Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported more information’, 2013 American Community Survey, 1-Year Esti- mates, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview. xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_B04003&prodType=table (accessed on 16 January 2019). 80 As for the relationship between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the autocephalous churches see S. Keleher, ‘Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century: Moscow versus Constantinople’, Religion, State & Society, 25, no. 2 (1997), pp. 125-137, on pp. 125-126. See also V. Roudometof, ‘Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional Disputes’, Sociology of Religion, 69, no. 1 (2008), pp. 67-91, on p. 86. 168 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová creates divisions inside the OCG and results in a split of its representatives into promoters and opponents of the cause of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Ecumenical Patriarch’s threat, directed towards the Metropolitan of Piraeus Seraphim and the Metropolitan of Kalavryta and Agialeias Amvro- sios, was that his Synod would ‘sever ecclesiastical and sacramental communion with them’ in the event that the OCG refuses to take action against the hierarchs undermining the Council. This seemed to be an unprecedented move, questioning the status of communion between these two local churches and the boundaries of the canonical authority of the Ecumenical Patriar- chate.81 All the more, this step has been interpreted by the OCG representatives as yet another sign of the interventionism of the Ecumenical Patri- archate in the OCG’s internal affairs.

4. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Holy and Great Council

Considering its size and importance among Orthodox churches, the attitude of the ROC towards the Council in Crete was crucial for its eventual success and for the manifestation of the Orthodox Church’s unity. Despite its dif- ficult position in the communist Soviet Union, the ROC has been active in modern pan-Orthodox conciliar efforts.82 The openness of the ROC to the planned Council could also be noticed at the 2016 Synaxis of the Primates. However, on 13 June 2016, during the extraordinary session of its Holy Synod, the ROC announced that it would follow the decision of the Bulgar- ian Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate of Antioch and the Georgian Ortho- dox Church not to attend the Council. The position of the ROC, its sudden adoption just before the beginning of the Council, was quite surprising, especially considering the relatively problem-free acceptance of texts that had

81 ‘Patriarch of Constantinople’s Letter to the Archbishop of Greece’ (see n. 73). 82 The ROC played an active role in the Holy and Great Council’s preparation process except for the period when the communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate was interrupted due to the ecclesiastical conflict between the two Patriarchates over the formation and recognition of the Estonian Orthodox Church. See D. P. Payne, ‘Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in Orthodox Commonwealth’, Nationalities Papers, 35, 5 (2007), pp. 832-852; K. Richters, ‘The Moscow Patriarchate in Estonia: Russian Versus International Concerns’, Problems of Post-Communism, 55, no. 1 (2008), pp. 3-11. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 169 been drafted during the preparatory meetings. The topics that seemed to be troublesome from the ROC’s perspective and deemed necessary to be resolved before the Council concerned ecclesiastical politics and issues of a technical character rather than the form and content of the documents included in the final agenda of the Council. At the end of 2015, the ROC suggested moving the pan-Orthodox gathering from Istanbul, the original location chosen for the Council.83 The rupture between Russia and Turkey over a Russian military aircraft shot down by the Turkish army in November 2015 could endanger the participation of the ROC’s delegation in the Council.84 Patriarch Kirill again mentioned the issue during the Synaxis of the Primates in Chambesy in January 2016.85 Primates of local churches finally agreed that the venue should be changed for security reasons and the unstable political situation in the Mid- dle East. Patriarch Kirill suggested the possibility of holding the Council on Mount Athos in Greece86; however, Crete was eventually selected.87 Nevertheless, the most important part of Patriarch Kirill’s speech at the January meeting in Chambesy dealt with other issues. Patriarch Kirill highlighted the necessity of the unanimity of local churches. In this regard, he first stated his satisfaction with the recognition of Rastislav, Metropolitan of the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia by all autocephalous Orthodox churches. The election of the new head of this church – widely

83 ‘Russkaya Tserkov’ predlagayet perenesti Vselenskiy sobor iz Stambula [The Russian Church suggests to move the Ecumenical Council from Istanbul]’, Tsargrad.tv, 27 Novem- ber 2015, https://tsargrad.tv/articles/russkaja-cerkov-predlagaet-perenesti-vselenskij-sobor- iz-stambula_2889 . 84 Secretariat of the Sacred Synaxis ‘Communiqué of the Synaxis of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches in Chambesy, 21-28, 2016’, accessed 10 June 2018, http://www. imks.gr/images/epikaira/2016_panorthodoxi/anakoinotheneng.pdf . 85 The Moscow Patriarchate,‘Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Kirill vystupil so slovom na Sobranii Predstoyateley Pomestnykh Pravoslavnykh Tserkvey [Patriarch Kirill gave a speech at the meeting of the hierarchs of local Orthodox churches]’, 22 January 2016, https://mospat. ru/ru/2016/01/22/news127085/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 86 ‘Patriarch Kirill has proposed a Pan-Orthodox Council on Mount Athos’, Pravoslavie. ru, 23 January 2016, http://pravoslavie.ru/89965.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 87 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘Kritskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov’ soobshchayet o gotovnosti prinyat’ Vsepravoslavnyy Sobor [Cretan Orthodox Church announces readiness to arrange the Council]’, 4 February 2016, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/90353.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 170 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová supported by the ROC – was one of the stumbling blocks for the ROC’s relations with some other autocephalous churches, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate, who criticized the controversial poll. However, the ROC was eventually able to pursue its influence and the recognition of Metropolitan Rastislav as primate was affirmed in January 2016.88 Second, in connection with the problem of unanimity among the local churches, Patriarch Kirill expressed concern about the ecclesiastical dispute between the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch. He also pointed at the non-canonical situation in Ukraine, which had been causing tensions in World Orthodoxy and the settlement of which had been one of the priorities of the ROC. The conflict between the recognized Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the schismatic Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), which intensified following the 2014 Russian military invasion of Ukraine, also represented a source of tensions between Moscow and Constantinople, because the ROC already by then worried the Ecumenical Patriarchate might support the UOC-KP.89 In this context, Patriarch Kirill hinted at the fact that some hierarchs of the

88 See ‘New Head of Orthodox Church of Czech Lands and Slovakia Elected’, Orthodox Christianity, 12 January 2014, http://orthochristian.com/67521.html (accessed on 5 Feb- ruary 2019); ‘Reconciliation in the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia’, Orthodox Christianity, 13 January 2016, http://orthochristian.com/89666.html (accessed on 5 February 2019); Simeon, Archbishop of Olomouc and Brno, ‘Vladyka Simeon’s Letter to Patriarch Bartholomew’, Sůl země, 12 January 2014, http://sul-zeme.cz/compo- nent/content/article?id=17:dopis-vladyky-simeona-patriarchovi-bartolomeji (accessed on 5 February 2019); Patriarch Bartholomew, ‘Patriarch Bartholomew’s Letter to the Minister of Culture of the Czech republic’, Sůl země, 11 April 2014, http://sul-zeme.cz/ruzne/8- zezahranici/71-bartolomej-ministrovi (accessed on 5 February 2019). 89 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP) was established in 1992 as a counterpart to the UOC-MP. There were strong antipathies between the two Ortho- dox churches, which further deepened after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a result of the conflict in the Donbas region and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, many Ukrainians converted to the UOC-KP. See J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness (Houndmills, 1996), pp. 92-96; M. Kozelsky, ‘Religion and the crisis in Ukraine’, International journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 14, 3 (2014), pp. 233-234; L. N. Leustean, ‘Eastern Orthodoxy’ (see n. 67), pp. 201-216; N. Mitrokhin, ‘Was There an Alternative? Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius and His First Steps’, Euxeinos: Governance & Culture in the Black Sea Region, 17 (2016), pp. 13-19; and N. Trach, ‘Ukrainians Shun Moscow Patriarchate as Russia’s War Inten- sifies in Donbas’, Kyiv Post, 23 January 2015, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 171

Ecumenical Patriarchate visited Ukraine and showed their support for the schismatics.90 Third, at the Synaxis of the Primates, Patriarch Kirill also raised the issue of those proposals submitted by some of the local churches concerning the Council agenda; for example, the Georgian Orthodox Church, the SOC and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church were not considered during the preparatory meetings over the previous two years. Furthermore, he commented on some of the documents prepared for the Council. For instance, he spoke of the need to review the draft document on The Sacrament of Marriage and Imped- iments to It because he assumed that the text did not sufficiently deal with the problems of the family in the contemporary world.91 Finally, he further opened the problem of autocephaly and the manner of granting it. He proposed that new autocephalous churches be established by consensus of all local churches.92 At the end of the Synaxis of the Primates, Patriarch Kirill, however, confirmed his decision to attend the Council and signed all the draft documents.93 He later stated his satisfaction with the documents and emphasized that most of the proposals made by the ROC were approved.94 He also pointed out that the Synaxis agreed to publish all the draft documents prepared for the Council.95

ukraine-politics/ukrainians-shun-moscow-patriarchate-as-russias-war-intensifies-in-donbas-378168.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 90 ‘Slovo Patriarkha Kirilla na Sobranii Predstoyateley Pomestnykh Tserkvey [Speech of Patriarch Kirill at the meeting of the hierarchs of the local churches]’, Pravmir.ru, 24 Janu- ary 2016, https://www.pravmir.ru/patriarh-kirill-shambezi/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 91 The Moscow Patriarchate, ‘Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Kirill vystupil’ (see n. 85) (accessed on 5 February 2019). 92 Ibid. 93 The Moscow Patriarchate, ‘V Zheneve zavershilos’ Sobraniye Predstoyateley Pomest- nykh Pravoslavnykh Tserkvey [The assembly of Primates of the local Orthodox Churches ended in Geneva]’, 28 January 2016, https://mospat.ru/ru/2016/01/28/news127341/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 94 ‘In Course of Preparations for Pan-Orthodox Council, Most of Russian Orthodox Church’s Proposals Approved’, Pravoslavie.ru, 2 February 2016, http://pravoslavie. ru/90344.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 95 A. Volkov, ‘6 voprosov o sobranii Predstoyateley Pomestnykh Tserkvey v Shambezi [6 questions about the meeting of the hierarchs of the local churches in Chambesy]’, Pravmir.ru, 26 January 2016, https://www.pravmir.ru/6-voprosov-o-sobranii-predstoyateley- pomestnyih-tserkvey-v-shambezi/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 172 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

The ROC Episcopal Council was held in Moscow at the beginning of February 2016. Patriarch Kirill did not expect any opposition to the results of the Synaxis of the Primates and considered the approval of draft documents by hierarchs of the ROC to be only a formality. As he assumed, the Episcopal Council endorsed the content of the draft documents and called for the Holy Synod of the ROC to assemble a delegation. However, the Episcopal Council also expressed its conviction that the participation of the delegations of all recognized autocephalous Orthodox churches would be a necessary condition for holding the pan-Orthodox council. In this context, the resolution pointed to the ongoing conflict between the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Antioch as a potential problem for the Church’s unity if either of the churches abstained from attending. Hence a resolution of the situation was called for.96 The first signs of opposition to the draft documents and the participation of the ROC at the Council appeared among conservative members of the ROC during the weeks following the ROC’s Episcopal Council.97 The criticism could especially be heard at the conference entitled ‘All-Orthodox Council: Opinions and Expectations’ that was held on 19 April at the Orthodox Holy Tikhon Uni- versity for the Humanities in Moscow.98 First, Metropolitan Hilarion, the Chair- man of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department of External Church Relations (DECR), spoke in detail about the preparatory process of the Council. He mentioned both the ROC’s demands, which had been approved during the pre- conciliar meetings, and those that remained unresolved. For example, he stressed the problem of the representation of bishops at the Council.99 Ever since the beginning of the preparatory process, the ROC had been proposing that all

96 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘Postanovleniya Osvyashchennogo Arkhiyereyskogo Sobora Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi (2-3 fevralya 2016 goda) [Resolutions of the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (February 2-3, 2016)]’, 3 February 2016, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4367700.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 97 S. Chapnin, ‘Svyatoy i Velikiy Sobor: pobeda ili porazheniye? [Holy and Great Council: victory or failure?]’, Rossiya v global’noy politike, 2 February 2017, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/ number/Svyatoi-i-Velikii-Sobor-pobeda-ili-porazhenie-18567 (accessed on 5 February 2019). 98 ‘Conference on the Forthcoming Pan-Orthodox Council at St. Tikhon’s University’, Orthodox Christianity, 20 April 2016, http://orthochristian.com/92685.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 99 M. Stroganova, ‘Vsepravoslavnyy Sobor: mneniya i ozhidaniya [Holy and Great Coun- cil: opinions and expectations]’, Pravmir.ru, 20 April 2016, https://www.pravmir.ru/ vsepravoslavnyiy-sobor-mneniya-i-ozhidaniya/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 173 bishops would have the right to participate and express their opinion. However, such an option was rejected due to the difficulties stemming from attempts to convene all bishops. As a consequence, a fixed number of participants for each autocephalous church was set, leaving the ROC as the largest church in a disad- vantageous position. At the end of his speech, Hilarion tried to calm the critical voices which were now voting against the ROC’s participation in the Council.100 The Archbishop of Berlin-Germany and Great Britain Mark, the first Dep- uty Chairman of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia, was among the participants at the conference at the Ortho- dox Tikhon University who expressed concerns that the draft documents were unclear and misleading. He noted that the document on the Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World raised ecclesiological problems; namely, he found the use of the term ‘other churches’ unacceptable, as there is only ‘one Church’. At the end of his speech, he pointed out that it would be easier if the Council would not be called a council but just a meeting.101 Among the critical voices was also priest Georgiy Maksimov, member of the ROC’s Synodal Working Group on Elaboration of the Conceptualiza- tion of Inter-Religious Relations, who commented on the document The Mis- sion of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World. He condemned the text mainly for containing statements allowing for its heretical interpretation. At the same time, Maksimov was ready to suggest some specific modifications. He further complained that, according to the Code of Regulations for organizing the work of the Council, only modifications supported by the representatives of all local churches could be included, which made editing the draft documents complicated.102 These are only some examples of the criticism that was voiced concerning the draft documents of the Council. The conference eventually adopted a final resolution containing some recommendations by Patriarch Kirill regarding the amendment of the draft documents.103

100 ‘Conference on the Forthcoming Pan-Orthodox Council’ (see n. 98). 101 M. Stroganova, ‘Vsepravoslavnyy Sobor’ (see n. 99). 102 G. Maximov, ‘Fr. George Maximov Offers Theological Reflection on Document of June Pan-Orthodox Council’, Orthodoxethos.com, 29 April 2016, https://orthodoxethos. com/post/fr-george-maximov-offers-theological-reflection-on-document-of-june-panorthodox-council (accessed on 5 February 2019). 103 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘DECR Chairman Attends Conference on the Forthcom- ing Pan-Orthodox Council’, Patriarchia.ru, 20 April 2016, http://www.patriarchia.ru/en/ db/text/4534901.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 174 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová

As for the document on the Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World, it is necessary to mention the meeting between Patri- arch Kirill and Pope Francis that took place in Havana on 12 February 2016. According to the ROC official press statement, it was held in a friendly atmosphere.104 It resulted in the signing of a Joint Declaration in which both parties expressed the need to develop cooperation between the Catholics and the Orthodox and, thus, to overcome their inherited differences.105 The Rus- sian press presented this meeting as an exceptional historical event, as it was the first meeting of top representatives of the ROC and the Catholic Church that had the potential to enhance mutual relations.106 Their meeting nevertheless unleashed the criticism of conservative and anti-ecumenical circles within the ROC,107 and it empowered their objections towards Patriarch Kirill as well as his attitude to the Council and the draft documents. Until the beginning of June 2016, the ROC’s delegation was prepared to head to Crete despite criticisms of the draft documents from various sides. In an interview given shortly before the beginning of the Council, Metropolitan

104 The Moscow Patriarchate, ‘Zavershilas’ vstrecha Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla s Papoy Rimskim Frantsiskom [The meeting of Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis over]’, Mospat.ru, 13 February 2016, https://mospat.ru/ru/2016/02/13/news128223/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 105 ‘Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia’, The Holy See, Havana, 12 February 2016, https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ speeches/2016/february/documents/papa-francesco_20160212_dichiarazione-comune- kirill.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 106 T. Kazarina ‘Vstrecha glavy RPTS Kirilla i papy rimskogo Frantsiska [Meeting of the head of the ROC Kirill and Pope Francis]’, TASS, http://tass.ru/spec/religion (accessed on 5 February 2019). 107 A. Moroz, ‘Svyashchennik Aleksey Moroz ob opasnosti raskola v Tserkvi [Priest Alexei Moroz about the danger of schism in the Church]’, Rus-Front, 18 February 2016, http:// www.rusfront.ru/10640-svyaschennik-aleksey-moroz-ob-opasnosti-raskola-v-cerkvi.html, (accessed on 9 April 2019). For more on negative reactions see O. Trofimov, ‘Neprostitel’nyy prostupok Papy - predatel’stvo uniatov [Pope’s unpardonable offense - betrayal of the Uniates]’, Russkaya narodnaya liniya, 16 February 2016, http://ruskline.ru/ special_opinion/2016/fevral/papa_vstretivshis_s_putinskim_patriarhom_predal_uniatov/, (accessed on 9 April 2019); V. Malcev, ‘Vstrecha patriarkha s papoy raspalila zelotov [The meeting of the Patriarch with the Pope infuriated zealots]’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 March 2016, http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2016-03-02/1_patriarh.html, (accessed on 9 April 2019); and V. Malcev, ‘Vsepravoslavnyy sobor gotovyat s grekhom popolam [Pan-Ortho- dox Council is prepared ineffectively]’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 April 2016, http://www. ng.ru/facts/2016-04-20/1_maltzev.html (accessed on 9 April 2019). The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 175

Hilarion was still quite optimistic about Russian participation in the Council and supposed that it could become a significant historical event. He admitted that there was a critical attitude towards the Council within the ROC, but he considered this as normal and potentially constructive.108 On 3 June, the Holy Synod of the ROC hierarchs, however, suggested to the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to organize another pre-conciliar meeting not later than 10 June to deal with rising criticism within and beyond the ROC.109 Patriarch Bartholomew deemed this conference impossible for scheduling reasons and also due to the absence of any normative basis for such a meeting.110 Consequently, on 13 June, the Holy Synod of the ROC issued a statement announcing its final decision not to attend the Council; the ROC justified its absence as a result of the non-participation of three local Orthodox churches (Antiochene, Georgian and Bulgarian), the hesitation of the SOC and the unwillingness of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to deal with these issues. The statement also summed up the unresolved issues that the ROC had indicated as problematic. In this connection, the accent was put, for example, on the relationship between the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem and the absence of a preliminary consensus on the draft document The Sacrament of Marriage and Impediments to It as well as the suggested amendments of two other draft documents - Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World and The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World.111 On 15 July 2016, the regular session of the Holy Synod of the ROC, which was held in Moscow, expressed once again the objections to the ongoing Coun- cil. The Holy Synod stated that the absence of certain autocephalous Orthodox Churches violated the principle of consensus; therefore, the Council could not

108 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev): Criticism of the Conciliar Documents Is Completely Normal”’, Pravmir.com, 6 June 2016, http://www.pravmir.com/metropolitan-hilarion-alfeyev- criticism-of-the-conciliar-documents-is-completely-normal/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 109 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘Zhurnal № 35 zasedaniya Svyashchennogo Sinoda ot 3 iyu- nya 2016 goda [Journal No. 35 of the Holy Synod session on 3 June 2016]’, 3 June 2016, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4486294.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 110 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘O situatsii, voznikshey v svyazi s otkazom ryada Pomest- nykh Pravoslavnykh Tserkvey ot uchastiya v Svyatom i Velikom Sobore Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi [On the situation caused by the refusal of several Local Orthodox Churches to participate in the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church]’, 13 June 2016, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4538241.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 111 Ibid. 176 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová be considered pan-Orthodox and could not adopt documents to express pan- Orthodox unity. It also emphasized that the ROC drew attention to this problem earlier, but that its call had gone unheard.112 Later, at the end of the 2017, the Holy Bishops’ Council of the ROC published a resolution summarizing the ROC’s evaluation of the Council. It was stressed that the Council could not be viewed as ecumenical and its decisions were not binding for the entire Ortho- dox Church as an agreement by all local churches was not achieved.113 In order to explain the decision of the ROC not to participate in the Council, we need to take into account the surprising yet significant wave of criticism towards the draft documents that appeared among hierarchs within the ROC as well as other local churches. The final stance of Patriarch Kirill, who earlier approved all the Council’s draft documents, was influenced by the rising concerns of the opposition in the domestic scene as well as efforts to represent the voice of other ‘dissatisfied’ Orthodox churches. To understand the ROC’s position towards the Council, it is necessary to further consider church-state relations in Russia and the geopolitical aspects of Russian Orthodoxy. Since the fall of communism, the significance of the ROC as a crucial institution in a spiritual, political and economic sense has gradually been growing. The increasing support of the Russian state for the ROC can be seen as crucial in this process. The state cooperates with the ROC to mobilize the population, using the narrative of Christian values and Orthodox symbolism.114 Inevitably, the ROC works as an instrument of Russia’s foreign policy as well and is often forced to follow the geopolitical ambitions and interests of Russian political elites. This is confirmed, for example, by the reasoning of the ROC during the discussion about the venue of the Council and its relocation from Turkey to Crete. Another example of the close relationship between the ROC and Russian political elites is the

112 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘Svyashchennyy Sinod Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi vyra- zil pozitsiyu po Soboru na Krite [The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church expressed its position towards the Crete Council]’, 16 July 2016, http://www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/4573134.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 113 Russian Orthodox Church, ‘Postanovleniya Osvyashchennogo Arkhiyereyskogo Sob- ora Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi (29 noyabrya ― 2 dekabrya 2017 goda) [Resolutions of the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church]’, 2 December 2017, http:// www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5076149.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 114 A. Curanović, ‘The Attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate Towards Other Orthodox Churches’, Religion, State and Society, 35, 4 (2007), pp. 301-318. The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 177 case of Ukraine. The ROC neither openly condemned the annexation of Crimea nor military actions in Eastern Ukraine, thus losing a significant number of believers to the unrecognized UOC-KP. The ecclesiastical situation in Ukraine has been a source of tension between the ROC and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which intensified as the Ukrainian Parliament called on Patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephalous status to the united Ukrainian church just a few days before the Council.115 It was decided that this issue would not be considered at the Council.116 Instead, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate established a special synodal commission to examine the proposal.117 The sympathetic position of the Ecumenical Patri- archate towards the efforts regarding autocephaly in Ukraine might be interpreted as another reason for the ROC to boycott the Council.118 Furthermore, we should realize that the ROC represents a significant number of Orthodox believers: somewhere around 180 million in the world according to Patriarch Kirill.119 This fact may also support Russian geopolitical interests, especially from the perspective of the concept known as ‘Russkiy Mir’ [Russian World].120 These aspects indicate that the ROC is

115 ‘As Orthodox Leaders Gather in Crete, Ukraine Calls for an Independent Church’, The Economist, 16 June 2016, https://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2016/06/orthodoxy-and- ukraine?zid=315&ah=ee087c5cc3198fc82970cd65083f5281 (accessed on 5 February 2019). 116 ‘Orthodox Council in Crete Will not Consider Ukrainian Parliament’s Message’, Orthodox Christianity, 20 June 2016, http://orthochristian.com/94478.html (accessed on 5 February 2019). 117 ‘The Patriarchte of Constantinople to Examine the Appeal of the Ukrainian Parlia- ment on Granting Autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’, RISU, 20 July 2016, https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/constantinople_patriarchy/64000/ (accessed on 5 February 2019). 118 Patriarch Bartholomew signed the Tomos granting autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in the beginning of January 2019. 119 The official statistics on the number of ROC’s believers are not available, and different sources refer to different figures. Patriarch Kiril’s estimation is, however, rather overstated as it counts almost the entire population of the Russian Federation, larger parts of the former Soviet Union and all diaspora congregations simply as members of the ROC. See ‘Patriarkh Kirill: prikhozhanami RPTS yavlyayutsya okolo 180 mln chelovek’, TASS, 28 October 2017, http://tass.ru/obschestvo/4684885 (accessed on 5 February 2019). 120 ‘Ruskiy Mir’ is translated as “Russian World” which means the entire Russian speaking Christian community worldwide, including the former Soviet Union as a whole, and all Russian diaspora communities. For more see M. Wawrzonek and M. Korzeniewska- Wiszniewska, Orthodoxy Versus Post-Communism?: Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir (Cambridge, 2016). 178 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová one of the major players in the Orthodox world, with a great political influence and confidence about its own status. As a result, it aspires to a more prominent position within Orthodoxy. Aspects of rivalry with the Ecumen- ical Patriarch possibly played a significant role in the final decision not to participate in the Council, but this was also manifested during the dispute over the recognition of Metropolitan Rastislav or the meeting between Patri- arch Kirill and Pope Francis. The Havana meeting could also be perceived as an attempt of Russian soft policy to improve Russian relations with West- ern states that were impaired after the Russian annexation of Crimea.121 By refusing to participate in the Council, the ROC intentionally situated itself in opposition to Constantinople. According to theologian Christos Yannaras, its final position could additionally be perceived as a move towards alienating various cultural identities in World Orthodoxy, which may further lead to an increased antagonism between Greek and Slavic (Russian) streams in Orthodox churches, power struggles and eventually the development of opposing worldviews or theologies.122

Conclusion

The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church was the result of long-lasting preparations stemming from the need to deal with the challenges of the contemporary world at the pan-Orthodox level and to address disputed issues in Orthodox ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The display of unity and confirmation of the essential role of the conciliar principle in Orthodoxy was, however, the substantial and most stressed aim of the Council. Never- theless, such a goal was not fully achieved since four autocephalous churches were absent from the meeting and serious objections to the Council’s pro- cedures and adopted documents were raised by others.

121 ‘As Orthodox Leaders Gather in Crete’ (see n. 115). 122 A. Andreopoulos, ‘In Conversation with Christos Yannaras: A Critical View of the Council of Crete’, Colloquium on Reflections after the Great Council of the Orthodox Church in Crete in 2016, Montreal Institute of Orthodox Theology & Faculté de théologie et de sciences religieuses, 29 April 2017, p. 3, https://www.trinityorthodox.ca/sites/default/files/Andreas%20 Andreopoulos-In%20Conversation%20with%20Christos%20Yannaras-A%20Critical%20 View%20of%20the%20Council%20of%20Crete.pdf (accessed on 5 February 2019). The Holy and Great Council and its Implications for Orthodox Unity 179

The three autocephalous churches discussed in this article served as examples of various approaches towards the Council in particular and Orthodox conciliar awareness in general. Furthermore, they embody different positions that were taken in the Orthodox world, divided – as many argue – into Greek and Slavic (Russian) streams and affected by the rivalry between the Ecu- menical and Moscow Patriarchates. Such a division seems to be confirmed by the final decisions of the churches about their (non)participation in the Coun- cil, as the OCG never openly questioned its presence in Crete, the SOC – playing the middleman – took a hesitant stance towards the Council until the last moment and the ROC stayed away from the Council, not recognizing the conciliar documents retrospectively. Yet, the research findings also indicate that, despite the opposing strategies applied eventually by the OCG, the SOC and the ROC, proponents of both options could be found within the ranks of all examined churches. Furthermore, the officially employed argumentation, as well as individual statements of hierarchs in favor of the Council and particularly against it, contained very similar features regardless of the collective allegiances to particular primates and to national frontiers. In the period shortly before the Council, concerns about the regulations for organizing the work of the Council arose. The representation of the hierarchs at the Council and (the absence of) their voting rights dominated churches’ objections in this respect. By leaving the texts on autocephaly and diptychs out of the final program of the Council and solving the diaspora issue only provisionally, the most controversial documents that had the potential to spark a ‘game of thrones’ in the Orthodox world were sidelined in criticism of the Council. It was then that the document on ecumenism and the relation of the Orthodox Church with non-Orthodox Christians became the most disputed topic by hierarchs, both present and absent, at the Council as well as by clergy, laity and believers belonging to the OCG, the SOC and the ROC. The harsh and rather unexpected condemnation of the document revealed strong anti-ecumenical sentiments within autocephalous churches. The negative attitude towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its claims to authority was made explicit, especially by Orthodox conservatives, and became yet another source of criticism related to the Council. Hierarchs from progressive circles in Orthodoxy across local churches tried to calm the critical voices, arguing that despite various imperfections of draft and eventually adopted documents, the Council contributed to the 180 Karin Hofmeisterová, Miroslava Jasenčáková, Nikola Karasová solution of many burning issues at the pan-Orthodox level. They also claimed that the Council was a significant event in the history of the Ortho- dox Church which strengthened the pan-Orthodox conciliar awareness as the main principle of Orthodox ecclesiology. The research conclusions, which showed similarities in the arguments of both proponents and opponents of the Council in the SOC, the OCG and the ROC, thus correspond with the general observation by theologian Andrey Shishkov, who asserted that in the context of the Council ‘different ideological streams within autocephalous churches – conservatives, funda- mentalists, liberals, ecumenists, etc. – realigned and overcame the autocephalous frontiers creating trans-autocephalous and trans-national alliances’.123

Abstract

The 2016 Holy and Great Council represents a significant milestone in the history of the Orthodox world; however, only the future will show whether its conclusions will be generally recognized. Its attested aim was to discuss certain theological and ecclesiastical issues, but its primary aim was to proclaim Orthodox unity. The latter goal has been achieved only in part so far due to the absence of several autocephalous churches and divisions within those churches that decided to participate. Based on the analysis of official documents from Orthodox churches, Orthodox presses and other media statements, this article illustrates different attitudes of three autocephalous churches (the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Orthodox Church of Greece) towards the Holy and Great Council and pan-Orthodox conciliarity in general. It is argued that the final positions of the examined churches were affected by mutual rivalries and ecclesiastical disputes as well as by existing antagonisms between Greek and Slavic (Russian) streams of Orthodoxy; they were further influenced by ideological subdivisions within and beyond autocephalous frontiers. Keywords: The Holy and Great Council in Crete, pan-Orthodox conciliarity, Ser- bian Orthodox Church, Orthodox Church of Greece, Russian Orthodox Church.

123 A. Shishkov, ‘Sur le Concile de Crète’, Contacts: Revue Française de l’Orthodoxie, LXVIII 255 (2016), pp. 376-379.