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Superforecasting Or Snafu: the Forecasting Ability of the Us Military Officer

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SUPERFORECASTING OR SNAFU: THE FORECASTING ABILITY OF THE US MILITARY OFFICER by DAVID L. RAUGH B.S. United States Military Academy, 1993 M.S. Kansas State University, 2004 M.M.A.S. School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005 A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the College of Science at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term 2019 Major Professor: Thomas Dolan ABSTRACT What is the impact of military institutional tendencies and habits on U.S. Army senior officer forecasting accuracy and how does this forecasting ability shape success in battle? Military leaders plan operations based on the forecasted strengths and vulnerabilities of their adversary. Negative habits, such as limited option development, confirmation bias, doctrinal overreliance, and over-consideration of sunk costs, inhibit effective forecasting. The tempo of the modern battlefield, hierarchical culture, and institutional tendencies of the US Army may promote and reinforce these habits. I surveyed Colonels in US Army War College programs to measure their individual tendencies, levels of education, and accuracy in forecasting events during a three to twelve-month future. Quantitative analysis of the resulting data shows that these habits are present and negatively affect forecasting ability; additionally, higher levels of education positively affect forecast accuracy, possibly counteracting the effects of negative institutional tendencies and habits. Extending the research using historical and contemporary case studies of senior US Army Generals, including interviews of General David Petraeus and other high- ranking officials, I find that rejection of these institutional habits and tendencies enabled superior forecasting, leading to battlefield success. I conclude by examining how educational levels of commanding generals in the Iraq War affected military success. Exploratory quantitative analysis of data collected from the US Army historical archives shows that higher levels of education positively affected significant activities within the general’s assigned areas. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................................... vii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL TENDENCIES AND HABITS ON FORECASTING .................................................................................................................................................... 4 Examination of Relevant Research .............................................................................................................. 6 Disciplinary Perspectives ............................................................................................................................ 7 Multidisciplinary Application to State Policy ..................................................................................... 9 The US Military and Forecasting ........................................................................................................... 11 Population of Interest ................................................................................................................................ 13 Theory- The Impact of US Army Institutional Tendencies and Habits ..................................... 14 Specialization ................................................................................................................................................ 15 Limited Option Development ................................................................................................................. 20 Neglect of Inconsistent Information .................................................................................................... 21 Neglect of Deviational Views .................................................................................................................. 23 Doctrinal Reliance ....................................................................................................................................... 25 Sunk Costs ....................................................................................................................................................... 27 Research Design ................................................................................................................................................ 28 Dependent Variable .................................................................................................................................... 28 Explanatory variables ................................................................................................................................ 30 Survey Sample ............................................................................................................................................... 33 Results ................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Conclusion and Future Research ............................................................................................................... 44 CHAPTER THREE: SENIOR GENERAL CASE STUDY .............................................................................. 49 Examination of Relevant Research ........................................................................................................... 51 iii Disciplinary Perspectives ......................................................................................................................... 51 Forecasting ..................................................................................................................................................... 54 Decision-making .......................................................................................................................................... 55 Military Decision-making ......................................................................................................................... 56 The Effect of Military Institutional Tendencies and Habits ....................................................... 56 Discounting Inconsistent Information................................................................................................ 57 Neglect of Deviational Views .................................................................................................................. 59 Research Design ................................................................................................................................................ 60 Tracking the Variables of Interest ........................................................................................................ 61 General McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign (1862) ..................................................................... 62 Background .................................................................................................................................................... 62 McClellan’s Overestimates ....................................................................................................................... 64 McClellan Ignored Dissent, Leading to Lost Opportunities ....................................................... 66 Outcome of the Peninsula Campaign .................................................................................................. 68 General Bradley in Operation Cobra (1944) ......................................................................................... 69 Background .................................................................................................................................................... 70 Bradley’s Consideration of Contrary Information Enables the Breakout ........................... 71 Bradley’s Promotion of Alternative Views and Subordinate Suggestions .......................... 73 Outcome of Operation Cobra .................................................................................................................. 74 General Petraeus during the Iraq Surge (2006-2008) ..................................................................... 75 Petraeus’ Forecasting Ability .................................................................................................................. 76 Background .................................................................................................................................................... 77 Petraeus’ Promotion of Alternative Views Supports Military Success in The Surge in Iraq ..................................................................................................................................................................... 82 Outcome of the Iraq Surge ....................................................................................................................... 83 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 85
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