ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 9s April 27, 2012 VOLUME XII s ISSUE 9 s APRIL 27, 2012 In This Issue: IN A FORTNIGHT By Peter Mattis 1 HU JINTAo’s sIXTH GENERATION PROTEGES PLAY SAFE TO ENSURE PROMOTION By Willy Lam 3 ASSESSING THE GROWING PLA AIR FORCE FOREIGN RELATIONS PROGRAM By Kenneth Allen and Emma Kelly 5 ASEAN AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: MOVEMENT IN LIEU OF PROGRESS By Ian Storey 10 One of China’s Maritime Surveil- SINO-PHILIPPINE TENSION AND TRADE RISING AMID SCARBOROUGH STANDOFF lance Vessels on Patrol By Samantha Hoffman 13 China Brief is a bi-weekly jour- nal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eur- In a Fortnight asia. By Peter Mattis China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a THE LIMITS OF REFORM: ASSAUltING THE CASTLE OF THE StatUS QUO private non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Peter Mattis. series of editorials this week in leading official newspapers suggested pressure A for reform within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to build. The opinions expressed in One of the unsigned commentaries—like Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech about China Brief are solely those of the authors, and do not political reform as Bo Xilai was ousted from Chongqing—stated “reform has necessarily reflect the views of reached a troubled period akin to assaulting fortified positions” (Xinhua, April 23; The Jamestown Foundation. Chinareform.org.cn, March 22). Outside observers picked up these calls for reform as sign of a coordinated propaganda campaign for cleaning out the CCP corrupted by ambitious politicians and entrenched interests (South China Morning Post, April 24; AGIChina.it, April 24). Even as the tocsin of reform sounded, however, the official press also established the acceptable boundaries of reform, limiting it to improving CCP performance and pushing forward on the 12th Five Year Plan. For comments or questions The propaganda language of “assaulting fortified positions” (gongjian) used in about China Brief, please Xinhua seemed to highlight the potential importance of these calls for reform contact us at (Xinhua, April 23). Indeed, in reference to the policy of reform and opening [email protected] (gaige kaifang), the gongjian formulation does not appear to have been used much 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 Washington, DC 20036 in official editorials for several years. The urgency surrounding the 12th Five Year Tel: (202) 483-8888 Plan and the need to make changes in economic governance last year probably Fax: (202) 483-8337 created the largest cluster of such calls (Procurator’s Daily, January 18, 2011). The urgency prompted one editorial writer to ask rhetorically “what does assaulting Copyright © 2011 TO SUBSCRIBE TO CHINA BRIEF, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/ 1 ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 9 s April 27, 2012 fortifications require?” and elaborate on the need for the from the Politburo last month, Chinese press filled the courage to act on reform (People’s Daily, January 26, 2011). pages with statements about how the investigation into him and his wife’s alleged murder of British businessman Premier Wen, however, has been using precisely this Neil Heywood would be handled according to the law formulation for at least three years in his well-publicized (People’s Daily, April 13; Xinhua, April 10; China Daily, if unheeded calls for reform. Last month at the China March 27). In contrast, Zhou stated the role of political- Development Research Foundation event hosting IMF legal work was to “consolidate the party’s ruling status” chief Christine Lagarde, Vice Premier Li Keqiang said and “politics is always the first requirement” for political- “In front of our eyes, Chinese reform has entered a legal work (People’s Daily, April 24). period akin to assaulting fortified positions” (Dongfang Zaobao, March 19). Finally, a widely-posted editorial— The focus on improving cadre performance and anti- reprinted as “Reform has reached a troubled period corruption highlights how the CCP tries to focus attention akin to assaulting fortified positions; promote the on non-procedural forms of political legitimacy, i.e. institutionalization of democratic supervision” (gaige jinru legitimacy not based on democratic elections. Observers shenshuiqu he gongjianqi ying cujin minzhu jiandu zhiduhua)— should not be surprised that these calls for reform in the drew attention to the first use of “government reform” last two months heralded a parallel attack on Western in the National People’s Congress’ Government Work Report democracy and defense of socialism with Chinese as part of the call for performance (People’s Daily, April 9; characteristics. The same day as the reform editorials, Xinhua, April 9; Science & Technology Daily, April 9). If Xinhua World Studies Institute researcher Chan Dexiong such strong language is not entirely out of character, penned an article questioning how a system that allows then the real puzzle of such strong language appearing a few people to get rich at the expense of the people in Xinhua is why the reform advocating editorials of the could be democratic or legitimate (People’s Daily, April People’s Daily and the China Youth Daily did not carry 23). This analysis mirrored an earlier article arguing the this language—or why Wen’s latest reform speech given Chinese people chose Marxism because it offered a path last week also omitted the phrase (People’s Daily, April 23). to national liberation and democratic rights while helping The answer, at least in part, is because the limits placed “build a harmonious and equitable society” (Red Flag, on reform make any progress largely irrelevant. March 26). Accordingly, foreign hostile forces threatened to divide and manipulate China if Beijing succumbed to In parallel with these calls for reform, other commentaries Western-style democracy, which one former ambassador in the official press systematically limited the scope suggested might even lead China to resemble the former of what Beijing considered acceptable as political Yugoslavia (People’s Daily, April 24; PLA Daily, April 1; and economic reform. An editor’s note on Monday Red Flag, March 26). stated the positive emphasis on the Chinese people in guiding reforms “does not mean weakening the CCP’s The latest calls for reform augur little, if any, change to leadership,” reflecting the center’s assertion that China the status quo, regardless how strong the language or “will stick to its fundamental political system” (People’s how dire the situation might seem for a scandal-ridden Daily, April 23; Global Times, April 11). The answer is CCP on the cusp of a major leadership transition. The to make the government and its CCP cadre work better internal tensions between the CCP’s primacy and the and more effectively while rooting out corruption, which need for more objective “scientific development” are Premier Wen recently called “the most crucial threat to not new, but reform probably will require tradeoffs the ruling party” (People’s Daily, April 24; April 23; China involving the CCP’s political power. The CCP’s rule Daily, March 27). however has not been opened for negotiation, keeping entrenched interests that the party claims to oppose in One of the best examples of these limits is the contrast place (source). On the positive side, the call for adherence between the embattled security chief Zhou Yongkang’s and continuation to the policy of reform and opening remarks at the Central Political-Legal Commission’s first is a fairly clear repudiation of the quasi-Maoist policies training session of the year and how the CCP claims the advocated by Bo. Bo family’s investigation will be handled. After Bo’s ouster 2 ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 9s April 27, 2012 Peter Mattis is Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown A graduate in Chinese language and literature from elite Foundation. Peking University, Hu served in the Tibet Autonomous Region for 20 years before becoming party boss of the CYL in 2006 and governor of Hebei Province in 2008. *** He assumed his current post as Inner Mongolia’s party chief in 2010, when he was merely 46 years old. The speed of his promotions—his stint at the CYL and in Hebei Hu Jintao’s Sixth Generation each lasted merely 18 months—is probably due to the fact that he enjoys the full confidence of President Hu. Protégés Play Safe to Ensure The younger Hu is tipped to be made Party Secretary of Promotion either Guangdong Province or the Beijing municipality at the 18th Party Congress. Since both posts carry Politburo By Willy Lam status, this would enable Hu to become the youngest Politburo member at the 18th Party Congress (Reuters, he rounds of ritualistic protestation of loyalty to the March 12; Deutche Welle [Berlin], February 8). T“Chinese Communist Party (CCP) central authorities with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary” show In the tradition of Chinese politics, up-and-coming President Hu Jintao has become the biggest beneficiary of cadres avoid making controversial statements—and the Bo Xilai scandal. Apart from pulling out all the stops initiating overly ambitious projects—so as not to be seen to ensure that more of his Communist Youth League as upstaging their superiors or departing from the line of (CYL) faction affiliates from the Fifth Generation—a the central party authorities. The younger Hu obviously reference to cadres born in the 1950s—will be inducted caught the eye of President Hu for having acquitted into the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at himself well in the rugged terrain of Tibet, where the the 18th Party Congress this autumn, the supremo is older Hu was party boss from 1988 to 1992. Chinese boosting the political standing of a few key members media accounts of Hu Chunhua have emphasized his of the Sixth Generation leadership.