[JCCP 1.1 (2015) p39-76] ISSN 2040-0837

Universal dream, national dreams and symbiotic dream Reflections on transcultural generativity CCPN 1 in China–Europe encounters Shuo Yu

Abstract: The China–Europe encounter is regarded as an auto-process of interpretative configuration which gradually forms a certain self-system that possesses sufficient transcultural generativity to communicate, understand, interpret, and go beyond the original sources of the one and the other. Its continuation depends on a degree of hetero-identity, and with the contributions of a ‘double agent’ this historical encounter has created a third kind of shared spiritual commonwealth which belongs to China and Europe. The article demonstrates a flow of history in a scrolling picture: 16th–18th-century ‘holy men’ in encounter with a spontaneous awakening to question universal values, accepted or rejected; 19th–20th-century ‘heroic men’ in encounter, accompanied by combats betweenGLobal sovereign states; the later 20th-century ‘economic men’ in encounter, sniffing out cultural differences and dominated by quantitative thinking after the end of the Cold War (Yu 2001); and the 21st-century emerging ‘ecological men’ who encounter a general planetary crisis. Echoing the topology of encounters in the common history of China and Europe are three historical dreams: the 17th–18th-century universal-value dream, the 19th–20th-century national-state dream, and the 21st-century human symbiotic dream. It first analyses the intensive interactions between

1. I would like to express my gratitude to CCPN Global’s voluntary researcher and translator Dr Guoxin Xing and Ms Chengqian Guo who translated this article from Chinese into English, and to Ju Tang, my assistant, who translated the revised second half of this article; thanks also go to Mr Nick Prendergast, Drs Ellie Mayger and Thomas Clarke, Associate Professors Xiaoying Zhang and Associate Professor Limei Gou who edited and proofread its English versions; Professors Qian Yufang and Guo Aimin and Ms Siqi Wang proofread its Chinese version; especially Professors Stephan Feuchtwang, Martin Albrow, Sam Whimster and Chu-Ren Huan, for their academic advice and corrections; and my assistants Daisy Tang Ju and Tang Yuen Ha’s efforts in sorting out and revising references and manuscript. Words cannot express my thanks toward Proferssor Xiangqun Chang and editorial team of JCCP, for without their great help this article could not exist. Finally, I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of my beloved mother, who passed away while I was revising it.

Journal of China in Comparative Perspective《中国比较研究》 © CCPN Global 全球中国比较研究会 40 Shuo Yu China and Europe during the period of the ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ in the 17th and 18th centuries. She puts forward the concepts of transcultural generativity and a shared spiritual historical common wealth. It then skips the second encounter to draw parallels between the first great debates on seeking universal values 300 years ago and the current criticism of universal values by the ‘awakened Lion China’. The author applies the concept of liminality to treat the cross-field of China–Europe encounters as a non-structure and a permanent transition. She points out an interesting fact: the Communist Party CCPNof China adopted from Europe has turned a ‘short-term’ liminal transition into a ‘long-term’ structure. She refers to the ‘total history’ of the Annals and calls for a common Europe–China transcultural history. In the last section she forms a contrast: the universal values of 300-year-old Enlightenment thought with the ‘Chinese values’ advocated in the great propaganda of the ‘China dream’. Finally, the author suggests that, faced by today’s reality of vital interdependence, a dream of national prosperity could only come true by admitting the reality of a sole human community, and metamorphosing itself into a symbiotic dream of the Earth.2

Keywords: Transcultural generativity, cultural cross-fields, liminal flexibility, liminal space, permanent transition, agent of in-between, China–Europe Encounters, symbiotic dream Introduction GLobal Why do we need to project far back in time to clip a piece of history? The past is a call from the outside, a call to a combination with the present time, their living-together and their coexistence. It is a call from the past itself to be seen again and again by different eyes in order to help us better understand our current world. Gilles Deleuze told us: ‘The memory could never evoke and recount the past if it had not already formed at a time when the past was still present, so in order to come’ (Deleuze 1985: 72). A history is the weaving of a tripartite relation: ‘the past is a former present, and future, a present to come’ (Deleuze 1985: 354). What then is the heritage of 500 years of encounters between China and Europe? Why did people stubbornly carry on with the centennial ‘Rites Controversy’ between the two Eurasian poles? What are the value and motivation behind it? What are the features of cultural and intercultural cross-fields? What kind of power games and representational strategies did double agents play in a liminal zone? How should researchers today move

2. Interestingly, the Communist Party of China’s report at the 18th Congress promotes socialist core values, which include universal values: prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity (honesty and trust), and kind- ness. These can form a major part of a symbiotic dream. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 41 away from the modern national diplomatic standpoint and get back to the human historical scene? This article tries to adopt a transcultural approach of historical anthropology to draw a topology of three China–Europe encounters. Besides the usual chronological way of describing dates and events, a series of new conceptual tools has been used as map makers in this article. These include such concepts as double agent or ‘agent of in-between’ (d’entre-deux), multi- identity, liminal flexibility, fuzzy border effect, cross-fields of encounter, CCPNinterpretative configuration, principle of distance, historicity, mirror effect, power games, representational system, communication strategies, proactive misunderstanding, positive misunderstanding, and transcultural generativity… (Yu 2001). The China–Europe encounter is regarded as an auto-process of interpretative configuration which gradually forms a certain self-system that possesses sufficient transcultural generativity to communicate, understand, interpret and go beyond the original sources of the one and the other. Its continuation depends on a degree of hetero-identity, and with the contributions of ‘double agents’ or agents of ‘in-between’, this historical encounter has created a third kind of shared spiritual commonwealth which belongs to China and Europe. The article demonstrates a flow of history in a scrolling picture: 16th–18th-century ‘holy men’ in encounter with a spontaneous awakening to question universal values, accepted or rejected; 19th–20th-century ‘heroic men’ in encounter, accompanied byGLobal combats between sovereign states; the later 20th-century ‘economic men’ in encounter, sniffing out cultural differences and dominated by quantitative thinking after the end of the Cold War (Yu: 2001); and the 21st-century emerging ‘ecological men’ who encounter a general planetary crisis (Yu 2007: 119–121; 2009). Echoing the topology of encounters in the common history of China and Europe are three historical dreams: the 17th–18th-century universal-value dream, the 19th–20th-century national-state dream, and the 21st-century human symbiotic dream. An interesting mismatch is that the 21st-century China dream is more like a spent force of the 19th–20th-century national dreams as demonstrated in the documentary The Rise of the Great Nations (《大国 崛起》).3 It would be a great contribution to humanity if the promotion of the current China dream were to lead to a symbiotic dream. Part I of this article will try to analyse the intensive interactions between China and Europe during the period of the ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ in the 17th–18th century, keeping in view the questions at the beginning of this article. In Part II the author will skip the second encounter to draw parallels between the first great debates on seeking universal values 300 years ago and the current criticism of

3. Ren Xuean et al. (2006) The Rise of the Great Nations (任学安等:《大国崛起》), 12 episodes of historical documentaries, produced by CCTV, Beijing. 42 Shuo Yu universal values by the ‘awakened Lion China’.4 Faced by today’s reality of vital interdependence, the final point is to realize that, for any national dream to prosper, it must metamorphose itself into a planetary symbiotic dream.

I. Attraction of heterogeneity and universal imagination: the French ‘China complex’ and the Chinese ‘France complex’ Besides political and diplomatic narratives praising ‘China’s Dream’, let us explore a phenomenon that we could call the French ‘China complex’ and the CCPNChinese ‘France complex’ (Yu 2001). To reflect the current discourse, in the place of ‘complex’ we can use the term ‘dream’. Such mutual dreams occurred between the two heterogeneous countries sited at the two poles of the Eurasian continent, resulting from imagination of and attraction to an ‘exotic land’ or an ‘Other’ in an anthropological sense. This also reflected a historicity of ‘the New World’ adventure. The difference is that the French have been looking for and spreading universal dreams (religious, rational or humane), whereas the Chinese have been emphasizing a dream of unification (cultural, historical or political) under the sky (tianxia 天下). The French tradition of universal values can probably be traced back to Rabelais and Montaigne, the two great humanist thinkers. The generation of Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire took Imperial China (a brilliant civilization without monotheism) as a model for launching a secularization campaign based on liberty, equality and fraternity.5 These universal values have been gradually recognized andGLobal accepted by all mankind over the past 250 years. Nowadays, planetary humanists, represented by French philosopher Edgar Morin, advocate an ‘anthropo-ethics’ needed by our ‘Planetary Era’ to realize a human dream of our ‘Homeland Earth’ (Morin 1996 and 2004). In this humanistic tradition, and in my personal experience over the last two decades, the French have introduced certain new concepts and ideas to China: civil society, global citizen governance, green ecology, circular economy, fair trade, transcultural perception, world society, planetary ethics, complex thinking and so forth.6 Take the China–Europa Forum, an independent non-

4. For the first time China repeats in a positive way the famous phrase of Napoleon: ‘Quand le lion Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera’, enunciated by President Xi Jinping at the French presidential palace Elysee on 27 March 2014. He added: ‘The lion China has been awakened, but it is a peaceful, pleasant and civilised lion!’ Immediately there was a comment on the ‘gentle lion theory’, contrasting it with the saying ‘a needle hidden in silk floss’ (Cao 2014). 5. His writings about China in Lettres philosophiques (1734), Essai sur les moeurs (1741) and Le siècle de Louis X1V (1751). 6. For example, they created the Yanjing Environmental Group in 1992, translated Vers une écologie industrielle (Suren Erkman), launched a translated book series ‘Nouveaux courants de la pensée française’ (French thinkers’ new thoughts), including authors such as François Furet, Pierre Rosanvallon, Pierre-André Taguieff, Raymond Boudon, Serge Moscovici, Edgar Morin, Pierre Calame, Gil Delannoi (published from 2004 by Beijing Joint Publishing House), invited famous Polish historian Adam Michnik to the China–Europa Forum and debated with Chinese academics about his book Toward Civil Society; translated Edgar Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 43 governmental organization, as an example: it promotes dialogue between Chinese and European societies by organizing series of forums, workshops, and arts exhibitions.7 These efforts have promoted the exchange of ideas and lived experiences between China and Europe, as well as bringing Chinese civil society onto the international stage.8 This phenomenon is also known by Chinese officials as ‘civil diplomacy’. On the Chinese side, it never lacked the ideals of ‘the supreme harmony with fraternity in the whole world (Sihai zhinei jiexiongdi四海之内皆兄 CCPN弟)9, ‘when the Grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky’ (Tianxia datong 天下大同).10 It has had followers of ‘universal values’ since ancient times. If we try to return to the historical scene and observe closely, we can find for instance that even Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty was a practitioner of universal values! He understood the spread of Catholicism, by his favorite Western ministers, as ‘universal righteousness under the Sky’ (tian xia tong yi 天下通义), ‘in accordance with the Great Tao’ (you he da Dao有合大道). To support them, he gave grants to build churches, bestowed titles of nobility that reached the first rank of the Mandarinate on men such as J. Adam Schall von Bell (1592–1666), inscribed plaques reflecting his veneration of the Sky (understood by missionaries as ‘Deus’) and his gratitude to his Western teachers, reminded them to be discreet in spreading the gospel, and provided advice on protecting them. Ancient emperors might accept or expel people, or prohibit the spread of religions, but they never denied the universalGLobal Tao. Paradoxically, about the time of the celebration of the 120th anniversary of the birth of Mao Zedong and with the new drumming of the ‘China dream’, there appeared a new round of

Morin, Ethique,by Yu Shuo, Joint Publishing House, 2014. 7. French artist Painting Exhibitions: François Bossière, Inner Remote (2005) http://www.china. com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/zf/844332.htm;F.Bossière,Roland Buraud, Chinese Sense of French Artists (2007) http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/CU-c/946120.htm; http://www.people. com.cn/BIG5/32306/32313/32330/2705153.html; China–Europa Forum Workshop Artistic creation and Art market (2010); http://china-europa-forum.net/rubrique232.html; http:// art.china.cn/huihua/2010-07/08/content_360 107.htm; Art brut exhibition The Strength of Natural (2013) http://www.china-europa-forum.net/article4146.htm; http://www.enghunan. gov.cn/Text_News/201307/t2013073 131_884188.htm 8. Under the leadership of Pierre Calame, President of the French Foundation Charles Leopold Meyer for Human Progress, we invited Chinese people from different social and professional categories to become involved in ‘Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and Solidary World’ (1996–2001), the World Social Forum (1998–2003), China–Europa Forum (begun in 2005 and continuing), Rio +20 Earth Summit (an important Chinese entrepreneurs’ delegation was to participate in the ‘People’s Summit’ in 2012) and the creation of ‘China–Europa– South America Tripartite Civil Societies Dialogue’... See: http://www.china-europa-forum. net/article4148.html 9. Confucius, Analects (Lun Yu), Yan Yuan, 12, 《论语·颜渊》十二. 10. The Book of Rites, the Conveyance of Rites，translated by James Legge in 1885. 《礼记– Liji》, http://ctext.org/liji/li-yun. Also see 姜义华、黄俊郎《新译礼记读本》，三民书 局，2007年. 44 Shuo Yu ‘carpet bombing’ against universal values by emphasizing the specialness of ‘Chinese characteristics’ (中国特色). The Institute of Political Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) recently published a Collection of discussions on universal values (e.g. Zhong 2008). The Global View website has been intensively criticizing universal values since 2008 (e.g. Zhang & Liu 2010). The Communist Party News of China follows this trend closely (e.g. Hou 2014). These views are full of paradoxes and form a stark contrast with the universal values of ‘Communist’ propaganda and the ‘One World, One CCPNDream’ slogan heard around the world at the time of the 2008 Olympics. The unusual relationship between China and France began in the late 17th century. At that time, the two countries were both at the pinnacle of glory. This period was known respectively as the ‘Prosperous Era of Kangxi and Qianlong’ (康乾盛世) in China and the Grand Siècle du Roi-Soleil in France. The two countries, each full of confidence in their own civilization, yearned for ‘friendly allies’. It was like a playing field where exciting competitions could unfold between mighty contestants. In 1685, Louis XIV, known as Louis the Great (Louis le Grand) or the Sun King (le Roi-Soleil), sent his first delegation to China. The delegation was entitled a ‘Scientific Mission’ and was composed of six mathematical astronomers of remarkable achievement from the French Academy of Sciences. Although in addition to their scientific investigation the scholars’ mission was primarily Jesuit, it seemed that they accomplished more in the fields of astronomical observation and mapping the route to China than in that of spreading the gospel. GLobal The Sun King seems to have read a huge quantity of books and correspondence by missionaries about China, and became a Kangxi ‘fan’ and instigator of the ‘China complex’. He once wrote a passionate letter to Emperor Kangxi but unfortunately it never reached him. Otherwise, one could imagine that Sino-French or Sino-European relations might have taken a different turn. These publications disrupted the Europeans’ views about China, affecting and shaping the Chinese emperors’ and literati’s ‘Western Ocean’ (西洋 signifying the West) image. From then on, a vivid China–Europe common modern history started, which has not yet been fully explored by historians.11

11. I always suggest that friends in the field of modern history should write such a common history, not like the existing separated and linear historical narrative, but a common live history in an approach exercised by historians aligned with l’Ecole des Annales or anthro- pological history, such as those by Philippe Poirrier and Georges Duby (Histoire de la vie privée), Philippe Poirrier (Les enjeux de l’histoire culturelle) , Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (Montaillou), Roger Chartier (Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations), Peter Burke (Fabrication of Louis XIV. 1994. Yale University Press), and Carlo Ginzburg (The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller). We could call this common history Europeo-Chinese history or Sino-European history, depending on the side of reference of the chronicle. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 45 Among the six12 ‘Mathematicians to the King’, the most significant scholar was Louis Lecomte (1655–1728). After arriving in China in 1687, Lecomte gave himself a Chinese name, Li Ming, with a courtesy name, Fu Chu. During his five-year stay in China, he travelled nearly 10,000 kilometers (2,000 French lieues/leagues), carrying out ‘ethnographic’ and astronomical studies as well as preaching. In 1696, Lecomte published Volume I of Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine [New Memoirs of the Present State of China]. He published the second volume in 1698 and the third one in 1702.13 He also CCPNpublished a feature book entitled Rites Controversy [Querelle des rites], sparing no effort to defend the ‘adaptation strategies’ established by Matteo Ricci (1583–1610) during his spreading of the gospel in China, which are known as the ‘Rules of Ricci’. Emperor Kangxi even gave it special affirmation14 one century later. At the end of the Ming Dynasty the Portuguese who occupied Macao were known as Fulangji (佛郎机人), phonetically translated from the Persian word ‘Firangi’ or Indian ‘Farangi’. In fact, the term stemmed from the former name of the Germanic people of Europe, Franci, the ancestors of the French. By the time of the Qing Dynasty, the imperial court called all Europeans ‘People from West Ocean’ (西洋人) before replacing this with ‘Barbarians’ by the late Qing. What I call the Chinese ‘France complex’ emerged much later, in the second decade of the 20th century, and was embodied in the May Fourth New Culture Enlightenment. Let us take the magazineGLobal New Youth (《新青年》)15 as an example. This magazine was founded in 1915 and from the first volume the title in French, La Jeunesse, appeared under the Chinese one on the cover. It clearly indicated the orientation of the movement: following the freedom and rationalism of the French Enlightenment. The founder and editor, Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), published in the inaugural issue ‘French People and Modern Civilization’, in which he passionately praised French civilization, calling it ‘the mother of modern European civilization’. He wrote: ‘Human Rights (La Fayette) and socialism (Saint-Simon) were produced in France […] Without France, today we would not know how long darkness would continue’ (Chen 1915). Rousseau’s ‘people’s sovereignty’ became a source of the democratic ideals of New Youth. Wang Shuqian (汪叔潜) considered the French conception

12. In fact only five mathematicians arrived in China. 13. In fact, the second and the third volumes were edited in 1698 and 1702, by Le RP Charles le Gobien; see Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, Paris, Chez J. G. Merigot Vol. 3. 1758. The Chinese edition, translated by Guo Qiang, Elephant Press, 2004. 14. Stewart J. Brown & Timothy Tackett, Cambridge History of Christianity: Volume 7, Enlightenment, Reawakening and Revolution 1660– 1815 (Cambridge University Press, 2006): 463. 15. The first name of the magazine was Youth Review (《青年杂志》, replaced by New Youth in 1916. 46 Shuo Yu of human rights to be the cornerstone of modern Western spiritual culture (Wang 1915). France’s achievements in literature, art, philosophy and mathematics held a great attraction for the Chinese intelligentsia, including the creation of the Encyclopedia, in which French thinkers of the Enlightenment constructed the idea of ‘general education following the Greek paideia, a system recognizing universal values. Diderot defined in his preface the two objectives of drafting the 17-volume Encyclopedia: ‘to collect knowledge disseminated around CCPNthe globe, to set forth its general system to the men with whom we live, and transmit it to those who will come after us’, and to ‘change the common way of thinking’. Meanwhile, the French Revolution and the Paris Commune also became the frame of reference for China’s Red Revolution. Chinese people nowadays seem more interested in prestigious French brands and wine. There can be no comparison between the past and the present when it comes to the ‘France complex’. However, Wang Qishan (王岐山), ‘the last remaining communist of the Chinese Communist Party’, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, recommended the book L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution [The Old Regime and the Revolution] to Chinese intellectuals during an anti-corruption meeting at the end of 2012. Written by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1856, this book explored why the French Revolution occurred in the most prosperous period in the reign of Louis XVI (Wang 2014).

II. ‘Rites controversy’ in feedback ofGLobal Eurasian two poles reflecting emergence of spontaneous universal awareness The awareness of a spontaneous universal consciousness ‘initiating from oneself, judging others by putting oneself in their shoes’​ emerged in the middle of the 17th century, beginning with the discovery of the New World and the formation of the global maritime network (Morin 1999). Unfortunately, this quickly subsided after the appearance of ‘race’, ‘culture’ and ‘nation states’. These ‘three musketeers’ of modern civilization have been the loyal defenders of national dreams for over 250 years, maintaining their mobilizing and deterrent strength even today. Let us return to the issue of spontaneous universal consciousness. Louis Lecomte’s experience of China gave him a fresh global awareness, although the actual concept of ‘globalization’ became familiar only in the 20th century. He praised China in an almost exaggerated way when he introduced Chinese civilization to Europe in his three-volume book. While introducing Chinese civilization, Lecomte also took the opportunity to criticize the ‘short- sightedness and depravity of Europe’. This book is an excellent illustration of the ‘mirror effect’, which makes European readers rethink Europe. It was a proto-encyclopedia about China, and one of the earliest ethnographies in China studies, providing the Europeans with valuable first-hand information Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 47 about China. Therefore, we can say that Lecomte was one of the earliest sinologists or quasi-sinologists. The description of China by Lecomte not only subverted the Europeans’ conventional understanding of China and its people at that time, but also juxtaposed certain spontaneous universal views of the civilization represented by Jesuit missionaries and the Chinese cosmic conception of ‘under the sky’ in the 17th century. Like his predecessor, the Italian Jesuit sinologist Martino Martini (1614–1661), Lecomte continued to expand the European awareness of civilization and the initially accepted global CCPNperspective. When Martini came back to Milan from China, he published the book Sinicæ Historiæ Decas Prima [The Ancient History of China] in 1658. His publication shook the world view of Christian Eurocentrism chiefly with the assertion that when Chinese ancient history ended, European history had just begun. How could such a brilliant civilization have existed before Christian history? Of course, we could also then ask: how did the Europeans of that time talk about the ancient Greek civilization? Lecomte was not a conscious humanist, but a self-centered Universalist. The primary objective of his book was to participate in the ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ to prove that both Chinese and Europeans were people chosen by God. In the opening of his book, he emphasized: ‘Please trust in the author of this book that the Chinese people have worshiped the true God through their history’ (Lecomte 1697). This unorthodox view immediately caused a fierce debate within the Church. It then extended to the entire academic com- munity, between religions, courts andGLobal the Curia. Ultimately ‘the Chinese Rites Controversy’ led to a climactic debate on universal values. And hidden behind the differences in sectarian orthodoxy were the constraints of ‘historicity’ in which the consciousness of the nation state was emerging, embodied in the struggle for patronage in China between Spain, France and Portugal. The Jesuit scientists of that generation, Ferdinand Verbiest, Philippus Maria Grimaldi, L. Lecomte, J. Bouvet, and J-F. Gerbillon, greatly influenced first Leibniz, philosopher of the century transition, and then 18th-centu- ry Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Quesnay. Lecomte’s book, Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine, was so popular that, within only four years, the French edition had been reprinted five times and been translated into English, Italian and German. Joachim Bouvet’s History of the Emperor of China, Presented to the King (1697) inaugurated the century of ‘la Vogue chinoise’. The Chinese emperor’s ‘austere elegance’ and ‘studious and ingenious’ image stimulated European interest in China. The Sun King Louis le Grand was attracted and became one of its main promoters. It is said that in 1700, to celebrate the new century, Louis XIV appeared at the grand ball held at Versailles dressed in Chinese-style clothing and sitting on a palanquin carried by eight people. The audience was amazed. Chinoiserie was popular throughout Europe and fanciful ‘Chinese’ imagery created the Rococo style, which combined Eastern and Western stylistic elements in both decoration and shape (Xu & Cheng 2003: 728–730). 48 Shuo Yu Leibniz (1646–1716) lived after the Thirty Years War, a conflict over religious differences which ultimately destroyed half the population of central Europe. He was therefore determined to work to promote dialogue between different religions and cultures and to look forward to a universal language that maybe Chinese could provide. One year after Lecomte published his Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine Leibniz published two issues of the Novissima Sinica (1697 and 1699). He translated a large number of extracts from Lecomte’s book and depicted images of China in his review.16 In CCPNthe preface he wrote: ‘But who would have believed that there is on earth a people who, though we are in our view so very advanced in every branch of behavior, still surpass us in comprehending the precepts of civil life? Yet now we find this to be so among the Chinese, as we learn to know them better. And so if we are their equals in the industrial arts, and ahead of them in contemplative sciences, certainly they surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of mortals’. (Leibniz 1994:46–47) The ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ provides inspirational insights for us who live 350 years later, both in value comprehension and in research. The focus of the debate is sanctity. Participants on both sides, whether their attitude was for acceptance or for rejection, appeared as God’s soldiers: for the Christian God (Deus) or for China’s sky (tian): which was greater? That is why I define the GLobal17 actors as ‘holy men’ in the first China– Europe encounter. The ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ has two major aspects: one, translation, and the other, the object of divinity. The origins of the controversy lay in how to translate the Latin word Deus (God). Missionaries initially translated the word as Tianzhu (Heavenly Lord or Lord of Heaven), based on Buddhism.18 Then, based on the Confucian classics, they translated it as Tian (Heaven) or Shangdi (Lord on High). Therefore, the word tian (sky or heaven) became the focal point. Some missionaries, who were not instructed in the Confucian sense of tian as representing the whole divine Cosmos, questioned the meaning of tian for Chinese people. They thought tian was just physical for the Chinese, rather than a concept of the supremacy of transcendence. They believed that Deus, the personified God of creation, ‘could anger and judge, and could also forgive’, which is different from the ‘impersonal’ Chinese ‘tian (Lord on High)’. As a creator of ‘the universe and the world’, the Chinese Tian or Shangdi was indifferent, embodying no love

16. Olivier Roy, Leibniz et la Chine (Paris: Vrin, 1972):22. 17. I distinguish ‘Holy men’ from the two sorts of actors in the two later encounters, the ‘Heroic men’ and the ‘Economic men’, adding one more nowadays: ‘Green men’... (Yu 2007: 119–121; 2009). 18. It took a long time for the missionaries to understand that Buddhism did not enjoy as high a status in the Chinese empire as it had in Japan. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 49 or hatred, by no means relevant to such Catholic concepts as sin, creation, incarnation, and redemption, and certainly unrelated to the Trinity. In their earliest efforts at Latin–Chinese translation, the Jesuit missionaries worked hard to find words from the Chinese classics for worship (崇拜), temples (寺庙) and sacrifice (祭祀)…, and use them to translate such concepts from Christianity. This phenomenon, called ‘enculturation’ by anthropologists, was the first stage of cultural adaptation. Enculturation is helpful for cultural acceptance. However, connotations of the original CCPNconcepts are easily subject to loss and gain in changing cultural contexts that cannot be translated literally. The second major element of the debate was the divine object itself, that is, whether Chinese Catholics should worship their ancestors and believe in Confucius. The controversy over worship and rites involved a disagreement over cultural values and​​ symbols of sanctity. After Ricci’s death, a liturgical controversy occurred among the Jesuits in China. By the year 1627, however, the Jesuit Conference in Jiading (嘉定会议) at the home of Ignacio Sun(孙元 化), a Catholic official and disciple of Xu Guangqi (徐光启), had reached a consensus, suggesting that the worship of Chinese ancestors and Confucius were secular rituals without a religious nature, which did not conflict with Christian Jesuit beliefs and thus could be retained. However, the new Spanish Dominican Order, which came to the Fu’an area of Fujian Province, was strongly against allowing its believers, Chinese Catholics, to worship Tian Di (Sky and Earth) and also againstGLobal ancestor veneration. This caused a ban on Catholicism, the closure of churches, and the arrest and deportation of Catholic priests. In 1645, the harsh Pope Innocent X issued a decree prohibiting Chinese Catholics from attending Confucius-worship rituals held at the Confucius Temple and ancestral worship at the shrine, or placing ancestral tablets at home. Chinese Catholics were allowed only to place tablets and flowers on the coffin and altar of the deceased, and to burn incense and candles. Ten years later, Pope Alexander VII issued another decree, allowing the preservation of Chinese etiquette, suggesting that honoring Confucius reflected a ‘purely social and political significance’.19 We discover that, by differentiating secular rituals from religious beliefs, the Vatican Holy See completed the narration that Catholicism is the universal religion. Europeans also began to form an awareness of the diversity of civilizations. Missionaries trudged in a cross-field of inclusive universality and diversity. During the late Ming and the whole of the Qing Dynasty, the imperial court accommodated many ‘Xiyangren’ (Westerners). They stayed with the emperors, teaching science, arts and humanities, acting as painters, musicians and scientists, and spreading the gospel by connecting it with Confucian ethics.

19. Cf. Zhang Xianqing, Guanfu, zongzu yu tianzhujiao (Government, Ancestors and Catholicism, Beijing, 2009). 50 Shuo Yu Matteo Ricci’s Dell’amicizia (1595) and Martini’s De Amicitia (1661) are a celebration of the universality of friendship. Xu Guangqi, a famous scientist who converted to Christianity and was committed to absorbing European science in the late Renaissance, agreed with Ricci on the significance of death for life.20 Li Zhi, the sophisticated philosopher of Confucianism, used this kind of ‘real science’ to rethink and criticize the abuse of the dominant ‘Yangming School of Mind’ (阳明心学), the incarnation of Neo-Confucianism in the late Ming Dynasty. CCPNKangxi did not ban Catholicism; he in fact banned some practices that did not conform to the ‘Ricci rules’. He banned some religious activities not for their supposed value differences, but for his disappointment with the ‘petty Western villain’ (xiao ren 小人). By contrast, Kangxi appreciated the European ‘teachers’ in his court more. This can serve as an example of our ‘principle of distance’. Kangxi highlighted the importance of language for understanding in communication, since their ignorance of Chinese language allowed the Westerners to make ‘remarks [that were] incredible and ridiculous’ (Chen 1932). This may explain why his son, Emperor Yongzheng, established an institution to teach the Latin language. For corresponding with Europe (before being replaced by a bunch of nation states), the Jesuit missionaries intentionally produced an interesting ‘proactive misunderstanding’. They translated the terms in Kangxi’s edict ‘preserved as in the past’, ‘missions as normal,’ ‘not necessarily forbidden’ as libertas in Latin, liberdade in Portuguese, and liberté in French. Having been nourished by the RenaissanceGLobal over the centuries, the missionaries could manifest a kind of Zeitgeist or historicity by emphasizing ‘libertas’ in this deliberate mistranslation. The publications of missionaries then influenced the Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century and initiated a European self-reflection and a secularized campaign (forlaicity ) by taking Chinese civilization as a pretext. That is a typical kind of ‘positive misunderstanding’. Leibniz, living in Paris at that time, often met members of the Royal Academy of Sciences and maintained communication with the scientist missionaries sent by the Academy to the imperial court as well as meeting those who had returned to Europe, such as Joachim Bouvet and Philippus Maria Grimaldi. He was strongly influenced by them and added fuel to the ‘Vogue chinoise’ (中国热) flames. Leibniz even voiced a proposal to ‘let the civilized Chinese people spread their moral religion in the decayed Europe’. Almost all the major works of Voltaire, a disciple of Leibniz, included important chapters about China. Being a fierce critic of religious traditions and considering Christianity as ‘assuredly the most ridiculous, the most absurd and the most bloody religion’ (Voltaire 1767: 184), he took advantage of the missionaries’ writings to attack the Roman Curia. 21 He also ‘translated’

20. 利玛窦《Jirenshipian畸人十篇·卷上·第一节》。 21. See ‘Correspondance avec le Roi de Prusse’, Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, Volume 7 (1767): 184. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 51 a pierce of Yuanqu (a type of popular opera in the Yuan Dynasty), The Orphan of Zhao Family, 赵氏孤儿》) into The Chinese Orphans. The book was translated into more than 20 languages in his time. Voltaire acknowledged that, except for the characters’ Chinese names, he had just made use of it as a pretext for his drawn-out plots, which fitted the universal values ​of Confucianism (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faith). Voltaire’s intention was to launch a secular campaign against the Vatican by taking Chinese civilization as a pretext. This is another example of ‘proactive CCPNmisunderstanding’. We have found that cultural differences have never been a reason for irreconcilability, but rather driving forces for mutual attraction. Tolerance and understanding are not that difficult. Standing higher allows one to see the whole forest, composed of individual trees. When differences are overemphasized, what is hidden behind them is a struggle of hostile ideologies and a desire for hegemony. Acceptance and appreciation of others’ particularity is based on the solid ground of sharing commonality (comparability). ‘Others’ or ‘foreign land’ can be the means of mirroring perceptions, which form a frame of reference and comparison, and inspire dreams. Misunderstandings may arise in communication, no matter whether there are differences or not. However, some misunderstandings are caused intentionally, which I call ‘proactive misunderstandings’, while some of them may lead to beneficial consequences, which I call ‘positive misunderstandings’ (Yu 2001).

III. Transcultural generativity and theGLobal fabrication22 of texts in a fuzzy border In the complexity of this cross-civilizational encounter, we notice the emergence of a transcultural generativity in the feedback of the ‘auto- process’. Most missionaries who tried to spread the gospel on the front line in China were overwhelmed by Chinese culture and thus advocated integration. However, the Vatican Holy See, far away from China, would rather insist on repulsion, refusing understanding and toleration. Therefore, I have extracted from the cross-cultural communication a ‘principle of distance’ that I describe as ‘clearance in the front line but blockage in the headquarters’ (Yu 2001). It is applicable nowadays not only to the general relations between the expatriates and the headquarters they were sent out from, but also to the gap between the upper echelons of ideologies and those on the bottom rungs of everyday life who felt and reacted differently to external cultures. Close contact between the emperor and mandarins in the court and the missionaries contributed to acceptance and understanding; local officials kept a distance and on hearsay adopted exclusion and persecution. The concept of ‘generativity’ is borrowed from semiotics and epistemology, and refers to a form of communication that possesses compositionality and the ability to construct complex messages. The concept of ‘transcultural

22. I refer to the usage of Peter Buker in his book Fabrication of Louis XIV. 52 Shuo Yu generativity’ refers to a self-system formed in the auto-process of encounters between civilizations with tremendous generative capacity to communicate, understand and create. It can achieve its own forward momentum in merging the original cultural sources of each one, and by taking a detour around obstacles and adapting to the new environment it generates a transcultural third kind of commonwealth. At that time, there was still neither ‘East’ nor ‘West’ as a kind of culturalist distinction, nor was there the standpoint of sacred sovereign-state positions CCPNthat subsequently appeared. As stated before, as agents or ‘holy men’ of the first China–Europe encounter, they operated a distinction or a union based on sanctity. While the Jesuits sought the Chinese emperor’s support by retaining the rites of ancestor worship and honoring Confucius, Dominicans and other denominations sought papal support to ban these rituals. Ordinary believers secretly combined local and foreign religious traditions in a fuzzy border. Meanwhile, within a period of ten years (1636–1643), Buddhist monks in association with local officials and scholars published three major anthologies, including Ward Off Evil, to attack Catholicism.23 The results led to a confused hubbub of religious tension and relaxation, protection and protestation, China and Europe, internal and external. Let us pay special attention to the so-called Kangxi Edict of Toleration issued in 1692 (the 31st year of Kangxi’s reign). In that year, the Portuguese missionary Thomas Pereira and the French mathematician Jean-Francois Gerbillon sought Emperor Kangxi’sGLobal permission to act as missionaries. After reminding them to act with caution, the emperor issued an edict, stating that there was no prohibition on Westerners and Chinese believers worshiping in the Catholic Church. The translations of the edict or decree from its original version, with the collaboration of court mandarins and missionaries, into different Western languages, and centuries of varying interpretation, have created a vivid case of a fabricated text in the Catholic world24. It is an excellent example of ‘proactive misunderstanding’. In the cross-field of cultural encounter, the agents have some ‘liminal flexibility’. In order to achieve their goals, they consciously use the ‘fuzzy border effect’ (Yu 2001). We should note that this important imperial edict cannot be found in any official document of the Qing Dynasty, such as Qing Patriarch Record (《清圣祖实录》) or in chronological events in Kangxi’s reign; therefore it seems not to have attracted imperial attention then or in the latter reign. The records of the ‘original’ text and comments we can see are mostly from missionaries’ or Chinese believers’ books compiled almost two centuries later, such as Xichao ding’an《熙朝定案》 (Prosperous Finalized),

23. 费隐通容 编《原道辟邪说》 (Original Way to Ward off Evil, 1636)、徐昌治 编 《圣朝破邪集》(Breaking the Evil, 1639) 和《辟邪集》 (Ward off Evil, 1643). 24. The term ‘fabricated text’ was borrowed from Peter Burke in his Fabrication of Louis XIV. 1994. Yale University Press. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 53 Zhengjiao fengzhuan《正教奉传》or Zhengjiao fengbao 《正教奉褒 (The Propagation of the Orthodox [Roman Catholic] Religion), also in missionaries’ correspondence such as that of Father Verbiest, collected at the Vatican Library Biblioteca Apostolica.25 Other records come from two pieces of a stele, Edict of Toleration, which was supposedly engraved by the Jesuit Pereira. Its rubbings are collected in the Chinese National Library in Beijing. We have no intention of digging into the historical truth. What interests us here is reviewing all of this using the approach of historical anthropology and CCPNrefining the concept of transcultural generativity from the ‘auto-process’ of cultural communication in cross-fields and feedback. Moreover, the scenario had been co-created and co-acted on the historical stage, which involved Chinese and Western actors, including scholars, missionaries and ordinary believers, as well as the Qing emperors and the Roman Popes. The above-mentioned Kangxi Edict of Toleration, issued in 1692, had been translated into different languages. The meaning and tone changed greatly in 200 years, as we see here: The Europeans are very quiet; they do not excite any disturbances in the provinces, they do no harm to anyone, they commit no crimes, and their doctrine has nothing in common with that of the false sects in the empire, nor has it any tendency to excite sedition ... We decide therefore that all temples dedicated to the Lord of heaven, in whatever place they may be found, ought to be preserved, and that it may be permitted to all who wish to worship this God to enterGLobal these temples, offer him incense, and perform the ceremonies practised according to ancient custom by the Christians. Therefore let no one henceforth offer them any opposition. (Pittman 2001: 35–36) The European missionaries who came later believed that they could cite this Edict of Toleration of Kangxi’s reign to provide a legal precedent that allowed them to reside in the provinces and resist the persecution of Christians. French Father J-A-M de Moyriac de Mailla (1669–1748) stated this clearly in his letter, commenting that they had obtained liberté (freedom) to preach the law of Jesus Christ in former times (Mailla 1758:354). On November 30, 1700, Jesuits Jean-François Gerbillon, Thomas Pereira and Philippus Maria Grimaldi once more presented a petition in the Manchu language to seek Emperor Kangxi’s support. They explained that Chinese rites were not religious worship, but concerned human nature, people’s customs and instructive exercises, and that Chinese Catholics should continue to practice them. They wrote:

25. Also at Xujiahui Library in Shanghai, the French National Library (Chinois 1329–1331) in Paris, the Roman Jesuit Archives (Jap.Sin.II 67II, Jap.Sin.II 68, Jap.Sin.II 73, Jap.Sin.II 67.2) and other versions at the Italian National library in Rome. Based on the sources of Vatican Library Biblioteca Apostolica, a collection Large Scale Academic Series (《梵蒂冈图书馆藏 明清中西文化交流史文献丛刊》(第一辑), edited by Zhang Xiping, to be published. 54 Shuo Yu

Honoring Confucius and respecting him as the human model has nothing to do with prayers for blessings or appanage; ancestral worship and veneration with sacrifice rituals is love for kinship based on Confucian rites and without seeking anything more than committing pious and filial respect… Emperor Kangxi signed the Royal Assent on the same day he received it: It is written very well and in accordance with the Grand Way (有合大道 You he Da Dao). Honoring tian (Sky) is the same as serving CCPNemperors, parents, masters and elders. It is the universal righteousness under the Sky (天下通义 tian xia tong yi). This is unchangeable. Hereby signed by his Majesty. (Huang, Bolu 1876) That day (November 30, 1700) was even considered to mark the beginning of Kangxi’s formal involvement in the Rites Controversy, because he clearly approved the practice of the three core controversial issues. The missionaries then sent the Royal Assent to the Vatican. However, the Vatican still went ahead with the decree Cum Deus Optimus promulgated in 1704, rebuking the Chinese rite and prohibiting the use of Tian (Heaven) or Shangdi (Lord on High) for naming God and stating that only the words Tian Zhu (Lord of Heaven) should be used. The controversy over the symbolic interpretation of tian is full of disagreements on interpretative strategy. This is because the Chinese character tian and the Western ‘heaven’ are not a single concept, but two sets of complex knowledge, cosmic systems and powerGLobal representations. The consequences of the controversy fell on Emperor Kangxi himself and challenged his divine authority and changed his attitude to the Roman Curia. Kangxi once gave J. Adam Schall von Bell a plaque inscribed with ‘Reverencing the Sky (Jing tian 敬天)’. For half of a century many Catholic churches in China duplicated it and hung it up. But Pope Clement XI officially condemned the word tian‘ ’ in Cum Deus Optimus in 1704 and in the papal bull Ex illa die in 1715. Only ‘Dousi (斗斯)’, the phonetic transcription of Deus, was allowed to name Jesus as the true God. In our eyes this may seem ridiculous, but for linguists or anthropologists it posed a research issue concerning how to translate from one cultural context to another a word that represents a whole symbolic system. The Pope even ordered the churches to remove the plaque immediately. Some missionaries thought the Chinese people went to church not because they had faith in Christ, but because the plaque had been given by the emperor. Their idolatry was thus proved. By then, some churches were no longer hanging up the Kangxi plaque. This naturally aroused his anger and caused a change of attitude toward the Roman Curia. Despite such a serious offense, the gentle and generous Emperor Kangxi, with a sense of universal values, sent four missionaries to the Vatican to explain the significance of the Chinese tian as ‘divine universe’. He strongly expected to reach a good understanding by ‘communication’ and ‘dialogue’. However, the missionaries Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 55 returned, their mission a failure. The Pope maintained the decree Cum Deus Optimus. Emperor Kangxi began to demonstrate his disdain for the Vatican envoys. The complications of the Chinese Rites Controversy were becoming intensified by court and Curia politics on succession and conflicts between religious sectarians. Research by Portuguese sinologist António Vasconcelos de Saldanha points out that Emperor Kangxi, as he did in 1675, wrote three calligraphic compositions with strong religious inspiration for the ‘Portuguese Church’ CCPN(南堂 Southern Church in Beijing) in 1711, for the inauguration ceremony of the new church for the Portuguese Mission, and for the commemoration of the third anniversary of Thomas Pereira’s death. During this period the religious emissary Charles-Thomas Maillard de Touron was sent to China, which exacerbated the precarious situation. Everything was arranged with great care and sophistication, particularly regarding the conception, composition, welcoming and installation of the emperor’s inscription. This was seen as an unusual and ‘collective honour’. At the same time, the President of the Imperial Astronomical Institute (Qintianjian钦天监), Ming Tu, led the participation of the highest officials in the cortège and the inauguration ceremony of the new church. They displayed a eulogium of the Europeorum Doctorum (欧籍博士颂), which no doubt was conceived and endorsed by the emperor. The text of the eulogium reveals itself as a significant Chinese conception and formulation of the European contribution to theGLobal ‘sciences’ in China; it can also be interpreted as an honorable consecration, authorized by Emperor Kangxi, of a chosen number of excellent Jesuits since Matteo Ricci (Saldanha 2012). In 1717, Chen Mao (陈昴), who served as a prominent brigade-general of Guangdong Province, proposed the prohibition of Catholicism to the imperial court. It was approved by Emperor Kangxi. This time it was the turn of the Pope to send missionaries to Beijing for negotiation. In 1721, Carolus Mezzabarba, a papal delegate, went to Beijing and presented Emperor Kangxi for the first time with the Chinese translation of the decreeCum Deus Optimus, issued in 1704. According to historical records ‘the Emperor was displeased’, and he instructed in a cinnabar edict: Reading this proclamation, I have concluded that the Westerners are petty villains indeed. It is impossible to reason with them because they do not understand larger issues as we understand them in China. There is not a single Westerner versed in Chinese works, and their remarks are often incredible and ridiculous. To judge from this proclamation, their religion is no different from other small, bigoted sects of Buddhism or Taoism. I have never seen a document which contains so much nonsense. From now on, Westerners should not be allowed to preach in China, to avoid further trouble. (Chen 1932) 56 Shuo Yu In the early years of the reign of Emperor Yongzheng, Catholicism was even more strictly prohibited. He ordered missionaries to be expelled to Macau and then deported back to Europe. Catholic evangelization was thus at a low ebb again. But the ‘fuzzy border effect’ of history offers other possibilities. Even in periods of complete excommunication Emperor Yongzheng himself permitted about ten Westerners to stay at the imperial court and 50 in Canton, while in 1723, the same year that the official prohibition of Christianity was enforced, four Chinese young men were allowed to be taken by Italian CCPNmissionary Matteo Ripa to Naples to study theology.26 In 1729, Emperor Yongzheng ordered missionaries to set up a translation college to teach Latin. The Europeans reacted in parallel to their Chinese counterparts. After 1700, the Paris Foreign Missions Board banned Lecomte’s book Status Quo of China’s New Memory. The Sorbonne University convened more than 20 seminars to inspect the book, submitting a report which dismissed it as false, reckless and mistaken, and prohibited its use as a university textbook. Lecomte returned to his hometown, Bordeaux, where he died in 1728. What was worse, the Paris parliament ordered the burning of his works on August 6, 1761. The Chinese Rites Controversy concluded with the issuing of the decree Cum Deus Optimus and the papal bull Ex illa die. In July 1773 the Society of Jesus was dissolved and replaced by the Paris Foreign Mission Society, which also replaced the Portuguese and acquired the patronage of the Catholics in China: a Catholic internal power struggle was indeed not less than the external clash of ‘civilizations’. GLobal About 200 years later, on December 8, 1939, Pope Pius XII released a new decree drafted by Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, Plane Compertum. This withdrew the ban on believers’ worshiping ancestors and Confucius, abolished the oaths of missionaries to obey the Cum Deus Optimus, and announced respect for Chinese Confucianism. The decree stated that: ‘Catholics are permitted to be present at ceremonies in honor of Confucius in Confucian temples or in schools; Erection of an image of Confucius or tablet with his name on it is permitted in Catholic schools...’27 The debates in the Rites Controversy are based on the appearance of difference. Everyone operated different representational strategies and took advantage of the power games. Deus and tian are indeed different, but the recognition of their sacredness is the same. Moreover, using today’s fashionable terms, it is a world war fought over the power of discourse. This debate inadvertently prepared the way for the distinction between sacred religious and secular ethics that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. The allied front of Chinese emperors and European missionaries reflected natural human sensibilities and passions toward ancestors, and Enlightenment

26. Mungello, David E., The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005):119. 27. S.C. Prop. Fid., 8 Dec. 1939, AAS 32–24. The Sacred Congregation of Propaganda. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 57 practices. And their battle carried on from generation to generation and was finally won, but only several centuries later.

IV. Transcultural liminality and Sino-European agents of the in-between Liminality (limen) refers to a threshold, a boundary or a corridor between two different places. French ethnologist Arnold van Gennep invented the term ‘liminality’ and called ‘rites of passage’ liminal rites. ‘As a universal symbolic phenomenon’ (‘all societies use rites to demarcate transitions’), these rites CCPN‘accompany every change of place, state, social position and age’. According to him, all rites of passage are marked by three phases: a preliminary phase (margin or separation), a liminaire phase (transition) and a postliminaire phase (communitas or aggregation) (van Gennep 1909). British anthropologist Victor Turner confirmed van Gennep’s nomenclature for the three phases of transition and defined it largely as being from one cultural state or status to another. He focused on the second phase – liminal rites: ‘The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (“threshold people”) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the many societies that ritualize social and cultural transitions’GLobal (Turner 1966: 95). These liminal people enter into a marginal state of ‘statuslessness’, non-organization, or non-structure. The original ranks, statuses and cultural distinctions critical to the original structure get neglected. Liminal people are humble, solitary, penitent, obedient and silent. Before being reincorporated, they are in the status of ‘between positions’ (Turner 1966: 97). Missionaries existed in just such a liminality between cultures: in the ‘in-between’, ‘hybridity’, ‘interstice’, ‘third place’, or ‘realm of beyond’, as defined by the Indian-American critic of post-colonialism Bhabha (Bhabha 1994). Detached from Europe and from their original religious congregations, missionaries, such as the Jesuits with their three vows of ‘poverty, chastity and obedience for the supreme glory of God and the public interest’, stayed in Macao, then occupied by the Portuguese, and waited for a chance to enter the Chinese mainland. For decades, they persisted in preaching consistently and secretly. They entered into a ‘communitas’ process with lowly underprivileged people, middle-level literati, and the emperor, on what seems to have been a prolonged extension of a liminality rite. The longest such stay in China, 55 years, was that of the Italian G. Castiglione, court painter to three regimes: Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong. Some missionaries received special treatment from the emperor, being awarded rank, churches, etc.… Can we thereby ascertain that they are ‘reincorporated’ in a stable structure? We need to read letters from the missionaries to learn the ‘emic’ experience of 58 Shuo Yu these historical actors. We find that, supported by a type of universal belief, these successful missionaries nevertheless behaved with great humility28 and prudence. Just like the saying ‘skating on thin ice’, they bore with humiliation and revealed the non-place and communitas that the liminal person occupies in the transition rite, but for them this transition appeared permanent. In such a complex historical and cultural encounter reincorporation into the existing structure seemed impossible. As we know, the introduction of Western learning into China (西学东 CCPN渐) was a significant historical event in the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Out of personal interest as well as to strengthen his rule of the Central Plain, the whole empire and beyond, Emperor Kangxi studiously acquired Western knowledge. Missionaries were an important source of knowledge about science, philosophy, and art for the Qing court. Johann Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest helped to amend the astronomical calendar; Ferdinand Verbiest achieved significant merit in conquering the Revolt of The Three Feudatories (三藩之乱), because with his help the Qing court produced hundreds of cannons to suppress the rebellion; Joachim Bouvet, J.-B. Regis and other missionaries conducted geographical surveys and drew a map of nation: Kangxi Huang Yu Quan Lan Tu (Map of Imperial Territory). Thomas Pereira made musical instruments and taught Western music and performance, while he ‘spread Catholicism, and even Emperor Kangxi’s closest eunuchs became believing Catholics’ (Xiao 2003: 179). Pereira and Gerbillon contributed much in signing the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Gerbillon and Bouvet were given the title of imperial teacher to teach EmperorGLobal Kangxi geometry, geodesy, anatomy, and medicine; a laboratory for research in chemistry and pharmacy was even set up in the palace. When Verbiest was sick, Kangxi sent his good wishes and imperial doctors. After Verbiest’s death, Kangxi bestowed on him the posthumous name ‘Qin Min’ (meaning diligent), and wrote an inscription to commemorate his contributions in establishing a calendar and manufacturing cannons. This may explain the preconditions of Kangxi’s approval for Catholic preaching. We mentioned in the first part of this paper that Xu Guangqi, Sun Yuanhua, Martino Martini, Louis le Comte or Gottfried Leibniz, and the above-mentioned missionaries (in addition to many others who published a number of books on the theme of China and advocated universal values) could all be regarded as ‘double agents’ or ‘agents of in-between’. A perfect example of the role of ‘double agent’ is Pereira and Gerbillon being sent to Russia on a diplomatic mission on behalf of Emperor Kangxi in 1689. During negotiations, the Qing Empire, Russia and the European Jesuit missionaries formed a subtle triangular relationship. The Qing Empire used Jesuit missionaries as interpreters as well as negotiators. We can see that Emperor Kangxi had absolute trust in them. Russia tried to draw delegates over to the

28. They were humble mainly before their God, but not in relation to ordinary ‘superstitious’ people. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 59 Russian side by virtue of the faith commonwealth of a distant relationship with Europe and close geographical links; the Jesuit missionaries who intended to explore a land route to Rome through Russia since the Netherlanders had cut off the way through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the Jesuit missionaries, who were masters of Latin, French, Portuguese, Chinese and Manchu languages, became multi-agents of negotiation. They played pivotal and decisive roles in this diplomatic power game. They tried to fulfil their duties without disadvantaging Emperor Kangxi, but also managed skilfully to meet the CCPNexpectations of the Russians. Finally, they guaranteed the successful signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which ensured that ‘China and Russia will maintain forever peaceful relations’. Meanwhile, they helped Russia privately in order to gain Russian governmental support for their proselytizing mission. Pereira wrote down his conversation with Russian envoy Golovin Ficdor Alekseevich in his diary: ‘I have been living in China for many years, and I was assigned by the Chinese emperor, so I have to do as his loyal subjects do, else, bad results come’ (Pereira 1973[1701]). From this we can track their liminality strategy in this complex cross- field, and see that they became the real ‘mediators’. They were subjects of the emperor, missionaries, and brothers in religious community. They were ‘inside’ as well as ‘outside’; under different pressures, they reversed roles wisely. Emperor Kangxi was quite content with the treaty and even met the returning diplomatic corps outside the Forbidden City. Even after the passage of many years, he still appreciated the missionaries’ contribution to the negotiations (Zhang 2006: 33–34). GLobal Jean-Baptiste du Halde’s book A Description of the Empire of China and Chinese-Tartary has in its English version a bilingual inscription engraved with Emperor Kangxi’s calligraphy in 1711, for rebuilding the Beijing South Church (Portuguese Church). 29 On the first column (right) it says: ‘He has had no beginning and will have no end, he has produced all things from the beginning: It’s he who governs them and is the true Lord’ (无始无终先作形 声真主宰). On the second column (left) it reads: ‘He is infinitely good and infinitely just: He enlightens, supports and rules all, with a supreme authority and sovereign justice’ (宣仁宣义聿昭拯济大权衡) (du Halde 1738). This was when Cum Deus Optimus was published and many restrictions were placed on Catholic preaching. In 1706 Kangxi sent Bouvet and three other legates to the Vatican to settle the Chinese Rites controversy, but they failed, straining the relationship between the Holy See and the Qing court. Under such extreme pressure, Emperor Kangxi bestowed the inscription, the Imperial Astronomical Bureau (IAB, 钦天监Qintianjian, literally meaning ‘Bureau to admire Heaven’). IAB organized magnificent rites and issued the Eulogium of the Europeorum Doctorum on behalf of the emperor. These acts prove the missionaries’ importance at the court as ‘Professors of doctrine’,

29. See the first part of this article published in Vol. 1 (1), 2014, 37-59 60 Shuo Yu who had earned the trust and friendship of the emperor and the court mandarins, developed an intimate relationship with the emperor and from time to time accompanied him when he went out to visit his empire. They also talked about Catholicism and its similarities with Confucianism. These outstanding Europeans had a tremendous impact on this Manchu emperor, and in missionaries’ writing the emperor was also described as brilliant.30 We could try to apply the ‘margin’ concept from the theory of liminality: in closed or structured societies, it is the marginal or ‘inferior’ person or the CCPN‘outsider’ who often comes to symbolize what David Hume has called ‘the sentiment for humanity’, which in turn relates to the model we have termed communitas (Turner 1966: 111). What’s more interesting is that we find two kinds of marginal encounter, the foreign Europeans and ‘adventive’ Manchus. The Qing Dynasty had never been recognized by the Han people. Emperor Yongzheng edited the book On Awareness to Justice (《大义觉迷录》) in order to clarify the legitimacy of the Manchu sovereign: ‘While the world has been unified and the Han (汉) and Yi (夷, Tartars) are one family, a bunch of usurpers wickedly distinguish Chinese and outsiders, create conflicts and resentment (Yongzheng 1729: vol 1) .’ The marginality of Emperor Kangxi and his Manchu mandarins (called ‘Tartars’ by the Han) to the Han majority, and the marginality of the European missionaries (called yiren 夷人, namely, barbarians) to the Qing court, formed their communal ‘sacred outsider’ experience. When the Manchus intruded into central China, they were met GLobalwith strong resistance from Ming soldiers and people, who believed that ‘changing dynasty means national subjugation’. The literati refused allegiance to the invaders. In this situation, we have the two greatest painters of China, Zhu Da and Shi Tao, retiring to a Buddhist temple, the poet Meicun putting his nom de plume rather than his name on his gravestone, and even the vassal state Lee Dynasty of Korea insisting on using ‘Post-Chongzhen’ in the calendar and opposing the Qing rulings. With this fresh in his memory, Kangxi easily sympathized with the missionaries, who suffered rejection and experienced this communal marginality. All external norms lose their binding function, and communitas becomes ‘a matter of giving recognition to an essential and generic human bond’ (Turner 1966: 97). Liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white [...] the temporal movement and passage that it allows, prevents identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities. The interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy (Bhabha 1994: 4).

30. Bouvet, Joachim. 1697. Histoire de l’Empereur de la Chine. Présentée au Roy. [History of the Emperor of China. Presented to King]. Paris. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 61 From an overall perspective of complex identity, missionary belief and institutional arrangement, we could try to abstract the features of transcultural encounters as ‘liminal space’: 1. Liminal ‘transition’ becomes a real and permanent situation and may be institutionalized, such as when dispatched ambassadors (an embassy) reside abroad and become fixed institutions; some types of individual are beyond the structure, such as Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus or Jews, friars or dervishes, or pilgrims, etc.; they have CCPNfeatures of the ‘sacred outsider’, and gain ‘statusless status’ from the super structure status of liminality (Turner 1966: 116). One can understand this permanent transitional situation better after visiting the missionary cemetery in Tenggong Zhalan at Beijing Er Li Gou. Looking at the placement of the Qiantianjian, under the Ancient Observatory founded by the Yuan Dynasty, beside the south-eastern tower (Jianguomen today) with access to the capital, we see a perfect ‘limen’ where the missionaries worked, a metaphor full of liminality. 2. The ‘liminal communitas’ that happened in the live encounter is neither ritualized nor a formalized ‘rites of passage’ process, but is a ‘greeting gift’. Nevertheless, as Erving Goffman pointed out, there is a framework of manoeuvres, which is a unique set in a large natural arena of social interaction; it is tangible and abstract. It is not just a static classification. The defined scenario projected before others is the driving force of changeGLobal in this framework (Goffman 1959: 229–230). The daily routine of work at Qintianjian (IAB), lecturing and discussion, drawing and fabricating musical instruments or cannons, writing prefaces, deepened the non-ritualized communitas process, varying according to time, people and tendency. We can draw enlightenment from this: friendship could be created beyond the structure while within the sacred communitas.31 3. ‘Liminality is not only a transitional form, but also a potential one’ (Spariosu 1997: 133); it carries sacred generativity. There were Chinese descriptions of such ‘transitional rites’. Mencius stated profoundly:

31. Stephan Feuchtwang commented on this point and thought this is unduly idealistic because ‘religious institutions and embassies each in their different ways insist on their own sover- eignty or rather on service to a sovereign authority’. This article acknowledges this point by demonstrating how the compromise is made with obedience to such a sovereign authority through cases that they worked together for domestic and foreign affairs in the part one and the above section. However, in a liminal situation of ‘ecology of action’ occurs conversion between structural and emotional relationship; the Jesuits were adept at ‘strategic choice’ or ‘ethical bet’ (Morin 2004: 59) between multiple imperatives. This creates a kind of reciprocal ‘personalizing institutional relationship’ between missionaries and emperors. They did their jobs for their own sovereignty respectively by working together instrumentally on the one hand; on the other hand, they also promoted their relationship as an ‘expressive’ one, which they enjoyed. This kind of social creativity and dynamic change in different types of relation- ship can be analyzed by using the lishang-wanglai model (Chang 2009, 2010). 62 Shuo Yu Before appointing someone for an important mission, Tian (天) first makes him suffer mental pain, bone exhaustion, abdomen hunger, body empty, failure of expectations, then hones will and strengthens his toughness for growing his capabilities.’ (Mengzi. Gaozi. Part II) We see the ‘baptism’ and ‘ascetic practice’ in Catholicism which test one’s potential, and enable one to complete the sacred transition through suffering, and therefore to gain some sort of ‘additional CCPNpower’ for guiding the world, which creates a new existing relationship and space, the third alternative place. 4. The marginality of liminality liberates transcultural persons from regular constraints, and sets them in an ‘alternative structure’ or ‘realm of beyond’, and thus they can obtain a certain freedom and ‘powerless power’, such as Qintianjian (IAB), in charge of observing astronomical phenomena, which in fact owns more important spiritual power. According to Chinese cosmology, as well as under the conception that ‘man and heaven are united’ (天人合一), the emperor was the Son of Heaven legitimated by a celestial mandate (君权神 授), and responsible to the Will of Heaven (替天行道). Therefore, Qintianjian served the emperor directly by fulfilling this sacred mission. IAB, the authoritative institution, belonged to the Ministry of Rites (礼部), and played an important role at court. It worked on the observation, interpretationGLobal and prediction of celestial phenomena as a commentary on imperial affairs and the ‘imperial fate’ (天机). It edited the annual lunisolar calendar based on the official calendric system. The calendar symbolized imperial power and order, and was used in the central empire and neighboring vassal states. It was also responsible for deciding auspicious times for the empire’s rituals and ceremonial events. These ritual activities maintained the relationship between the emperor and Heaven. In the early years of the Qing, Emperor Shunzhi gave Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell the title of Supervisor (监正) of Qintianjian, promoting him to the first rank. Three generations of his descendants in Germany also benefited from this favour. With the exception of Yang Guangxian, it was Westerners such as Schall von Bell, Ferdinand Verbiest, Thomas Pereira and Philippus Maria Grimaldi, etc. who held the post of Supervisor of Qintianjian at one time or another.32 Over almost 200 years, more than 20 missionaries took such posts in the IAB. Missionaries thus successfully obtained benefits from both transitional power and their intermediate situation by setting themselves within the two solidified structures.

32. Yang became Supervisor by making an unjust case against Adam Schall, but soon afterwards the truth was discovered and Yang was removed from the post by Emperor Kangxi. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 63 5. Multiple identities and fuzzy boundaries produced ‘liminal flexibility’ in strategic activity. We note this from an anecdote. Few people noticed that among the missionaries there were two Min Mingwo ( 闵明我) sequentially. The first was the Spanish Dominican Jesuit Domingo Fernández Navarrete (1610–1689), who returned to Europe in 1689 and died the same year. The second was another Jesuit, Italian missionary Philippus Maria Grimaldi (1639–1712). Benefiting from the fuzzy liminality, the canny Jesuits at the Qing court arranged CCPNthe appointment of Grimaldi by making it widely known that Navarrete had ‘returned’ to China and entered the Forbidden City as Verbiest’s assistant. Fuzzy liminality is also applicable to the multiple possibilities and diversity of text translation. 6. The liminal position is also a dangerous one: a double agent as a liminal person may be sacrificed mercilessly and excluded by the two fixed structures. From this perspective of permanent liminality, as a natural consequence of transcultural generativity, a Europe–China or China–Europe common history becomes an expectation. We need such a history, which should be able to portray these 500 years of people-to-people encounters, deal with its interactive and generative process,33 apply new conceptual tools and a historical–anthropological approach, and represent the transcultural fruits cultivated during these human encounters. It is a liminal history of mediation, a way of appreciating ‘in… between’ (L’entre-deux, Deleuze 1991), and thus it gathers the abundant fruits of the GLobalhuman mind. We refer to the three-temporalities theory of Fernand Braudel, the most famous historian of the Annales School (École des Annales), to describe this liminal history created by double agents. Braudel categorizes historical time into three genres: the structural ‘geological time’ (longue durée or constructure), functioning in the deepest structures and changing almost imperceptibly; the situational ‘social time’ (moyenne durée or conjoncture), characterized by human collective destiny and common trends with gradually changing economic, social and political situations; and the event ‘individual time’ (courte durée), changing from the short-term agitation of ‘events, politics and people’.34 Unlike the early Annales scholars, we pay as much attention to the significance of social time and individual time, since the human relationship has been the way through which people perceive the world and behave towards each other; and the will to change on the part of the actors involved has quite often been decisive in historical orientation. Kangxi and the missionaries

33. A Chinese model of reciprocity and social creativity, based on a case study of dynamic changes in social relationships in a rural Chinese village (Chang 2009, 2010) is helpful for understanding such an interactive generational process. 34. Fernand Braudel, 1972, 1967, 1979a and b. The Mediterranean in the Age of Philip II. 3 vols (1972). Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries, 3 vols (1967, 1979a and 1979b). 64 Shuo Yu played such a role in the orientation of China and Europe. The desires and actions of actors could subvert the structure and either change or conform to a situation. Chaos theory illustrates this with the ‘Butterfly Effect’; a Taiji maxim is: ‘with four liang one will remove thousand jin’, which means defeating the strong with little effort. As we know, the discovery of electricity arose from a sequence of mistakes and accidental events, but it totally changed human life and the ways of industry. Today, the notion of innovation via serendipitous encounter is gaining popularity.35 CCPNWe can also see the historical significance of accidental events in the ceremony for the new revolutionary regime in 1949. From this moment on, the Communist Party of China, introduced from Europe, has tenaciously turned a ‘short-term’ liminal transition into a ‘long-term’ structure. We need a Sino-European common history, as a ‘total history’ advocated by the Annales, which can be traced back to the ‘total social fact’ of Durkheim and Mauss. According to Durkheim, [a] social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations. (Durkheim 1988[1894]: 107) According to Durkheim’s distinction, we can focus on the second type of social fact: pathological social facts – whichGLobal are much less common, and are irregular and exceptional (Durkheim 2007[1893]: 360), and with this perspective we could understand the coercive constraint in a permanent liminal transition. There are some outstanding research works on China–Europe encounters, such as French sinologist Jacques Gernet’s China and the Christian Impact (Chine et Christianisme, la premiere confrontation, 1982), American historian and sinologist Jonathan Spence’s The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (1984), and French literary historian and linguist R. Étiemble’s book L’Europe chinoise (1988–1989), which have opened up new paths for researching encounters between China and Europe. Twenty-seven years ago, I corresponded with Professor Jacques Gernet to discuss details while translating his book into Chinese, and we kept in touch after my stay in Paris. He was invited by F. Braudel to view Chinese history through the lens of the ‘total social fact’. Therefore, his book China and the Christian Impact focused in particular on the mutually constraining power of traditional history. Through contrasting the Chinese and European literature of the same era he made an overall analysis of the fields of political systems, social organizations, cultural systems and the faith value of believers. However, he did not agree that Christian preaching in early China was a ‘dialogue of two civilizations’. Instead, he regarded it as the

35. See cognitive anthropologist Bob Deutsch, ‘Personal Innovation is Often Serendipitous and ZigZag’, in Tips for Transformation & Inspiration. September 9, 2013. Also see his book The 5 Essentials: Using Your Inborn Resources to Create a Fulfilling Life. Hudson Street Press, 2013. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 65 unilateral efforts made by arrogant Christians with the purpose of changing China. Matteo Ricci failed in using ‘mediation’ and communitas, although the new technology or art attracted many Chinese eminent literati. While Xu Guangqi and Li Zhizao echoed Matteo Ricci by explaining ‘Tian’ and ‘God’ with the word Deus, ‘they made a tacit understanding on the basis of misunderstanding’, or even ‘conspiracy’ (Gernet 1982: 59, 100). From my point of view, ‘proactive misunderstanding’ and ‘positive misunderstanding’ in liminality status changed each other’s world, which CCPNshould form a compositional third history. We need not only the usual focus on the Chinese and European chronology of events, important persons and cultural differences, but also to pay attention to the stories of the people who encountered each other, and to describe their journeys, their motivations for and channels of encounter, the ‘emic’ narrative of encounter agents, their communication methods and their ‘collective memories’. Meanwhile we consider faith value, collision, communitas, the changing of behavioural norms, the ultra-structural and ultra-cultural friendship through long-term communitas, the expansion of the spiritual realm in their life experience, and the modification of original intention and self-positioning… We need such an ordinary people-to-people’s history of mentality. It can describe a topology of social structures and systems of cultural representation, and the collision of minds and ideas. The facts of this thereby generated transcultural communitas, some sort of ‘neither here nor there’ cross-border state (跨界状态), can have new meaning for survival only through engaging and participating in activities.GLobal This history will commit to revealing the liminal features of dialogists’ double (in-between) agency that we have summarized above as permanent transition, a communitas non-ritualization, a potential energy exercise, powerless liminality with freedom and power, and strategic liminal flexibility. This kind of anthropological history or historical anthropology could help us to come back to a historical scene from self- experience, surpass artificial political–diplomatic boundaries, and reveal the principles of reconstruction of human relationships in the living world. It can help us to comprehend the modern evolution of China and Europe thanks to these 500 years of encounters, and to appreciate the great transcultural achievements created through the encounter process. By necessity, we researchers have to be in the liminality, because human history has changed from stable traditional society into ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman 2000), or a ‘post-modern’ transition. The flow of globalization has caused an inseparable human destiny, therefore ‘l’âme est sur la route’ (Deleuze & Parnet 2008: 77).

V. Hyperstable nationalist ‘China dream’ and the ‘awakened lion’ As the previous section shows, Part II skipped the second encounter, explained the transcultural field as a liminal non-structure, and pointed out the paradox of permanent transition. This section will contrast the universal values of 66 Shuo Yu Enlightenment thinking 300 years ago with the current ‘China dream’. Faced by today’s reality of vital interdependence, the final point is to realize that, for any national dream to prosper, it must metamorphose into a planetary symbiotic dream. After the founding of New China, and especially since the reform and opening up, we have always heard and seen a grand narration of China’s prosperity on occasions such as Army Day, the Party Day, and the National Day, and also at annual events such as the Spring Festival Galas and Two CCPNSessions. This narrative describes a blueprint for China: China rises,36 the Chinese economic takes off, ‘surpassing Europe and the United States’; all these indicate that China will take the place of the USA as a worldwide leader.37 No matter how serious the disasters the Party has caused, in politics, culture, humanity and the environment, the national slogan always invokes the ‘Great, Glorious, and Correct Chinese Communist Party’. This ideological propaganda shows its hyperstability in always praising the ‘great era’, and refusing to be criticized publicly. For political parties, every election is a process of liminal transition. Turner pointed out that, since ‘[s]tructure and the high offices provided by structure are thus seen as instrumentalities of the common weal, not as means of personal aggrandizement’, in the process of liminal rites, people with authority or people who will have authority ‘have to hone themselves’, have compassion for the public, listen to criticism, speak meticulously and behave properly, so as to uphold justice GLobalafter gaining power; ‘he must laugh with the people’ (Turner 1966: 104). However, the so-called ‘always great, glorious, and correct’ image makes a party refuse to heed public criticism and submit to democratic supervision, while its continual mistakes cause significant historical disasters. Whenever lies cannot be hidden, ‘national benefit’ is put forward as an excuse, or an autocratic execution takes place and individuals are sacrificed as scapegoats, as in the cases of Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou and so on...; they ‘caused severe results, damaged the fame of CPC and the People of China’. CPC thus maintains its reputation as ‘always great, glorious, and correct’.38 What one-party dictatorship hates most is multi-party alternation of power. In a multi-party system, the political parties make their schemes, echoing public opinion during their campaigning, maximizing citizen participation and support at the ballot box, and the party with misdeeds will

36. Ren Xu’an et al. 2006. The Rise of the Great Nations (《大国崛起》), historical documenta- ries, 12 episodes, CCTV. 5 episodes, CCTV. 2014. Centennial tide· Chinese Dream (《百年 潮·中国梦》). 37. Chinese political five-episode Rising Tide-China Dream, the narrations of Centennial Dream Seeking, China Road, China Spirit, and China Power pave the way for the ultimate goal of Dream World. 38. CPC Notification on Zhou Yongkang’s Serious Discipline Violation. (http://www.lianzheng. org/plus/view.php?aid=11362&bsh_bid=358296267510643007) Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 67 be defeated. Democratic elections contested by different parties can be seen as a liminal rite, through the processes of separation (e.g. resignation from a current position) transition (statuslessness), communitas (widespread people- first campaigning) and reincorporation (being elected), and assuming power as legal representatives of the people. Though 65 years have passed, the symbol system of New China has never changed. Red symbolizes the continuation of ultra-stability: Red army, Red zone, red flag, red armbands, red heart, the sacred songThe East CCPNis Red, Little Red Book, red sun, ‘sing red and blow black’... unscrupulous officials and hack writers could always turn the black into red. Zhang Weiying defined this phenomenon as ‘language corruption’, or ‘blow black becomes blackly repression’ (Zhang 2012). Some naïve, kind-hearted people are willing to cheer the political party’s rites, and travel especially to Beijing to watch the Tiananmen Square flag-raising ritual with tears in their eyes. However, the reality of Chinese crony capitalism is apparently detached from the symbolic signifiers of the propaganda and discourses. In the intellectual field, performance is even worse: ‘earnest lying’, a learning experience of fake Marxism and the lambasting of universal values produce further public confusion and a spiritual crisis for the whole of society. It becomes necessary to create new symbols to maintain the permanent transition. So a series of nationalist depictions such as ‘the rise of China’, ‘the Chinese dream’, ‘global appeal’ and ‘the awakened lion’ come into being, to inject miraculous new blood into GLobalthe confused people. There is also the ‘big country’ idea. Cheng Yinghong writes in his article “China, Your Name is the Big Country?”: ‘Take a Web search, you can see the “big country” (大国) self- proclaimed as “national awareness” even became a commonly used concept of contemporary Chinese national identity. For instance, “big country’s diplomacy”, “nationals of big country”, “big country’s magnanimity”, “military of the big country”, etc. “Big country” after “sacred Earth” (神州) may become the synonym of China’ (Cheng 2014). In the 21st century China plays the 19th century nationalism Awakened Lions , which ‘infects’ far-right groups in other countries, thereby becoming a danger to human society today. Hannah Arendt explains that the source of the mass appeal of totalitarian regimes is their ideology, which provides a comforting, single answer to the mysteries of the past, present and future. For Nazism, all history is the history of race struggle, and, for Marxism, all history is the history of class struggle. Once that premise is accepted, all actions of the state can be justified by appealing to Nature or the Law of History, justifying their establishment of authoritarian state apparatuses (Arendt 2000: 18) Many scholars point out further that totalitarianism seeks to mobilize entire populations in support of an official state ideology, and is intolerant of activities that are not 68 Shuo Yu directed towards the goals of the state, entailing repression or state control of universities, media, lawyers, churches or political parties.39 The governing party that gained absolute authority after the Long March had no will at all to repass through a symbolic threshold, as in the rites of passage. It did not allow the underprivileged people that Turner called ‘the powers of the weak’ to become ‘high-level’ ‘privilege possessors’, even if only during a short course of the rite. The authority with the highest power does not want to play the symbolic game of ‘democratic election’ any more, CCPN‘being symbolically deprived’ of power, to obey the authority of the Republic citizens choose, because they are the judges and the bearers of social justice, dignity and freedom, customs and beliefs. In contrast, the transitional feature of the symbol becomes permanent to serve the ‘stability maintenance’ for getting rid of ‘nation and party fall’. However, political reform calls for change, and ‘transition’ is an in- between process beyond the norms, which is quite dangerous and threatening in the eyes of the insiders of the structure. Looking back at the four warnings issued by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, all come under the ‘danger’ and ‘threat’ of liminality status. The ‘powers of the weak’ are dangerous, because of ‘the permanently or transiently sacred attributes of low status or position’, and they could become the owner of moral power through participating in the belief rites (Turner 1969: 109).40 Here is a popular online postGLobal forwarded by someone called Zhibai Shouhei (Knowing White and Persisting Black知白守黑), which was actually the slogan of the French youth in ‘May 1968’ in France:

39. Recently there was a quite popular headline from the Chinese Academy of Social Science spread by people through Wechat (a mobile-phone app for sending and receiving messages and broadcasting news, like Facebook): Four Problems on Ideology of China Social Science Institute: Penetrated by Foreign Hostile Forces: ’Central disciplinary inspection group leaders pointed out: 1. Dressing up by invisible academic coat to blow smoke; 2. Making up cross- border false reasoning by internet; 3. Processing illegal connection into politically sensitive periods; 4. Accepting the foreign hostile force penetration point by point; all members of the Academy should maintain political sensitivity; exception is not tolerable.’ Research Institutes in universities were controlled by the stationed Workers’ Propaganda Team and PLA Propaganda Team, and the comment alerted ‘Seems the left forces will come up totally before the Fourth Plenary Session.’ Someone quoted from the Canadian Premier’s ‘Eulogize Freedom’ banquet speech: No matter Nazism, Marxism-Leninism or terrorism, they have the same common ground: To destroy human beings and cause extinction’ (Pepole.com. 14 June 2014). 40. ‘Da Yu Flood Control’ posted a message on 15 June via Wechat: “A friend told me on the phone that the fireworks lasted almost the whole night in Nanchang last night. I was puzzled about the motivation and got the answer it was for celebrating the corrupt officer’s–the former Guangdong Provincial Party secretary Su Rong’s–downfall. I responded that it deserves an even more wonderful celebration than winning the World Cup, which is just kicking a ball into the net. We people are celebrating locking a tiger in a cage. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 69

1. A consumer society dies with no dignity, alienation society with no dignity, we want a new unique world, we refuse to use a non-lethal danger to exchange a world exempt from hunger; 2. People are not free until the last capitalist’s intestines strangle the last bureaucrat; 3. Do not change employers, but change hired lives; 4. Action must not be reactive, but create; 5. Prohibit ‘No’; 6. There is nothing called a revolutionary idea, but only revolutionary action; 7. You are rich but fear, although surviving but dead. CCPNThis shows the insecurity felt by the Chinese and an unfinished complex in France, also representing some kind of ‘will of the weak’. We are now in a chaotic world, a digital time mixed with the Gold, Bronze, Iron and Steam Ages, accompanied by a heavy haze. In such a complicated historical period, China, succeeding at becoming the last locomotive of national dreams, desires to prolong the trip for as long as possible. However, besides the commonplace GDP index, China needs to present a new image to the world. Surprisingly, we hear President Xi Jinping’s speech in the Élysée Palace about the ‘gentle lion’: ‘Napoleon said: “Quand le lion Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera”. The Chinese lion has awakened, but it is a peaceful, amiable and gentle lion!’ In the middle of the 19th century, the ‘sleeping lion’ was bound up with two other terms, ‘the sick man of Asia’ and the ‘Yellow Peril’ (Yang 2010). These three symbols constituted a negative imagery of modern China from a Western point of view during the second China–Europe encounter (‘Heroic men encounter’, 19th and first part of 20th century), totally different from the first ‘Holy men encounter’.GLobal This negative 19th-century symbol of the ‘sleeping Chinese lion’ becomes an ‘awakened lion’, but modified by ‘lovable’ and ‘gentle’, which triggers both misplacement and misreading. A lion is a lion. It’s said that in order to keep its throne, the lion will kill its own sons. No wonder that, the day after the speech was given, people commented: ‘Xi Jinping’s “gentle, lovable lion” is a needle in the cotton’ (Cao 2014). The idea of the ‘China dream’ or the ‘gentle, lovable lion’ drags us back to the competitive relationship of sovereign states in the 19th century. However, the 21st century has to be a collaborative century; the global forces of good and evil are composed of diverse coalitions. In a good sense, the deepening interdependence of all human societies means surviving and dying together; the evil sense develops through the globalization of such horrors as terrorism and drug trafficking, the Monsanto Company’s globalized financial support of transgenic research institutions, and some Western financial institutions’ assistance in establishing tax havens for Chinese high officials and sending abroad 700,000 wives and children of ‘naked officials’ (裸官).41 Many Chinese people have regained self-pride owing to the country’s impressive economic achievements since the late 20th century. However,

41. Naked official (裸官; luo guan): refers to Communist Party of China officials who stay in mainland China while their wives and children reside abroad. (‘China: Naked official de- bate’. Global Voices, 9 May 2010.) 70 Shuo Yu many are anxious as they see cultural scarcity, post-totalitarian politics, daily injustices in life, and the challenges of ethical collapse. Chinese people seem to lack confidence in the ‘Chinese dream’. While the world admires China’s economic growth, it is also disquieted when China beats the drum to boast of the ‘China dream’. A popular online video made by ‘Fuxing lu shang’,42 widely circulated, purports to explain the ‘Chinese dream’ and presents a portrait of China as an ‘ancient and youthful country’, a land of blue skies and green fields, where citizens and foreigners gather together, clapping and CCPNlaughing, and a young clown on a motorbike waves flowers to pretty women. This ‘China dream’ video has been praised by Chinese social media users – but they most likely aren’t the target audience. The video, made in English with Chinese subtitles, appears to be the Party’s latest, slickest attempt to explain itself to the broader world, along with more English-language news output, social media from state-run news outlets and giant billboard ads in New York’s Times Square (Timmons & Yang 2014). In autumn 2013 the New World Press of China published a book: 《中 国梦：谁的梦？》. The literal translation should be China’s Dream: Whose dream? However, the English title on the cover is The Chinese Dream: What It Means for China and the Rest of the World, and, in translating back to Chinese, it loses the original meaning completely. The title of its preface is only ‘China’s Dream for 1.3 Billion Chinese People’, by Cai Mingzhao, the Minister of the State Council Information Office. He introduced the background of the ‘Chinese dream’, indicating that itGLobal could represent the core ideology of Xi Jinping, the new President of China, to let the people have a better life, to realize the great revival of China, and to have a win–win collaboration with the world.43 This book reviews 60 years of Chinese dreams, journeying across the periods of ‘the Grand Revolution’ and ‘the Grand Construction’, and also reveals how some Chinese people have realized their dreams. It even openly cites the survey data collected by People.com Forum on ‘China’s national problems’. The top ten of these are as follows: 1. Corruption is so rampant that inadequate anti-corruption would lead to the demise of the state and the party (100% vote); 2. The gap between the rich and the poor is too big and distribution of incomes is unfair (97.16%); 3. The masses on the bottom rungs can’t afford housing, medical care and education (86.75%);

42. ‘Fuxing lu shang’ (复兴路上) in Chinese could either mean ‘the road to rejuvenation’ or be an indirect reference to a street in Beijing where CCTV, state broadcaster China Central Television, is located. 43. Some scholars explain this by the conception of ‘symbiotic’ (e.g. Hu Shoujun 2006, Theory on Social Symbiosis; Yu Zhen. 2011, Symbiosis; Qian Hong. 2012. China: Symbiotically rising.) Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 71 4. The alliance between power and capital worsens, how to prevent the kidnapping of public power, holding public power as hostage (82.36%); 5. The prevailing cadre-centred beliefs, bureaucracy and formalism (78.99%); 6. Vested interest groups continuing to block reforms in key areas (78.50%); 7. Salient crisis in resources, environment and ecology (77.73%); CCPN8. The more we hold on to stability, the more unstable we are; how to innovate social management and maintain social stability (73.56%); 9. The pressure of a declining economy is increasing, and how can rapid growth be sustained and how can the cake be made bigger (72.89%); 10. How to implement the policy requiring officials to report and make public their assets (72.36%) (Ren 2013: 23–24). These ten chief public concerns (the results of a public vote) were all cited by over 72% of respondents. We believe in their authenticity because of the official source (People.com) of this data, which was not censored. This also reminds us of the cruel social realities behind the abstract figures: the permanent haze, the Kunming railway station massacre, the Malaysian air crash, the unbearable overstepping of legal boundaries, brutal rampages, moral collapses, disordered social phenomena, and so on. If any of these happened in a democratic country, the public would demand accountability from the government and ask it GLobalto step down; if these ten concerns are occurring together it means that deadly social, political, environmental, civic and humanitarian diseases coexist. If the President of China insists that China is a ‘gentle, lovable lion’, it is also a sick lion. China’s dream is indeed difficult to realize. However, the Chinese people still kindly go along with the new generation of Chinese leaders to realize the Chinese dream. Havel’s book The Power of the Powerless states that [t]he primary excusatory function of ideology, therefore, is to provide people, both as victims and pillars of the post-totalitarian system, with the illusion that the system is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe. (Havel 1978: 7) One of the important revelations Havel gives us is the double identity of victims: they can be conspirators with systems, or they can be the main parties to destroying the systems’ shackles; everyone who obeys the system forces others to follow that system, until the system becomes automatically stronger through such interaction. Individuals confirm the system, fulfil the system, make the system, and they are the system. The automatic operation of a power structure thus dehumanized and made anonymous is a feature of the fundamental automatism of this system. It would seem that it is precisely the diktats of this automatism 72 Shuo Yu

which select people lacking individual will for the power structure; that it is precisely the diktat of the empty phrase which summons to power people who use empty phrases as the best guarantee that the automatism of the post-totalitarian system will continue. (Havel 1978: 12–13) Perhaps extremes produce anti-effects. Chinese people (instead of the lion) are awakening. We could see streams of hot discussion on the internet about systems, values, qualities of the national spirit, vulnerable civilians suffering misrepresentation, humiliation, intellectuals revolting against oppression CCPNand calling for freedom. Firewalls could not stop jet fire or ground fire; the one-way stream of information is broken, and the communitas liminality of segmentary oppositions is going on quietly online. Since the production of the first generation of mobile phones, people have already begun to escape from the workplace administrative system, the monitoring of relatives, and the regional police constraint, and to construct new relationships.

Conclusion: symbiotic dream In the 21st century, transcultural universalism again becomes a necessity for the symbiotic world. Today we have new thinking about universal values worldwide, and the emergence of the identity of human community becomes a mark of collaboration. Our conscience has finally been resurrected by the interdependence of the whole world in death and survival, and we begin to cultivate the homeland of our human being. As I stated in the first part, exchangesGLobal among smaller groups are happening in cities and villages, including social enterprises, businesses, joint research by schools, and the international communication of artists, philosophers and ordinary people. On a bigger scale, cooperation has been engaged at the levels of regional communities (such as the European Union), and borderless online communities have been established. The world’s society readily shapes and waits for its global citizens to transcend sovereign-state boundaries and enter and take responsibilities in the coming social metamorphosis. The best role a nation can play is functional: to serve the people of the world and to encourage mutual respect for democratic world governance, rather than to strive for its own national interests. To build a prosperous autonomous China is the general trend of global development and the common aspiration of the Chinese people at home and abroad. Nevertheless, Morin warns: The more independent we are, the more uncertainty and restlessness we have, and the more connections we need. The more we realize we are lost in the universe and engaged in an unknown adventure, the more connections with our human brothers and sisters we need. In our human world, since separation, solitude, rupture, dislocation, and hatred are so powerful, rather than dreaming of an eternal harmony or paradise, we had better admit the vital importance of friendship and love, both socially and ethically. Transcultural generativity in China-Europe encounters 73

Otherwise, we human beings will live in hostility and aggressiveness, and will be more perverse and deteriorated. (Morin 2014: 53) The narrative of the ‘Chinese dream’ includes two metaphors: one is a national mega-dream, expressing China’s ambitions in the world; the other is a citizen’s micro-dream, the individual’s longing for dignity of life. The two dreams are not inherently in conflict with each other. It is always possible to see these wishes coming true. However, there are two prerequisite conditions: let the ordinary people live with dignity and be able to maintain a balance between CCPNideals and reality, and let the ‘Chinese dream’ be a component part of the ‘human dream’. In fact, the Chinese dream suffers a disjunction between living conditions and ideological statement. As the famous Chinese historian Xu Jilin writes in his new book, [t]he 150-year national prosperous dream overwhelmed the civilization dream. A prosperous dream lacking civilization would be a terrible and short-lived prosperity, a brutal force without soul, and it is nothing more than Tuhao (local tyrant). One of the reasons is that China cannot yet reconcile herself with her humiliation in modern history; she thus will not reconcile with the mainstream world that had hegemonic powers in the past. (Xu 2014) The dream of universal values in the 18th century reflected people’s spontaneous awareness, while theGLobal dream of symbiosis in the 21st century reflects interdependent realities, and manifests the human community’s expectation of self-preservation. Therefore, from ‘Chinese dream’ to symbiotic dream should be going homeward with human virtue. It will get out of the permanent liminality and begin a return process to the order of the universe in seeking goodness.

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Shuo Yu (于硕), Professor in historical anthropology, Founding Director and Euro- pean Representative of the Centre for China-Europe Transcultural Communication at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. She was a co-founder of the China–Europa Forum and served as its first Coordinator General. She taught at Renmin University of China before going to France in the early 1990s and lived there for more than 20 years while studying and teaching transcultural anthropology. She applied Edgar Morin’s complex thinking (pensée complexe) to her transcultural operation of Europe–China dialogue and put forward a theory of cross-fields champs( croisés) of three China– Europe Encounters. GLobal