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Ballistic Missile Monitoring in Southern Asia

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Ballistic Missile Monitoring in Southern Asia SAND 2004-0317 Unlimited Release February 2004 Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia: Options for Stabilization Arvind Kumar National Institute of Advanced Studies Bangalore, India Michael Vannoni Cooperative Monitoring Center Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/34 Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Cooperative Monitoring Center The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and technical experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based tools they need to assess, design, analyze, and implement nonproliferation, arms control, and other cooperative security measures. As part of its mission, the CMC sponsors research on cooperative security and the role of technology. Reports of that work are provided through the Occasional Papers series. Research is conducted by Sandia staff, international technical experts, and visiting scholars. (The CMC’s Visiting Scholars Program is administered by the Institute for Public Policy at the University of New Mexico.) For additional information on the CMC’s programs, visit the CMC home page on the World Wide Web at <http://www.cmc.sandia.gov> or write to: Cooperative Monitoring Center Sandia National Laboratories PO Box 5800 Mail Stop 1373 Albuquerque, NM 87185-1373 For specific information on this report contact: Michael Vannoni at the above address. This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 4 Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia: Options for Stabilization Abstract This study assesses the destabilizing and stabilizing effects of ballistic missile development, induction, and deployment in Southern Asia. India’s relations with China and Pakistan are characterized by poor communication and mutual distrust. Within this context, the delivery systems for nuclear and conventional weapons strongly influence each country’s threat perceptions and military strategy. The study reviews the respective national missile programs and the concept of deterrence within the context of national nuclear and missile strategies. The recent concept of limited war is also reviewed. The study goes on to develop practical concepts that could decrease the instability resulting from the introduction of ballistic missiles. The analysis process uses three regional scenarios to identify stabilizing and destabilizing factors and assess potential options for improvement. The study presents options that could be initiated within the current regional political environment and presents additional options that could be applicable if political conditions improve. The stabilization options include political, operational, and communication initiatives. These initiatives are both unilateral and cooperative (bilateral between India-Pakistan or India-China) 5 Cooperative Monitoring Center Acronyms ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System BSRBM Battlefield Short Range Ballistic Missile CASC China Aerospace Corporation CEP Circular Error Probable DCC Development Control Committee DRDL Defence Research and Development Laboratory (India) DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation (India) ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IGMDP Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (India) IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation JWG Joint Working Group KRL A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory (Pakistan) LOC Line of Control (India-Pakistan) MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile NDC National Defense Complex (Pakistan) PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission PLA Peoples Liberation Army RCI Research Centre Imarat SFC Strategic Forces Command SLV Space Launched Vehicle SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (Pakistan) TEL Transporter Erector Launcher WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 6 Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia Contents 1.0 SOUTHERN ASIA, BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND THE RISK OF WAR.....................................11 1.1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................11 1.2 MISSILES AND REGIONAL STABILITY ...........................................................................................12 1.3 GOALS OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................................................13 2.0 SECURITY ISSUES BETWEEN INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND CHINA.............................................14 2.1 INDIA-PAKISTAN ..........................................................................................................................14 2.2 INDIA-CHINA................................................................................................................................14 3.0 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN ASIA ..................................................16 3.1 CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND DOCTRINE..............................................................16 3.2 PAKISTAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND DOCTRINE ........................................................17 3.3 INDIA’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND DOCTRINE ...............................................................20 4.0 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE ROLE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES.................................22 4.1 DETERRENCE THEORY IN SOUTHERN ASIA ..................................................................................22 4.2 NATIONAL NUCLEAR DOCTRINES ................................................................................................24 4.3 THE CONCEPT OF LIMITED WAR IN SOUTHERN ASIA ...................................................................30 5.0 SCENARIOS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN ASIA....................32 5.1 SCENARIO 1: INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISIS IN KASHMIR......................................................................33 5.1.1. Destabilizing factors: ........................................................................................................33 5.1.2. Stabilizing factors: ............................................................................................................34 5.2 SCENARIO 2: INDIA-PAKISTAN MISSILE RACE AND MILITARY EXERCISES ..................................34 5.2.1. Destabilizing Factors: .......................................................................................................35 5.2.2. Stabilizing Factors: ...........................................................................................................36 5.3 SCENARIO 3: INDIA-CHINA MISSILE RACE...................................................................................36 5.3.1. Destabilizing factors: ........................................................................................................37 5.3.2. Stabilizing factors: ............................................................................................................37 5.4 IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE SCENARIOS.....................................................................................38 5.4.1 Primary Destabilizing Factors...........................................................................................38 5.4.2 Primary Stabilizing Factors...............................................................................................38 6.0 OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING STABILITY...............................................................................39 6.1 A GENERAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING STABILITY......................................................................39 7 Cooperative Monitoring Center 6.2 STABILIZATION OPTIONS APPLICABLE TO MISSILE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY ............................40 6.3 STABILIZATION OPTIONS APPLICABLE TO UNCERTAINTY IN MISSILE OPERATIONS .....................43 6.4 STABILIZATION OPTIONS APPLICABLE TO PERCEPTION AND PREEMPTION...................................45 7.0 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................48 APPENDIX A: BALLISTIC MISSILE FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................51 MISSILES AS MILITARY WEAPONS ..........................................................................................................51 NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS ........................................................................................51 BASING MODES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES...............................................................................................53 APPENDIX B: REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILES ............................................................................55 ABOUT THE AUTHORS...........................................................................................................................62 Figures Figure 1: Indian, Chinese and Pakistani ballistic missiles on parade ............................................................12 Figure 2: Missile targeting coverage of India from Chinese bases................................................................37 Figure 3: Access control device using hand geometry for identification.......................................................46 Figure 4: Deployment of Strike Aircraft to Rearward Bases.........................................................................47
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