Secrets of the Federal Reserve: the London Connection
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Friedman and Schwartz's a Monetary History of the United States 1867
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES NOT JUST THE GREAT CONTRACTION: FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ’S A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867 TO 1960 Michael D. Bordo Hugh Rockoff Working Paper 18828 http://www.nber.org/papers/w18828 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 February 2013 Paper prepared for the Session: “The Fiftieth Anniversary of Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States”, American Economic Association Annual Meetings, San Diego, CA, January 6 2013. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2013 by Michael D. Bordo and Hugh Rockoff. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Not Just the Great Contraction: Friedman and Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States 1867 to 1960 Michael D. Bordo and Hugh Rockoff NBER Working Paper No. 18828 February 2013 JEL No. B22,N1 ABSTRACT A Monetary History of the United States 1867 to 1960 published in 1963 was written as part of an extensive NBER research project on Money and Business Cycles started in the 1950s. The project resulted in three more books and many important articles. A Monetary History was designed to provide historical evidence for the modern quantity theory of money. -
The Federal Reserve's Role
The Federal Reserve’s Role: Actions Before, During, and After the 2008 Panic in the Historical Context of the Great Contraction Michael D. Bordo Economics Working Paper 13111 HOOVER INSTITUTION 434 GALVEZ MALL STANFORD UNIVERSITY STANFORD, CA 94305-6010 December 2013 This paper examines the Federal Reserve’s actions before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis. It looks to the Great Contraction of 1929-1933 for historical context of the Federal Reserve’s actions. Acknowledgements: For helpful comments I thank Allan Meltzer, Ashoka Mody, and David Wheelock. For valuable research assistance I thank Antonio Cusato. The Hoover Institution Economics Working Paper Series allows authors to distribute research for discussion and comment among other researchers. Working papers reflect the views of the author and not the views of the Hoover Institution. The Federal Reserve’s Role: Actions Before, During, and After the 2008 Panic in the Historical Context of the Great Contraction Michael D. Bordo Introduction The financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been viewed as the worst since the Great Contraction of the 1930s. It is also widely believed that the policy lessons learned from the experience of the 1930s helped the US monetary authorities prevent another Great Depression. Indeed, Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve during the crisis, stated in his 2012 book that, having been a scholar of the Great Depression, his understanding of the events of the early 1930s led him to take many of the actions that he did. This chapter briefly reviews the salient features of the Great Contraction of 1929-1933 and the policy lessons learned. -
Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and a Monetary History of the US
Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and A Monetary History of the US Thomas S. Coleman∗ Draft – February 21, 2019 PEOPLE: Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz RELATED: Inflation, monetary stimulus, Quantitative Easing DATES: A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 was published in 1963. Friedman and Schwarz’s book was preceded and followed by substantial work on monetary policy and monetary history. CHICAGO: Milton Friedman is one of the best-known economists to have taught at University of Chicago. Anna Schwartz was Friedman’s co-author and collaborator, associated with the NBER REFERENCES: A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, particularly chapter 7 VIGNETTE Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz published their book A Monetary History of the United States in 1963; in doing so re-wrote monetary theory and history. In fact, it is only something of an exaggeration to say their research saved the world during the 2008 financial crisis. To see why we need to delve into monetary history, starting with the financial crisis and depression of 1907-08, following the thread through the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the 1930s Great Depression, Friedman and Schwartz’s revisions of monetary history (1960s), Ben Bernanke’s acknowledgement (in 2002) of the Fed’s role in creating the 1930s Great Depression, and finally the Fed’s 2008 response with QE1’s massive liquidity injection. Understanding the role of banks, money, and the Fed ties together the three episodes (the 1907-08 depression, the 1930s Great Depression, and the 2008 financial crisis) and illuminates how and why these differed. -
Monetary Policy in the Great Depression: What the Fed Did, and Why
David C. Wheelock David C. Wheelock, assistant professor of economics at the University of Texas-Austin, is a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. David H. Kelly provided research assistance. Monetary Policy in the Great Depression: What the Fed Did, and Why SIXTY YEARS AGO the United States— role of monetary policy in causing the Depression indeed; most of the world—was in the midst of and the possibility that different policies might the Great Depression. Today, interest in the have made it less severe. Depression's causes and the failure of govern- ment policies to prevent it continues, peaking Much of the debate centers on whether mone- whenever the stock market crashes or the econ- tary conditions were "easy" or "tight" during the omy enters a recession. In the 1930s, dissatisfac- Depression—that is, whether money and credit tion with the failure of monetary policy to pre- were plentiful and inexpensive, or scarce and vent the Depression, or to revive the economy, expensive. During the 1930s, many Fed officials led to sweeping changes in the structure of the argued that money was abundant and "cheap," Federal Reserve System. One of the most impor- even "sloppy," because market interest rates tant changes was the creation of the Federal were low and few banks borrowed from the dis- Open Market Committee (FOMC) to direct open count window. Modern researchers who agree market policy. Recently Congress has again con- generally believe neither that monetary forces sidered possible changes in the Federal Reserve were responsible for the Depression nor that System.1 different policies could have alleviated it. -
Why Was Monetary Policy So Inept?
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: The Great Contraction, 1929–33 Volume Author/Editor: Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz Volume Publisher: Princeton University Press Volume ISBN: 0-691-00350-5 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/frie65-1 Publication Date: 1965 Chapter Title: Why Was Monetary Policy So Inept? Chapter Authors: Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson Schwartz Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9280 Chapter pages in book: (p. 111 - 123) THE GREAT c:0NTRAcTI0N 7. Why Was Monetary Pohcy SoIncp:.' We trust that, in light of the preceding sections ofthis chaptet, the adjective used in the heading of this one to characterize monetary policy during the critical period from 1929 to 1933 strikes OUt readersas it does us, as a plain description of fact. The monetarysystem collapsed, hut it clearly need not have done so. The actions required to prevent monetary collapse didnot call for a level of knowledge of the operation of the banking systemor of the work- ings of monetary forces or of economic fluctuations whichwas developed only later and was not available to the Reserve System. Onthe contrary. as we have pointed out earlier, pursuit of the policies outlined by the System itself in the 192O's, or for that matter by Bagehot in 1873,would have prevented the catastrophe. The men'ho established thFederal Reserve System had many misconceptions about monetary theoryand banking operations. It may well be that a policy in accordancewith their understanding of monetary matters would not have preventedthe decline in the stock of mone' from 1929 to the end of 1930.562 But theyunder- For example, H. -
Did Monetary Forces Cause the Depression?
LIBRARIESIBR ^^^^ MIT I Basemeki iiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIIII """" n03 ?8 3 l?_lMMllTlW LIBRARY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/didmonetaryforceOOtemi DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE DEPRESSION? Peter Temin Number 107 April 1973 massachusetts institute of technology 50 memorial drive Cambridge, mass. 02139 DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE DEPRESSION? Peter Temin Number 107 April 1973 This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. Their help and the help of Robert A. Taggert with the calculations are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are the author's sole responsibility and do not reflect those of the Department of Economics nor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE DEPRESSION? It is an uncomfortable reflection on the current state of economics that this question is still an open one. In the early 1930's, no one doubted that the answer was yes. In the 1940 's and '50's, no one doubted that 2 the answer was no. And since the brilliant exposition of a monetarist point of view by Friedman and Schwartz in 1963, there does not appear to be 3 a consensus on either side of the issue. The purpose of this paper is to review the discussion by Friedman and Schwartz to discover precisely what they did and did not conclude and then to approach the question anew, asking some questions that were not asked by Friedman and Schwartz. My conclusion is that monetary forces did not cause the Depression. -
Development of Monetary Policy
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: The Great Contraction, 1929–33 Volume Author/Editor: Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz Volume Publisher: Princeton University Press Volume ISBN: 0-691-00350-5 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/frie65-1 Publication Date: 1965 Chapter Title: Development of Monetary Policy Chapter Authors: Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson Schwartz Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9278 Chapter pages in book: (p. 66 - 95) THE GItEAT CONTRA(:TIQN to 1931, China was hardly affected internally by the holocaustthat wa. s%eeping the gold-standard world,Tjust as inl920-21, Germans' had been insulated byher hvperinfiation and associated floatingrxchan rate." The first major country to Cut the linkwas Britain, when she left tL gold standard in 1931. The trough of the depressionin Britain and in other countries that accompanied Britain in leavinggold was reached in the third quarter of 1932. In the countriesthat remained on tile gold standard or,like Canada, that went onlypart way with Britain, the depression dragged on. In China, whosecurrency appreciated relative to the pound as a result of the sharp depreciation of tile pound relativeto gold. the depression set in for die first timein 1931. Of course, the country in tile vanguard of such an internationalmove- rnent need not stay there. France, which hadaccumulatec, s laree stock of gold as a result of returning to the goldstandard in 1928 at .' exchange rate that undervalued the franc, and therefore had much leeway, atsome point passed the United States and not only beganto add to its gold stock but also, after late 1931, to draingold from the United States The between the franc and the dollar link was cut when the United Statessus- pended gold pa)ments in March 1933,which proved to be the business cycle trough for the United States and countries closely linkedto itIn France. -
Brinkley New Deal
Name: ______________________________________________ Purpose: the purpose of the reading and accompanying tasks is to think about the successes and failures of the New Deal. Directions: Complete the following tasks and answer the following questions in your composition books. Read the questions/tasks and then read the reading about the New Deal. 1. Describe the economic problems that FDR needed to address. 2. What programs did FDR implement during the “first hundred days”? 3. Explain three programs that helped address the problem of unemployment. 4. What is the “Second New Deal”? 5. Describe at least two reasons that the New Deal was a success. 6. Describe at least two reasons that the New Deal was a failure. The New Deal, Then and Now by Alan Brinkley Well before Barack Obama’s election, the New Deal was emerging as an instructive model for those trying to understand, and address, what is now known as the “worst financial crisis since the 1930s.” But is the New Deal in fact a useful model for our own troubled times? In some respects, the New Deal – and in particular its first hundred days – have important lessons for our time, lessons that President Obama seems already to have learned. Franklin Roosevelt’s first and most important contribution to solving the great economic crisis he inherited in 1933 was to exude confidence and optimism and to invite frightened Americans to put their trust in his energy and activism. In his Inaugural Address, Roosevelt promised “action, and action now,” and to a large degree he delivered on that promise. The frenzy of activity and innovation that marked those first months, a welcome contrast to the seeming paralysis of the discredited Hoover regime, helped accomplish the first, and perhaps most important, task he faced: ending the panic that was gripping the nation. -
Great Expectations and the End of the Depression
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports Great Expectations and the End of the Depression Gauti B. Eggertsson Staff Report no. 234 December 2005 This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. Great Expectations and the End of the Depression Gauti B. Eggertsson Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 234 December 2005 JEL classification: E52, E63 Abstract This paper argues that the U.S. economy’s recovery from the Great Depression was driven by a shift in expectations brought about by the policy actions of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On the monetary policy side, Roosevelt abolished the gold standard and—even more important—announced the policy objective of inflating the price level to pre-depression levels. On the fiscal policy side, Roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending. Together, these actions made his policy objective credible; they violated prevailing policy dogmas and introduced a policy regime change such as that described in work by Sargent and by Temin and Wigmore. The economic consequences of Roosevelt’s policies are evaluated in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and rational expectations. Key words: deflation, Great Depression, regime change, zero interest rates Eggertsson: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (e-mail: [email protected]). -
The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: a Comparative Approach
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH Ben S. Bernanke Working Paper No. 4814 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 August 1994 Presented as the Money, Credit, and Banking Lecture, Ohio State University, May 16, 1994. I thank Barry Eichengrecn for his comments and han Mihov for excellent Research Assistance. This paper is part of NBER's research programs in Economic Fluctuations and Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. © 1994 by Ben S. Bernanke. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. NBER Working Paper #4814 August 1994 THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH ABSTRACT Recently, research on the causes of the Great Depression has shifted from a heavy emphasis on events in the United States to a broader, more comparative approach that examines the interwar experiences of many countries simultaneously. In this lecture I survey the current state of our knowledge about the Depression from a comparative perspective. On the aggregate demand side of the economy, comparative analysis has greatly strengthened the empirical case for monetary shocks as a major driving force of the Depression; an interesting possibility suggested by this analysis is that the worldwide monetary collapse that began in 1931 may be interpreted as a jump from one Nash equilibrium to another. On the aggregate supply side, comparative empirical studies provide support for both induced financial crisis and sticky nominal wages as mechanisms by which nominal shocks had real effects. -
U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention in Bolshevik Russia Russian Provisional Government As a Democracy and Wartime 1 Ally
68 69 Wilsonian Ideology and Revolution: Seven months earlier, the United States officially recognized the U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention in Bolshevik Russia Russian Provisional Government as a democracy and wartime ally.1 Immediately, U.S. Ambassador to Russia David Francis and Secretary of State Robert Lansing agreed that the United States would make no recognition of the Bolshevik government. State was concerned with Lenin’s rhetoric promoting Russia’s exit from the war. Reports from Russia warned that a Russian-German Martin Ruhaak armistice was imminent. Maddin Summers, the American Consul General in Moscow reported to Lansing on November 17, 1917, Historians have long debated the role of internationalism and “There is strong feeling amongst the working class…if the liberal ideology in the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson. movement is not put down immediately peace may be made with Undoubtedly an academic committed to liberalism, Wilson Germany.”2 abolished American isolationism with the United States entry into State and Wilson also concurred that Russian departure from World War I. Wilson hoped to redesign the world based on the the war represented a violation of the alliance, thus putting the two fundamental principles of democracy, self-determination, and in agreement over the issue of recognition.3 Reports from State capitalism. With the guidance of the United States, Wilson indicated that the Bolsheviks held only a minority of the political argued, world politics and economics would be governed under a power in Russia, and therefore had no authority to pull troops from new, liberalized international legal system. The first test of the Eastern front.4 In 1917 and 1918, the main priority of the Wilson’s postwar agenda came after the Bolshevik revolution in United States was to keep Russia in the war. -
The Riga Mission: the Reports of the First American Outpost on the Soviet Border, 1924-1933 Jeffrey Acosta Old Dominion University
Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons History Theses & Dissertations History Summer 1992 The Riga Mission: The Reports of the First American Outpost on the Soviet Border, 1924-1933 Jeffrey Acosta Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, International Relations Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Acosta, Jeffrey. "The Riga Mission: The Reports of the First American Outpost on the Soviet Border, 1924-1933" (1992). Master of Arts (MA), thesis, History, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/728m-ff79 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds/41 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE RIGA MISSION: THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST AMERICAN OUTPOST ON THE SOVIET BORDER, 1924-1933 by Jeffrey Acosta B.A. May 1981, Old Dominion University A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS HISTORY OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY August, 1992 Approved by: Lorraine M. Lees (Director) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT THE RIGA MISSION: THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST AMERICAN OUTPOST ON THE SOVIET BORDER, 1924-1933 Jeffrey Acosta Old Dominion University, 1992 Director: Dr. Lorraine Lees From 1917 to 1933, the United States did not recognize the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.