A Government of Advisers: The Role, Influence and Accountability of Ministerial Advisers in the New South Wales Political System
By
Benito Folino
School of Social Sciences and International Studies
A thesis presented to the University of NSW for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
August 2010
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Surname or Family name: FOLINO
First name: BENITO Other name/s:
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School: SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND Faculty: ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Title: A Government of Advisers: The Role, Influence and Accountability of Ministerial Advisers in the New South Wales Political System
Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)
This thesis explores the roles, influence and accountability of ministerial advisers in the New South Wales (NSW) political system with a focus on developments during the Greiner/Fahey and Carr Governments. Important normative concerns are raised about advisers' functions, their power and influence, the legal and ethical framework in which they operate, and their involvement in managing interactions between ministers and the permanent public service. Much of the Australian research on advisers has focused on developments at the federal level with little attention being paid to political staffing arrangements in state jurisdictions. This thesis contributes to scant knowledge about advisers by focusing on the developments of political staffing in NSW.
A grounded-theory based methodology is used on data collected from 23 interviews with advisers, ministers, government officials, and interest group representatives. Interpretivism was chosen as the principal research paradigm for eliciting an understanding of advisers' place in the NSW governmental system.
The findings reveal that the administrative reforms introduced under Greiner created opportunities for advisers to both thrive in number and roles performed. Further, they show that advisers have led to a greater degree of convergence between political and administrative arms of government. This general argument challenges the authorised choice perspective of policy-making in which government officials develop policy and then pass this on to the Cabinet for final approval. The challenge this poses for a parliamentary democracy is that advisers make policy decisions both as ministers' representatives and as independent policy actors whose authority, though enacted through that of the minister's, lacks legitimacy.
The adviser system in NSW has evolved into a large and elaborate political institution, one capable of providing the political executive with additional capacity to respond to the challenges of modern governance. As an organisational entity, advisers have become an important 'site of power' rivalling other more established political institutions such as the Cabinet and political parties. Significantly, the adviser system provides the political executive with an institutional means of organising for the development of policy by ministerialising the process: they imbue the process by ensuring a partisan perspective is brought to bear on policy decisions and that the process itself harmonises with the minister's outlook.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My deep gratitude goes to my two supervisors, Professor Eileen Baldry and Dr Michael
Wearing. Without these two wonderful people, I would not have been able to complete my thesis. They showed tremendous patience and support in getting me through the critical steps of the process, teaching me the love and discipline of research and providing me with the motivation to complete my thesis in a timely fashion. There were many occasions during the past few years when I thought this thesis would never be completed but the encouragement and support provided to me by each of these people kept me going. Their guidance and direction and ability to relate to practical issues in research, made my task so much easier. Their knowledge and guidance in conducting qualitative research together with their extensive backgrounds in social science and politics were of immeasurable assistance to me.
It is with heartfelt thanks that I express my gratitude to you both. I will miss our regular supervision sessions particularly the discussions about the roles of ministerial advisers and their influence in policy-making but will cherish the friendship that we have shared through the PhD experience.
I am extremely grateful for the true generosity of the interviewees who participated in the study. They provided honest and thoughtful answers to the questions asked during the interviews and they courteously gave their time to participate and willingly shared their
knowledge and experience of the subject matter.
Words cannot express my deep gratitude and appreciation to my wife, Karen for her
wonderful support over the years. Karen’s encouragement and her continual and
unconditional support during the many difficult periods have made it all worthwhile. Without
Karen this thesis would never have come to fruition. I could not have done half the things in
my life without her love and belief in me.
I also give a big thank you to my beautiful daughter Georgia who was 7 years of age when I
commenced this project and is now only a short step away from commencing a tertiary
education herself. Georgia, I hope that my studies model for you how important it is to continue to develop a love of learning and abiding passion for ideas that remain to be explored.
This thesis would not have been possible without the kind support of my work colleagues, particularly Chris Applebee, Yim Chan, and Susan Hungar who took a keen interest in my research, shared with me their valuable insights, resources, wisdom, time, energy and support.
A special thanks to Michael Wall for proof reading and offering editorial advice.
I am also grateful to the University of NSW’s post-graduate research program for the opportunity to present my research at a conference in New York in 2009.
Last but not the least, I’d like to dedicate this thesis to my mother, Rachele, who has been a source of strength and inspiration to me in achieving my ultimate goal in my education. A very intelligent woman, having only completed 3 years of schooling in a small mountain village in Italy, she always encouraged me to value learning and I know she is extremely proud that I have completed a PhD.
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the roles, influence and accountability of ministerial advisers in the
New South Wales (NSW) political system with a focus on developments during the
Greiner/Fahey and Carr Governments. Important normative concerns are raised about advisers' functions, their power and influence, the legal and ethical framework in which they
operate, and their involvement in managing interactions between ministers and the permanent public service. Much of the Australian research on advisers has focused on developments at the federal level with little attention being paid to political staffing arrangements in state jurisdictions. This thesis contributes to scant knowledge about
advisers by focusing on the developments of political staffing in NSW.
A grounded-theory based methodology is used on data collected from 23 interviews with
advisers, ministers, government officials, and interest group representatives. Interpretivism
was chosen as the principal research paradigm for eliciting an understanding of advisers'
place in the NSW governmental system.
The findings reveal that the administrative reforms introduced under Greiner created
opportunities for advisers to both thrive in number and roles performed. Further, they show
that advisers have led to a greater degree of convergence between political and administrative arms of government. This general argument challenges the authorised choice perspective of policy-making in which government officials develop policy and then pass this on to the Cabinet for final approval. The challenge this poses for a parliamentary democracy is that advisers make policy decisions both as ministers' representatives and as independent policy actors whose authority, though enacted through that of the minister's,
lacks legitimacy.
The adviser system in NSW has evolved into a large and elaborate political institution, one
capable of providing the political executive with additional capacity to respond to the
challenges of modern governance. As an organisational entity, advisers have become an
important 'site of power' rivalling other more established political institutions such as the
Cabinet and political parties. Significantly, the adviser system provides the political
executive with an institutional means of organising for the development of policy by ministerialising the process: they imbue the process by ensuring a partisan perspective is brought to bear on policy decisions and that the process itself harmonises with the minister's outlook.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 - Introduction – ‘Wearing the Minister’s Hat‘ ...... 1
Part I – Foundational Aspects of the Study ...... 16
Chapter 2 – Literature Review ...... 17
Chapter 3 – Methodology ...... 64
Part II – Empirical Findings ...... 88
Chapter 4 – The Advent, Growth and Institutionalisation of Advisers in NSW ...... 89
Chapter 5 – A Moving Target – Factors Influencing Advisers’ Roles ...... 105
Part III – The Roles of Ministerial Advisers ...... 130
Chapter 6 – Personal Support ...... 134
Chapter 7 – Informational Roles ...... 141
Chapter 8 – The Policy Roles ...... 156
Part IV – Managing the External Environment ...... 182
Chapter 9 – Managing Relations with the Department ...... 183
Chapter 10 – Managing Relations with the Media ...... 210
Chapter 11 – Managing Relations with Interest groups ...... 222
Part V – ‘Oiling the Wheels’ – Managing the Business of Government ...... 233
Chapter 12 – Coordinating ...... 234
Chapter 13 – Networking ...... 247
Chapter 14 – Resolving Policy Differences...... 261
Part VI – The Impact of Advisers ...... 272
Chapter 15 – Influence ...... 273
Chapter 16 – Accountability ...... 304
Part VII – Discussion ...... 323
Chapter 17 – Discussion ...... 324
References ...... 360
Appendix ...... 375
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION – ‘WEARING THE MINISTER’S HAT‘
My interest in this field of inquiry arose from a conversation I had with a ministerial adviser some 15 years ago. Back then I worked in a public service role for the Disability Council of
NSW, a government body responsible for advising the NSW State Government on policies affecting people with a disability and their families. As Policy Officer for the Council, I was responsible for providing policy advice to the minister responsible for disability programs.
An issue I was working on at the time involved a large residential facility for people with a disability which our organisation wanted to see closed as it was considered to be inconsistent with the community-held view – and government policy for that matter – of community-based living and accommodation for people with a disability. The residential facility accommodated people with varying degrees of disability and support needs, but it was regarded as having an inappropriate mix of residents: some were ageing, some were young adults and some were young children.
The facility itself was regarded by many community and interest groups as an inappropriate model of accommodation and support for people with a disability. The government at the time had a commitment to community-based living for people with a disability but had adopted a piecemeal approach to the closure of large residential facilities – or
‘deinstitutionalisation’ as it is more commonly known.
After much lobbying by community and advocacy groups, the government agreed to the placement of the younger residents with a disability into age-appropriate and community- based accommodation. However, the disability sector had expressed concern that the vacancies created by the relocation of younger residents would be ‘back-filled’ by other people with a disability who had a similar level of support, and the sector had sought assurances from the minister that this would not occur. In response to this concern, I prepared a briefing for the minister recommending he announce as policy that no vacancies would be back-filled.
1 Some time after preparing the brief, I contacted the ministerial office to follow up on the progress of the Council’s advice. I was immediately put in contact with one of the minister’s advisers, and, after explaining the purpose of the call and going through some of the key points raised in the briefing, was told by the adviser: “Well, wearing the minister’s hat, I don’t think he’d go for it.” It was a powerful statement which left a deep impression on me.
Apart from feeling put in my place, those few words, ‘wearing the minister’s hat’, had raised a number of important questions and concerns. The first and most obvious was who was this person to assume the minister’s authority? How did they get to the position where they could think and speak like the minister? Naturally, I also wanted to know what they did, where they came from, and how they came to be in the position they held. On a broader and more philosophical level, I also wanted to know how our system of government, which at least in theory is based on the Westminster tradition, could accommodate a group of individuals who are unelected and, seemingly in most cases, chosen with little or no regard to principles of merit but nevertheless hold positions of influence and authority.
This was also the phrase that proved the catalyst for this thesis.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis is in five parts, totalling 17 chapters. Part I, addressing the foundational aspects of the research, contains two chapters: Literature Review; and Methodology. Part II, exploring the reasons for the advent of advisers and factors influencing their roles, also
contains two chapters: The Advent, Growth and Institutionalisation of Advisers in NSW; and
A Moving Target – Factors Influencing Advisers’ Roles.
Parts III, IV and V examine the empirical investigation with the aim of addressing the key questions of the study:
What roles did advisers perform in the Greiner/Fahey and Carr governments?
What was the impact of these roles on the development of policy?
What does this mean for the NSW system of government?
2 Part III, which explores the work of advisers within the relational space of the minister and adviser and the institutional setting of the ministerial office, contains three chapters:
Personal Support; Informational Roles; and the Policy Roles of Advisers. Part IV examines
the work of advisers in managing the external environment. It contains three chapters:
Managing Relations with the Department; Managing Relations with Interest Groups and
Managing Relations with the Media. Part V, is titled ‘Oiling the wheels’ and focuses on
advisers’ roles in managing the business of government. This part has three chapters:
Coordinating, Networking; and Resolving Policy Differences.
Part VI, investigating the impact of advisers’ work, contains two chapters: Influence; and
Accountability. The thesis concludes with a discussion (Chapter 17) which summarises the key findings of the study and describes the broader implications of the adviser system on policy development within the NSW political context.
Objectives of the study
This study aims to develop an understanding of the work and significance of ministerial advisers in the NSW political system. It also aims to add to the body of public administration knowledge, since advisers operating at the state level in Australia have not previously been studied. Advisers are worthy of study because they hold a significant and growing place within the Australian political system and are arguably an administrative metaphor for contemporary public and political management in Australia; that is, they are an expression of the post-bureaucratic agenda which many Australian governments have imported into the arena of public sector management.
Advisers do not operate in a vacuum. They are integrated into a web of relationships that extends upwards, downwards and horizontally through the governmental system and into the larger bureaucratic and extra-governmental realms. To understand the role of advisers it is necessary therefore to examine the particulars of these relationships. More generally, it is important to understand their context.
3 Advisers are also influential. They mostly derive their influence from the authority of the minister and their location within the political executive. How this influence is used and played out in the policy process is of importance to this study.
Finally, this thesis aims to trace the development of the adviser system in NSW. In the space of 20 years, the adviser system has evolved to become an important political institution within the NSW political executive and other Australian jurisdictions (Walter 1986;
Dunn 1997; Maley 2002). It has evolved from an arrangement in which personal
(ministerial) support was its main justification to one which has become significant in size, flexible in design, and increasingly interventionist in its approach to policy development
(Tiernan 2004). But this evolution has occurred without regard to how the adviser system should operate and what role it should have in the political executive. Equally, it has come to exist with the expectation that it would fit into the same governance frameworks as those that apply to ministers and public servants. The evidence presented in the literature and in this study suggests that these frameworks lack applicability and suitability.
Why study ministerial advisers?
There are several reasons for studying ministerial advisers. First, they have received little academic attention in the Australian public administration literature.
Second, advisers merit attention because they are regarded as important policy and political actors.1 As a new political elite, advisers possess considerable power and influence, making them an actor deserving of academic interest.
Third, advisers are known to be intricately involved in the policy process and have become very important to the functioning of the political executive. Since the activities of advisers have not been documented at the state level, it is important to identify their activities for a better understanding of the inner workings of government.
1 In various parts of this study, the term ‘actor’ is ascribed to advisers because of the part they play in the policy process. 4 Fourth, advisers occupy a unique position in the Australian governmental system: they are increasingly being portrayed as the ‘hinge’ between the political and administrative domains of government. Therefore, the question is open as to the extent to which the interface between the administrative and bureaucratic realms is being mediated by advisers. An investigation of the adviser position provides insight into this important question.
Fifth, advisers occupy a central position within government and the political executive. This position enables them to exercise considerable influence and responsibility in policy development. Moreover, they can be assumed to possess a higher level of knowledge than ministers of context and particulars concerning external relationships in their areas of operation.
Sixth, there are normative reasons for conducting this kind of research. Shedding light on the work of advisers has ramifications that go beyond intellectual curiosity. Knowledge gained on advisers can aid future leaders and their governments in the organisation of their political staff as well as policy practitioners who are required to interact with them because of their work and role. The political science literature has tended to ignore the role of advisers both empirically and conceptually (Maley 2002:3). While researchers such as Maley (2002) and
Tiernan (2004) have made significant inroads into addressing this gap, research into ministerial advisers operating in the state political system remains largely understudied. No known study of ministerial advisers operating in the state political system has been undertaken.
Finally, it is useful to study advisers in the Greiner/Fahey and Carr eras because these governments cover a period of significant machinery of government changes and a time in which political and media management became an important strategic concern in the development and implementation of policy. The Greiner/Fahey era is often regarded as a watershed in relations between the political executive and public service. In parts of the literature review (Chapter 2), it is noted that the administrative reforms implemented in the early 1980s and carried through into the 1990s have affected the relationship between ministers and public servants. As already noted, the advent of new public management
5 introduced under Greiner and later adopted by Carr has had a significant role in redefining the ‘space’ between both these policy actors.
This thesis argues that the administrative reforms introduced by Greiner and later expanded by Carr created the conditions for advisers to grow in numbers and develop roles
that evolved as these changes dictated. Their influence therefore can be seen as a
manifestation of governments moving with the times and prevailing circumstances.
Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework for this study is developed through two approaches: new institutionalism, a body of writings which examines the ways in which institutions structure
social and political behaviour, and the concepts of role, influence, policy-making, and
accountability.
This thesis proposes that advisers are an emerging political institution sharing many of the
characteristics that an institution entails. Advisers and the system they form are embedded in organisational structures and internal processes. March and Olsen (1989) define institutions as rules of conduct in organisations, routines and repertoires of procedures
(1989:21), and define political institutions as a collection of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations.
This study draws primarily on new institutionalism as an analytical framework for examining the institutional developments and characteristics of the adviser system operating in NSW.
As a framework, new institutionalism offers insights into how political life is organised, operates and changes in contemporary democracies.
Given the inductive nature of the research - in which grounded theory is used for the discovery of theory - new institutionalism is used heuristically to interpret and add meaning to the analysis of advisers’ place in the NSW political system as well as to advance theoretical propositions for the topic of study. As such, it serves as a reference point for examining the dynamics of the adviser system as against a theoretical frame in which to situate the discussion about advisers.
6 New institutionalism theory examines the relationship between institutions and their effect on political behaviour as well as the process by which institutions originate or change. New institutionalism provides an alternative approach to pluralism by addressing the institutional influence on policy making. It brings the state back into the political analysis of policy making (Evans et al., 1985) and sees policy makers (e.g. advisers) as yet another interest group with particular preferences and a position with respect to the direction public policy should take (Geddes 1994, 1992; Hall, 1986; Skocpol 1985).
Common to new institutionalist analyses is a wish “to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 936) and "how a given institutional configuration shapes political interactions" (Thelen and Steinmo
1992:6). However, the aim is not merely to show that institutions matter, but “to guide inquiry into which of many more-or-less stable features of collective choice settings are essential to understanding collective choice behaviour and outcomes” (Diermeier and
Krehbiel 2003: 124).
According to Lowndes and Leach (2004), new institutionalism provides a useful framework for analysing the relationship between structure, context and agency in political leadership.
Thus, this study draws on new institutionalism to detect those features of the adviser system that give it an institutional frame and place in the NSW political system. From the framework selected, this study is interested in how the adviser system has evolved over time, how it provides an institutional basis upon which to coordinate policy advice for the executive, and how strategic choices and actions (power) are put into effect.
A key tenet of new institutionalism is the proposition that institutions have the capacity to structure political behaviour; that is they define and shape the means by which interests (or policies) are determined and pursued (Hall and Taylor 1996; Swank 2002).
According to Cook (2006) the theory of new institutionalism not only offers a conceptual
framework for researchers to understand the relative autonomy of policy actors, but also
explains how policy decisions are a product of interaction with other actors in the political
sphere. The utility of this approach is that it provides a framework to study interaction at 7 mezzo-level, in between what occurs at the macro-level of political and social structure and micro-level of individual behaviour, among social systems or institutions (Ryfe 2006).
‘Institution’ is a relevant and important concept for this research because it necessitates the study of an established and evolving political entity, namely that of the adviser system.
March and Olsen (2005) provide a useful definition of institutions defining them as
“relatively enduring collections of rules and organised practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of individual turnover and changing external circumstances” (March and Olsen 2005:4). According to Clemens and
Cook, institutions may be actors in the political process in their own right (1999:454) and that their behaviour will be shaped by that organisation and vice-versa. Furthermore, the position of actors within organisations, their institutional responsibilities and their relationships with other actors will shape their perception of their interests (Hall 1986:19).
Thus, ‘institution’ provides a useful lens through which to understand how power and preferences of actors (e.g. ministers, advisers etc.) are shaped and maintained (Levi
1990:407). The notion of the advisers as a political institution is based on two characteristics of the adviser system: first, advisers play a crucial role in shaping and defining the policy-process; and second, they have particular political and policy interests to which they must attend, namely those of the minister and the government more broadly.
For this study, three frameworks situate institutionalism: economic institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and political institutionalism. Underpinning the economic institutionalism perspective is a set of assumptions about human behaviour; that individual actors regardless of institutional setting are driven by self-interest and place primacy on the purposive conduct of individuals in determining policy outcomes. According to Hall and
Taylor (1996), “the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences, behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximise the attainment of these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation” (1996:945). A key and relevant assumption underpinning economic institutionalism is that institutions are necessary for managing competition. This particular view - that institutions are needed to manage
8 competition - has particular relevance for this study as it goes part way to explaining how and why the adviser system has come to be seen as a mechanism for enforcing the political executives’ policy agenda.
Sociological institutionalism deals with how institutional arrangements influence behaviour.
This form of institutionalism holds that institutions emerge in response to choices made by individuals and that these choices are made on the basis of preferences that are socially constructed including those that are perceived as rational. Sociological institutionalists view institutions as a set of formal rules and procedures, but are mainly a ‘frame of meaning’ composed of symbols, rules and guides for behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996). Thus, central to this perspective is the notion that institutions shape what is appropriate and what is not.
In other words, they frame meaning. Sociological institutionalism holds significant explanatory value to how certain issues are constructed as being important enough to be
handled at the political level (Stone Sweet et al 2001:20). From this perspective and applied to this study, sociological institutionalism can offer insights into the role advisers play in framing certain policy issues particularly with the media and interest groups, the degree to which certain issues are centralised within the realms of the ministerial office, and the informality advisers bring to the development of policy through personal networks.
Another relevant form of institutionalism that is relevant to this study is political institutionalism. This variant of institutionalism comprises contributions that focus on the autonomy of the state in policy-making and the relationship of state and society. Important
for the conceptualisation of policy is the institutional structuring of the state (Hall 1986). The
strength of this approach is that it provides a framework for analysing decision-making in
historical and comparative terms (Parsons 1995:335). Exponents of political institutionalism
assume that political institutions shape political actors’ behaviours, and that specific
organisational arrangements of the state consist of formal and informal arrangements. This
is relevant for understanding advisers’ networking activities amongst advisers themselves and organised interests.
9 Peters (1999) outlines four features of institutions that help distinguish institutions from other entities. First, institutions are ‘in some way a structural feature of society’ (Peters
1999:18). These can be formal (organisations), informal (networks) which in some way
shapes a relationship between actors. Second, institutions entail an element of stability.
Third, institutions, by some means, impact upon behaviour. Fourth, there is ‘some sense of shared values and meanings´ (Peters 1999: 18) among the members of an institution.
The institutionalisation of the advisers involves the process by which the adviser system, as an organisation, attains stability and value as an end itself. Stability means it has an
element of permanence: it cannot be altered or easily eliminated. Value denotes the entity
attaining a distinctive form and identity, and having utility. Thus, the adviser system, as a
political institution, becomes institutionalised when it achieves a high degree of autonomy
(the independence from other institutional structures e.g. the bureaucracy); complexity (it is
distinct and distinguishable from other entities); adaptability (adjusts to changes forced
upon it) and coherence.
Institutionalism has significant utility to the study of advisers. In parts of this study, advisers’
networks and networking roles are described with an emphasis on their patterns of
interaction amongst other policy actors including advisers and organised interests. It is
argued that advisers’ networking function and the networks they depend upon form an
important institutional feature of the modern adviser system; their interactions with other
policy actors and the significance of these for policy development, gives advisers
institutionality, that is, organisational form that includes beliefs, structures and relationships
that condition the roles and behaviours of those involved in it. In their dealings with other
actors, advisers bargain and use their positional power to produce policy outcomes for
ministers. As such, the structured patterns of interaction (behaviour) between advisers and
other policy actors (networking) are strongly influenced by institutional factors. These
factors typically involve the nature of the state in a given policy arena and the institutional
and organisational capacities of the actors in question. Another example pertains to how
the adviser system contributes to the capacity of the political executive to respond
10 effectively to the demands placed upon on it by the community. As described throughout this study, the adviser system is theorised as a necessary resource to enable the political executive to do all that it is asked and expected of it. This includes extracting greater
responsiveness from the public service to implement its policies and programs.
Role is an important construct for this research, yet it is not an aim of this study to make a
contribution to the field of role theory. Rather, the aim is to utilise those aspects of it which
are conceptually helpful in the analysis of advisers’ work. As such, this thesis will be limited
to a working definition of role theory and definitions of key terms such as ‘actor’.
The term ‘role’ has been variously defined: “a patterned sequence of learned actions or
deeds performed by a person in an interaction situation” (Sarbin 1954:225); “a particular set
of norms that is organised about a function” (Bates & Harvey 1975:106); “a comprehensive
pattern for behavior and attitude” (Turner 1979:124); and “behavior referring to normative
expectations associated with a position in a social system” (Allen & van de Vliert 1984a:3).
In attempting to integrate the various elements and conceptualisations in role theory, Bruce
Biddle (1986) writes that “role theory is a science concerned with the study of behaviors
that are characteristic of persons within contexts and with various processes that
presumably produce, explain, or are affected by those behaviors (1986:67)”. This is
particularly applicable to this study because advisers must have a thorough knowledge of
the expectations of the minister. Therefore, to understand the roles and behaviours of
advisers, an attempt must be made to determine the boundaries or determinants of that
behaviour. The terminonlogy and the analytical framework of role analysis will help to
organise the data gathered for this study. In the language of role theory, then, I use the
term ‘actor’ and ‘actors’ in various parts of this study to underscore the significance of
advisers’ interactions in the development of policy.
Influence is another concept that informs this research. Influence is conceptualised in much
the same way as Foucault theorises power; that is, “it is a name [given] to a complex
strategic situation in our particular society” (Foucault 1979:93). This study attempts to
establish a qualitative measure of influence by analysing what advisers do and how
11 influence is ‘felt’ and experienced by advisers themselves and those with whom they interact. It is claimed in this study that advisers are highly influential, with some achieving predominance and most others exerting influence in setting agendas and shaping policy outcomes.
Policy and policy-making are two other constituent parts of the research framework. The traditional starting point for defining policy is that it constitutes the decisions taken by those with responsibility for a given policy area, and that these decisions usually take the form of statements or formal positions on an issue, which are then executed by the bureaucracy.
However, in practice, policy is notoriously difficult to define. As Considine (1994) states,
“policy is a deceptively simple term that conceals some very complex activities” (1994:2).
Rather than seeing policy as simply a single decision implemented in a linear fashion, many observers have noted that, in practice, policies generally consist of a broad course of action (or inaction, for that matter) or a web of interrelated decisions which evolve over time during the process of implementation (Hill 1997). The position taken in this study is that policy also needs to be seen as an inherently political process, rather than simply the instrumental execution of rational decisions.
For this study, policy is what the government says and does about what it perceives to be the problems it faces (Ripley & Franklin 1980). Public policy includes choices about the intentions or purposes of government action, ends to be achieved, means for achieving program goals, and actions to implement the programs (Jones 1984).
The literature on policy-making is both diverse and extensive. A few themes are particularly important in the literature. The first is the difficulty of defining the term ‘policy’. Ozga
(2000:2) says that there is “no fixed single definition of policy”, while Hill (1997:6-18) devotes significant space to wrestling with “the definitional problems posed by the concept of policy”.
The second is the critique of the ‘policy cycle’ model of the policy process. This model assumes that the policy process consists of various subsequent stages: agenda-setting,
policy formulation, implementation, evaluation, etc. This model was dominant throughout 12 the 1970s and the 1980s (deLeon 1999:23) but has been criticised by a number of policy scholars, with alternatives being developed emphasising that policy is contested at all levels or stages (see Colebatch 2006).
A third theme is that actors interact and bargain with each other, and thereby produce a particular (albeit temporary) policy outcome. Actors can be individuals pursuing their own material interest, or they can be collective (interest groups). There are various ways in which this interaction has been conceptualised: in terms of rational self-interested actors, or in terms of policy networks, pluralist interest groups or policy interfaces. All these approaches illustrate the fact that policy processes are inherently political, because they stress interactions between people, social mobilisation and pursuance of ideas and interests. People with more power (money, skills, networks, etc) are more likely to get things done their way than people with less power.
A fourth theme in the literature is that policy discourses are important. Discourses can be defined as “ensemble[s] of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. Discourses frame certain problems; that is to say, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others” (Hajer 1993:45). There are important power questions related to discourses, such as ‘who has the power to define what, and what is the social basis of ideas?’ The literature focuses on sociological aspects (discourse coalitions)
and also on the ‘techniques’ of policy discourses (the labels, metaphors and other stylistic
devices, policy narratives, etc) (Hajer 1993:45).
A final important and relevant concept for this study is accountability. While there is no
consensus on the meaning of ‘accountability’ (Mulgan 2000), some working definitions
appear well-established in the political science and public administration literature. Thus,
‘accountability’ refers to a relationship in which one party, the holder of accountability, has
the right to seek information about, to investigate and to scrutinise the actions of another
party, the giver of accountability. In its fullest sense, accountability also implies the right to
impose remedies and sanctions, though sometimes that function may belong to some other
party (Mulgan 2000: 555; Dubnick 2005:6). This definition encompasses a number of
13 features: that accountability is external; it is owed to someone or something other than the person who is being held accountable (Mulgan 2000: 555; Mulgan 2003: 10). It involves social interaction and exchange implying that there are rights of authority, in that the body to whom accountability is owed asserts authority over those who are accountable (Corbett,
1992; Mulgan 2000: 555). In this sense accountability can also be seen as answerability
(Dubnick 2005: 410-411; Bovens 2005). Of relevance to this study is that ‘accountability’ is a situational concept in that it needs to be specified in context: who is accountable to whom and for what? (Scott 2000). This view, that accountability is situational, appears to be borne out in the interview data.
This understanding of accountability can be elucidated further by contrasting it with another related concept, namely responsibility. Accountability is not the same as ‘responsibility’
(Uhr 1993) but it many include accountability. Accountability is distinguishable from responsibility in that it involves the capacity for individual choice and action (‘acting responsibly’) exercised without reference to another persons. Accountability is always other-directed, whereas responsibility is not.
Research methods
This study presents a ‘thick description’ of the adviser system under the Greiner/Fahey and
Carr governments. Twenty-three interviews were conducted involving present and former advisers and ministers, senior government officials (e.g. Directors General), and interest group representatives. This multiplicity of perspectives is part of an attempt to develop a
deep understanding of the adviser system and the impact of advisers throughout the
broader polity. It is also part of the research strategy to ‘triangulate’ observations as much
as possible.
The research method adopted for this research was modified grounded theory. The
technique of thematic analysis and the constant comparison method were also used to
develop useful ways of analysing the data that were uniquely suited to the research
questions.
14 For the purpose of this study, interpretivism was chosen as the principal research paradigm for eliciting an understanding of the adviser’s place in the NSW political system. This paradigm stresses the importance of the meanings or understandings that people bring to any activity, the construction of meaning by experience, and the fact that these meanings
can only be expressed through the language of the actors themselves (Crotty 1998). In the
case of the policy-making process, it is the adviser who brings certain understandings to
the process. In turn, their experiences will affect the understandings that they hold, either confirming them or remoulding them.
15 Part I – Foundational Aspects of the Study
The following two chapters address the foundational aspects of the study. Chapter 2 surveys and reviews the relevant literature. Its purpose is to define and refine the research problem, as well as to assess what is known and what remains to be answered with respect to the research questions framed for this study. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology
used for the study. As noted, this research was conducted within the interpretivist paradigm
using a modified grounded research approach.
16 CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter surveys and reviews the literature on ministerial advisers. Its purpose is to highlight some of the key themes which correspond with the aims of this study, to explore the roles and influence of advisers operating in the NSW political system, and to lay a conceptual foundation for its in-depth qualitative methodology. The review represents an analysis of salient research studies and conclusions that are relevant to and support the purposes and significance of this study. This includes a historical overview of the emergence of and growth in the NSW adviser system; a description of research findings which illuminate advisers’ roles and functions; and accounts of influence and accountability of advisers in the Australian federal and state political arenas.
The analytical framework overlaying the literature review seeks to gain critical insights into the level and type of influence advisers exert in decision-making both through the locus of their roles and the authority conferred on them by ministers. It also seeks to assemble inferences about their existence and evolution within the federal and NSW political systems, the significance of their interaction with the bureaucracy and interest groups in the development of policy, and their impact on the governmental system.
This review focuses on literature in countries which have similar governmental systems to that of Australia and which have followed a similar path in the development of ministerial staffing arrangements. As such, literature from Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) is included for comparative purposes and to identify trends in the way adviser systems have evolved. A brief overview of selective literature on partisan advisers in the United States
(US) is included in the comparative analysis to gain insights and ‘lessons learnt’ from a country that has long had such political staff with established management practices.
These countries also provide a useful comparator for evaluating the impact adviser systems have on frameworks designed to regulate advisers’ roles and influence.
17 Survey of the literature
Since the early 1970s, there has been growing scholarly interest in the role of advisers within the Australian political system. Such interest has generated a modest body of
Australian literature which explores advisers’ backgrounds, the reasons for their emergence and growth, their degree and type of involvement in policy-making processes, and their growing importance in managing interactions between government, the public service and established interest groups (Forward 1975, 1977; Smith 1975; Walter 1986; Ryan 1995;
Dunn 1997). In more recent times, a critical body of literature and research has begun to emerge examining theoretical questions about advisers’ roles, the types of contexts in which these roles manifest themselves, the policy work advisers perform, the impact they have on the polity’s structure, and ethical concerns such as their conduct and their accountability (Maley 2002, 2002; Holland 2002; Tiernan 2004).
Much of the Australian research and literature on ministerial advisers can be seen as falling into three streams. The first is empirically based and deals with ministerial advisers as subjects in their own right (Forward 1975; Smith 1977; Forward 1975; Walter 1986; Ryan
1995; Dunn 1997; Maley 2000; Tiernan 2004). This research, while comparatively small, focuses largely on the period 1972 to the present, and places a heavy emphasis on ministerial advisers operating within the federal parliamentary system. This stream includes a series of experiential and observational accounts about the work of advisers (Kennett
1989; Rudd 1992; Holloway 1993) and deals mostly with normative concerns such as advisers’ ideal role-type and the support needs of ministers. It is within this stream that literature on advisers operating in NSW mostly exists (see for example Painter 1987;
Halligan & Power 1992; Laffin & Painter 1995), but it tends to describe advisers as part of broader topics about politics and public administration rather than as research subjects in their own right.
Within this stream of research there is an established and growing body of international literature exploring the emerging role, institutionalisation and influence of advisers in countries with similar political systems to that of Australia, including the UK, Canada and
18 New Zealand. This is variously descriptive and historical (see for example Lenoski 1983;
Blick 2004), empirical (see for example Shaw & Eichbaum 2003) and investigative (see for example Plasse 1994).
The second stream encompasses the political sciences and the subfields of public policy and administration. Many of the texts in this stream make reference to advisers’ roles in the policy process (see for example Althaus et al 2007; Colebatch 1998) or provide commentary on particular aspects of their work, such as news management (see for example Anderson in Colebatch 2004). This increasing scholarly attention is indicative of the growing importance some academics are placing on the roles and influence of advisers in the policy-making process. While these texts connect the policy work of advisers to aspects or episodes of the policy process, or offer theorisations of their role based on particular approaches or contexts, generally they do not explore advisers’ roles in any depth.
Research dealing with advisers who work in state governments is small, and that which does exist focuses on descriptions about advisers within the context of machinery of government changes (Painter 1987; Laffin & Painter 1995) and broader political or public administration subjects and topics, such as mechanisms for achieving coordination and control of and responsiveness from the public service (Halligan 2001). These are mostly short commentary pieces describing in broad terms the types of roles advisers perform and why they have become an “institutionalised part” of state governments (Halligan 2001:11).
While most of these studies view the role and growing importance of advisers within the context of the political and administrative reforms that have occurred in the last 20 or so years, they do not trace developments or explore advisers’ roles.
The third and final stream of literature on advisers emanates from research into advisory structures that have been established to support core executives (Plowden 1987; Campbell
& Wysomirski 1991; Peters, Rhodes & Wright 2000b). These texts take a varied approach to comparing institutions of advice and support for core executives in a number of countries, including Australia. There are claims in these texts that the roles advisers
19 perform are ill-defined and cover a wide ambit (Campbell & Wysomirski 1991); that the adviser system in Australia is generally weak because it operates within the Westminster tradition (Bakvis 1997); and that centralisation has resulted in the growth of advisers, and with it a trend towards institutionalisation and politicisation (Peters, Rhodes & Wright
2000a). While these texts exhibit some of the pitfalls associated with comparative analysis, they do provide valuable insights into advisory support structures for executive leadership, the status of Cabinet government, and the roles of personal staff of presidents and prime ministers. Other identifiable themes that cut across this stream of literature include trends
towards greater centralisation and towards the personalisation of political authority (Peters,
Rhodes & Wright 2000a).
According to Tiernan, advisers in Australia are an understudied area of research, the
literature on which is “primarily descriptive” (2004:10, 15). Similarly, and according to
Maley, the work by Walter (1986), while making an important contribution to knowledge
about advisers, “represents only a beginning to the exploration of the work of advisers”
(Maley 2002:25). On this basis, therefore, this study seeks to contribute to existing
knowledge about ministerial advisers by exploring those arrangements and developments
experienced in NSW.
The following section examines the literature on advisers based on the four conceptual
fields that have been selected to organise the analyses of advisers in NSW: advent, growth
and institutionalisation; roles and role-determinants; influence; and accountability. At the
end of the section, a brief overview of the international literature on partisan advisers is
presented to identify key themes and significant lessons.
Advent, growth and institutionalisation of ministerial advisers
Advent
As noted above, much of the scholarly literature on advisers in Australia is descriptive. One of the first Australian studies to capture the motivations for and merits of the experiment by
Gough Whitlam (Prime Minister, 1972-75) with advisers was undertaken by Dr Robert
20 Smith as part of a submission he made to the Royal Commission on Australian
Government Administration (RCAGA). Smith’s assessment of the emerging use of advisers during the Whitlam era suggests that the adviser system grew largely out of the need to support ministers who came to power with the expectation that the bureaucracy would impede the new government’s ambitious policy reform agenda (Smith 1977:135).
Walter’s seminal work on ministerial advisers, The Minister’s Minders (1986), carries this theme further by drawing attention to a deeper set of issues that confronted Whitlam and his ministers when they came to office after 23 years in opposition. There were strongly held perceptions that Coalition ministers were being ‘run’ by the Canberra public service elite. There was concern that the new Labor government would face resistance from a public service that had grown accustomed to the ways of a Coalition government that had been in power for over two decades. As such, Walter formed the view that ministerial control and a desire to prepare government departments for a new policy agenda were the primary reasons for the introduction of advisers (Walter 1986:52). For Walter, therefore, advisers were seen as a logical response to overcoming bureaucratic obduracy and
achieving ministerial control.
Whitlam’s ministers were also suspicious of the public service’s disinclination to engage in
the government’s ambitious policy agenda (Smith 1977:135). Doubts were held as to
whether the public service had the necessary skills and competencies to implement Labor’s
agenda, which included new program areas such as urban planning (Walter 1986:52).
Labor was inspired by developments in Britain and Canada, which had experimented with
advisers and had made them a near permanent arrangement within the political executive.
Political leaders in these countries viewed advisers as an effective means of countering the dominance of the bureaucracy and of providing much needed personal support to ministers, two outcomes that would feature strongly in Whitlam’s thinking when trialling similar staffing arrangements in Australia (Smith 1977:136; Wilenski 1979).
In his study of advisers under Paul Keating and John Howard (Prime Ministers 1991-96 and
1996-2007 respectively), Dunn (1997) advances the political control thesis by asserting that
21 advisers “provide assistance to the elected executive for exercising political directions of departments” (1997:108). For Dunn, advisers are a powerful force for pulling together the contributions of bureaucrats and politicians and ensuring there is a balance of neutral and responsive competence in the development of policy (1997). In her study of advisers under
Keating, Maley (2002) forms the view that the roles advisers perform correlate strongly with the problems experienced by the political executive in achieving political control. For Maley, the ambit of political control extends beyond helping ministers cope with the demands of office and directing the bureaucracy; it must involve a proper examination of the breadth and depth of advisers’ roles that are performed to “effectively steer government” (2002:31).
This includes policy and political coordination.
There is other literature that links the political control thesis to the advent of advisers in
Australia. Halligan and Power (1992), in their research on political-bureaucratic relations, correlate the desire of the political executive to assert primacy over policy-making with
growth in adviser numbers. They locate this phenomenon within the context of machinery
of government changes that occurred in many western democratic countries in the 1980s.
These changes saw a devaluing of bureaucratic advice relative to that sourced from
ministerial advisers (Campbell & Halligan 1992). Their research led them to conclude that
Australian governments have used ministerial staff to influence the partisan element within
the executive; to contribute to a redistribution of power between political and administrative
systems; to perform tasks that could not be done by bureaucrats; and to reduce the
potential influence of public servants (Halligan & Power 1992).
Missing from much of this research is an analysis of whether the political control thesis can
be applied to other relational contexts, such as those involving the media – given, as
Anderson points out, they are “the sites where politics and public life are played out”
(2006:177-178). Further, given that much of managing the policy-making process involves
a greater focus by politicians on consultation, networking across a range of policy networks,
coordination, and issue and news management (Halligan & Power 1992; Dunn 1997; Maley
22 2002), it stands to reason that other conceptions of political control could be developed around the roles performed by advisers.
Growth and institutionalisation
There are several reasons cited in the literature for the expansion of adviser numbers and their subsequent institutionalisation within Australian political systems. The two dominant reasons appear to be strongly connected with the prevailing themes of political control and a crisis of executive leadership in advanced liberal democracies (Halligan & Power 1995).
On this basis, the adviser system has expanded because it is seen as a device for sustaining and extending executive control in demanding situations. The literature points to other causes as well, but before describing these it is instructive to examine the numbers, and some of the explanations, behind the growth in the size of adviser systems in Australia.
Under Whitlam, adviser numbers expanded significantly and quickly. By the end of his term in office, it was reported that adviser numbers, which included press and ministerial advisers, stood at 227 (Forward 1977; Smith 1977). On coming to power, Malcolm Fraser
(Prime Minister 1975-83), suspicious of the role of advisers, opted to go back to orthodox arrangements and rely on the public service for advice and support (Mediansky & Nockles
1981). As a result, adviser numbers were cut sharply to 138 in early 1976 (Maley 2000b), yet many of the institutional underpinnings formulated by Whitlam were kept intact (Smith
1977). For instance, Fraser maintained a similar number of personal advisers to Whitlam in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).2 Also like Whitlam, Fraser recruited an academic to
head up his personal office. In Whitlam’s case this was Dr Peter Wilenski, and in Fraser’s it
was Dr David Kemp, an academic from Melbourne (Smith 1977; Walter 1986).
Adviser numbers expanded significantly under the governments of Bob Hawke (Prime
Minister 1983-91), Keating (1991-96) and Howard (1996-2007). On coming to office, the
Hawke government maintained many of the staffing structures inherited from Fraser
2 Respectively, Whitlam and Fraser had 21 and 23 personal advisers within the PMO (Holland 2002).
23 (Walter 1986), keeping the total number in the PMO at 23 and allowing the ministry to expand personal staff numbers to 165 (Walter 1986). In the initial stages, the PMO was comprised of partisan political appointees, but towards the end of Hawke’s term it was
complemented by policy experts from the public service (Campbell & Halligan 1992).
Under Keating the PMO increased in size to 30, up from 23 under Hawke (Holland 2002),
and the Keating ministry was supported by no fewer than 338 staff, double that of Hawke’s.
More than half of these consisted of staff with advisory functions (Maley 2000). Keating was
regarded as having a ‘command and control’ style of leadership, preferring to conduct
politics and policy-making informally through known contacts and informal structures
(Waterford 1996:92). Evidently, Keating’s leadership style led to the PMO growing in
power. Maley attributes this to Keating’s centralist approach to governing and the
expectations he set for advisers in taking an active role in the policy process, especially
policy and political coordination. As a consequence, advisers were seen as having a great
deal more autonomy than in the past (Maley 2002).
Prior to winning the 1996 election, the Coalition3 had promised to control the number of
ministerial staff. On coming to office, Howard significantly reduced staff numbers from 364
to 294 (Tiernan 2004). But, like their predecessors, the Coalition soon met with the realities
of politics and pressures of governing, and so by 1998 staff numbers were boosted to 325,
and then 391 in 2004 (Tiernan 2004). According to Tiernan, this was done to “increase the
political skills of the government” (Tiernan 2004:24, 112). Prime ministerial staff numbers
increased to 36 under Howard, surpassing Keating’s 30.
Compared with their federal counterparts, NSW state government adviser numbers began
somewhat modestly under Greiner/Fahey, with approximately 100 employed during their
leadership. Of these, some 50 were regarded as having advisory functions (Laffin & Painter
1995:80). Greiner saw advisers as a means of preventing ministers from becoming
captured by the bureaucracy and ensuring they were able to control the development of
3 The Coalition is an alliance between two political parties, namely the Federal Liberal Party and National Party. The Coalition at the state level is also an alliance of these two political parties.
24 policy (Laffin & Painter 1995:80). During Carr’s term as premier, adviser numbers were reported to be in the vicinity of 223, almost double that employed under Greiner/Fahey. At 1
December 2008, adviser numbers stood at around 230 (Director of Public Employment
2008). Staff in Carr’s personal office at the end of his premiership was reported to number
29 (Clennell 2008).
Prime ministers who tried to reduce the number of advisors soon came to realise that
additional resources in the form of personal staff were essential to enhancing control of the
executive and maintaining a disciplined approach to governing. It can be inferred from this
that advisers not only have utility, they have indispensability, two essential preconditions to institutionalisation (Peters & Pierre 2004).
Other contributors to the growth and institutionalisation of advisers include the formal recognition of the position of adviser in legislation (Walter 1986; Maley 2002; Tiernan
2004), increased seniority and status, and the move to larger working environments
(Tiernan 2004). These trends are also evident in NSW. For example, advisers became formally known as ‘temporary public servants’ in the NSW Public Sector Management Act
1988. Numbers also increased when ministers moved from office accommodation in
multiple sites in Sydney into one central location, the Governor Macquarie Tower.4
Another rationale for the introduction of advisers is ministerial overload. On this basis,
advisers were seen as an appropriate way to help ministers cope with the demands of their
portfolio responsibilities (Weller & Grattan 1981; Briot & Lloyd 1976) and pressures
associated with the challenges of office (RCAGA 1976). Additional resources, in the form of
personal staff, could be used by ministers to offload aspects of their own work and allow
them to concentrate on more important parts of their job, such as developing policy
(Hughes 1978).
4 This building is a government-tenanted building and currently accommodates 20 of 21 government ministers.
25 Another sign pointing to the growing institutionalisation of advisers can be found in the job titles assigned to holders of these positions. Ministers’ offices nowadays are hierarchical in structure with distinct divisions of labour. Each minister has a ‘chief of staff’ while some, depending on size, have a ‘deputy chief of staff’. Elements of a minister’s portfolio are divided according to policy or program area.
Some of these themes resonate with the reasons for the introduction of advisers in NSW.
According to Painter (1987), ministers gained “greatly enlarged personal staff of expert advisers” to give them greater control over the machinery of government (1987:1-2). One of these arrangements came in the form of the Ministerial Advisory Unit (colloquially known as
‘MAU MAU’), which was established by Neville Wran (NSW Premier 1976-86) to provide him with alternative advice to that of Treasury on economic matters (Alaba 1994; Gleeson
2006).
The Greiner period is frequently cited as a watershed in political-administrative relations in
NSW. It was regarded as the point at which the bureaucracy succumbed to the control of
the political executive, this being achieved through the creation of a senior executive service. On a broader level this came at a time when questions were being asked about the scope of government activity and whether market-oriented methods should be introduced to improve the quality of performance. This positioning of the public service according to market ideas is sometimes referred to as the ‘post-bureaucratic model’ (Laffin & Painter
1995). The literature is unclear as to whether advisers in NSW were an important part of the post-bureaucratic agenda or incidental to it, but some researchers appear to suggest that it created opportunities for advisers themselves to carve out new roles (Halligan &
Power 1995; Maley 2002).
Similarly, the literature is unclear as to whether advisers were part of the plan to subject the public service to New Public Management principles and post-bureaucratic processes. If anything, advisers seem to represent a missing part of the discourse surrounding government changes that occurred under Greiner and political leaders in other Australian jurisdictions. It is possible, as theorised in this study, that the post-bureaucratic agenda,
26 which created a cultural shift in political-bureaucratic relations, also gave rise to new and different role opportunities for advisers, and therefore strengthened the case for their advent, growth and institutionalisation.
It is important to emphasise the point that under the premierships of Wran, Greiner/Fahey and Carr, various forms of political oversight were introduced to assert the primacy of the political executive over the bureaucratic machine. Measures included the formation of the
Cabinet office, headed by Gary Sturgess, a close personal friend of Greiner’s;
‘ministerialisation’, the bringing together of independent agencies under the direct control of the minister; the appointment of partisan loyalists to key public service positions; and an expansion in the number of advisers within the premier’s personal office. Advisers, therefore, need to be seen as part of the broader mix of strategies used by NSW governments to achieve political responsiveness and control.
There are at least two theoretical perspectives relevant to the advent and institutionalisation of advisers. The first relates to one of Weber’s theories of bureaucracy, which posits that bureaucracies have an inherent tendency to exceed their instrumental function and therefore develop an independent role in policy development. The theory also holds that bureaucracies are able to carve out their own space within the state because of the expertise, superior knowledge and special interests they possess, creating a power base of their own. This then provides them with the means and impetus to usurp political power
(Beetham 1985). The scope and character of political control is therefore a function of whether bureaucracies are subordinate to the ministry.
The second perspective sees the advent of advisers, in part at least, as a derivative of
public choice. From this perspective, advisers represent an institutional response to the
inability of bureaucracies to act in the interests of the political executive because of their
tendency to self-serve, to grow beyond their original purpose, and to arrogate power from
the political executive. These two perspectives are central to this study because they
provide the basis for a theoretical framework for analysing advisers’ roles and impact.
27 The roles and policy work of advisers
With greater numbers of advisers working in Australia, and equally so in NSW, there has been growing scholarly and media scrutiny of their roles and functions. Yet, at the same time, little light has been shed on what they actually do and how they go about their roles
(Tiernan 2004). This section of the review seeks to distil some of the key themes contained in the literature regarding advisers’ roles. These themes inform one of the positions advanced in this study; that advisers’ roles have evolved to the extent they have because advisers perform many of the functions ministers once used to, but now do not because ministerial roles have shifted into other areas.
Key themes
This review of the key literature in relation to advisers’ roles is presented chronologically, starting with Smith (1997) and ending with Maley (2002). This is done to highlight the extent to which advisers’ roles have evolved over time, and the contextual factors that have defined these changes.
As noted, Smith’s (1977) research was one of the first Australian studies to explore the role and influence of advisers. His survey of the recruitment patterns of ministerial staff includes a comprehensive digest of the policy and political roles they performed for Whitlam and his ministers. Within these two broad descriptors of advisers’ functions – policy and political –
Smith reports that the roles of advisers varied in their detail and importance according to the minister, the portfolio and the department for whom or in which advisers worked (Smith
1977). Indeed, their roles were heavily dependent on others (Smith 1977), suggesting that there was little scope for them to work autonomously.
Despite this, an adviser’s role-set at the time covered a range of tasks integral to policy development and implementation. These included conducting policy research, providing critical commentary on departmental advice, presenting new ideas to the minister, and expanding policy options. Further, Smith reports that advisers helped ministers make contact with organised interests and key parts of the party organisation. These were also
28 important because they increased the political repertory of the minister, helping him or her reach across policy domains (Smith 1977).
Even from this small study, there is a definite sense that ministers lack the capacity to deal with the demands of their job. Smith’s long list of advisers’ activities and functions provides
clues as to the scale and scope of the policy environment with which the political executive
was attempting to contend. Roles such as assisting the minister with parliamentary work,
responding to press enquiries and dealing with disputes contribute to an overall sense of
the complexities of governing.
Conducted a decade later, James Walter’s (1986) study of advisers, contained in his book
The Minister’s Minders: Personal Advisers in National Government, is an elaborate piece of
descriptive text that traces the history and developments of ministerial staff in Australia.
The book covers the proliferation of advisers during the Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke
governments, concentrating mainly on their roles and background. In this regard, Walter
found that advisers were young and had little private sector experience. Many came from
academia or had previously held advisory positions. Further, they were also mostly male,
Australian born, graduates, educated in private schools, and evenly represented from
inside and outside the public service. Walter saw advisers’ roles in instrumental terms,
defining them as a ‘functionary’ or as someone who facilitates and establishes links on
behalf of the minister among bureaucracy, Cabinet and the party (Walter 1986). Their
primary role was to support the minister in providing the efficient administration of the
private office and the management of organisational tasks (appointments, briefings,
paperwork, etc). According to Walter, the more personally supportive roles of advisers
included providing emotional support, acting as a “sounding board”, a confidante, a political
advocate and a “reactionary to political ideas”. Thus, the tasks of the “loyal aide” will
frequently be cast more directly in terms of their technical and political role than their policy-
making functions (Walter 1986:130-31).
Walter’s analysis reveals that advisers’ roles are important in addressing gaps in the policy
process that emerge from the constant collision of politics and public administration. In this
29 sense, advisers facilitated connections between the bureaucracy and the executive and helped the minister cope with his or her department and its aims. They coordinated the work of the minister’s office, and exerted influence by acting as gatekeepers or ‘buffers’ for the minister (Walter 1986). They also provided a link to the party and its views, wrote speeches and assisted the minister in articulating policy.
Walter concludes that the policy-making functions of advisers were as individual actors engaged in a group enterprise whose contributions to policy development were confined to a particular institutional setting (the minister’s office) and policy continuum (top-down).
Importantly, he was in two minds about the impact of advisers in policy development, suggesting that they were “bit players” in the process but were nonetheless influential and a growing force alongside ministers and bureaucrats (Walter 1986:5). While Walter saw advisers as having a legitimate role in providing policy advice to ministers, he held a different view on their standing in developing policy independently of the minister and department.
Walter’s study, while seminal, is the product of research that was conducted over 25 years ago at a time when significant machinery of government changes were taking place at both federal and state levels. His description of advisers’ roles suggests a growing orientation towards policy work, something not detected in earlier studies. Significantly, while describing advisers as important for achieving political control, he does not explain how this control was achieved.
Also noteworthy are two other studies on advisers in Australia conducted in the 1990s – the first by Delmer Dunn (1997), an American academic who was interested in political- administrative interactions in Australia and in identifying lessons for the US administration, and the second by Neil Ryan (1995), an academic from Queensland.
Dunn (1997) explored advisers’ roles relationally rather than positionally; that is, he was interested to see what roles advisers perform within certain relational contexts and arenas, the most important of which is between ministers and public servants. Dunn was quite open
30 about advisers functioning as extensions of the minister in providing direction to and obtaining political responsiveness from departments. There is a sense in Dunn’s account of advisers’ roles and policy work that advisers are more active in interacting with and engaging departments to develop policy. Of note, he illustrated advisers working with departments to shape policy, evaluate policy ideas, and oversee policy development and implementation (Dunn 1997).
Ryan’s (1995) research, which covers a similar period to that of Dunn’s, interpreted the influence of advisers through two of Luke’s three dimensions of power, namely as decision- making and agenda-setting. Ryan asked his sample, which included ministers and advisers, to gauge the level of influence advisers had on a range of policy-decisions taken by the Hawke and then Keating government between 1990 and 1993. Ryan found that ministers had ultimate decision-making authority but advisers were regarded as having significant influence in some decisions or in how decisions were made. He also concluded that advisers were more influential in shaping the agenda than in decision-making. While
Ryan’s study has ‘indicative’ value, there are significant shortcomings in the research which prompt questions concerning the conclusions reached. The survey response rate was extremely low, with only three ministers, eight advisers and two public servants responding from a possible sample of well over 100; responses from public servants were not included in the final analysis.
A significant piece of empirical work on ministerial staff by Maria Maley (2002) focused on the roles of advisers in the Keating government. Using interviews with advisers, ministers and government officials, Maley explored the roles of advisers multi-dimensionally. She did this by building on the conceptual frameworks developed by Walter and Dunn to construct a framework with a broader conception of political control. Maley’s conception of political control extends beyond providing ministers with personal support and managing exchanges
with the bureaucracy (Walter 1986; Dunn 1997); it also includes coordination within the
executive, managing policy and political networks, and engaging in complex policy
processes (Maley 2002). From this viewpoint, Maley posits that advisers’ roles grew in
31 order to account for a broader conception of political control, one that not only includes
personal support but also political support, communication, steering policy and executive
coordination.
Maley’s study detected a number of important changes in the adviser system under
Keating. First, she notes that not only did advisers’ roles grow in scope, they were confirmed as partisan. She sees this as being distinct to Australia and different from other countries such as the UK, where advisers (or ‘special advisers’, as they are more commonly known) are either partisan or come from the bureaucracy to fulfil non-partisan roles. In Australia, most advisers came from the bureaucracy to fulfil partisan policy roles.
The confirmation of advisers as partisan in Australia was made possible by the enactment of the Commonwealth Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, which made a distinction between the roles of ministerial and public service advisers and entitled ministers to partisan support in their offices. Second, the adviser system under Labor grew larger in size and became more institutionalised (Maley 2002; Walter 1986). Third, advisers’ roles became technical, with some 70% coming to the position from the public service. Fourth, advisers were highly skilled at and active in policy. As mentioned, many ministers and advisers responded to Keating’s activist approach to politics and policy-making by becoming more engaged in the processes of both.
Final among Maley’s observed changes was a growing professionalism in the work of advisers. These roles extended to include communication, policy steering and executive coordination, each identified by Maley as important in enabling executive government to have control over the development and implementation of policy and influence over government decisions more generally. According to Maley, advisers performed key roles in supervising and directing the work of departments, as well as mobilising them to carry out the minister’s policy agenda. They played important roles in policy-making and in working with stakeholders within and outside of government (Maley 2000). Advisers also appeared to have an increased role in policy development. Maley (2000) found that advisers played a significant role in policy-making which went beyond involvement in generating policy ideas,
32 development and implementation. Maley (2002) identified ‘five distinctive policy roles’ which grew from their strategic location within government. These roles she classified as agenda setting; linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilising; bargaining; and delivering.
Their work extended beyond analysing and adding a political dimension to the work of departments by interacting across organisational boundaries.
Other themes
There are other important themes to emerge from the literature review on advisers’ roles and policy work. The first and most obvious theme is that there is a high degree of variability among writers in how they conceptualise and contextualise the activities and functions of advisers. Walter (1986), Dunn (1997) and Maley (2002) use different typologies to organise advisers’ roles and functions, although with each there is some degree of overlap. Walter’s analysis of advisers’ roles falls within three conceptual fields: personal,
technical and political. Dunn defines advisers’ roles relative to the arena in which these are
performed, for example, working with the department. Maley’s conceptual framework has
an additional two roles: communication and coordination. It is within the functional space of
coordination that Maley grounds much of her thesis on political control.
These conceptual frameworks could be extended to include an account of advisers’ policy
work based on the degree to which policy and policy-making processes become centralised
within the institutional realms and purview of the minister and ministerial office. Missing is
the idea that policy moves in and out of proximity to decision-making because of factors
such as time, resources, issue saliency, political opportunism, and concordance with the minister’s own perspective on a given issue. Thus, under the broad heading of ‘policy work’, the following functions could be added to the mix: initiating, facilitating, directing and monitoring policy. These functions capture the degree to which advisers engage in policy work and the degree to which policy-making processes are controlled centrally by the ministerial office. They also capture the degree to which advisers subjugate policy development to the minister’s outlook and thinking. This view, that advisers’ roles and
33 policy work shifts according to circumstance, is appropriately linked to new institutionalism,
which posits that political behaviour is shaped by institutional settings (March & Olsen
1989).
Thus political control is more than engaging the bureaucracy and coordinating disparate elements within the political-bureaucratic nexus: it is also about subjugating policy processes to a ministerial and political view. Much of what advisers do is as an extension of the minister. While they bring their own skill sets and experience to the task, they by and large mobilise the minister’s interests in the process. They provide a new means of organising for policy.
The second theme is that there has been evolution in advisers’ roles since their formal introduction under Whitlam. Earlier writers stressed the value of advisers briefing on issues outside the minister’s direct remit and ensuring ministers received an appropriate level of support. For the most part, however, their functions were largely about filling in gaps
created by the tensions between the two spheres of government: politics and administration
(Walter 1986). It is within this nexus that opportunities for advisers are carved out and spill over into other areas, such as media work (Anderson 2006). Anderson (2004) draws
attention to the fact that advisers are increasingly vetting media releases prepared by
departments.
A final general theme to emerge is that advisers’ roles are highly situated. This means that
context plays a big part in what advisers do. This context can be at the individual level,
where skills, knowledge, experience and personality define what advisers do and how they go about their work (Smith 1977; Walter 1986; Dunn 1997; Maley 2002). It can also be situated institutionally, where the requirements and personality of the minister drive the work of the adviser. It is this relationship which places advisers in a unique position for pulling together the various threads of the minister’s political and ministerial life – and which gives advisers much of their influence and authority. The profile, work and philosophy of the department are also important (Smith 1977; Walter 1986; Maley 2000).
34 Advisers’ influence within government
Of all the themes emerging from the literature, as outlined above, one is particularly
significant for this thesis: advisers’ influence. It is instructive here to gain impressions from
the literature on advisers’ power and their impact on policy outcomes, and to frame a
conceptual map in which to populate data generated by my research.
The various discourses that are used to explain the advent and roles of advisers provide an
insight into their level of influence. As mentioned, advisers have been justified on the
grounds that they provide an ‘offset’ to the dominance of the bureaucracy and a means of
increasing responsiveness of public servants to ministers. In other words, they exist to
render political control. They are spoken of as a necessary device for keeping ministers “in
the game” (Maley 2002:286), as a buffer to prevent ministers from becoming captured by
the bureaucracy (Laffin & Painter 1995), and as a way of ensuring partisan control of the
institutions of government (Smith 1977; Halligan & Power 1992; Kimber 2000). It follows
therefore that the very essence of an adviser’s existence is to redress a power imbalance
caused by institutional drift.
Part of this discourse also concerns how advisers’ influence is spoken about and viewed in
the literature. The literature is replete with examples and references to advisers being
influential through the roles they perform and the authority they derive from the position
they hold. First, it is instructive to note that earlier writers appear to avoid the topic of
advisers’ power and influence altogether or at least there is tentativeness in exploring the
subject matter in great detail. Smith (1977) and Forward (1977) do not broach influence in
their work, although Smith does make reference to a potential ethical concern: the
usurpation of the minister’s authority through “unauthorised invocation of the minister’s
name” (Smith 1977:151). But, for the most part, neither influence nor power is explored in
great depth by earlier researchers. Even Walter, who provides a robust account of advisers’
background and roles, is hesitant to conclude that advisers are influential. He observes that
advisers’ influence is “primarily indirect” but “nonetheless significant” (Walter 1986:152).
35 For Walter, advisers’ influence was mostly concentrated in activities such as extending policy options and paying attention to the policy agenda, but for the most part he believes their influence is indeterminate and difficult to trace (Walter 1986).
Later writers, such as Dunn (1997), Maley (2002) and Tiernan (2004), are less reticent about exploring advisers’ influence, although with the exception of Ryan (1995) they do not explore this area through a theoretical frame. Thus, and adding to the idea of discourse, there appears to be a normative shift in how advisers are spoken about and viewed. No longer are questions being asked about why they exist and whether they have a legitimate place in the Australian executive core; the research has established that they are now a permanent feature of the Australian political system. Now, it seems, the research has shifted from debates about who advisers are and how they got there in the first place, to what they do, how they do it and, increasingly, what this all means.
My research, which is the first to look in depth at advisers operating in a state political system, aims to traverse this research space, that is, to explore the reasons for the advent of advisers, and their roles, influence and accountability. The question of why advisers exist to the extent they do is still worth raising, because it is likely to yield important insights into the pressures and challenges governments face in responding to community concerns, and the support needed by political executives for these to be overcome. In fact New Zealand researchers, Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw (2008), have explored the roles and influence of advisers in their political system. It is not inappropriate therefore to examine the rationale behind advisers’ advent, particularly in a political system that has undergone significant reform in the last 20 years.
So, what are the key findings in the literature in relation to advisers’ influence and power?
The first, and this relates to the point made earlier, is that descriptions of advisers’ influence, though vast, are deeply grounded in the language used. They are also inescapably linked to their roles. For instance, Dunn (1997), whose study explored the role and influence of advisers under the Keating and Howard governments, refers to some advisers’ roles as “directing the department” and “coordinating the portfolio” (Dunn
36 1997:81;97). He also notes that influence comes from the policy roles advisers perform, such “brokering”, “filtering” information and advice, and “intervening” at critical stages of policy development (1997:94-108). Similarly, their “political power” also comes from speaking on behalf of the minister, developing an interpretive sense of the minister’s wants and needs, and using “discretion” to achieve administrative control (Dunn 1995:509-516).
These are descriptions of functions that confer influence.
Dunn (1997) detected important roles played by advisers in brokering positions with other ministerial offices before Cabinet, and in coordinating within portfolios (1997:93-99). Thus, for Dunn, advisers are seen as a means of gaining control over the work and direction of departments as determined by executive governments and their stance on policy issues.
So they are an extension of the minister and the authority that goes with him or her.
Similarly, Maley’s (2002) study contains descriptions of advisers’ roles which are suggestive of the high degree of power and authority advisers possess. For example, she describes the gate-keeping function of advisers in various parts of her research; in one section she states that this function gave advisers “considerable leverage in dealing with departments” especially in the control of information (Maley 2002:118). According to Maley, advisers’ ability to control information was something they could use to trade, cut deals with and define the terms of their relationship with public servants (Maley 2002).
Maley (2002) asserts that advisers derive their influence functionally from the roles they perform, particularly from coordination, which is integral to her thesis of political control; structurally from the institutional arrangements in which they work; and implicitly from the relationship they have with their minister. Her assessment of the patterns of influence among advisers suggests that advisers influence policy-decisions by performing a range of strategic roles that are mostly concerned with resolving conflict, such as “bargaining” and
“negotiating” (Maley 2002:64, 106). However, missing from her assessment of advisers’ influence is the degree to which advisers use discretion.
37 Significantly, Maley detected that a ”very active” group of advisers ”had accrued significant administrative authority in their dealings with departments”, to the extent that some could check and question departmental advice before it went to the minister (Maley 2002:118).
She found that some advisers developed roles as surrogates for their minister, leading to a less direct relationship between departments and ministers than in the past. However, she noted that extreme influence among advisers was confined to the PMO and the two economic portfolios, Treasury and Finance. Those outside this ‘inner circle’ were seen as influential but only in relative terms and among themselves (Maley 2002).
A second finding regarding advisers’ influence is that it has ramifications and implications; this is largely the focus of Tiernan’s research. Tiernan (2004) used both small and large case studies as an empirical base for evaluating issues regarding advisers’ accountability, conduct and behaviour, and their fit within Australia’s Westminster system of government.
Two case studies of significance were the ‘travel rorts’ affair and the ‘children overboard’ affair, which at the time of their public airing raised serious questions about the role and growing influence of advisers, and are presented by Tiernan to demonstrate the degree to which Howard’s leadership style conditioned the advisory system around him and his ministry. According to Tiernan, advisers under Howard were active and interventionist in their dealings with departments. She found that Howard’s personality and leadership style were influential in setting the tone for the way advisers behaved and conducted themselves, particularly in the two cases just mentioned (Tiernan 2004).
Tiernan (2004) also argues that advisers under Howard brought a personalised form of influence that derives from the relationship they have with their minister. She describes
Howard advisers as “active” and “interventionist”, particularly in their dealings with departments (Tiernan 2004:24). Significantly, she observes that the advisers’ authority had
grown significantly, to the point where they were exceeding their station as extensions of
their minister, possessing what she believes to be executive authority (Tiernan 2004).
Other key themes and findings of Tiernan’s research will be discussed later in this chapter
(under ‘Accountability’).
38 There is a sense from the literature that some advisers, because of who they are, their expertise, and personality, were able to achieve a type of predominance. For instance,
Maley noted the existence of a ‘troika’, a group of ministers and advisers whose policy
focus was on matters economic. Laffin and Painter (1995) noted the existence of
‘triumvirate’5 on whom Greiner relied for political and economic advice. Tiernan noted the influential role Arthur Sinodinos, Howard’s chief of staff, played in bringing a disciplined approach to political management for the Coalition when it was struggling in the polls and trying to implement its policy agenda (Tiernan 2004).
Viewed broadly, there is a definite sense in the literature that advisers have developed more influence recently than in the past, and than the influence detected in the research by earlier writers such as Smith (1977) and Walter (1986). There appears to be strong correlation between the rise of advisers’ influence and the growth in their numbers, particularly over the last two decades, in which the size of the adviser system at the federal level has more than doubled (Walter 1992; Maley 2002; 2004 Tiernan). There is a strong correlation between the attitude of the political executive, particularly the prime minister, and the institutional stretch of the adviser system. An ‘active’ and ‘interventionist’ staffing system can only emerge if political leaders create a space for this operating style to thrive.
One of the aims of this study is to identify advisers’ spheres of influence. Is this influence achieved largely through their roles, the authority of the minister, or some other means?
One area of influence which the literature appears to ignore is whether advisers have discretionary powers. To what extent do advisers make judgements about policy issues on the basis that ‘this is how the minister would think’ if faced with the same problem? There is no denying that advisers are influential. The literature is quite clear on that. Of importance here, however, is how this influence is manifested, how it is used, and what it says about the nature of politics and policy-making in the modern era. Is advisers’ influence giving rise to new methods of policy work?
5Greiner formed a small group of high-powered advisers including Ian Kortlang (chief of staff), Ken Hooper (a former journalist), and Gary Sturgess (a former lawyer).
39 Tiernan’s (2004) study is largely concerned with the accountability of advisers and arrangements for regulating their conduct and behaviour. She refers to the adviser system as having evolved into “a powerful new political institution within the core executive”
(Tiernan 2004:ii). Throughout her study there are references to the influence advisers exert
in their dealings with departments. There are also multiple references to advisers having
influence or ‘undue influence’.
The studies discussed above each point to advisers deriving their influence from that which
is conferred to them by ministers, but they each give a different perspective on how
advisers derive their influence. For instance, Maley observes that influence is structural and
relative to the way advisers work, their skills, qualities, location and significantly,
relationships. Only in Ryan’s study is influence examined theoretically, albeit with
methodological limitations.
Managing relationships
This section of the review traverses the literature to identify the key themes regarding the
roles advisers perform in managing relations with key stakeholders, which, for the purposes
of this study, are government officials, interest groups and the media. Evidence in the
literature makes it clear that advisers perform a host of important roles in order to ensure
the executive is able to assert political control over the bureaucracy. There is also mounting
evidence that advisers insert themselves into relationships that fall outside of the minister-
bureaucrat dynamic to ensure problems are solved before they get out of hand.
Relations with the bureaucracy
It is argued that a reasonable working relationship between ministers and bureaucrats is
essential for the administration of good government (Dunn 1997; Maley 2002; Aberach et al
1981). Under the Westminster model, relations between ministers and government officials rest on the normative view that politics and public administration ought to be kept separate and in balance by the established principles of a non-partisan expert public service (Weller
40 & Rhodes 2005) and responsible government (Aucoin 1995). There is a concern that the interposing of advisers within this relational space, together with the changes to the machinery of government in the 1980s, has brought greater convergence between the political and administrative spheres of government (Halligan 2001). This convergence has
raised questions about whether the Weberian model of bureaucracy has become distorted
as a consequence of advisers’ presence and roles, and whether this model can continue to
be used to guide relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. Such convergence has
also raised questions about whether the public service has become politicised (Halligan
2001) or has given rise to different conceptions of politicisation.
The literature and research on advisers place a heavy emphasis on advisers forming
effective and productive relationships with public servants to ensure the minister’s policy
agenda is implemented (Dunn 1997; Maley 2002). It is a relationship that is largely defined
by the political executive’s desire to assert control over the administrative structures of
government.
While there is an extensive body of knowledge and literature on the relationship between
ministers and bureaucrats in western democracies, comparatively little exists on relations
between advisers and public servants. Of the literature surveyed for this study, only Dunn
(1997) and Maley (2002) examine the relationship between advisers and government
officials in any great detail.
Dunn (1997) provides an in-depth analysis of the functions advisers perform and the nature
of the relationship between advisers and public servants. He identifies a number of roles
performed by advisers that enable a minister to extract a combination of neutral and
responsive competence from the bureaucracy. To this end, advisers monitor and evaluate
the work of departments, facilitate contact between ministers and the department, and direct the department, involving conveying the minister’s views on policy. In Dunn’s assessment, these roles are essential for engaging the bureaucracy and for providing ministers with additional capacity and capability to exercise political control (Dunn 1997). In her study of advisers in the Keating government, Maley (2002) also detected a number of
41 roles which advisers performed to keep the department engaged with the minister’s policy agenda. The roles emerging from within the minister-department relationship included supervising, orienting and mobilising the department, all of which, as in Dunn’s assessment, contributed to political control (Maley 2002).
Maley detects three key roles emerging from the relationship between advisers and departments. The first of these is ‘supervising’, which would involve scrutinising departmental documents and obtaining regular briefs on departmental activities. This particular function enables advisers to gain a high degree of control over the advisory functions of the bureaucracy. The second role to emerge is ‘orienting’, which involves communicating the minister’s decisions, reinforcing his or her agenda, and acting as the minister’s ‘surrogate’ when decisions have to be made on his or her behalf. The third is
‘mobilising’, a function concerned with marshalling bureaucratic resources to work on the minister’s agenda (Maley 2002).
Reviewing the patterns of change at the state level, Halligan (2002) reports a similar set of roles performed by advisers in their dealings with NSW bureaucrats to those identified by
Dunn (1997) and Maley (2002). Halligan (2002) notes that advisers play a crucial role in mediating between ministers and the bureaucracy, assisting to communicate ministerial intentions to government officials, and acting as a sounding board for public servants.
Descriptions of the relationship between advisers and public servants are wide and varied.
Earlier writers, such as Smith (1977), found that there was considerable friction and tension between advisers and public servants owing partly to advisers being structurally
“anomalous” and fulfilling advisory functions that were poorly developed (1977:150).
According to Smith, advisers disrupted “accepted patterns of bureaucratic influence” and posed a challenge to “both the formal responsibilities and informal practices of senior public servants” (1977:150). He also reports on instances of advisers liaising with junior public servants, causing confusion and disloyalties (Smith 1977).
42 Reporting only on the perspectives of advisers and ministers, Walter (1986) found that relations between advisers and government officials were generally positive. Advisers did not compete for the “last word” with public servants because divisions of labour between the two were generally well understood (Walter 1986:146). Similarly, there was acknowledgement by advisers of the primacy of the department in being the principal adviser to the minister. According to Walter, advisers reported that it was only in rare or exceptional circumstances that they would intervene to have changes made to policy content (1986). Again, it is important to note that Walter did not ask public servants for their views on advisers’ dealings with departments.
In a similar vein, Tiernan (2004) found that advisers have the potential to disrupt relationships between ministers and officials because of the lack of clarity over demarcation of roles between advisers and public servants. Tiernan points to growing systemic problems in the management of ministerial staff which she identified as being largely driven by institutional imperatives. In her assessment of advisers’ involvement in the children overboard affair, she found that advisers were more interventionist in their dealings with departments and strongly motivated by political opportunism (Tiernan 2004).
At the state level, Laffin and Painter (1995) found that the interposition of advisers into the political-administration divide had caused tension and discordance among senior public servants. They note that officials had to adjust to young and inexperienced advisers who had little regard for the way the bureaucracy worked. Laffin and Painter reported that officials found that advisers added to the problems of management by going directly to junior public servants for information instead of approaching the departmental head first.
Thus, tension and friction existed in relations between advisers and public servants and at the nascent stages of the adviser system in NSW (Laffin & Painter 1995).
In contrast to these descriptions, Dunn (1997) found a high degree of complementarity in the roles of advisers and public servants. This led him to conclude that relations between advisers and public servants were generally positive and harmonious. This occurred because there was recognition by both of the important contribution they could make to the
43 development of policy. Dunn found that advisers were able to make a contribution to the work of the department by exploring the political implications of the department’s work. He also found that advisers help reduced politicisation by taking on tasks that would be considered inappropriate for the department. Advisers and public servants were able to coexist relatively independently and stably because there was a strong understanding of each other’s roles (Dunn 1997). Ryan (1995) found greater variability in the relationship between advisers and public servants. Relationships that were cooperative and harmonious were the result of advisers being active in policy work and office administration, and those that were tense and conflictual were caused by differences over agenda and by advisers being interventionist in their approach to departmental relations.
Maley produced evidence to suggest that the relationship between ministers and public servants was being mediated by the presence of advisers (2002). Her analysis of advisers’ roles and relations with public servants led her to develop a model characterising the way in which these two sets of policy actors interact. She argues that, while complementarity existed in the relationship between advisers and public servants, much of what was worked on was “shared and contested” (Maley 2002:138). She found evidence of a “blurring of roles” which occurred because of the increased orientation of advisers to policy work and the recruitment of public servants into ministers’ offices (Maley 2002:278).
Interest groups and the media
The literature suggests that an important facet of advisers’ roles is managing relationships that exist outside the divide of politics and public administration (Smith 1977; Walter 1986;
Dunn 1997; Maley 2002). Generally, these relationships are with interest groups and the media, and the need to manage them derives from governments needing to control and understand how policy will play out in the public domain.
Earlier writers, such as Smith (1977), report on advisers having important roles in helping ministers to manage contacts with interest groups and the media. He reports that advisers assisted ministers and media advisers in responding to enquiries from the press. Ministerial
44 advisers would also meet with interest groups on the minister’s behalf to keep themselves and the minister informed of stakeholder issues. On occasion, advisers deputised for
ministers by interviewing people and attending meetings, and the staff concerned needed
to have established their credibility in the appropriate areas (Smith 1977:154).
Maley does not explore the roles of advisers in managing relations with the media, noting
that this work is largely done by media advisers and as a result did not warrant
investigation. She does however explore advisers’ work with interest groups. There is
acknowledgement that interest groups are an important consideration in the development
of policy and that the advent and growth in numbers of advisers has made it easier for
interest groups to gain access to the political system (Maley 2002:81). There is recognition
that trust is important to the relations between advisers and interest groups, given the
relationship is defined by the exchange of confidential information. Maley also
acknowledges the positive contribution interest groups make to generating ideas, the roles
advisers perform in “testing ideas”, “negotiating policy change” with interest groups and
increasing their access to ministers (Maley 2002:82). However, Maley’s research does not
include the views of interest groups in the analysis of advisers’ roles or of the consequent
relationship that transpires.
The significance of the advisers’ roles in managing media relations is also mentioned in
other literature. Starr (1995) draws attention to Greiner and Fahey’s approach to news
management and political marketing. Starr reports that the development of public relations
strategies was a preoccupation of the Greiner/Fahey governments, particularly after the
1991 election, where an internal review found that the government had not effectively
marketed its policies and achievements, a factor that was identified as being responsible
for the government losing its majority. Further, Starr reports that both premiers saw the
need to better manage the way their policies were communicated to the electorate in order
to achieve their adoption and acceptance (Starr 1995). Carr additionally took media
management seriously. At the end of his term it was reported he had assembled a
contingent of seven media advisers within his own personal office. He has also been
45 regarded by many commentators as a masterful manager of the media (Savage 2005;
Dempster 2004).
Anderson (2006) reports on the increasing involvement of advisers in managing relations with the media, particularly in controlling news content emanating from the bureaucracy
and content emanating from the minister’s office. He sees media management as a critical
component of policy development (2006:182).
The institutional arrangements that developed under Hawke, Keating and Howard to
manage media relations and strategic communications are explored by Tiernan (2004).
Under Hawke, media management became centralised within a small leadership group, an
arrangement adopted by Keating but expanded significantly under Howard. Under Keating,
media advisers played important roles in structuring media appearances and controlling
political content and messages to the public via the media, but institutional arrangements
were not as prominent as those formed under Hawke. According to Tiernan (2004) this
reflected Keating’s desire to withdraw from media engagements. Under Howard, media
relations went through an initial phase of being poorly managed to one of being significantly
strengthened and enhanced (Tiernan 2004). This occurred through the expansion of media
adviser positions and centralisation of news management. The desire of political leaders to
bolster media management resources can be seen as indication of the high value they
place on controlling media messages, and of the intense partisanship of contemporary
Australian politics.
The nature of the relationship between advisers and interest groups and the media is only
given a cursory examination by the researchers presented in this review. Nevertheless
there is a general sense from the literature that, while advisers perform important roles in
managing the external policy context, there is still much to be learnt about the scale and
scope of these functions, their significance in managing policy processes, and whether
advisers facilitate access to policy and political processes. The relation between advisers
and public servants is said by Maley (2002) to be an understudied area, one that needs to
46 be better understood to reveal how the political executive engages the administrative structures of government and, as a result, achieves political control.
The views and voices of interest groups have been included in this current study because they hold an important place in contemporary debates about governance. Rhodes (1994), for instance, maintains that interest groups, or more specifically policy networks, are an important feature of a differentiated polity and that their role represents an important component of the “hollowing out” of the state in western democratic countries (Rhodes
1994:151). They also provide a measure of “democratic legitimacy”, that is, the extent to which they are able to participate in policy processes within the government arena
(Hamilton & Maddison 2007:81).
The dominant themes to emerge from the literature in relation to advisers’ roles in managing the external context are that relations with the department rank above those of relationships with interest groups and the media. This is reflected in the degree of reporting of advisers’ roles, which is heavily grounded within the adviser-bureaucrat relational context. Within this dynamic, advisers perform a range of important roles to ensure engagement of the bureaucracy, responsiveness and political control. There is also a high degree of variability in the description of adviser relationships with public servants. Some writers report that conflict and tension defined the relationship (Smith 1975), while others formed the view that exchanges were mostly cooperative and harmonious (Dunn 1997).
Later writers such as Maley concluded that the relationship between advisers and public servants was competitive, producing tension that needed to be managed (Maley 2002).
Accountability
A set of concerns that flows from the expansion of the size of the adviser system in
Australia, and more notably in NSW, and their corresponding growth in functions, relates to whether they are sufficiently accountable for their actions and whether there are adequate rules to define and limit their proper roles (Tiernan 2004). This section examines the literature on the accountability of advisers to provide some basis for generating research
47 questions about the impact of advisers’ roles and presence, and to develop a framework for analysing the interview data provided by study participants.
The accountability of ministerial staff rose to prominence with the ‘children overboard’ affair
in 2001. For many observers, this controversy made definite and clear the problems
associated with the size of and functional growth in the modern adviser system (Weller
2002; Tiernan 2004). In fact, so serious were the problems exposed that a Commonwealth
Senate Committee was established to inquire into the level of advisers’ involvement in the
whole affair.6 Among the Committee’s many findings, two stand out as a measure of the
impact of political staffing on the conventions and norms governing the Australian political
systems. The first evinces how advisers’ influence and their corresponding lack of
accountability contribute to the politicisation of the public service. Here, the Committee
found that advisers “embroiled agencies improperly as a means to advisers’ politically
partisan ends” (SSCCMI 2002:177), creating confusion and improper conduct (SSCCMI
2002). The second relates to deficiencies in the frameworks governing advisers’
accountability. The Committee concluded that there exists a “serious accountability vacuum
at the minister’s office level” which is partly the result:
… of the increased size of ministers’ staff, but more significantly of the evolution of the
role of advisers to a point where they enjoy a level of autonomous executive authority
separable from that to which they have been customarily entitled as the immediate
agents of the minister. (SSCCMI 2002:173)
These and other matters were referred to another parliamentary committee, which was asked to inquire into and report on the adequacy of employment and accountability arrangements for staff employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984
(‘MOPS Act’).7 The Committee invited submissions from the public, yielding a significant
body of practitioner knowledge and academic and journalistic accounts of the issues
surrounding advisers’ accountability.
6 The inquiry became known as the Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (SSCCMI). 7 Senate Reference Committee on Finance and Public Administration.
48 A number of salient points were made by contributors to the inquiry. Don Russell, a former economic adviser to Paul Keating, noted that the children overboard affair revealed a situation in which advisers “lead an existence separate from the minister” (Russell 2002:3).
Tiernan and Weller (2002), who have both produced books on aspects of the affair, noted in a submission to the committee that advisers “have significant autonomous power and agency and are constrained only by the strength of their relationship with their Minister”
(2002:9).8
In the last decade or so, considerable disquiet about the size and functional growth of the
adviser system has been highlighted in practitioner accounts of advisers’ roles. Kennett
(1989) draws attention to the potential problem of advisers assuming responsibility and
control that goes beyond that delegated to them (1989:133). Concerns have been raised
about advisers supplanting the role of the public service in the provision of advice
(Fitzgerald 1996); power shifting into the hands of advisers and altering the type of advice
public servants provide (Kimber 2004); the potential for advisers to exercise “undue
influence” (Sherman 1998:21); and the limits of advisers’ authority not always being known
and understood by ministers and staff (Waterford 1996). In a submission to the (MOPS) Act
inquiry, the Clerk of the Senate stated that advisers are involved in “extreme and
illegitimate” actions (Evans 2002:2).
More recent empirical accounts reveal that ministers bestow substantial autonomy on
advisers because they have little time or inclination to manage aspects of policy
development themselves (Maley 2002). Advisers occupy positions of influence as
‘surrogates’ of the minister (Maley 2002) and as experts (Smith 1977; Walter 1986; Maley
2002). Dunn (1997), who devotes significant space in his book to an analysis of advisers’
accountability, acknowledges that the potential accountability problems for advisers lie in
the fact that they:
8 Anne Tiernan’s book Power without Responsibility is largely a derivation of her thesis. Patrick Weller’s book Don’t Tell the Prime Minister examines the ‘children overboard’ affair and presents a critical assessment of the impact of changes to advisory systems on the quality of advice to ministers.
49 ... speak in the name of the minister, carry out duties that minister delegates either
directly or indirectly, and answer questions interpreting what the minister wants. This
provides potential power to the staffer. (Dunn 1997:103)
However, Dunn (1997) found that staff were conscious of the extent of their discretion. He saw advisers’ behaviour and conduct tempered by versions of Friedrich’s (1940) internal controls and Finer’s (1941) external controls (Dunn 1997). Internal approaches rely on
professional judgement and internalised norms that safeguard against abuses of discretion.
External controls place an emphasis on oversight and democratic institutions to keep
administrative performance in line with expectations. On this basis, therefore, Dunn sees
advisers being held accountable for their conduct and behaviour by an internal guide which
they develop from having a deep sense and understanding of the minister’s preferences
and style of operating, and the expectations that flow from operating as an extension of the
minister (Dunn 1997). It is important to note that Dunn’s analysis of advisers’ accountability
is based mostly on interviews with ministers and advisers: the views of government officials
are not factored into the analysis. Nor does his analysis take into account the controversies
involving advisers that were prominent in the Keating government.9
While acknowledging the importance of examining advisers’ accountability, Maley does not incorporate this area of the adviser system into her research. As a former adviser herself,
Maley reflects that she and other advisers with whom she worked had a deep sense of where the boundaries were and to whom they were accountable: the minister. This is an odd position to take given the range of issues uncovered in her analysis of advisers’ roles.
For instance, she mentions the consternation caused to government officials by advisers’ contact with junior public servants, and refers to two controversies that exposed problems in the adviser system under Keating. These were the 1993 ‘pay television affair’, in which staff were actively involved in the tender process (Maley 2002) and the 1994 ‘sports rorts affair’, which revealed that staff were involved in making decisions about the selection of grants to sporting groups (Maley 2002). Finally, Maley concludes in her thesis that the
9 For example, the pay television and sports rorts affairs.
50 adviser system under Keating had become a powerful political institution, but she does not explore the implications of this development.
As noted earlier, Tiernan’s research provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the problems arising from an adviser system that has outgrown the very frameworks that were designed to keep in it check (Tiernan 2004). In several case studies and interviews with ministers, advisers and government officials attention is drawn to the inherent problems that underlie contemporary ministerial staffing within the federal sphere of politics
in Australia. First, she notes that conventions such as ministerial responsibility are proving
to be inadequate in holding advisers accountable because advisers are increasingly being seen as executive decision-makers, which fragments and dilutes ministerial responsibility
(Tiernan 2004).
Second, Tiernan identifies that there are issues concerning the conduct and behaviour of advisers (2004). Her analysis of the children overboard affair reports instances of advisers showing lack of respect to public servants and military personnel, and ministers failing to reign in transgressors (Tiernan 2004). Third, she identifies that there are systemic problems with the management of ministerial advisers, owing mostly to gaps and weaknesses within governance frameworks (2004). Finally, Tiernan argues that the contemporary staffing system is anomalous to the Westminster model of government: it disrupts one of the key tenets of the tradition – the cooperative relationship between ministers and public servants
(2004).
In a detailed description of developments in the Howard era, Tiernan reveals the degree of secrecy that surrounded the expansion of advisory arrangements under Howard and his ministry, a point made clear in her section on methodology, which reports the difficulties she encountered in obtaining interviews with current ministers and advisers. One shortcoming of Tiernan’s research is that events and arrangements at the state level are not canvassed or discussed, although some follow-up work in this area has transpired in other scholarly work of hers (see Tiernan 2005). Another limitation of Tiernan’s research is
51 that interactions between advisers and public servants in the Howard era are not explored.
This would have shown the nature of relations between these two actors.
Debates about the problems of the federal adviser system have been matched by suggestions and policy responses designed to render the ministerial staffing more accountable. There have been calls for a code of conduct along similar lines to that developed and used in the United Kingdom (Tiernan 2004; Alexandra & McArdle; Kimber
2004), a statement of conduct and values (Podger 2002), greater clarity over the roles and responsibilities of advisers and public servants (Barrett 2003; Uhr 2003), and legislation to enable parliamentary committees to call advisers as witnesses (Alexandra & McArdle
2003).
International literature
Canada – exempt staff
In Canada, partisan-political advisers are known as ‘exempt staff’ by virtue of the fact that they are not appointed under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and do not perform tasks that are prescribed for public servants under the Public Sector Employment
Act 1984. Ostensibly, they are hired by ministers on an individual basis to perform strictly partisan tasks.
Over a comparable period to that covered in this thesis (1980-2000), there exist only a handful of studies exploring political staffing arrangements in the Canadian context. Some of the earlier studies include practitioner accounts by Mallory (1967), Tilley (1977), Williams
(1980), Savoie (1983) and O’Conner (1991), while later works include academic pieces by
Plasse (1994) and Benoit (2005). These works cover a range of topics and issues, including staff’s backgrounds and recruitment practices (Tilley 1977; Williams 1980; Savoie
1983), their roles and their relationships with bureaucrats (Savoie 1983; Plasse 1994;
Benoit 2005), and issues regarding their accountability and performance (Benoit 2005). For the most part, however, there is a paucity of scholarly work on ministerial staffing in
Canada.
52 As in most countries that have experimented with political staffing systems, Canada’s political culture and partisan ideology appear to have had a strong bearing on its structure and performance. Bakvis (1997), for instance, claims that Canada operates with a relatively subdued ministerial staffing system compared with some western European nations because it is largely constrained by a Westminster-style adversarial political system and a
tendency of the political executive to rely on orthodox advisory arrangements (Bakvis
1997). This view accords with Campbell’s (1998) assessment of political staffing in Canada.
He argues that prime ministers and ministers have tended to avoid extensive use of
advisers because they have long been supported by the role and strength of the Privy
Council Office, a central executive agency responsible for coordinating the activities of
Cabinet and Cabinet committees (Campbell 1998).
Debates and discussions about staffing arrangements in Canada have a similar timbre to
those occurring in Australia. The advent of advisers occurred at a time when political
executives were struggling to come to grips with governing in an increasingly complex
social and political environment and dealing with increasing demands of office (Benoit
2005). The theme of bureaucratic control also permeates much of the literature on
Canadian exempt staff (Savoie 1993; Benoit 2005).
In relation to roles, those of exempt staff appear to have followed a similar trajectory to
those of ministerial advisers in Australia. In the early stages, exempt staff’s roles were
limited and confined to personal support functions and partisan-related work, such as
maintaining contact with organised interests and the media. According to Mallory (1967),
exempt staff also prepared ministers’ speeches, maintained contact with the media, and
responded to requests from interest groups. As in the Australian experience, these roles
expanded considerably, resulting in larger, more elaborate and hierarchical staffing
arrangements (Benoit 2005). Functional growth also characterises the development of
Canadian exempt staff. In addition to personal support functions, staff liaised with Cabinet,
Caucus and Opposition staff (Plasse 1994), directed office operations and ensured the
minister’s directives were carried out in the department.
53 As in Australia, the exempt staff system faced questions of legitimacy. Writing in the late
1960s, at a time when exempt staff were regarded as a relatively recent phenomenon,
Mallory (1967) noted that exempt staff functioned as “an intermediate class of persons in the Minister’s Office, who are political rather than bureaucratic in their functions, appointed rather than elected, and who operate in an area which strict constitutional theory does not
recognize as existing” (Mallory 1967, cited in Benoit 2005:150). While Canada appears to
have experimented much earlier with partisan advisers (Mallory 1967; Smith 1977), it has
both a smaller and a less developed system than that of Australia’s with 200 advisers, less
than half the number in Australia, which has an adviser system numbering 450 (Tiernan
2007). Canada, with a population of over 33 million people, has a staffing system equal in
size to NSW, a state with a population of 6.5 million people and a staffing system
numbering approximately 230.
As in Australia, political staffing in Canada has met with controversy and criticism. In 1964,
executive assistants to the Minister for Immigration used bribery to prevent the extradition
to the US of an alleged heroin smuggler who had close links to the Quebec wing of the
Liberal party (Benoit 2005). The scandal sparked an investigation into staffing
arrangements and culminated in the publication of an article by Mallory which highlighted
the anomalous position exempt staff hold under the Westminster system of government:
It is clearly undesirable that a considerable number of persons not a part of the civil
service should be interposed between a minister and his department. They lack the
training and professional standards of the public service: it may even be the peculiar
nature of the appointment means they escape the security screening which is an
unpleasant accompaniment of most candidatures for responsible posts in the public
service. Not only do these functionaries wield great power because they control
access to the minister and can speak in his name, but they may wield this power with
ludicrous ineptitude and in ways that are clearly tainted with political motives.
(Mallory 1967:25)
54 In 1991, another controversy involving political staff erupted. Known as the ‘Al-Mashat affair’, the matter involved a former Iraqi Ambassador to Washington, Mohammed Al-
Mashat, who had arrived in Canada soon after being recalled to Baghdad in 1991, the time of the first Iraqi Gulf War. His immigration was handled by officials from Immigration and
External Affairs, who failed to draw the matter to the attention of the Minister for External
Affairs, Joe Clark. This caused a political storm because the former ambassador had close
ties to the Iraqi dictatorship. The government argued the minister could not be held
responsible because he was not made aware of the application. Instead, the government
blamed a senior government official and the minister’s chief of staff for failing to inform the
minister. The case brought to the fore the degree to which ministers are able to abdicate
responsibility for the actions or inactions of their political staff on the basis that they had not
been informed, and the invidious position in which staff find themselves – on the one hand
operating as extensions of the minister, but on the other scapegoated and disowned when
controversy implicating a minister looms large (Benoit 2005).
United Kingdom – special advisers
In the UK, advisers are more commonly referred to as ‘special advisers’. They are
appointed by ministers as temporary civil servants to perform a combination of policy and
partisan functions or to provide expertise on specific areas of government activity (e.g. the
economy). Historically, advisers were seconded into ministers’ offices from the public
service and were expected to serve both minister and department loyally. But as their
numbers expanded and presence consolidated, expectations of their functions and
answerability changed (Seldon 2007). It is only in recent times that a partisan element to
the recruitment of advisers has begun to creep in, although compared to Australia this
remains relatively subdued (Plowden 1991).
The research and literature on special advisers covers a broad spectrum, though
surprisingly little has been written with an empirical orientation. There are texts covering
historical developments of advisers (Lenoski 1983; Klein & Lewis 1977; Blick 2004),
55 publications covering advisers’ roles in advisory structures supporting prime ministers
(Plowden 1991; James 1999; Kavanagh & Seldon 2000) and ministers (Theakston 1992), and in practitioner and personal accounts (Mitchell 1978). Interest in the role of special advisers has also crept into texts dealing with comparative politics (Rhodes et al 2009) and
public policy (Hennessy 1989), politics and public administration (Foster 2001; Peters &
Pierre 2004; Peele 2004; Page 2005), and news management (Watts 1997; Seymour-Ure
1995). They have also been incorporated into books on British prime ministers, such as
Tony Blair (Prime Minister 1997-2007) (Claven 2000; Seldon 2007), but for the most part there has not been any recent empirical work looking at special advisers as a distinct group.
The current UK staffing system began in earnest under Harold Wilson (Prime Minister
1964-70 and 1974-76) in 1974. Initially he created a small policy unit of five advisers in
Number 10 to provide him with more personal and political advice and to counterbalance the advice from officials (Lenoski 1983). Wilson also formalised arrangements across the ministry allowing Cabinet ministers to appoint a limited number of special advisers. A few of these positions were recruited from academic posts but generally they came to the role as individuals with strong party connections (Lenoski 1983). There are indications that the impact of advisers under Wilson was limited. This was because most advisers were young, inexperienced and too few in number to match the size and expertise of the bureaucracy
(Donoghue 1987; Theakston 1992). They were also unable to “develop an esprit de corps or more functionally, an effective interdepartmental net to parallel that of the civil service”
(Pollitt 1984:110).
Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister 1979-90) took a slightly different attitude towards special advisers, choosing to rely on her ministers for political advice, but as her leadership developed she came to rely increasingly on her personal advisers, who by the end of her first term in office numbered 15, increasing to 17 by the end of her second term (Shepherd
1983:33). Like Wilson, Thatcher surrounded herself with advisers from diverse backgrounds, including academia, the civil service and the party machine. John Major
56 (Prime Minister 1990-97), on taking over the leadership in 1990, made few changes to the advisory structures he inherited (Lee et al 1998), but like Wilson he encouraged ministers
to appoint their own special advisers (King 2007).
While formalisation of the role of special advisers occurred under Wilson in the early 1970s,
consolidation of their employment occurred under Thatcher and Major in the 1980s and
1990s. However, it was with Blair’s Labour government that interest in the roles and
influence of special advisers expanded significantly. In 2007, the Labour government had
78 special advisers (Tiernan 2007), twice as many as the Major administration. Towards
the end of Blair’s prime-ministership, there were 27 special advisers to the Prime Minister,
substantially more than the eight Major had working for him at the end of his term in office.
Correspondingly, there was growing and often intense media scrutiny of advisers such as
Alastair Campbell and Jonathan Powell, two advisers to Blair. According to Seldon (2007),
these two advisers performed roles that were unprecedented in scope, having, among
other things, line management powers over government officials.
In addition to scholarly interest and media coverage, the roles of special advisers have
been examined by a number of formal parliamentary committees, including the House of
Commons Select Committee on Public Administration and the Wicks Committee. These
committees have investigated the roles and influence of advisers and their dealings with
the public service. Some of the key concerns to come of out these investigations were the
appropriateness of engaging advisers under the same framework as public servants; the
ability of existing frameworks to hold them accountable, given that their terms of
employment fall under the responsibility of the Cabinet office; their performance and their
suitability to hold these positions (Neill 2000); and the use of public funds to pay for their
overtly political activities (Blick 2004; Wicks 2003).
Much attention and criticism was levelled at the use of special advisers in news
management and political marketing. A controversial move by Blair was the appointment of
special advisers in departments to perform partisan media relations roles, a practice which
regularly caused grief for government information officers steeped in a culture of political
57 impartiality (Seldon 2007). As in Australia, the expansion of the UK adviser system has created tension between, and confusion over the appropriate boundaries between advisers and the public service. This matter came to the fore when Blair appointed three advisers to his personal office who were empowered to direct public servants, prompting concerns about whether advisers had illegitimately acquired executive authority by virtue of this decision.
Under Blair, there were serious attempts to clarify the roles of advisers vis-a-vis public servants through the codification of their roles and functions. In 2001, a separate code of conduct was developed in response to recommendations emanating from the inquiry undertaken by (the Neill) Committee on Standards in Public Life. The code, together with a
Model Contract for Special Advisers, was adopted by the Blair government, with sections amended to clarify advisers’ roles: for instance, the change from “giving advice” to
“providing assistance to the minister” (Gay & Fawcett 2005:9-11).
Nevertheless, the adviser system operating in the UK is extremely small by comparison to
Australia. In fact, NSW has nearly three times as many advisers as the UK. With the introduction of a code of conduct, Britain appears to have taken the regulation of advisers as a means to curtailing their influence and ensuring their accountability in a far more serious light than Australia (Tiernan 2007).
United States of America
This section reviews the literature on political staff who work within some political spheres in the USA, namely the White House, Congress and the Senate, and state legislatures. As mentioned, the literature on political staffing in the US is extensive. It covers a broad range of topics, issues and themes, as well as staffing types (partisan and policy) and institutional and organisational contexts. Some studies on staffing deal specifically with their roles and influence (Rundquist et al 1992; Fox & Hammond 1977), while others deal with staff groupings within these institutional entities, such as committee staff (Fenno 1973; Musca
1986). Other important work on staffing focuses on issues regarding their growth and
58 accountability (Hart 1995; Dickinson 1997) and their roles in presidential decision-making
(Kessel 1984; Walcott & Hult 1999).
Given the breadth of the literature in this area, I have opted to focus on research and writings that connect with the key areas of this study: reasons for the introduction of political staff, their roles and influence, and the problems that arise from their numerical size and behaviour. The literature reviewed here is relatively current, as there is a large body of work dating from the 1940s that cannot be included due to lack of space.
It is instructive to note that, while Australia operates under a different system of government to that of the US, there are strong parallels between the two countries in the way political staffing has evolved, and its impact. The US is well advanced in the debate about the impact of advisers’ roles and in introducing measures to curtail their influence, providing important lessons for Australia, and in particular NSW.
Advent and growth in numbers of staff
A number of studies on presidential and US political staff have, as their starting point, the work of the 1937 Brownlow Commission, a committee formed by Franklin D. Roosevelt
(President 1933-45) to find new ways of managing the White House workload. The work of this committee is often cited in the literature because it laid the foundation for the advisory
support structures that have been established for the President and it provided the framework for the development of an institutionalised presidential staffing system
(Dickinson 1997; Hart 1995). The report produced by the Commission acknowledged that
“the President needs help” and recommended a small expansion of White House staff to
serve the President in an administrative capacity (Mosher 1976:115).
The literature also makes reference to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which legitimated the need for increased congressional and personal staff (Fox & Hammond
1977; Rundquist et al 1992; Kofmehl 1962). This body of work includes a modest line of research, with much of it focusing on descriptions of congressional staff offices (Kofmehl
1977; Fox & Hammond 1977; Congressional Management Foundation 1995); roles, career
59 paths and working styles of staff (Price 1971; Romzek & Utter 1997; DeGregorio 1988); the impact of staff growth on the members (DeGregorio 1988, 1994); the degree of responsiveness of, and turnover within, the large legislative bureaucracy (Salisbury &
Shepsle 1981a); and consideration of forms and mechanisms of accountability (Romzek
2000). This body of work provides useful insights into the causes of variability in staff’s roles and their influence on policy-making.
Writers on presidential and congressional staffing point to the increased volume and complexity of legislation and federal programs, a growing domestic and foreign affairs agenda, greater awareness of presidential and congressional activity on the part of constituents, and power struggles between the executive and legislatures over presidential power as some of the reasons for the advent and growth in numbers of staff (DeGregorio
1994; Hart 1995). Wildavsky (1971), in his oft-cited essay “Salvation by staff”, viewed administrative overload as the dominant reason for presidents needing staff (cited in Pika
1991:321). Dickinson, in his analysis of the reasons behind the growth in the White House staffing system, asserts that it is attributed to presidential uncertainty and the power imbalances that existed between the President and Congress, creating the need for political bargaining (Dickinson 2003). Also cited as a possible cause is the political weakness of the Cabinet and its diminished status as principal adviser to the President.
The thesis behind this view is that presidential staff have emerged to fill in the void left by a cabinet that no longer operates as a collective decision-making entity (Hart 1995).
Role and influence
The overriding theme throughout studies of staff role and influence is variability. The data on legislative staffing, for instance, while sometimes ambiguous, show that staff involvement and influence range from providing information (Patterson 1970; Balutis 1977;
Mooney 1991; Rosenthal 1974, 1981, 1989; Fox & Hammond 1975; Sabatier & Whiteman,
1985), to analysing policy (Rosenthal 1989; Fox & Hammond, 1977; Sabatier & Whiteman
60 1985) to developing policy and influencing policy decisions (Price 1971; Balutis 1975;
Ornstein 1975; Malbin 1980).
A number of congressional scholars have documented staff influence in determining policy outcomes. Specifically, Malbin (1980) reports that members are willing to delegate to their staff the kinds of responsibilities that allow staff a great deal of both direct and indirect influence on policy development. It is argued that fiscal staff generally have more impact on policy outcomes than other staff; “as the complexity of the decisions facing legislators increases, so does the likelihood that the staff will exert influence on the outcome” (Balutis
1977:138). Finally, as a staffer, BeVier (1979) noted, “the amount of power I had over the bills on which I worked”, continuing that some staffers negotiate agreements and arbitrate conflicts among groups and strive to see “what we considered our ideas ultimately become law” (BeVier 1979:234).
The problem with staff
The conduct and behaviour of political staff is viewed as a serious concern in the USA, especially in light of political scandals such as Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair. These events have given rise to a large body of literature which, among other things, has explored the abuses of presidential and staff power. One of the issues that emerged in the post-
Watergate era was the size of the presidential staffing system. It is estimated that the number of White House staff in the 1960s was in the vicinity of 300 (Walcott & Hult 2004), expanding to between 500 and 600 under Nixon (Hart 1995). It is estimated that in 2005 this figure stood at 1,700 (Jones 2005).
It has been argued that a problem with a staffing system of this size is that it becomes too difficult and onerous to supervise and manage, creating what Hart calls “dysfunctional consequences” (Hart 1995:198). It has also been argued that a large staffing system can diminish contact between the President and the people who are working in the President’s interests. As Tiernan (2007) notes, having a large staffing system can result in the production of advice that bears little resemblance to that which was originally conceived
61 (2007). Critically, it can lead to the types of pathologies that are characteristic of large organisations but manifestly more problematic given the closeness these staff have to political power. Some writers argue that advisers may not share the President’s preferences and may choose to run with their own agendas (see for example Pika 1991).
They may also overwhelm the President with information on which the President is required to act (Wildavsky 2003).
Many of the themes that run through the literature on staffing in the USA resonate strongly with those identified in the research on the Australian experience. Hart (1995) reports on the impact of the gatekeeping roles staff perform which can have the effect of isolating the
President and “depriving him of oxygen” (1995:145). He reports that staff also bring problems to the White House that do not belong there, and do so because they make judgements about what might impress the President. Arrogance and aggressive behaviour are also cited in the literature (Hart 1995; Tiernan 2004) with a final important theme being the degree to which the staffing system in the USA operates with few, if any, statutory
controls. As Hart (1995) notes, oversight of presidential staffing operates on a presumption
of comity in which staff’s executive authority is treated as a special case.
Summary
From this review of the literature on advisers in Australian government (including NSW) and in political systems analogous to Australia, a number of key themes are highlighted. First, while advisers are not necessarily a new development, they have, in the last 30 years, become a prominent and established feature of Australia’s political system, with both federal and state governments instituting varying forms of the arrangements initiated by
Whitlam. Second, political leaders have continued to add more staff to their personal office,
reflecting the uniquely political role of the leaders of the governing party. Third, each new
government comes to the task of structuring their advisory system with remnants of the
predecessor but also with the intention of stamping their own mark on arrangements. It is a
system that has been built up as changing political and social circumstances dictate. As the
role and size of government has expanded and the pressures on ministers have grown and
62 criticism of the government has mounted, there has been a clear trend to use more political advisers. Fourth, prime ministerial style is influential, setting the tone for what advisers can and cannot do. Fifth, there is a belief that ministers need support from skilled advisers to help with managing the demands of their job – ministers require people who can perform partisan functions which bureaucracies are ill equipped to handle. Finally, there is a mistrust of the bureaucracy in responding to the direction and policy agenda of the political
executive.
The literature tends to theorise advisers’ roles and place within the Australian political
system as a device for sustaining and extending political control of the administrative
structures of government. The advent of the adviser role appears to be an institutional
response to resolving ministerial overload and increasing responsiveness of the
bureaucracy. Advisers therefore are part of a strategy for wielding power. In important
ways, advisers have become an extension of the political executive, enabling it to exert
greater control over a larger and more difficult policy-making environment.
63 CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY
This chapter has two interrelated purposes: the first is to elucidate each of the different elements that have been brought together in the development of the research process and design. The second is to argue that a ‘blended approach’ has been necessary in order to achieve the aims of the research, as established in the introduction. There is also consideration of the ethical issues and credibility that are both omnipresent when an inquiry is conducted with political and community elites.
The process followed in the selection of the research design, the motivation behind choosing a qualitative research approach, and the research paradigm that informed this decision are outlined, with the inquiry being situated within a qualitative and interpretivist paradigm. The use of a modified grounded methodology, which includes a description of the key principles of this particular approach to social research, is discussed before detailing the way in which these principles have been translated into the research methods used in this study, including the techniques used to systematically code and analyse data.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodology’s strengths and limitations, and other distinctive features.
Focus of the inquiry
The purpose of this study is to extend current knowledge about the role, behaviour, relative influence, and accountability of advisers in the NSW political system. As revealed in the literature review, the bulk of Australian research on advisers has been conducted on staffing arrangements in the federal sphere, with little or no reference to arrangements at the state level. An aim of this research, therefore, is to narrow this gap in knowledge.
It can only be surmised that this inattention to advisers at the state level is the result of researchers showing a natural predisposition towards advisers operating in the federal sphere. It may also be due to an attitudinal difference between federal and state politics. As quipped by a federal politician, “federal politics is about policy and state politics is about management” (Sherry 2001). In a similar sentiment, former Premier Bob Carr admitted that
64 state politics is a “provincial” affair (2002:107). However, as Sharman (1997) asserts,
“politics is state politics” (1997:44). Australian states have by far the greater responsibility in the delivery of public policy programs (e.g. health, education, community services, justice,
transport) compared with the federal government. Further, since states are also responsible
for a significant body of law and regulation of parts of the economy, understanding
decision-making at the state government level becomes crucial for understanding
Australian politics.
I chose to explore the adviser system in NSW primarily for two reasons: the first was
pragmatic. I live and work in Sydney, and this provided me with relatively easy access to
study participants. I also worked for a state government organisation responsible for the
provision of advice to the NSW Government on issues affecting people with a disability.
This gave me an outsider view of the work of advisers, as my role involved regular contact
with the minister’s office and staff. The second reason was that research on advisers at the
state level had not been undertaken prior to this study. My research is not only unique in
this regard but it is distinguishable from others in that it covers two political parties that
together were in power for 15 years, one in rather unusual circumstances.10
The literature review noted that earlier studies on advisers were conducted long before the
implementation of public sector reforms by Australian governments in the 1980s and
1990s, and accordingly, did not account for the influence this had on the growth of adviser
numbers and scope in their roles. At the state level, such reforms were introduced by Nick
Greiner, a political leader often regarded as the first to implement measures that shifted the
balance of power from the bureaucracy to the executive (Laffin 1992). These measures
included the abolition of permanency for departmental heads and the introduction of the
senior executive service (Laffin 1992, 1995).
The research tends to focus on roles that emerge in the relationship between advisers and
ministers, and advisers and bureaucrats. On one level this is understandable, given the
10 For instance, Greiner was forced into minority government in 1991.
65 nature of the position and location in which advisers work. However, as detected in some studies, advisers also interact with policy actors who fall outside these relational contexts, such as interest groups and the media. A key concern of this study, therefore, is whether conceptions of political control, a theme which echoed strongly in the literature review,
apply to the exchanges between advisers and non-governmental policy actors and whether
these interactions give rise to new ways of organising for policy development.
One striking feature of the literature on advisers is the diversity of their contribution to policy-making, yet exploration of this diversity rarely includes normative discussions about whether they strengthen or weaken systems of government and representative democracy
in general. Thus, it is hoped that by including the voices of interest groups some gauge of
whether advisers democratise policy-making activities that occur within governmental and
non-governmental structures can be presented. The best way to learn more about the
activities with which advisers are engaged and the level and type of influence they exert is
not only to ask them but also to ask other people with whom they interact.
Apart from the many problems commonly encountered with qualitative research (reliability, data reduction, researcher bias, generalisability), there are some that are specific to the research involving political elites (Moyser & Wagstaffe 1987; Richards & Smith 2004). One is access, and this was encountered with the relatively low acceptance rate to the invitation to participate in the research; approximately 25% accepted the invitation to participate in this study. Another is the power imbalance that is ‘felt’ during interviews, especially with ministers, who, as I encountered on two occasions, were quite strident in their views about some of the topics canvassed. A final problem is the partisan bias that enters into debates about advisers. This was found to be the case with two former ministers and one former adviser who at various stages of their interview expressed highly partisan views about differences in staffing arrangements and practices when they were in office.
These factors are recognised and are taken into account in the design of the study and interpretation of information gathered.
66 Research questions
This study comprises four conceptual fields into which data gathered from the interviews are organised: advent, growth and institutionalisation; roles and role-determinants; influence; and accountability. Each field contains its own set of research questions that have been posed to guide the investigation of the NSW adviser system. These questions are also designed to address a number of issues identified through the literature review, including:
1. The reasons behind the introduction of advisers within the NSW political system. Do
ministerial overload and broader concerns such as ministerial control and political
responsiveness continue to feature in discussions about the reasons for advisers’
existence or do other causes predominate? If so, how do they feature?
2. Roles advisers performed for ministers of the Greiner/Fahey and Carr governments.
To what extent do these roles add to new understandings of policy and policy-
making? Does the adviser system provide a new means of organising for policy-
making? If so, how does this happen and why?
3. Influence advisers exert and how this manifests in policy development. In what
spheres of influence do advisers operate? In what ways do they control access to
the minister and use other forms of influence, such as discretion and agenda-
setting? To what extent is their influence derived from the authority of the minister?
What factors help them achieve a high degree of predominance (e.g. their
personality, the relationships they form?). What effect does all this have on
executive power?
4. The effect advisers’ presence, roles and influence have on existing frameworks for
ensuring their accountability. What are the means of regulating advisers’ conduct
and behaviour? What have been the effects of the adviser system’s threefold
expansion over the last 15 years on regulation and accountability?
67 Selecting the research design
A research design is “an action plan for getting from here to there, where ‘here’ is the initial set of questions and ‘there’ are the set of answers” (Yin 1994:19). This research was undertaken with the ultimate goal of understanding the work and influence of advisers in the NSW political system. To fulfill this goal, a research framework was developed to enable the research process to be conducted in an orderly manner and the results to be presented within the context of a logical framework.
The essence of ‘good’ research design for an interpretive study is that the methods used are open-ended and rigorous, and that they ‘do justice’ to the complexity of the social setting under study (Flick 1998). The main considerations include the recognition and incorporation of multiple perspectives, issues of trustworthiness in data generation and analysis, the use of multiple data gathering methods, and ethical concerns. These are discussed in this chapter.
Theoretical paradigm
Paradigm in this study is taken to mean “a basic orientation to theory and research”
(Neuman 1997:62) or as Denzin and Lincoln (1994) state “the net that contains the researcher’s epistemological, ontological and methodological premises” (1994:13). I wanted to explore the subjective world of advisers and the perspectives of people who interact with them. I was interested in using a personal interactive method of producing data. This study is therefore best located in the interpretive paradigm as it attempts to understand the way human beings understand their place in the world through their own experience of it.
Ontologically, and for the purposes of this research, the interpretivist ontological paradigm posits that advisers and other political elites create their own perspectives of events, their roles, and how they influence policy processes. Within an interpretivist paradigm,
“researchers assume that people’s subjective experiences are real and should be taken seriously (ontology), that others’ experiences are understood through interacting with them
68 and listening to what they have to say (epistemology), and that qualitative research techniques are best suited to this task (methodology)” (Terre Blanche & Kelly 1999:123).
The research interviews therefore sought to construct their realities of their environment in order to fully understand the activities of advisers and their place in the political system.
Epistemologically, the nature of knowledge to be addressed and the relationship between
the researcher and the phenomenon being researched was achieved through semi-
structured interviews. In other words, a researcher actively seeks to interpret meaning.
To understand the participants’ interpretation of the complexities, variables and influences
that shape advisers’ roles, it was important to use an approach that allowed for
understanding to be gained from the interactions, influences and impacts inherent in a
wider organisational view. The approach adopted and described here fulfilled that
requirement.
Choosing the qualitative research approach
Under circumstances where information on the research area is limited and discovery is an important aim, Sarantakos (1998) and Stern (1980) suggest the use of a qualitative, or interpretive, research approach. A qualitative approach is capable of yielding significant levels of data rich in a participant’s perceptions and experiences. This form of data can be beneficial in identifying unknown variables, themes and processes that may be valuable in developing an explanatory theory of events and social processes in the area to be studied
(Sarantakos 1998; Silverman 1993). In other words, “qualitative research pursues the
process of exploration and discovery rather than measurement and confirmation of
predetermined hypotheses” (Merriman 1988:17). These characteristics of a qualitative
research approach are consistent with the aims of this study. That is, the study seeks to
gain a clearer picture and accompanying explanation of the level and type of policy
activities with which advisers are engaged.
Methodologically, the qualitative approach was an appropriate one to use in order to fit with
the interpretive paradigm. Qualitative researchers are interested in documenting the
69 process by which social ‘reality’ is expressed and interpreted by members within a defined social context. Thus, it is crucial that the stories about how advisers see themselves and how they are seen by those with whom they interact are expressed utilising a process of naturalistic inquiry, to ensure the interpretation and analysis is contextually bound (Mason
1996; Sarantakos 1995).
There were many reasons for the selection of a qualitative approach for this particular
study. The research focus, which involves an exploration of the role and influence of
advisers in policy-making from the perspectives of multiple policy actors, called for an
approach capable of revealing the reality of phenomena in depth and detail based on the
experiences of participants. Qualitative methods, particularly the use of unstructured interviews, allowed “points of view of other people without predetermining those points of view through prior selection of questionnaire categories” (Patton 1990:24).
In general, as demonstrated in the literature review, the extant literature on advisers is restricted to providing descriptions of their roles and influence from the perspectives of advisers themselves and those operating within the inner sanctum of government decision- making (ministers and officials). At this time, there exists no clear identification of the experiences of advisers’ roles and their impact on policy from the perspective of those outside of this group, or an explanatory theory of advisers’ roles and influence and their impact on the policy process.
Another reason for the selection of a qualitative research approach is that it deals better with multiple realities than quantitative designs, and that these realities benefit from interpretation rather than measurement by a researcher. In other words, qualitative research affords the opportunity for participants in a study to express their opinions, emotions and feelings, thereby enabling people to express how they make sense of their expression of social meaning (Sapsford & Jupp 1996).
Another reason relates to analytical framework adopted in this research. According to
Bogdan and Biklen (2007), qualitative researchers tend to analyse their data inductively. An
70 example of inductive analysis is Glaser and Strauss’s grounded theory framework and involves theoretical sampling. Glaser and Strauss (1967) assert that the “analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses [their] data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them in order to develop [their] theory as it emerges” (1967:45). The data were analysed using Patton’s strategy of thematising and forms the analytical framework for the research. In brief, thematising means studying characteristics that are common for several interviewees. Thematising was performed by reading through each transcript and combining the answer to each question under one theme. A descriptive name was then given for each theme. These themes were not defined beforehand, but emerged from the
collected data. After this collation, the deeper connections between the themes were
established. Thematising alone was insufficient for the analysis; these themes needed to
be interpreted and understood.
A final reason for taking a qualitative approach was my own preference. Both Creswell
(1994) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that personal preference is a legitimate and
appropriate reason in the selection of a research approach. They suggest that the personal
attributes, experiences, skills and interests of the researcher can, and should, influence the
selection of a research approach. In the context of this study, my personal interest is in
understanding advisers’ behaviours from their perspective and others’, rather than
attempting to ascribe numerical value to their actions. This personal preference influenced
the decision to adopt a qualitative research approach in the current study.
Qualitative research informed by grounded theory
The study design is based on a modified grounded theory approach. Locke (1997) notes that methods associated with grounded theory have evolved and developed since their original presentation. Whiteley (2002), too, proposes that if the principles and procedures of
grounded theory, as espoused by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin
(1990), can only be partially met then the term ‘grounded research’ may be a more
appropriate term to use.
71 Based on a review of the methodology employed in similar studies, this research project followed a modified grounded theory methodology in which theory is embedded in the actual findings of the study. This approach was particularly appropriate because aspects of the phenomenon of political staffing are not yet well known, though previous research provides important clues.
The reasons for selecting a grounded methodology over alternative qualitative research approaches in the current study are manifold. First, Morse (1994), in a review of qualitative research strategies, labels grounded methodology as the “method of choice” in circumstances where the phenomenon under investigation is a process (1994:223). An aim is to understand the diversity of advisers’ roles and the impact they have on the policy process. In a similar vein, Locke (2001) argues that grounded methodology is “particularly appropriate to researching … behaviour” as it captures its complexity (2001:95). Second, grounded methodology is an inductive, theory-generating methodology in which the theory generated is derived from, or ‘grounded’ in, the empirical data collected. In other words, it is a methodology that does not force preconceived notions of the researcher onto the data.
Third, grounded methodology is a well-established, widely recognised and rigorous methodology (Glaser 2001; Gerson 1991). Fourth, grounded methodology has, as one of its objectives, the generation of theories that are relevant to practitioners in the area of inquiry, what Locke calls “linking well with practice” (2001:95). So, a grounded methodology has practical value to policy practitioners, such as interest groups and students of policy and politics. Fifth, Locke (2001) suggests grounded methodology is well suited to researching new phenomena. Ministerial advisers represent a relatively new and under- researched phenomenon in need of theoretical understanding, and so grounded methodology, in the context of this study, is a relevant research methodology.
Other qualitative research approaches, such as case study, could have been used in the current study. But the emphasis in case study, and other similar qualitative research approaches, is on thick description rather than conceptualisation of a study participant’s main concern and how they continuously act to resolve this concern (Glaser 2001). The
72 generation of thick description was not the purpose of the current study. Rather, it was the generation of a substantive theory that conceptualises, and brings strong explanatory power to the patterns of behaviour of study participants in the area of inquiry.
The research method
Researchers informed by the interpretivist paradigm tend to adopt the individual interview as their main research method (Powell 2002). The choice of data-collection method must also take into consideration the nature of the data sought and the purpose of the research, and must answer the questions and respond to the practical constraints posed by the context (Darlington & Scott 2002). This section will outline briefly the sampling method, data sources, interview technique and process for data interpretation and analysis.
Sample
Huberman and Miles (1997) assert that qualitative researchers should engage in sampling purposively and conceptually. Thus, the researcher ”needs to sample an intricately nested range of activities, processes, events, locations and times. Such choices are theory driven”
(1997:204). Decisions made about sampling are linked to this study’s ontological and epistemological foundations. A clear example of the theoretically informed nature of these decisions was the inclusion of individuals in the sample who work or have worked in a social policy area of government (e.g. community services, transport).
A combination of sampling methods – snowball sampling and theoretical sampling – was used. The rationale to adopt a snowball method arose from the need to find participants who shared similar characteristics and who were willing to participate in this study.
Snowball sampling is a common sampling technique suited to studying groups where gaining access is a problem and whose numbers are small, as is the case with advisers.
The use of theoretical sampling was also pivotal to the research. The cyclical process of interpretation required being open to new possibilities emerging from the data, including the issue of dealing with dissonance (Fawcett 2000). It was important to explore a range of perspectives and meanings about the roles of advisers and the impact they have on
73 relationships between themselves and other policy elites (e.g. ministers, officials, community leaders, etc).
The final sample size of 23 was reached after identifying that the point of data saturation had been reached, that is, when no new areas of understanding emerged from interpretation and analysis (Thyer 2001). While only seven advisers were interviewed for this study, the sample included individuals who had worked previously in the role as a ministerial staffer. This was the case with three of the four government officials; two of the six interest group representatives; and one of the five ministers. Thus 13 of the 23 study participants were advisers or had worked in this role at some stage in their working life.
Having former advisers in the sample proved to be a valuable source of information as they
were able to describe how the role had changed over time. They were also able to provide
insider/outsider accounts of the role.
My approach to forming the sample involved writing to current ministers, advisers and
government officials. Contact with these participants was made through the NSW
Government Directory. Contact with ministers of the Greiner government was made by
conducting online searches and writing to the NSW Parliament with a request that they
forward the invitation letter to former ministers. Advisers of these ministers were contacted using the snowball method; that is, they were asked to provide the names and contact details of advisers who had worked for them. My previous employment with a government
advisory organisation provided me with a number of contacts in the community sector to
include in the sample. I chose organisations that had a strong social policy focus, and I
invited individuals who were regarded as having a high community profile. The important
criterion for the selection of government officials and interest group representatives was
that they interacted with advisers on a regular basis and could share their experience of
this interaction.
Determining the extent of representativeness of the sample was difficult because of the
lack of numerical data on advisers. At the time, there was anecdotal evidence that advisers
had numbered somewhere between 100 and 150. Although the sampling is qualitative and
74 does not depend on a certain number to provide valid statistical analysis, a reasonable spread of advisers across the period was thought important to ensure a broad range of views was gained. The number and range of participants across the period being studied was diverse and provided category saturation by the time of the last few interviews.
Admittedly, the sample size was small by comparison with other studies on advisers but ample and consistent with similar qualitative inquiries using a grounded-theory approach.
Qualitative research texts do not provide much guidance as to the number of interviews to be conducted (Guest et al. 2006). This is because grounded theory research is not concerned with testing hypotheses and takes a different approach to sample size. In grounded theory research, in contrast to hypothesis-testing research, sample size cannot be determined in advance. Grounded theory research is concerned with constructing theory, rather than testing it. Each group of research participants interviewed embodies a new opportunity to develop and refine theory. Therefore, in grounded theory research interviews are conducted until saturation is reached; that is, when interviews are not generating data that add new concepts to theory.
The number of interviews conducted was a topic of conversation with my supervisors in many supervision sessions. My supervisors were provided with copies of the transcripts over the period in which interviews were being conducted. The identification of categories and themes took place over this period, and as it became evident that saturation had been reached, it was agreed to stop collecting data through interviews. My supervisors were satisfied that saturation had been reached and that there was sufficient data to draw on.
Other studies on advisers have varying sample sizes partly because of the approach adopted by researchers of these works in realising the objectives of the research and of the unique circumstances in which the researcher found themselves. Dunn’s data collection was conducted in two stages using two interview samples: the first in 1992 involved a total of 25 ministers, senior public servants and advisers; the second in 1996 involving 20
75 subjects of the same category but with some overlap between the two samples11. Dunn’s
analysis of advisers’ roles and relationship with public servants was based on the first lot of
interviews conducted in 1992. Maley’s sample comprised a total of 64 ministers, advisers,
and public servants, and is a much larger sample than this and Dunn’s study. Tiernan’s
study had a sample size of 4312. The data generated from her interviews with sample members were mostly used to triangulate case-study evidence as against developing new insights or theory.
Data sources
The data for this research arose from a number of sources, including audio-taped individual interviews with seven ministerial advisers, six ministers (four former, two current), six community representatives and four senior government officials; interview transcripts; personal observations and reflections; and notes of supervision sessions. Data collection
and interpretation occurred as a continuous and cyclical process, allowing emerging
themes to influence judgements about further data collection (Sarantakos 1998). As noted,
Strauss and Corbin (1990) refer to this process as theoretical sampling. The next section
will deal with the question of who the research participants were and how they were
recruited.
Selection of participants
In August 2002, an invitation list comprising both former and current advisers, ministers,
senior government officials and interest group representatives was prepared using a number of sources, including the Member of Parliament list available from the NSW
Parliament website, the NSW On-line Government Directory and community organisation directories. Some former ministers were sent invitations through their political party
11 Dunn’s 1995 article (Ministerial Staff in Australian Commonwealth Government,’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 507-519) drew on data generated from interviews with this first sample. 12 One participant provided their views in writing.
76 organisations on the researcher’s behalf, or directly to the organisation with which they were either affiliated or currently employed. Only those who worked in social policy (e.g. education, health, community services, housing, transport, etc) were invited to participate.
The senior government officials who agreed to be interviewed were all at director-general level. Interest group representatives came from diverse organisations: two were CEOs of peak disability groups, two worked for an organisation that represented the welfare industry, one was the CEO of a union, and one was a private consultant who had previously worked in government and academia. This person had interacted with advisers for a period of nearly 30 years.
The use of interviews
Individual interviews were chosen for methodological and practical reasons. Anderson
(1990:222) defines an interview as “a specialised form of communication between people for a specific purpose associated with some agreed subject matter”. Cohen and Manion
(1994) suggest that research interviews serve three purposes: they are a principal way of gathering information relating to the research objectives, they can be used to test hypotheses (or suggest new ones), and they can be used to support other methods (e.g. to triangulate data or go deeper into elements uncovered by other methods). The interviews in
this study reflect aspects of these purposes. They were used to gather information on the
topic about advisers, their roles and level, and the type of influence they had in the policy
process. The data generated from the interviews were analysed as to how they offered
explanations on key aspects of the study. Finally, they were used to provide some
triangulation across participants and across methods, and they were essential for delving deeper into issues raised by participants.
Interviewing was consistent with the intent of the research, that is, to gain a holistic and detailed understanding of the work of advisers and the ‘felt’ impact of their roles on others.
What made the technique even more suitable was the fact that information was being sought from a small number of study participants (Denscombe 1999). Through face-to-face
77 interviews I had access to people’s ideas, thoughts and memories, expressed in their own words rather than mine.
Another reason to interview was to give voice to multiple perspectives. King (1994) argues that interviews are “ideally suited to examining topics in which different levels of meaning need to be explored”, such as in understanding advisers’ views about policy-making in government (1994:33). The collection of data through interviewing allowed for themes to emerge that were both common and unique (Rhodes et al 2007). Critical to obtaining insight from multiple perspectives is gaining historical knowledge and insights about the
future. This was important for obtaining a sense of how the political staffing system had
changed. Mason (1996) lends further weight to this view, writing that interviews give
emphasis to complexity and depth and therefore enable a researcher to produce authentic
knowledge.
Interviewing was useful also because it is a naturalistic method. As Wengraf (2001) notes,
interviewing is a research tool which occurs in a social context. As such, participants are more familiar and comfortable with the interviewing process and thus may be more willing
to share their experiences with the researcher. In many instances, the fact that I was known to some of the participants and had a shared background in public policy and community welfare facilitated this sense that what was occurring in interviews was a natural process.
The final rationale for the use of interviewing in this study relates to a point made earlier concerning elite interviewing. Dexter (1970) posited that interviews are a key source of insight for researchers focused on the political arena. More recently, Rhodes (2007) and his colleagues, in their work Observing Government Elites, have argued that political science researchers need to “defy the scorn of their traditionalist colleagues and write interview- based accounts of incumbent governments” (2007:2). In support of this view, Peabody et al
(1990) argue that interviews are almost always an appropriate research strategy when studying politicians, political institutions and public administration. Others, such as Beamer
(2002), argue that interviews offer a tool for researchers to tap into political constructs that
may otherwise be difficult to examine, and to target people directly involved in the political
78 process. Gray (2004) adds to this view, noting that interviewing is useful when people enjoy talking about themselves and their work and are well practised in doing so both in the public and private domains.
The interview style that this study used was semi-structured. The interviews initially started with broad questions that were provided to the participants in the invitation letter but were flexible enough to allow participants to talk about their own experiences.
Among advisers themselves, the first part of the interview involved exploration of roles, activities, background, etc. Questions included: “Can you describe your role within the
Minister’s office?”, “Can you tell me how you were recruited as a ministerial adviser?”,
“What is the rationale behind having ministerial advisers in our current system of government?”, and “How is policy made within the Minister’s office and what is your role in that process?” These questions established early recognition of the researchers’ interest in their role and the type of work advisers performed. The second part of the interview generally involved exploration of other key themes, such as influence, accountability, interaction with interest groups and government departments, and significance to the NSW parliamentary system. Questions included: “What forms of accountability measures are in place for ministerial advisers?”, “Are they sufficient?”, “Can you describe the level and type of influence you feel you have in policy development?”, and “How important is the interaction with interest groups for policy development?”
Among other participants, such as ministers (current and former), senior government officials and interest group representatives, the focus was also on attempting to gain a better understanding of the distinct policy roles played by advisers and their significance in the development of policy. However, there was a greater emphasis on questions concerning the experiences these participants had of their dealings and interactions with advisers.
The interviews, which lasted up to three hours, were audio-taped, with written permission sought from each participant. The interviews were then transcribed and sent back to
79 participants who had requested a copy so that they could make either corrections or
additions. The next section outlines the processes undertaken to interpret and analyse the
interviews.
Data analysis
While the interview was chosen as the method for gathering participants’ perspectives, I was aware that the act of transcribing every word and sentence had implications for the analysis of participants’ stories. I was aware that interpretation of such texts involves being open to the text provided and questioning its soundness (Kneller 1984). Silverman (2000) claims that, while categories developed provide a powerful ‘conceptual grip’ in organising the data, they also have the potential to deflect attention away from uncategorised text.
Thus, in developing themes or codes of analysis there is potential to diminish or devalue
some of the text that does not ‘fit’ comfortably within any particular category.
Another concern is the validity of ‘self-reported’ data. Cook and Campbell (1979) point out
that subjects tend to either report what they believe the researcher expects to see, or report
what reflects positively on their own abilities, knowledge, beliefs or opinions. There is also
the question of whether subjects are able to accurately recall past events. To overcome the potential limitations of self-reported data, a form of ‘triangulation’ (Patton 2002) was adopted whereby at least one group of participants from the same portfolio was interviewed. This happened in the Police portfolio, in which the Minister, his two advisers and an interest group representative were interviewed. The same questions were asked of each, and information derived was cross-checked for similarities, consistencies or inconsistencies in perspectives.
Since qualitative researchers collect data from interviews in terms of individual experiences, this needs to be reflected in data analysis (Wengraf 2002). The literature also urges researchers to recognise that they need to ensure a structure is placed on the data that reflects the focus of the study (Gray 2004; Krueger 1998; Tesch 1990; Maxwell 2005).
In terms of qualitative data, Miles and Huberman (1994) identify a set of steps which
80 provides this structure. They are coding, reflecting, sorting to identify patterns, similarities or differences between variables, isolating and using them to focus follow-up field work, developing a set of generalisations, and using these generalisations with the literature to develop theory.
Coding is a process that requires the researcher to undertake a very close scrutiny of the texts. Dey (1993) describes the process as noting what is interesting, labeling it and putting it in appropriate files. As far as noting what is interesting, Blaxter et al (2006) make the point that coding should be directed primarily by the research question, while Schmidt
(2004) and Berg (2004) argue for the importance of coding while moving between the data and the literature. Miller and Crabtree (2004) also posit that there is a need for coding to reflect the complexity of the lived experiences of participants. Collectively, this advice highlights the need for coding to be a focused and systematic process but also open and flexible.
Conceptually, while I developed a set of codes early in the study, these were revised throughout the course of the research as I reread the interview transcripts, continued to engage with the literature and discussed my findings with my supervisors. These codes were also revised as I worked through the other stages of the analytic process. Critical to these iterative stages were the data display techniques outlined by Miles and Huberman
(1994), which allowed me to organise and quantify aspects of the data. These techniques were useful in highlighting divergences in the data and in competing interpretations of events and issues. Thus, the analytic process both assisted in identifying patterns as well as highlighting the multiplicity of voices and perspectives in the data.
The data were organised by collating and grouping the fragments of text into a matrix based on the four conceptual fields described earlier. This matrix was derived from a three- stage process of data reduction, data organisation and interpretation and was informed by
Ryan and Bernard’s (2000) claim that it is hard to see “patterns in words unless one first does some kind of data reduction” (2000:77). Analysis also included a process of
81 “manipulating, integrating, transforming and highlighting the data” collected into a format of patterns and themes that facilitated their interpretation (Ryan and Bernard 2000:77).
Themes are “abstract constructs that investigators identify before, during and after data collection” and were induced in this study through “careful, line by line reading of text while looking for processes, actions, assumptions and consequences” (Ryan & Bernard
2000:780), looking for metaphors, word repetitions and shifts in content (Agar & Hobbs
1985), aligning my values and prior experience with participants and, finally, by using professional definitions and commonsense constructs (Bulmer 1979).
Thematic and constant comparative analysis
According to Boyatzis (1998) and Daly et al (1997), a thematic analysis allows the researcher to recognise important messages inherent in the data. Its purpose is to identify important concepts or categories and examine them in relation to the rest of the data and context. From these categories, themes are developed that provide explanation of the phenomenon under study. Thematic analysis was therefore selected in preference to other approaches (e.g. content analysis) because it allows greater consideration of process and meaning.
Themes were identified by what Leininger (1985) calls “bringing together components or fragments of ideas or experiences, which often are meaningless when viewed alone”
(1985:60). Themes that emerged from the participants’ stories were pieced together to form a comprehensive picture of their collective experience.
The next step involved building a valid argument for choosing the themes. In part this was done by reading the related literature. Referring back to the literature, I was able to make inferences from the interviews. Once the themes were collected and the literature studied, I was ready to formulate theme statements to develop the narrative. When the literature is interlaced with the findings, the story that the researcher constructs is one that stands with merit. A developed story line helps the reader to comprehend the process, understanding, and motivation of the interviewer. For example, in exploring influence, I explored the
82 number of different ways in which the participants spoke about the influence of advisers in policy-making. The aim here was to look for differences, similarities, tensions and paradoxes in the participants’ views and experiences as well as in the use of their language
(Darlington & Scott 2002). Analysis, therefore, was based on an exploration of patterns within the data, which were both consistent and inconsistent (Fawcett 2000; Trinder 2000).
This coding process proceeded until theoretical saturation was achieved, which occurs when “additional analysis no longer contributes to discovering anything new about a category” (Alvesson & Skolberg 2001:25).
A key strategy used in grounded theory is the general method of constant comparative analysis (Glaser 1965). The researcher commences with analysing the data line by line. As a result, the researcher becomes immersed in the data elements to their smallest divisible components. Underlying patterns of behaviours and processes are delved into as the researcher analyses and codes the data. The data are subjected to constant comparison while the researcher continues looking at the indicators in the data, conceptualisations and conceptual hypotheses evolving and emerging throughout this process (Glaser 1965).
Limitations and trustworthiness
As with all research methods, the techniques employed in this study to obtain data have their limitations. With respect to interviews, one oft-cited problem is that it can be a protracted and labour-intensive process. This is true at every stage of interviewing, from organising access to transcribing (Barone & Switzer 1995; Mason 2002; Seidman 2006).
This is a valid point and one that I experienced in relation to researching advisers.
I was fortunate, however, as my background in the community welfare sector and government facilitated access and ultimately resulted in my time in the field being used very effectively and efficiently. The issue of the time-consuming nature of interview research was also addressed by limiting the number of interviews undertaken. This meant I was able to give emphasis to depth both in the conduct and analysis of the interviews. The relatively small sample was guided by the recommendations of qualitative methodology writers such
83 as Burns (1990), who stresses the need to remain concentrated on the definition of a study and the units of analysis within it.
Perhaps the most-cited drawback of interviewing noted in the methodological literature, and one that is also noted in explorations of elite interviewing, is that the method is subject to bias, distortion and a lack of validity and reliability. This concern with interviewing focuses on both the interviewer and the interviewee as they each bring values and preconceptions to the research and may influence the contents of the interview (Powell & Amsbary 2006;
Gubrium & Holstein 2001). Berg (2007) sums up this problem, writing that neither the interviewer nor interviewees operate within a vacuum. Mason (2002) addresses this issue by stressing that the researcher’s epistemological position will shape how he or she understands bias and addresses it in the interview process. Like Mason (2002), I argue that qualitative researchers should not ignore the need for validity in research (or
‘trustworthiness’, as Lincoln and Guba (1985:296) call it), but there also needs to be recognition that assumptions inherent in a positivist paradigm (e.g. about eradicating, controlling for bias) are not necessarily relevant to a qualitative interpretive approach. Thus, while, like Mason (2002), I viewed the interviews as ‘social interactions’ where subjectivity was always present, I also adopted strategies which included faithfully recording and transcribing interviews (Silverman 2005), utilising direct quotations from respondents themselves (Bouma & Ling 2004), contextualising interview quotations and findings
(Silverman 2007) and identifying a clear audit trail of the phases in the analytic process
(Gray 2004).
Other checks were built into the research process to ensure internal and external validity and credibility. These were prolonged engagement, triangulation, peer debriefing, and confirmability.
A common concern in qualitative research is sample size.
84 Prolonged engagement
Prolonged engagement is defined by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as “investment of sufficient time to achieve certain purposes; learning the culture, testing for misinformation introduced by distortions either of the self or of the respondents, and building truths” (1985:301).
Prolonged engagement with the research field allows familiarity with the context, more effective scheduling for member checks, more time for recording of field notes, and better acquaintance with the informants. Because the study had to fit in with the busy schedules of ministerial advisers, ministers and officials – dictated by a state election and changes in ministerial portfolios – engagement in the field was intense with 23 interviews being conducted over a 16-month period.
Triangulation
Triangulation is considered to be the most important tool for assessing the trustworthiness of qualitative data (Guba 1981). This technique combines dissimilar methods, such as interviews, observations and physical evidence, to study the same unit (Merriam 1988).
The process involves checking inferences from one set or data across other sources of data. Denzin (1970) states that the flaws in one method become the strengths of another, and by combining methods the best results can be achieved while overcoming the unique deficiencies of each method/technique. Triangulation was achieved through the use of case
examples that were provided by study participants and those that exist in the public
domain, such as the ‘Cecil Hills High School affair’.
Peer debriefing
Peer debriefing involves consultation with a group of fellow researchers involved in
qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln 1989). In these sessions emphasis is placed on the
process rather than the content. Peer debriefing provides an opportunity to view the
research process critically, particularly when it becomes progressively more subjective. My
85 supervisors constituted a source of debriefing by checking emerging categories and themes.
Confirmability
All records of consent and the interviews were kept together with their coding data.
Personal notes and code lists were kept. Newspaper clippings and internet page information were also kept.
External validity
External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study are generalisable beyond the immediate study (Leedy & Ormrod 2001). The results of this study are generalisable to political systems operating under the Westminister model of government which not only includes NSW but all Australian states. The provision of detail about the research method adopted, and rich descriptions and discussion of its application, are also likely to be helpful in making decisions about the likelihood of successful transferability from the context described in this study to other contexts. Finally, the study is intended to enable other researchers with an interest in this particular field of inquiry to compare the findings to themes, theories and cases within or external to the study and thus allow an intuitive assessment of the study's 'validity’ (relevance) (Yin 1994:36). This is consistent with
Stake’s (2000) view that the reader is the ultimate assessor of the qualitative study.
Ethics
Initial ethical approval was given by the UNSW Ethics Committee on the condition that participants were not directly approached to participate in the study and that participants’
confidentiality was maintained. Kvale (1996:114) states, “confidentiality in research implies that private data identifying the subject will not be reported”. This was problematic as many participants had very high profiles in either their former or current roles.
The ethical process this research followed reflects the basic requirements of qualitative research conducted by a postgraduate student. The researcher was required to submit a
86 research proposal and complete the UNSW Ethics Application Form for Research Involving
Humans. The research proposal provided details of the research question, an explanation of the purpose of the research and potential outcomes, a precis of existing research, a
description of the potential candidates, the research methodology, the methods used
(interview and sampling method) and the data analysis process. The ethics approval stage involved demonstrating a process for making contact with potential research participants as well as providing a copy of the information and consent forms. These forms ensured participants understood the aims of the study and their contributions to it.
Contact with potential research participants was made via a letter which outlined the aims of the study, the sorts of questions the research would focus on, the method of recording interviews, and contact details of both the researcher and supervisor so participants could seek clarification or raise ethics-related questions. The information and consent forms ensured participants understood the aims of the research and their contributions to it. They were assured that they could withdraw from the interview at any stage. They were asked permission for interviews to be taped and whether they wished to view, amend or make additions to the transcripts. Finally, they were reassured that anonymity could be maintained by removing references to case examples that would connect the event to the participant. They were told that case examples would be presented in a ‘round-about’ manner which would prevent identification. All this involved a high degree of trust, and I was careful to respect this trust and accept that, although some data might be lost as participants reconsidered and amended their statements, the benefits of overall participation outweighed such disadvantages.
87 Part II – Empirical Findings
Part II describes the empirical findings of the research and begins with an analysis of the drivers behind the introduction of advisers in the NSW governmental system. There are two reasons for doing this. The first is to determine whether the themes identified in the literature review apply to the NSW context. The second is to assess whether the roles advisers perform correlate with the reason for advisers’ advent and growth. Included in this part is an examination of the factors conditioning advisers’ roles. This is to gauge why advisers do what they do and the degree of variability in their functions.
88 CHAPTER 4 – THE ADVENT, GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONALISATION OF ADVISERS IN NSW
It’s hard to reverse these things. (Minister 1)
This chapter explores the drivers behind the advent, growth in numbers and institutionalisation of advisers as experienced and understood by participants selected for this study. The themes that emerged from participants’ accounts of the reasons for advisers’ introduction, evolution and institutionalisation, are: relieving ministerial overload, preserving the public service’s neutrality;, political control, ‘another voice’, expertise, and personal support.
Relieving ministerial overload
… they need all the help they can get. (Minister 1)
One of the dominant themes to emerge from the interview data on the reasons for the introduction of advisers to the NSW political system was relieving ministerial overload.
According to King (1975), ministerial overload is seen as the cumulative effect of demands placed upon ministers that over time overwhelm their ability to work effectively. As will be shown in the analysis of the justifications for the appointment of ministerial advisers, ministerial overload is attributable to a range of interrelated factors. Some of these relate to the complexity of governing in the modern era, while others relate to the handling of ministers’ escalating tasks and responsibilities. Examples of these pressures include increasing ministerial responsibilities, increasing demands from and scrutiny by the media,
growing demands for accountability and transparency, greater expectations and pressures from interest groups, and the need for independent advice on policy issues.
The concept of ministerial overload has been explored in some texts that have examined the work of ministers and political leaders in general (Grattan & Weller 1981; Klein & Lewis
1977; Rose & Peters 1978; Foster 1999). These writings attribute ministerial overload to the quantity and complexity of matters faced by ministers and see ministerial advisers as a legitimate response to helping ministers cope with their growing responsibilities. But for the
89 most part these writings offer little insight into the roles played by advisers in relieving ministerial overload and are generally ambivalent about whether advisers’ existence is linked to ministerial overload.
In this study, most respondents interviewed acknowledged that ministers needed help to cope with the demands of their role and saw advisers as a natural response to disburdening ministers of their heavy workloads. Many saw the demands placed upon ministers as too great for one person to handle and inappropriate for delegation to departments, particularly political aspects of their work as these could potentially threaten or compromise the public service’s neutrality. One minister cited the complexity of issues confronting governments, the escalating demands placed on ministers which have arisen from growing government activity, and the inherent challenges associated with managing decision-making and policy-making processes:
Ministers have more complex issues to deal with. I think issues once used to be quite
simple. There are now essentially budgetary issues particularly as government post war
has grown in terms of service delivery … so it becomes much more important to have
your policy [ministerial] advisers working through detail … to digest often complex and
technical issues into a form that can be utilised by ministers. (Minister 4)
Here, then, advisers are justified because they help ministers deal with aspects of government administration and business that have changed dramatically over the last 60 years mostly because of the expansion of government activity in Australia. They are also justified because of the need for ministers to be able to come to grips with complex policy processes, such as government expenditure, and to absorb the copious amounts of
information they need to read.
Many ministers agreed that they were overloaded, with some clearly seeing advisers as a
way of relieving overload. Minister 1 referred to the need for “another pair of hands”.
Minister 2 suggested, “all the time you are reading briefings until midnight or needing to
answer media enquiries on a Sunday morning”. This minister suggested that advisers do
relieve overload and that that was one of the reasons for their introduction. Minister 4 noted
90 “without them a minister is almost certainly swamped by the sheer pressure of bureaucrats surrounding him”.
The relief of overload was interpreted in a number of ways. Many advisers believed they
were performing tasks (especially in the political field) which otherwise might have been left for the minister. Some advisers thought that this did not always result in ministers being any less overloaded; they simply became involved in extra activities. Other advisers felt, however, they were appointed to relieve overload. Adviser 4 said he believed his minister
“wanted more capacity to get things done”. Adviser 6 suggested that, even though his minister might not have been prepared to admit it, he feared being ‘swamped’ by the workload, and the appointment of an adviser was an attempt to “relieve the burdens”.
A former adviser who worked for two ministers of the Greiner government provided a glimpse of these workloads and a sense of the personalised nature of advisers’ work in
tending to the individual needs of ministers:
My overwhelming answer to you is using that [minister’s name removed] example, you
can’t possibly … it’s an extremely demanding job. They go home at night with massive
cases of files and reading to be done, appointments to be had. If they’re doing their job
seriously, they don’t see much of their family. They don’t get much sleep for a few years
and they need all the help they can get. And it needs to be trusted. It needs to be close.
It needs to be the right set of skills … That man has an incredible number of portfolios.
Huge job. (Adviser 4)
Tellingly, this comment not only confirms one of the findings cited in the literature review
(that advisers provide ministers with personal support to help reduce their heavy workloads), it also puts into context the nature of the relationship between ministers and
advisers, particularly the importance of mutual trust that needs to exist in order for the relationship between the ministers and advisers to be effective. Trust was recognised as
important in the minister-staff relationship and seen as essential by ministers in allowing
their staff to act in their interest and to delegate additional responsibilities. The theme of trust is explored later in this thesis.
91 Another adviser pointed to the growing complexity of governing and government business as justification for the appointment of advisers, but saw the expansion of ministerial portfolio responsibilities and growth in government activity as another contributing factor:
I acknowledge there’s been an expansion in the role of advisers, and I think really my
sense of it is that one person sitting at the top i.e. the minister cannot process the level
of information required to be remotely on top of the portfolio. There is simply too much …
I mean I do DoCS13 stuff, another guy does disability stuff. There’s a 3rd person that
advises on the broad youth issues. There’s a 4th person that does juvenile justice … no
minister can be across all four … (Adviser 1)
In a sense, the foregoing observation confirms that advisers are seen as part of an institutional response to helping ministers cope with the demands of their work and achieve
control of the departments they oversee. They provide ministers with extra resources to
manage paperwork and programs and to deal with potential time and stress-management
problems. Thus, indirectly, advisers add to the capacity of ministers to do their own jobs
more effectively. This observation also provides insight into the way ministers’ offices are
structured. In the case of the abovementioned office, advisers are allocated responsibilities
of the portfolio based on the program areas that fall within the minister’s ambit.
There was evidence linking overload to the proliferation of portfolios. Surprisingly, this
came from the views of two interest group interviewees. Representative 4 said:
... we’ve seen a proliferation of portfolios but many of those portfolios are held by the
same person. So for the period we’re talking about I think the minister there had 6
portfolios. Well it’s not humanly possible for any one person to manage the detail of
those sorts of issues, and ministers have always been more or less on top of their
portfolios, more or less bright and more or less good or bad. So ... you’ve got a very big
portfolio where the minister might not be too bright and too capable - it’s inevitable that
there’ll be delegation almost.
13 Department of Community Services.
92 This participant’s remarks lend significant weight to the view that ministers suffer from overload brought about by the expansion in the scale and scope of government activity, as expressed in the growing number of ministerial portfolios. Here, overload appears to matter because it can affect a minister’s ability to do their job effectively and make good decisions.
It seems from this participant’s observation that relief from overload occurs through the delegation of some functions.
One adviser in the Carr government saw these new demands for accountability as a direct cause of the introduction and increase in numbers of advisers, and a contributing factor to ministers’ heavy workloads:
Yeah. I think it’s to do with the increasing transparency of government. I think the fact we
are constantly exposed and risk exposure. I think in the last 8 years or so there’s been a
rise in the community’s expectations. They have more information about their elected
officials and the bureaucracy. (Adviser 2)
A former ministerial adviser turned member of parliament also attested to the growing institutional arrangements that demand greater accountability from ministers and governments:
... in addition to the growing complexities facing members of parliament there have been
other liabilities added like ICAC and those sorts of things. So I think there are many
more filters now in the system where politicians 20 years ago would be able to make a
rough and ready decision and win. You can’t do that now. (Adviser 6)
Contributing to ministerial overload are the rising expectations of the community and growing demands on ministers to explain their decisions and actions to the public and the media. There was a strong sense that the introduction of advisers was a response to the array of political relationships ministers need to foster and manage to work through policy processes:
Undoubtedly that contributes to ministers not being in control. In this portfolio there are
hundreds of groups so many that it’s impossible to keep abreast of what they do and
what their concerns are. There’s a culture of grievance in our society and governments
need to manage those grievances properly and carefully. (Adviser 2)
93 Thus, there exists a real tension between the human limitations of a minister and the many social, political and administrative tasks that his or her position entails and that require support.
Another determinant of ministerial overload and justification for the existence of advisers is the growing expectation that governments will consult with interest groups in the development of policy and respond to the immediacy of their concerns. Many participants, including interest group representatives, acknowledged the demands from organised interests as justification for advisers’ appointments:
… that’s another daily experience of ministers nowadays to be … dealing with various
interest groups on a daily basis. So that’s another important reason for why a minister
has to have personal advisers. (Representative 3)
One minister provided an account of how far these expectations have changed and
contributed to the pressures of governing and to the justification for the need for extra help
in the form of personal support for ministers:
If you go back to ministerial offices as my recollection is about 20 years ago, ministerial
offices consisted of 2 or 3 people. Members of Parliament didn’t have staff. So ... the
community now has a greater interface with their members of parliament, they expect
more from their members of parliament, members of parliament therefore expect more
from their ministers, that the community feels that they want direct access to the
ministerial office, and expect an immediate turn around in response to their concerns.
(Minister 5)
This minister’s reflection gives expression to some of the societal changes that are seen to be contributing to ministerial overload. For this minister, advancements in communication technology and the community’s increased engagement in the political process are seen as being significant contributors to overload, and the basis for ministers needing help from personal staff. This minister’s assessment also reveals that public involvement in policy- making processes is now greater and it is more difficult for governments to make decisions without regard to the concerns of those likely to be affected by new policy developments.
94 Ministerial overload has several causes, as highlighted by some study participants:
Ministers are ultimately responsible for translating the public interest into policy. That
generally means they are responsible for handling current issues and managing
strategic issues. (Minister 4)
These responsibilities sit alongside a range of other factors which contribute to overload:
Ministers are accountable to parliament for the day-to-day administration of the
department’s programs. They have to sign an endless stream of correspondence
covering representations from MPs, members of the public, and from community groups
… (Adviser 7)
Equally, there is the day-to-day grind of administering programs and overseeing their development:
A minister needs to keep himself informed of important negotiations between his
department and other departments. He needs, as well, to represent his department and
portfolio in the Cabinet and he must prepare himself to participate in these processes.
He needs to leave time for political and parliamentary tasks. Political tasks might involve
meeting interest groups, making speeches, attending functions. Parliamentary tasks
involve participation in debates, question time and meetings with backbench
committees. (Minister 2)
A final reason given for the importance of advisers is, as Minister 2 (a former minister of the
Greiner/Fahey government) puts it, “the ceaseless intrusion of the media”. There was widespread acceptance that ministers have an extensive public relations role in managing messages, shaping ideas, and handling the pervasive nature and influence of the media.
The extent of this is expressed by Minister 6:
Because I think the media exposure is a lot more intense. You can’t afford to stuff up.
And you rely on advisers to try and minimise the stuff ups.
Thus, overload comes from a variety of sources – some endogenous, some exogenous. It occurs because ministers’ roles have evolved in response to growing expectations of the community and the complex mixture of professional and political pressures. Ministerial overload matters because it can affect ministers’ ability to think clearly and strategically and
95 thus make good decisions. There is a critical need to lighten the heavy workload of the minister by providing them with personal staff services. This assistance goes far towards solving many of the basic problems of overwork, negotiating policy outcomes, and lengthy parliamentary sessions. Ministers felt that their departments were not suitably placed to provide them with both political and personal support.
Overload also comes from the need to manage relationships, to which departments are not ideally suited. As will be shown in this study, some of these relationships require attention
because of political and institutional circumstances. Overload also arises from governments
having to pay greater attention to political management, that is, managing the politics of
policy development and implementation.
The idea that advisers have been introduced to relieve ministerial overload appears to be
closely linked to one of the themes raised in the literature review – the decline in the
capacity of the state to develop and implement policy. A key question for this study,
therefore, is whether the adviser system provides new capacity to the political executive to
govern effectively.
Preserving the neutrality of the public service
The need to preserve the neutrality of the public service was another theme to arise in this
area. The argument that transpires from participants’ comments is that advisers preserve the neutrality of the public service by taking on work that would be deemed inappropriate for the bureaucracy to handle. In most cases, this work is of a political nature:
I think there’s a good argument for ministers to want people they can delegate work that
isn’t suitable for the department to handle, you know, dealing with minor parties, political
presentation. (Adviser 1)
A Director-General who was also a former adviser for a Wran minister saw the need to preserve the neutrality of the department as the main reason for the appointment of advisers:
96 I think it’s totally appropriate that a minister has some of their own staff to manage media
relations and to manage their own personal time and diary and to also help the minister
to have a political perspective which … is legitimate for them but which is not legitimate
for the public service. (Official 3)
The view that advisers’ existence is based on them shielding departments from the political demands of government came largely from ministers and advisers themselves, although the foregoing remark came from a current departmental head. For these participants, the existence of advisers meant that work of a political nature could be contained within the minister’s office, thus preserving the bureaucracy’s neutrality. It also meant that, by enabling ministers to appoint advisers whose main concerns are partisan politics, the need to increase the political responsiveness of departments by appointing public servants with strong partisan political affiliations is lessened. Seen in these terms, advisers provide ministers with the necessary means of achieving political responsiveness while at the same time preventing the public service from being embroiled in partisan or political controversies.
Additional evidence to support the claim that advisers exist to prevent politicisation of the bureaucracy comes from a former adviser who worked for a Greiner minister:
… one of the advantages is that they [advisers] can help depoliticise the public service
to a degree. Ministers are such political kinds of beasts that they are focused on the next
election, they focus on getting their headline, they’re worried that they will do something
to embarrass the government – the Premier will be on the phone. And in a way, if a
minister’s staff wasn’t doing it, there’d be pressure on the Department to do it. Is that a
reason for their existence? Partly yes, they act as an important buffer between what
goes on politically and what goes on with policy implementation. (Adviser 3)
This point is further illustrated by another study participant who was also a former adviser of a Carr minister, now a minister:
I think a minister needs to be able to rely on people he or she knows are loyal to the
government’s agenda. … The public service … can sometimes have their own agenda
97 as well and be pushing various projects and any minister needs to be aware of that. I
think it’s a question of balance. (Minister 4)
Such assessments draw attention to three important activities of advisers: the first is that ministers require support from individuals who are committed to the government’s policy agenda; the second is that advisers are needed to counter the dominance of the bureaucracy and to help keep ministers informed of what is going on around them, principally in the department; and the third is that advisers minimise the temptation of ministers to refer work of a political nature to his or her department.
Ministers have a number of sometimes overlapping needs in relation to their departmental role, especially policy-making. Recognition of these needs encourages them to appoint advisers. About half the ministers interviewed expressed a desire for somebody who was independent of the public service to have an input into the policy process. Minister 2 referred to the need for somebody independent to give “frank advice” and Minister 6 claimed that advisers assisted her work by giving her “a source of advice independent from that of the department”.
The need to appoint advisers to provide such independent advice was felt by both Labor and Coalition ministers, who felt it was important that the advice came from somebody politically committed to, and/or knowledgeable about, party policies. Minister 3 thought it was important that “everything was looked at from the political angle”. If, as a number of ministers believed, politics is a ‘minefield’, then, as Minister 1 declared, “one of the things you would hope to get from your staff is a mine detector”. Advisers can therefore carry out this role by taking part in policy discussions within the departmental officers and by commenting on submissions going to the minister.
This view, that advisers meet the needs of ministers’ departmental roles, was affirmed by officials, who as a group could see advisers serving as a buffer to distance the department from the political environment. However, as will be reported on in other parts of this thesis, government officials also expressed concern about politicisation that occurred from
98 advisers making direct contact with public servants at senior and middle levels of the organisation.
Political control
The contention that advisers emerged within the Australian political system to enable the political executive to assert control over the machinery of government emerged as a theme in this study, although it was not expressed in overt terms. The political control thesis was detected in comments and observations about the pathologies of government departments and in reflections about the personal support needs of ministers. It appeared from the comments reviewed that political control happened directly through advisers’ dealings with the bureaucracy and indirectly through increasing the capacity of ministers to perform their roles effectively by performing certain functions.
Perhaps the most overt view about advisers existing on the basis of political control comes from this minister’s evaluation:
It changed a bit in the Wran period because Wran felt that the bureaucracy was
conservative in every sense of the word ... Wran was first of the very politically
management oriented people ... and so this was a way of entrenching himself politically
... he had something called the MAU MAU ... the Ministerial Advisory Unit ... in his office
... it meant that if there was a proposal to close 10 schools coming up through the
education department, the [unit] would know about it ... In Wran’s case it was for reasons
more of wondering whether a policy was politically acceptable ... whatever combination
of policy and politics ... So it helps you entrench yourself. It helps you avoid damage. It
gives you positions to hand out. (Minister 1)
This minister’s reflection reveals how attempts to achieve political control were first tried under Wran with the formation of a political unit within his own personal office, the
Ministerial Advisory Unit or, as it was colloquially known, MAU MAU.14 He reveals what this unit was charged to do: to challenge the judicious temperament of the bureaucracy, to know what was going on, and to know how to manage the politics of a policy decision.
14 It was colloquially known as MAU MAU after a Kenyan terrorist group.
99 Here, advisers are about managing the vertical and horizontal processes, turning a state of powerlessness into a position of command and control.
Linked to this, but most contentious of all, was how far advisers were appointed to help maintain the thrust of the minister’s policies, possibly against public service obstruction.
Many saw advisers’ introduction and institutionalisation in these terms. Adviser 3 felt there was “emphatically a desire when they came in to sustain the thrust of implementing the policies on which they had been elected, and that advisers sustain the thrust because they know why the policy was devised”. Furthermore, as noted by Minister 2, if ministers were considering moving away from a party commitment or from a policy they had already established, then, compared with the public servants, the adviser, as a political operative, has far more licence to ask “are you sure?”
‘Another voice’
A sub-theme to emerge is the need for ministers to have another voice. The need for an alternative view emanates from ministers’ distrust of the public service to provide advice that was not consistent with government’s agenda. It was remarked by several ministers and advisers interviewed that political staff provide ministers with a source of advice that is independent of departments, which were regarded as “notorious for driving their own agenda” (Minister 1), “cumbersome” (Adviser 4) and “intransigent” (Minister 6). Official 2 offers the following observation:
… politicians felt they weren’t getting sufficient and current, purposeful and up to date
advice up from the bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are terribly cumbersome …, especially
big infrastructure departments, public works is a good example – they just didn’t come
up with a new idea.
This particular point of view was also affirmed by advisers, who believed advisers existed to ensure that policy issues that came from the department were examined by somebody
independent from the department, wholly committed to the minister and proactive in the
role of developing policies:
100 They exist because ministers want some independent advice from that which is driven
from the agencies. Agencies won’t admit it but agencies do run their own agendas. If
you want to run an agenda which the agency doesn’t like then the agency will do its best
to derail the ministerial agenda. …. Now if the minister has got to spend all of his time
trying to drive his agenda, then he won’t have time for doing other things. (Adviser 3)
There is belief therefore that the introduction and growth of advisers is a consequence of the political executive’s loss of faith that the public service can provide the sort of advice they need to make decisions. There is a sense that advisers have been introduced to bring contestability to the provision of advice and that governments have become altogether more sceptical of officials’ motives. Arguably, the case for ministerial advisers rests in the belief that public servants do not have sufficiently well-developed political antennae.
There were some ministers interviewed, however, who believed the presence of advisers was due to ministers needing someone independent of the department to play a proactive role in developing policies. This is distinct from ministers needing an independent voice to play a reactive role in examining departmental submissions. The importance of having an adviser to provide long-term thinking was stressed by certain ministers. Minister 3, on becoming minister, appointed one adviser with expertise in disability and another in child protection on the basis that they would provide alternative and new thinking: “we were about to create a new department for disability and restructure DoCS so I needed people who were thoughtful and knew how the system worked”. This minister believed it important to not only have “someone there to give you a political perspective but to understand that you might be making major reforms in policy of a very long-lasting nature”.
Some of the advisers appointed to provide committed expertise and/or alternative and new thinking were expected by the minister to cover a wide ambit. The appointment of two advisers interviewed for this study signalled the minister’s intention to give greater attention to specific policy areas. This was especially true of Advisers 3 and 6, who were appointed to provide “an entirely new dimension of expertise” and “a new way of doing things” in relation to industrial relations and education.
101 Expertise
Providing ministers with expertise was another justification for advisers. This theme overlaps with the need for ‘another voice’. It was often felt, particularly among ministers, that the need for expertise arose because it could not be provided by the department or did not ‘fit’ with the government’s policy agenda. One minister commented that advisers’ expertise was particularly crucial when governments were newly formed or when ministers changed their portfolios. Thus, ministers wanted people knowledgeable in the policy area for which they had responsibility in order to maximise the responsiveness of their departments.
The provision of expertise can be linked to filling gaps in the knowledge and experience of the public service, as well as to party policies. However, it can also be linked to political control. This is because advisers who are recruited for their expertise are used largely to
challenge the technical skills and knowledge of the bureaucracy. Expertise serves as a
crucial political resource for ministers because it provides them with the capability to
question the data and information used by the department to legitimate its decisions. Thus,
it puts ministers in the game; it gives them a foothold in technical matters and access to
knowledge that may not always be forthcoming from, or available in the department.
While only one adviser interviewed for this study was recruited for their expertise, a number
of ministers said they recruited advisers to work on an area of policy that needed to be kept
away from the department “because it was likely to be watered down” (Minister 1).
Advisers, as experts, play a substantial role in policy-making. Ministers sometimes depend
on the expertise of advisers to support a pre-existing or a partisan view, to give ministers
bargaining power in persuading parliamentary colleagues, occasionally to provide new
insights into policy directions, and to define appropriate policy alternatives. Minister 2 who
recruited an adviser from the union movement said he needed “someone who could take it
up to the unions because they were unlikely to like what I wanted to do” and someone who
could “help me argue the case to the department”. Here therefore, expertise gives ministers
102 the capacity to manage policy change, help explain policy debates, and deal with resistance.
Personal support
About a third of ministers interviewed suggested that their appointment of an adviser was
partly associated with their need for personal support. Again there is a range of
interpretations. A few ministers thought it desirable to appoint somebody with whom issues
could be discussed when making policy decisions in the department. Some respondents
claimed that personal support is required to combat the isolation ministers feel from their
department and from party colleagues:
The last thing you want is to be aloof, to not engage with what the department is doing
and what your colleagues are doing too. Advisers at least keep you linked, connected.
(Minister 2)
Conclusion
This chapter has revealed that there were particular preconditions that led to the introduction and institutionalisation of ministerial advisers. Two such preconditions were the increase in the scope of governmental activity and the resultant workloads that ministers
were required to carry. It was stated that problems of governing could be remedied by
providing ministers with additional resources to manage the governance, administration
and communications resulting from expanded government activity. These new resources,
which came in the form of ministerial advisers, would be used to handle liaison with the
media, other ministerial offices, Members of Parliament, and political party members, and
also to provide much-needed personal assistance to overloaded ministers. Their
introduction also came at a time when the neutral competence of the public service was
being questioned by politicians who were suspicious of the public service for being
obstructionist and unsympathetic to the policy agenda of newly elected governments. Thus,
advisers were seen as a means of bringing the public service under the control of the
political executive. While the analysis pinpointed some of the causes of advisers becoming
103 a mainstay within the NSW political system, on a broader level it served as a background for contextualising the roles of advisers.
104 CHAPTER 5 – A MOVING TARGET – FACTORS INFLUENCING ADVISERS’ ROLES15
There was such variability in what my staff did ... it’s hard to pin down what they’re meant to do
because they can be interacting with media one minute and dealing with the department the next.
It really hinges on what the minister wants, his or her style. (Minister 5)
The previous chapter explored the reasons for the introduction and growing permanency of ministerial advisers within the NSW parliamentary system. Questions this chapter seeks to explore are ‘What motivates advisers to take on the roles that they do?’ and ‘What are the
“patterned expectations” of what advisers do?’
Before examining the specific roles advisers perform, it is valuable to look at some of the themes that emerged from the interview data regarding why advisers’ roles varied to the extent reported. This is important for three reasons. First, study participants frequently sought to qualify their answers for why advisers did what they did. There was a sense that some participants did this to rationalise why advisers behaved a certain way and to point out that advisers’ roles are different to those of other policy actors such as public servants.
For instance, one minister interviewed for this study noted that the work of advisers was mediated by several factors and to varying degrees, including “the aspiration of the government, the personality and management style of the minister, and the policy agenda are some things that influence what the ministerial office focuses on” (Minister 4). But he added:
...they work in a completely different context to the department. They need to be able to
read what is going on politically; how this policy would affect this group. I wanted
advisers who could communicate well, who could work through information and put it in
a concise piece of advice for me to then make a decision on ....
Minister 1 made a similar point:
15 There are findings in this chapter that are similar to those detected and described by Maley in her study of advisers and the factors influencing their roles. Differences and similarities are discussed in the ‘Discussion’ chapter.
105 I think you’ll find that advisers will try to mirror the minister as much as possible. They
have to work in his or her interests as much as possible, which is different to the way a
department operates. They’ve got technical problems to sort out. Where to put the next
school? Do we need to keep this one open when enrolments are falling? It’s a different
mindset. It’s very much a real-time real-world operation for ministers.
Thus, there is a ‘realpolitik’ aspect to what advisers do, and this should not be ignored
because it is likely to yield important insights about the mediating factors influencing
advisers’ behaviours and those of their ministers.
Second, it is important to address one of the gaps identified in the literature review – that
earlier studies have tended to ignore why advisers take on certain roles. As noted by Maley
(2002), a criticism of earlier studies on advisers is that they do not capture the variability in advisers’ roles and explanations for why advisers do what they do (2002).
Finally, it is necessary to define elements of the institutional context in which advisers work.
As will be shown in parts of this thesis, the work of advisers is heavily conditioned by the institutional settings in which they operate, which include the nature and quality of the relationship they have with the minister, the culture of the minister’s office, and the political and policy agenda on which advisers take action.
What is evident from the analysis of the findings is that advisers’ roles are contextually driven and highly dependent upon their interaction with other people. Importantly, it shows that there are many factors influencing the type and scope of advisers’ roles, including, but not limited to, the minister’s management style, role conception and personality; the type of portfolio; issue saliency; and whether advisers are recruited for their expertise or political skill. While such factors are seen as playing an important role in determining the types of functions advisers perform, they should be seen as indicative only, as there are likely to be other factors influencing what advisers do which cannot be fully explored in the context of this study.
It should be noted, therefore, that the intention here is not to provide an exhaustive list or description of the factors encouraging or limiting the roles of advisers, as doing so will
106 cause the research to fall outside its intended aims. Rather, the purpose is to present a representative ‘feel’ of the factors mediating advisers’ role and to ensure the discussion of these is anchored in the perspectives of those interviewed for this study, as against any external discourses that may exist to explain role variance. In a sense, understanding why advisers do what they do is likely to augment rather than diminish the themes presented in this study, particularly those relating to political control.
Those interviewed were asked to describe the factors influencing the sorts of roles
performed, and in response the following determinants were identified.
The minister’s management style
The first and dominant theme to emerge was the minister’s management style. Almost all ministers and advisers interviewed identified the significance of the minister’s style and personal attributes as key to influencing advisers’ roles. These also had a bearing on the amount of time they spent engaged in certain activities. It was the minister’s style that formed a key component of the organisational context in which advisers went about their work. Minister 2, commenting on the significance of ministers’ personal style, noted:
The advisers, the quality of those advisers are a direct reflection on the minister. The
quality of advisers is a direct reflection on the quality of the office, and is also a direct
reflection on the quality of the output of the office. And is also a direct reflection on the
quality of interaction between the department and a minister.
The minister’s style took on many meanings: the minister’s “organisational style” (Minister
1), “management style” (Minister 3), “decision-making style” (Adviser 1) and “strategic style”
(Adviser 6). This may suggest that ministers do not necessarily have one style but may over time exhibit more than one. However, for the most part it seems the minister’s way of working is an important determinant in what advisers can and cannot do.
Adviser 2 said that the most important thing was “to develop a sixth sense for what the minister wants to do” and “an ability to pre-empt what the minister’s wants”, and this type of remark was echoed by others. Most also agreed with Minister 4, who stated: “The adviser’s
107 philosophy must reflect the minister’s otherwise there’s no point being there”. This implies that advisers need to understand the minister’s perspective in order to interpret their needs; otherwise the relationship between the two is likely to be ineffective and the adviser’s role ill defined.
Another take on the meaning and significance of minister’s style came from Official 2, who worked as an adviser for a minister in the Carr government:
I think what you’ll find is that advisers will pretty much reflect the minister’s attitude and
how he thinks. Some like robust debate about policy, some like people with intellect who
bring rigour to the way policy is made. … It’s not uncommon to see an office of staff
behaving like the minister, because that’s the nature of being close to political power.
There is a sense, therefore, that the minister’s management style is the composite of a number of characteristics: his or her way of thinking, personal sense of efficacy and competence, and orientation towards dealing with conflict both political and interpersonal.
The minister’s style encompasses the minister’s pattern of using information, the tasks he
or she feels comfortable performing and delegating, and his or her approach to dealing with
external differences and conflict.
Related to the minister’s management style as a determinant of advisers’ role was the tone
the minister set for the running of the ministerial office. It is the minister “who sets the tone
for the way his or her office functions and the way in which advisers go about their work”,
said Adviser 5. It is through the minister’s tone that the expectations and wishes of the
minister were understood by his or her advisers:
The minister sets the tone. You know, if the minister is wandering [in] at eleven o’clock,
and leaving early, then that will reflect, and the staff will see that as a standard, and work
that way. (Adviser 3)
Again, the minister’s proclivities serve as a powerful organiser for how the ministerial office functions. While no clear definition of tone arose from the interview data, a threading of views by participants reveals that it is the cumulative effect of the minister’s persona, outlook, and modus operandi from which staff developed a ‘feel’ and understanding over
108 time. It is, as one participant mentioned, what makes the work “meaningful and purposive”
(Adviser 3).
Ministers’ relationships with their departments
Advisers do not work in a vacuum: they are required to work extensively with departmental staff and interest groups. How well their attitude marries with other players can also influence the role they play. As Minister 2 put it:
I think the important issue is the ability also of advisers to be able to interface with the
advisers of other offices … so if the minister is not available then the chief-of-staff has
got to be able to interface on a whole of government basis and to be able to drive an
agenda.
In addition to highlighting the expectations ministers have of staff in dealing with departments, this minister’s comments show that senior advisers are expected to make representations on the minister’s behalf when he or she is unable to. It provides evidence that advisers operate as extensions of the minister, acting as his or her agent or delegate when circumstances dictate.
There is an obvious sense of relativism about the way advisers performed their roles. If a minister was seen to be ‘hands on’, this usually translated into advisers adopting the same approach. If the minister was content to keep a low profile and allow the department to direct much of the policy agenda, then advisers assumed a less hands-on role. However, ministers who preferred to be “creatures of their own departments”, as Minister 1 put it, had advisers who supplemented rather than complemented the minister’s style and approach:
Different ministers have very different approaches. Other than your active, assertive and
confident ministers, the majority some three-quarters of the 20 or so ministers allow their
minders [to decide] what comes to them, how it comes to them. (Minister 1)
Advisers not only take their cues from ministers, they also produce a qualitative measure of how political control is organised through staff. Here, advisers are expected to lead like their minister in dealing with the department as well as laying out the options for the
109 minister to consider when the minister’s orientation is one of ‘taking a back seat’ to the department and his or her advisers.
Many ministers and advisers commented that advisers took an active role in policy if there was perceived to be a ‘capability gap’ either in the minister or in the office in general. In many respects, this was the main justification for the appointment of advisers with expertise, although there was a strong expectation that advisers developed this over time:
In my case, I wanted advisers who had a lot of knowledge and background in the policy
area or at minimum showed an ability to learn it very quickly. So they didn’t have to be
an expert? No, that’s right but it helped that they knew what the key important issues
were. (Minister 6)
The minister’s relationship with his or her department can also impact on the sorts of roles advisers take on. Ministers had high expectations of their advisers if there was a sense that departments were ‘running the show’ and not showing any interest in the government’s or minister’s policy agenda. If the relationship with the department was characterised by a sense of contest, then advisers had to help ministers ‘take up the fight’ to the department. If a minister wanted to shape his or her department in a personal way, then advisers were expected to adopt the same attitude in their dealings with the department. If, on the other hand, ministers took little interest in the operational matters of departments, then, as pointed out earlier, advisers were expected to present and comment on policy options:
I think your job was determined by a couple of things: the minister’s style, …, but also
what he has in mind for the department to work on [and whether the minister] takes an
active interest in what the department does. (Adviser 3)
Adviser 4 echoed similar sentiments:
If the minister had big ideas you shared in them and it was your job to see to it that the
department did as well.
However, Official 4 noted that some minister’s take a ‘horses for courses’ approach to dealing with the department:
110 Some ministers will let the department run things some of the time on some issues.
Others won’t, they’ll initiate policy, see that it’s taken up and understood by the
department – that’ll depend sometimes on whether the minister is new and wants to
make a mark. … If there’s controversy, that’ll get them going as well.
Thus, the minister’s attitude to the department and how this shapes the mindset of advisers can vary greatly depending on a host of factors.
Adviser 5 reported on the working style and approach to the department of the minister for whom she worked. In this observation, there is a clear demarcation between the role of the ministerial office – strategic direction – and the work of the department – service delivery:
[Name omitted] didn’t get too caught up in what was going on operationally. He was
more into developing the strategic direction of the portfolio rather than ensuring things
were functioning smoothly. That was the role of the department and its management. I
think the minister would’ve been pissed off if he had to get involved in sorting out
operational matters.
Minister 2 echoes similar sentiments.
I sought to see myself in a role of initiating policy, driving policy and driving the
accountability of the agency. …. I do not see myself as someone who was to engage in
the day-to-day operations. And if I had to be involved in the day-to-day operations, then I
needed to sack the head of the agency. Then basically that’s it.
In many respects, these sentiments provide a qualitative understanding of the degree to
which ministers and advisers seek to exert political control over the bureaucracy. There is a
definite sense that ministers and advisers understand the importance of ensuring
ministerial leadership is a constant in exchanges between the minister’s office and the
department. The type of work advisers performed was also mediated by whether a
government was newly elected or had been in power for a period of time. Advisers who
came to the role anew spoke of the difficulty of establishing rapport with government departments and gaining their trust; however, this was usually helped if there had been a series of political appointments within the senior ranks of the bureaucracy.
111 Minister’s role conception
Most ministers and advisers were quick to point out that the minister’s own role conception
was also mediated by a host of factors, including the political cycle in which the government
found itself, the type of reforms the government was pushing, and the length of time the
minister had been in the portfolio:
There are so many factors that determine what happens in government and what the
minister does. There’s the budget which starts to concentrate the mind of the minister
and department almost immediately after the budget is handed down. Then there’s the
reform agenda, are things travelling well in the portfolio or do things need to change?
There are controversies, how normalised things are with the department. How we work,
how we become involved in policy activity is so dependent on things that are sometimes
completely out of your control. (Adviser 2)
The above assessment is useful because it yields an impression of the extent to which the external environment has a bearing on what ministers decide to do and how that in turn affects the type of work advisers engage in. Controversies, government business and the degree of stability of minister-department relations affect ministers’ and advisers’ roles.
These insights demonstrate the degree to which advisers’ and ministers’ involvement in the policy process informs the approach advisers take to their role. There was a sense from the interview data that ministers who were less active in policy encouraged the ascension of advisers to fill any void created by a minister being detached from the policy process itself.
A similar dynamic was manifested with issue saliency and complexity, which are described in the following section.
Policy and political experience of ministers and advisers
The level and type of policy and political experience a minister and adviser bring to their respective roles also have a significant bearing on the performance of advisers’ roles.
There were two extremes to this view expressed in the interviews. Some ministers showed a preference for advisers who demonstrated expertise in a particular policy area, and tended to recruit on this basis. Other ministers wanted advisers who had an intimate
112 knowledge of the workings of government and party politics. This was seen as important for handling conflict arising with departments and interest groups. Similarly, to be an effective adviser, most ministers interviewed saw as paramount the qualities of reliability, dependability, and being honest and loyal. Others identified knowledge, influence and discretion as being the most valued attributes of advisers, along with competence in managing stakeholder relations and issues.
Some advisers were chosen on the basis of their loyalty and networks, as well as their competence and skills in bringing political acuity to an issue. Political loyalty and party affiliation were seen as being key criteria for the job, but not always. Some came recommended by a relative of a member of parliament or a former minister, while others were chosen because of their reputation and talents. The importance of loyalty was repeatedly stressed by advisers and ministers interviewed in this study.
Most interviewed had completed tertiary qualifications and reported that this was the case in most ministerial offices. The fact that most advisers are tertiary educated reinforces the growing professionalisation of their role and of politics in general:
There’s probably not an adviser who hasn’t been to university or who hasn’t been active
in politics in some form or another. (Adviser 2)
I think ... there is a breed of new professionals who are advisers. (Minister 4)
Nearly all advisers (including those who had worked in the role prior to their current position) had some background in politics. At least five had a family member who was either a politician or had held a key position in a political party (e.g. party president). Thus, many come to the role having been introduced to politics at an early age, and the interest generated finds expression in a variety of roles they perform. Some advisers had worked with Opposition ministers developing party policy to take to the next election, while others worked for a member of parliament in an electoral office dealing with constituency matters.
113 Policy competence and knowledge
A number of ministers and advisers identified policy competence and knowledge as significant determinants of advisers’ roles and involvement in policy development:
It was important to have people with a lot of experience in this issue ... and people who
are intelligent. All my staff, I think, have outstanding intelligence. (Minister 2)
Minister 4 concurred:
It was critical to have staff knowledgeable in governmental processes, people who could
translate ideas into policy and legislation. If they were knowledgeable of the issue then
that was a bonus too. The more knowledgeable the more trust you could have in their
abilities.
Advisers echoed these ministers’ responses in citing determinants of roles in policy- making. When asked about factors associated with variability in advisers of advisers’ roles,
Adviser 5 responded: “Knowledge has an effect on what advisers do. It’s what makes a minister delegate certain pieces of work.” Adviser 6 said: “I had a background in industrial relations so I knew who the players were and what needed to be done to get reform happening. So that’s probably why I ended up working for Greiner after Hannaford”.
Advisers’ level of policy competence greatly influenced how they could be used in working with departments and in policy-making. Public servants and interest group representatives in particular commented on the fact that the scope of the role played by advisers depended on their knowledge and abilities. A crucial aspect of policy competence was subject matter expertise. They usually had a background in the policy area, were recruited for their knowledge, experience and networks, and in some cases had an academic or professional background:
[Name omitted] certainly did know what she was doing. Child protection was always a
sensitive area and it was a sensitive area then and I just have to say that she was an
ideal policy adviser for that area. She had a strong personality but she had a strong
academic and professional background in that area. (Minister 3)
114 Competence and understanding of the policy area, therefore, were vital in some instances.
It meant advisers could direct the department and could have a substantial and influential role in policy-making.
There was also the view that advisers brought to the role a set of skills and knowledge to
either supplement or compensate for areas where these did not exist either with the minister or his or her office in general. This view that advisers compensate for the minister’s skills represents a point of departure from the view described earlier – that advisers’ roles are defined on the basis of whether they reflect, mirror or accord with the minister’s style.
Autonomy and delegation
Some advisers pointed out that they had a great deal of autonomy or latitude to pursue their own policy agenda. While advisers have the potential to bring their own policy agenda to the role, their ability to do so depends largely on the approval (tacit or explicit) of the minister. This was certainly the case for one adviser, who was able to develop a policy on special education “because it wasn’t an area the minister was interested in”. This particular adviser found himself with a high degree of autonomy to develop policy within his own sphere of activity, such as deciding which stakeholders to talk to and what information to collect and analyse.
A somewhat related role to autonomy is delegation. Because of the excessive workload, ministers seem willing to delegate to their advisers the kinds of responsibilities that would afford them a great deal of freedom to engage in their own policy agendas. There were extremes to which advisers had the minister’s authority to engage in a policy area entrusted to them. At one end, advisers were given complete free run of a policy issue, either because the minister saw it as an effective time management strategy or because they were too remote from the issue at hand. At the other, advisers were delegated tasks because they had expertise in the policy area:
I had a lot of freedom in the role as I became more accustomed to the way things worked. I
also developed a lot of knowledge of the issues so in time certain tasks got delegated to me
115 because I knew who to go to in the department to work on it. I imagine that happens in most
offices. It stands to reason that as you spend more time in the role you’re going to develop
that knowledge base that puts you on a level footing with the department. (Adviser 2)
Autonomy (and delegation), it appears, is manifested in the freedom advisers are given to get their work done however they see fit. Some ministers expected advisers to be self- starters, to show initiative, and to “come up with good ideas” (Minister 2). Consequently,
such autonomy is a function of the style and function of the minister.
The participants noted that the context in which advisers worked autonomously was also
coloured by the enthusiasm and willingness of a minister to get involved. Issues that were controversial often saw the adviser take on the archetypal ‘minder’ role. There was a sense that the high degree of autonomy and delegation given to advisers was legitimate because of the sorts of activities ministers’ required the adviser to become involved in. There were many examples given by study participants of advisers intervening in operational matters because the “minister wanted to get to the bottom of [an] issue” (Adviser 4) which had attracted significant media attention, or because ministers needed ‘protecting’ from a scandal. This finding is explored in more detail in other parts of this study such as chapter
10.
Issue saliency and complexity
Another determinant of advisers’ roles was the complexity and saliency of an issue with which both the minister and adviser were confronted. Minister 5 stated that the adviser’s role was “very much determined by whatever they’re confronted with”. If the issue was seen to be controversial and therefore salient to the minister, advisers would play an influential role. If the issue was technical, requiring the advisers’ expertise, then advisers would equally be actively engaged in its resolution. Similarly, the greater the confidence of the minister in the adviser’s subject matter ability, expertise and political sensitivity, the more likely they were to be involved in assisting the minister find alternatives. One minister offers a succinct explanation of the significance that issue saliency and complexity play in defining advisers’ roles:
116 My staff would get involved in anything if the right circumstances prevailed. If the matter
was technical they would either provide a perspective or take on a coordinating role. It all
depended on the significance of the issue too. If it was a hot political issue then I’d
expect them to get involved in sorting the problem out … it’s as simple as that really.
(Minister 4)
Advisers’ view of their role
Advisers’ own role conception was detected in the interviews as a determinant of their roles. Role orientation means what advisers see as the main purpose of their role. Those committed to policy work were seen as being activist, highly partisan and “committed to finding policy gaps and solutions” (Adviser 5). In this respect, ministers allowed their staff to
look for new initiatives and to push proposals even if faced with constraints. These advisers
felt it was their responsibility to engage in policy development with departments.
Some advisers were less active, adopting a ‘mixed’ approach to developing policies with
less room to manoeuvre. Advisers with a professional background or expertise tended to
be less partisan in their approach to policy making. They used their expertise to analyse
and present alternatives. Their orientation tended to be more proactive than reactive:
As I said, I came to the role from the labour movement so my political colours were
pretty obvious. The minister wanted someone with contacts and knowledge. I’d have to
say, now this wasn’t the case all of the time, but I was generally involved in getting
reforms in place so I wasn’t dealing with problems in the media ... so I was less reactive
in my approach compared to others. (Adviser 5)
Type of portfolio
Another determinant defining the role of advisers was the type of portfolio a minister had, the scope and demands the portfolio placed on ministers, and the nature of the relationship between ministerial offices and departments. Portfolios like health, education and community services were seen to be heavily demanding and often had advisers who were seen as interventionist by their ministers. These portfolios tend to receive significant media
117 attention and therefore usually require advisers to be actively involved in news and political management:
I think you’ll find Health and Education which are always making news will probably have
a large number of advisers who deal with crisis management,…. They attract media
attention, constant media attention, and having seen what goes from the Premier’s
office, most of what advisers are dealing with are bushfires. (Adviser 4)
As you know DoCs is a difficult area – kids in trouble, disability, family breakdowns.
These have lots and lots of interest groups that forever want their concerns heard.
They’re complex, intractable problems and you spend half your time dealing with
individual matters that you know you shouldn’t be. (Adviser 2)
Thus, portfolios with extensive service provision (e.g. health and community services) and organised interests required interventionist advisers as compared to portfolios where little was demanded from ministers in terms of change management. Minister 4 described some of the challenges he faced which he believed defined the types of roles advisers performed.
This minister’s reform plans, which involved splitting his department into two entities, met with a great deal of resistance, especially from senior bureaucrats. To implement the changes, this minister had to depend on his advisers to take the “fight up to the department”. This portfolio also had a number of community groups that needed convincing of the changes.
Ministerial advisers’ characteristics and previous occupations provide a glimpse into the type of skills they bring to the role and exercise in supporting the work of ministers. Some advisers had worked with opposition ministers developing party policy to take to the next election, while others worked for a member of parliament in an electoral office dealing with constituency matters.
How they are recruited and the attributes ministers look for
This section examines how advisers come to their role and how reasons correlated with expectations of advisers’ roles.
118 Advisers are recruited in one of a few ways: though there is legislation governing the
recruitment of advisers, most are employed through less formal means. While most
advisers interviewed for this study came to the role with a strong partisan bent, it was not
uncommon to see advisers appointed because of their expertise or knowledge of a
particular area. Many came to the role working for an opposition spokesperson or a
member of parliament. Others were ‘head-hunted’ because they possessed knowledge and expertise in a policy area which could not be mobilised from any other source, including the department.
Most ministers interviewed reported recruiting advisers from the same political party and/or because they shared a similar philosophy to the minister, although one minister mentioned that this was never investigated and did not matter as much as long as they performed well in the role. However, in most cases the political background of applicants was usually known, especially if the office relied on informal contacts. Invariably and somewhat unsurprisingly, most ministers and advisers felt they could not work with someone whose ideas they did not support or whose worldview was not the same as theirs. While party
similarity was the litmus test for suitability and compatibility, very occasionally ministers
would appoint an adviser for their expertise in a policy area. For instance, one adviser was
recruited from a peak union organisation by a Liberal Party minister because they had
extensive knowledge and networks that were seen as essential in driving this particular
minister’s reform agenda.
Two ministers preferred to employ generalists equipped with the right skills and background
as experts to work on particular policy areas. One minister justified this as important
because “reshuffles happened all the time”, implying that it was more effective to have
people who could adapt to the portfolio than go in search of people who were
knowledgeable. Furthermore, having experts served little purpose “because this was the
role of the department” (Minister 4). Another minister did not share this view. He felt it
necessary to have people knowledgeable in the portfolio area, particularly if the area
included complex legislation and required people to know the law in the policy area. In the
119 description presented below, this minister recruited most of his advisers from the departments which came under his portfolios:
I seconded a policy officer from the Attorney General’s Department, who was a lawyer,
…. So I had few qualified, experienced lawyers around me. … And I seconded one or
two from the Department of Industrial Relations, who were Industrial Relations
specialists and who were not lawyers. (Minister 5)
Advisers perceived themselves and were perceived by others as having a professional role and were expected to show loyalty and partisanship. It was emphasised that the work was an “insecure and stressful environment” (Adviser 3). They also worked in an environment where personal relationships are significant and where human resources rules of government bureaucracy do not necessarily apply. Recruitment and hiring continue to be based on informal contacts – ‘who knows whom’ – and personal patronage. In this context, bureaucratic norms such as promotion on the basis of merit, defined career paths, rigorous selection standards and recognised career paths simply do not exist.
In the early days of government, advisers were expected to “learn the ropes quickly”
(Adviser 3). Coming to grips with the public service was seen as an enormous challenge for both newly and established advisers and was seen as another factor influencing their role.
There was acknowledgement that the role of advisers changed over time. Once established, advisers were able to ‘settle in’ to the ebbs and flows of the roles into which they were cast.
It should be noted that, although differing patterns of staff recruitment exist, certain patterns are common to nearly all offices. That is, recruitment of advisers is generally informal, somewhat haphazard, and dependent on contacts. The interview data also revealed that there is increasing expertise, specialisation and professionalism, as well as growing differentiation of positions. This may be the result of the heavier and more complex workloads of ministers but may also reflect changes in the education, training, experience and role perceptions of advisers and ministers themselves. Comments from ministers and advisers show overwhelmingly that ministers want loyal advisers capable of thinking along
120 the same lines as themselves. As put by Adviser 4: “The minister’s office is a highly collegiate workplace. It’s highly personalised.”
The personalised characterisation of the ministerial office was regarded as a crucial function of the minister’s leadership style. Personalisation in an institutional context is important because it indicates the extent to which a relationship subsumes a wide range of activities and roles:
It was personal and had to be. You work very close to the minister and you work very
close to other advisers as well. Relationships had to be trusted. (Adviser 4)
Overall, nearly all appointments of advisers take effect at or near the start of a new government. There are, over the course of the government’s term, sporadic appointments either brought about by vacancies or a need to increase numbers because of growing workloads. It is not surprising that each appointment within the group of advisers interviewed for this study originated either directly or indirectly through personal patronage or through strong party affiliations or family ties:
I had some luck with taking up a job with a senator when I finished uni on a part-time
basis job, sharing with a friend and over time a few of us had left that office and it was a
such a great experience. (Adviser 2)
... I started working for a member while we, the ALP, was in opposition at that stage, so
that was 18 months before the 1995 election. (Adviser 1)
... a relative who was involved in politics just asked me to come and do some work
experience for two weeks. (Adviser 3)
Advisers come to the job from a range of backgrounds and for a range of reasons. Some have been public servants, brought into ministerial offices because of their expertise, but more commonly they come from political circles such as student or organised politics (e.g.
Young Labor). Most of them have had partisan allegiances, but some do not. Some advisers have been political party members, and indeed a few of those saw working as an adviser as a step towards their own political career.
121 Another of the more common means of access to work in a minister’s office is through acquaintance with those already working there. Current advisers will often know when openings arise and tell their friends of the opportunity and, conversely, tell the minister about their friends.
Generally, advisers work with one minister even if that minister assumes additional or different portfolio responsibilities. A ministerial reshuffle due to a minister resigning may result in these ministerial staff remaining in the role to support the new minister, working for another minister, or moving on completely. The resignation of a minister can also result in their advisers being looked after by being appointed to fairly significant positions within the
public and private sectors.
One minister interviewed was not concerned as to the political leanings of his or her
advisers even if this brought the ire of the political party:
No, in fact I was regarded as a bit of disgrace within the Liberal Party because I had no
one in my staff who was a Liberal Party member. I didn’t actually require them to be a
member of the Liberal Party to be honest. I recruited my chief of staff from the media on
the recommendation from someone. The others came to me basically because of people
I knew. … I actually thought that was better because they didn’t come with a pre-
conceived agenda which meant that their agenda and my agenda could be moulded at
the same time. You know, I said to them … “I don’t want to know how you vote but I
need to know you’re comfortable working with a conservative liberal who has these
views, and if you’re not, then you’re wasting my time and your time”. (Minister 6)
Minister 4 had a different perspective on the question of how he recruited political staff:
I would say both were important. If anything, I would regard it as important that policy
advisers were expert in their own areas. Personal loyalty was also important but I
wouldn’t want to have staff who didn’t know what they were doing.
Another wanted political nous and party ties as the main criteria for his advisory team. This minister felt portfolio expertise was unnecessary as it was the effectiveness of the relationship that mattered most:
122 No, I wanted people loyal to the party, who knew the party’s philosophy and beliefs.
They had to be loyal definitely. It wouldn’t work otherwise. A background in the portfolio
wasn’t as important because ultimately it’s about how you work together. (Minister 5)
Advisers, therefore, are a blend of expert or generalist, with ministers determining a preference for one or the other. It is not uncommon for ministerial offices to have at least one specialist person with knowledge of the portfolio area for which the minister has responsibility. Without exception, the ministerial office is a reflection of the minister’s whims
and personal style. Ministers who wanted advisers of this ilk recruited those advisers who
could help with policy and project work, help drive the minister’s reform agenda, and bring
energy to the policy process.
Interest group representatives maintained that it was important for advisers to have a
background in the portfolio in which they worked, because it meant that they could take a
full appreciation of their concerns to the minister. However, it was rare that advisers would
come to the role with knowledge of the portfolio. This appears to be starkly different to what
Maley (2002) reported in her study: she found that some 75% of advisers came from the
department with policy knowledge of portfolio.
Political and organisational culture – the temper of the ministerial office
The ministerial office is a closely knit group … it’s a highly personalised workplace.
(Adviser 4)
The ministerial office provides a vantage point in the governmental policy process. It is seen as providing a stable and reliable source of both information and expertise. With the introduction of advisers, ministers were equipped to supplement information from their
departments and increase their capacity to analyse and interpret information.
There were many metaphors and idioms that were be used by the participants to describe
the ministerial office and its working environment. Adviser 4 likened the ministerial office to
a “pressure cooker environment where you move from one crisis to another”. One official
felt that the ministerial office was the ideal “grooming place” for anyone considering a
123 career in politics or wanting to “advance their career in the senior ranks of a department”
(Official 3). Another described the ministerial office as a “hotbed of activity in which you’re
always on your toes. The last thing you want to do is stuff up” (Official 2). The ministerial
office functions as a political unit in which advisers are required to do ‘almost anything’ to
ensure political success.
Each office is seen as having its own culture and personality. The work culture as
described by many advisers interviewed was “intimate”, “collegial”, “fierce” (Adviser 4),
“intense” (Adviser 3), “competitive” (Adviser 2), and, in contrast, “mundane” (Adviser 1).
The ministerial office is highly partisan, and it is not surprising that much of the work of
advisers is constituted through this notion.
Each ministerial office tends to be divided according to the ministerial portfolio,
specialisation, expertise or policy area. The ministerial office of the (then) Minister for
Community Services, Minister for Ageing and Minister for Disability had at the time of the
interview one ministerial adviser for each of the three portfolios, plus another to cover a
program area falling within this particular minister’s area responsibility. Ministers who have
single portfolios, such as the Minister for Health, have their advisers allocated to a
specialised policy area (e.g. public health, area health service). There is no hard and fast
rule about the divisions of labour within ministerial offices; it is very much the expression of
the minister’s wishes as to how responsibilities and work are shared among staff.
The size of ministerial offices can vary considerably depending on whether a minister has
multiple portfolios or single-issue portfolios with significant budgets and responsibility (e.g.
health). For instance the (then) Minister for Health (Della Bosca16) had 11.8 staff as
compared to the Minister for Roads (Roozendaal17), who had eight. In total, there were 241 political staff employed in ministerial offices, ranging from as few as seven (Borger) to as many as 26 (Premier).
16 Portfolio held as at December 2008. 17 Portfolio held as at December 2008.
124 Table 1 – Ministers’ staff numbers as at December 2008
Minister Number of staff Premier 26.6 Tebbutt 11.5 Della-Bosca 11.8 Hatzistergos 12 Roozendaal 8 Campbell 12 Firth 12 Keneally 11 Tripodi 10 Macdonald 11 Kelly 14.4 Burney 11.6 Greene 9.6 Lynch 8 Perry 9 West 8.2 Daley 8 Costa 8 Judge 8.6 Borger 7 McKay 8 Robertson 7 Whan 7.8 Total 241.1 Over the past three decades ministerial offices have undergone an expansion which, to a large extent, parallels the growth in government activity. Ministers today have a level of political and personal assistance to the extent that they have become entities in their own right. What may be of more significance is the extent to which ministerial offices serve as a
“breeding ground” (Official 1) for advisers to enter into politics and the senior ranks of the public service. Ministerial offices employ young and energetic people to fill highly partisan positions requiring, in most cases, a high degree of partisan loyalty. Because of their strong connection with the minister and the political contacts this connection brings, some
advisers are able to pursue high-paying positions in the private or government sectors upon
leaving the role. For example, two advisers from the Greiner government have become
members of parliament. John Brogden was a ministerial adviser in the Fahey government
and became a member of parliament in 1996 and opposition leader in 2002. Three advisers
interviewed for this study had become directors general in the NSW government. Looking
125 further afield, in the current mix of political appointees, Michael Coutts-Trotter was a former chief of staff to the NSW treasurer, Michael Egan, and became Director-General of the
NSW Department of Commerce and NSW Department of Education and Training. He is
now Director-General of the Department of Finance and Services. The former chief of staff
for the minister for transport now holds a senior government appointment within the NSW
Department of Transport, as does one of his senior policy advisers. Other advisers and
ministers interviewed either spoke of taking up, or have taken up, roles themselves in the
private sector, earning quite significant salaries. Increasingly, it seems, being an adviser can bring significant rewards.
The former Director-General of the NSW Department of Energy, Mark Duffy, began his government career in the former NSW Treasurer’s Office (Mr Michael Egan's) working as his chief of staff. Prior to taking up this post, Mr Duffy worked in the NSW Labor Council as a union official along with the current NSW Treasurer Michael Costa. John O'Neill, an executive director of Tourism NSW, also came out of the office of the former NSW
Treasurer’s office. John Whelan, the current director of policy and research in the NSW
Department of Gaming and Racing, was previously chief of staff to the portfolio's former minister, Grant McBride, and former Chief of Staff to Michael Costa. The immediate past
Director-General of the Department of Community Services, Jennifer Mason was Chief of
Staff to former Attorney-General Bob Debus. Other senior NSW public servants include
Chris Ryan a former adviser to Andrew Refshauge, Todd Clewett a former deputy chief of staff to Craig Knowles and Aldo Pennini worked as an adviser to Mr Carr and Frank Sartor before taking up a senior position in the Redfern Waterloo Authority.
These appointments are suggestive of a growing trend in the way senior positions in the public service are being filled. The advent of advisers and the transition of some into senior public service positions raise important questions about the nature of public administration.
Do these appointments suggest that the policy work of the department has a much greater partisan content than may have been the case in the past, or has new public management given way to more bureaucratic forms of politics?
126 Political culture
Political culture was perceived by some participants as important in understanding the variations in adviser involvement in policy-making. Most of the respondents agreed that there are certain cultural properties in the political environment which contribute to or inhibit the behaviour and involvement of advisers in policy development. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that beliefs, feelings and values influence the political behaviour of ministers, and consequently the behaviour and involvement of advisers. For example, the adviser who worked on the education reforms implemented by minister Terry Metherell in the late 1980s characterised the nature of his involvement as having “mutual background and sharing in his vision”. He went on to explain the uniqueness of this political friendship:
The fact of the matter is that we had a lot in common and we were comfortable with each
other, and therefore, trusted one another. It’s odd to say we had similar backgrounds
when you look at the both of us, but we did have certain similarities. We had a
background in education; we all believed in education; we came from the progressive
part of the Liberal Party. (Adviser 6)
Another adviser attempted to identify some of the perceived defining characteristics of the political culture of the ministerial office:
... it’s a very exciting world. … You pick up the paper inevitably there are issues you’re
dealing and handling that are in there. So there’s a sense of being sort of cutting edge
… of things. You’ve got usually high profile people wheeling in and out all day through
the sitting rooms ... basically it’s a political environment where there has to be a degree
of trust of what’s going on and right down to who’s on the front desk ... Very exciting,
very stimulating ... (Adviser 4)
It is obvious from these responses that the concept of political culture is elusive, and it prompts different reactions when the question is raised. The prevailing evidence, however, seems to suggest that political culture does affect advisers’ roles and their relative influence, and that it is an important factor in understanding the variability of that influence:
But, what is good about this team here is, as a rule, most people are in early, seven,
eight, working on policies, surfing the internet, looking for good ideas around the globe,
127 doing their research, writing the policies. And, I think that reflects [name omitted], to be
frank, tiring us all out, because he is so energetic. (Adviser 2)
Trust and loyalty
Essential to the relationship between advisers and ministers interviewed were trust and loyalty:
… you had to have a relationship with your advisers that you trusted them, that you
trusted their judgments, and that the agencies knew that the judgments made by the
advisers was in fact being inspected. (Minister 2)
While it can be safely assumed that ministers and advisers come to their respective roles with the same political worldview and ideological beliefs, the importance of personal chemistry cannot be underestimated. It is through loyalty and personal trust that the
relationship between minister and ministerial adviser is forged.
It was regarded by the participants as paramount that advisers show loyalty to their
minister, and loyalty was considered one of the driving forces behind their work. It was
through the loyalty that expectations to ‘protect’ ministers from negative political consequences arose. Adviser 3 characterised the role as “doing whatever is required of you to prevent them [the minister] from getting in harm’s way”.
Conclusion
This chapter reported on the factors conditioning advisers’ roles. It showed that the minister’s leadership style and the tone he or she sets in managing the portfolio are key determinants in the scale and scope of advisers’ activities. Political culture, competence, and trust and loyalty are also significant determinants of advisers’ roles. An important theme to emerge is that much of what advisers do and the influence they exercise is highly dependent upon the type of relationship they have with their minister. Advisers orient their roles and behaviours according to the norms of personal loyalty to the minister: it is the glue that holds the bonds of the relationship together. It meant that advisers who had a strong rapport with their minister could be more effective in acting as a confidante and
128 dealing with the emotional aspects of a minister’s role. It enabled them to relate and understand how the minister would react to certain issues and develop a ‘feel’ for what the
minister was thinking. It meant they could be trusted and therefore more effective and influential in their role.
129 Part III – The Roles of Ministerial Advisers
The first opinion that is formed of a ruler’s intelligence is based on the quality of the men
he has around him. (Niccolo Machiavelli)
This, and the next two parts of the thesis, explores the roles of ministerial advisers. To make the presentation of this information manageable, the section of the thesis is broken into three parts. Part III explores the work of advisers within the relational space of the minister and adviser and the institutional setting of the ministerial office and includes three chapters: Personal Support; Informational Roles; and The Policy Roles Advisers. Part IV examines the work of advisers in managing the external environment and comprises four chapters: Managing Relations with the Department; Managing Relations with Interest
Groups; and Managing Relations with the Media. Part V focuses on advisers’ roles in managing the business of government and includes three chapters: Coordination;
Networking; and Resolving Policy Differences.
In establishing the roles of ministerial advisers, participants were asked to describe the functions advisers performed, or ought to have performed, and the significance of those functions in the process of policy development. From their responses, aspects of the policy process in which advisers were most involved, and perceived as most influential, were identified. This too is important because it provides some means of reconciling the data with relevant theories on the policy-making process. Here ‘influential’ is defined as having the capacity to affect outcomes or change based on the use of certain resources, including knowledge, social status and position.
The 2005 advertisement that appears in this section has been included here to serve as a reference point for evaluating differences arising from the analysis of the roles formally assigned to advisers, such as the ones listed in the advertisement, and those that are played out in reality, such as the filtering of information – that is, the normative and experiential elements of their roles. The advertisement indicates the range of functions advisers are expected to perform and the parameters within which these roles are played
130 out. Such parameters not only convey the sorts of roles advisers perform – those seen as legitimate – but also highlight where the boundaries limiting their roles lie. As can be seen the formal roles of advisers involve working directly with government agencies on policy
development, interacting with interest groups, and representing the minister’s interests. The
advertisement also shows the political and governmental nature of the roles expected of
advisers (e.g. consulting with portfolio agencies and stakeholders), the broad scope of the
responsibilities that fall within their remit, and the prerequisites of the role.
[GOVT CREST] Office of the Minister for Infrastructure and Planning and Minister for Natural Resources Policy Advisors Two positions (senior and junior) exist for experienced staff in the areas of policy development and political advice. Advisers are required to provide strategic advice on relevant policy issues and develop policy directions in consultation with portfolio agencies, industry stakeholders and members of the public. Eligible candidates will have:
. Proven experience in research and analysis . Knowledge of the political and parliamentary processes . Strong communication skills . A sound understanding of the legislative framework, and . Appropriate tertiary qualifications Applicants should also have strong writing skills with experience in the preparation of speeches, briefing notes and submissions. Applicants for the senior role require experience in the supervision and management of staff. Media/communications experience would also be an advantage. Knowledge and understanding of EEO and OH&S policies, Ethical Practice and the Ethnic Affairs Priorities Statement. Salary will reflect qualifications and experience. Note: This is a temporary position under the Public Sector Employment and Management Act 2002 for the term of the Minister’s appointment or a lesser period. Applications: [Name omitted], Chief of Staff, Office of the Minister for Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, GPO Box 5341, Sydney 2001. Closing date: 25 March 2005.
It is significant that knowledge of the portfolio area – in this case infrastructure, planning and natural resources – does not factor as a selection criterion. This accords with the views of most of the interviewees, who believed that it was not important for advisers to have a background in the portfolio in which they worked. As mentioned in Chapter 5, a number of ministers interviewed for this study felt loyalty and relevant skills in research and policy
131 analysis were key attributes in the selection of advisers. They, like advisers, acknowledged that it was unrealistic to recruit advisers with prior industry experience because the reality and nature of the role necessitated having advisers who could adapt to changing circumstances, such as Cabinet reshuffles. Adviser 4 provided insight into this perspective:
Having a background in the portfolio would help but I don’t think it’s essential. No. That’s because
the role isn’t about giving technical advice or being an expert in an area. The role is about
supporting the role of the minister. It’s the department’s job to provide expert advice. Advisers
help ministers with dealing with interest groups’ concerns making sure he has all the relevant
information so that he can make an informed decision.
This remark acknowledges the primacy of the bureaucracy in providing expert and technical policy advice. It also shows that having a background in the portfolio area is not essential, given the unpredictable nature of the role. In a sense it highlights the degree to which ministers show a preference for advisers who are best able to service his or her need for support, as against a requisite for specialist knowledge.
It is also significant that the functions listed in the job advertisement are not explained or elucidated in a formal job description. This situation is not unique to advisers who work in
NSW. In Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, ministerial advisers operate without clear job guidelines. The same is true of advisers working for federal ministers.18 That an explicit statement operationalising the roles and duties of advisers does not exist is likely to be indicative of the difficulty associated with capturing the informal and unfixed nature of advisers’ roles. Ministerial advisers, as the literature on their roles suggests, are expected to serve in the minister’s interests, protect him or her from harm, manage the flow of information, and handle the concerns of the electorate. These are tasks that cannot be easily undertaken by the public service.
Although there is no clear or distinct way to categorise the work of advisers, given the indeterminate and unstructured nature of their role. They do perform many functions that
18 The researcher contacted the relevant agencies responsible for recruiting and regulating the employment conditions of ministerial advisers in these states and was informed that the roles of advisers are generally not codified in position descriptions.
132 participants were able to identify and describe and which are presented in the next three parts.
133 CHAPTER 6 – PERSONAL SUPPORT
Advisers perform a range of personal support functions that help ministers come to manage the scale, scope and complexities of their roles. Both ministers and advisers interviewed
believed this type of work to be critically important in enabling ministers to discharge their
responsibilities effectively, sustain their standing among parliamentary colleagues, interest groups and the media, and cope with a relentless workload. The five personal support functions identified were ‘managing the minister’s time’, ‘acting as a confidante and sounding board to the minister’, ‘acting as the minister’s eyes and ears’, ‘protecting and
minding’, and ‘troubleshooting’. While some of these functions have been described or
mentioned in previous research, they have been presented and reported on here to show
the enduring nature of what advisers do. It appears that functions associated with personal
support are still very much the ‘bread and butter’ of advisers’ work.
Managing the minister’s time
Advisers play a key role in ensuring a minister’s daily meeting schedule addresses his or her particular needs. They provide ministers with effective day-to-day support capability, assisting in balancing his or her schedule of activities, and keeping in touch with other ministers, parliamentary colleagues, officials, party officials and members of the press and interest groups. The management of ministers’ time serves as a support structure for the management, organisation and controlling of information flows and decision processes within ministerial offices. This involves keeping and maintaining the minister’s diary to
ensure his or her daily schedule is structured in a manageable way and reflects the
minister’s policy priorities at that time.
In this role, the advisers interviewed would concern themselves with understanding the
minister’s priorities and the type of the strategy theme he or she would like to emphasise,
routinely determining the fate of meeting requests from interest groups and speaking
arrangements. An important aspect of this function was ensuring the minister had time to
134 think and reflect on decisions that needed to be made. Much of the minister’s own policy work was built around the scheduling of his or her time:
An effective minister in my view is one of those that spent a couple of hours in the office
and the rest of the time dealing with the community. So you don’t have the time to sit
and drive programs. The most important part is to find time to think and contemplate
issues. (Minister 2)
This reflection underlines the scarcity of discretionary time and the importance of decisions surrounding its allocation. It further underlines the importance of creating space for the minister to do vital things, such as thinking. By scheduling the minister’s time, advisers could ensure the minister remained focused on the policy agenda. Ergo, time is a resource that needs to be managed effectively.
Acting as a confidante and sounding board
Most advisers and ministers interviewed mentioned that advisers acted as a confidante – someone in whom ministers could confide, share personal information, thoughts and ideas,
and someone to provide moral and emotional support when conflicts arose. This was crucial for ministers, who found the demands of their job heavy-going and stressful and needed to rely on advisers to “hear them out” (Adviser 4) and “vent” (Adviser 7). One adviser said he played this role when the minister for whom he was working was embroiled in a controversy that ultimately cost him his job:
[He] was at a very low point in his career. The centre of controversy about deaths in
custody, misleading the Parliament, he had to resign over that. So you have to be
prepared to listen and take the hits because they’re going through a kind of hell, you
know, their career’s had it, their credibility too. (Adviser 4)
Another adviser commented:
I’d had a lot of sway over [name omitted]. I’d say “do you really want to do that”, … and
I’d explain my reasons. Ministers have lots of ideas which from time-to-time they need to
be disabused of. (Adviser 5)
135 It was not beyond the scope of an adviser therefore to be forceful and offer a challenge to the minister’s views and actions.
Often ministers, when trying to bring about change or come to terms with a controversy, would rely on advisers to listen and respond as they talked through their ideas and courses of action:
In some cases, if a minister had intense feelings of anger to the extent that they were
unable to move on, they relied on advisers to listen to their concerns. (Minister 2)
Advisers, including those who had previously worked in the role, stated that they acted as a sounding board for issues that arose for the minister. This is a function Walter (1986) and
Dunn (1997) revealed in their research and has been reported on here to demonstrate the enduring nature of advisers’ roles. Based on the interview data, this particular role meant asking critically reflective questions, providing ideas, playing the ‘devil’s advocate’, and going over strategies and discussing tactics for dealing with the Opposition. At times this meant being a ‘critical friend’:
You’d bounce ideas around, hear the minister out on what she wants to do, you say “do
you really want to go down that path” … Yes, there’d be robust discussion about lots of
ideas and I wasn’t afraid to raise my eyebrows at some of them. (Adviser 4)
Challenging the minister to consider the implications of a particular course of action, therefore, is not outside the limits of an adviser’s role; it seems that they are comfortable serving as the minister’s conscience, even at times controlling what they saw was his or her possible excesses.
This particular role was invaluable when there was something important to progress on the minister’s agenda that “they had ignored or not thought much about” (Adviser 6). Acting as a sounding board for the minister provided advisers with the opportunity to add their thoughts to those of the minister, and opportunities to explore more consequences of a given decision than would otherwise be the case. It required being fully immersed in the issue before the minister without succumbing to his or her way of thinking. Adviser 2 said,
136 “The minister would regularly ask my opinion, ask lots and lots of questions. He respected my views on things.”
A measure of the significance of this role is highlighted in the responses advisers provided
to the question of whether their views were incorporated into their minister’s thinking.
Adviser 2 said, “the minister would take on board many suggestions”, Adviser 3 stated, “he
took what I had to say seriously”, and Adviser 7 said, “my views were nearly always
welcomed”.
Acting as the minister’s eyes and ears
Another personal support function was serving as the minister’s eyes and ears. This function too appears This meant, as some revealed, “keeping the minister in the loop about what was happening in the Parliament, with interest groups, and the department” (Adviser
1) and what was happening with “the Opposition” (Adviser 3); it was a function supplemental to the representing role. One of the subtle purposes of carrying out this function was to gather ‘intelligence’ for the minister and pick up on the political ‘rumblings’ in the Caucus, the party, and the Opposition. Advisers needed to develop a sharp sense of the minister’s interests to ensure the political implications of a policy were not ignored.
Advisers reported that, when they interacted with ministers, the discussion would frequently centre on hot political issues and the impact these would have on the government:
I’d keep an eye on what was going on in the community; the hot-button issues if you like.
(Adviser 2)
Being attentive to outside matters. (Adviser 3)
Advisers are well placed to take the pulse of the minister’s outside world and to know when and how issues might develop into major political problems; they rely on their contacts and networks as well as skills in analysing political information.
Some ministers reported that advisers needed to possess political sensitivity in scanning the political environment for problems and discerning the likely political ramifications of a
137 policy issue or proposal. This also required the ability to grasp how political issues were constructed in the media and the political environment:
I think an important skill for an adviser is to be able to grasp all matters political, however
these manifest. They need to be able to pick up the politics of policy; how’s this going to
impact on this group? Has this group been consulted? What if the media hears about it?
(Minister 3)
Serving as the minister’s eyes and ears was considered by the participants a lower-order but vital function that advisers performed. Ministers having heavy workloads means they
are reliant on advisers to gather information about the political support and opposition that proposals are likely to generate, and the ‘deals’ that can be made with various stakeholders. It was a support function that involved attending meetings with public servants, organised interests and journalists, and dropping in on advisers in other offices, members of parliament and, in some cases, other ministers:
We have to be the minister’s eyes and ears because he’s busy, he’s got commitments,
he can’t be everywhere basically. (Adviser 5)
Protecting and minding
One of the more frequently reported aspects of an adviser’s function was acting as the minister’s protector or minder. This function was detected in a number of general statements about some of the lower-order functions performed by advisers. Words and phrases such as “protecting”, “protector”, “looking after the minister’s interests” and “acting as the minder” and “his guardian” (Advisers 2, 3, 5, 6 and 2 respectively) were used; these provide a useful gauge of the role advisers perform in shielding the minister from damaging situations. In many respects, these descriptors serve as a useful reminder that, although advisers’ roles have evolved quite extensively since their introduction, some responsibilities remain core and enduring.
There was an expectation that advisers would protect the minister’s interests at all costs even if it meant putting their careers on the line. Adviser 4 explains:
138 You are the fall guy at times. I’ve seen it with a friend of mine who works for [name
omitted] who got into a bit of mess with ... you know the high school gun matter19.
This role is multifaceted and ranges from serving as a ‘lightning rod’ for criticisms about policy or the administration of the department, serving as a proxy for the minister by performing unpleasant tasks such as mediating disputes and controlling access, and generally working behind the scenes on unpopular issues. In the case of one adviser, it appears he enjoyed playing the role of ‘bad cop’:
I played the ‘bad-cop’ role lots of times when tough questions had to be asked of
commanders who were running their own show. I’d meet with them and give them a
serve, absolutely! (Adviser 3)
Troubleshooting
Advisers also help ministers resolve problems of a ‘bureaucratic’ nature which are brought to his or her attention by the media, interest groups and/or individual members of the public. This was referred to by some advisers and ministers as troubleshooting and encompassed “untangling messes” (Adviser 3), “cutting bureaucratic red tape” (Adviser 5), and “sorting out [the] bullshit” (Adviser 6) to bring about an immediate resolution of a problem. In many respects, this particular function highlights how advisers are able to give ministers flexibility in responding to complex problems expeditiously. It also reaffirms the theme that advisers increase ministers’ capacity to respond to challenging situations by sometimes ignoring rules, regulations, policies and relationships.
Some advisers were effective in this role because they had intimate knowledge of the workings of the department and “knew what was going on and who to contact” (Adviser 2):
I guess we know how the system works, know who knows the answers, and question
why things are the way they are. (Adviser 3)
Thus, they see themselves as being able to handle concrete problems quickly and appropriately, using common sense to get things done.
19 This is discussed further in Chapter 17: Accountability.
139 The ministers interviewed believed there were significant benefits to be realised from advisers being used to identify and resolve ‘bureaucratic’ problems or complaints about departmental operations. It could, for example, help establish trust with the person or organisation raising the complaint. Significantly, it could also yield political capital if promises or actions were delivered on:
Navigating the workings of the departments was something [name omitted] was good at
... she had the ability to overcome barriers so that the vision could become a reality.
(Minister 3)
This function is therefore important in implementing the minister’s vision, which advisers
achieve by working the system, using their negotiation skills, and applying their knowledge
of the bureaucratic system.
Conclusion
This chapter outlined the personal support functions advisers performed. Far from being trivial, this sphere of activity included important functions to support the minister execute his
or her functions effectively. Relevantly, advisers derived significant administrative authority from performing these personal support functions.
140 CHAPTER 7 – INFORMATIONAL ROLES
As described in Chapter 4, ministers are burdened with large amounts of information they need to have processed and managed. It was pointed out that a key constraint on ministers
is that they are too busy to view and act on every piece of information that enters the
ministerial office. A corollary of this information overload is that time devoted to important
policy issues can be very short, with insufficient opportunity for thorough analysis.
Accordingly, advisers play a significant role in helping ministers deal with this aspect of
their role, and do so by presenting information in a form which ministers are able to digest
quickly and make decisions on. It is, as Minister 4 put it, a role that is “invaluable because it
helps [ministers] make the right choices”. However, central to this chapter is what advisers
do with the information they either seek or receive on behalf of ministers. There are six
areas to be explored within this overall theme: ‘advising’, ‘filtering’, ‘investigating’, ‘critical
analysis’, ’attentiveness to issues’, and ‘speechwriting’.
Advising
Are you there to advise on politics, what’s going to keep a minister in power? Or are you
there to advise on what the community really wants out of that portfolio? (Representative
1)
As their job title suggests, advisers provide ministers with advice. How they advise and what they advise on are fundamentally important to this study. Advising was seen as a critical role for advisers to perform in assisting ministers with decision-making. The advisory role included evaluating possible policy options, advising on the selection of policy alternatives, and sensitising the minister to the political implications of actions that were being recommended. As expected, all advisers interviewed had a different take on what it meant to provide advice, but they all said that this was the essence of their role. In
response to a question as to how advice to the minister was prepared and presented,
Adviser 7 said:
Every office was different but then most of us provided advice based on some research
that we would have done. It might’ve come as a directive from Nick [Greiner] …. It
141 might’ve come up because it was in the media ... The advice could be prepared as a
summary attached to a briefing note from the department. It could be a separate briefing
altogether. Would it contain recommendations? It would but it was generally something
along the lines of: “The department should investigate … this matter further – that kind of
thing”.
Adviser 1 provides a similar take on this issue:
[An Adviser] who can also seek information on an issue not just from the department but
from the relevant community groups, peak body, can spend a bit of time on the internet,
can ring the minister’s office in Queensland and say “what’s your experience in this?
We’ve heard that there’s some scheme happening in the USA”.
Adviser 4 said:
After sorting through all the information that comes to the minister and after you’ve
helped prioritise issues, you’d then advise the minister on what to do next.
It is evident from these three assessments of what advising entails that advisers are extremely well positioned to provide input into aspects of the policy process. It can occur
early in the process when a minister issues a directive. It can involve adding to the work of
the department by looking further afield and incorporating the policies of other jurisdictions.
Importantly, it can involve making recommendations for the minister to decide on. The
advisory function is also heavily intertwined with their informational roles, which were
described earlier.
Some advisory functions are based on advisers’ expertise or the “political nous” (Adviser 4)
they brought to the role. It was acknowledged that there were two important streams of
policy advice. The first was technical advice, and, although this was mainly provided by
officials, advisers were expected to filter this advice or impart their knowledge or expertise
on it before presenting it to the minister for his or her assessment. Advisers appointed for
their expertise concentrated primarily on scrutinising departmental initiatives. They pointed
out weaknesses and provided suggestions that reflected established government policy
and personal insights and opinions. Advisers could improve the advice received from
142 departments by providing a political overlay to it, and “by contesting the department’s advice” (Adviser 6). In general, advisers were perceived to be effective for their political
‘know-how’ and ability to respond quickly to public concerns, as opposed to getting into all the ‘nuts and bolts’ of a particular policy. They were likely to discuss the political and electoral implications of advice coming from departments, including the likely reception from the media.
In this context, the role of advisers was perceived as supporting the policy advisory role of departments because it would shield the public service from the partisan risks associated with advising ministers. Official 3, also a former adviser, described this in more detail:
It’s a legitimate function that advisers’ have … to work out the politics of a policy that we
might be working on … I accept that … it wouldn’t be right, for instance, for us to be
talking about how the minister might get political mileage out of doing this or doing that.
This is an assessment that accords with the findings of other researchers on political staffing, which is that advisers are increasingly being seen as having a rightful place within government to deal with the political dimension of policy development. However, as will be shown in other parts of this study, politics and policy are not as distinct as this observation implies.
The second stream of advice advisers provided, according to the participants, involved consideration of a policy’s consequences on the electorate, community, media or political party. Political advice was expected to help ministers understand the dimensions of a problem.
Ministerial advisers appointed as generalists tended to advise on the partisan viewpoints on policy options and would focus their advisory role on monitoring issues throughout the process while questioning their political aspects. Of importance to the function of advising was being able to integrate policy and politics, that is, to ascertain the degree of risk associated with the nature of a particular policy being considered and the strategy imperatives arising from the information received by the minister from the department:
143 The minister would be getting good policy advice about which schools to close but they
couldn’t tell us what the fallout of that would be … so it was basically our role to come up
with what that would be … you know, you had to work out who was going to be screwed
before letting the minister know. (Adviser 6)
It was rare for meetings between ministers and officials to exclude advisers. Many ministers considered it “absolutely essential” (Ministers 2 and 4) for advisers to be present at these meetings, so that advisers could keep abreast of the policy areas departments were working on. Advisers were also effective at providing countervailing advice, particularly if they were brought in for their specialist knowledge. At times this countervailing function would extend to the ministerial adviser playing devil’s advocate “so that issues could be
debated” (Minister 3).
The relationship between a minister and an adviser meant that such debates could consider “all things absurd” and the “politically risky” (Adviser 3). This, in part, depended on the trust and loyalty of the relationship between ministers and advisers. Policy debates in which advisers argue the opposite view could take a course of their own without fear of being publicly scrutinised by departments. As Adviser 4 explained:
… you’re in that position where they know the minister trusts you and relies on you and
is looking for your advice and then you show that you’re open ... we had some incredibly
robust discussions night after night after night … whether it was about anything from
smoking in the workplace to building royal commissions ...
While unlikely to possess the intense familiarity with issues of departmental officials, advisers do not confront the problems commonly associated with large bureaucracies, such as intransigence. The position advisers hold within the machinery of government means they are able to place their analysis of policy options within the larger context of the minister’s role and to temper their advice with an understanding of the minister’s political needs.
Part of their advisory function involves telling ministers “things they do not want to hear”
(Adviser 6) or questioning assumptions about specific policies. One adviser who had
144 worked for an education minister in the Greiner government remarked on having to challenge the minister’s ideas because they “had been tried and tested before” (Adviser 6), observing that there was little point in these policies being pursued another time. This suggests that advisers can bring a type of corporate knowledge or memory to policy debates once they have become established and experienced in the role. Since advisers are ‘on tap’, this countervailing advisory function can be readily and easily mobilised at a moment’s call. It may also be the case that there is a time and place for advisers to tender frank and fearless advice in much the way as same senior public servants are expected to.
As Adviser 6 explains:
You need people to be looking at or assessing advice in terms of its appeal to the
community broadly, its regional input, or Sydney impact and having an adviser who’s
had experience in another area can add value because well “we tried that in health” or
“when I was a prison officer I discovered that no-one could read” therefore in my role as
advising you as education minister I think we ought to put [name omitted] on to this.
Thus, a key role of advisers is to sensitise the minister to the kinds of issues the department is working on or controversies among interest groups. This was considered important among some ministers who had to make critical policy decisions. As Adviser 7 said:
Here’s a problem, what do you want to do? That wasn’t the way he worked and you’d
have to have all the facts sorted out. So the advice I would give him was “Here are some
suggested solutions to this problem”. There’s other advice like, we’d go through the
speeches and say here’s an opportunity to talk about this particular issue that I might
want to get on the agenda so we can do it here or there. Every morning there’d be a
staff meeting at 7.30 with his media staff ... so I would contribute to that meeting which
could be a logistic or content of a piece of strategic advice.
At the heart of the advising function therefore was the responsibility for providing the minister with ideas and options on how to best cope with emerging issues, or to advise on a course of action the minister might be contemplating.
145 Filtering
Ministers have a tremendous need for information and, advisers play a crucial role in filtering information that comes to the minister’s office. In filtering information, advisers act as a type of sieve, prioritising information for the minister’s attention. They act as the first point of contact for any external source wishing to communicate with a minister, and as the first filter for all departmental documents and any written material.
The filtering function advisers perform stems mainly from the need to help ministers cope with the amount of information they receive. It ensures that information that goes to the minister is of a high standard and satisfies the interests of the minister. It also enables the department to gauge the minister’s likely reaction to a policy proposal; as one adviser put it:
But the Department would do that too in a sense. That’s how they use you as a filter and
an interpreter and a tester because you have better insight into what was flying and what
wasn’t. (Adviser 1)
This response serves to underscore the significance of advisers’ work in organising for policy- and decision-making. Based on this adviser’s assessment, advisers are used by departments to ensure their advice is pitched correctly, and advisers in turn offer feedback on what is likely to be acceptable to the minister.
This particular function suggests that advisers have a great deal of discretion in determining the type of information passed on to ministers. Interest group representatives expressed concern that the filtering of information by advisers may lead to the minister being misinformed:
They’re supposedly … taking information on behalf of the minister, and my experience
with being confronted with that is that they say they’ll take those issues forward to the
minister for further consideration, but you’re never totally confident that the minister hears
them. (Representative 1)
An obvious question to arise from this participant’s evaluation of advisers’ filtering role is whether information makes its way to the minister for consideration in the form intended. As
146 will be shown in other parts of this study, interest groups and government officials are often concerned that advisers can distort information and/or misinform the minister.
Official 3 expressed a similar view, although he saw the filtering function as a usurpation of the department’s expertise:
Advisers filter every issue and every communication through to the minister and every
policy and every decision, and it’s very hard to untangle them. I think if it leads to an
isolation of the real expertise it can be a real problem.
There are at least two elements of criticism here. First, as mentioned by this participant, advisers appear to be quite influential in determining what gets through to the minister, and their involvement in handling departmental information can create problems that are difficult to reverse. Second, the adviser system may represent a parallel administrative structure, appropriating many of the tasks departments have been established to undertake.
Advisers applied a framework of analysis that was largely informed by the management style, information needs and predispositions of the minister, as well as by the currency and saliency of the issue being considered. This framework served as a lens through which advisers made judgements about what went through to the minister for his or her consideration and what did not. Since information is a powerful resource in politics, the
ability of advisers to influence the flow of information to ministers by filtering useful
information provided by other sources, and by generating their own independent policy
analysis, places them in a very influential position. Moreover, it reaffirms one of the key
themes to emerge from this study – the way in which minister’s bias is used to bring order
to the large amounts of information that enter the ministerial office.
An ability to exercise judgement in all phases of analysis – from sorting out the most
important problems when dealing with voluminous information, to ensuring that the many
facets of a policy issue are explored, to sifting evidence and developing feasible options or
alternative proposals and anticipating policy consequences – was seen as critical in this
particular area of work:
147 [What] you have to have a sense of is this ready to go to the minister, or do I just send
this one back? … So as I said you’re back to a filtering role.
In filtering information, advisers would be expected to highlight which interest groups would be affected and whether the department had consulted them to ensure the matter had some degree of acceptance. Admittedly, this would not always rule out the policy’s endorsement by the minister or government but it would bring to the fore knowledge about where the political sensitivities lay:
But more than that, they’re the gatekeepers in terms of filtering or sieving the policy
proposals for their political content, both clearly party political but also broader. (Minister
1)
Adviser 4 made the following observation:
… at the end of the day a minister’s office is driven by those ‘pink’ files that come
through: what are the issues? What’s the recommendation? What’s the role of the
minister? Sometimes you’re a sort of ‘filter’ of departmental advice to the minister. You’re
adding a summary. You’re helping prioritise.
Representative 1 made a similar assessment:
I think the minister has huge levels of responsibility, and they need someone to filter
advice. Someone is needed to give a précis of what it’s all about so that the minister can
deal with that. I imagine advisers do that.
The filtering function ensures information that goes to the minister is of a high standard and satisfies the information needs of the minister. Filtering gives advisers significant authority to decide what information goes through to the minister and in what form. In filtering
information, advisers need to ‘think like the minister’, taking into account their
understanding of the minister’s views on an issue. For departments, there is a concern that the advisers’ filtering function can result in information loss.
Investigating
… it was up to me to see to it that the minister got information to help her make
decisions. (Adviser 1)
148 One of the more discernible functions of advisers involves investigating. This was seen by participants in this study as essential to helping ministers with their decision-making and
enabling advisers to carry out their advisory function and develop an agenda for the
minister to consider. The investigative function was seen as important in filling in
“knowledge gaps” (Adviser 3) arising from the department’s analysis of a policy issue and keeping the minister in the ‘information loop’. This ensured ministers received updates on departmental activities in a timely and synchronised manner.
The investigative function also extended to enabling the minister to “keep an eye on what the Opposition was doing” (Adviser 3). This proved valuable for shaping the minister’s arguments to highlight the Opposition’s policy weaknesses and to anticipate their actions and positions on policy issues. Since ministers have little time to thoroughly analyse policies developed by the Opposition, they depend on advisers to pinpoint the Opposition’s policy strengths and weaknesses:
Another one of their roles is to monitor the work of the Opposition, what they’re saying
[to] the media about the portfolio, the government etc. With the media being the way it is
nowadays, constant, immediate and profuse, it has to be monitored. (Minister 6)
Activities associated with the investigative function included researching legislative and policy proposals, consulting with interest groups to assess a policy’s impact (including those emanating from the department and the Opposition), gathering and synthesising factual and analytical information, and compiling reports for ministers to evaluate. Their investigative role was justified on the ground that advisers were expected to look at issues from a wider perspective than that provided by departments. This helped resolve information asymmetries that may exist between the minister and his or her department, and between the minister and external sources, such as interest groups. This was seen as critical to the work of ministers in helping them make decisions and influence the direction of departments. Adviser 5 demonstrates this point:
It is important that advisers learn quickly what information to get and how to get it …
Accuracy of information is especially important because advisers are always working
149 with incomplete information … and they have to be able to solve those sorts of
problems.
One minister commented that advisers would be expected to do extensive research on a policy idea before passing it on to the department for analysis. This was done to ensure the policy had credibility and could withstand the rigours of analysis of the department.
Critical analysis
There was strong evidence from advisers, ministers and officials that advisers provide critical analysis on pieces of written information intended for ministers. It would be the
adviser’s role to go through each piece of correspondence or policy proposal and consider
the claims made by the department. Similarly, it would be the adviser’s role to make
notations on matters to do with the proposal’s timing, its newsworthiness, and the extent to
which it would cause controversy. Advisers would also make comments that were directive
and highly political in nature and would invariably result in fairly significant policy changes.
The following comment provides a measure of advisers’ functions in bringing critical
analysis to bear on information prepared for the minister:
I’d read every briefing note and policy proposal and make comments on them, like this is
‘highly political’ or is likely to offend some group, that kind of thing. Would they contain
instructions for the department? Yeah yeah. I’d write or send it back with comments “How
did you come to this conclusion”? “Can you provide evidence”? Education would regularly
put up stuff that didn’t consider all the implications so we’d always send it back for more
information. (Adviser 6)
Thus, advisers were entrusted with examining the work of departments and providing a critical review of content. The purpose of this review function was to identify potential problems and gaps in the department’s analysis, and to work through the political implications.
Ministers expected advisers to comment on which interest groups would likely be impacted by the proposal. It was their role to detect any points of contention, assess gaps in
information, and tease out issues deemed ‘sensitive’ and controversial. An example of
150 advisers providing political comments on departmental submissions came from an adviser who worked for the minister for education:
They’d be things to do with political sensitivity. Priorities and timing. You know, “are they
stalling on this or not”? This is really good news and we should make sure no one
announces this and hold it back for a slow Sunday – …or I’m really worried that this is
going to look bad. (Adviser 6)
Some ministers interviewed expected advisers to comment on whether the policy proposal was aligned with the government’s own policy agenda and philosophical approval; if not, it would be their role to make appropriate notations or comments highlighting this fact. Over time, advisers would develop a clear sense of the particular information needs of ministers because it was their role to know “what to look out for” (Adviser 4) when evaluating proposals.
Nearly all proposals developed by departments are read by and commented on by advisers. Many officials interviewed conceded that all proposals go through the ‘eyes’ of a ministerial adviser, whose role it is to provide a ‘political overlay’ to the content of the proposal. Official 2 said:
Advisers pretty much read everything that goes up from me and in a sense it’s their job
to read what we’re recommending and consider the likely impact of that politically.
Ministers rely on advisers to impart their own expertise and perspectives to the consideration of a policy issue, and rely on them to obtain timely, analytical and relevant information. In commenting on the department’s work, advisers would be expected to ask questions of the originator of the proposal. It was evident in the interviews that at times this would involve asking a junior/middle level public servant even without prior approval of the senior government official. Official 3 explains:
And would an adviser come to you for advice or would they go through one of your staff?
Well they go to my policy officers but I would expect them to come through me first. How
often do they go directly to your staff? All the time and all you can do is ask that they
stop.
151 This is one of a few instances reported of advisers making contact with public servants, and raises serious questions about politicisation and whether it is occurring in ways not previously considered in the literature on advisers. At the heart of this issue lies a paradox: on the one hand advisers’ actions have been justified on the grounds that they preserve the neutrality of the bureaucracy by taking on activities of a political nature, but on the other they interact with segments of the public service in ways that officials consider to be inappropriate and improper, an issue that is explored in Chapter 9.
Attentiveness to issues
An important job of the adviser is to keep a watching brief of what is going on in the
department and in the community. (Minister 2)
What I do in my sleep is become aware of things that are problems and hunt through the
Department until I find the people who deal with it. (Adviser 2)
Another function of advisers is attentiveness to issues. They have to keep ministers informed on a wide range of issues, including economic, political, administrative and media matters. In this role, advisers stay attentive to issues as they emerge from the media and meetings with interest groups and stakeholders, then relaying this information to the minister and other advisers. As Minister 1 comments:
Advisers are political antennae – monitoring media, listening to talk shows, conversing
with interest groups, picking up gossip, and attending countless meetings. It’s all about
keeping the minister informed.
Preparing and organising the minister’s briefing papers for Cabinet meetings is an adviser function associated with staying attentive to issues. The adviser’s role here is to see that
everything is in order, to discern any issues relevant to the minister’s portfolio
responsibilities, and to prepare the minister properly for Cabinet briefings. This function can
also involve briefing the minister on matters unrelated to their portfolio:
… I’d get Cabinet briefings together and go through them teasing out what would be
relevant to our minister … It was a way of keeping an eye on what other agencies were
doing that might have an impact on us … (Adviser 2)
152 Attentiveness to issues was a measure of the extent to which a minister would focus his or her attention on some policy issues at the expense of others. At times this would be driven by the media, at others by interest groups. As mentioned, advisers’ roles are shaped by what activities or tasks engage the minister’s attention from time to time and more enduringly.
An essential skill ministers felt advisers needed to support this role was political sensitivity.
This meant being attuned to the political ramifications of a policy proposal for the minister and the broader policy community, as well as having a heightened awareness of how the minister would react to certain news:
An adviser needs to know what is going on in the portfolio because it is simply too big
and departments aren’t geared towards doing that kind of work. My staff would track
what was happening in the media and today that is crucial with the web and 24 hour
news coverage. (Minister 2)
Most advisers and ministers reported that it would be irresponsible to ignore the political implications of a policy proposal developed by the department because it could backfire or have significant ramifications not just for the minister but the government as a whole.
In many respects, this function is about addressing some of the weaknesses ministers perceive departments to have, including a lack of insight into the political environment or an understanding of how political issues will play out in the media and broader policy community, including the parliament. Minister 1 drew attention to the fact that departments are “only good at policy substance and organising”, suggesting they are not adept at scanning the political environment.
Speechwriting
Another important informational role performed by advisers is speechwriting. Some advisers reported that they either vetted speeches written by departments or wrote them themselves. Speeches produced by departments would be assessed by advisers to ensure key themes covered in the speech accorded with the minister’s and the government’s
153 policy, highlighted program achievements (including budget allocations and new spending), catalogued present challenges and future directions, and provided criticisms of Opposition policies and their failures when they were in government. This role was seen as having an
important place in the policy-making process. Sometimes it would serve as an initial prod
for decision-making and framing policy problems and solutions, for example “what the
government is thinking about doing; very broad, very general” (Adviser 4).
Advisers’ involvement in speechwriting varied. Some would write the speech in its entirety,
while others would vet and/or make changes to speeches prepared by the department:
I write speeches. That’d be fairly standard for me. I would review speeches or
correspondence that came from the department – you know – ministerials. (Adviser 1)
I’d look at speeches that departments write before they went to the minister. I’d be
checking … that everything reflected what we were doing. (Adviser 2)
It was the adviser’s role to see to it that the government’s policy commitments were clearly articulated and evident in speeches prepared by departments. At times, speeches would need to be rewritten to take the ‘bureaucratese’ out of the content or to rewrite sections so that it catered for the intended audience. Changes to speeches included inserting the government’s policy initiatives and highlighting the Opposition’s failures. One minister wanted the speechwriting role totally in the control of his advisers because he felt departments “aren’t able to cast the government’s policies in practical terms” (Minister 2), suggesting that public servants are not always well suited to service a minister’s rhetorical needs. Importantly, this implies that there is significant negotiation over language between the minister’s office and the department.
There was evidence that advisers also delivered speeches. One minister commented:
I went to a business meeting at which Arthur Sinodinos [Prime Minister’s chief of staff]
gave a speech … (Minister 1)
As noted by the minister who provided this anecdote, the delivery of a speech by an adviser can be seen as an indication of the evolving roles of advisers and the high degree of trust ministers bestow on them to speak on their and the government’s behalf. It also
154 affirms one of the central findings of this study – that advisers are taking on functions that have formerly been the sole province of the minister, in this case the delivery of speeches.
The writing or vetting of speeches by advisers afforded them significant opportunity to articulate policy, and the preparation of speeches often led to the setting of agendas and clarification of the government’s policy positions. The writing of speeches was an important
component of defining the leadership style of the minister.
Conclusion
A recurring theme throughout the analysis of advisers’ roles is that information and its management are central to what they do. The informational roles they perform are mostly about redressing what they see as information asymmetries that exist between the minister and the department, reducing uncertainty and making recommendations regarding policy options. The examples presented in this chapter indicate that advisers serve as a ‘filter’ and
‘link’ for their minister, providing a vital channel for information and a medium of exchange
(particularly political intelligence) and marshalling public support for policy agendas. The key to success in this latter role is the development of a broad communication network and list of contacts.
155 CHAPTER 8 – THE POLICY ROLES
Having examined a range of functions that advisers perform to help ministers with their own
roles, this chapter now turns to looking at those roles that centre on policy and policy-
making. To this end, and in broad terms, this chapter seeks to answer the following broad
question: What type of roles did advisers perform for ministers of the Greiner/Fahey and
Carr eras in the development of policy? Moreover, and to develop a more elaborate
description of advisers’ policy roles, this chapter also seeks to elicit answers to the
following questions:
1. To what extent did advisers’ policy work involve others?
2. What strategies and tactics did advisers employ in the policy-making process?
3. What was their pattern of activity in relation to how policy was made and then
implemented?
Finding answers to these questions is important because the adviser system which
operates in NSW (and in other jurisdictions, including federally) provides a relatively new and poorly understood way of organising for the development of policy which transcends the hierarchical and rule-based approach of bureaucracies. This thesis argues that advisers bring greater informality to the development of policy and resolution of policy problems than is generally the case with the bureaucracy. But more than this, the adviser system also centralises aspects of policy-making away from the bureaucracy to the ministerial office, depending on a variety of contextual factors such as the minister’s interests, issue salience and policy competence of advisers.
The task of describing advisers’ involvement in the policy process is not as straightforward as it seems. It is tempting simply to go down the path of anchoring a policy episode or instance to a particular policy framework, model or approach, such as the policy cycle, and use this to guide the analysis of advisers’ policy roles and work. However, this would only reveal part of the picture, because the roles of advisers are not as clear-cut as some models of policy-making imply. For instance, the dominant view of policy-making in
156 government – the policy cycle model (Althaus et al 2008), which holds that policy passes through a series of interconnected stages from ‘issues identification’ through ‘decision’ and on to ‘evaluation’ – has been challenged by a growing body of scholarly work which recognises that policy-making is ‘messy’ and complex and in most cases is the outcome of unsettled and competing interests.
For advisers and policy actors alike, policy-making is an activity that emerges almost daily
as they attempt to decide how best to promote the policy interests of their ministers using
whatever institutional resources they have at their disposal. Also, it is an activity that can
take place over a long period and involve multiple decision points and participants, and this
can make explaining the policy process as an observable event extremely difficult. Thus,
and as alluded to in other parts of this study, it is context and nuance that play a significant
part in shaping advisers’ roles. In respect of advisers’ policy roles, this context is largely
informed by the relationships advisers develop with key policy actors (e.g. the minister,
government officials, interest groups), the minister’s policy direction and its impact on
framing the operations of the ministerial office, the advisers’ own policy competence, and
the characteristics of the policy issues confronting advisers.
Before describing and analysing the policy roles of advisers, it would be useful to reiterate
the conceptual foundations for this work and to touch briefly on how the research describes
and conceptualises advisers’ policy roles. As described, policy is the output of
governmental decision-making enacted by a political system as the result of the interplay of
needs, demands and loyalties of the people, institutions and other factors which affect the
system. As Adrian and Press (1977) define ‘public policy’, it is the end result of a process
which includes “negotiation, accommodations, compromise, and the achievement of
proximate rather than ultimate goals.” Policy is the product of a series of decisions which
have common themes and consequently is arrived at unintentionally. At other times, policy
is a conscious and deliberate choice among collective goals which serves as a guide to
future decisions. It is a statement of intentions and reflects a political system’s allocation of
values. To make policy, then, is to participate in this decision process, to allocate collective
157 goods and scarce resources, and to decide, through a competitive and often conflictual process of negotiation and compromise, the direction government will take.
Maley (2002) conceptualises advisers’ policy roles across two complementary dimensions: the vertical dimension which pertains to the downward transmission of authorised decisions; and the horizontal dimension which emphasises the “structured interaction” and the relationships among policy participants that lie outside the authority hierarchy. On the vertical plane, policy actors send courses of action up for endorsement to authorised decision-makers. This dimension stresses rational choice and authority (Colebatch, 2002) and is closely linked to the policy-cycle approach (Monaghen 2011:63), a model that has been criticised for being too government centric (see Colebatch 2006). On the horizontal plane, policy development is likely to involve a number of different groups and organisations with different understandings of the policy question and various levels of interest in cooperating with other entities (Colebatch, 2002).
In the vertical space, Dunn (1997) found that advisers played a role in shaping policy through overseeing the policy development process, providing direction, evaluating policy proposals, and monitoring implementation (1997:78-93). By comparison, Maley (2002) found that advisers were involved in generating ideas as well as developing and implementing policy (2002:172_181). Like Maley’s, this study also found that advisers initiate and work with ideas to inform policy. Accordingly, this role could be seen to align with the vertical dimension of policy-making because it is concerned with the upward flow of information.
Turning to the horizontal axis, Walter (1992) found certain roles performed by advisers which reinforce this particular dimension of policy-making. For instance, he noted that advisers liaised with the party, media, and organised interests (1992:49). Ryan (1995) detected a significant role in setting policy agendas while Halligan and Power describe advisers as “managing networks of political interaction” (1992:83) Dunn discovered a policy role of advisers not noted in earlier studies: the coordination and brokerage of policy positions among ministerial offices (Dunn 1997). In her study, Maley assesses the role of
158 ‘active’ policy advisers and discerns five independent roles in horizontal policy making including: agenda-setting, linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilising, bargaining; and delivering. Maley found that these roles were critical to supporting ministers develop and deliver on partisan goals and managing the external political context (Maley 2002:182-
198). Maley asserts that advisers’ policy roles in the horizontal dimension are “difficult to observe and articulate” (2002:199). The policy roles identified and described in this chapter may go part way to resolving this difficulty.
These earlier studies revealed an expanding role set for advisers in managing exchanges between governmental policy actors (e.g. public servants) and stakeholders that fall outside this relational space (horizontal). But what is not entirely clear from these studies is whether this model of policy-making is being used to guide the analysis of advisers’ policy roles or to test its utility with a view to generating new insights into its application or theories about policy-making. Certainly, from the evidence presented in those studies, there is scope for this to be done. With the exception of Maley’s research, earlier writers do not make reference to this model of policy-making in their analysis of advisers’ policy roles. Nor is it clear from the analysis of advisers’ policy roles if these form part of a continuum that advisers play in the policy process. Furthermore, it is not clear how this model – in particular the vertical frame of policy-making - deals with policy actors who are unauthorised decision-makers, such as ministerial advisers. In NSW, advisers’ functions are not specified in policy or law and questions continue to be asked regarding their legitimate place in this state’s governmental system. Can they be categorised as an
‘authorised decision-maker’ like ministers, the Cabinet, and public servants, as this model of policy-making appears to suggest? If so, is some reconceptualisation of this model warranted? Further, does the analysis of advisers’ policy roles along this plane mean that they should now be regarded as having some kind of legitimate ‘authority’?
If advisers are to be regarded and referred to as a political institution then this needs to be contextualised and evinced in some way. This is an important component of the analytical framework for this study. The policy roles presented in this chapter are suggestive of a role-
159 continuum ranging from the introduction of ideas to the monitoring of policy activity in the departments. This continuum gives advisers structural power to influence policy-making processes that are conditioned by the external political context. In many respects, this role continuum defines advisers’ institutionality; that is, those ‘things’ that give advisers their institutional form which in part derives from the processes they fashion to organise for the development of policy and from the routines they follow which impact on policy content.
As stated from the outset, this study does not set out to apply a particular model or theory of policy as this would be inconsistent with the inductive nature of the research. An important aim of this study is to identify how advisers define policy and view their place in
the policy-making process. This is because much of the literature in this area very rarely
captures practitioner accounts of these concepts.
Maley’s study found that advisers performed a number of independent roles, like
bargaining, which arose from their interactions with interest groups. That advisers perform
independent roles implies these are distinct and mutually exclusive. However, the voices of
these policy actors – organised interests - are not reflected in the analysis of this particular
function or in ones similar to it. This means descriptions of this role are likely to be heavily
biased towards the views of advisers. Advisers might view themselves as having a bargaining role, but others might see this function in a different light. My study shows these roles are relationally based and more likely to manifest interdependently because they involve structured and routine interactions between actors.
The context of advisers’ policy-making roles
Far from working in a vacuum, advisers participate in policy-making alongside a myriad of other policy actors, including interest groups and government officials. It is the interplay among these policy actors that both governs and helps unravel the types of policy-making functions advisers perform within the machinery of government.
Advisers read, interpret, produce and shape policy in the policy setting within which they work. This setting is the ministerial office and represents the locus around which advisers
160 engage in policy work. As has been noted throughout this study, the ministerial office has evolved as an organisation and entity in its own right out of the minister’s need for
information. It can now be seen as representing the nerve centre of governmental activity, providing ministers vantage points into the policy-making process and a base from which to leverage their resultant power and influence.
Advisers’ policy roles as seen by ministers, officials and interest groups
When participants were asked to describe the policy roles of advisers and how they saw policy being made, their responses gave rise to rather prosaic though telling conceptualisations of policy and policy-making. Some were informed by the personal interests and policy preferences of the minister, while others were shaped by events or circumstances of which only advisers had knowledge.
Advisers enter the policy-making process in a variety of ways. Though the dictates of the minister drive much of what advisers do in policy-making, chance or circumstance also appear to play a significant part. In this sense, advisers would fashion or seize upon opportunities purely because of the knowledge and experience they had accumulated over time, and because of the unique place they had grown to occupy within the machinery of government. Evidence in support of this idea came from Minister 3, who conceptualised advisers’ policy roles as taking “advantage of policy opportunities”, which he believed tended to occur in the early stages of a government’s term. According to this minister, this was the period in which a newly elected government would be laying the groundwork for implementing its policies, ‘feeling its way’ through the bureaucratic landscape, and coming to terms with enduring policy issues:
Perhaps I should say the extent to which a policy adviser is crucial might vary according
to whether it’s a new government to whether it’s a long established government. So I
would take the view that a policy adviser in the context of a freshly elected Carr
Government in 1995 might be even more important [than] in the context of the Carr
Government just re-elected in 2003 … there’s usually a flurry of activity early on and
161 your policy advisers can take advantage of policy opportunities that come up when all
this change is happening.
Early on, the foundational work of Opposition staff can potentially produce some of the most substantially useful contributions to policy-making. Seen in indicative terms at least, these staffers were reported as having done a great deal of policy development work in
Opposition and were actively involved in the implementation of policy once they moved into
the ministerial adviser role. Adviser 1 provides some context to this viewpoint:
I was the sole staff person as I say about 18 months before March 95 election … that I
guess gave me grounding into a raft of policy areas – community services, children,
disability etc … In that role you’re basically involved in helping the shadow minister
formulate an alternative policy platform.
Advisers, therefore, have opportunities to work on policy in Opposition within a political party context. Work in Opposition provides a solid grounding for understanding political and governmental processes and the policy environment in general. Adviser 1, for example, said he was exposed to a wide range of policy issues while assisting the shadow minister to develop alternative policies.
Gaps based on shortages of information and expertise also created opportunities for advisers to become involved in policy-making. As one adviser put it:
You go where other people aren’t. In the first few months there are a lot of policy gaps …
where there’s simply a complete lack of concern for selling priorities. (Adviser 1)
Policy opportunities also arose when ministers focused their attention elsewhere or took a low-level interest in a policy area and advisers were able to stake a claim to the policy area and engage in policy-making with the aim of filling the policy void. One example of this was provided by an adviser who worked with another adviser responsible for developing the government’s education policy for people with a disability. This particular adviser worked for
Terry Metherell in the early years of the Greiner government and was allowed to develop the government’s ‘special education’ policy (as it was called then) because the minister was unable to give his attention to this particular area of education policy. The adviser who had
162 responsibility for developing the government’s special education policy was able to take
advantage of the vacuum created by this minister:
And this is where I think [adviser’s name omitted] is a little different ... [He] worked more
in some of the social policy areas, like special education ... And I think [the adviser] was
more influential in creating policy and setting the agenda and telling Metherell this is
what’s important. (Adviser 6)
One minister was content to allow his advisers ‘free rein’ in their involvement in policy- related activities because they could be trusted and were needed to drive the minister’s policy agenda:
… I would allow my staff to work autonomously on policy. I had full trust in their ability …
to work with the department on policy ideas … (Minister 2)
Another, on the other hand, was more controlling and wanted his advisers to work on specific projects:
… the political advisers would work on projects generally assigned by me. If I had an
idea I would say “Let’s work this up” … Seldom would they do their own thing …
certainly not without my knowing. (Minister 6)
One minister commented that it would be rare for advisers to develop a policy position which would be adopted by government or the adviser’s minister. Instead, they contributed to the debate by carrying out research, responding to the initial position statements and identifying implementation challenges:
… it’s been my experience that advisers don’t generally develop policy positions …
that’s either my role or the government’s when it develops its policy platform … that’s not
to say they don’t contribute to policy in ways like speaking with the department and
interest groups …. (Minister 4)
Advisers played a host of other roles in policy-making that contributed to the policy-making process. According to Minister 4, advisers played an important role in “generating knowledge” and “articulating issues” in the policy-making process.
163 In a similar vein, advisers were seen as being in an ideal position to exploit the broad nature of their roles by engaging in ‘big picture’ thinking or ‘pushing the envelope’ on policy development. Advisers in this context would serve as a sounding board for new ideas by helping to clarify issues and options for the minister:
… I would help the minister work out how his policy would be implemented. … he drove
policy [and] I certainly helped him with the process … trying to keep a timetable going
with the Department so that they would do what he wanted to do … He’d also bounce
ideas …. (Adviser 6)
One minister reported that he staked out positions on major policy issues but asked advisers to analyse and suggest policy options and commented, “they have influence on policy just by developing policy options.” (Minister 3)
Another minister acknowledged the importance of advisers in the formative stages of a policy:
I would carve out the political parameters – here’s where we want to go – and I then
asked staff to fill in policy options for getting there … But the buck stops with me.
[Advisers] play a good role in the ‘what if’ scenarios … if you do this then this will
happen. (Minister 6)
Minister 3 saw his advisers as energisers of the policy process, providing a counter-force to bureaucratic influences. This minister oversaw an extensive policy reform agenda which he recognised could only be implemented with the assistance of people who “shared” and could “drive” his policy agenda. As energisers, advisers were expected to assess and translate their minister’s policy preferences and take necessary action to make the department responsive and attuned to the government’s plans.
Similarly, Minister 5 saw his advisers as “catalysts” who, because of their unique skills, position and understanding of the minister’s policy preferences, could bring about the sorts
of changes reflected in the government’s policy agenda:
… they’re catalysts … you need people who can help you bring about change because
you’re up against it trying to get your departments to do what you want them to.
164 There was a wide arc of views among officials with some feeling that policy development had been totally usurped by the ministerial office, and the bureaucracy being left to do only policy implementation. One official acknowledged that policy development resembled a
‘tug-o-war’ in which it “would be our ideas versus theirs [and that] that was the order of things” (Official 3).
Most officials interviewed for this study saw advisers performing a legitimate and valuable role in policy-making. However, they often tempered their remarks with an acknowledgement that departments still played the dominant role in developing and managing the policy-making process:
Advisers have a legitimate role in helping ministers with their responsibilities – they’ll
work on policy that’s probably more political than technical and making sure the minister
has all the information in front of him or her to make decisions. Departments still are the
experts; … departments are principally and steadfastly the government’s principal
adviser. (Official 4)
According to the official who provided the following comment, advisers’ policy roles tended to be limited to issue-management, a role that was seen to be important in helping ministers manage their work with the media:
The current role of advisers is less in terms of policy input although one person in the
minister’s office has a degree of expertise in construction industry matters, therefore
there’s a reasonable input there. That level of expertise is no greater than the
department and the department people of course have the benefit of time and resources
and interaction with other players and therefore in the minister’s eyes we’d still be ahead
of the minister’s staff in that regard. (Official 3)
There were reported instances of advisers announcing policy decisions without the involvement of the department. One official provided an account of a senior officers’ meeting which he had attended and at which an adviser working for the Minister for
Education was also present. He described how this particular adviser announced funding for school maintenance which did not involve consultation with the agency responsible for
165 this particular public works program. The announcement was made in reaction to negative media publicity which the Opposition had orchestrated:
[The adviser] was at a meeting yesterday [and] she came up with a solution and
enforced it and only presented half the information on the solution and her solution was
a bad one which was going to cause a lot of the problems for the minister and she
wasn’t interested in dialogue with us and our minister’s staff to help with considering
options which I think would have been right. … there were clearly some better options.
(Official 3)
This brief account of an adviser’s role in influencing a policy outcome shows the extent to which issues deemed sensitive or controversial for the minister and government at large can suddenly come under the control of the ministerial office with little or no input from the department.
Interest group representatives generally saw advisers’ policy roles in normative terms. For them, advisers were seen as having an important policy role to play in representing their particular concerns and seeing that such concerns were reflected in government policy.
The following comments from two interest group representatives give some flavour to this point:
They ought to be reflecting the interests of the community – I think that’s what their
policy role is. (Representative 1)
… you hope to have a relationship with an adviser where they can more
comprehensively understand your position and describe it to the minister ... assist the
minister in getting a broader context and assist the minister to liaise with the department
in relation to the views of the organisation … [So] we do want the adviser to have some
‘clout’ both with the minister and the department in the issues that we raise.
(Representative 4)
There is acknowledgement by these two participants that advisers provide the minister with additional capacity to respond to community concerns expeditiously and to take the concerns of interest groups into the political arena for action. Here, the policy work of
166 advisers, as seen by non-governmental policy actors, appears limited to policy advocacy rather than actual development and implementation.
Advisers’ policy roles as seen by advisers
Four types of policy roles were discerned from descriptions and case examples provided by advisers. These were:
Initiating – in which proposals for new policies, or changes to existing policies, are
instigated by ministerial advisers
Directing – in which policy is highly centralised and under the control of advisers
Facilitating – in which advisers work in tandem with departments and interest
groups, coordinating activities of these actors and taking an active part in policy
deliberation, and
Monitoring – which involves advisers actively overseeing policy-making that has
been assigned to the bureaucracy.
Initiating
I would be promoting ideas. (Adviser 7)
My view on policy is making good ideas reality. That is what policy should be. And, that
involves a whole lot of things. Making really tough decisions. Working out what are the
good ideas, and what aren’t. But, in answer to your question making good ideas a reality
is what it should be about. (Adviser 3)
It was evident from interviews with advisers and ministers that advisers often initiate policy either through ideas that they had generated themselves or had garnered from other policy domains such as the information networks or personal contacts that they had established.
Some ministers welcomed this particular adviser function because it would “advantage the
government” and “bolster the minister’s standing within the government and the electorate
at large” (Minister 5).
167 The same minister thought the generation of policy ideas by advisers was necessary because it accorded with his approach to policy-making and the government’s policy agenda:
And the way I see their role as working extremely closely to the minister as a team, and
basically exhibiting a loyalty to the minister, but also to the political program of the
government. That involves both implementing pre-existing policy, and coming up with
new ideas that are thought to be of an advantage to the government. (Minister 5)
In the case of the minister who provided the following comment, the initiation of policy ideas by advisers was seen as valuable because it would define the government’s character as being forward thinking and breaking new ground:
I have a view that governments should be bold. They need to try to do things and unless
you’ve got people who can come up with ideas and actually start testing whether that
can work, then you won’t be bold. (Minister 6)
One adviser saw the role of initiating policy ideas as a factor contributing to the
strengthening of the policy capacity of the minister. As the following comment by an adviser
reveals, it is a key function of advisers to look for ideas that help ministers resolve policy problems. It also reveals the extent to which advisers mobilise ideas developed externally.
Ministers rely heavily on their advisers to collect relevant information from a variety of sources and translate ideas into a digestible form for the minister’s consideration in their decision-making:
Most of us who work in an advisory capacity, … we’ve read the major reports by the
National Institute of Justice or the UK Home office, Australian Institute of Criminology …
we do try to be aware of the suggestions that are made because … if we can come up
with ways to fix things then our bosses look tremendous and everyone gets to keep their
jobs. … I wonder if New York policing is the solution to our problem wouldn’t that be
tops: do that and everything will be great. Similarly, people in Juvenile Justice have gone
… “gee I wonder if kids do rural camps?” if that will give them a routine and discipline
and good kick with a horse … it’s not like we’re some kind of congenitally predisposed to
providing sensible ideas, we actively look for them. (Adviser 2)
168 Here is a sense that advisers’ policy work – in the case of the generation or introduction of ideas – can produce certain benefits, some policy related, some political. Seemingly, there is an imperative to align good ideas or policy with politics. Another insight from the foregoing observation is that policy development at times can be reactive, responding to issues that emerge with little warning.
Even though ministers and officials interviewed stated that advisers rarely initiate policy, they did recognise the important functions advisers play in shaping and framing its development. Minister 2 saw advisers as “putting the meat” on the ideas that he would generate and noted that advisers would work with departments to develop these further to the implementation stage. This particular minister admitted that in some instances advisers, when the opportunity arose, would work on policy ideas, but always with the minister’s imprimatur:
Your staff are very important in the level of policy setting. In my case, I would generate
ideas …– the general direction. The policy adviser then – his role is to work with the
Department in putting meat around that idea … with my sanction … to look at what are
the options for handling that idea. (Minister 2)
Some advisers saw themselves as being the ‘litmus test’ for ideas, bringing an independent perspective to bear on policy proposals, questioning assumptions, looking for weaknesses, and providing and suggesting ideas to be followed up by officials. It was generally recognised that advisers do not come to the role with set policy ideas. Rather, this was the minister’s area of responsibility. However, once in the role, advisers were afforded many opportunities to initiate policy ideas, identify and determine policy options, and implement policy:
In most cases I think advisers don’t work up a policy position – that’s for the minister, the
government really. I doubt advisers would’ve thought of the Goods and Services Tax
which the Howard government just introduced. But that’s not to say they don’t suggest
things, bring ideas ... (Minister 1)
169 It was acknowledged that departments remain the main force in generating policy ideas, with advisers taking on the role of mapping their consequences in electoral terms, with
Adviser 1 saying, “it’s our job really to see that it doesn’t upset interest groups.”
Directing
I feel as though I have a great deal of flexibility to pursue issues in which I can say the
minister’s interested – whether she’s expressed a specific interest in it or not, but I rarely
have to do that because of the nature of the meetings with the senior staff you know – the
chief of staff and me are the significant players … (Adviser 1)
Ministerial advisers were also involved in directing policy. In this regard, they were seen as taking a lead on forging the course and substance of policy. Ministerial advisers assumed this role when issues were politically charged and required a high degree of responsiveness from the bureaucracy. Such responsiveness would warrant that advisers synthesise information and coordinate key aspects of the department’s policy work.
However, much of the development of policy would be undertaken by advisers with little
active impact from the department beyond technical advice.
Directing would involve advisers developing policy on their own removed from the purview
of the department. Though departments would provide technical advice when it was
sought, much of this advice would be filtered and integrated by advisers into the substance
of policy advice to the minister. That this occurs to the extent outlined in the following case
example may be seen as further evidence of the erosion of the department’s independence
in policy-making. It may also signal the extent to which its primacy as an adviser to
government on substantive policy is being diminished, with the rise of the ministerial office.
Thus, whereas when initiating policy departments play a key role, they are usually cast
aside or have their role reduced to auxiliary status when advisers direct policy.
An example is the Drug Summit, described in the following case example. In directing
policy, advisers map out a strategy for gaining the minister’s acceptance of his or her
170 agenda. They are likely to be concerned with the ends not the means of pushing their own vision, and have an intense desire to be an active participant in the political process.
Case example – Drug Summit reforms
Adviser 1 provided a good example of the extent of his role in initiating and directing policy.
He spoke of his involvement in the NSW Drug Summit, which was established by Bob Carr in 1999. Its stated purpose was to raise awareness among parliamentarians and the community of the causes, nature and extent of illicit drug use in NSW. It brought together drug experts, politicians, parents, and community and interest groups to develop preventative and remedial measures to address the problem of drugs in NSW, particularly among young people.
Among the several recommendations and policy options canvassed during the summit, one taken up by the minister for whom this particular ministerial adviser worked involved using specific measures to deter and control drug use within juvenile detention centres. One such measure involved the use of ‘sniffer dogs’ to perform searches on staff, inmates and visitors for illicit drugs and other contraband. Another involved the taking of urine samples from staff and inmates to test for illicit drug use.
The decision to introduce these particular measures was, as stated by this adviser, “overtly political”, suggesting that political gain was the main motivation behind the introduction of these measures. In the time leading up to and after the summit, there were numerous media reports criticising the management of juvenile detention centres. There were reports
of riots among “high risk violent detainees”, drug use among detainees and drug trafficking
among staff. It was revealed by the adviser that drug detection methods such as sniffer-
dogs and drug testing were his ideas:
One thing that emerged out of that for us I was referring before was sniffer dogs – that
was me that came up with that. A second one was urinalysis. You know taking regular
samples from kids to find out what they’re consuming. (Adviser 1)
171 It was revealed that the Drug Summit had given the government (and the minister) both the impetus and legitimacy to introduce drug control measures within juvenile detention centres because it had the “support of most politicians” and was in keeping with the community’s expectations about the management of detention centres. In other words, the political risk of pursuing these particular measures was considered low, with gains high.
The ministerial adviser who gave this example had the responsibility of working with the
Department of Juvenile Justice to see that the drug control measures he had proposed, which later became government policy, were implemented. There were high-level negotiations between Adviser 1 and senior bureaucrats within the department over how this would happen. Initially, the department had taken the view that these particular measures were unnecessary and unworkable because they would involve staff taking on roles they were not trained for and would raise controversy among civil libertarians.
From inception to final adoption, the policy had undergone an iterative process of development and evaluation. A departmental committee was formed to consider the policy and other recommendations that came out of the Drug Summit which fell within the purview of the Department of Juvenile Justice. A consultant was engaged to consider the industrial concerns raised by staff and the unions on the drug control measures and other workplace safety issues. For instance, one concern was “who would take the urine sample”. The adviser took active steps to engage the department and sensitise key people to his and the minister’s outlook on this issue. He also had the task of directing the consultation process and taking political soundings from the broader policy community:
You’re regularly meeting and in the end you go through a public consultation process
and yes you’re looking for some agreement out of people. (Adviser 1)
It is difficult to gauge from this adviser’s description of events what strategies were employed to influence the department to enact this particular policy. Indeed, a case study analysis would have canvassed the views of a number of stakeholders to identify how it was that this policy came to be implemented. However, if the following remark by the adviser who gave the example described above is any indication of how the policy was
172 adopted, it would suggest that the department had a minimal if not compromised part to play: “to the department’s credit they accepted it in the end and they’ve gone to some considerable length to adopt it”.
This aside, and at least in indicative terms, the account Adviser 1 provided does highlight the opportunities advisers have to initiate and direct policy. The quote at the beginning of this section shows the degree to which advisers are able to use the trusted nature of their relationship with ministers to pursue policy in an almost unhindered manner. Further, it shows the extent to which advisers are in an ideal position to draw on their expertise and direct policy with little active input from the bureaucracy beyond technical advice.
Facilitating
… we help ministers think through what they want and organise themselves to achieve it
as smoothly as possible. (Adviser 2)
There was evidence from another case example provided by an adviser that in addition to directing policy they also facilitate it. In this sense, advisers seek to forge a middle ground between policy-making being controlled by the ministerial office and policy being left to departments to apply their technical expertise.
In facilitating policy, advisers seek to adopt a ‘blended’ approach in which adviser and department work together to develop policy. In this particular policy role, advisers serve as intermediaries representing and helping the minister to communicate his or her policy ideas and interests to the department. It is the role of the department to feed substantive advice and policy analysis into the ministerial office to inform ministerial decision-making. Advisers in turn play a strong coordination role with the aim of bridging the gap between the minister’s policy direction and the technical expertise of the bureaucracy and interests of community stakeholders.
Advisers tend to assume a facilitating role when policy issues under consideration fall across two or more departments (or policy domains) and when issues are so broad and complex in nature that they warrant the technical expertise of the bureaucracy. Unlike the
173 directing role, in which policy issues are politically charged, conditions exist under which ministers shift the focus of the policy attention in accordance with the dictates of policy content or the political environment. In other words, there is an effort to diffuse tensions arising at the intersection of policy and politics.
Advisers’ engagement with organised interests tends to be more significant here than that in the directing role. They seek to develop working relations with policy communities with a view to achieving a high degree of agreement. Advisers become a proxy for both the minister and the broader policy community by assuring all parties’ views are heard and integrated into decision-making. Thus, theirs is the typical ‘behind the scenes’ role in which negotiation and liaison with policy stakeholders play a significant part. They appear to act as a bridge between ministers and vested interests and usually have personal involvement in the policy-making process without assuming responsibility for policy formulation; that is,
they establish a political climate supportive of policy-oriented change. They work to
overcome the political impediments to components of these changes, and, as the following
case example shows, their policy interests often translate into legislative actions.
In this role, the adviser is more geared towards accommodating the political realities of
policy and compromise than in the directing role; towards building a consensus rather than
generating policy. They see their main tasks as helping the minister realise his or her policy
program. To this end, the adviser works to minimise conflict and maximise coherence.
Case example – workplace safety reforms
Adviser 4, who was recruited for his expertise and background in workplace safety,
provided a good example of the facilitator role advisers perform in policy-making. He worked for the minister responsible for workplace safety and was given the opportunity to work on a “major policy initiative that was his idea” … and which had the support of the
“minister, the Cabinet, and the government of the day”.
The minister’s ‘reformist’ approach to policy development, coupled with Adviser 4’s expertise in workplace safety and related industrial matters, was key to the adviser’s policy
174 facilitation role. Adviser 4 worked on and sought to implement Enterprise Safety Plans
(ESPs) as part of the government’s policy to improve workplace safety in NSW. ESPs are a mechanism for ensuring employers develop and implement safety programs in the workplace in return for certain exemptions from the existing regulatory framework and reductions in insurance premiums.
Adviser 4’s expertise, extensive networks and strong connections in the labour movement proved important factors “in getting this initiative up and running”. He also had the “trust of the minister” to drive this particular policy initiative. His role was to ensure “there was a cohesive, smooth, and coordinated process” with this particular reform. He relied heavily on his own knowledge and personal contacts to ensure he had all the political and policy
advice at this disposal to assess risk accurately. To this end, he served as a facilitator
between the unions, WorkCover and other relevant stakeholders (e.g. NSW Mines
Council), and used both the political and analytical information from this process to inform
the development of the legislative change.
The reform proposals met with some criticism from unions, which saw this particular reform
as a cost-saving exercise and an attempt to restrict their access to the workplace to
conduct safety inspections. To overcome this, he offered assurances to the unions that the reforms were ultimately about “fostering a culture of safety in the workplace” so as to make them safer for workers and more productive for employers.
Adviser 4 kept his minister abreast of developments by providing politically responsive analysis of the issues. He played a pivotal role in policy formation by mediating between departmental policy-makers and interest groups and by guiding debate into various policy arenas.
In order for Adviser 4 to have been effective in coordinating information sources and synthesising policy and political advice, it was necessary for him to find common ground with vested interests, particularly two government departments (WorkCover and Industrial
Relations), state and federal instrumentalities (formal advisory bodies) and the union
175 movement. To this end, he facilitated political strategy meetings to bring along those groups, whose support was needed for the policy’s success. For instance, the unions were able to agree to the ESPs as long as they did not restrict union representatives from entering the workplace to carry out safety checks.
This example is instructive in that it shows the adviser striving for compromise. His
observations also support the impression of high-level coordination. In this manner, he was able to maintain a strong facilitating role, coordinating the critical task of developing the policy proposals while at the same time benefiting from the expertise of bureaucrats and interest groups. The ESPs process appeared to be more open and conciliatory than that of the Drug Summit example, in which the adviser assumed greater control of proceedings.
This may have been because the issue was not mired in the controversy of the Drug
Summit. Adviser 4 was also able to anticipate the reaction of the unions because of his background and familiarity with key players.
Monitoring
… the department doesn’t implement policies the way we like them to … they’re forever
telling us this can’t be done or that can’t be put into practice … so I see my role as
monitoring that what we promised to implement gets implemented. (Adviser 2)
The directing and facilitating roles outlined above represent two types of policy roles in which advisers are actively involved. The final policy role identified from advisers’ accounts of their involvement in policy-making activities was monitoring.
Ministerial advisers become active in monitoring policy when much of the policy work has been delegated to departments for formulation. Policies are delegated because expertise rests almost solely with the department and policy issues tend to be less controversial in nature than those encountered in the other two policy roles. While the ministerial office
relies on the expertise of the department to formulate policy, it is the role of advisers to
monitor the progress and content of the policy under question. As a result, they are
involved in supervising rather than active engagement in policy. Advisers’ actual
176 participation in policy-making is subdued in the monitoring phase but rises and falls according to the degree to which the substance of policy is being developed with regard to
the minister’s preferences. Even though advisers are less active in policy-making activities
than in directing and facilitating roles, they are nonetheless on alert to respond to difficulties
or controversies.
Monitoring of policy tends to occur with issues that are either complex or are of low priority
to the minister and government. In this particular role, there is tacit acknowledgement that
departments are in a better position to put policy ideas to the test. Under this arrangement,
advisers monitor the activities of departments in order to mitigate the problems associated
with information asymmetry. That is, they assume this role to compensate for the fact that
departments have greater information and knowledge about the program activities over
which they have control than ministers. Advisers take a ‘back seat’ in policy formulation and
instead assume a policy monitoring role when policy expertise is lacking in the ministerial
office. In a monitoring role, advisers seek to ensure that policies of the department are
consistent with the minister’s goals.
Monitoring the policy work of the department was seen by the participants in this study as
an important role for advisers because it would enable a minister to be fully informed of the
activities of their department without direct involvement in the formulation or development
of policy. One adviser referred to this as “keeping the policy on track” and ensuring it “toe[d]
the line” (Adviser 2). In the monitoring role, there was strong acknowledgement that the
department had primacy in the development of policy:
The responsibility for the development of policy resides very much with the department.
We have a small role to play … you know, keeping a watch on things. (Adviser 4)
Activities in the monitoring role would involve keeping the minister informed of potential problems, identifying likely political hazards as policy was formulated, and evaluating
departmental briefings or policy proposals. Further, this particular function involves detecting policy changes, identifying implementation problems, and building knowledge
177 about the policy work of departments in order to understand the politics of a policy area and inform the minister’s decision-making.
The analysis presented here suggests advisers rely on open communication and effective contacts within the bureaucracy, with advisers coordinating information coming from the department and advising public servants of the minister’s preference:
The portfolio is just too broad so you do need these people on a daily basis monitoring
particular policy areas and providing advice on that. (Minister 4)
Advisers also make use of external advice to gauge reactions from interest groups and other experts who bring an independent perspective to the process and ensure the proposal will be acceptable to the minister. Thus, in this role advisers act as overseers of the policy work of the department and take a less active role than when directing or facilitating policy.
Monitoring – advocacy services tender
This case example was presented by Adviser 5, who worked for the minister responsible for disability services and programs. In 2001, the minister and her department decided to put to tender the NSW disability advocacy and information services, a funding program for organisations that provide advice, support and representation to people with a disability and their families. The program itself had been the subject of several performance reviews and inquiries by various state government bodies,20 including the department responsible for its funding and administration, the Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care (DADHC).
The impetus for placing the program to tender therefore arose from an identified need to
improve the provision of advocacy and information services to this section of the
community.
20 For example: the Auditor General and Community Services Commission (1997) Large Residential Centres for People with a Disability in NSW; Audit Office of NSW (2000) Performance Audit Report: Ageing and Disability Department – Group Homes for People with Disabilities in NSW.
178 The decision by the minister to put the program out to tender through an expression of interest (EoI) process was based on the rationale that it would lead to improvements in the way advocacy and information services were provided to people with a disability. However, the decision taken to use this method for reforming the program caused considerable concern among disability groups and organisations. In particular, they expressed disquiet about the lack of consultation with and involvement of disability groups in the EoI process and the appropriateness of this method of tendering for the human services. Some groups and organisations were concerned that the reforms would result in services losing their
funding. Others believed the decision was part of a political strategy to take revenge on
groups that had been critical of the government’s disability policies. So vociferous and disconcerting were the complaints that the matter was investigated by a parliamentary committee.21 It also received significant media attention.
Adviser 5, who provided an account of her role in monitoring this issue, stated that “once
the decision had been made by the minister it was the department’s role to oversee and
manage the whole tender process”. She explained that the intent behind the minister’s
decision “wasn’t to exact revenge on [name of organisation omitted] as they claimed or as
reported in the media ... it was to make things a little more competitive so that we could
attract new services to the program.” She also mentioned that the “policy had been brewing
for years and years and nothing was being done about it ... There were inquiries into the
adequacy of these services ... lots and lots of performance reviews – and it became clear
and apparent that changes needed to be made.”
The adviser reported working closely with the officers of the department to ensure a sound
framework for the EoI process was developed, but for the most part she “took a back seat
to things”, allowing the department to use its experts to handle the reform. She noted that
since the department had administered the program for “a lengthy period of time ... it wasn’t
necessary to get involved”. Plus, according to her, “it was quite an involved area – the
21 NSW Parliament, Legislative Council, General Purpose Standing Committee No 2.
179 program specialists knew how to manage the process”, implying that there was little opportunity for her to get involved. But, as negative publicity and stakeholder concerns arose around the handling of the EoI, she became increasingly involved in monitoring
various aspects of it. She met regularly with stakeholder groups and attended community information sessions to hear about their concerns and what could be done to allay fears.
Many organisations and groups were concerned that the new process would exclude them from submitting an EoI because they were unfamiliar with the method or that it was part of a plan to have greater control over their operations. She stated that she would use this information to “work with the department to refine aspects of the EoI”.
Her monitoring role had two dimensions: the first involved regular meetings with the Deputy
Director-General and program managers to obtain updates on the progress of the EoI process and community consultations; the second involved being attentive to negative media reports and protests from stakeholders. Information obtained from this process would be used to keep the minister informed. Thus, the monitoring of policy by advisers can be seen as a strategic device to redress information imbalances between minister and department as well as a means of responding to stakeholders, who at the time of the policy announcement were well mobilised to respond to the government’s decision. Subtly, monitoring of policy is also about achieving political control not just of the bureaucracy,
through structured interactions and information requests, but also of organised interests,
through their engagement.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the policy work and roles of ministerial advisers equate to the
development of a new form of organising for the making of policy. The adviser system
provides the political executive with additional capacity to engage the bureaucracy in the
government’s agenda, and a new capability to decide on the extent to which policy
development is controlled or centralised within the minister’s office.
180 It is apparent that advisers engage in policy-making to varying degrees and at various times and stages. They initiate policies by putting forward ideas of their own or drawing on existing research. They direct policy when issue saliency is high or when the minister believes policy should be controlled within the ministerial office. When politics and policy mix, advisers assume a more facilitative role in policy-making, leaving technical aspects to
the department but assuming the responsibility of resolving disturbances and differences
along the way. Finally, when policy is delegated to the bureaucracy, advisers take a ‘back
seat’ to formulation but seek to maintain control over its trajectory by monitoring
developments.
Significantly, the advisers interviewed were unable to connect to or draw on a theoretical
model or framework to account for their role in the policy-making process. Yet, they were
able to describe in great detail the work they performed in bringing policy from conception
to fruition. In one sense, these four categorisations of advisers’ policy work represent
degrees of ministerial control; in another, they give expression to a theorisation of policy-
making within a small but growing political institution, the ministerial office, which has fast
become a policy-making body that parallels the bureaucratic machine.
181 Part IV – Managing the External Environment
Part IV of this thesis explores a number of roles performed by ministerial advisers that fall within the broad conceptual field of ‘managing the external environment’. This particular field encompasses three distinct yet interconnected relational contexts: managing relations with the department (Chapter 9), managing relations with interest groups (Chapter 10) and managing relations with the media (Chapter 11). These relational contexts anchor a host of
interactional functions that advisers carry out to help ministers deal effectively with the
challenges and demands that the external policy and political environments bring to bear
upon the minister.
182 CHAPTER 9 – MANAGING RELATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT
The job advertisement appearing earlier notes that advisers need to interact with
departments as part of their prescribed list of functions. So contact with public servants is
an important and legitimate function for advisers to perform. But what is unclear from the
advertisement – or for that matter other sources of information containing descriptions of
advisers’ roles – is how these relationships are formed or their significance in policy
development and broader theoretical questions. The aims in this chapter are to:
Analyse the roles of advisers in managing relations with the bureaucracy
Gain insight into the changing patterns of governance over the last 25 years as
seen through the roles of advisers and their relationships with public servants and
interest groups, and
Glimpse the significance that managing the external environment plays in the
making of public policy.
Importantly, and from a theoretical standpoint, this chapter explores the extent to which the
Weberian model of political and bureaucratic relations still governs patterns of interaction
among ministers and officials within the core executive. Are there new role conceptions
evident, and how can their occurrence and diffusion in the NSW core executive be
explained?
In many respects, examining the roles of advisers through the relationships they form both
inside and outside of government provides an important insight into the significance that
managing relationships and the external environment has in the making of policy. Exploring
the types of functions advisers perform in managing relationships between the ministerial
office and key policy stakeholders provides valuable insights into how advisers have
become an integral part of modern governance structures.
Before reporting on the interview data in relation to advisers’ relationship with public
servants, it is instructive to review briefly the literature in this area.
183 As noted earlier, a keen interest has been placed on the roles advisers’ perform in their interactions with public servants and the impact these have on defining the relationship between ministers and their departments. Descriptions of the relationship between advisers
and public servants are mixed making it difficult to generalise and draw definitive
conclusions.
Earlier writers like Smith (1977) and Walter (1986) characterised the relationship between
advisers and public servants as tense and conflictual basing their assessment on advisers’
advent and lack of clarity regarding their roles. Later writers describing the relationship
between advisers and public servants emphasise the reciprocal impact of each side’s
activities (Dunn 1997; Eichbaum and Shaw 2010:129; Fitzgerald 1996:123; Maley
2002:276; Maley 2010:102) but draw slightly different conclusions about the impact of
advisers’ interposition within the political-administration divide. Dunn (1997) and others
(Hollway 1996; Podger 2002) point to growing complementarity in the roles between
advisers and public servants noting that the collaborative aspect of this relationship has
supplanted the conflictual aspect. This may be an indication of institutional settlement
whereby suspicion and questions of legitimacy are no longer part of the debate regarding
advisers’ place in Australia’s political system.
However, Maley calls into question the notion of complementarity, arguing the relationship
is essentially one of control and characterised by “competition and overlapping roles”
(Maley 2002:276). Further, she argues that both are involved in policy development
working together on projects and bringing different perspectives to the task. Eichbaum and
Shaw found positive and negative markers in the relationship noting that “contestability”
brought benefits but “politicisation” was still feared (2010:130), finding detected in this
study.
In respect of the types of roles advisers perform in this relational space, Dunn found that
advisers evaluate the department’s work, assist with overseeing departmental activity, and
facilitate ministerial contact with the department (1997:84). While disagreements occurred,
these did not define the relationship. Maley found advisers performed a similar set of roles
184 to those unearthed by Dunn but also identified others which emerged from various relationship styles; whether these were cooperative, competitive, responsive or powerful
(2002:130-140;155-160). Within these relationship styles, advisers supervised elements of the department’s work, oriented the department to the minister’s agenda, and mobilised the department to work on major change initiatives (2002:131-134). These roles were critical to engaging the department.
While there is some parallel between the findings of these researchers and those presented in this study, there are some points of differentiation. First, on the issue
‘complementarity’ which Dunn, and to a lesser degree Maley found, this was present, but it tended to be grounded in the views of advisers and ministers; in other words, it was largely one-sided. They saw advisers being well placed to deal with the “politics of policy” (Adviser
4) and public servants to handling technical and administrative matters. Conversely, few if any public servants felt complementarity existed in the relationship. In some respects,
public servants’ views align with Maley’s findings; that the relationship is competitive and
their roles are blurred. Second, and in a related sense, the relationship between advisers
and public servants appears to be significantly shaped by the distinctive institutional routines, interests, resources, and constraints of both sides. This is important given the
theoretical and analytical framework chosen for this study, namely institutionalism. A key
question to answer therefore is how the nature of the relationship varies within the political
context, issue area, or institutional features of the NSW political system.
A final point of differentiation is that the findings suggest the presence of a diffuse form of
politicisation borne out of advisers’ contact with junior public servants and handling of
departmental advice. This is an area that Dunn and Maley do not appear to traverse in any
great detail. Eichbaum and Shaw (2010) explore this issue to some degree applying the
concept of “administrative politicisation” which they define as “ … an action or intervention
which is contrary to the principle of an impartial … civil service” (2010:135). From here,
they present evidence of advisers tainting the content of advice tendered by the public
service and thwarting access to the minister and the policy process in general. Despite
185 these findings, their analysis of the data gathered from public servants led them to conclude that this form of politicisation was not as widespread as believed. Instead, they
drew two tentative conclusions: first, that advisers were contributing to a diminution in the
neutral competence of the public service; and second, that advisers were undermining the
traditional boundaries governing the political and administrative arms of the government
(2010:137).
An important aspect of Maley’s research in this area is the description of the types of
behaviours that are exhibited in exchanges between advisers and public servants.
“Games”, “information wars” and “tactics” are played out in order to gain the upper hand on
each other. This translates into the view that the development of policy between these two
actors is very much a contested area (Maley 2002:115). What is more, it provides insight
into how these types of behaviours are heavily influenced by culture and power, two
concepts that are strongly linked with institutional analysis.
Study participants’ views
Study participants were asked to evaluate their working relationship with ministerial advisers, who in turn were asked to evaluate the working relationships they encountered in their roles. This was done to gauge the extent to which the effectiveness of advisers’ roles and policy outcomes depended on the relationships they formed outside the ministerial office.
Managing relationships between the ministerial office and the department was seen as a critical function for advisers to perform, particularly among advisers and ministers interviewed for this study. It was seen as crucial for transmitting the policy preferences of the minister and achieving integration of the government’s policy. The specific adviser functions to be explored in this chapter, therefore, which are largely concerned with helping ministers manage interactions with the broader policy community, are representing, laying the groundwork, and overseeing departmental activities.
186 These roles can be seen as having grown out of the need for ministers to manage policy issues horizontally (Colebatch 1996: see Maley 2002), which requires that they pay greater attention to negotiating policy agreements with organised interests, backbenchers, members of minor parties and members of Caucus, as well as responding to public opinion
– areas of government activity inappropriate for the public service due to the need to preserve its independence.
Part of the task of managing the relationship between the ministerial office and the department involves gaining a strong understanding of the agendas of both the minister
and department. The following comment from an adviser illustrates this point:
Before anything, you need to know what you’re working with or you’re stuffed. When I
started in this role, we knew little about what the department did. On day one, we
demanded a folder of briefings on what the department was doing for the previous
government, and we went through it to see what matched up with our policies, and what
didn’t. What didn’t, we threw out. (Adviser 4)
The analysis of interactions between advisers and public servants shows that the relationship is becoming increasingly triangulated. This has resulted both from the
administrative reforms of the 1980s and the advent of ministerial advisers themselves.
Much of advisers’ work in managing relations focuses on dealing with issues that come up
on a daily basis or on the implementation of the government policy agenda. They are able
to give immediacy to a decision that may not be able to be provided to a minister by the
department:
I’d scan the newspapers daily to check out the hotspots. I’d glance over all the briefing
notes to see if there are hotspots there too. If I sensed, and this is what [minister’s name
omitted] liked. If I sensed there was trouble with what the [agency name omitted] then I’d
bring to [his] attention which is something agencies don’t like doing much or they’re not
very good at it. (Adviser 7)
It is important to mention that interactions between advisers and lower-ranked public servants were generally not channelled through the departmental head. A number of
187 officials remonstrated against the practice of advisers bypassing their authority and going straight to the originator of a departmental briefing to enquire further about its content:
It happens and it worries me no end when it does. I can understand the minister’s office
needing to speak with my staff members about the content of a brief but they need to
know they can’t simply pick up the phone and contact the officer. They need to do it
through me otherwise you have no idea what advice is going up. (Official 3)
Moreover, there appears to be little by way of protocol or guidelines at the adviser-system level that regulate the types of relationships advisers have with public servants or that manage interactions dealing with requests for information, viewing departmental briefings or soliciting information from departmental officials. It was also evident that protocols governing interactions between the ministerial office and the department were largely developed by the department (to counter interactions between lower-level public servants) rather than by both parties:
I would usually make it clear from the outset that these are things we have in place to
manage how information goes up and how it comes back. There’s no in between …
the minister’s office isn’t going to come up with how this happens … (Official 2)
As mentioned previously, advisers can be seen as a means of helping to preserve the neutrality of the public service. They are able to do this by working with the minister on aspects of policy-making that public servants are not able to do, such as presenting and selling policies to the media and political party. Senior government officials interviewed saw tremendous value in having advisers who could look at departmental activities from a political standpoint, performing functions that would be deemed inappropriate for the department to carry out:
I think it is useful for a minister to have a group of people [advisers] who could bring a
political dimension to the work of the department. (Official 3)
However, some officials felt that they were in a bind – having to respond to the policy directions of their minister without compromising the neutrality of the department:
188 It’s a definite balancing act dealing with advisers because you don’t know if what they
want is for political purposes or because the minister needs to have something
clarified … you’re caught between being responsive but also trying to be apolitical …
advisers make it that one bit harder because their job is to communicate the
minister’s outlook on things. (Official 2)
Having advisers has given ministers greater capacity to manage the external policy-making context. As noted in the section regarding advisers’ policy roles, advisers work closely with departments to build on the policy ideas generated by ministers. They assist departmental staff by making them aware of the minister’s thinking, and assist the minister by
‘deciphering’ information that could be presented to him or her in a more manageable form.
As a result, they could do all the preliminary work of getting across the breadth and depth of a policy problem and translating it to the minister without him or her getting caught up in minutiae.
It fell principally to advisers to communicate the minister’s policy agenda to the department and to ensure officials were aware of the minister’s and government’s political objectives so
as to enable these to be integrated into the program work of the department.
One minister believed there was an inevitable tension between advisers and bureaucrats.
On the one hand, advisers stridently seek access to information to build the minister’s decision-making capacity while, on the other, public servants point to a host of practices that allow advisers to exert influence over the functions of the department – for instance, by controlling and filtering information.
For this minister, however, such tension did not need to be detrimental to the relationship
between advisers and officials or to the policy development needs of the minister. Another minister thought the built-in rivalry that developed from the convergence of roles often led to development of good policy: “it was an interplay that gave policy development its energy”
(Minister 3). He added:
189 … there is an inevitable tension between the policy advisers and the departments that
the minister relates to. Now there’s nothing sinister in that it’s just an inevitable fact of
life.
This minister oversaw major changes to child protection legislation and disability services on coming to office, to the extent that he appointed two advisers with considerable expertise in these policy areas. He used these two advisers to instigate significant changes to the way these services were provided, starting with the creation of a new department to oversee the development and implementation of disability policy. He observed that the
types of reforms could not have been implemented had it been left to the department,
because it had resisted the proposed changes:
I set up this department and I have to say that the then Director-General [name omitted]
was not terribly impressed – that carved something out of his bureaucratic empire, and
there was some bureaucratic resistance to that. So support at the policy adviser level
was quite crucial to get it up and running. (Minister 3)
Descriptions of the relationship
A spectrum of views existed on the characterisation of the relationship between advisers and public servants. The description provided by Official 2 depicts the relationship as
“polarised” and “marred by tension and friction”. Similarly, there was a range of metaphors used to describe the relationship between advisers and public servants. Adviser 3 described it as an “arranged marriage” in which both parties were expected to learn and live with each other so as to support the implementation of the government’s policy objectives. Another likened the relationship to a partnership where both parties were working in the interests of the minister and the government as a whole. Describing the relationship in these terms suggests that there may be a high degree of equality and respect for the institutional boundaries that define the workings of government. However, it may also suggest that there has been greater convergence between the political and administrative spheres of government brought about largely by the new public management movement, and perhaps to a lesser extent the introduction of advisers.
190 The relationship between advisers and public servants seemed to fall between two extremes: at one end, and which was found to be mostly the case, the relationship was cooperative, harmonious and based on mutual respect, with high regard for the traditional conventions governing the relationship between ministerial office and department. Here the respective roles of advisers and public servants were seen as complementary and lent themselves to cooperative working arrangements. According to two officials, complementarity tended to exist when advisers worked on the political rather than technical dimensions of policy:
There’s a legitimate place for advisers in helping the minister see through the politics of
a policy ... and to support the minister when things don’t go well ... It certainly isn’t their
role to be advising on things that we’ve got the expertise for ... (Official 3)
The minister’s staff add value in dealing with things the department can’t ... we can’t
handle the media in a way that gets the type of message a minister would want to get
across to the public. (Official 2)
At another extreme there was proof that it was tense, competitive and occasionally embroiled in controversy and conflict. What made the relationship take on this characteristic was in part the lack of rules or guidelines to shape the relationship and define their respective roles:
There aren’t clearly established rules about how staff and officers are to interact – it’s
very much a ‘play-it-by-ear’ approach. (Official 4)
Some advisers agreed that it was crucial to the success of a minister’s policy preference being implemented to have good working relationships with public servants. “We have to get on. It’s in their interests and the minister’s for us to get on”, said Adviser 6.
The level and type of access advisers had to ministers meant that they could expedite decisions without delay:
I’ll say listen “this is critical” we have to have this signed because of X, Y and Z. …
and you would, you literally camp outside a door and in between say “it’s got to be
191 done”. … Or sometimes you’d stand there and he’d say “nup, sorry” no matter if you
did, stand there …. So there’s great potential to add a great deal of value. (Adviser 4)
The relationship between the ministerial office and the department were complicated by the roles performed by advisers. As a tenet, the arrangement of advisers working as intermediaries between the two ends of the relationship should operate smoothly when the minister was being given two types of advice: that of a political nature from his or her advisers, and that of a policy nature from the department. It is then incumbent upon the minister to consider both types of advice. However, in practice the relationship between advisers and public servants presents particular challenges.
While officials saw benefits in forming stable and effective working relationships with advisers, such as gaining immediate and direct access to the minister, they saw the roles of advisers in a narrow sense. They saw advisers as offering assistance to ministers in dealing with matters outside the realms of the department, such as interacting with the broader policy community and providing personal support. Thus, for public servants, it was a case of the boundaries between politics and administration needing to remain intact and as distinct as possible so as to prevent politicisation and undue interference.
Complementarity in the roles
Though the evidence pointed to a high degree of complementarity in the role of advisers and officials, there were questions about how this came about or was constituted. Advisers certainly bring to the task of policy-making the political interests of policy, while officials, in theory at least, bring the continued influence of the Westminster system. But the analysis raises questions about the extent to which complementarity was accepted or tolerated.
Was it biased towards advisers more so than to public servants?
Senior government officials argued that advisers’ roles ought to be kept within the confines of the ministerial office, with little or no interaction with public servants. So although complementarity provides a useful framework within which to understand the relationship between advisers and public servant, it needs to be borne in mind that the idea of two
192 policy actors working in harmony came largely from the views of advisers and ministers themselves, not officials. For advisers, such a relationship encompassed addressing gaps in the policy work of the department as well as taking on tasks that would compromise the department’s neutrality. For departments, it was a condition that occurred when advisers and public servants worked separately.
Senior government officials use advisers to concentrate the minister’s mind on the agency’s perspective. One official thought advisers could be helpful in getting a sense of the politics of an issue and the minister’s concerns, as well as making the most of the relationship with advisers to persuade the minister to accept the department’s view or dissuade the minister from going down a particular path. One official gave an example of an initiative they wanted to launch which dealt with empowering young professional women but which the minister did not warm to at first:
I spoke to the minister about this mentoring program for young women … she wasn’t
enthusiastic about it when she became minister because it was a carry on from the
previous government. So it fell off the radar a bit ... when that happens you have to
think strategically ... Her chief of staff had a more sympathetic view ... we were able
to recast the program more to the minister’s liking and it was done because of that
interaction with her chief of staff ... so yes, they can be useful ... it gives you an
option when you’re trying to win support for something. (Official 2)
To a degree, this example illustrates that the roles of advisers and public servants can be complementary, and, while potential for overlap exists, advisers can be seen as being able to contribute to the work of the department by dealing with the more partisan aspects of
policy, in this case representing the department on an initiative of theirs.
Officials had to work hard at the relationship, often needing to assert their rightful place as
the minister’s main policy adviser. Tensions would arise from the inability of officials to gain direct access to the minister when critical decisions needed to be made. Intrusions into the administrative operations of the department were usually a cause for concern:
193 … if you can’t manage the ministerial office then there’s little chance of you getting
any sort of policy agenda up. It’s a really tricky thing this because governments and
Ministers own the policy agenda there’s no question about that. … If you want to get
your policy agenda up to affect the government of the day’s point of view and it might
be different from the way an adviser thinks about it and you want to the minister to
hear, then the relationship is crucial. (Official 2)
Senior government officials resented these intrusions as they believed this undermined accepted Westminster conventions and caused unnecessary disruptions to the workings of the agency. They expressed the view that such interventions were often motivated by short-term requirements that sought to instil partisan characteristics into program decisions that resulted in distortions of departmental authorities:
The concept of the Westminster system and representative democracy is being
shattered. (Official 1)
These are men and women who have literally come off the streets, whether they’re
lawyers or cleaners ... most haven’t heard of [the Westminster system] or believe it’s
a figment or it’s crap anyway. So they come in and start ordering people around.
(Official 1)
Like I said, you have to set the parameters early on. You can’t let the minister’s office
run things otherwise you’ll be shut out and that’s a dangerous situation to be in.
(Official 2)
A few advisers enjoyed uncommon access to senior public servants partly because they were well acquainted with each other. Because of their previous participation in the political
administrative network, some advisers were well known to other ministers too. This level of
familiarity, which surfaces repeatedly in various parts of this study, facilitated access to the
communication process, optimised interaction and feedback, and fostered mutual trust,
which seemed to be requisite in the provision of quality policy advice. Similarly, a few officials enjoyed open and unrestricted access to their minister, particularly if they had
194 worked as an adviser in the past or had past party connections. Such familiarity facilitated access to information and fostered informal contacts with staff of the ministerial office.
It is noteworthy that three of the four officials interviewed for this study had worked as an
adviser at one time in their careers. These individuals saw advisers as an important resource for helping ministers deal with matters external to relationships with the department. Though not confirmed, it would be possible to assume that these officials were appointed to head up government departments because of their former adviser connection with the governing political party, and, importantly, because of their political management
and public administration skills. Interestingly, most had very unsympathetic views of the roles advisers performed when these involved dealings with the department and when they were compared to the roles they performed as advisers. They spoke of the need to keep the department at arm’s length to the functions carried out by the minister’s staff to prevent undue interference.
Some advisers were acutely aware that, whatever the difficulties or benefits of harmonising with the workings of the department, they had to conform to public sector management principles and accountabilities:
I was keenly aware of the boundaries. As I said, we worked well together and I can’t
recall one instance where the department was compromised….
we understood each other really well, and they understood us as well. (Adviser 4)
All advisers are bound by the same public sector laws that govern public servants. If
they breach that law then there are grounds for dismissal. Instantly! (Official 4)
They were also aware that cooperation from the departmental head was not only earned in this exchange but that it was essential in the administering of governmental activities:
You have to get on and I had the respect of two Directors-General. We worked
together on implementing a raft of reforms. Big stuff that Metherell wanted to see in
place ... it would’ve worked if there wasn’t mutual respect. (Adviser 4)
195 Ministers formed the view that, to be effective, advisers had to have the ability to work with the department but not succumb to its culture:
They have to have the ability to work in interface with the departments to work on the
ideas that I develop in concert with the department ... they need to be able to do this
knowing that they work for me and not become part of the bureaucratic machine.
(Minister 2)
This was generally accepted by advisers as well:
... you have to remember who you’re working for. It’s easy to get sucked into the
department’s way of life. (Adviser 4)
Determinants of the relationship
Variability in the relationship between advisers and public servants appeared to be determined by the minister’s management style and his or her policy preferences. Although the parameters of the relationship were largely set by the minister, there was evidence to suggest that these shifted according to the saliency of the policy issue with which the
ministerial office and department were confronted. Indeed, several other factors influenced
the relationship.
The general absence of guidelines for framing behaviours resulted in personalities
determining how well advisers and senior government official got on. The policy
competence of the adviser was a factor in the degree of their dependency on the public
service. Personal trust and confidence in the abilities of each other were also factors
framing and underpinning the relationship between advisers and public servants. This point
was made by two advisers who worked for two separate ministers and who both could be
regarded as being very active in managing interactions with the department:
You need to trust their abilities and they need to trust ours … you’re always working
out whether they can do what you expect them as they are of us. (Adviser 7)
Trust is crucial to how the ministerial office gets on with the department … if it isn’t
there then things can go sour (Adviser 4) 196 Sources of tension
Descriptions of difficulties in the relationship abound. The friction and conflict which some advisers and officials experienced, and the occasional antagonism they described, arose in a variety of ways. It should be noted that no single experience typified how each party viewed each other. Several factors were noted as causing friction between advisers and officials. One cause of tension for officials arose because they had to deal with advisers rather than directly with ministers on policy matters. On one level, such tension could be seen as a clash of egos, while on another it could be seen as the result of two distinct, and often conflicting, institutional worlds moving closer within each other’s orbit. Adviser 4 describes one particularly fraught experience as follows:
As soon as they knew that I couldn’t be sort of captive they set out to destroy me.
They did illegal criminal searches on every single person in the office … I probably
shouldn’t say that but it was true. That’s the kind of thing. I was clean so they didn’t
get anything but you know this is the kind of the thing they did. They did every trick in
the book. I tried really hard to make that positive, to develop a relationship … but I
failed to achieve it …
As stated in parts of this study, the policy interests of ministers and roles of advisers in translating these regularly differ to those of public servants. These differences, along with the perception by public servants that advisers are too prominent in the policy-making process, were often seen as a source of tension and proved to be a key determinant in defining the functional relationship between these policy actors.
Similarly, tension and friction were linked to several political and bureaucratic realities. For
instance, the need for quick results may not have accorded with the administrative realities
of the department, or the need to take a longer-term outlook.
Officials felt they were sometimes thwarted in their policy work by advisers whose policy
knowledge was limited. Further, they believed they had a better understanding of the policy
area in question than the advisers. “They do take on work that is meant to be ours. I have
197 no doubt that they do ... and it’s constant tug-o-war over whose ideas should prevail”
(Official 2).
There was a view from officials that the initiation of policy ideas by advisers was encroaching on what had traditionally been the proper responsibility of the department –
that the initiation of policy ideas had become contested territory:
It can be large. I mean it’s really dangerous. It’s dangerous from the point of view of
getting really consistent policy advice. It’s also bad stuff goes up that’s not signed off
so you can’t … it can happen that advice can go up to the minister’s office which has
come from the department but that’s never been seen by a senior officer. That’s the
most undesirable set of arrangements where … clearly minister’s offices need to
communicate with the originators of briefs but they need to do that with the
knowledge of managers because if they don’t they get into all sorts of trouble. And
there also needs to be good systems set up in that ministerial liaison with the
departments because if you don’t know what sort of advice is being sought and
someone rings up the minister’s office and says “give me a brief on this”, timeframes
can’t be met, you don’t know whether the advice has been signed off ... (Official 2)
There were also reported instances of advisers breaching the traditional boundaries of the political-administrative relationship. Their intrusion into the lower ranks of the public service is a constant source of tension between the ministerial office and department. Interviewees contended that advisers infiltrate various levels of the bureaucracy in order to secure important information, obtain feedback on ideas, and structure opportunities to meet informally. In most cases there was a contingent nature to these meetings with public servants that was tied to the policy requirements and political interests of the minister. That advisers infiltrate the lower levels of the bureaucracy raises questions about whether politicisation runs deeper within the administrative core of the public service than previously thought. Is it still largely sited in the upper ranks of the public service or is it strewn in and across the bureaucracy?
An additional source of tension arose from advisers taking on roles that were clearly the responsibility of the department. The section describing the policy roles of advisers
198 illustrates the extent to which advisers are able to carry out some of the department’s policy work without its knowledge or endorsement:
I’d like to think that my department has sole responsibility for policy ... I know the
minister sets the general direction but ultimately we have to build on that. I know it’s
no longer what it used to be – ideas can come from anywhere nowadays, advisers,
dare I say, the community, the media ... and that’s not necessarily a bad thing.
(Official 2)
Another source of friction was the high level of distrust that could be generated from the absence of protocols to guide relations between advisers and public servants. In some instances, where this was found, tensions between these two had the potential to harm
relationships between officials and ministers:
I think you can take it as given that if you don’t get on with the job of implementing
what the government or the minister wants you to it can harm your relationship with
the minister ... we all know that including the Director-General. (Adviser 2)
At times the type of relationship advisers had with public servants would be a measure of the degree of separateness and ‘de-blurring’ of institutional boundaries. However, there was a sense that public servants had to tolerate the regular incursion of advisers into parts of the bureaucracy:
… when I started I made it clear to the minister that my performance agreement
meant that I needed to handle and to direct the resources to the areas I’d agree to
perform in rather than advisers directing my staff on issues of their own. So I had
people doing things that were operationally wrong and they’re still trying to direct
resources into areas they think are administratively important. (Official 3)
They would seek to have staff attend meetings of a political nature in Sydney or
remote parts of NSW that don’t meet the requirements of the Department … I put a
stop to that…. Because I’ve had staff complain bitterly about being directed to do
things they know are either not appropriate, improper or on occasion illegal. (Official
1)
199 Different viewpoints on policy ideas were another cause of tension between the ministerial
office and the department. One adviser expressed consternation about the extent to which
departments would put up barriers to ideas emanating from the ministerial office. Adviser 4
stated that “They’re always putting up roadblocks”.
Yet not all advisers encountered resistance or barriers. Indeed, some reported having
come away with a sense of headiness and accomplishment. Adviser 4 emphasised the
importance of trust and respect for the policy boundaries which led to him pursuing a
number of policy reforms on behalf of his minister:
Definitely. In terms of [agency name omitted] and [agency name omitted] it was like
… this is a beautiful story. I knew them, they knew me. They trusted me, they knew I
listened, they knew I would take whatever message they wanted. They knew that if
they desperately wanted something signed I would camp outside his door and get it
for them … at the end of the day you know there was value adding and when we all
knew we were achieving to working to a common end … it was very functional, very
effective and I say there was robust disagreements, but ultimately decisions were
made and things were done. In [name of agency omitted], yes there was the weekly
meeting and I told you I used to go down daily for a briefing on that operational stuff.
So I used to literally walk in … sit down.
This particular adviser also felt driven to help the minister make a difference, and placed the role of the department as central to achieving this end. Though the emphasis of trust varied in the relationships between advisers and public servants, it proved to be a powerful force in creating predictability and serving as an alternative coordination mechanism.
Sentiments emphasising a positive approach tended to come mostly from ministers and advisers, while views of competition and rivalry were nearly always tendered by officials.
Similarly, it was rare for officials to establish partnerships with advisers on the development of a particular policy. In most cases it was the adviser who would approach the departments rather than the reverse. Part of managing any tension involved making clear what the expectations of the relationship exchange would be up front. As Adviser 2 pointed
200 out: “from the start you need to work out who’s going to do what because the minister doesn’t want to see a circus”.
Senior Government Official 1 made a similar point about needing to set the parameters of the relationship between the ministerial office and department, but in more strident terms:
I’m not a shrinking violet so I will go straight to the minister rather than have my views
or the views of my staff demeaned [by advisers] which has been happening. And
that’s a robust process ...
It would also seem from the tone of the comments made by advisers that the invocation of the minister’s authority would also set the tone of the relationship between advisers and public servants.
Role of advisers in the relationship between the ministerial office and officials
There was a range of specific roles performed by advisers that emerged from their interactions and the unique relationship formed with officials. These include ‘representing’, and ’laying the groundwork’.
Representing
… if you get my advisers you get me (Minister 4)
One of the important functions performed by ministerial advisers as part of their broader set of accountabilities is representing. This function helps prevent ministers from becoming isolated from the activities of their department and the concerns of organised interests, as well as widening the field of contacts in order to facilitate stronger communications with stakeholders. By serving as the minister’s representative, advisers are expected to create an environment in which the minister’s policy agenda is understood and engendered.
Ministers placed a high value on advisers acting as their representative in dealings with the department, the media and interest groups. Advisers variously described this as “acting as the minister’s alter-ego”, “being deputised” and serving as the minister’s “proxy”. Ministers 201 would deputise their advisers to attend crisis meetings and community fora, and to respond to enquiries from the department and the media. In this particular role, advisers were seen as an extension of the minister, handling day-to-day decisions which would be too difficult and cumbersome for the minister to handle.
All ministers interviewed admitted to having entrusted considerable authority to their advisers with the expectation that they would act as the minister’s substitute in dealings with the department and organised interests. In this terrain, ministerial advisers operate as extensions of the minister in shaping the scope and content of advice from the department.
Many advisers interviewed took this particular function extremely seriously, acknowledging the significance of the responsibility bestowed upon them in speaking on the minister’s behalf. To fulfil this role, advisers needed to have a good relationship with both the minister and officials. In examples given by advisers of them attending meetings or other exchanges on the minister’s behalf, they were quick to remark that there were limits to the execution of this function. If it was interpreted as excessive, officials would seek to curtail this by stamping their authority or giving a stern reminder about where the boundaries were:
I don’t hesitate in telling them when things have gone beyond what’s reasonable ...
it’s not nice but you can’t have a situation where they’re walking in and out of the
place at will. (Official 2)
Representing would also involve attending departmental meetings with officials, other public servants and interest groups. Advisers would attend these meetings largely because the minister had sufficient confidence in the adviser to act on his or her behalf, or because the minister felt it was inappropriate to attend. In such instances, advisers would attend
public forum meetings, especially during election campaigns, to assist the minister with
fielding one-to-one questions with the media or organised interests. Most commonly,
advisers were used to fill in for the minister when he or she was unable to attend meetings
because of time constraints, or when the issue of concern did not warrant the minister’s
attention. This was also critical for supporting the work of the minister, given he or she
would be unable to attend to every matter that came to the attention of the ministerial office. 202 On occasions the role involved advisers making deputations on the minister’s behalf on what advisers called ‘protecting’ ministers from themselves, particularly if they had ambitious plans or were unfamiliar with the way departments operated. One adviser who had worked in the same portfolio with two ministers was effective at this as he worked for a minister with a tendency for “impulsive decisions” (Adviser 6). In this regard, advisers were able to utilise the knowledge and experience they had acquired from their interactions with the department in managing other relational contexts, such as those involving a newly appointed minister:
I think I would have been seen as being more influential over Chadwick than over
Metherell, and that I was because I had more experience, I
had been around more often, and I suppose she was less dominating. (Adviser 6)
Representing the minister was an important function for maintaining a cooperative working relationship with the department and achieving a high degree of alignment between the policy agenda of the minister and the policy work of the department, as well as bringing policy traction to the ideas generated from the ministerial office. That advisers were able to carry out this role suggests that a high degree of trust was needed from ministers in delegating this function. Though officials were generally accepting of this, nearly all expressed concern about whether advisers could be trusted to speak on the minister’s behalf or convey the minister’s thinking on policy effectively.
Ministers appreciated the ability of advisers to cut across policy domains in ways departments were unable to because of their apolitical character, and in some instances expected them to do this. Some ministers gave high priority to advisers acting as their representative, especially in dealings with the department and interest groups as it would
“free up time” for the minister to focus on matters of priority (Ministers 1 and 4).
Many advisers also spoke of instances of needing to meet with interest groups because the minister did not have the time to do so:
203 I meet with interest groups because there are so many of them and the minister
needs to use her time more effectively ... you know for when parliament sits, budget
committees, and departmental committees, meeting the DG and other senior
departmental staff. (Adviser 2)
There were several conditions that lead advisers to assume this particular function. In the
Drug Summit case example (see Chapter 8), the adviser was able to get regular updates from the department on measures to control the riots that had occurred in one of the state’s juvenile detention centres. In this particular case, the adviser acted as the minister’s ‘eyes
and ears’, enabling the minister to be kept informed of events occurring on the ground. In another, a minister was able to use an adviser to arrange tendering arrangements of advocacy services for people with disabilities to ensure the minister was cognisant of the full ramifications of this decision and could manage any negative reactions.
Some officials felt that advisers often surmised or second-guessed the minister’s thinking on an issue:
I don’t know half the time what they’re saying. They could be making it all up for all I
know. It’s serious. Are they really speaking on the minister’s behalf or are they
presenting their own view? (Official 3)
Similarly, interactions between interest groups and advisers often resulted in the former feeling their concerns would be either misrepresented or not conveyed to the minister in the manner intended. One interest group representative indicated that they always had to assess whether advisers were truly representing the minister or whether they were representing their own views:
That’s always a concern for the [name of organisation omitted]. We never know if
they take back to the minister what our concerns are. I guess we’ll never know unless
there’s a change in policy. (Representative 3)
While not all officials saw value in this particular function, those that did formed the view that it could contribute to the decision-making process and the setting of the department’s
204 overall direction. The informal nature of the relationship that occasionally defined the way advisers and officials interacted would sometimes facilitate access to the minister that would otherwise be difficult if advisers did not exist. Relationships formed along these lines enabled public servants to obtain a decision or keep the minister interested in the work of the department.
There were reported instances where advisers representing their minister would ‘wreak havoc’ on the operations of the department. As noted earlier, one adviser attended a taskforce meeting at which she reported the minister’s decision to fund the removal of asbestos that had been unearthed by school children in a school building and which had received extensive media coverage. It was revealed by the Director-General responsible for school maintenance that the adviser acting as the minister’s representative made the decision to fund the removal of asbestos without consulting the relevant government agency and without prior approval.
There was a sense that representing had greater importance in interactions with the department than in dealings with interest groups. Those involving the department “had to be taken seriously” (Adviser 4), because they carried the authority of the minister and would in most cases have implications for the program areas of the department.
This ‘shadowing’ view of the advisers’ role accorded with the comments of most ministers and advisers interviewed, but not all. For instance, it was noted by some officials that some ministers were comfortable with letting their departments drive policy (with ministers taking on a policy legitimator role) but this would not necessarily translate into one being subservient to the other. In fact, according to Official 4, it was a sign of cooperation:
I think what you see often is that ... well if we take this department as an example, is
that things run smoothly because we understand what the minister’s office wants.
There’s a shared understanding of what needs to be done. That always helps. Where
things come undone I suppose is when the minister is chopping and changing things
to fit a political agenda and it’s not uncommon to see that and advisers to get caught
up in that as well.
205 Laying the groundwork
There was a lot of ground work that needs to be done with any new government …
there’s a buzz of activity. (Adviser 6)
Another critical role associated with gaining policy traction and managing relations with the department and other external policy actors is laying the groundwork. This has two dimensions to it: the first concerns the policy program of a new government or newly appointed minister; the second concerns new policy initiatives developed in response to a controversial issue. Laying the groundwork was seen as an important activity for advisers to perform because it would set the tone for introducing significant policy change and mobilising the department’s resources. The elements within this process are: raising the department’s awareness of the government’s policy reform agenda, educating departmental heads about the policies, and forming a roadmap for smooth implementation of policy.
In large part this role involves preparing the department to understand the government’s policy agenda and the way it operates, and gaining an understanding of the way the department works and the frameworks it employs in developing and implementing policy. It involves working proactively with the department to ensure the policy expectations of the minister are understood and that those of the department’s program activities are considered in the calculus of policy development:
When we first came in we were often hitting brick walls with the department … We’d
ask why we couldn’t do this and they’d tell us why? Over time, you get a sense of
how the department works and how you need to work together. (Adviser 6)
This function also comes to the fore when new policies or legislation are being proposed, particularly after an election or during an ongoing crisis. For ministers interviewed there was a need to understand the full implications of new policy proposals or legislative changes in order to make a favourable presentation to Cabinet and Caucus colleagues.
During these periods, when ministers were heavily involved in deliberations on the merits of
206 policy proposals and establishing close links with senior public servants to frame proposals, there was a number of direct contacts between ministerial advisers and public servants.
Ministers saw advisers as playing a valuable role in this regard because this helped the minister cut through the preponderance of departmental documents that would constantly overwhelm the ministerial office. Advisers, therefore, who were trusted by and loyal to a minister, could translate the departmental view and prepare information in a digestible form for the minister.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the interaction between advisers and public servants and the roles advisers perform in this particularly context. Within this relational space a range of functions emerged which advisers performed to increase the policy-making capacity of ministers. It
revealed that the point at which these policy actors meet is both complex and crucial to
building on the policy ideas of the minister. It revealed that advisers and officials preserve
close communication and negotiations – or exchanges – that are necessary for executing
the functions of the ministerial office. True, each party requires a certain type of help from
the other, and each avoids getting into situations of conflict or being antagonistic toward the
other.
This chapter has shown that the adviser position is now an essential tool for the
organisation of government work. The interviews suggest that advisers provide an effective
mechanism for strengthening the relationship between political and administrative arms of
government. This strengthening is to the advantage of good governance and plays an
important role in bridging the gap between the ministerial office and external environment,
such as the department, the media, and interest groups.
The relationship between ministers and departments has changed dramatically as a result
of advisers being interposed between these two policy players.
207 Advisers as an institution in the policy-making arena
The adviser system in NSW has evolved into a political institution in its own right. Organisationally, advisers are interposed between the political executive and the bureaucracy. The relationship between the executive and bureaucracy has become ‘triangulated’ with exchanges between the two realms mediated by advisers. What is more, advisers have enabled greater institutional convergence between the political and administrative arms of government. Advisers are also ideally positioned to connect organised interests to the political-policy-making processes within the NSW governmental system.
NSW
governmental system Ministerial Political Bureaucracy advisers executive
Organised interests/Media
208 Advisers have important roles to perform in ensuring the work of the department harmonises with the government’s agenda. These functions are largely about achieving greater convergence between political and administrative arms of policy development within government. The evidence presented in this chapter would suggest that Weberian inspired notions of political-bureaucratic relations may need to be recast in light of the growing place of advisers within the political executive. The relationship is now very much
‘triangulated’ with exchanges being mediated by advisers.
209 CHAPTER 10 – MANAGING RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA
Media management is a big issue with the current [Carr] government. That’s a full-time focus.
(Official 1)
This chapter examines the types of activities advisers engage in to manage relations with the media. It does so for two reasons: the first is that ministers need to be able to manage the demands placed upon them by the media. The second, which correlates with the first, is that ministers need to be able to control policy messages and counter the media’s influence. To these two ends, advisers perform a range of important functions that add to the capacity of ministers to control the external policy-making environment, which includes the media.
It is important to note that media advisers were not included in this study for pragmatic reasons. As such, descriptions about the nature and type of relationship between ministerial advisers and media advisers cannot be explored fully. Suffice it to say, the interview data elicited from advisers and ministers suggest that the relationship with the media is largely symbiotic and that this particular characteristic is significant in shaping advisers’ roles in managing exchanges with media advisers. And like other relationships advisers are required to deal with, those involving the media paint a revealing picture about the way power and politics are played out in the public domain, and provide an insight into how segments of the political executive routinely works with the media to achieve partisan
ends.
It is axiomatic that the media play an influential and powerful role in shaping policy and the
context in which it is made (Barker 2005). The media are also, as Anderson (2006:177-178)
posits, the “site where politics and public life are played out” and the locus around which
the development of policy is increasingly being organised. In assessing the extent that this view holds true – that regard for the media dictates the way policy is made – the following
observation is tendered from an adviser interviewed for this study:
And I clearly put to you that anyone who is vying for a higher position or leadership will
almost inevitably have their office led by a media person. And their orientation is highly
210 around what is favourable and positive for the media sense; rather than what is the
reformist policy type approach. (Adviser 4)
It cannot be understated, therefore, that ministers pay close attention to the management of political communication with and through the media. Its importance derives from the fact that ministers operate in a highly mediatised environment in which framing messages and the task of news and image management are now part and parcel of politics and the development of policy. Ministers today are closely scrutinised and monitored by the media in terms of performing in parliament, selling and marketing government policy on television and other media systems, and responding to controversy. Furthermore, they have a high awareness of the importance of the mass media as the means of ‘selling’ the right message about government activity, and they are particularly sensitive to the media’s potential to be a source of government image problems. In short, controlling messages, images and ideas, managing public expectations about government policy, maintaining electoral popularity, conveying the impression of being in control of events, and reinforcing authority are some of the reasons ministers place importance on managing media relations.
Its importance also stems from the fact that the public is unlikely to know about the activities of government other than through the media. Through the media, the public
becomes more knowledgeable of how government policies will affect them, and
governments gain feedback on their policies and programs.
The role of the media in shaping the conduct of political debate and the framing of public policies has expanded greatly in the last 30 years. As Minister 3 said, “Menzies used to give a press conference a couple of times a year [but] I was having daily contact with the media in one form or another ... I’d probably give 2 or 3 press conferences a week.”
Some of these changes have been conceptualised as representing the rise of a public relations (PR) state in Australia (Ward 2003; Van Onselen & Errington 2007), and the growing presence of a permanent campaign (Heclo 2000, 2001; Sparrow & Turner 2001) in which governments devote resources of the state to the management of news for partisan purposes. Ministerial advisers increasingly comprise a significant component of this
211 resource and are being credited for turning the minister’s authority into political power
(Seymour-Ure 2003).
All interviewees felt that the impact of the media on ministers had increased over the years.
As a corollary, the PR role of ministers is much more important now than in the past.
Promoting and selling policies through the media has become an integral part of the minister’s political role. For that reason, ministers are placing an increased emphasis on
policy presentation and are relying more and more on communication specialists (e.g.
journalists) to develop media and communications strategies.
There was common ground among study participants that governments face daily media
pressures which require immediate handling, both in creating and responding to news
stories. Many spoke of the media’s insatiable appetite for political news and events in
government, while others described the impact of a 24-hour news cycle and the
pervasiveness of the media on ministers “who have to defend their own performance
publicly and that of the department” (Minister 5), sometimes at great political expense to the
government. Minister 4 described the challenge as follows:
You’re trying to manage a complex system in a very, very challenging mediated world.
Issues come up quickly and you need to respond. And the Government is subject to a lot
more scrutiny than in years past. We are in an entirely different game.
Nearly all interviewees felt that media impact on ministers has increased over the years, with many going so far as to suggest that the introduction and ensuing growth in numbers of ministerial advisers was a direct consequence of the media’s power and influence:
I just think [the proliferation of advisers] is a consequence of the scrutiny in the media
and the spin-doctoring going on. (Representative 6)
Ministers have to spend more time on media management … the need for advisers and
media specialists were much less then than it is the case now. (Minister 1)
Another interviewee felt that advances in communication technology (internet, mobile phones, email) had increased the pervasiveness of the media in its reporting of politics, and
212 that advisers existed to help ministers develop communication strategies to keep on top of the media’s influence:
… when there weren’t any mobile phones then you didn’t need to have someone next to
the elbow saying “well The Telegraph or Alan Jones has said in Sydney ‘you’re an idiot’,
what are we going to do about it?” That wasn’t an issue 25 years ago. (Minister 1)
This is a sentiment reinforced by Nick Greiner (1992:3), who made the following assessment of the media’s role in politics in a speech about the ethics and conduct of the media:
The media have moved from observers in politics to taking positions, seeking outcomes,
interviewing each other to build momentum in particular direction, and often writing for
‘each other’; that is, to seek affirmation and approval.
Greiner’s reflection of the media’s role and influence in politics came at a time when governments themselves were investing heavily in political marketing and related media management techniques. According to Starr (1995), both Greiner and Fahey were overt in their views about the application of political marketing strategies to routine everyday politics. For instance, Fahey made it patently clear that he wanted to address the
“neglected roles of communications” by investing in “better communications, more effective media relations and in what was generally perceived as tighter media management” (Starr
1995:41-42).
Bob Carr, too, placed importance on media management. In fact, concern with the media and news management evolved a lot further during his tenure than was seen under his predecessors (Clennell 2006). According to some media commentators, there was a more systematic attempt to centralise communications within the premier’s own office with the intention of positioning the government as the framer of policy decisions in the media and ensuring proper coordination of messages (Davies 2005).
Two interviewees commented that Carr was savvy and strategic in using the media, noting that his background as a journalist and the contacts he had formed in this role helped enhance his communication strategy:
213 ... he knew when and when not to use the media ... he recognised the importance of the
media being an ex-journalist and that ... he knew it could help communicate a message
and also enhance constituents understanding of their policies. (Minister 4)
... he is very smart when it comes to the media ... he knows there are certain times to
need media attention to try to get his message out. (Representative 3)
Indeed, managing relations with the media became a core element of advisers’ roles during
Carr’s time in power. His own office was staffed with no fewer than seven media advisers
(Clennell 2006), each responsible for planning and controlling activities with the media. And while there is a widely held view that Carr’s journalistic background proved a factor in setting the tone for the way he and his minister’s approached management of the media, a great deal of interest has been generated, especially among media commentators and academics, as to how ‘spin’ – putting a tendentious interpretation on the news – and ‘spin- doctors’ – who were employed to do it – were used to manage news and the selling of policies (Savage 2008).
What advisers do in this role
Though much of managing relations with the media is performed by ministers’ media adviser(s), ministerial advisers also performed vital work in supporting ministers to deal with the media. This work includes ‘monitoring media reports’, ‘orchestrating publicity events,’
‘networking,’ ‘coordinating messages,’ and ‘managing issues.’
Monitoring media reports
Tracking media reports is a key function of advisers in managing media-related activities.
Some advisers commented that they regularly scanned newspapers and television bulletins, and used media monitoring services that provide a real-time account of media
output, to learn about the topics and issues the media were focusing on and the political
slant adopted in the reporting and journalists involved:
214 One of the bread and butter things I do is read through the Herald and the Tele
scanning for issues that might embarrass the minister or might be critical of the
department and government. (Adviser 2)
Monitoring also involves advisers routinely checking newspapers for what they see as inaccuracies. This is a way of managing the message that goes out to the public. One adviser stated that checking the accuracy of a news article was “an important step in a minister’s media strategy” (Adviser 6).
An adviser developing a sense of the media’s reporting of government decisions also enables their minister to develop a sense of community sentiment about an issue and identify potentially controversial issues. This could prove important in being able to pitch a ministerial response more effectively if warranted, particularly in question time when ministers are likely to face Opposition scrutiny and undue attention from the media:
Keeping track of the types of news stories journalists were writing about also meant
that any planned activity or policy announcements could be targeted. (Adviser 4)
Ministers interviewed said they relied on advisers to keep them informed of media reports that impacted directly on their portfolio and to advise them on a communication strategy to counter any negative reporting or controversy. Invariably, this would involve the adviser working with the media adviser to frame an immediate response and then arranging for its distribution through established information networks (e.g. community groups), as well as mobilising the department into action to develop and coordinate implementation of a communication strategy.
Similarly, controversial news stories would often spark advisers into action to manage any fallout or controversies being reported in the media:
Whenever shit happens, and we get a lot of it in community services, the minister
wants to know how best to deal with it in the media. The Department doesn’t know
how to deal with controversy. They’re good at technical advice, operational matters,
not politics or dealing with a Bolshie media that want answers. (Adviser 2)
215 Having advisers monitor news stories would also help the minister and government keep an eye on what the Opposition was saying or proposing in policy terms. Advisers have responsibility for cataloguing the views of the Opposition on government decisions and banking these for an opportune time (e.g. question time, election campaigns, policy debates) so as to discredit or embarrass the spokesperson in the media or in the
Parliament.
Orchestrating publicity events
Another communication function advisers perform is orchestrating. This involves organised matters to ensure control over the way in which new policy and program announcements are reported and to prevent the media’s filtering of key messages. Events provide opportunity to project the image of the government being in control of certain issues and to cultivate the image of a broad-based coalition.
Public events are an efficient way for ministers to transmit several messages to the media on a range of topics and also act as a forum for media questioning. By utilising a wide array of media organisations, events also provided a unique opportunity for the minister to shape public opinion and set an agenda. Adviser 6 stated, “We get involved in launches because we want to make sure the minister doesn’t get sidetracked”.
Public appearances and specialised leaks are strategies used by ministers to place ‘hints’ to the media about a specific issue and to foster a positive political image for him or herself.
It is a press strategy that can play a tremendous role in fostering positive effects for ministers, garnering feedback from the public and other officials, and serving as an indication to ministers to retract or go forward with policy initiatives.
Orchestrating also involves advisers arranging one-on-one interviews with the minister.
According to the study participants, this served several purposes: providing exclusivity on the announcement of a new policy or initiative, circumventing any negative publicity that might ensue as a result of a policy decision, influencing the angle to be taken on a news
216 story, correcting any wrong reporting, protecting the minister’s reputation, and building trust:
The media adviser will arrange interviews with reporters sometimes to give them the
heads up about something new that’s about to happen. It’s all about timing with the
media, choosing when to release and when to hold back. (Adviser 1)
I occasionally arrange interviews for the minister with journalists. Sometimes it’s better to
be on the front foot with the media so that you’re able to hold sway with them. (Adviser
5)
In orchestrating news events, advisers would assist the minister by holding off-the-record briefings with journalists, and, depending on the issue making news or needing to be promoted to the public, advisers would also serve as the primary spokesperson for the minister, handling journalists’ enquiries and explaining the background of the minister’s decision. This was important for maintaining the news initiative:
Generally our media adviser does the legwork with journos ... he uses his contacts in
the media but I also help out with arranging meetings with the minister ... (Adviser 3)
[The minister can get] crucified in the media or [mislead] Parliament, so you’re doing
your best to prevent this from happening so you arrange meetings with journalists to
do the hard sell. (Adviser 5)
In a related role, advisers assist with the arrangements of press conferences and ‘door stops’ as a way of controlling the flow of information to the media. Thus, they play a hand in negotiations about the frequency and format of news conferences, as well as dealing with enquiries and issuing clarifications at the end.
Advisers are also involved in public information campaigns to raise awareness of government plans. This activity has several components, namely identifying themes, testing
ideas, devising slogans and monitoring public reaction:
217 I handle media enquiries for the minister who’s too busy to deal with every journalist
who wants an answer. In most cases they just want clarification but you have to deal
with these sorts of things otherwise they lose interest. (Adviser 1)
Networking
At least two advisers whose role it was to work directly with the media indicated that they had developed strong connections with major media outlets (newspapers, radio, television, etc) to facilitate the process of attracting media attention. Adviser 3 said, “it was very important that the minister’s office reached out to the media” when a new policy was being developed or implemented. Adviser 4 said this was done so the minister could “keep the media abreast of her concerns and agenda” and further commented that:
The minister liked the way that his media adviser works. He had a big reform agenda
and believes the press played a big role in getting the message out to the
community.
The capacity of advisers to network effectively and develop relationships with journalists enabled ministers to maximise positive media exposure and garner support for initiatives.
Establishing relationships with journalists could be an important source of intelligence about
undercurrents in the Opposition and what might be happening elsewhere in the
government. Advisers commented that building trust with journalists proved to be an
important dimension of their media relations work. It helped establish the minister’s credibility and reputation, as well as garnering favourable reporting.
It was explained by some advisers that a successful media strategy had to predict possible
‘press spins’ for issues, that is, anticipating ways reporters may ‘misinterpret’ a story. As noted, advisers have been associated with a supposed fixation with media presentation by governments. It has been alleged that they are predominately concerned with ‘spin’ – the
“highly professional selling of political messages that involves maximum management and manipulation of the media” (Grattan 1998:34).
218 The concept of spin was largely addressed by officials and interest group representatives in the interviews, although a number of advisers and ministers used similar terms to highlight the deliberate manipulation of political messages to influence public opinion. Examples include “messaging”, “manipulating” (Official 2 and 3 respectively), and “altering” and
“putting a gloss” (Representative 3 and 4 respectively) on media content.
One interviewee, an activist in the disability movement, expressed the view that advisers
engage “in a lot of spin, especially in the reporting of issues affecting people with a
disabilities”. Further comments included the following:
You’ll often hear them putting a positive spin on something you know isn’t true or
something that is worse than they’re trying to tell you is the case ... (Representative
1)
That’s to manage media, manage public perception. It’s a very sophisticated system
of information and perception management that largely operates at the adviser level.
(Representative 2)
A senior government official expressed a similar view about advisers’ use of the media to put ministers’ pronouncements in a favourable light and reach the electorate:
…advisers who deal with the media are generally influential I think. Their focus is to
put what the government is doing in a favourable light even if they’re not. (Official 2)
Coordinating messages
As noted earlier, the fragmented nature the governmental system calls for the effective coordination of political and policy information. Advisers assist with the coordination of
publicity events with government agencies and stakeholder groups to exploit a wide range
of resources and build a broad-based consensus to promote initiatives.
Advisers commented that they held regular meetings with media units in departments to
ensure the minister spoke with one voice. Coordinating messages also ensured media
considerations were integrated into the policy process so as to minimise confusion among,
219 or reinterpretation by, the media, and was essential in the management of political controversy involving the minister or his or her portfolio.
Managing issues
One interest group representative made the observation that governments in Australia, and in NSW in particular, believe the introduction of advisers was a direct response to the need for governments to control controversies and keep on top of the policy agenda:
I think advisers have come about because governments need to be able to control
controversies. This government [Carr] has been fixated with issue management and
controlling the way the media reports news. (Representative 5)
While much of this particular function involves seeing a minister through a personal or political crisis, typically what follows is a reactive attempt by his or her advisers, and in some cases the department, to calm the media and preserve the minister’s reputation.
Issue management therefore involves dealing with the media to accomplish these goals.
Ministers’ media relations efforts take on a special intensity and focus during election campaigns, with advisers being used to counter any negative reporting. An example is the
2006 NSW election, in which Morris Iemma (Premier 2005-08) was embarrassed during an organised event when a campaign participant gave his support to the Opposition leader.
The newspaper article reporting the incident noted the way in which advisers “went into meltdown”, contacting media organisations to protest against the story being viewed on television (Mitchell 2007).
Conclusion
The themes developed in this chapter suggest that the public relations role of ministers is much more important than it was 30 years ago, resulting in an increased emphasis on policy presentation. Ministers are to a greater extent keen to summon help from communication professionals, such as media advisers and departmental press officers, to develop media and communication strategies. The data from the interviews also showed that advisers are aware of the importance of managing relations with the media and that 220 they play a critical role in creating the message that is carried to the media as part of a media strategy.
221 CHAPTER 11 – MANAGING RELATIONS WITH INTEREST GROUPS
The policy-making process in Australia appears to have changed over the past 30 or so years, with decision-making processes now involving a diversity of participants including lobby groups, think-tanks, non-government organisations, consultancy groups, trade unions
and professional bodies. The relationships these groups have and share with government
is very important to understanding how and why advisers tap into these networks and how
these groups interact with advisers to promote their policy agenda and influence
government decision-making.
As noted earlier, the literature on advisers is relatively silent on the interaction between advisers and interest groups. There is brief mention of advisers working with interest groups to share and receive information and to diffuse any conflict likely to come to pass as a result of changes to policy and programs (Maley 2002). But, for the most part, previous studies have tended to under-emphasise the interactive and reciprocal nature of the relationship between advisers and interest groups. This chapter therefore seeks to address this gap by focusing on the nature, type and extent of the relationship between advisers and interest groups, and its importance to policy-making.
In theoretical terms, and in satisfying one of the aims of this study, exploring how these policy actors interact with each other is important for broadening an understanding of power as well as for determining the level and type of influence advisers exert as a group. A key question of this thesis, therefore, is whether advisers hinder or promote access to the NSW political system for organised interests and, by extension, democratise the policy process.
In considering why advisers are charged with the responsibility of managing relations with interest groups, three main views were gleaned from the interview data. First, some advisers seek to manage interest groups because they are seen as being influential in determining policy outcomes. Second, some advisers hold the genuine belief that interacting with interest groups leads to creative problem-solving and the development of more informed policy. Finally, and following from the second view, some advisers work with interest groups in the hope of building legitimacy for the process of policy change. Thus, 222 advisers are an important resource for ministers in determining the substantive focus of the relationship with organised interests.
Advisers have an important role to play in managing interactions with interest groups.
These interactions emerge from organised interests placing demands on ministers, not just so they can have a say in the type of policies governments ought to be pursuing but in order to seek to become an integral player in its final outcome. Importantly, the analysis shows that advisers are increasingly becoming the means by which interest groups inform
themselves about and influence the government public policy agenda.
Importance of the role
It was said that a number of benefits accrued to ministers who relied on advisers to make deputations to organised interests. There were potential workload benefits for ministers who were able to delegate responsibilities involving interaction with departments and external stakeholders. “It just frees up my time”, stated Minister 4. “In my portfolio, there are literally dozens of interest groups ... so I rely on my staff to interact with them”, said Minister
2.
Ministers also valued highly the roles advisers played in maintaining regular and open contacts with organised interests to ensure their particular concerns could be better integrated into the minister’s decision-making:
... the minister has also got to have a sufficient level of confidence in interest [groups] or
stakeholders. Not every stakeholder can get time with the minister, so the stakeholders
have got to have confidence that they can talk to people in the minister’s office and feel
that the views are going to be properly reflected in whatever summaries are given to the
minister. (Minister 2)
Advisers commented that being able to represent the minister in dealing with policy-making exchanges with interest groups enabled them to increase the scope of their roles and degree of autonomy. For instance, they could help extend the minister’s reach into interest group politics by working around the rigidities of the bureaucracy:
223 I meet with interest groups a lot … I listen to their concerns … talk to them about
what the department is doing, things the minister might be thinking about. (Adviser 1)
Nature of the relationship
Like those involving officials, the nature and type of relationship between advisers and interest groups covered a wide compass and varied according to the type of portfolio in which advisers worked, the adviser’s attitude towards the exchange, issue salience, and partisan ties. The size and complexity of the portfolio was a significant determinant in the level and type of relationship advisers had with interest groups. Portfolios that involved working with extensive organised interests, such as community services, the environment and the labour movement, tended to demand greater involvement from advisers in managing their interactions than portfolios with fewer organised interests. The attitude of the minister also played a part in how advisers interacted with interest groups. Ministers valuing the relationship tended to result in advisers having more to do with interest groups than if a minister saw little worth in fostering such relationships. For example Adviser 4 commented of his minister, “... he encouraged all that. He believed that’s what the world
was about linking into the community ….”
A closer look at the exchange between advisers and interest group representatives reveals
that both parties take action based on their perceptions of the needs and resources of both
sides. At times the relationship has an informal quality to it where unwritten rules and
mutual understanding define the exchange. Such informality could prove an important
ingredient in dealing with policy differences and sustaining the sharing of information about
the status of proposals and policy direction of the minister:
Those relationships with interest groups tend to be informal ... occasionally I’d run things
past certain people in the community sector, those I knew, had a rapport with I suppose
... They could help test ideas and I could let them know where things were at ... (Adviser
4)
While informality often governed the way advisers and interest groups interacted with each other, it is important to point out that advisers had virtually all the power over the way in
224 which these exchanges took place. He or she would decide when and with whom to meet, as well as the amount of time spent discussing an interest group’s issues. Moreover, they had a significant say over who got to speak with the minister and the amount and type of information that was conveyed to him or her.
The exchange was largely driven by the need to share information and influence policy formulation and implementation. Groups possess political and technical information of a sort that is not routinely available in the bureaucracy or ministerial office, and this assists with orienting the ministerial office on an issue. They are able to aggregate the interests and concerns of their constituent members and present them in a unified framework to the minister. To this end, they seek to foster relationships with advisers because they provide a ready means of access to the minister and the political process and an alternative avenue through which to set the agenda, help formulate policy, and ultimately influence decisions.
They also seek to form a relationship with advisers “because departments are … unresponsive to [their] concerns” (Representative 3) or because departments are
constrained by the priorities of the government.
Advisers, for their part, would turn to interest groups for information not available from the
department and to have them check information emanating from administrative agencies to
achieve a balanced view on policy proposals. Interest groups provided ‘a lived experience’
of the issues that they try to elevate to the political domain in the hope that their concerns
translate to government policy:
... we help the minister link with interest groups that departments aren’t good at doing.
We can go to them for information without the preconceived ideas that the department
has. (Adviser 2)
Some advisers actively engaged interest groups in the belief that it augured well for the development of policy and improving the minister’s and government’s standing in the community. “I meet with interest groups because the minister genuinely believes it pays off in the electorate”, noted Adviser 4. Ministers shared this belief:
225 You need to maintain good relations with community groups ... because they’re
vociferous, they know how to attract media attention, they’re good at mobilising support
from their members ... (Minister 4)
They’re a good barometer of what the public thinks about the government and its
policies ... So they need to be taken seriously. (Minister 2)
Some advisers perceived interest groups as being of assistance in helping the minister come to terms with how policy was being felt in the general community. As such, it would
be the role of advisers to turn to interest groups to gauge the public’s reaction to a proposal and build support for the introduction of a new policy:
I knew where the hot buttons were, and so I was the interpreter for them on education
policy and the government’s intent. (Adviser 6)
Some advisers treated their interactions with interest groups carefully, understanding very well that representatives of these groups were intent on influencing the political and policy-
making process. There was a sense that advisers who had political ambitions courted or at least interacted more intensely with interest groups than those who were less inclined in this regard.22 Others, it seemed, treated interest groups with indifference or with little regard to their importance in policy-making:
I had little involvement with interest groups. [Name of adviser omitted] worked with
interest groups in developing special education policy ... it just wasn’t something I had to
do. (Adviser 4)
While some exchanges between advisers and interest groups were encouraged by a desire for mutual benefit, there was evidence to suggest that the relationship was asymmetrical – benefiting one at the expense of the other:
We have a good relationship with the minister’s staff even if at times it feels like they get
more from us than we do from them ... it’s not a two way street. (Representative 2)
22 One adviser who admitted to meeting with interest groups on a regular basis now has a significant leadership role in local government politics. 226 There was a sense from some advisers’ description of their relationships with interest groups that they had to be accommodated into the policy cycle or the minister’s approach to policy-making in order to guarantee the minister’s political success, rather than out of a desire to treat them as a valued partner. Adviser 6 saw interest groups representatives as solicitous and “needing to be accommodated”. But the most significant objection to interest group participation was that it did not accord with the priorities of the minister or that their involvement caused the minister to pursue policies different from those they would prefer to pursue:
... but when [minister’s name omitted] got into government he was determined to reform
education and we basically had little time to keep those [group] contacts. (Adviser 4)
From their side of the relationship, interest groups sought endorsement of their positions and a pledge that their concerns would be reflected in policy debates. Some sought an advocate willing to speak on their behalf regarding an issue to other ministers, members of parliament and the media.
The balancing act for advisers, therefore, was one of ensuring that interest groups were afforded sufficient access to the minister so that they were able to have their views heard, while at the same time seeing that they did not become too influential or monopolising the minister’s attention.
Types of functions
In this relational context, advisers would seek to gain an in-depth understanding of the sector’s issues and keep abreast of interest group activities. This was important in helping ministers remain connected with the broader community, learn more about the ideas being developed outside the realms of the department, and make the most of this knowledge for weighing up policy options.
227 Advisers were also expected to deal with organised interests on matters affecting the minister’s portfolio and program areas of the department.23 Critically, they assisted
ministers in building coalitions of support for a policy or program, and in so doing helped
keep track of the minister’s relations with organised interests and the government
machinery. The following example provides an instructive account of how this is achieved
by advisers, and appears to suggest that advisers play a key role in enlarging the
constituency to generate support for the government’s policy.
One adviser convened a series of consultation forums to investigate alternative policing
practices. She considered the groups to be consulted and took responsibility for meeting
with their representatives to discuss the policy proposal and inform the minister of the
groups’ reactions. In working with these individuals, she took on the responsibility of
ensuring that interest groups were contacted before the announcement of the proposed
changes, that all relevant stakeholders (e.g. Police Association, civil liberty groups, social
action groups) were assembled for the announcement, and that briefings for these groups
were held soon after the announcement of the changes.
There was a feeling among the ministers and advisers interviewed that interest groups
were reliable indicators of public opinion; that is, they were able to crystallise and
communicate the intensity of the mood of the community, and this, depending on the issue,
could be an important ingredient in the calculation of the government’s decision-making. As
such, advisers would be charged with the responsibility of monitoring and considering
community sentiment in weighing up policy options:
I know our minister meets with lobby groups regularly. We’ve attended meetings to get
feedback, to listen to what they’ve got to say. (Adviser 2)
I meet regularly with interest groups – maybe once a week. It helps them raise their
concerns which they otherwise wouldn’t be able to do. If there are issues they want to
talk about they’ll phone me. If there’s feedback we want to give them we’ll phone them.
On a specific issue we’re working on at the moment we’re doing some public forums with
23 Constituency or electoral concerns tend to be handled by the minister’s own electoral staff. 228 stakeholders – interest groups, families and carers, service providers to let them know
on a package we’re putting together for advocacy programs. (Adviser 1)
Advisers’ control of access by interest groups to the minister is explored in greater depth in
Chapter 16, but, in brief, advisers use the position they hold to control who meets with the minister and to decide the circumstances under which to accept the overtures of organised interests, who typically initiate contact. In the early stages of the relationship, advisers have the advantage in setting the limits, scope and depth of interest group interactions. This is done for reasons of managing the minister’s time and maintaining the integrity of established communication channels.
One important element of the adviser’s role in this exchange was to carry messages from interest groups to the minister. This required an ability to articulate at least two points of view. In these circumstances, the advisers’ value lay in being able to present the minister’s policy agenda to interest groups, and then communicate the groups’ concerns to the minister. Minister 2 spoke of an adviser who had the political and community knowledge needed to relay these two kinds of information:
He was good at communicating and liaising with community groups, representing me in
effect. [He] was a good conduit, if you like, to the community, and that bridge was lost
when [he] left.
The most direct impact of the role of advisers concerns the reception they give to ideas put forward by interest groups. Representatives noted that they depend on advisers to listen to them, advocate their ideas, and ensure they are reflected in any decision-making.
Some interest group representatives emphasised trust as one of the more significant factors influencing the nature of their exchanges with advisers. According to one interviewee, it helped to break down barriers, avoid suspicion and build support:
... where you can actually get to a point where an adviser had some level of trust for you
it can be a very powerful way to influence the process ... if you’re able to build up a
relationship so that you actually develop the sort of dialogue with the policy adviser on a
particular issue then that might result in something that becomes a policy at the next
election or next year’s budget. (Representative 2) 229 Another representative commented:
They were a good crew to work with, very positive. I have to say when you get a good
set of advisers it really gets your industry going. (Interest Group Representative 3)
Though advisers revealed that they met with interest groups on a regular basis and as a matter of routine, these encounters were generally initiated by interest groups rather than advisers themselves, and mostly involved critical assessments of government proposals and ministers’ policy directions. Such exchanges also came with the expectation of favours being returned. One interest group representative acknowledged they were regularly requested to show support for a proposal in return for concessions over access to information or changes to aspects of policy development:
That happens regularly. You know they want something in return for meeting with the
minister or wanting something changed. I think once we mentioned in a newsletter that
the government’s decision to change some tendering guidelines was highly welcomed
and a sign of working together effectively but that’s not how we presented it.
(Representative 3)
In managing relationships, advisers were expected to diffuse tensions between the minister
and interest groups as a result of disagreements over policy. They were also expected to
absorb any criticisms interest groups may have of the minister or the policies espoused by
the government:
It’s important that they know who all the community groups are that have a stake in the
issues of my portfolio. It’s their job to know who the department is dealing with ... It’s also
their job to meet with them and consult with them at every opportunity ... to deal with
their specific concerns, take the heat, and hopefully leave those encounters knowing
and being better informed of why we’re doing the things we said we’d do. (Minister 3)
Problems with the relationship tended to be reported by interest groups rather than advisers. In most cases difficulties were due to interest groups having access to the minister curtailed, advisers refusing to meet with interest groups because their views were inconsistent with those of the government, or interest groups being overtly critical of the minister’s position on an issue. Many interest group representatives described instances of
230 discordant relationships, of varying intensity. Disagreements and tensions were variously referred to as “healthy debates”, “failure on the part of the government to hear our concerns”, and the adviser “riding roughshod” over due process (Representatives 2, 4 and
1 respectively).
There was broad acknowledgement by interest group representatives that the relationship
with ministers and advisers had to be managed carefully because their organisations were
in receipt of government funding to support their activity. This ‘one down’ position was
recognised as a factor in setting the tone of the relationship with advisers and to a large
extent reaffirms the view that the relationships between advisers and interest groups is less symbiotic than that between advisers and senior public servants or the media:
... because we’re government funded and in that interesting biting the hand that
feeds you scenario we’ve got a particular perspective and a particular set of
behaviours that we’ve got to engage in it doesn’t mean that we don’t push for what
our constituency wants. (Representative 4)
Conclusion
Advisers assume a vital role in responding to the concerns of interest groups. They are well placed to provide interest groups with access to the political process which would be denied to them if not for the agency of advisers. Ministers value highly the roles advisers play in forging close links with organised interests to gauge community sentiments. There is evidence to suggest that adviser-interest group interaction is important and has a direct connection with public policy.
Though alliances exist, these are generally weak and tend to be formed by advisers who are proactive and creative in their approach to policy-making. And, given the clear sense of superiority in the relationship, advisers find themselves acting on behalf of interest groups’ agendas in some stages of the exchange relationship.
Though the relationship between interest groups and advisers is less interdependent than that between advisers and public servants, there is evidence to suggest that each is able to
231 use their exchanges for their own purposes, such as influencing the minister to take a particular course of action or persuading interest group representatives to see the government’s position. Indeed, the relationship between advisers and interest group representatives does not appear to form the type of policy subsystem as that between advisers and government officials, suggesting that advisers work is a constantly fluctuating symbiosis of socialisation and strategic policy-making.
232 Part V – ‘Oiling the Wheels’ – Managing the Business of Government
Part V examines the roles advisers performed within the conceptual field of ‘managing the business of government’. This field arose from the need to organise the rich array of data that emerged from study participants’ reflections on dealing with the complexity, ambiguity and conflict associated with the development of policy.
This part comprises three chapters: Coordinating (Chapter 12), Networking (Chapter 13) and Resolving Policy Differences (Chapter 14), each containing a thematic analysis of the roles performed by advisers that help ministers come to terms with the challenges associated with managing the business of government. This challenge is seen to arise from concerns about the capacity of the state to steer and manage a differentiated polity, and from growing recognition that policy issues are becoming more difficult to contain within the boundaries of conventional governmental structures (Peters 2000; Rhodes 2000). To respond to this challenge, governments have moved to what a number of scholars
(Rhodes, 1997; Considine & Lewis 2003; Rummery 2006; Geddes 2006) have identified as
‘networked’ governance, a system of governing that represents a shift away from bureaucratic arrangements to one which requires cooperation between central government agencies, organised interests and the private sector.
233 CHAPTER 12 – COORDINATING
I deal with a lot of complex problems that involve multiple agencies and stakeholders. (Minister 2)
This chapter is concerned with how advisers are assigned significant coordination work to support the decision-making and portfolio management responsibilities of their ministers, and it explores how this is achieved. A prevailing sub-theme to emerge in the interviews from the overarching theme of managing government business was coordinating, a role in which advisers’ activities helped ministers deal with policy implications within and beyond their portfolio responsibilities. These activities were concerned with managing the more complex elements of policy-making: dealing with and controlling disagreements and ensuring the minister and his or her agencies were working to a common purpose. These activities support the view that advisers have an important role to play in maintaining the policy direction of the government through coordination, enabling political control for ministers. They achieve this through the unique position they hold within the political
executive and the relative ease with which they are able to work in and around the system
of government to calibrate the development of policy to the government’s agenda.
Advisers’ coordination role appears to have evolved as a consequence of the
administrative reforms introduced under Greiner in the late 1980s and strengthened under
Carr’s political management strategy, which centralised power and decision-making
authority within the Premier’s office. In government, Greiner bolstered the machinery
available to him for policy coordination. Centrally, he established the Cabinet office “to
coordinate the development of government policy through the Cabinet process and to act
as the Premier’s primary source of advice” (Laffin 1995:6). Externally, he reorganised a
number of government departments to achieve greater control and policy direction. For
instance, smaller departments were subsumed into larger ones, creating what are
commonly known as ‘mega-departments’. The consolidation of departments caused
ministers to take on more significant and complex portfolio responsibilities and placed
additional weight on the need to pursue coordination (Laffin 1995). Advisers who worked
for Greiner’s ministers were assigned significant policy coordination work to support their
234 decision-making and portfolio responsibilities. This was due to the ambitious administrative reforms already mentioned and the need for political flexibility to manage policy-making in
coalition, and in minority government, after the 1991 state election.
Coordination in the Carr government occurred on many fronts as well. Like Greiner, Carr
adopted a centralised approach to policy coordination by retaining the Cabinet Office and
Premier’s Department as distinct entities (Dodkin 2003), as well as expanding the number
of ministerial staff within his personal office to centralise control and draw together political
and policy content. As previously mentioned, advisers under Carr more than doubled in
number from 120 when he took office to 240 when he left in 2005. Carr was also regarded
as having a consensus management style which energised ministers to work in a unified
manner.
This assessment that coordination is centralised and increasingly handled by advisers
resonates with Lindblom’s view of policy coordination. He asserts that coordination is
achieved in two ways: by means of central command in which a single central authority
directs subordinate entities towards a common purpose, and by means of partisan mutual
adjustment involving a multi-centred system in which outcomes are negotiated by
independent actors (1965:28-29).This is important for understanding the place and roles of
advisers in the NSW political system.
While coordination is an important function that advisers perform to assist ministers to deal
with the disparate elements of policy-making, it is a function that brings to the fore the types
of institutional changes that occurred as a result of advisers’ roles and the place they
occupy within the political system. One of these changes is the diminished status of the
Cabinet as a deliberative and decision-making body; another is the growing place of the
ministerial office as a highly developed policy-making resource.
Advisers’ coordination role has received varying degrees of attention by researchers in this
area. Walter saw advisers as the ‘cement’ between the minister’s office and other policy
actors such as the party, government and public service (1986:158) ensuring greater
coherence over the development and provision of policy advice was achieved. Dunn found 235 advisers played a significant role in coordinating activities within the portfolio. He noted that these occurred through formal means such as regular meetings with the minister, public servants and themselves, and the organisation of paperwork, as well as through less formal means such as regular liaison (1997:98). Maley too reports advisers fulfilled significant policy coordination, a function she determined was critical to supporting Cabinet decision- making processes and political control (2002:240-242, 2010:103). She examines the budget process and the activities within central agencies - the Prime Minister’s Office,
Treasury and Finance, to elucidate advisers’ coordination role. She found that advisers’ coordination role facilitated decision-making processes both inside and outside of the cabinet, and enabled better management of policy differences.
This study, like those reviewed, also found advisers performed a policy coordination role. It found that advisers helped ministers reach within and across policy domains to identify policy problems (Dunn 1997:107), mobilised support for the government’s priorities (Maley
2002: 243), and enabled more seamless interaction among policy actors within the policy process (Davis 1998:154-155). It also found that the role grew out of institutional change.
Maley notes that advisers’ coordination role was conditioned by Hawke and Keating’s
desire to reduce cabinet business (2002:203) preferring instead for policy issues to be dealt
with between ministers rather than as a collective group. Another role determinant was
Keating’s leadership style, which according to Maley, led to advisers being delegated
greater responsibility in handling policy issues that were not part of the Prime Minister’s “big
picture” agenda (2002:207).
Coordination – a conceptual understanding
According to Pusey (1991), social and economic divisions are best resolved by integration and coordination. This task has become increasingly difficult as the state’s capacity to project power has been significantly diminished due to “a complex displacement of powers upward, downward and to some extent outward” (Jessop 1993:10). Such new public management techniques, specifically privatisation and contracting out, have exacerbated the decline of the state’s coordination capacity (Rhodes 1994). Some writers have argued
236 that this constitutes a ‘second wave’ of managerialism (Considine & Painter 1997) in which the application of market principles to government organisation became more explicit
(Davis 1997).
Writers on the role of coordination in government (e.g. Wanna et al 1992) point out that the process of coordination is frequently promoted by government as a panacea to the problems of strategic policy-making and governability. Davis (1995), for instance, argues
that coordination is the means by which governments assert control over the increasingly
fragmented structure of government agencies and programs and the interrelations between
them. He also asserts that governments in Australia pursue coordination in policy
administration for political reasons, and that there is a political dividend to be gained in the
pursuit of coordination.
The growing need for policy coordination is seen as a direct response to increasing
complexity associated with growth in government activity (Painter 1987) and questions
about the state’s ability to “steer policy through increasingly complex political and economic
environment” (Di Francesco 2001:104). Such complexity is said to give rise to a separate
series of government entities and institutions that, over time, take on their own
organisational form and identity. This is said to result in specialisation,
compartmentalisation and structural fragmentation. From this, it is argued, difficulties arise
from overlaps and conflicts between organisational units, and the more pronounced these
are, the stronger the tendency to pursue government activity through forms of coordination
(Painter 1981). In public administration, therefore, coordination is seen as the most
effective mechanism for bringing coherence to the range and complexity of government
activity, and for bringing order and method to the way institutions operate; accordingly, the
extent to which advisers form an integral part of this coordination process is of significance
to this thesis.
Its significance can be detected in the views of study participants who emphasised the
importance of coordination as an imperative that serves to overcome the complexities of
237 policy-making, and the significant role advisers play in managing these complexities, a role evident in the following comments.
You have all these issues to deal with you know – there’s the unions, there’s the
community groups, the media’s on your back, industry concerns etc,
you’re advisers help with threading all these concerns in a coherent manner. (Minister 2)
There are some issues that required advisers to coordinate technical advice because
quite often you need to get external people to provide you with
that technical advice but they play [advisers] that coordinating function … (Minister 3)
... they have a coordinating liaison role with technical people with the department, and
the need to coordinate that information and put it into a digestive form and it’s very
critical. (Minister 4)
Coordination therefore arises from the need for governments to be in control of public policy and administration and to respond to social and economic problems in a coherent manner.
Types of coordination
Coordination was conceptualised as an instrumental function. That is, it was discussed as a process that required advisers from different portfolios to ‘work together’ to implement goals that had already been agreed upon, generally by ministers. The following respondent made this process clear:
So if a group of people sitting around a table were coordinating, those goals would
already be set usually by the lead-minister and we would be working to that goal.
(Adviser 6)
Coordination was often associated with the notion of ‘driving’ an initiative through government. This was particularly the case with issues that were not popular with participating agencies but in which government had a higher-order responsibility to produce a coherent or whole-of-government outcome:
... to me coordination often comes with ‘well what is the endpoint that we want to reach’,
and this is the process, and we’ve got to manage that process. (Adviser 2)
238 Coordination largely involved advisers from various ministerial offices working together to shape, frame and develop policy in a packaged form to be then considered by the relevant ministers. The motivation to enhance policy advice for the minister was seen as important
by advisers in triggering this type of coordination, as was the immediate need for
information-sharing, especially on issues that cut across two or more portfolios. Other
triggers included a crisis event, which often resulted in ministerial offices responding in a
united manner:
Depending on what’s happening, I’ll get a hold of staff I know in [Name of agency
omitted] and we’ll meet and talk about something the minister’s been thinking about.
Sometimes that’ll get the ball rolling on an idea ... Now that’ll happen because
something’s made the news or because the union’s planning industrial action. (Adviser
4)
There are always things that you need to work on that involve other ministers. In this
portfolio nearly everything involves AGs, JJs [Juvenile Justice], DoCS [Department of
Community Services]. So every time there’s something that we’re working on that
involves other ministers we’ll generally work together and talk shop about policy ideas.
(Adviser 3)
Advisers were involved in day-to-day policy coordination often with issues that could be resolved quickly and informally.
It’s way way easier to call your equivalent in [Name of agency omitted] and get the
heads up on an issue ... I did it regularly when things just popped up in the news.
One routine function which gave a means of pursuing this particular function was the briefing for the minister on all Cabinet submissions. This would focus the minister’s attention on gaps and shortfalls in the pre-Cabinet preparation of policy options and advice.
This ensured that all stakeholders’ views were integrated and had the effect of redressing imbalances within arenas of bureaucratic politics where agencies might be facing persistent opposition. Briefings for the minister were important for this function because they provided the minister with arguments that could be used to counter the opinions of other Cabinet
239 ministers. To prepare briefings for a minister, an adviser would have extensive contact with public servants on relevant policy matters.
Various means were used to facilitate coordination within and across government.
Meetings between advisers would happen regularly and usually informally to exchange
information on the progress of policy development as well as to receive updates on the
policy work of the respective department’s other portfolios. Coordination could be achieved
through regular meetings and contact between ministerial offices primarily through the
formation of interministerial committees, or taskforces comprising experts from the
department, community groups and think-tanks. Such committees were used to resolve
policy issues that required a whole-of-government approach and conflicts that arose from
intersections in policy.
Advisers also coordinated policy through the Departmental Liaison Officers (DLOs), who
acted as an information conduit between the ministerial office and department.
Coordination involving the DLOs was seen to be highly important to the relationship
between advisers and departments because it strengthened the quality of advice provided
to the minister.
Regular meetings with departmental officials were held to “get a sense of what the
department was working on” (Adviser 3) and a feel for “what the left and right hands were doing” (Adviser 5). Advisers noted that these meetings built coalitions to ensure policy was not developed in isolation. These exchanges were important for resolving differences that occurred when policy areas overlapped with each other. Committees were a means of managing the process of interagency conflict and interrelatedness and were used to discuss contentious issues, oversee interagency working groups, consider afresh proposals emanating from the minister or from the Premier’s Department, and receive updates on the policy work of their respective departments.
Coordination also involved policy work outside the ministerial-bureaucratic relationship and focused on supporting ministers’ parliamentary and political roles. Here advisers assessed difficulties within and outside the ministerial office, especially in other offices. Ministers 240 used advisers to help deal with policy programs that spanned departments and to carry out partisan-related projects that could not be reasonably undertaken by the bureaucracy. This type of coordination included exchanges with members of the parliamentary party and negotiations on proposed legislation with members of minor parties.
The crux of this type of coordination was said to be to support ministers with their parliamentary and political roles. Ministers come into government with their own set of political perspectives and policy agendas that set the speed and direction of the bureaucratic machinery. Ministers also know that their political success depends on
retaining the confidence of the premier, parliamentary colleagues and party headquarters.
For advisers this meant working with key contacts to present their minister in a positive light. One adviser said she would organise meetings with certain members of the parliamentary party on specific policies and provide briefs and speech notes to support their work on parliamentary committees or to deal with constituency concerns.
Coordination also involved preparing the minister for question time, and devising strategies to deal with questions with and without notice. During question time, advisers would be called upon to provide answers to questions that arose without notice from the Opposition.
It also involved working with DLOs to provide a political overlay on responses coordinated with the department.
Their role in this regard had great importance in being able to organise the department and organise members of the parliamentary party to ask ‘Dorothy Dixers’ that ministers could use to sell the government’s strengths and successes and highlight the Opposition’s weaknesses and flaws. To support this particular activity, advisers would develop and establish contacts with institutions with an interest in the minister’s portfolio. This included
organised interests as well as official advisory bodies established to advise the government
on policy matters.
241 Relevance of coordination
It can be reasoned from what advisers do and their place in the system of government that they are well suited to carrying out coordination. As ministers’ representatives, they are able to take a whole-of-government perspective on the development of policy and integrate this into the policy agenda of their ministers. As a coordinating force, advisers provide ministers, and by extension the government, with the additional capacity to manage conflicting interests and harmonise policy differences as far as practicable:
But if you’ve got anywhere up to a dozen or 20 agencies to manage, then when the
minister is not there then that person – the chief of staff has got to be a person who
coordinates communications with their equivalent positions in other ministers’ offices.
So the chief of staff has got to be able to deal with agency to agency, minister to
minister or ministerial office in resolving problems. (Minister 2)
The foregoing comment suggests that ministers are too busy to bring under control the scale and scope of their portfolio and so delegate responsibility for coordination to advisers who are working on policy problems associated with policy development.
The growing organisation of advisers can be seen as one of the means by which ministers seek to assert their control over the executive bureaucracy, and occasionally take over elements of the Cabinet decision-making process. Arguably, there is a strengthening view that many of the deliberative and formal decision-making processes of the Cabinet have been ceded to the ministerial office and are now executed by advisers. This can be evinced in Greiner’s preference to reduce the business of Cabinet by devolving the decision-making responsibilities of the Cabinet to his ministers and departments, making them each responsible for setting the direction of their departments (Laffin 1995). Interviewees suggested that advisers’ help improve the quality of debate in Cabinet by providing high- level briefings on policy outside of their portfolio responsibility:
I would work with advisers in other officers to sort out or work up policy proposals.
We have to because no-one issue exists in isolation. I have to coordinate the team in
this office, … I think what you see now with the way things are with the number of 242 advisers is that they prepare the minister for Cabinet – that’s the forum where the
minister has to argue and make the case for the government to adopt a certain policy
position. (Adviser 4)
So whether the ministers have to get together or not depends on the issues at play,
but the minister has some background on what the view of the department is going to
be in that sense it’s a considerably more smaller and more practical version of the
way the Cabinet operates. You know, and that’s happening on a multi-times a day
level. (Adviser 1)
These statements add weight to Maley’s claim that advisers’ networks act as an “adjunct to the Cabinet system ...” (2002:204), providing an institutional resource and support to the way it conducts its business and deliberates on policy matters. They can also serve as an effective mechanism for interministerial policy coordination. A strong network of advisers can develop between ministerial offices and can provide an effective device for negotiating important policy decisions before they reach the Cabinet process. As the above comment
suggests, disagreements over policy are being settled between advisers rather than
between ministers themselves. As this study has observed, networking that occurs
between advisers of ministerial offices exerts a powerful influence in determining the type of policies that progress to the Cabinet.
Importance of coordination
As noted, coordination is made distinguishable by the fact that government agencies are interdependent, and that the implementation of policy by one agency may have consequences for another. Its purpose is to ensure that these externalities are properly taken into account in the calculus of government decision-making. The views drawn out in interview revealed a wide and varied understanding of the significance of coordination in resolving policy uncertainties and the benefits it brought to collective decision-making:
One mechanism to do that [co-ordinating] is having advisers from offices agreeing on an
approach … and in a sense the direction can be given to the departments. (Adviser 1)
243 The coordination role performed by advisers was highly valued by ministers and officials because it meant much of the policy detail could be worked out prior to Cabinet approval. It
freed up ministers’ time, took them away from situations of having to face other ministers
over policy minutiae, and brought a unified front to the Cabinet process. It was also seen as
highly important among ministers who oversaw major policy reforms and whose portfolios
were large in scale and scope. For these ministers, coordination allowed for dealing with
conflict that arose from the development implementation of new policy, working more
effectively in and across portfolios, and maintaining productive working with relationships
with ministers who shared similar portfolio responsibilities (e.g. community services and
health).
[Name omitted] is quite a diverse portfolio. It has some 20 different agencies, [name
omitted], [name omitted] etc. No minister could realistically work across all that and
produce a whole of portfolio whole of government view. You need advisers who know
how to form a whole-of-government view who can work in interface with the agencies
and other offices. (Minister 2)
Yes that’s right … their skill base I think is overwhelmingly their knowledge of
governments and their inter-relationships. Their gate-keeper, traffic policy you know how
does a piece of paper or an idea get from A-to-B or “how do we influence certain
outcomes?” and “how do we play the Cabinet process”. (Minister 1)
Coordination was also critical to giving the impression of unity and reducing duplication.
Ministers want their area of portfolio responsibility to bear some relationship to the whole since they want their policy outcomes to reflect positively on themselves and the government as a whole:
Greiner had strong feelings about the direction of policy and he used me
and others to see that everything was beating to the sound of his drum. (Adviser 3)
Most advisers interviewed placed an emphasis on coordination, stressing its importance in helping ministers resolve policy uncertainties, bringing coherence to the type of advice presented to ministers, and imposing a decision value on the bureaucracy. Coordination enabled ministers to work more effectively, both in and across their own portfolios and that
244 of other ministers. It ensured that momentum in the development of policy could be established over time. It meant that information could continue to flow from various sources into the ministerial office leading to the minister being better informed. It also helped with clarifying and resolving impasses before entering the Cabinet process.
How coordination happens
To coordinate policy advice for the minister, advisers work both inside and outside the bureaucratic system. In relation to the department, advisers comment on policy submissions, sit in on meetings, provide the minister with political and policy advice and transmit messages to departmental officials, and provide and manage the interface with external stakeholders. They go about their coordination work in an unencumbered manner, obtaining the views of parliamentary colleagues and other outside interests and integrating this information into the department’s policy program. Advisers from portfolio-related ministerial offices would work in conjunction with the Cabinet office to provide and enable a more concerted effort from the centre, and to focus on cross-cutting activity issues.24
The coordination role undertaken by the advisers interviewed occurred on at least two
levels. Internally, advisers would operate as a control point for receiving departmental
information, including papers, briefings and expenditure proposals. Externally, they would
link the various agencies, systems and individuals involved with developing and
implementing government policy. Analysis of the interview data reveals that advisers from
two or more ministerial offices worked together to coordinate the development of policy that
cut across portfolio responsibilities. These lateral relations provided a means of achieving coordination and accommodation of differences outside of the ambit of the Cabinet process. It also helped resolve policy differences prior to a minister or ministers elevating a
matter to the Cabinet level.
24 For example, Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care and Department of Health. 245 Conclusion
Coordination can be seen as a potential source of power for ministers and advisers. This potential is enhanced when there is a strong emphasis placed on resolving policy differences, particularly when policies cut across portfolios and when budgetary issues are involved. Interviewees revealed a wide and varied understanding of the significance of coordination in resolving policy uncertainties and the benefits it accrued to collective decision-making. This chapter has drawn attention to a role that advisers perform, which appears to have evolved by virtue of the growing importance of the ministerial office in
policy development and the growing numbers of advisers who are expected to deal with
policy and political externalities. Importantly, it has drawn attention to the fact that advisers are increasingly seen as part of a formal and informal structure for coordinating the political and policy roles of their ministers.
246 CHAPTER 13 – NETWORKING
… but certainly my impression is that there is almost a ‘government of ministerial advisers’ …
they get together, they know each other, they talk to each other a lot. So there’s [an] informal
grouping, they all know each other, and meet at party political functions and so on. (Minister 1)
The minister’s comment quoted above invokes a powerful image about the organisation of advisers and their growing place in the Australian political system. The notion that there
could be, in structure and form, a government of ministerial advisers serves to illustrate
how far perceptions of advisers have changed since their formal introduction some 35
years ago. Far from being seen as ‘anomalous’ and ‘experimental’, as reported by earlier
writers, advisers, it seems, have evolved into a settled feature of Australian politics, a well-
connected policy centre in their own right. This particular characterisation can be found in
descriptions of the working environment of the ministerial office and the contacts advisers
formed with advisers from other offices:
I would say it was very collegiate. It has to be and based on trust and having confidence
in the people you have around you and for that to translate into a resource that you can
use to develop and implement your ideas. (Minister 5)
Most people I know that have worked in ministerial offices work as a really tight team
and they continue to stay in contact for decades to come. So that’s I think a very nice
part of it. (Adviser 4)
These statements, and the one at the start of this chapter, raise important questions about the network-like structure that advisers are able to form by virtue of their numbers and the institutional context and setting in which they operate. Does the networking function performed by advisers contribute to a governance-like capability which governments use to resolve policy problems, and which ministers then draw on to manage what goes on around them? If it does, what does this mean about the way policy is made within the political executive, and about past and current conceptualisations of power and governance?
This chapter explores the networking activities of advisers, their patterns of interaction, the significance of networking for policy-making, and its relevance in managing government business. While networking was not specifically named by those interviewed, the 247 descriptions given by advisers of their interactions with advisers of other ministerial offices, and to a lesser extent with interest groups and the media, would suggest that they engage in networking to manage critical elements of policy-making. These elements include coordinating advice, garnering support for policy development, and extending the reach and capabilities of the minister to manage the business of government.
As noted in the literature chapter, policy-making arises from the ongoing interactions of policy actors. In the public administration and policy literature, networking is seen as an important governance mechanism and as a way of integrating differentiated actors. These accounts have documented the way in which state-centred policy-making processes have given way to more multidimensional and interactive policy-making involving a diversity of state and non-state actors with multiple linkages, including formal and informal patterns of interactions (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998). Essentially, networks can serve as an important means of producing coordination (Peters 1998). But more than this, they can provide a source of power, influence and resources, and can be managed for political gain.
Earlier writers on advisers provide a brief exposition of advisers’ networks and networking roles and the significance of these in the development of policy. Smith refers to an
“information network” arising from advisers’ surveillance function (1975:146) and the existence of a network between staff of the Prime Minster’s office and Minister for Foreign
Affairs. According to Smith, these networks enabled ministers to obtain information quickly thereby contributing to the effectiveness of the executive (1975:153). Networks and networking are given cursory analysis in Walter’s study. He notes their significance in opening up career opportunities for advisers in both public and private enterprise
(1986:187). Dunn too provides a brief overview of advisers’ networking activities. He found liaison between advisers to be an important activity contributing to coordination within the executive. He also found advisers established networks with their counterparts in the department (Dunn 1997:75), which in and of itself provides an interesting insight into the level and type of convergence that is occurring between the politics and public administration.
248 Maley (2002; 2010; 2011) provides a comprehensive analysis of advisers’ networks and networking activities. She found that networking amongst advisers aided coordination
within the ministry and that it proved to be an “important adjunct to the cabinet system …”.
(2002:204; 2010:104). Maley reports that networking between advisers was “more
deliberate” than that detected by earlier writers implying that it had to be purposeful and
actively undertaken because the environment in which advisers worked was not conducive
to informal social contact (2002:206). She likens advisers’ networks to a “community” linked
together by a web of personal relationships, political connections and shared
understandings (2002:211-212). Taking this assessment one step further, Maley reports on
the presence of formal and informal networks framed around policy areas (e.g. women’s
policy). She also maps communication networks to show the interconnectedness between
advisers of one portfolio and advisers of another’s. She found these networks intersected
with three key central agencies: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Finance and Treasurer’s
offices and were significant for coordination from the centre (2002:221-222; 2011:7).
Maley draws two significant conclusions regarding advisers’ networks and networking
function that are of import to this study. The first is that advisers’ networks created a power-
structure which not only enabled the exchange of information but the capability also to
resolve differences of policy matters (2002:239; 2011:8). The second, which derives from
the first, is that networking functioned as a coordination device enabling policy matters to
be resolved quickly and cabinet processes to be streamlined and supported. This is in line
with one of the central themes in this study which is that there is a strong institutional
dimension to the adviser system: they take on a significant body of work; there is a shared
understanding of what this work entails; and they exist to solve what Shepsle refers to as
“problems of cooperation” (1989:138). As noted by Maley, some 90% of matters going
before cabinet for consideration were pre-handled by advisers enabling ministers to be
freed up from the role of settling policy disputes (2002:241). This points to institutional
change but the implications of this were not explored. When viewed in the context of one of
the key tenets of the Westminster system of government - the concentration of political
power in the collective responsibility of the cabinet - an obvious question arises: does the 249 presence and activity of advisers dilute or weaken this responsibility and the institution of the cabinet? Another is whether this tenet of Westminster continues to hold true in the
Australian political system given the degree to which cabinet responsibility is shared amongst advisers.
This study found evidence of the existence of adviser-networks and networking between advisers and other actors and confirmation of what Maley found to be the case in her study of advisers in the Keating government: that advisers interacted with each other forming lasting relationships that were found to be important in resolving portfolio-related matters. It is relevant to note however that the analysis of advisers’ networks and networking activities in this thesis is very much grounded in the assessment of the minister who made this powerful observation of there being ‘a government of advisers’. It provides the spark for mapping the institutional territory occupied by advisers.
There is one limitation in relation to the analysis of advisers’ networks and networking function, and that pertains to the number of advisers interviewed for this study making it difficult to gauge the full scale and scope of advisers’ networks and networking roles especially between advisers. Advisers’ networks were not mapped in the manner undertaken by Maley. This means the degree of ‘interconnectedness’ cannot be fully explored.
In this study, advisers’ networks were found to be broader than those described by Maley and earlier writers. In addition to adviser-based networks in which advisers interacted between each other, there were networks that existed between advisers and organised interests, the media, parliamentary staff, and public servants. These did not appear to be as robust or stable as adviser-based networks but they were nonetheless important assets in the exchange of information and sharing of ideas. Advisers also brought personal networks and contacts to the role, a finding that did not appear to be present in previous research. In one example highlighted in parts of this study, an adviser was recruited because of his background and extensive contacts in the union movement.
250 The networking function affirms one of the dominant themes to emerge from this study which is the need for ministers to be able to reach within and across diverse policy domains to identify policy problems, bring coherence to policy advice and solutions, marshal support for the government’s priorities, and to enable more seamless interaction among policy actors within the policy process. It also affirms the extent to which advisers’ roles are shaped by the circumstances in which they find themselves at a given point in time. For instance, the network function appeared to be more evident and important for ministerial advisers who worked for ministers during the Greiner/Fahey Governments. This was partly
because of the extensive economic and administrative reforms introduced by Greiner upon
being elected to government in 1988 which placed greater expectations on ministers to
better manage the policy-making process by focusing on consultation, networking across a range of policy domains, coordination, and issue management. For ministerial advisers, this meant having to liaise with advisers in other ministerial offices, departments, and party colleagues.
At its most basic and by definition, a network is a set of actors connected by a set of ties and can be defined as a public policy making and implementation system involving multiple nodes (individuals, agencies and organisations) with multiple linkages – not just informal patterns of interaction, but also structures through which public goods and services are planned, designed and produced and delivered (modified from McGuire 2002).
The findings presented in this chapter contribute to an understanding of the adviser system operating as a political institution. The networks advisers form and functions they perform within this relational context give rise to a conception of their institutionality. Indeed, a network implies institutional territory as well as infers ways of working or ‘rules of the game’ as the literature in this area tends to proclaim (North 1991:3; Rhodes 1992:78). Importantly, advisers’ networks provide institutional breadth to the political executive enabling it to reach into policy domains that were hitherto difficult to access.
Much of the literature on advisers tends not to draw on the explanatory power of institutionalism, or network theory for that matter, to account for the changing institutional
251 complexion of the Australian and NSW political system resulting from the advent, growth and institutionalisation of ministerial advisers. This chapter and study goes part way to addressing this gap in knowledge and understanding.
Respondents’ views on networking
Interviewees used a variety of terms and descriptions to account for the type of networking advisers undertook. Terms such as “connecting” (Minister 2), “linking”, “closely knit”
(Adviser 4) and “associations” (Official 2) were used to characterise some of advisers’ networks and networking functions.
Networking was part of advisers’ routine work in coordinating the minister’s portfolio and cross-portfolio responsibilities (e.g. between disability and health). Ministers valued this because it enabled them to keep informed of other ministers’ matters as well as to learn
about the details of policy ideas and innovations in the broader policy community. Advisers’ networking also allowed ministers to be aware of policy debating points and where the sensitivities were likely to lie in selling a particular policy idea. Thus, it served as a way of gathering intelligence, of bringing externalities within the control of the ministerial office, and of broadening the minister’s contacts beyond his or her immediate surrounds.
Two ministers offered a qualitative measure of the significance of advisers’ networking function:
But if the alternative is going back to the old days where you take this group out …
advisers. And if you go back to where here is the education department, and here is the
minister who sits in a different building, and gets a visit from the head of the department
periodically … and that’s about it, then I think the advisers probably lubricate the system,
not always for good purpose, mostly for political purpose, but nevertheless they help the
world go round. And compared to the alternatives, I think it’s probably right. (Minister 1)
A Department and minister can’t be effective if they’re not interfacing with all of the
groups that have an impact on them and if they don’t have a network with all the
community groups then they’re operating in a vacuum. (Minister 2)
252 These views offer insights into advisers’ roles in connecting their minister with the broader policy community: they broaden his or her horizontal ties and build links with key policy institutions. The second comment in particular supports the view that advisers and their networking role can serve to strengthen a minister’s capability in dealing more effectively with interest groups and expand his or her reach beyond the confines of his or her
department.
Participants also noted other important but less tangible benefits (e.g. reputation-building):
And one of the things I used to say to staff in my office if they are interfacing well with
the community and developing good relationships and networks with the community
then I as a minister would be relating well with the community and developing good
networks with the community because the community would feel they are working well
with the minister and the office because they’re working well with those people. (Minister
2)
There’s a degree of activism in that you build your own information sources from within
and outside the department and you do this because you want things to flow and go
smoothly for you when you’re dealing with new proposals. (Adviser 2)
So there is political capital that can accrue to ministers whose advisers establish and make use of networks to enhance their reputation. Trust and links with these actors hinge on the types of networks established among advisers. Not only do networks serve as a vehicle to carry the minister’s reputation and build trust with community groups, they also enable ministers to become sensitised to the political and policy cues emanating from relevant policy communities. Key to advisers’ success in managing the external environment on the minister’s behalf was their ability to develop, cultivate and maintain personal networks.
Networking, was also apparent in what Adviser 7 referred to as “politicking”, which in its simplest fashion meant “dropping by to talk about the minister’s concerns” or “regularly calling in” to discuss policy related matters. This particular aspect of networking appeared to support the coordination function described earlier in that it grew out of the cross- portfolio work that advisers were required to do to resolve disagreements at the ministerial
253 level. ‘Politicking’ was another of the two-way relationships in which advisers from different offices would engage.
One adviser provided an insightful account of this particular feature of networking:
There was a lot of negotiating over this proposal by Health to close community health
centres in the inner city and use that funding for these centres to be established in areas
where they don’t have them – the west basically. It all made perfect sense but action
groups complained, it made the papers, the minister was worried because the centre
was in her electorate. I met with the people in the health minister’s office, one of whom I
knew, to see if something could be done ... strangely enough they weren’t aware of the
proposal so it got back to the health minister who was also worried about the public’s
reaction. So there was all this toing-and-froing about funding, whether the department
was right, and eventually they were able to find money from somewhere to keep the
centres open and build new ones where they were needed ... I think they were able to
extract some money from the feds, in the end it didn’t really matter. There’s a lot of
politics that goes on with some of these decisions. You wonder sometimes. (Adviser 1)
Seemingly, therefore, advisers’ networking can be an effective mechanism for interministerial policy coordination. The strong ties advisers develop between ministerial offices can provide an effective device for negotiating important policy decisions. As mentioned in Chapter 12, disagreements over policy are increasingly being settled between advisers rather than between ministers or through other more formal processes such as the
Cabinet.
In the comment above, the adviser mentioned making use of his own personal contacts to effect a policy decision quickly and advocate on the minister’s behalf about an issue that was likely to impact on her politically among her immediate constituents. It was an effective way of containing and spreading risk across a broader array of policy players. It also fed a type of ‘intelligence’ into the decision-making process from which both offices were able to benefit. This particular adviser had extensive partisan contacts, having worked as a staffer for an Opposition spokesperson who oversaw a significant area of social policy and having been an adviser for at least three ministers. He currently has a leadership role in local government and is also well known in political circles. As implied in a number of his 254 statements that appear in other sections of this study, for instance the policy director role,
this adviser is highly partisan in the way he goes about his work and has often pursued
strategies that are concerned with supporting a career trajectory in politics.
The comment above also serves to highlight how policy decisions are influenced by policy
networking and strategic activity internally, instead of by the political activism of an external
body. It also highlights how personal discussions between friends and associates can drive
action. The network and type of intervention described in this example raise important
questions about advisers’ place and role in the policy-making process. As a guide, this
example shows that advisers provide ministers with structural resources to resolve policy
problems through less formal bureaucratic means.
There appears to be a set of uncodified norms that advisers play by in order to be effective
in their jobs and maintain their minister’s reputation. Advisers, it seems, are expected to
inform other advisers of activities that affect them, share risks, agree on aims, and work in
ways that lead to more openness and sharing of information on common or related
initiatives. Personal trust and confidence in their abilities are major factors in structuring
network relationships between advisers. This function affirms an important theme emerging
from the analysis, which is that advisers’ networks and the networking role engender
personal trust among those with whom they must closely work.
The legitimacy of this networking function can also be detected in officials’ comments. For
them, the role prevented public servants from becoming too entangled with the concerns of
organised interests and the media. It allowed rapid connections to be made with potential
supporters and participants and gave immediate access to political support, expertise and
practical resources without politicising the department:
I think there is a role for advisers to provide a range of views and get input from other
areas than just the Department – the unions, industry, environmental groups, community
groups, academia etc rather than just challenging the departmental view or pushing the
departmental view. (Official 1)
An interest group representative provided the following contribution on this specific role:
255 I think an adviser should really have some sort of working knowledge of what they’re
advising on. Are you there to advise on politics, what’s going to keep a minister in
power? Or are you there to advise on what the community really wants out of that
portfolio? For me, advisers in community or disability services should really know
networks and have some basic grounding in what the community sector is all about.
(Representative 1)
It seems that, for interest group representatives, advisers’ networks are able to provide a constructive base for learning about the issues and concerns of those affected by government policy and contribute to the establishment of effective working relationships with organised interests.
Networking was seen by some advisers to be an important coordination method. Informal contacts were the preferred method for sharing information about portfolio activities and achieving a consensus on policy proposals:
When I first started I was very open to meeting with [name omitted]. I can remember
people bringing forward ideas about group insurance schemes for local government and
just innovative and different things that weren’t possible. And I suppose therefore I
cultivated a network of experts and others to help bounce ideas around and help bring
things together that could help the minister in his role in Cabinet. (Adviser 4)
As implied here, the networking activities of advisers could be seen as an important
addition to the Cabinet decision-making process. Information about cross-cutting issues
could be shared and policy decisions consulted on – key ingredients to keeping policy-
making as coherent as possible. These informal arrangements were very important. It could
take the ‘sting’ out of policy debates that may have occurred at the ministerial level:
I became the interface between [name omitted] and the public sector in the Premier’s
department and in day one or two [name omitted] said I ... want you to be the action
doer ... I was responsible for attending office meetings, doing file notes, advising
ministers and their advisers or departments of whatever the outcomes of meetings were
and following them through and diffusing any tension. I would take a softly softly
approach to these things most of the time. It was just the way things were and got done.
(Adviser 6)
256 Accordingly, having access to the views of other advisers could be a special asset to an adviser. It could give them special insights into policy problems and assist with solutions that might address these problems. Networking enabled advisers to gain a deeper understanding of the frameworks employed by other advisers, how issues came to be
framed, and what outcomes and processes each office valued. It was the basis of
successful negotiation.
There were other advantages of the networks advisers formed, including being at the leading edge of information, having access to new ideas, gossip and happenings in other sectors, professions and organisations, and being able to seek support from and influence advisers in other ministerial offices.
I have a lot of contact with outside organisations, the minister encourages that and
certainly I get across to GMT [Governor Macquarie Tower] to catch up on things that
impact on our minister’s portfolio. (Adviser 5)
In some circumstances, advisers’ networks could be a valuable asset and a determining factor in them being recruited:
The whole reason I was brought in there was because I had great networks with all the
employer associations and unions at the time and we used that. (Adviser 4)
This observation suggests that, although displaying variation in their form and function, the
networks all exhibited a form of governance based on relationships, trust, mutual
understanding, cooperation and joint problem-solving.
Dimensions of the networking role
Networking is made possible by a range of factors and conditions. First, nearly all advisers interviewed worked in close proximity to each other. The majority of advisers in NSW are located and work in the Governor Macquarie Tower building, a government-tenanted office
situated near Parliament House. Although such arrangements are by design, they provide
opportunities for advisers to have regular contact with each other and meet informally to obtain feedback on ideas. As noted earlier, the work culture of the ministerial office is fairly intimate and this is said to filter through the ministerial adviser enterprise. Each office is a 257 relatively small work setting which fosters networks, close working relationships and opinions based on first-hand experience. This proximity fosters collective work to achieve the policy objectives of the government. The nearness of each office, coupled with a strong sense of common purpose, makes it easy to discern the work of each office, its habits, workloads, talents and personalities.
A second factor is the importance of managing risk and the concomitant potential loss of reputation which further motivated staff to devote time to networking. A third is the minister’s preferences as to who relates to whom, which has a bearing on the frequency and patterns of interactions amongst advisers. A fourth is that ministers have little time to
meet with the many individuals and groups necessary to fulfil the full range of his or her
duties. Finally, and more broadly, the increasing complexity of public agendas necessitates
a search for new approaches to the resolution of policy problems: the use of networks is
seen as one of these approaches.
Patterns of interaction
Typically, the advisers interviewed characterised their networks as loose, informal and built on established ties – not as a formalised independent network. Networks grew from collegiality between advisers and existed in a variety of forms: some were based on personal relationships and some on contacts made between advisers working together to develop policy. These involved phone calls, drop-in visits, meetings in coffee shops, etc.
Yet other networks were tight and formed around policy issues.
Networking also developed with interest groups and the media, as indicated earlier. This tended to result in loose and tight networks with the aim of keeping information and
communication channels intact between ministerial offices.
Descriptions of advisers’ interactions with each other grew out of discussions regarding the
working environment and political climate of the ministerial office. There was evidence to
suggest that advisers’ networks have an enduring quality, that they fulfilled an important support and mentoring role and that advisers came to the role with their own networks and
258 contacts. The following comment supports the view that trust and confidence is a key feature of networking, that personal networks can grow over time, and that they may include former and current working colleagues:
... they’ll connect still for each of their birthdays and celebrate certain events and that’s
going on year after year … (Adviser 4)
They tend to develop a network of people that they rely on, that they trust to give them
advice, or to get information from them. Sometimes, they do that to trick up the DG, or
test what we are saying to them. (Adviser 5)
Another dimension to the enduring element of advisers’ networks was that they would carry into other policy contexts and settings. For instance, advisers who left their roles to take up positions in government would often continue to make contact with their former colleagues to help them in their new role. “I often hear from [name omitted] in Health whenever he’s got a problem or needs advice”, stated Adviser 1.
On some occasions advisers would form a type of issue network, like an informal taskforce, to oversee the development and implementation of policy. In these arrangements, advisers were perceived as catalysts, bringing policy stakeholders from different organisations together to consider and deliberate on policy issues. At times, these types of networks would extend to include interest groups, but for the most part they involved advisers from other ministerial offices and public servants. Advisers’ knowledge of governmental structures and processes were recognised as a valuable resource in enabling this to happen. In this role advisers sought to assemble and maintain coalitions to support particular policy ideas, which in the midst of significant reforms can prove to be a valuable political resource:
... when you’re about to undergo significant change you need the support of like
minded people, people who can help you drive policy. (Adviser 6)
It’s a lot easier to work through problems with other advisers particularly if they have
a stake in the issue. The second the department gets involved it can be a slow grind.
(Adviser 3)
259 Both views are illustrative of the way in which informality, which is achieved through networking, transcends hierarchical structures and boundaries. While the contacts and relationships this adviser formed evolved over time, they represent the idea of networks
binding around an issue. This has some resonance to concepts of policy communities and issue networks, which both emphasise the integrated character of relations between policy actors.
Conclusion
Networking has been shown to be important for gaining information, being influential in helping implement the minister’s agenda and in exchanging with key policy actors information, cooperation and resources. In strategic terms, networking is important for
coordinating the minister’s portfolio and providing ministers with additional capability to
resolve policy differences that arise from issues that cut across policy fields. Personal networks provide advisers with a community of support, and support ongoing political ambitions for advisers. Ministers appear to be heavily dependent upon advisers’ networks to steer policy development: they provide an important foundation for governance.
260 CHAPTER 14 – RESOLVING POLICY DIFFERENCES
And in negotiating with stakeholders? Yes, they have a lot of influence. (Official 1)
In this chapter attention is given to a host of functions that advisers perform which fall broadly under the theme of resolving policy differences. The grouping of these functions reflects what advisers do to resolve disagreements on policy matters that come about from differences over the way in which various actors believe policies ought to be developed and implemented by government. Such differences stem from a number of causes, including the diversity of interests that stakeholders have over the make-up of policy, the way in which authority is dispersed across decision points, and the institutional imperatives that necessitate the need to compromise in the political arena. On a theoretical level, resolving policy differences emerges from a conceptualisation of policy being “an outcome of political
states of play in policy arenas” (Fulcher 1989:15). On this basis, therefore, the role has a political imperative intended to keep policy aligned with the agenda of the political executive.
The relative importance of this role can be found in some of the phrases advisers and other study participants used to describe this particular area of activity. Some included “brokering a policy deal” (Adviser 2), “bargaining over policy” (Adviser 3), “negotiating policy decisions”
(Minister 2), “oiling the system” (Minister 1), “keeping policy on an even keel” (Official 4), and “enforcing decisions” (Representative 3). As intended, this function had a significant bearing on the way policies are framed and presented to ministers for endorsement and on bringing about a high degree of consensus to the way policies were made and implemented. Further, it has the effect of contributing to the effectiveness of ministers’ decision-making and helping them come to terms with policy problems that are deemed too complex to be the province of any single agency.
The descriptions and terms used by the interviewees are subjective as they are based largely on how they saw advisers carrying out this function. Though terms such as
‘brokering’, ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiating’ have distinct meanings in certain contexts and discourses (e.g. conflict resolution, arbitrating), they will be treated holistically and relative 261 to the way study participants understood them, so as to render a broader understanding of what advisers do to manage policy conflicts.
This aside, resolving policy differences can best be seen as one-to-one or group interactions involving advisers and other key policy and political actors, including officials and representatives of organised interests, that on the whole are concerned with resolving differences over the make-up of policy that exists between stakeholders. On its own, the role can be seen as part of an array of interventions for which ministers depend on advisers to mediate diverse interests, and by extension ensure that policy issues that require high levels of facilitation across a number of jurisdictions are managed effectively.
Importance of the role
Advisers were delegated a significant degree of autonomy in this matter, and in some cases had the imprimatur of the minister to obtain agreements on policy detail. Only in situations where agreement was not reached would a minister get involved in resolving the matter. The following description by Minister 2 gives some credence to this view:
Advisers work together because it’s better that they deal with it before ministers have to
step in otherwise everything can grind to a halt ... it keeps things moving.
As long as advisers were suitably skilled and competent in representing the minister’s interests, it was commonplace for advisers to be handed responsibility for conducting major negotiations. The informality that advisers bring to a minister’s capability in resolving policy differences means that any obstructions or stumbling blocks that occur between ministerial
offices and departments can be resolved quickly and in an integrated manner. As such, at
least two ministers interviewed in this study mentioned that advisers performed valuable
work in brokering policy options, getting agreement over its content, and shaping its
contours:
They can help deal with things between my department and that of another on my behalf
without my having to write to or arrange a formal meeting with another minister. (Minister
4)
262 My political staff would work with the political people of other ministers ... So staff
working together, negotiating at that level means they can do things a lot quicker.
(Minister 6)
These statements render the idea that a great deal of policy work happens informally between ministers whose portfolio responsibilities overlap. This supports the claim that an increasing amount of government business is decided outside of the Cabinet system or that the resolution of policy problems takes a different trajectory at times to the usual Cabinet
process (Maley 2002).
The importance of advisers’ responsibility in relation to this role can also be gleaned from
some of the advisers’ comments:
It was like a brokering role you’d say, “If you say it like that he’s not going to listen to
you”. (Adviser 6)
I had a pretty central role in putting together the drug house ... quite literally sitting down
with operational police ... identifying blocks in the process, and then bringing people in
from the Ministry and drafters and following the process through, so that you work
towards Cabinet minutes, drive the process through Cabinet and parliamentary council.
(Adviser 2)
It seems therefore that advisers have a significant degree of leverage they can use in negotiations with key political actors to reach agreement on critical aspects of legislation so as to ensure its enactment. This role provides an impulse for keeping the minister’s agenda on track, asserting his or her authority on policy development, and building effective partnerships with key stakeholders. The role raises questions about the extent to which advisers take on executive-level negotiations, and the extent to which the role provides ministers with a different type of capability that lends itself to new ways of resolving policy problems.
In this role, advisers attempt to resolve tensions and differences over policy among various
stakeholders and coalitions. They are principally concerned with finding consensus and compromise to reduce conflict and enable policy development to move to the next step of the process: 263 Very few issues exist in isolation so if I needed my staff to work on overlapping issues
and they would get the ball rolling on things and on some occasions they were required
to meet with other advisers. (Minister 2)
Negotiations between advisers of various ministerial offices over policy differences were commonplace, especially in instances that involved consultation with public servants and interest groups. At times the role would extend to include the media, but generally it involved those stakeholders represented in this study. The function was also integral to supporting other roles performed by advisers which were concerned with helping ministers carry out their portfolio responsibilities and deliberations in Cabinet. One example was given by Adviser 6, who had to negotiate with the department responsible for disability services25 and disability interest groups over the parameters of a review into advocacy services. The department had responsibility for conducting the review but there was strident opposition from disability groups over the exclusion of people with a disability at
important stages of the review process. This adviser was able to negotiate an agreement
that involved the creation of a reference group comprising people representing the interests
of people with a disability in order to feed their concerns into the review process. He was
also able to get the department’s agreement on having representation from the sector on
the review oversight committee, a position the department thought of little value.
In this example reasonable accommodations were made without compromising the integrity
of the policy decision. However, where adjustments were made, Adviser 6 used his
discretion as the minister’s representative “to agree to certain changes”, but rarely did
these exchanges involve a complete “backing down of the government’s stance” on policy.
There was a strong sense that advisers were well placed to mediate diverse interests and resolve policy differences, partly because they were often the first port of call for those seeking to influence the political and policy-making process and partly because of the proximity they had to the minister, which meant they could fulfil an intermediary role.
Minister 2 said, “being at the centre of things they should be able to reconcile advice
25 In NSW, that department is the Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care. 264 coming to me from the department, the community”, and Adviser 4 provided a similar insight:
... when I worked for the Premier and gee there’s nothing like being in a place like that
and some of the toughest politics I have ever dealt with are out of the health sector and
out of groups like the Autistic Children’s Association, disability groups. They play politics
like I’ve never seen. Ultimatums, if you don’t do this, we’ll do that. Incredible level of
politics and why not ... I can remember the people who were the big lawyers down town
who had a child with a particular disability … they were masters.
This adviser’s view on negotiating with interest groups supports the view that advisers have extensive involvement in hearing the concerns of organised interests and that they can act like a ‘shock absorber’ or ‘pacifier’ charged with the responsibility of diffusing tensions and providing an outlet for political tensions that might exist between the government and community.
Much of this role was performed by advisers in order to facilitate communications for agreement by Cabinet or budget-related committees, resolve past and current disputes, and reach agreement for the future (especially on cross-cutting issues). Advisers’ involvement in the search for common ground was important in supporting ministers’ attempts to settle policy disputes. In some situations, advisers would offer concessions or trade-offs, knowing full well that these had the minister’s approval; on the other hand, while in deadlocked situations, they would be required to take any impasse back to the minister for further deliberation or resolution. “Just as one budget is handed down you’d be starting the whole process again, doing deals, sorting out policy messes for Cabinet” was Adviser
7’s comment on the importance of reaching agreements to support the political executive.
In addition to fulfilling these purposes, the role produced a number of other tangible benefits. For instance and in relation to the policy-making process, resolving policy differences meant that a broad coalition of interests could be assembled to assure acceptance of policy measures. At various stages and times of the policy-making process there is considerable negotiation regarding its intent and content with key players in government and external groups. Similarly, when new policies are announced there is 265 usually a focus on gauging the reactions of interest groups, monitoring the drift of public debate and identifying where the ‘sticking points’ are likely to lie. In this regard advisers ensure that vested interests are mediated. This they achieve by devising strategies and
tactics to reach compromises at various stages of policy development. As already noted,
this is something advisers could do quickly, with minimal or no delay:
I remember sitting in on this meeting with one of the minister’s advisers – with the
minister present – and she’d be saying “this is what we can do”, “there’s scope for that to
happen”. (Representative 4)
Resolving policy differences was a task that gave advisers a great deal of influence and power in cutting deals with their counterparts in other offices or with public servants. In being delegated this role, advisers were authorised to speak on the minister’s behalf, agreeing to or rejecting the department’s policy advice.
Dimensions of the role
The need for this role stems from a number of factors. As discussed, a degree of policy competition is deliberately maintained between ministerial offices and departments in order to maintain a level of creative tension, and in so doing promote the contestability of policy advice. This proved to be an important driver in advisers working to resolve policy differences.
Chapter 12 also highlighted the extent to which policy development creates vertical and horizontal conflict between competing groups. The need for advisers to resolve policy differences arises from competition between various sources of advice and conflict among policy issues which are resolved by trade-offs being made, usually at the highest level, by the political executive.
Since the development of policy invariably involves a group of policy stakeholders and often pits bureaucratic agencies against one another, the conditions are ripe for ministers and their advisers to get involved, particularly if an impasse has expanded beyond the control of public servants. Attempting to resolve policy differences within the context of the
266 relationship between the ministerial office and the department could also be a lengthy and protracted process, as one minister stated:
… governments are notorious for taking a long time to collect and go through material
and think through options. There’s always going to be advice that comes in and
questions asked about the validity of that advice ... and I expect my staff to get involved
in that process. (Minister 5)
This suggests that advisers intercede on their minister’s behalf when there are reservations about the make-up of policies, and serve as the principal access point and informant for the
minister in ensuring the momentum of a policy is maintained. It also affirms the observation
that resolving policy differences can be foundational to other functions, namely winnowing
information.
A related factor affecting the need for ministers to enhance the resolution of policy conflicts
relates to the inherent tensions that exist within all governments. These tensions are
reflected, for example, in the conflicting sectoral interests of line ministries, which compete
with each other for financial resources. They are also reflected in tensions between
government departments. As noted previously, the relational context in which advisers and
senior public servants operate makes exchanges between the two tense and at times
combative, especially when there are discernible differences over policy matters. The relationship is inherently one based on power and a struggle for domination. Negotiations over matters of policy, therefore, are almost part and parcel of the interactions that take place between these two policy actors, and on some occasions involve using competitive tactics to win over the minister’s attention. Advisers, as described, had to tread carefully in their dealings with the department, particularly in negotiations over policy, because of the tenuous relationship in which both parties found themselves.
Fuelling this situation was evidence put forward by one senior government official that negotiations with advisers resembled a “game” in which it was never clear whether advisers
“would carry out what was agreed” (Official 2) or “take back to the minister the advice put forward” (Representative 1). Such a view was more blatantly put by Official 1, who
267 remarked that advisers did not have the knowledge and expertise to negotiate policy matters and as a result tended to exacerbate conflict between the ministerial office and department:
They’re clueless. They lack the technical skill and know-how when it comes to dealing
with policy matters. The number of the times they’ve given us the bum-steer is
unbelievable.
Paradoxically, it seems, far from facilitating consensus or the resolution of conflict, some advisers create further distortions by engaging in policy activities for which they are not necessarily equipped.
Though the roles were largely about resolving policy differences, they could also be used to structure ‘non-decisions’ or to stall decisions:
There have been a few occasions when we’ve met with the minister and his advisers
and all they’d say is “We’ll think about it, or “It’ll have to wait until the next funding round”
... I suppose you just don’t know what they’re going to decide and it’d be nice if they
were just up front about it. (Official 5)
This particular function also appears to have evolved from the time advisers were first introduced under Whitlam. Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact cause for advisers becoming involved in brokering policy positions or negotiating elements of the policy process, it seems the administrative reforms introduced by Greiner in the late 1980s, together with the fragile position of the Greiner government (minority government), created the conditions for advisers to work in ways that suited the times.
The political executive is also a product of complex relationships which may produce tensions between a ministerial office and the political centre. The extent of this issue was noted in one minister’s comment:
Everyone knows there’s a lot of infighting that goes on in the party room. No party is
immune from internal problems and it’s usually about jockeying for positions, making
sure you get the portfolio you want, fighting for what you believe in even if it’s not shared
with your colleagues. (Minister 5)
268 Other factors emerged in the search for expectations of advisers’ success and frustrations in fulfilling this role. First, they require resources for influence, and one source of power for advisers in resolving policy conflicts derives from and is vicariously executed through the authority of the minister. Their closeness to the minister means that they have significant authority and influence to “cut deals”, as one chief of staff asserted (Adviser 4).
Second, advisers needed opportunities to enter into these situations, and these tended to arise from policy vacuums or opportunities during the various stages of the policy process that generally involve debates about the shaping of policy. In public policy-making, the
conditions for negotiation and brokering policy outcomes abound, and ministers place a
premium on ensuring that discordant views are highlighted and integrated into the decision-
making process. In the end ministers simply have no choice. Since ministers are too busy
to meet and get together to negotiate on policy, they pass this aspect of their role onto
advisers to fulfil.
How the role is performed
The analysis of interviews revealed an array of hidden tasks and tactics that advisers use to support the resolution of policy conflicts. Advisers, through their networks and relationships with stakeholders, established a reliable source of information that they used in negotiations with the department over policy matters. This would enable them to construct a narrative about what the policy was set to achieve and the groups it was to
have an impact on.
In some instances, it seemed access to a well-developed network of contacts proved a vital
resource for advisers in marketing a proposal, persuading stakeholders to accept options and resist opposition, and ensuring policy adoption:
If you want to get a proposal endorsed by the minister you sometimes had to show that it
had the support of community groups and other ministers. (Adviser 7)
Advisers also required other strategies to be effective in this role. The ability to “argue persuasively” (Minister 4) was a key skill. Information was an important resource for
269 influence, and since the effectiveness of resolving policy conflicts is sometimes based on the persuasiveness of an argument it could prove a source of leverage to the minister if advisers were able to communicate with influence.
Supporting this particular role were rules governing the way advisers went about the task of negotiating policy, and an understanding of the power structures that set the limits on how far they could go in fulfilling this role and carry out certain policy assignments. Adviser 4 provided an illustration of the way advisers were able to forge agreements, know where the trade-offs were and where the boundaries of their authority lay; it involved education funding for young prisoners to improve life skills and achieve higher rates of integration into the community. This adviser indicated that his department was not in a position to fund the program “because of budgetary problems”. In working through this problem, he met with his counterpart in education to go through a series of options before having it finally submitted for the minister’s endorsement. The meetings involved seeing if there was scope for one of this department’s educational providers to fund and provide the program. The tactic appeared to have the effect of getting his line agency on-board, because senior officials of that department did not want to see another agency providing a program that fell outside its sphere of responsibility. The net effect of this adviser’s negotiations was a doubling of funding for educational services for young prison inmates. Adviser 4 stated that “it was beautiful to watch the planets line up on this because there was nothing happening for these people”.
This example shows how advisers can be used to achieve positive results where other instruments such as interdepartmental committees may be less effective, and where the issue was seen as unimportant and may have drawn unwanted attention. The adviser sought to use the status and position of a powerful minister to fashion settlements which draw on the support of a range of vested interests. To this end the adviser relied on informal contacts and meetings with departmental officers, doing research and preparing a report with a series of recommendations which the minister, the bureaucracy and organised interests had adopted.
270 So advisers, given the opportunity, can play an important role in working with advisers of other ministers to resolve policy differences. The role carries with it a high degree of decision-making and political authority to find the middle ground on issues.
Conclusion
Resolving policy differences has to do with the way in which certain policy issues cut across portfolios and departments, inevitably resulting in complexity or conflict. It is also partly the result of policy forces over which the ministerial office has little or no control and over which there is disagreement. The role itself is intended to generate cooperation and
build support between the ministerial office and the bureaucracy. It yields the benefits of
overcoming the problems of inertia for which bureaucracies are renowned, as well as
freeing up ministers’ time. As shown in this chapter, advisers brought a high degree of
informality to the resolution of policy conflicts and in some instances this appeared to be a
favoured approach to what would otherwise be resolved between departments that have a
tendency to use rigid and somewhat protracted processes. This function served an
important purpose in identifying policy alternatives that government ministers could, among
themselves, deliberate upon. It also proved influential in structuring policy alternatives.
271 Part VI – The Impact of Advisers
Part VI examines the impact of advisers on the political system and policy-making process in NSW. This is achieved through an analysis of advisers’ influence and issues concerning their accountability. Part VI contains two chapters: Influence (Chapter 15) and
Accountability (Chapter 16).
272 CHAPTER 15 – INFLUENCE
John Howard said to me “well, go and find someone who’ll take them [refugees]”. So, I
went back up to my office and got my staff together there and said “well now, we are
literally going to have to think up a country to send these people to that’ll take them”.
One of my staff she said “Well, look, you had that call from Rene Harris, the President of
Nauru, a week or so ago pleading for $200,000 or $300,000 so he could pay for some
oil, so what about ringing him?” That was a good idea, I thought. So I rang Rene Harris
and he said “yeah, that would be fine”. (Alexander Downer)
This musing from the former Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, was taken from a 2008 documentary presented by the ABC on the Howard government’s time in power. It subtly reveals the way in which time, place and serendipity can have a significant bearing on the ability of advisers to influence decisions. In this interview snippet, involving the
Prime Minister directing the Foreign Minister to find a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of asylum
seekers, the adviser was able to impart – albeit opportunistically – her political knowledge,
with the effect of setting the minister on a path to resolving a highly politically charged
problem. Indeed, her role in this situation raises the question as to what might have
happened had the adviser not been present or not possessed knowledge of a solution.
Would a different solution have been found? How would the minister’s department have
responded if it had been asked to resolve this problem? Could it have handled this issue
without compromising its neutrality?
As the above story suggests, advisers can have a profound effect on policy decisions, even
on moral issues such as those involving refugees. Advisers, it seems, can play a crucial
role in the resolution of policy problems, exerting a distinctive type of influence that is
ultimately concerned with advancing the political interest of their minister.
Participants told several stories and anecdotes like these that contribute to an overall sense of the level and type of influence advisers exert on decision-making. Not only do these accounts raise serious questions about the accountability of advisers, they also raise
questions about the extent to which advisers can usurp executive powers in carrying out a
273 minister’s wishes. By extension, these accounts bring into question traditional normative democratic theory and concepts of representative government.
This chapter describes the level and type of influence advisers exert in policy-making.
Participants were asked: are advisers influential in policy-making, and, if so, how does this influence manifest itself in practice and in the patterns of their work? In answering these questions, study participants identified four spheres of influence: agenda-setting, gatekeeping, discretion, and invoking the minister’s authority. These four spheres have the effect of allowing advisers to maintain control over the policy activities of the department – suppressing or supporting major initiatives, and using the minister’s authority to push an agenda. Together with the minister’s authority, these spheres of influence provide advisers with a power structure with which to exert and maintain control over the external policy- making environment. A model that explains and theorises the type of influence advisers
exercise in policy-making and is developed at the end of this chapter.
Advisers’ influence through the roles they perform
It can be argued that many of the roles advisers perform confer power. Coordination, for instance, can be seen as a form of power because it can involve coercion (see Peres
1974). The networks that advisers form and rely on to access information and weld disparate policymakers into a cohesive whole provide them with a power base for influencing policy processes, and, by extension, optimising the minister’s interests. In this sense, their influence is structured through connections. In more reckonable terms, the simple act of holding on to a briefing note or adding comments which are imbued with the minister’s outlook can also be perceived as exerting influence. Finally, in helping ministers achieve high levels of cooperation with agencies and organised interests, advisers fashion routines and patterns of work that can prevent policy from taking a different trajectory to
that of its intended course.
274 The concept of influence in the study of advisers
Influence can take various shapes and forms depending on who the adviser is, what they do, and the personality of the minister. These are described in the section exploring the variability of advisers’ influence. This aside, it appears that advisers’ influence has evolved to take on a different look and feel to that detected when their numbers were modest. In the present period, where advisers outnumber (on average) ministers ten to one, their influence has increased simply due to weight of numbers. Ministerial staffing as an organisation,
therefore, has power, and this power is not only derived from and distributed through the
authority of the minister, it exists by virtue of the fact that they have reached a critical mass
as a political force. As previously posited, this thesis argues that increased numbers of
advisers is a sign of the dispersion of power in the NSW polity, away from the party
machine and Cabinet to the individual minister.
This study conceptualises influence in much the same way as Foucault theorises power;
that is, “it is a name [given] to a complex strategic situation in our particular society”
(Foucault 1979:93). It is also multidimensional and can occur at various stages and to
varying degrees. Advisers’ influence is extremely difficult to define and measure, mainly
because it manifests itself in so many different ways. This makes isolating advisers’
influence both empirically and methodological challenging. Though influence is difficult to
measure, and can only be ascertained as far as the methodology used in this study allows,
this should not detract from trying to understand how advisers’ influence is contextualised
through what they do and analysed through the four spheres identified by the study
participants.
Given the research design selected for this study, influence as a measure of advisers’
power and authority rests on how it is experienced and felt by those interviewed and those
who interact with advisers on a regular basis. In this study, advisers were found to not only
influence decision-making through their significant contribution to the issues that were
considered, but at times to be involved so significantly as to invoke the minister’s authority
through the exercise of discretion.
275 Another reason advisers’ influence may be more pronounced than in the past is that the very people who used to question their legitimacy – officials – are now often former ministerial staffers themselves; indeed former advisers now swell the ranks of senior positions within the public service. This means they are more likely to be accustomed to the
ambit of advisers’ roles than their predecessors, who were far more suspicious and
distrustful of these ‘irregulars’ when they were introduced. Arguably, therefore, it seems that, as the boundaries between politics and public administration become blurred and artificial, so too have the limits of advisers’ influence been extended.
A concern regarding advisers’ influence is how secretive ministers have become about information regarding the size of the ministerial staffing system. In 1995 when the Carr government first came to power, information about their numbers was made known to
Parliament during question time. Twelve years later when similar questions were asked, the government was less forthcoming, offering instead the standard response:
ministers’ staff are employed by the Director-General, Department of Premier and
Cabinet pursuant to the Public Sector Employment and Management Act 2002.26
Is this secretive stance about advisers and what they do a measure of governments becoming wary of advisers’ influence? Or, are ministers merely reluctant to let on that advisers’ numbers have increased over time because revealing such information could spark controversy or bad publicity? Or, are there other concerns at play, such as whether there has been an accretion of power to advisers that is linked directly to their growth in numbers?
Further evidence to support the impression that advisers’ influence has changed over time came from the views of three of the four officials who participated in this study. They each observed that when they worked as an adviser they were much more constrained in their dealings with the department. “I knew where the boundaries were”, said Official 1. Another
26 Retrieved 21 February 2009 from http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/lc/qalc.nsf/ 18101dc36b638302ca257146007ee41a/e1c1ac94583c 3f7ca25737c001f0e0c!OpenDocument. 276 stated, “the shenanigans you see today just didn’t happen when I worked as a staffer for
Wran – there was far more respect for the role of the department” (Official 3).
It is important to note that, among the participants in this study, the manner and scope of advisers’ influence depended on the way ministers used them. Some ministers kept
advisers in check by making it clear from the outset what they could and could not do. The
influence of these advisers was limited to sifting through the ideas that came up through the
department, explaining options to the minister, and perhaps developing some original but closely related alternatives. Other ministers were prepared to loosen the reins, allowing their advisers to apply their technical knowledge and expertise to criticising and vetting proposals emanating from the department. At times they let them take the lead and suggest better ways of working:
... my adviser was taking the lead in driving a direction in a significant area of
administration on a national basis. He had written the books in the area and was
respected nationally in that field ... But the role of your ministerial adviser should be to
look at the detail to make certain that the policy decision in the detail was being
reflected. (Minister 2)
Although ministers had ultimate say over which issues would get onto their agendas, advisers were credited for bringing these to their attention, framing how they were presented, and selecting and prioritising the matters that received a minister’s consideration. Advisers also made certain that ministers heard all sides of the issues and, in so doing, affected the decisions that were made. Ministers expressed the view that advisers played an important role in initiating policy options and had considerable impact on the alternatives considered: “They’d always get together to brainstorm solutions and then decide on the best one” (Minister 4). The minister who put forward this view, when asked whether he would support the solution developed by advisers, staunchly stated
“yes”.
It is worth mentioning that the influence advisers exercise is not too dissimilar to that of their minister or of public servants, but it is constituted differently. Advisers do not have legitimated power inherent in a position. Rather, their power is legitimated through the 277 minister’s own authority, which is derived institutionally from the Parliament and legally through the state constitution.27
While advisers do not have the authority of position, that is, legitimated power, this does not mean that they do not have power. Advisers have power as representatives of the minister.
When acting as the minister’s representative they wield vicarious power. Vicarious power is
the right to speak in the name of the minister, to claim his or her authority as the justification for action, and to use the influence of the minister in working with external stakeholders. Vicarious power is not vested in a position, but in a relationship of confidence and trust.
Advisers’ influence – perspectives of participants
There was a broad spectrum of views on advisers’ influence. Minister 6 expressed it in axiomatic terms: “They are influential and they have to be – that’s what they’re there for.”
Another made the point that “there’s not much point having advisers if they’re not influential”, implying that it is both proper and just for advisers to have and use whatever influence is necessary to help ministers discharge their responsibilities. Adviser 2 offered an interesting and powerful observation of how advisers’ influence is discerned and revealed, and which resonates with the theme of vicarious power: “I think what happens is a process of osmosis. You grow into the role and over time you develop a sense of the way the minister operates. You start to think like him.”
There was general agreement that advisers exercise greater influence now than they might once have, but the views expressed by study participants were divided on whether their effectiveness had negative or positive consequences. Advisers felt that the influence they exercised was largely concerned with implementing the policy agenda of the minister, regardless of how that came to be expressed. Ministers tended to agree with this view, and felt advisers’ influence was legitimate and not anomalous to the Westminster system:
27 NSW Constitution Act 1902. 278 You basically do what you have to do to get the minister’s agenda implemented.
(Adviser 1)
I don’t believe their influence poses a threat to the [NSW] system of government. It’d fail
the public interest test [advisers’ influence] I think. (Minister 1)
I think our system of government has accommodated advisers rather well. You see the
odd problem but generally it’s manageable. (Minister 3)
A closer examination of these participants’ views paints a contradictory picture. For instance, Minister 1 stated that advisers often take on the characteristics of the minister
they are representing:
I see it with this government, advisers that is, who do things that make you question
who’s in charge ... and you do see how they almost mimic their minister or have their
own persona that’s ministerial like ... maybe they’re just ambitious politically.
Occasionally you do wonder how far all this will go, whether there will be a point at which
we start to question whether they’re doing more than they should.
Minister 3 made a similar observation:
Again, if they can’t be the almost alter-ego of the minister then they’re not going to be
effective in their communications with the interest groups ... The advisers have
significant influence. And in some areas the advisers would have an exceptional level of
influence.
This minister was asked the follow-up question “more or less than you?”, to which he replied:
In some areas advisers had more knowledge than you did, so yes, they were influential
in that regard. In one piece of legislation, if you had policy people brought on because of
high levels of expertise then you would leave the ministerial adviser to drive that
particular area and to draw upon that expertise.
There is therefore a sense that advisers can be very influential, and that in some situations their influence can be legitimated through the expertise they bring to the role when recruited or acquired over time as their knowledge in the portfolio increases. In some
279 instances, advisers have to act as the minister would when faced with having to represent him or her.
While most ministers felt advisers were an essential part of the modern political system and did not pose a problem to the conventions of governing, these views were diametrically opposed to those put forward by other participants. For instance, officials and interest group representatives tended to see advisers’ influence in negative and paradoxical terms.
There were concerns expressed about the high degree to which advisers kept certain matters off the policy agenda, discouraged the provision of free and frank advice to ministers, and hindered public servants’ access to ministers. These participants saw advisers as usurping the functions of the minister almost to the point of being seen as his or her de facto:
They do exert a lot of influence. A lot in fact. And I worry what this means for our system
of government. I really do. They meddle a lot in our operations. And you’ve got to
wonder who’s keeping an eye on these people. (Official 1)
These insights suggest that advisers can, and often do, exert a substantial degree of influence on the development and administration of public policy. Seemingly, they influence the ebb and flow of bureaucratic political interface, the pace and progress of policy development, and the level and type of information that gets through to the minister. These insights also suggest that advisers’ influence can at times be misdirected and over- reached.
There are a few examples that reveal an extreme and concentrated form of advisers’ influence and power. In at least three interviews, Gary Sturgess was mentioned as being a very powerful and influential adviser. Adviser 2 said that “Gary [Sturgess] had a lot of influence ... he could persuade a minister, even Nick [Greiner], to do something”. Another noted that Sturgess had power to persuade which was created by his reputation, position and personality, and that he was adept at overcoming the constraints placed on him by the bureaucratic machine:
280 He had gravitas. You knew that anything that was asked of our office was being asked
by Gary. Rarely would the Premier get on the phone and ask for something. He had
tremendous influence I’d say. And nothing would stand in his way, not the Party, not the
Departments. (Adviser 6)
In a similar vein, a 2006 newspaper article reporting on the career paths of Carr’s former advisers noted that Graeme Wedderburn, one of Carr’s chiefs of staff, was “the most powerful man in government”. He was credited for being so influential that he would unwaveringly tell the Premier to “stop ... being self-indulgent”. He was known as the “de facto premier” to Carr and it was reported he created an environment of discipline and fear.
It appears therefore that some advisers are able to achieve a type of predominance that enables them to not only develop and steer policy but also take command of the political executive. This predominance arises from the advisers’ ability to utilise the authority of the minister. Such predominance is further captured in the following comment:
If your question is: are advisers operating too much as the minister? I think the answer
can be “yes”. I was at a meeting and a relatively junior member of the minister’s staff
convened [it] between a Deputy Director-General and a senior officer ... the Deputy
Director-General pointed out that there was no money or no budget available to do what
she had committed to. Her response was financial issues are the department’s problem.
And that was a case where she was way over the top ... by operating as the minister.
(Official 2)
Perspectives of ministers
From ministers’ accounts, advisers’ influence could also be assessed in relation to the contribution they make in overseeing and providing advice on policy proposals emanating from the department, and, as noted earlier, seizing opportunities generated because ministers take little or no interest in a policy area or have no time. Minister 2 described his advisers as being influential in “working with the department to work on his ideas”, which he
was not able to do given the breadth of responsibility associated with his portfolio and the
time constraints placed on him by the demands of being a minister in a “reformist
government”.
281 Another instructive example of how influential advisers can be, came from Minister 2. This minister stated that the adviser “changed attitudes in the department”, which helped influence the reform process. The minister went on to say that it would have been impossible to have introduced these reforms without this advisers’ “expertise, range of contacts, his grasp of exactly what needed to be done and how it was going to be done ...
One of the key things [the adviser] could do that nobody could have done was to get the unions on board, get industry on board, and to get the department heading in the right direction.” Thus, this adviser was able to work out a complete strategy, and the minister claimed that it would have been impossible without this adviser’s “knowledge, expertise and
overall influence”. After his spell with the minister this adviser moved to work for the
premier, Greiner, to advise on other key policy reform areas, such as health, education and
corrective services, because he “was extremely good on grasping policy issues quickly and
getting results ... he was highly influential”.
Another indicator of advisers’ influence is the extent to which their views prevail over that of
the department. One minister said that this occurred “occasionally”, while another said that
to ignore what advisers had to offer would be “fraught with danger”. Minister 5 offered a
more telling view:
I’d always listen to what they had to say and sometimes their advice would win out over
the department’s: it’d just depend. I think because they highlight the politics a lot better
than the department you tend to lean towards them at times. So they could influence
your decision on an issue? Absolutely. Absolutely.
Advisers therefore can have a direct impact on the minister’s attitudes or decision-making if the politics of an issue is likely to cause problems for the minister.
Of critical importance was the fact that ministers took ultimate responsibility for final
decision-making. Advisers, it seems, were influential in tendering advice, having their views
reflected in the final decisions and working up policy detail, but responsibility for final
decisions rested solely with ministers and Cabinet:
282 But, I don’t see them as having any ultimate decision-making power or role. I see them
as strictly advisers, which advice can be accepted, rejected or modified. (Minister 5)
I always made the point to them that at the end of the day it was my call ... (Minister 6)
Perspectives of advisers
Advisers generally felt that they were influential but not exceedingly so. Most believed their level of influence was proportionate to the role that had been structured by the minister for whom they worked and the day-to-day functions and activities delegated to them as circumstances dictated. They felt there were few if any instances in which they breached the bounds of their minister’s authority.
Being influential encompassed many and varied things according to the advisers. For one, it was about being able to make serious changes to a policy area and contributing to the public good:
I think you’re in a unique position to influence policy outcomes and make a contribution
in a way that very few people can. The number of things I have done, ideas I’ve come up
with which have had a positive effect have you wondering how they could have been
done otherwise. I’m not big noting myself, it’s that you can have a lot of influence to do
good. (Adviser 4)
For another, it meant seeing policy developed and then implemented:
I think what advisers can be crucial in is progressing a policy view bringing it through into
fruition. You know in my view on most occasions if a policy change is reconsidered and I
don’t support it and can’t be persuaded – it’s my view that I have some significant
influence in putting forward a view that would be accepted. It’s never 100%, but on most
occasions it is. (Adviser 1)
For Adviser 2, being influential meant taking part in the development of policy as well as contributing to important decisions:
I get to talk to ministers about policy development and influence decision-making at a
senior level and that’s tremendous fun.
283 The comment above implies that advisers do have the opportunity to influence decisions and have a form of authority that emerges from being part of the central decision-making process.
For Adviser 6, power meant, “having the right or mandate to implement the government’s policies”. This implies that advisers’ influence is legitimate and justified because it is sanctioned by the will of the people and democratic values. Adviser 3 felt that influence was, “canvassing and pushing through options”, suggesting that they were well placed to propose and have their ideas realised.
Adviser 6 took a conservative view on advisers’ influence. He accepted the view that advisers were influential but felt it was contained within the limits of minister’s power and authority. In other words, advisers’ influence varied according to how far ministers were prepared to let advisers exercise it. It was also constrained by the minister’s own span of control:
I don’t think our influence is what people imagine it to be. Sure there are going to be
some who are more influential than others but by and large you’re as influential as
you’re allowed to be by the minister you work for ... and how influential they are as well.
(Adviser 4)
As noted earlier, the type of portfolio in which an adviser worked could have a significant bearing on the roles they carried out. It could also have a significant bearing on the extent of influence exercised by advisers. One adviser explained that he had to be more influential in dealing with the department that oversaw corrective services than other agencies because “they were suspicious, [they] had background checks done on him [and they] constantly played games”. He pointed out that many of the prisons were run by former senior military personnel and that this fed into, as he described it, a “paramilitary type”
culture. It appears that this defined the nature of relationship between the agency and the
ministerial office. His response to this was to “fight back and demand that they provide him
with weekly updates on how things were going in prisons that had problems” (e.g. deaths in
custody). This suggests that advisers’ influence can take on a type of coercive power that is
284 proportionate to the policy context in which advisers find themselves. Adviser 4 elaborated on this point with the following comments:
There were elements of ‘good cop, bad-cop‘. [The minister] had to maintain his
relationships with the departmental heads at all costs. There were tough questions to be
asked. And it was my job to do that. I was universally hated by every single employee of
the corrective services department. The then commissioner made my life hell. All the
classic "Yes Minister" stuff had been frozen out. All those sorts of issues. Not being
advised of things as serious as deaths in custody in accordance with all of our
protocols...district commanders were always told not to speak to me … always classic
games and so it was an extremely different role but quite fulfilling in a different way.
Another measure of advisers’ influence is the frequency of meetings advisers have with senior public servants. They sit in on meetings with key policy-makers such as directors general and other senior bureaucrats with and without the minister being present. In this scenario, advisers interviewed said they acted as the minister’s representative, often reaffirming government policy, answering questions, and presenting a ministerial view to departmental proposals. Many advisers admitted that they have a major role in shaping decisions that go to the minister and Cabinet for final endorsement. Adviser 2 said she has
“ample opportunities to direct policy”, while Adviser 6 said he had “constant access to [the
Director-General]”. This is further demonstrated in the following statements:
I’ve worked with people where I was always in on every meeting with every departmental
head and so I knew where everything stood ... (Adviser 4)
… I would go to the Department and sit in on the meeting and report back to the
minister. I would sit in on a lot of meetings with the minister and the Department, hear
from him what he wanted to do, and then in a sense be the watch dog, and be the
guiding kind of force. (Adviser 6)
These two comments show that advisers are placed in situations in which they are required to exert influence. As the minister’s representative, advisers met with key policy-makers to monitor developments and to see that departmental business was kept in order. A follow-up question was asked of these two advisers as to whether their ideas or views were accepted in discussions over policy during these meeting. Adviser 4 said that his “ideas were taken 285 very seriously” and he had great input. Adviser 6 reported that, in addition to being a
“guiding force”, he was the “enforcer of the minister’s wishes when resistance struck”.
Advisers could also be influential in quite overt ways as revealed in the comment by
Adviser 6 above. It shows that advisers can initiate significant change to the organisational
structure of a department and have considerable influence over a minister’s thinking:
... all of a sudden [minister’s name omitted] and I had this brilliant plan to restructure the
Department. Map it out on the back of paper napkin … you know … with her I was more
like Sir Humphrey – you know “minister, why would you really want to do that, that would
be very crazy”. I’d actively engage her.
As discerned in other statements this adviser provided, he grew to be quite influential the longer he worked in the role and the portfolio. That he was able to question the minister’s thinking provides a clear indication of how some advisers can emerge to be quite influential
– even powerful – to the extent that they could have control over decision-making.
Perspectives of senior government officials
Senior government officials expressed serious concerns about the growing influence of advisers. All four officials interviewed for this study felt advisers exerted a great deal of influence over the operations of the department and in the vetting of policy proposals.
Official 1 described the advisers he had dealings with as “zealots” who would do “anything to get a political advantage”. As noted earlier, advisers were viewed by officials as being bureaucratically disruptive because they would question the legitimacy of the bureaucracy’s chosen policy, or identify flaws that were not real. Official 2, for instance, stated: “they’re always putting up stuff that they think is superior to what we’ve come up with or that we’ve have tried in the past.”
The need to gain political control over the bureaucracy was another measure of the extent and impact of advisers’ influence:
286 … some advisers believe [in] the importance of getting on top of the bureaucrats as they
call it … they don’t necessarily understand what trouble they’ve caused or what
opportunities have been lost. (Official 4)
So, in addition to advisers being seen as enforcers of the minister’s agenda, it was believed that advisers’ influence had negative consequences on the operations of the department and the development of policy.
Advisers’ influence was also felt in their control of information and in the perceived furtive manner in which some conducted themselves in their interaction with public servants. This point was also made by Official 4 who voiced frustration with, and alarm at, the manner in which advisers would hold onto departmental files because, “advisers were busy with other things”:
I think one of the best examples … when I got to this job, the senior executive was very
depressed because there were a huge number of issues with the minister – work had
been done in the department and had been forwarded to the minister and nothing had
happened … I said there are 70 files up here and my people are wondering what your
perspective on this is? ... it was pretty much there’s a problem with it, we’ll fix when we
get to it ... I got all their files and fixed it all over time.
While the general attitude of public servants towards advisers appears to suggest a growing acceptance within the political system, there were fervent views about the impact of their roles. Official 1 offered the following assessment:
A number of advisers became very powerful in their own right. And I am worried about
that in terms of representative democracy … The minister finds his authority usurped on
a daily basis. “I’ve spoken to the minister and he wants …”. And my response in those
situations is “well if that’s the case then I can’t work like that” ... Advisers have assumed
the mantle of the minister ... The concept of the Westminster system and representative
democracy is being shattered ...
This is perhaps one of the strongest views expressed about the scale and scope of advisers’ influence. It states in categorical terms how the minister’s authority can be arrogated, how the minister’s name can be used to discharge this authority, and the
287 implications of advisers’ roles and behaviour on conventions governing public administration.
This response also corresponds with what is commonly referred to as ‘administrative politicisation’, that is, attempts by advisers to influence or determine the content of public servants’ advice to ministers. To be sure, some government officials reported having experiences “where advisers asked them to review policy papers and seek changes before being submitted to ministers” (Official 2). Others reported cases in which advisers “asked for papers to be rewritten to reflect their [the adviser’s] needs, not departmental advice”
(Official 4) or attempted to “edit out full complete advice, and block out sensitive material that may damage political interests” (Official 1).
Views of interest groups
In general, interest groups representatives saw advisers as highly influential, with at least two expressing concerns about their accountability and their potential to exercise executive authority. One representative made the following assessment of this point: “My view was that he carried out the minister’s functions ... no doubt about it” (Representative 4). Another
went a step further in describing the extremity of advisers’ influence:
Well some of them actually are [de facto ministers]. Particularly chiefs of staff ... certainly
not all of them. There are chiefs of staff who concentrate on running a good office and
don’t try to exercise that level of control over policy issues ... (Representative 2)
They also believed that advisers often consulted with them about decisions that had already been made at the ministerial level and that they were often participating in discussions about matters that were incongruous with the views expressed in previous encounters. In other words, they were being asked to participate in ‘non-decisions’ or a narrower policy agenda. “The dye is often cast when dealing with the minister’s staff”, stated Representative 2. Another offered the following view:
One adviser overstepped their powers in interfering with the Department with the way it
operated ... to the point where no-one was prepared to “sneeze” without asking the
adviser first. And that level of influence is totally unwarranted ... I can think of a couple of 288 advisers in my 7 years experience who have had undue influence on policy on policy
direction. (Representative 1)
Other interest group representatives had strong views as well. Representative 1 felt that in his dealings with advisers there was “an unwillingness on advisers’ part to compromise on policy”, suggesting again that they get involved in decisions that were predetermined.
Another felt that some advisers showed zeal in their pursuit of implementing government
policy:
Some I’ve dealt with seemed fanatical. They wanted to win at all costs. You do see the
odd adviser whose power has gone to their heads and I suppose they’re the ones you
have to worry about. (Representative 3)
Some advisers were seen as arrogant and aggressive in their dealings with organised interests and would use their proximity to the minister to assert power over them. Their sense of importance at being called to serve the minister also led some interest group representatives to believe that some advisers had over-reached their influence:
You know they do know the detail so their knowledge is power – they’re quite influential
in their decision-making process ... (Representative 2)
Some are extremely influential because of their intellect and their ability to articulate a
policy driven by a set of words, and then there are some who are very influential
because they’re probably better at the political system than their political masters.
(Representative 6)
Another dominant theme to come out of the interviews with interest group representatives was that advisers’ influence could be discerned from the representative role that they were expected to perform when dealing with them:
... the minister is present but a hell of a proportion of the talking seems to be done at
times by the advisers. ... But overall, my impression has been that they act in the name
of the minister, they assume quite a bit of authority of the minister. (Representative 3)
It was also sensed that advisers could be influential in framing issues and controlling what matters came before the minister for his or her consideration:
289 ... I’ve sat in on several meetings with ministers and with advisers being present and
you’ll start the conversation about what the issues are and invariably it’s the adviser who
steps in to say “well the problem is this, the problem is that”. The minister looks stunned
sometimes about not knowing the reality of the problem. (Representative 5)
Even as outsiders to the relationship between the ministerial office and the department, interest groups representatives were able to observe how influential advisers can be in meddling in the affairs of the department, to the point that officials had to go through the adviser first before any decision could be made on policy changes. The representative who offered the comment above had worked closely with the department on changes to a program for people with a disability. He had an insider’s view of how politicised reforms to this program area had become because the adviser had “steered the minister in the wrong direction” to the extent that “there was no turning back” and the “changes were going to happen at all cost”.
Advisers would also directly influence the interest groups in other ways, including offering to involve them in consultations, taskforces and departmental committees.
Dimensions of advisers’ influence
This section explores five dimensions of advisers’ influence, namely: ‘expertise’, ‘agenda- setting’, ‘discretion’, ‘gatekeeping’ and ‘invoking the minister’s name’.
Expertise
One means by which advisers were able to exert influence was through their expertise.
Advisers had considerable opportunity for influence if they were recruited for their expertise and knowledge of a portfolio. They had power through superior knowledge of a problem or policy, or, as minister 2 stated, they could “match the intellectual weight of the department”.
It was also a significant source of power. It could be used to legitimise a decision and achieve a high degree of acceptability of policy proposals and ideas. It also gave them a type of informal power that allowed them to do their work and succeed in areas in which they had no formal power.
290 Such expertise often meant doing or commissioning research and preparing reports, with recommendations to be used to influence the actions of the minister or public servants. For example, Adviser 2 mentioned that he commissioned a consultant to inquire into reforming advocacy services for people with a disability. This culminated in a report containing a number of recommendations which were adopted by the minister. The inquiry, which the
adviser initiated, “brought significant financial savings” and sparked a high degree of
departmental activity in bringing about these changes into fruition. The report gave this
adviser considerable “sway to justify the changes” (Adviser 2) when meeting with organised
interests. It also gave the adviser a means of achieving legitimacy and a higher degree of
acceptability of policy proposals and ideas.
For some, expertise was a significant source of power:
I recruited as you know [names omitted] for their expertise in disability and child
protection matters ... I needed people with expertise to help argue a case. (Minister 4)
In this example expertise was used to support the minister’s larger interest: to avoid risking compromises, delays or derailment. It provided the minister with an innovative way to effect change and a means through which to increase his chances of gaining dominance in a policy environment that was resistant to change. The two advisers recruited by this minister
were well known within their respective policy circles and were also well connected
politically.
Some advisers gained influence through the knowledge they either brought to the role or
gained through being in the role for a long time. A number of advisers admitted to having
gained influence because of the expertise that they had acquired in their roles:
Eventually you get to know what you’re talking about. You have access to a ton of
information and you need to get on top of that for the minister because departments are
notorious for sending you mountains of stuff. I sometimes wonder if they do it
deliberately as a way of keeping you distracted. But yeah, you end up knowing what the
experts come up with. (Adviser 2)
291 Some pointed to the way in which advisers’ proximity and place in the political system created situations in which they were required to be influential. Such closeness to the
minister conditioned advisers to making full use of their special status and access to
maximise the minister’s interests. This access stemmed from the fact that advisers were
delegated and assigned policy tasks that invariably involved structured interactions with the
minister, public servants and organised interests:
Closeness is key. You can’t get away from the fact that you’re in the same physical
space as the minister and that gives you clout to do a lot of things. (Adviser 4)
You get given things to do that gets you locked into having to be influential, it’s just the
way policy and politics come together. (Adviser 2)
The two comments above demonstrate that advisers’ leverage derives not just from place but also from having to maximise the minister’s preferences: they are responsible for fashioning strategies that translate the minister’s ideas into policy. Culture also appears to condition advisers’ influence: it causes them to think about problems and solutions, and develop tactics to infuse politics into policy development and diffuse its negative impact.
And because advisers are seen as devices of power, they reproduce it in their dealings with other policy actors. Thus, there is an imperative to be influential because circumstances dictate this.
Weak accountability arrangements were also seen as a source of advisers’ power; advisers had more room to manoeuvre inside and outside the political and administrative spheres as compared with ministers and public servants, who were bound by obligations of ministerial responsibility and legislative requirements. Official 1 asserted that advisers are influential because “they can get away with it; there’s little holding them to account”.
Minister 6 made a similar point but also drew attention to how advisers could fill a power void if a minister is found wanting in certain areas:
I can think of a couple of ministers who over the years have had a reputation of being
bloody hopeless but who have had very good staff and their staff have done most of the
work. (Minister 6)
292 The following observation by Minister 2 is in response to the question ‘how influential are ministerial advisers?’ It reveals that advisers’ influence can have detrimental effects on a minister’s career:
Absolutely ... Advisers are extremely influential people. They are capable of making and
breaking ministers, and have done so. They can set a minister up and destroy him and
that has happened. (Minister 2)
The minister’s prestige was not the only consideration. Good relations with their colleagues in the department and the trust and respect of their respective roles were also determinants of advisers’ effectiveness:
I think trust, a culture of trust, plays a part in how effective your advisers are going to be
and that needs to be the case with everyone they work with including the departmental
people. (Minister 5)
One prominent minister offered this corroboration:
They get power because of their competence and the reputation that they build by doing
good work. It’s hard being effective if you don’t have that and I’d also have to say that
they’re not going to get far if they fail too many times. (Minister 2)
While competence, skills and experience played a part in establishing advisers’ influence, factors such as advisers’ personality and the nature of the relationship with their minister also proved significant. Minister 2 noted that his adviser was “more involved in policy because of his personality. He was confident, knew his stuff”.
Just as competence and trust played a part in enabling advisers to be influential in their roles, so too did continuity and reputation. Adviser 6, who later became chief of staff, felt that having worked for two ministers in the same portfolio over a period of four years had positioned him to become very influential. Yet this adviser felt he could be influential with the second minister he worked for but not the first. This was partly because the first minister “drove” policy and was “determined to see things go his way”. The adviser’s influence in this case therefore was limited to supporting the minister in implementing his agenda. However, the adviser was able to exert greater influence on the second minister
293 for whom he worked mainly because he had built up experience, a knowledge base, and an extensive network to enable him hold sway over the minister.
To what extent would your views prevail? Over him? Yes. I think they would’ve thought
that he still dominated as far as we were concerned. I think I would have been seen as
being more influential over [minister’s name omitted] than over [minister’s name omitted],
and that I was because I had
more experience, I had been around longer, and I suppose she was less dominating ...
(Adviser 6)
Adviser 6 also noted that he was able to build his reputation in dealing with policy matters with the department because he believed that he could leverage the authority of the first minister for whom he worked. His experience in the portfolio also put him in good stead in being able to hold sway over the second minister: he had power to persuade. The comment above shows that experience in and knowledge of a policy area can have a significant impact on an adviser’s influence. It also shows that the personality of the minister affects
the degree to which advisers can be influential.
One minister noted that this particular adviser was trusted to negotiate with minor party
members over key legislative reforms and that “he was challenged not to come back until
he had got a deal”. He further qualified this remark with this comment: “I wouldn’t have
given that kind of responsibility to anyone I didn’t have confidence in or didn’t trust”. This
comment also implies that seniority affects the influence of staff, and suggests that it takes
time for advisers to be influential and demonstrate knowledge of a policy area.
Common themes were also evident in the responses of participants to the nature, saliency
and complexity of issues. Minister 1 said:
I think the answer is that they are overwhelmingly influential and I suspect more so now
than 10 years ago, than the time of my government. There’s a greater emphasis on
working out whether a particular policy might offend certain interest groups especially
with this government. So ... advisers are influential because policy and politics come
together and sometimes that can be difficult for governments to deal with.
294 This minister’s assessment suggests that advisers’ influence may have increased substantially from the time he was a minister, and that concern for the way policy impacts on the community might be a factor behind such a change in perception. This would further suggest that advisers’ influence is relative to the forces of public opinion and the increasing need to ensure that governments are responsive to community demands.
Agenda-setting
A significant theme identified from the data was that of agenda-setting. According to
Kingdon (1984), agenda-setting consists of the activities that influence which issues come before government, how the issues are defined, and which policy proposals are likely to be taken seriously as possible solutions. In a similar vein, Schattschneider (1960) emphasised the importance of agenda-setting when he wrote: “The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (1960:68). Agenda-setting was one of the more powerful means in which advisers were able to influence policy-making. Advisers used their role as information filters to define what policy options become available to the minister. They could also act as agenda-setters by proposing policy initiatives to their ministers, who could officially bring these proposals into the Cabinet decision-making process. This is now a shared function between what used to be the dominant domain of the department and what is increasingly becoming a legitimate function of advisers. Advisers were effective agenda- setters because they affected the salience of issues.
In this study, two ministers reported that advisers were more important in “identifying what the problem was” than in identifying solutions. Indeed, and in some instances, advisers were needed to ‘edge out’ the bureaucracy in this regard:
So having within your own office staff who are going to lead when you lead, able to be
terminated because they are not addressing issues that need to be addressed, basically
they’re for the minister, then they are there as the alter ego for the minister, they’ve got
to be there to drive the agenda of the minister and provide interface for your agenda.
(Minister 2)
295 It’s something they do. They have their ears to ground on a lot of issues probably a lot
better than the department. (Minister 5)
But agenda-setting also comprises identifying issues that advisers can work on and then identifying the critical tasks required to get their agenda considered and agreed to by the minister. The identification of issues involved analysing the external policy and political environment. Here, advisers sought cues from the media or through their networks. An example of issue identification was given by Adviser 4, who wanted to establish and obtain funding for a “homicide support group” as there were numerous media stories about the lack of assistance for victims of crime. He identified a need to put in place such a strategy because “these people fell through the cracks”. An indicator of this adviser’s level of influence can be detected in his remark about funding for this initiative: “I could sign off and say ‘here you have $50,000’.”
Official 3 made the general observation that some advisers create their own agenda by initiating ideas and taking on policy issues that diverge from the minister’s own agenda and noted that some advisers are “smart and intuitive and they’ll pursue the agenda with their minister to instruct the department.”
Thus, in this sphere of influence advisers served as advocates ‘for a cause’, ensuring that the ideas they generated were adopted by their minister and the bureaucracy. In other words, they took the initiative and took steps to engage the department in the agenda.
One adviser believed that she had a great deal of scope and freedom to set the agenda.
For instance, she said that if she wanted to have a strong focus on reconciliation with
Indigenous people in the following year, “no-one would say [I] couldn’t do that”. She said that this freedom often resulted in issues being raised because of the passion she had for
Indigenous issues.
Thus advisers are well situated to setting the agenda, because ministers look to them to do so. The comment above implies that ministers require an agenda from outside, and some ministers look to advisers to take cues from the external environment because they are primed to know what the agenda should be. 296 A number of advisers reported examples of policy issues they helped bring to the fore and oversaw in their translation into policy. To advance their agenda, they first had to convince their minister of the value of the policy. They researched issues they thought might be of interest to the minister, described the problem and outlined possible solutions. In some cases, advisers would ‘shop’ the idea around to see if other ministers might like to take up
the cause. One example of a successful agenda-setting effort involved Adviser 2, who
spent a year researching the importance of violence against women as a public health issue: “It was a piece I could hang on to, a piece that gave me a real sense of pride.”
The process of selecting what was important from the vast amounts of information that
made its way into the ministerial office from the department, the media, interest groups, the
minister’s own electorate and so on gave advisers the potential to exercise a considerable degree of influence on the minister’s decision-making. They had the potential to define what the ‘issue’ was, how the minister should resolve that issue, and what level of attention a minister should give to it. As an interest group representative noted, the “adviser’s concerns are equally that of the minister’s” (Representative 2).
There was a sense that advisers felt comfortable trying to convince ministers of choosing one option over another or of altering a proposal, especially if they had built up expertise and trust over time. Thus, they would not only suggest but also persuade:
When you become chief of staff as I did after [name omitted] resigned you had a lot
more say over policy matters. I could look at a proposal and go “that’s not going to
work”, or “that’s going to mean this for us politically”, so having it changed wasn’t
problematic for me. (Adviser 6)
To win the support of the department some advisers used a range of tactics to “have it come on board” (Adviser 2). One tactic was ‘signaling’. This would often involve dropping hints to the department that changes were likely to occur in the near future and that the department could be required to adapt:
297 At times my meetings with the Director-General or Deputies would be about just letting
them know that this is what the minister was heading towards just to let them know that
something was about to happen. (Adviser 4)
Another tactic advisers employed involved identifying supporters to advance the agenda, usually public servants and organised interests that shared a similar view. In some instances, advisers had to persuade public servants of the value of the minister’s agenda.
Some persuasive tactics involved creating urgency for the agenda, emphasising the point
that “it had the minister’s support” (Adviser 3), highlighting the department’s failures, and
showing research or evidence supporting the agenda:
Without the minister’s support you’d have Buckley’s of getting something up. If you could
get the minister’s support you’re almost nine-tenths of the way there but the Department
needs to be convinced too – they’re not big on change particularly if it comes out of
here. (Adviser 3)
Apart from using persuasive tactics to gain commitment and support of the department, advisers also had to pre-empt possible or likely resistance. One way was through the use
of advisers’ networks – often other advisers and interest groups but at times lower-ranking
public servants. One example given was from an adviser who said that she would often
speak with operational staff to see if “an idea would fly” before trying to change the minds
of senior management (Adviser 2). It gave this adviser a type of intelligence that would
show where the tension points lay before pursuing the agenda further.
Discretion
Another sphere of influence identified was discretion. As can be gleaned from the interview
data, discretion can be viewed as advisers having the authority or power to apply their own
judgment to the selection of policy alternatives. This study found that advisers used
discretion to ensure that policy, irrespective of from where it emanated, was in concert with
the wishes of the minister. It enabled a ministerial view to be applied in specific cases or
instances “that were too complicated or too time consuming for the minister to be bothered with” (Adviser 3).
298 The degree of discretion advisers exercised was a product of the interaction between what they were capable of doing and their preference for the type of work on which they wanted to concentrate. Since advisers’ roles were largely indeterminate and anchored in the level of trust bestowed upon them by their minister, there was scope for advisers to carve out a role for themselves.
Discretion therefore appears to be a necessary part of advisers’ roles. It is necessary when choices have to be made and advisers cannot depend upon their minister to make decisions for them. They have to exercise discretion in the course of doing their work, in part, because they do not work under the direct observation of their minister.
The advisers interviewed used discretion because they were faced with problems and situations that were complex, multifaceted and politically charged, and because they had to think as if they were the minister. It was key to their empowerment and exercising influence
within the political system: it made them feel they could make decisions and perform their jobs effectively:
It’d be an impossible job to do if you didn’t have room to move on certain things ...
(Adviser 2)
... they have a lot of discretion to make decisions, they need it otherwise they’d struggle
to support the minister properly I think. (Adviser 5)
So discretion is seen as consistent with notions of decision-making and policy implementation and necessary in the pursuit of the ministers’ goals. It provides for the quick, sometimes split second, decision-making process.
Discretion can be seen as a measure of the latitude advisers have to perform their roles, a barometer of the level of trust ministers bestow on advisers, and a gauge of how far a minister is willing to go in allowing advisers to echo their personality. Critically, and inevitably, discretion introduces the possibility of the minister’s authority being usurped:
So that’s a fair degree of discretion? What I think you do have is a significant amount of
discretion is with the time in which people receive things – you know – is this something
you can put aside and you want to read and you want to talk to a couple of people or if
299 you’re convince of the argument you can put it to the top of the pile and know the
minister is going to see it within 48 hours. (Adviser 1)
The discretion exercised by advisers can be interpreted as policy-making in that it is expressed in the various acts and judgments they make when faced with having to make a decision.
A small number of advisers had sufficient discretion to perform tasks of which their minister was not aware. For many, however, there was a high degree of discretion, which entailed
working close to and in the interests of their minister. This was well captured by Adviser 2:
When I was appointed, the Department was very wary of me because they had no
knowledge of what I was working on; nor did I for that matter. I think what happens in
practice with these types of roles is that you carve out a niche around what the minister
wants to see happen and meeting their individual needs.
Gatekeeping
They definitely function as a gatekeeper. It’s an important function because the minister is a busy
person and they need to decide how the minister’s time is managed. A lot of people want to meet
the minister. (Representative 4)
Gatekeeping was another means by which advisers could exercise influence. It was a sphere of influence that played out largely in the way advisers controlled the flow of information and in the management of the minister’s time. (The latter sphere was discussed in Chapter 6.) Nearly all study participants acknowledged that advisers were influential in this regard. It gave them considerable power to structure choice and frame issues. Since advisers were able to shape the content of a brief or submission, they had the ability to mould the minister’s thinking.
Representatives 1, 3 and 4 stated that gatekeeping gave advisers tremendous power to control what information made its way to the minister for consideration and how it was presented:
They act as a gatekeeper controlling what information the minister gets to see.
(Representative 1) 300 I think ministers need someone to act as a gatekeeper to make decision-making
manageable and advisers are there for that purpose. (Representative 3)
There’s a ton of information that the minister can’t see, emails, letters, submissions etc.
You can see why they’d need people to help keep all that under control (Representative
3)
Thus, the use of advisers to act as gatekeepers was necessitated by the volume of information that comes into the ministerial office and the complexity of issues with which ministers are confronted.
The gatekeeping function grew mostly out the monitoring of the department’s work and activities. It largely involved evaluating policy proposals and briefings that required the minister’s approval. One measure of the power as gatekeeper of an adviser can be seen in the number and type of reports requested from department officials. Official 2 stated that advisers “were constantly demanding files and papers on everything”. Adviser 4 admitted to having daily reports from the department because there were “controversies that needed to
be kept at bay”.
The gatekeeping function is a manifestation of the ministerial office becoming a power centre in its own right – a centre into which advisers draw information from a number of sources, including government agencies. They could exercise discretion over which documents could go through to the minister for viewing, they could make representations on behalf of the department or interest groups, and they could wait at the minister’s door to get proposals signed:
[Advisers] will determine what goes to the minister. What goes through ... there’s power
in terms of being the front line conduit of things. Theirs is power, you’re a 20 or 30 year
old something or other and you’ve got Directors-General coming to you seeking you
know … everyone will have their own story on all that kind of stuff. (Adviser 4)
301 Invoking the minister’s name
Yep. You hear advisers doing that all the time. Minister wants this, the minister wants
that. The minister thinks this, the minister thinks that. His name gets used a lot by
advisers and it’s a worry to me. (Official 1)
One of the means by which advisers multiply the power and control of the minister is using his or her name to influence certain outcomes. One adviser admitted to using the minister’s name not just to ask for information and cooperation, but to compel it from whomever they
deemed appropriate. Adviser 4 openly admitted to having to do this to gain the upper hand
on the department:
Yep. That’s right. I had to in that instance. When you’re up against an agency like
corrective services who as I said has a para-military mentality you need to counter that
by needing to be as powerful as you can and that has to involve speaking with the
minister’s name. I was highly conscious of my place and I knew where my limits were.
The use of the minister’s name provided advisers with a powerful means to ‘get things done’. It was a resource that advisers could make use of to achieve a high degree of compliance to the minister’s agenda. Many interest group representatives noted that advisers used the minister’s name with little regard to the institutional significance it holds.
These participants felt that advisers used the minister’s name to persuade them to adopt
the government’s position:
It gets used with gay abandon. You hear it being used when I meet or speak with them.
Of course you wonder whether this is right, whether they do that without regard to what
the minister might think. (Representative 5)
Invocations of a minister’s name were reported mostly by officials and interest group representatives. They were able to and did report on some of the more informal and questionable forms of advisers’ influence.
Conclusion
This chapter indicates that advisers are powerfully placed to influence policy and decisions
– they outnumber ministers by 10 to 1, they have expertise and use it strategically to exert 302 power over the bureaucracy, and they control information and access to the minister.
Among those interviewed for this study there was a clear consensus that advisers play a critical role in a minister’s interaction with the political and administrative spheres of government. They serve as both ‘buffer and bridge’ for their minister and constitute a vital channel for political intelligence and other valuable information. In addition, they often serve as an independent source of ideas or advice and may, in some instances, be a close confidante of the minister.
The findings indicate that advisers are well positioned to make a major contribution on government policies and programs and shape the opinions and decisions of the minister.
They are as close as can be to the centre of political power. Time pressures on a minister in the modern political system are unrelenting. As a result, ministers tend to rely heavily on their staff to fulfil a host of functions, which directly or indirectly, are concerned with asserting ministerial control.
Close and almost constant proximity to their ministers, coupled with what was reported to be considerable control over the flow of paper and the access of people to them, provides advisers with a unique opportunity to exercise discretionary authority. In addition, advisers who are able to achieve predominance, such as the premier’s chiefs of staff, can exert considerable control over legislative and other priorities, including the level and pattern of public spending. Although advisers operate in the shadow of their ministers, it appears from this study that they can be and often are very powerful individuals. The fact that their activities are often secretive and difficult to detect, or at least substantially removed from public view, does not necessarily suggest that such activities are nefarious. However, given the potential for abuse of power that exists in the realm of advisers it would seem prudent to subject these individuals to closer scrutiny than has been the case to date.
303 CHAPTER 16 – ACCOUNTABILITY
What is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men [sic], the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. (James
Madison, 4th President of the USA, 1809-17)
The preceding chapters have brought to the fore a number of concerns about the impact of advisers’ roles and influence on governance and ethics. Some of these concerns relate to the growth in the number of advisers while others arise as a result of the impact of their
roles. The preceding chapters demonstrate that advisers, contrary to Walter’s findings, are
more than ‘bit players’.
The emergence of the contemporary ministerial staffing system has occasioned debates
regarding their accountability. These debates have been about normative concerns: what
should advisers be accountable for, to whom, and how? Such debates have also been
about the realities of the modern political system: making advisers accountable is difficult
because the world they operate in is complex, capricious and highly unpredictable. This chapter examines these debates through study participants’ views and by reference to a
controversial incident, known as the ‘Cecil Hills High School affair’. This example serves to reveal the uncharted limits of advisers’ roles and influence and calls into question the adequacy of existing frameworks in holding advisers to account for their actions.
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the arrangements governing the conduct and activities of advisers suffer from insufficient vertical controls and monitoring: in other words, an accountability deficit. They also point to a number of concerns about the appropriate use of advisers, their independence relative to public servants, and the broader institutional impact they have had as an increasingly sizeable group on the role of the public service.
In the last decade there has been an increase in scholarly concern about the accountability 304 of advisers in Australia. Arguments abound about their numbers, whether there are adequate arrangements to keep their roles and conduct in check, and whether the authority delegated to them constitutes a usurpation of executive powers (see Holland 2002; Tiernan
2004; Weller 2002). Issues exist as to whether advisers should be required to account for their actions to Parliament. The Westminster convention posits that ministers are ultimately responsible for the conduct of their staff, and are accountable to Parliament for these actions. This is based on the principle that advisers function as an extension of their minister and do not exist in their own right as independent actors (Russell 2002:3; Tiernan
2004:38; Weller 2002:71). The convention holds that advisers should not be required to appear before Parliamentary committees to account for their actions because this preserves the principle of ministerial responsibility, and the executive privilege that exists between ministers and their staff.
The interposition of advisers at the ministerial level has also raised concerns as to whether there are adequate safeguards to prevent advisers from encroaching on the roles of public servants. Public servants are troubled by the degree of influence that advisers exert on middle-ranking public servants and on the work of the department in general (Edwards
2002:2, Kimber 2004:20; Maley 2002:276; 278). Advisers issue instructions and it remains questionable as to whether they are empowered to do so (Tiernan 2004:241). Officials are equally troubled by how such influence permeates the bureaucracy and impacts on the work of the department. Thus, there remains uncertainty as to what constitutes appropriate interactions between advisers and bureaucrats. Contributing to this problem is the fact that the activities in which advisers engage overlap significantly with those of public servants leading to confusion over who is responsible for what and a breakdown in governing processes (Edwards 2002:2; Tiernan and Weller 2003; Uhr 2002).
Finally, concerns surround the effectiveness of the minister-adviser relationship in functioning as a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of advisers’ role and conduct, particularly as these are largely defined by a range of legal, administrative and conventional processes (Mills 2007:17-18). The doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which holds a
305 minister responsible for the outcomes of their policies, appears to be ineffective in its application to the modern ministerial staffing system. The evidence presented on this issue suggests that the doctrine, as an organising principle, has been diluted by the delegation of ministers’ authority to ministerial advisers (Tiernan 2004:39; Mills 2007:2). Advisers are appointed by ministers and perform functions that ministers once used to but now do not.
Many of these functions are delegated and carry the authority of the minister. Such delegation is usually informal and provides advisers with a high degree of autonomy which for some scholars has raised questions and concerns about what advisers are accountable for and to whom (Tiernan 2004; Tiernan and Weller 2003).
Some Australian governments have introduced measures to strengthen the accountability and responsibility of advisers. In the Federal sphere, the Rudd government reduced adviser numbers by 100 and introduced a Code of Conduct specifically for advisers, two measures designed to restore the Westminster tradition to the public service28. The Code ‘codifies’
responsibilities and behaviours expected of advisers particularly in relation to interactions
with public servants. At least one Australian state, namely Queensland, has introduced a
code of conduct specifically for advisers. In most states, including NSW, advisers are
covered in the codes of conduct for government employees. Unlike codes that exist
specifically for advisers, that in NSW makes no reference on how dealings between
advisers and public servants should be conducted. Despite this, extensive information on
government processes and procedures is available to staff employed in ministerial offices
through the Ministers’ Offices Administration Handbook, published on the Department of
Premier and Cabinet (DPC) website. Staff numbers and office costs by Minister are also reported annually by DPC, indicating higher level of administrative transparency than in the past. However, there is little evidence available to suggest that staff receive formal induction and professional development, and they are similarly dependent on the performance of and the strength of their relationship with their minister for their continued employment.
28 The Code of Conduct is accessible online at: http://www.smos.gov.au/media/code_of_conduct.html. 306 The findings presented in this chapter confirm some of those reported by Tiernan in her research on advisers’ accountability. Like hers, this study found evidence of an accountability deficit in the frameworks regulating advisers’ actions. However, a point of differentiation between this and Tiernan’s study is that the question of advisers’
accountability is explored from the perspective of advisers themselves and those who interact with them, yielding the view that notions of advisers’ accountability are both highly subjective and somewhat distorted. This further characterises the weaknesses associated with arrangements governing the accountability of advisers.
Finally, as previously stated, many advisers move into public service positions, often filling senior executive roles (including heads of departments) and often bypassing merit selection processes. This raises concerns that such practices are adding to an already politicised public service and that a ‘spoils’ system, similar to that operating in the US, is in the offing in Australia.
The accountability framework of ministerial advisers
Before analysing respondents’ views and the case example, it is instructive to explore the framework in which advisers are held accountable.
Arrangements governing the appointment and regulation of advisers comprise a legislative base, namely Part 2.5 Section 33 of the NSW Public Sector Employment and Management
Act 2002, and a range of conventions that have developed as the staffing system has evolved. Advisers are categorised as ‘special temporary employees’ under this section of the Act and are appointed directly by ministers with their terms and conditions of employment set and managed by the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet. The Act provides little guidance on how the staffing system should be regulated, particularly in relation to interactions between advisers and public servants. Significantly, it is quite unequivocal about the exemption of advisers from merit selection. This means that appointments made on the basis of patronage are not prohibited. That the provisions of the
Act are framed in this manner leaves open the opportunity for flexibility in the adviser system. 307 By convention, advisers are exempt from the established accountability arrangements that apply to politicians and public servants. They are not required, at the Commonwealth level at least, to appear before parliamentary committees, as the ‘children overboard’ scandal proved.29 Their activities are not recorded in departmental annual reports and they are not subject to auditing or other forms of scrutiny. Yet they hold publicly funded positions, and their impact and influence is significant. While the functions, terms of employment and accountabilities for public servants are set and prescribed in legislation, codes and other formal processes, those of advisers are less prescriptive. In the case of public servants, there is a clear line of accountability: public service legislation sets norms of behaviour and there is a hierarchy to enforce the rules and sanctions for breaches of the rules.
Recent developments
Several of reforms and measures, notably a Code of Conduct, to render the staff accountable for their actions are beginning to take shape in Australia. Many of these measures were in direct response to recommendations made by government inquiries or investigations by bodies responsible for ensuring accountability in government. An example is the Auditor-General.
At the Federal level, two policy changes were introduced to improve the accountability of advisers. The first was the reduction in numbers by the Rudd government on coming to office in 2007. Adviser numbers were reduced by 100 at that time as part of the Prime
Minister’s commitment to restore the Westminster tradition to the public service. A
Ministerial Staff Code of Conduct has also been introduced30. The Code sets out the
standards of personal integrity, professionalism and behaviour that are expected of
advisers. It also includes specific protocols covering working relationships between
29 The children overboard scandal was an Australian political controversy involving allegations by ministers of the Howard government that seafaring asylum seekers had thrown children overboard in order to secure passage into Australia. The affair called into question the roles, behaviour and accountability of ministerial advisers who used government agencies to pursue partisan ends. 30 The Code of Conduct is accessible online at: http://www.smos.gov.au/media/code_of_conduct.html. 308 Ministerial staff and commonwealth public servants, and recognises the important and trusted role of Ministerial staff in providing advice and assistance to Ministers.
All Australian states with the exception of NSW, have put in place a Code of Conduct specifically for ministerial staff. In NSW, advisers are covered in the Code of Conduct for
Government employees. Unlike the codes for advisers, that introduced in NSW makes no
reference on how dealings with the bureaucracy should be conducted. Despite this,
extensive information on government processes and procedures is available to staff
employed in ministerial offices through the Ministers’ Offices Administration Handbook,
published on the DPC website. Staff numbers and office costs by Minister are also reported
annually on by DPC, indicating higher level of administrative transparency than in the past.
There is little evidence available to suggest that staff receive formal induction and
professional development, and they are similarly dependent on the performance of and the
strength of their relationship with their minister for their continued employment.
With little to guide advisers’ roles and conduct, issues regarding accountability emerge from
the environment in which they work. To start with, the work they perform is done in secret
and out of the public’s view. They “work in a tense, combative, fast-paced environment”
(Adviser 1) with little time for considered judgement. They have no employment security:
their tenure is tied to the fortunes of the minister (Tiernan 2004:35). They may not receive
‘code of conduct’ training or guidance in how to work ethically within the machinery of
government, unlike public servants, who undergo this training as a matter of course. Thus,
advisers operate with little or no reference to the ethical frameworks or value sets that
underpin and guide, for example, the work of ministers, who are responsible and
accountable to Parliament for their own actions and those of their department(s).
NSW has a Westminster system of government under which ministers and political
executive are held accountable for their actions to the Parliament. Traditions of the
Westminster system include the concentration of political power in the collective
309 responsibility of the Cabinet, and a constitutional bureaucracy with a non-partisan and expert public service which is accountable to ministers.
At the heart of advisers’ accountability is whether they serve as an extension of the minister, and ipso facto, ought to fall within the realm of the minister’s responsibility given that their role is to assist and support the minister in overseeing the department and ensuring that it implements government policy. Advisers are essentially a conduit between the departmental head and the minister. If a staffer fails to inform or advise the minister of certain information made available by the department, then the minister is and must be responsible for the consequences. Seen in these terms, therefore, the accountability of advisers is rendered through the nature of the relationship they have with their minister.
Ministers, in turn, have vicarious liability; they are accountable for their staff, and must
answer to Parliament for their conduct and actions. However, as the interviews and following case example reveal, ministers are loath to take remedial action or resign in support of the convention of ministerial responsibility.
The following sections explore the extent to which these normative expectations are
upheld.
Respondents’ views
Study participants’ views on advisers’ accountability are mixed. That such diversity of opinions exists on the behaviour and conduct of advisers suggests the debate surrounding
their place in the NSW parliamentary system has some distance to travel. Participants were
asked whether they believed the doctrine of ministerial responsibility provides an effective
mechanism for the accountability of advisers. Responses reveal that accountability
arrangements for advisers are complex and unclear. They are complex because they are
structured through the nature and type of relationship advisers have with their minister. As
noted, this relationship is fluid and situated. It can give advisers considerable autonomy to
define their own roles and responsibilities. Their accountability arrangements are unclear
because advisers exercise a form of it that is subjective, as the evidence presented in this
310 chapter suggests. All told, the analysis of respondents’ views on the issue of adviser accountability suggests that perceptions of the frameworks designed to hold the ministerial staffing system responsible for its actions and conduct have been reframed. This reframing is evident in the fact that subjective forms of accountability appear to be replacing
conventional mechanisms.
Ministers and advisers in this study were emphatic in their views that advisers were highly
accountable for their actions. Such accountability, they argued, was achieved through a
chain of responsibility that involved the minister as the dominant tie, and Parliament.
Minister 5 was categorical in his response to the question of advisers’ accountability:
I think the ultimate responsibility is that of the minister. And he has to take responsibility
of staff behaviour that is in some way untoward. I mean they would never for example
write a letter, without ministerial approval. They would never make a submission to
Cabinet that is without ministerial sign off. But, if they behaved in some inappropriate
way, it would be a matter for the minister to exercise discipline, and in extreme cases
dismissal for that particular staff member. So, there is accountability, and it is essential,
that is why the choice of staff is so critical. Both, in terms of competence, balance, and
behaviour.
For this minister, advisers are ultimately accountable to ministers for the work they perform and their conduct and actions, with accountability being a key capability for advisers in ensuring their actions do not bring about negative consequences. This view has some resonance with Corbett’s (1992) ‘upward’ accountability in which an agent (adviser) is accountable to their principal (minister) in a legalistic and constitutional sense. In this context, advisers are accountable to ministers, who in turn are accountable legally to
Parliament and the state’s constitution.
Minister 4 was equally unequivocal in his assessment of advisers’ accountability:
... advisers are probably the most accountable people in the government. They have no
industrial rights and short tenures. Of all the groups they’re much more accountable.
That’s why the structure works. As I said, the departmental people quite often don’t have
311 that same level of accountability. That’s why I said they’re [advisers] integral to modern
government.
Interestingly, this minister went on to reveal that he considered it was highly appropriate for advisers to carry the authority of the minister in their dealings with public servants. When asked whether he thought there were issues that came with advisers operating with the minister’s authority, he said:
I think if an adviser rang someone in the department that was part of the portfolio and
asked information and the person at the other end of the phone call would have to
expect that it’s got the minister’s authority – well it’s certainly how we work.
Seemingly, therefore, advisers are well and truly empowered to make contact with and solicit information from public servants. According to this minister, it is ‘par for the course’.
But his contribution to the debate regarding advisers’ accountability differs markedly from the dominant view promoted by some of the public servants interviewed:
They make contact with my departmental officer all the time but they’re meant to go
through me. It’s not appropriate that they do because you have no idea what they’re
asking for and what they’re getting. (Official 2)
They are enmeshed in the day-to-day operations to the extent that I have to ask them to
come back through one officer so that I can keep track of where issues are being
handled. Again when I started I made it clear to the minister that my performance
agreement meant that I needed to ... direct the resources to the areas I’d agree to
perform in, rather than advisers directing my staff to hop on issues of theirs. (Official 1)
Most advisers interviewed were unable to identify or describe the types of accountability arrangements governing the activities of advisers, which indicates the ambiguity that clouds debates about advisers’ roles and behaviours. However, most advisers were emphatic in
their views about their accountability. Adviser 6 stated ardently that he “was accountable to the minister, no question about that”. Adviser 3 stated that he faced the same array of accountability arrangements as those imposed upon ministers and public servants:
I think ministerial staff are accountable. Today, in my job, I’m answerable to the minister
obviously and then to the Parliament through the minister. To the media, to the Auditor-
312 General in relation to finances ... If I’m working with the Police, to the Police Integrity
Commission ... to the Ombudsman as a matter of course, if people … [are] concerned
about the way I have approached their matter of concern, they can refer me to the
Ombudsman. So, I’m accountable at any one time to six or seven different bodies, all of
which have the function of ensuring accountability, Parliament, the media, the Auditor-
General, etc.
This view offers an interesting, albeit possibly contrived, assessment of advisers’ accountability. It is a falsehood to claim that advisers are accountable to Parliament through the minister; only ministers are accountable to Parliament. It is the word ‘through’ which makes this adviser’s assessment of his own accountability flawed. While it is not uncommon for ministers to account for the conduct and behaviours of advisers, they are under no legal or constitutional obligation to do so. As shown, they can easily deflect any scrutiny by providing superficial responses, pleading ignorance or distancing themselves from any kind of responsibility. As for being accountable to the Auditor-General, this too is questionable, as this particular body has no jurisdiction to look into the conduct of advisers unless they are implicated in the performance of administrative systems. Adviser 4 offered a view that chimes closely with that of Adviser 3:
... no-one can be masters of everything. Those people are highly accountable ... We are
in a state that has an ICAC.31 There’s still no equivalent in the Commonwealth or other
places. There’s a positive obligation on public servants or at least on Directors-General
to report you know so if again, if people think an adviser is up to no-good, you know
there are certain positive obligations, you’re absolutely accountable to ICAC, to
Ombudsman ...
The assessments of both these advisers give the impression that advisers have political accountability in much the same way that ministers do; that is, their actions can be rendered accountable through democratic institutions such as the Parliament and institutions that have been established to monitor the performance of governments and public servants. But, as the Cecil Hills School case-example suggests, advisers are not
31 Independent Commission Against Corruption. 313 accountable to Parliament or, for that matter, the institutions referred to in the advisers’ comment above.
It is instructive to note that the Ombudsman, like the Auditor-General, has no jurisdiction to investigate the conduct of advisers except in instances when their actions are identified in complaints regarding the delivery of services to the community. A member of the public cannot lodge a complaint to the Ombudsman if he or she had an issue of concern about the behaviour or misconduct of advisers. The ICAC, on the other hand, can only investigate matters that have been referred to them.
However, just as some participants were emphatic in their views about the accountability of advisers, others were less so. Adviser 1, when asked about advisers’ accountability, said:
“It’s a good question. I don’t know the answer to it.” He elaborated with an assessment of the difficulties associated with the application of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility in
holding advisers accountable:
There are regularly things that I think – you know – “I’m not going to give this to the
minister because I don’t know much about it yet”. And a variation of that is that she
doesn’t need to know. And it is best if she doesn’t know because this was an
administrative decision made by the department that would be best that she didn’t know
anything about that. And that happens all the time. Am I accountable for those
decisions? Well only in the broad sense of whether the minister is happy. Does she feel
as though there are things she should know about that she hasn’t been? Well, that
happens all the time.
This adviser’s observation about the accountability of the ministerial staffing system suggests that it is dependent upon the level of trust that exists between advisers, ministers and public servants. Trust, as noted in various parts of this study, acts as a powerful
‘organiser’ of the types of behaviours advisers employ in their dealings with policy-makers.
It appears from the numerous occasions that ‘trust’ is mentioned in this study that it transcends the hierarchical conditions that govern other kinds of relationships, such as those formed in bureaucratic contexts; it aligns what advisers can and cannot do, and serves as a precursor to ethical considerations.
314 Significantly, this adviser’s description highlights other important issues in relation to the accountability of ministerial adviser. First, discretion is prevalent and poses some difficulties. If an adviser decides not to reveal information to the minister, are they then accountable for that action? Second, advisers make decisions about what to tell and what not to tell their minister. Is the adviser then responsible for holding on to that advice?
Finally, has the accountability of ministers become fragmented and diluted to the extent
that advisers are responsible for the actions and non-actions of ministers? The above
comment would suggest that it has.
Problems with accountability also emerge because advisers regularly have to interpret what
the minister wants when those expectations are not entirely clear. This means that advisers either have to second-guess or work out for themselves what their minister would have them do if this was not made known explicitly to them from the outset. In some instances this causes advisers’ influence to be heightened. Thus, as Adviser 2 states:
Part of the problem I think with the accountability of advisers is that we have to interpret
what the minister is thinking; we don’t work with tangibles. You know, it’s hectic in this
place and you’re forever asking yourself “what would the minister have me do?” … you
sometimes are using an authority that perhaps raises questions, indeed legitimate ones,
about whether you’re over-reaching.
This reflects a point raised earlier, which is that the environment in which advisers work conditions the need for advisers to think like their minister, and this creates problems for the accountability of the ministerial staffing system as a whole. The statement reinforces the theme that advisers exceed the power that they are meant to possess; they exceed their true station.
Adviser 4 expressed a similar view to that of Adviser 1 above, but not as emphatically: “I suppose ... my gut feeling is that it’s okay. It’s therefore something I haven’t put a lot of time and thought into the issue.” This adviser felt that he conducted himself in a highly ethical manner when dealing with the department and when representing the minister. He stated that he “relied on his own individual values to guide” how he performed his role. He added that his minister played a significant role in establishing effective ethical and business 315 practices within the ministerial office to the extent, as he avows, “every cent had to be accounted for, every plane trip had to be recorded”. This suggests that advisers exercise a subjective form of accountability in which they rely on their own individual values as well as an evaluation of those expected of them by their minister. This further suggests that the type of relationship that advisers have with their minister serves as a control mechanism for keeping their conduct and behaviour in check. Indeed, the quality of the relationship they had with their minister proved to be a powerful force in demanding accountability from
advisers, as the following observations from Advisers 1 and 3 attest:
I’m highly trusted by the minister and that helps keep things pretty much in check.
The relationship I had with [name omitted] was highly professional. He trusted me and
that counts as everything in this game.
It seems from these remarks that the accountability of advisers is constituted relationally, that is, through the bond and association advisers have with their minister. If the minister displays good ethical practices, this tends to be reflected in the behaviours of advisers.
Adviser 7 offers a point of difference between the arrangements governing the
accountability of advisers and that for ministers:
They’re not as publicly as accountable, no. If a minister downstairs says “Oh well, it
wasn’t my fault, I was advised wrongly. My ministerial staff advised me wrongly”, I would
say well “tough luck … it’s your role”.
This (former) adviser, who is now a member of parliament, notes that advisers have little accountability outside the relationship of the minister. For her, advisers do not have the same public profile as ministers, and because of this they are unlikely to hold the same level of external accountability as ministers. But of significance, as this adviser’s remark suggests, is the difficulty of making ministers responsible for the misdeeds of advisers. This adviser spoke of an instance in which the (then) Minister for Transport, denied knowledge of an engineering report which highlighted structural deficiencies with a rail bridge. It was reported in the media that the minister was unaware of the report’s findings because his advisers had neglected to pass them on to him. Incidents like these raise questions as to
316 whether the acts of advisers are the acts of ministers and whether ministers therefore should take responsibility for the negligence or misconduct of their staff.
The following observation by Minister 1 highlights how far ministers are willing to take the
blame for the transgressions of advisers. It shows that the notion of advisers operating as an extension of the minister exists more as an ideal than as a practice:
There’s been an increasing prevalence if you recall in the federal government before the
children overboard … Graeme Morris got sacked by the Prime Minister … who was the
Prime Minister’s closest adviser … he got sacked for one or other scandal – I think it was
travel or whatever. Graeme Morris resigned but essentially got pushed out. So I think
increasingly there has been a trend which was never the case historically that minders
have taken the rap for errors or perceived errors or whatever. Or provided a necessary
falling on sword where the minister didn’t want to fall on the sword.
Official 1 was able to show that the accountabilities of advisers are not as precisely defined
as those of public servants, whose accountabilities are defined in legislation, performance
agreements and codes of conduct. While advisers have strong accountability ties to their
minister, these ties do not predominate in the same way as for ministers and public
servants. It is instructive to note that Official 1 is also a former adviser and is therefore able
to provide a credible comparative assessment between his current and previous roles:
Under statute. I’m accountable under the Audit Act, under the Public Service Act,
Transport Administration Act, whole lot of things. Whereas advisers can seek to have
safety reports on railway incidents … I’ve said that’s absolutely not on. The minister and
the Department are accountable but advisers don’t have any accountability. They don’t?
There’s no separate audit of their expenses, of their travel … none of the
accountabilities my staff have to me. They don’t have a performance agreement with the
minister, which in NSW I’m required to have with the minister.
In addition to asserting the types of accountability arrangements that govern the work he carries out and his performance in that role, Official 1 went on to claim that conventions such as Westminster are being eroded as a result of the existence of advisers. It seems, as the following implies, that there is still an appeal for Westminster to be preserved:
317 I’m accountable to the minister and I’ve made that clear to advisers that’s where the
accountability sits. When I arrived here the traditional Westminster system had
fundamentally broken down completely.
The growth of the ministerial adviser system, in both size and complexity, has had significant negative effects on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. As noted earlier, ministers are not willing enough to accept responsibility for mistakes made on their watch:
No. I think that if you look at all that’s happened with the children overboard it’s a really
good illustration of that. I mean if you espouse the view that advisers are an extension of
the minister then in theory in should be the case but in reality it’s not … there’s no
accountability for advisers. It’s not true to say there’s none. I think in NSW certainly from
the way this government works that there’s an attempt by the Premier’s Department to
place a level of accountability on ministerial office advisers. The premier’s chief of staff
really has that role vested in him or her. But it’s a very difficult one to perform because
you never know. (Official 3)
One government official spoke of her difficulty in and the general challenges of raising concerns about advisers’ conduct with ministers. As described below, efforts to address advisers’ accountability can be a fraught and futile, with possible reprisals against those who attempt to do so:
Absolutely … and it’s very difficult to have a discussion with the minister about an
adviser that you find difficult … it’s almost impossible. It’s like a taboo subject. (Official 2)
An additional insight that can be obtained from this participant’s opinion is that advisers’ accountability appears to be weighed down with ambiguity: who does an official go to when concerns about advisers’ accountability come to light? It seems public servants are reluctant to deal with advisers’ conduct because doing so may have repercussions.
Official 1 expressed a similar concern, although his comment highlights the lack of grievance-handling procedures for dealing with complaints about advisers’ conduct:
I have staff here wanting to lodge grievances against advisers and there’s no process to
do that because of the breakdown of process. I will raise that with the minister and try to
deal with that.
318 Another official acknowledged the primacy of the minister as the line of accountability for advisers but highlighted how problematic advisers’ accountability can be if matters of conduct have to be handled by a public sector agency:
... they are an extension of the minister and they’ve got to be covered by the
accountability of the minister. In cases where it’s not working … the head of the
premier’s department can have a role to play but they’re acting as an extension of the
premier I suppose. (Official 4)
It seems that addressing the accountability of advisers has to be left to the devices of the minister, and only if the minister has the time and inclination to do so. Not only is there uncertainty as to whom advisers are accountable, but as to how matters of misconduct ought to be handled.
The data did not yield much in the way of identifying what it was that advisers were actually accountable for. When asked, advisers provided wide and varied responses focusing on functions rather than conduct or behaviour. Adviser 2 said she was accountable for
“ensuring implementation of the minister’s policy ... and looking after his interests”. In a similar vein, Adviser 3 said that he was accountable for “producing advice that informs the minister’s decision-making”. For ministers, accountability appeared to be about expectations: “advisers have to be my eyes and ears”; they “keep me informed of … community groups’ activities”, and they maintain “close links to the department” (Ministers
2, 3 and 5 respectively).
Cecil Hills High School case example32
An incident which graphically illustrates the problems associated with the accountability of advisers involved the falsifying of information given to the media by the then Minister for
Education, John Aquilina, his media adviser Patrick Low, and Carr’s Communications
Director, Walt Secord. The incident involved a statement made in Parliament by Aquilina on
10 April 2001 which referred to the contents of a student’s diary that contained “graphic
32 The official matter was referred to as Report of an investigation into matters arising from a Ministerial Statement to the Legislative Assembly on 10 April 2001. 319 passages describing a massacre list, descriptions of suicide and plans to kill other students during a school assembly”. According to the Minister the student was planning “a replica of the Colorado [Colombine] High School massacre” (ICAC Report 2001).
At the time the statement was made, the media was informed that the student had access to his father’s gun. This was subsequently found to be untrue in an investigation by NSW
Police. As expected, a media storm broke out, and the minister, who was on an overseas holiday at the time, was unable to face accusations that he had lied to Parliament and that his office had falsified advice to the media (Zimmer 2001).
The minister’s statement and the events that followed became the subject of widespread comment and controversy. There was extensive debate about the motivations of the government in raising the matter, the political and media strategy employed, and the statement’s impact on the student and the school. There was also growing cynicism that the story was being used to divert media attention from government’s plans to close four inner-Sydney schools. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial stated: “Mr Aquilina and his advisers ... seized on this ‘massacre’ ploy at a time when the Government and the department were feeling the first wave of growing public anger on the education front, the like of which has not been seen for many years” (Zimmer 2001).
As noted, at the heart of the controversy were two advisers: Walt Secord and Patrick Low.
Their conduct was the subject of an ICAC inquiry after it was referred by the Opposition spokesman on police, Andrew Tink, because he had concerns about government intervention in the Police’s handling of the matter. His specific concern centred on the
Police media unit revealing that it had no record of the case; yet hours after the Premier’s office became aware of the Police’s admission, the media unit retracted the statement and replaced it with another.
The investigation by ICAC revealed that Low failed to obtain information confirming that the student had access to a gun when it was believed, by both the Minister and Secord, that he had done so. According to them, Low was positive a gun existed which was confirmed by a
Department of Education officer. But Low said that, despite being asked to research the 320 story before 10 April, he decided not to because he did not “personally want to do it, as I did not agree with making this kind of thing public” (Zimmer 2001). He also had concerns about the student and his family being defamed. The report highlights Low’s reluctance to include reference to the existence of a gun and Secord’s desire to have it included.
Low told ICAC he only allowed the Minister and Secord to believe there was a gun, rather
than positively asserting the fact, but he conceded he did nothing to correct this misleading impression. Although Low’s testimony ultimately cleared Secord of misconduct, it also implicated him as the individual responsible for identifying the media value of the story. The
ICAC report states: “According to Low, Secord told him he believed this would be the biggest story of the day and he had put off other ministers from doing other stories so this one would get a clear run.”
Low resigned but soon after took up employment in a senior management position for NSW
Maritime. The Minister is now a parliamentary secretary in the NSW government; and
Secord, who was named in the media as the source of the gun rumour, kept his job at the time of the investigations and then moved to become the former Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd’s communications’ director.
This case highlights several aspects about the accountability of advisers and the relevance
and applicability of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. It indicates the potential that
exists for advisers to engage in rank political opportunism through potentially distorting the
truth and falsifying information. Both advisers displayed a lack of regard for the impact the
story would have on the student in question and his family, and the parameters of their role.
When questions were being asked about the accuracy of the advice provided to the media,
there was little attempt to establish the truth of the matter or correct the record, even when
it began to unravel in the public domain. Secord’s retention in the same role and Low’s
appointment to a senior post at NSW Maritime sends a worrying signal to the public about
the lack of professional standards that apply to ministerial staff. Unquestionably, it
demonstrates systemic weaknesses in the mechanisms governing the roles and
behaviours of advisers, and shows that advisers, depending on the circumstances in which
321 they find themselves, can have a separate existence to that of ministers. It seems there is a point at which advisers can be cast adrift from the bonds that tie them to their minister.
Conclusion
The analysis of participants’ views suggests that advisers’ accountability is rendered through two mechanisms: the trust that grows out of the relationship between advisers and their minister, and the trust that comes from their own value sets. This suggests the arrangements that hold ministers and public servants accountable have little relevance or applicability to the modern adviser system. If anything, these exist in name only rather than in reality, and may be indicative of the way political practice has evolved in modern governmental systems.
Related to this, it appears from the analysis of advisers’ accountability that the design of the
ministerial staffing system as a whole has evolved to such an extent that it has eclipsed the
constitutional foundations on which the NSW political system was founded. The concerns
raised by study participants point to the existence of an accountability deficit within the
NSW ministerial staffing system. This deficit has emerged as a result of several factors:
growth in the number of advisers, which makes managing the staffing system problematic;
subjective and shifting notions of accountability, which makes lines of responsibility vague
and ambiguous; and heavy workloads, which stretch or dilute accountability.
322 Part VII – Discussion
The final part of this study brings together the key themes in the analysis of advisers’ roles, influence and accountability. It seeks to explain and interpret the findings of the study with a view to developing new understandings about political staffing in NSW and relating these to theory. It is argued that advisers have become an established feature of the NSW
governmental system providing the executive with a institutional means of organising for
the development of policy.
323 CHAPTER 17 – DISCUSSION
They have been men who, unlike the charismatic leader, have not wished to be lords themselves,
but who have entered the service of political lords ... they place themselves at the princes’
disposal and by managing the princes’ politics they earned, on the one hand, a living and, on the
other, an ideal content of life. (Max Weber)
This chapter has three overarching aims: the first is to summarise the findings relating to the principal lines of inquiry presented in the introduction (Chapter 1). These, as noted, include advisers’ core functions and activities, selected factors conditioning their roles and growth in numbers, the influence they exert in policy-making, and their accountability.
The second is to explore the broader implications of the ministerial staffing system on the governance arrangements and institutional structures operating in NSW. Here I argue that the adviser system has produced a number of qualitative changes to the machinery of government, which can be grouped according to the following propositions:
The adviser system has become institutionalised because of its growth in numbers
and functions, and because it offers the prospect of a durable form of political
organisation; it has the intrinsic qualities of stability and indispensability.
The roles advisers perform make them an important governance device, helping
ministers govern optimally and providing them with additional capability to manage
relations with the bureaucracy and organised interests.
Allied to this, the adviser system has had the effect of recalibrating the public
service through the partisanisation of decision-making structures and the
politicisation of the administrative core. These have occurred through the
appointment of former advisers to senior positions in the public service and through
advisers’ interactions with lower-ranked public servants.
Advisers add to the capacity of the state by helping the political executive resolve
policy differences. The networks advisers form act as a powerful coordination
device to deliver policy coherence.
324 Advisers ministerialise policy-making by imbuing elements of the process with the
minister’s view and at same time promoting his or her political interests.
Advisers bridge the divide between political and administrative spheres of policy-
making, creating tension and energy in the process. They also act as bridges
between society and state, democratising the policy and political process for
organised interests.
Advisers are an influential and powerful political actor whose influence and power
derives from the authority of the minister. Advisers use their discretion to determine
what issues get considered, debated and determined. The ability to speak for the
minister is the mainstay of advisers’ power.
Directly and indirectly, the adviser system has resulted in a number of institutional
changes within the NSW governmental system, including changes in the role of the
Cabinet and relationships between the political executive and the public service.
Finally, the adviser system forms a talent pool from which future political and
bureaucratic leaders are drawn.
The third aim of this chapter is to present a theorisation of advisers’ roles and their place
within the policy-making process, and so to fulfil one of the broader aims of the thesis: the
generation of new theory based on the grounded theory methodology. In more ways than
one, this study has presented an interpretive account of advisers’ roles relative to a number
of theories that cut across social and behavioural sciences, political science, sociology,
public administration, organisational theory, economics and policy-making. I aim to add to
the texture of these theories by evaluating them in the context of advisers’ roles, influence
and impact.
Scale, scope and nature of advisers’ roles
The experience of the ministerial adviser system during the Greiner/Fahey and Carr eras has highlighted several important themes about advisers’ roles and the system they inhabit.
First, it has shown that advisers’ roles have evolved significantly since their formal 325 introduction under Whitlam and adoption at the NSW state level under Wran a little later. As noted in the literature review (Chapter 2), when advisers were first introduced, their roles were limited to providing ministers with personal support (e.g. managing appointments, dealing with party political matters) in order to free ministers up to deal with policy matters.
But as their numbers have grown, advisers’ roles have moved into other spheres of policy- making: they engage the bureaucracy; they deal with interest groups, ensuring their views
are heard and their influence kept under control; and they develop strategies for
communicating ideas and information. Thus, no longer can advisers be seen as ‘bit
players’, as described by Walter, or as having “limited and confined” roles in policy-making
as asserted by Smith (1977:155). Rather, they have emerged as powerful political actors
whose functions and activities have far-reaching implications for policy development and
the institutions that take part in this process.
The second theme to emerge from the analysis is that they do many things, more than is
usually known publicly. The roles advisers perform are able to compensate in some
instances, and augment in others, the weaknesses and strengths of the minister. The
adviser system has evolved, it seems, to a point where it very much fills (or exploits) a
capability gap that has been created by a variety of interrelated factors: ministers having
greater responsibilities and accountabilities, a desire by the executive to extract political
dividends (or rents) from the bureaucracy, and the perceived limitations in the services of
the bureaucracy.
The third theme relates specifically to the contextual factors defining advisers’ roles. What
is evident from the analysis of the interviews and other documents is that advisers’ roles
are contextually driven and dependent upon their interaction with other people; in other
words, their roles are highly situated. Importantly, the analysis shows that there are many
factors influencing the type and scope of advisers’ roles, including, but not limited to, the
minister’s management style, role conception, personality; the type of portfolio; issue
saliency; and whether they were recruited for their expertise or political skill, or both. As
indeterminate as advisers’ functions are, the singular thread that runs through the analysis
326 of the ministerial staffing system is that their functions are overtly partisan and inescapably political. While advisers have licence to shape their role set according to the context in which they find themselves, the crux of their function is to serve the political interests of the minister.
A fourth and related theme is that there is a purpose to advisers possessing an expansive
role set: it provides ministers with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and
agility to respond quickly to complex and unpredictable situations. In a sense, this flexibility
enables ministers to ‘tread carefully’ in areas that conventionally are off limits.
A fifth and significant theme to emerge from the analysis is that there is no firm agreement
in either theoretical or practical terms as to what constitutes an appropriate role for advisers
in policy development. Though some advisers interviewed were able to bring expertise and
technical knowledge to the policy work of the portfolio, most brought a political dimension to
the analysis of policy. This finding differs markedly from that detected in Maley’s study,
which found a significant presence of public servants in ministerial offices laying foundation to the claim that a French-style Cabinet ministeriels33 had emerged within the political
executive under Keating. According to Maley, this provided ministers with advisers who
were able to blend policy knowledge and competence with an understanding of public
service processes, producing what Howard regarded as the “ideal ministerial adviser”
(Maley 2002:279). While there were examples of NSW ministers recruiting advisers for their
technical expertise, most were recruited from the party machine or as individuals known to
the minister personally; in other words, their presence bears the imprint of party politics.
This meant two things: ministerial offices were highly partisan in their composition and as a
result brought a high degree of politicality to the development of policy; and many advisers
came to the role with little or no background knowledge of the portfolio, suggesting that
33 Cabinet Ministeriels consist usually of a mixed group of political advisers and civil servants on temporary secondment, who both advise the minister and exercise strong control over the ministry in his/her name: In such systems there is usually some distance between the minister/cabinet and the civil servants who make make up the remainder of the ministry. 327 other skills and competencies (communication, consultation, political nous and acumen, as
described earlier) were more important.
A sixth theme to materialise from the interview data is that advisers have an extensive ‘role
stretch’, so much so that their role encroaches on the traditional roles of the bureaucracy
and brings organised interests within reach of the political process. It also provides the
catalyst for bringing contestability to the provision of advice to the minister.
It became clear from the interviews that advisers’ roles correlate strongly with the reasons
for advisers’ existence. One reason that resonated strongly with the interviewees was the
need to protect the public service from partisan risks. Negotiating policy with the Caucus
and brokering agreements with minor parties were functions deemed inappropriate for
public servants to perform, and were consequently taken on by advisers. Thus, advisers
could add to the capacity of ministers by taking on functions of a more political nature, and
thereby preserving the bureaucracy’s impartiality.
The differences of perspectives among interviewees on the topic of advisers’ roles seem to
surface in part because of the unique nature of the institutions from which they came (e.g.
minister’s office, department, community). Perceptions about the roles of advisers were
generally congruent among advisers and ministers. However, some interesting differences
in perspective were evident in comments from officials and interest group representatives.
These differences suggest that perceptions of advisers’ roles vary according to the
institutional perspective. On this basis, then, the most sensible and accurate way to
describe the response from interviewees is that they represented a continuum of views –
from the prevailing view of advisers and ministers that advisers have an important and
substantive role in policy-making, to the view of officials and interest group representatives
that advisers have a strongly influential role.
Finally, this study has shown that advisers have a wide array of roles: they examine
submissions for politically sensitive problems and extend the range of options from which
the minister chooses; ‘progress chase’ on decisions; brief the minister on non-departmental
328 items on the Cabinet agenda; liaise with the party and interest groups; help handle the media; and ‘ginger up’ draft speeches and statements.
Advisers perform a range of important informational roles to help ministers cope with the demands of their responsibilities. They filter information emanating from the bureaucracy and present it in a digestible form for the minister to use in making decisions. They serve as both “a buffer and a bridge” (Minister 4) for their minister and become a vital channel for information, the medium of exchange, particularly political intelligence.
In their role as counsel to the minister, advisers discharge a variety of important and related tasks. They may serve as confidante, providing advice, reassurance and a ‘friendly ear’ when the occasion demands. In helping ministers come to terms with their responsibilities, advisers provide personal support by acting as a sounding board, being an extra pair of hands, being their ‘eyes and ears’, and being a critical friend. Significantly, they assist with managing the minister’s time so that he or she can reflect and focus on strategic matters.
Lastly, advisers serve as a source of ideas, by submitting ‘think pieces’ of their own or
obtaining outside advice, so as to extend the range of policy options available to their
minister. A number of interviewees stressed that this is done to supplement public service
expertise.
Apart from responding to the requirements of ministers, advisers have significant scope
and opportunity to work on policy independently of the department and bring forward
proposals that advance the government’s agenda. Many advisers claimed to be a source
and inspiration of new policy ideas, while others claimed that they made new policy ideas
take hold and grow.
Institutional changes
The roles advisers fulfil provide an insight into the types of institutional changes that have occurred within the NSW political executive and its capacity to deal with the challenges of modern governance. In a sense, the adviser system has evolved to take on the shape and form described in this study as an institutional and adaptive response to the complexities of
329 these challenges. In other words, advisers have come to exist to the extent that they have because of an apparent governance deficit. While some of these institutional changes have occurred under the economic doctrine of New Public Management, which, as Savoie asserts, seeks to break down formal structures of control and instil a “new bias of action” in government agencies (Savoie 2003:13), they have also been inspired by public choice arguments which have focused on making the administrative structures of government responsive to the executive (Aucoin 1990).
Though the notion of role has been used extensively in this study to conceptualise and contextualise the work of advisers, it has, in reality, served as a vehicle for exploring the inner workings of the modern political process and the institutional changes that have been associated with and fashioned by the introduction of and growth in the ministerial adviser system in NSW. For instance, the analysis of the NSW adviser system has yielded observations about a growing personalised form of rule within the political executive: ministers have greater say over who gets to represent his or her interests and how these become instituted within the administrative structures of government. These institutional changes also point to a rebalancing of power, one that has occurred between the bureaucracy and the ministerial office.
The first notable institutional change has been the adviser system itself: it has evolved into a political institution in its own right, sharing many of the characteristics that institutions exhibit. For instance, it has stability; advisers’ behaviour is shaped by the institutional settings in which they work; and there is a sense of shared values and meaning among participants (Peters 1999).
The second institutional change resulting from growth in the NSW adviser system has been in the way Cabinet processes operate. As noted, the adviser system operates as an institutional support structure to the political executive (Maley 2002), absorbing much of the pre-decision work that ministers used to do themselves or for which they once relied on their departments. The coordination and networking activities in which advisers engage are largely concerned with resolving disagreements over policy before they reach the decision-
330 making stage. There are grounds to believe that the NSW adviser system has caused a dispersion of power away from the party machine and Cabinet to individual ministers.
Cabinet is no longer the deliberative body it used to be, and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the adviser system has been responsible for this, at least indirectly (Fawcett &
Gay 2010:24; Maley 2002: 285). This suggests that some elements of policy-making are becoming centralised within the executive at the ministerial level, which has been made
possible by advisers sharing close proximity with one another. This may be suggestive of a
variant form of Rhodes’ ‘differentiated polity model’, in which power is dispersed throughout
the polity (Rhodes 1997).
The advent and functional growth of the adviser system has led to another important
institutional change: the prominence of the minister and the ministerial office as a political
institution. In many respects the adviser system, as it has developed throughout Australian
jurisdictions, has created the ‘institutional minister’. Ministers are no longer the solitary
actor consulting with each other and relying on the department for advice on how best to
handle the issues of the day.
Equally so, the ministerial office has grown into a powerful decision- and policy-making
body whose purpose is to bring the activities of the bureaucracy within closer range of the
political executive. The ministerial office now operates as a small ‘enterprise’ capable of
grappling with the complexity of communication and asserting its power and authority over
a system of government that is fragmented and characterised by competition between
organised groups for influence and power. This authoritative positioning of the ministerial
office has been largely achieved by the expansion of the ministerial staffing system.
This study has also identified two important roles emerging from changes to institutional
arrangements. The first, coordination, is a function that was seen, based on the interview
data, to be critical to the resolution of policy differences that resulted from issues falling
within or across bureaucratic organisations. The other was networking. It appears that
advisers exist and operate in a ‘government’-like manner, thrashing out policy issues for
consideration by the executive. In the policy-making and public administration literature,
331 networks are seen as an important governance mechanism and as a means of integrating
differentiated actors (Rhodes 1997). Advisers can be seen as fulfilling this description: they are delegated an aspect of a policy issue and are required to resolve it. In some cases, this involves working with other advisers. A key and significant institutional feature of the adviser network that was identified in this study is that it is predominately located in the same physical space. This gives them a geography of power which enables them to move freely and easily in the same physical space almost without restriction.
Formalisation and institutionalisation
One of the aims of this study was to unearth some of the explanations for the introduction,
evolution and institutionalisation of advisers within the NSW political system. This, as noted in the literature review, was one area much of the research on advisers has tended to overlook and to which this study has sought to give attention. Comments offered by study participants provide further grounds for conceptualising this development as the institutionalisation of advisers. Some confirmed the capacity deficits of the political executive in coming to grips with the dominance of the public service and the demands of
the external environment. Others, especially ministers of the Greiner government, noted
that being in minority government created the need for a more conciliatory style of
governance and provided opportunities for advisers to take on roles associated with this
goal. Similarly, under Carr, news management and strategic communications became a
defining feature of his premiership and government, and correlated strongly with the views
of participants as a justification for advisers’ existence.
In exploring the reasons for the introduction and growing permanency of the ministerial
adviser system within the NSW parliamentary system, this study found that there were (and
still are) particular preconditions that have led to the introduction of advisers and their
ensuing institutionalisation. One such precondition was the increase in the scope of
governmental activity and the heavy workload imposed on ministers. It was argued that
governmental problems could be remedied by providing ministers with additional resources
to manage the governance, administration and communications that resulted from
332 increased government activity. These new resources, which came in the form of advisers,
would be used to handle liaison with media, other ministers, members of parliament and
the parties.
Factors were identified that contribute to the legitimacy, acceptance and institutionalisation of advisers in NSW political system. In a formal sense, changes to the NSW Public Sector
Employment and Management Act 2002 make provisions for ministers to employ advisers without restrictions on their numbers, skills or qualifications. In this legislation, advisers are employed as ‘special temporary employees’. There is little in the Act which describes what advisers are required to do, but their inclusion goes part of the way to clarifying the legal basis of their existence within the executive core.
The findings illuminate two additional points about the formalisation and institutionalisation
of the adviser system in NSW. Though very few ministers openly admitted to needing help,
their descriptions of the reasons they recruited advisers would suggest otherwise. Many
admitted they could not ‘live’ without them because the scale of their own work was “too
great for any one person to do” (Minister 4). Advisers, too, provided several honest
accounts of the relentless workload with which ministers must deal and for which they
require help. Interest groups acknowledged that advisers were necessary to help ministers
discharge their duties, including dealing with policy-makers operating outside the political
sphere.
In NSW, it is possible to see acceptance of the adviser system as evidence of the
adaptability of the public service. This, in part, could be explained in two ways: first, officials
showing a preparedness to work with advisers and appreciating the contribution they can
make particularly in handling politically sensitive matters; and second, the growing
partisanisation of the public service, which lends itself to favourable judgements about
advisers.
Allied to this, there has been a marked shift in attitude towards their place within the
governmental system; most participants were favourably disposed towards advisers,
although there were concerns about the scope and impact of their roles. Even the way 333 advisers are spoken about adds to their legitimacy. That is, this study, through an examination of why advisers have come to exist to the extent they have, has revealed that a discourse of legitimacy surrounds much of the debate about the presence of advisers.
For instance, ministers need advisers to help them cope with information overload.
Ministers also rely on advisers to absorb political activity which departments feel ill equipped to handle.
The adviser system has transcended and transformed its original purpose. The personalisation of the ministerial office has given ministers many more people who work only to give him or her information, policy advice and program ideas. The political executive now has a professional and dedicated body within which to concentrate political decision- making and innovation. The adviser system is also a formidable instrument for controlling the activities of departments.
An additional contributor to the institutionalisation of advisers has been the physical location in which they exist and work. As noted, the majority of ministers and advisers work
in one building in Sydney, the Governor Macquarie Tower. This gives them organisational
form and a geographical base from which to function as a collective unit.
Further evidence of the adviser system becoming institutionalised is the degree of
hierarchy that can be found in most ministerial offices. Many offices these days have a
position of deputy chiefs of staff to help ministers and chiefs of staff better manage the
internal operations of the ministerial office. Thus, the adviser system has many of the trademarks of an institutional entity: it has divisions of labour; it has developed in size and capability, giving it utility and indispensability; and it is formally linked by a common concern
– lending support to the minister.
Institutional theory would propose that the process of institutionalisation in relation to
advisers has occurred due to a variety of exogenous and endogenous influences, including
the accretion of governmental roles; the growing abdication of Cabinet function to the
ministerial office; the existence of problems that transcend responsibilities of any one
334 department; and ministers who need a resilient and agile support system to help them with their own functions.
Advisers bridging state and society?
A unique feature of this study was the inclusion of interest groups in the discussion of advisers’ work. As noted earlier, the literature on advisers is relatively silent on the interaction between advisers and interest groups. There is brief mention of advisers working with interest groups to share and receive information and to diffuse any conflict likely to come to pass as a result of changes to policy and programs. But, for the most part, previous studies have tended to under-emphasise the interactive and reciprocal nature of political interest group relationships. This study has sought to address this lack of emphasis
by focusing on the nature, type and extent of the relationship between advisers and interest
groups, and its importance to policy-making.
In considering why advisers are charged with the responsibility of managing relations with
organised interests, three main views can be gleaned from the interview data. First, some
advisers seek to manage interest groups because these groups are seen as being
influential in determining policy outcomes. Second, some advisers hold the genuine belief
that interacting with interest groups leads to creative problem-solving and the development
of more informed policy. Finally, and following from the second view, advisers work with
interest groups in the hope that this will build legitimacy for the process of policy change.
Thus, advisers are an important resource for ministers in determining the substantive focus
of the relationship with organised interests.
The adviser system appears to create more points of interaction between organised
interests and government than in the past. Accordingly, advisers are seen as an effective
means of managing these interactions. The adviser system has also become an important
arena for organised interests to have their concerns heard and in which to contribute to the
policy-making process; it is now the primary target of interest groups in raising issues.
335 Chapter 11 showed that some advisers, depending on their attitude to interest groups, took the relationship with these groups seriously, noting how advisers could elevate the concerns of interest groups into the domain of government. Advisers used interest groups to obtain an experiential ‘feel’ for an issue, as well as knowledge about how a policy would play out in the broader policy community. They served as a feedback loop on policy to the minister.
It is possible to mount a strong argument that advisers are in an ideal position to connect
organised interests to the political-policy making machine, and by extension address some
of the limitations of representative democracy. But the findings provided a mixed
assessment of how far advisers are able to democratise the policy process for organised
interests. The dynamic between advisers and interest groups did not appear to be as
strong as that detected among advisers, ministers and government officials. In a sense, this
was to be expected given the interposition of advisers within the political-administrative
divide and the need to serve in the minister’s interests. However, this should not detract
from the fact that advisers provide a means of empowering groups and connecting them
with the formal state policy-making apparatus, even if the overall sense derived from the
data was that interest groups “had to be managed” (Minister 2).
The adviser-bureaucrat relationship
This study has presented data on the relationship and pattern of interactions between advisers and government officials. The data suggests that the relationship between the two is vital to the success of government implementing its policy agenda. Importantly, it shows that there are several dimensions to the nature of the relationship and how this translates into the type of work each actor performs. Government officials interviewed saw value in having advisers who could provide a ministerial view on a policy proposal before it went to the minister for final consideration – it was a way they could ‘test the waters’, and advisers could take over activities so as to avoid compromising the neutrality of the department.
Characterisations of the relationship between advisers and government officials were legion. Some described the relationship as productive, harmonious and cordial. Some 336 adopted a tolerable line: “we get on okay” (Official 2). Others, however, felt the relationship was a problem that needed to be constantly managed, with some expressing dismay at, and frustration with, advisers meddling in the operations of the department. All government
officials highlighted instances of advisers contacting lower-ranked public servants for
information without first going through the department head. There was a sense that
officials were the ‘reluctant partner’ in the relationship, compelled to deal with a group of
individuals who were seen to be exceeding their station. Further, the analysis of
interactions between advisers and public servants shows that the relationship between
these two policy actors is becoming increasingly triangulated, both as a result of the
administrative reforms of the 1980s which dramatically changed the way ministers and
public servants relate to each other, and as a result of the introduction of advisers
themselves, who, through their roles, provide ministers with partisan assistance in
managing the external policy environment.
Ministers interviewed took the view that contestability, or “creative tension”, as one minister
put it, produced the most helpful advice. Advisers, on the other hand, saw the relationship
through the lens of complementarity and confirms Dunn’s assessment of the relationship
between the two actors. In many respects the relationship highlights what perhaps has
been a missing ingredient in the development of policy: that the public service is unable to
deal with the politics of policy in a way that satisfies the needs of the minister and the
executive.
Advisers noted that they were able to exercise considerable influence over bureaucrats by
virtue of their relationship with the minister. Such influence was expressed through the
control they exerted over information flows and access to the minister, and through their
working on policy independent of the department. The relationship was also defined by
significant role overlap, especially between advisers and public servants. While public
servants valued advisers taking on the political aspects of policy for reasons of preserving
public service neutrality, they did not appreciate advisers’ constant incursions into the lower
levels of the organisation.
337 All this suggests that a reconceptualisation of the model governing relations between politicians and officials is warranted, given the place of and roles performed by advisers within this relational space. It further suggests that the conventional Weberian/Wilsonian model of the separation of politics and administration is giving way to other conceptualisations of the relationship within the executive core. The data point to the emergence of a new equilibrium, one in which the relationship between ministers and senior public servants is being mediated by the presence of advisers, in a space where shared values and goals, functional integration and contestability underpin the new order.
Though the evidence pointed to a high degree of complementarity in the roles of advisers and officials, there were questions about how this came about or was constituted. To be sure, advisers bring to the task of policy-making the political interests of policy, while officials, in theory at least, bring the continued influence of Westminster. But the analysis raises questions about the extent to which complementarity provides an effective framework within which to understand the relationship between advisers and public servants, because, as the analysis shows, there was variance over how complementarity was understood by the participants. For advisers, it was a matter that complementarity encompassed closing gaps in the policy work of the department as well as taking on tasks that were considered inappropriate for the department to handle. For departments, complementarity was a condition that occurred when advisers and public servants worked separately, with the former dealing with matters political and the latter matters of policy.
Analysis of the interviews suggests that advisers provide an effective mechanism for strengthening the relationship between the political and administrative arms of government to the advantage of good governance, and play an important role in bridging the gap between the ministerial office and the external environment, including the department, the media and interest groups. Thus, advisers can be seen as an essential tool for the organisation of government work. Though no definitive model arose from the descriptions of the relationship between advisers and officials, the analysis of the interviews would suggest that there is a pattern of convergence emerging between the political and
338 administrative spheres of government that is similar to ‘the pure hybrid’ (or Image IV) model developed by Aberbach et al (1981), in which the roles of politicians and senior public servants overlap and become blurred. Arguably, advisers, through the roles they perform and their centrality in governmental activity, are key players in achieving this level and type of convergence.
Policy-making as political practice
This study has presented empirical evidence of advisers’ roles and place in the policy process. It has shown that, far from being peripheral to the policy process, they are very much in the thick of it. The essence of their policy work is politics: they function in the shadow of ministers who have a manifestly partisan-political role to play in policy-making.
This means they operate as a minister would, and in some cases as a minister might. The policy work advisers perform fundamentally reflects the modus operandi of the minister.
They apply a framework to the analysis of policy which echoes the disposition of the minister. They are positioned in the interstice between politics and policy, engaging in an enterprise which is largely concerned with, as one study participant put it, “the politics of policy” (Adviser 6).
The analysis has also shown that, far from working in a vacuum, advisers bestride a policy space that is highly fragmented and comprised of a diversity of interests. Principally, this space includes the minister, whose interests are largely concerned with implementing government policy; government agencies, whose policy activities routinely pass through the hands of advisers; interest groups, who interact with advisers to influence policy and gain access to the political process; and the media, which plays a powerful role in framing the policy agenda to which advisers are routinely required to respond.
At least four dominant themes emerged from the analysis of advisers’ roles in the policy- making process. The first is that context matters; it matters because the degree to which advisers engage in policy work and the types of roles they assume are intimately related to the environment in which they operate. This environment comprises the structures within government; past policy-making; political values; the influence of government officials, 339 media and interest groups; the character of the issue with which advisers are concerned and confronted; the stage of the government; the character and personal skills of the adviser themselves; and the degree to which policy-making is centralised within the ambit of the ministerial office.
The second theme is that the political and policy interests of the minister matter most; they prevail in the development of policy to the extent that advisers’ roles are inexorably linked to the translation of the minister’s policy preferences. Accordingly, this study advances the argument that advisers ministerialise the policy process by imbuing aspects of policy
development with the minister’s take on it. They channel the minister’s interests through his
or her authority to ensure policies harmonise with his or her point of view. In this regard,
therefore, the adviser system can be seen as a subjugating force, bringing stages or
elements of the policy process within closer reach of the political executive. As ministers’
emissaries, advisers accentuate the power of the minister by speaking in his or her name
when policies are being worked on or debated. Depending on why they were recruited in
the first place, some advisers bring expertise to the role and are used by ministers to
counter the dominance of the bureaucracy in the provision of policy advice (here, expertise
is used strategically to deliver political ends). Others, those categorised as generalists,
attempt to bring a political fix to the policy work of the department and the work of other
policy actors in the broader policy community.
The high degree of autonomy that advisers have to work on policy independently of the bureaucracy is the third theme. This autonomy occurs within a context of advisers having ministerial approval, both tacit and explicit, and seizing on policy opportunities as these arise. Advisers intervene in the development of policy in at least four ways, each reflecting the extent to which it harmonises with the direction of the minister. These are: initiating, in which proposals for new policies, or changes to existing policies, are instigated by ministerial advisers; directing, in which policy is highly centralised and under the control of ministerial advisers; facilitating, when ministerial advisers work in tandem with departments and interest groups, coordinating activities of these actors and taking an active part in
340 policy deliberation; and monitoring, which involves advisers actively overseeing policy- making that has been assigned to the bureaucracy.
The final theme that weaves through advisers’ roles in the policy process relates to their own account of these roles. As noted, advisers interviewed had a prosaic view of what policy is and how it is made within government. Some saw it as an idea that would be worked on by advisers either on their own or in concert with government officials. Others had a decisionist (or authorised) view of it: “it’s doing whatever the minister decides”
(Adviser 4). But, as revealed, advisers’ role and place within the policy-making process is far more elaborate than these accounts suggest. Few, if any, saw their place or policy roles
relative to a particular model or framework. There was little evidence of advisers having
knowledge of the policy cycle (authoritative choice), or viewing policy as an outcome of
political states of play (structured interaction), or mobilising language to construct a
particular view of policy (social construction). As shown, the majority of advisers come to
the role with little or no knowledge of policy development or background to the portfolio in
which they work, yet they have a significant role to play in determining what goes on in the
minister’s policy space. It seems, therefore, there are strong grounds for expanding the
knowledge base of advisers, not just in how policy is made within the machinery of
government or around them but also in the political values that guide what they do.
Taken together, these themes provide a useful basis for evaluating advisers’ policy work in
the context of the various conceptual frameworks of the policy-making process. More
importantly, they provide a basis for expanding the conceptual maps that orient
understandings of the policy process. As will be made clear, a multidimensional
understanding of the policy process is essential to understanding advisers’ roles and their
place in it.
Paradigms for understanding policy-making in Australia
While current Australian policy textbooks mention the growing importance of advisers in policy-making, few, it seems, attempt to draw on theory to account for their roles and place in the process (Anderson 2004). One current and prominent text devotes three paragraphs 341 of a chapter entitled ‘Public Policy Institutions’ to advisers, describing them as a “third significant group” in policy-making (Althaus et al 2007:16). This text, now in its fourth edition, still sees advisers operating in the political sphere of policy-making, something which Maley found to be no longer the case. Another, Beyond the Policy Cycle (Colebatch
2004), contains one chapter by Geoff Anderson on advisers’ media management roles relative to the policy cycle, but it is unclear whether advisers’ roles substrate or give rise to new understandings of this model’s interpretation and application.
Even so, these texts provide a ‘thick description’ of the activities that occur within certain policy contexts and institutions. In Althaus et al’s book (2007), such descriptions are captured in what continues to be the prevailing view of the policy-making process: the policy cycle which portrays policy-making as an orderly process with a series of interlocking steps, each building towards a policy outcome. Policy is seen as a cycle because it typically moves through a series of stages, beginning with issue identification then proceeding through issue analysis, policy instrument identification, consultation, coordination, decision, implementation and evaluation (Bridgeman & Davis 2000). This orderly view of policy- making is challenged.
In Colebatch’s Beyond the Policy Cycle, policy is set within a wider context. It is recognised that participants in the process are drawn from both government and diverse areas outside government, and looks not at a ‘model’ process but rather at how the game is played – how issues rise to prominence, who is actually doing the work, and exactly what they are doing.
The typology of policy perspectives presented in this text is used by the contributors to criticise the policy cycle paradigm. The suggestion is that the policy cycle advantages the authorised choice model and neglects the interactions between players and the socially constructed nature of policy. According to the contributors, the reality is more complex and challenging. Many hands are involved in policy-making, not all of them official; and they are not all addressing the same problem – they have different ideas about what would be a good answer, and the process is rarely brought to a neat close by a clear decision.
342 These differences aside, both texts organise observations about how policy is made in
Australia with a particular focus on the dynamism of contemporary policy processes.
Relevantly, both texts start from the same position with a brief overview of the dominant
paradigm, policy as authoritative choice.
From the authoritative choice perspective, public policy is seen as a product of government decisions and is rationally based. Policies are seen as authoritative because they are made by government actors with legitimate power to bind government structures to act on these policies (e.g. preparing legislation). In this perspective, there is a sense of command about the way policy is made and control about how it is carried out: ministers are presented with a problem, then enjoy a choice of action and inaction as they make political decisions that can be evaluated in order to assess whether the chosen policy achieved its aim and solved the given problem (Colebatch 1998). Advisers’ policy work has some fit with this take on policy-making in that it explains the support with which they provide ministers, making decisions through their informational roles and by scrutinising the work of the department.
This conceptualisation of the policy process has strong links with the traditional-rationalist view of policy-making (Kay 2006), the executive model of decision-making (Yeatman 1998) and the policy development framework (Edwards 2001).
In some respects, though, advisers pose a challenge to this conceptualisation of the policy- making process because, as presented in this study, they make decisions, both as ministers’ representatives and as independent policy actors whose authority and legitimacy, though constituted through the authority of the minister, remains questionable. In other words, this perspective carries the inherent problem of how to account for a group of policy actors who fall between those authorised to make decisions (ministers) and those delegated to work on them (government officials). Though not directly linked to advisers, another inherent weakness of this policy understanding is that it tends to ignore the power of non-decisions. As shown, advisers are influential in determining what gets considered and then decided, and what does not.
343 Another conceptual field, which anchors a different understanding of the way policy is made, is known as structured interaction. Here policy is seen as the outcome of interactions between different players operating in particular institutional and organisational contexts. According to Colebatch, this perspective:
… does not assume a single decision-maker, addressing a clear policy problem: it
focuses on the range of participants in the game, the diversity of their understandings of
the situation and the problem, the ways in which they interact with one another, and the
outcomes of this interaction. It does not assume that this pattern of activity is a collective
effort to achieve known and shared goals. (1998:102)
The government’s role in this perspective of the policy process is markedly different to that of authoritative choice. Rather than government being seen as unified and decisive in its pursuit of a policy agenda, it is seen as a space in which policy players, as legitimate
stakeholders, interact to produce policy. Government responds to policy actions rather than
directs it (Colebatch 2006).
The applicability of this schema to the work of advisers is relatively straightforward:
advisers, in developing contacts with interest groups, broaden the minister’s reach; they
work and negotiate with policy-makers to craft policy options; and they provide an arena or
site for a wide range of views to be incorporated into policy advice as a “committed
structure” (Colebatch 2006:12).
However, as shown, there are doubts as to how robust these interactions are, given some
advisers seem highly selective in their choice of groups with which to deal. But more than
this, and as the data suggests, interactions involving advisers and other policy actors have
a distinctly political feel. This is because advisers engage within a policy frame that is
essentially about the resolution of conflicts over goals and values, and in most cases these
tend to belie rational approaches (Lindblom 1980). Seen in these terms, policy-making is a
form of political practice characterised by conflict and cooperation, and by struggles for
power, influence and authority; furthermore, it includes groups and individuals both inside
and outside government.
344 The final perspective on the policy process sees policy as a social construction. Here, the formation of policy is influenced by the meanings different actors attribute to policy goals
(Fischer 2003). Policy is ‘socially constructed’ within a specific set of discourses and discursive practices. As far as relating this perspective to the work of advisers, this study has brought to light how advisers help ministers develop policy narratives that frame policy problems and solutions, and how ministers depend on advisers to provide a sounding on the political acceptance of the content of a policy proposal emanating from the department or the broader policy community. Advisers’ media work is a good example of how narratives about issues are constructed to suit a particular audience. Advisers also influence how certain policy issues are to be understood, who gets assigned to deal with them, and processes through which responses to problems are carried out.
In some small way, this chapter has contributed to the ‘conceptual maps’ of the policy process by advancing the argument that advisers bring a politically concentrated form of activity to the policy process, one framed around incorporating the minister’s viewpoint. If anything, and as alluded to in parts of this thesis, the evidence presented on advisers’ policy work shows that no single conceptual field of the policy process can realistically account for everything that they do; in fact no theory or model of the policy process can realistically lay claim to being able to do this. At best, theories or models can explain why advisers do what they do in the light of the evidence presented in this study. In many respects, advisers’ roles traverse all three concepts of the policy process as presented by both Althaus et al and Colebatch. To reiterate, in the authoritative choice mode, advisers transmit the preferences of ministers (Colebatch 2006) to the appropriate agency for implementation. When the field shifts to one of structured interaction, a new perspective on advisers’ policy roles emerges: as emissaries, advisers interact with bureaucrats, interest groups and the media, and, significantly, among themselves, as a “government of advisers”
(Minister 1) to produce a negotiated form of policy. Lastly, in the social construction perspective, policies are shaped by the discourses that are available to advisers – they read, interpret, produce, and shape policy in the context of the policy setting in which they work. 345 Another area in which I believe the analysis of the data contributes to conceptions of policy and the policy process is the shaping role that political behaviour has on aspects of policy development. This seems to be an area that Althaus et al and Colebatch are silent on. In
Chapter 1, I recounted a story of an adviser who assumed the authority of the minister by acting as he or she would if confronted with the same policy choices. When an adviser says they are ‘wearing the minister’s hat’, they lay claim to a type of authority that is not legitimately constituted but has the same effect or consequences as that which is. In a sense this study has shown the significance of how certain determinants of behaviour – such as culture, the allure of power, expediency, and realpolitik (in other words, the context) – shape policy processes. This study has also provided numerous examples of the extent to which policies are inextricably linked to behaviour; it can be found in what advisers do or in what they say, such as the ‘wearing the hat’ metaphor. Thus, for advisers, there is a type of praxis in which policy and politics are one and the same thing.
Theorising advisers’ roles
The findings and analysis so far suggest a model that explains advisers’ roles and accounts
for their place in the policy-making process and the broader political environment. However,
it must be reiterated that no single theory exists to explain adequately the observations that
have been accumulated about the roles advisers perform and the impact they have on the
development of policy. The inherent difficulty lies in the fact that the analysis presented on
ministerial advisers traverses several theoretical arenas and perspectives. For instance,
advisers’ roles encompass a set of concepts and interrelated theories that underpin social,
political and behavioural sciences. Furthermore, because advisers’ policy work is overtly
partisan and political in nature, and their level of influence is inextricably linked to authority
of the minister, there is overlap with theories of power and the state.
As this implies, a multitheoretical approach is both warranted and needed in order to
augment an understanding of advisers’ roles and their place within the modern system of
government. This is consistent with the inductive nature of this research, which has been
adopted to generate new theory about the complex social and political processes informing
346 advisers’ roles. It is also consistent with the inductive nature of some institutionalist approaches, such as historical institutionalism, which this study is using heuristically to add texture to descriptions about advisers. New institutionalism has a high degree of applicability to advisers because it contains the concept of organisational field, which for the purposes of this study includes the adviser system itself (e.g. their networks), the minister, and the relationships advisers form with other key policy actors (e.g. government officials, interest groups). It also provides a useful frame for studying change and thinking about how policy is made and practised in an emerging institutional setting in which the ministerial adviser system and the ministerial office are axiomatically linked.
This study conceptualises advisers’ roles and place within the governmental system as an institutional entity that is surrounded by a shifting and uncertain environment and that adapts as political conditions and policy priorities dictate. The model I propose asserts that ministers are busy, have little time and, at times, little inclination to address the full array of policy issues with which they are confronted. To come to terms with this situation, they delegate aspects of policy-making to ministerial advisers, whose involvement is constant but varies according to the context: the saliency of an issue, the priority given to it by the minister, and the political dividend likely to accrue from its pursuit. This feeds into the view that advisers form a new governmental institution: they perform functions that ministers once used to but now do not, because the scope of ministers’ roles has evolved extensively into new areas of governing (e.g. media work, negotiating with interest groups). This is an important finding because it provides a good measure of the degree to which functions have devolved to advisers.
347 Model of advisers’ place in the NSW political system
This graph attempts to show the place of advisers in the NSW governmental system. Advisers here provide a ‘touchpoint’ for external stakeholders to gain access to the minister.
Other Ministerial Offices
Organised Interests Media
The Minister
Bureaucracy Parliament
Institutions advisers interact with
NSW governmental system
Ministerial advisers
What makes this finding even more revealing is the fact that many members of parliament
today are former advisers. The adviser system, which has grown to number 240 in NSW 348 alone, has become a completely new career field for political aspirants and has added an extra stratum to the political elite. It has fast grown into a training ground where advisers practice the art of policy development, hone their communication skills, and make themselves known to members of the political class. It has also become a vehicle for career development to more exalted roles within the public service, especially senior executive positions.
Earlier writers, including Maley, saw the introduction of advisers as a response to bureaucratic obduracy, to give the political executive ascendancy over the policy-making process. While the adviser system in NSW followed a similar trajectory to that in the federal sphere, the reasons for their introduction seem to be far more elaborate than the political control thesis. The interviews in this study reveal that ministers need help to cope with their workloads and negotiate policy and legislative changes. In many respects this confirms
Maley’s conceptualisation of political control which goes beyond advisers assisting the political executive to extract greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy to one which includes advisers helping the executive steer policy through the bureaucracy and supporting governmental processes such as the cabinet.
In many respects this study has shown that political control of the bureaucracy has been further advanced in NSW through the appointment of former advisers to senior public service positions. As highlighted, three of the four government officials interviewed for this study were former ministerial advisers, and many more now occupy head of department and senior executive positions in various government departments and trading enterprises.
These appointments not only provide reward for advisers’ loyalty and talents, they provide
ministers with a high degree of continuity in the implementation of their policy and political
agendas. As a result, the placement of former advisers in senior public service positions is
another strategy of government to achieve greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy.
This has led me to conclude that the adviser system has resulted in a recalibration of the
public service, one which has become more aligned to and attuned with the wishes of
349 ministers and one that is increasingly being shaped in the interests of the political executive.
Advisers are influential ...
The chapters on advisers’ roles (Chapters 6 to 8) provided a comprehensive account of how influential advisers can be through the roles they perform. The findings showed that advisers’ influence pervades the policy process from beginning to end. It was noted that a great deal of policy development gets its start within the ministerial office and that advisers are important initiators of that process. It was also noted that advisers are heavily involved in providing policy advice based on the ideas they generate and on the expertise they bring to the role. Some of this advice is of a technical nature but for the most part it is politically
laden and is likely to involve assessments of organised interests relevant to the minister’s
portfolio.
Apart from responding to policy assignments given to them by ministers, advisers are
highly proactive in policy development. For instance, they work up and bring forward policy
proposals that advance the minister’s agenda and take advantage of policy vacuums to
formulate policy on their own. In handling information they exercise judgement and
discretion to organise and filter what gets through to the minister: they are highly attentive
to the policy and political sensitivities of the government and minister. And, depending on
the minister’s policy priorities and leadership style, advisers can become deeply involved in
facilitating, directing or monitoring policy, or a combination of these, at various stages.
It can be argued that many of the roles advisers perform confer power. Coordination, for
instance, can be seen as a form of power because it can involve coercion (see Peres
1974). The networks that advisers form and rely on to access information and weld
together disparate policy-makers into a cohesive whole provide them with a power base for
influencing policy processes and, by extension, optimising the minister’s interests. In this
sense, therefore, their influence is structured through connections.
350 It also appears that advisers’ influence is far more pronounced than identified in other studies on advisers and their roles. For instance, Ryan (1995) found that advisers were not influential in decision-making but had a prominent role in helping the minister to make decisions. While his study tried to quantify the number of decisions advisers had made vis- a-vis those made by ministers and public servants, it ignored the fact that quantity alone is not a good indicator of advisers’ influence because one major decision can have just as
powerful an effect as many small ones combined.
As shown, advisers can be influential by virtue of who they are and the value they bring to
the role. For instance, the chapter on influence revealed that some advisers are able to
achieve a high degree of predominance that enables them to take matters directly to the
executive. As noted, this predominance derives from the minister’s authority.
The general impression of advisers’ influence is that it can take various shapes and forms
depending on who advisers are and what they do, and the personality of the minister.
These are described in the section exploring the variability of advisers’ influence. This
aside, it appears that advisers’ influence has evolved to a different level to that detected
when their numbers were modest. In the present period, where (on average) advisers
outnumber ministers 10 to one, their influence has been cast far and wide because there
are more of them and they have an institutional base. On this basis, therefore, ministerial
staffing, as an organisation, holds power; and this power is not only derived from and
distributed through the authority of the minister, it exists by virtue of the fact that they have
reached a critical mass as a political force in their own right. As argued earlier, increased
numbers of advisers is a sign of the dispersion of power in the NSW polity, away from the
party machine and Cabinet to the individual minister.
So, influence is a multidimensional concept that is difficult to measure precisely. Its
multidimensionality stems from the fact that there is variability in the degree to which
advisers exert their influence: it variously expands and erodes over time; it depends on the
saliency of and the circumstances in which a policy issues comes to the fore (agenda-
setting, implementation, etc); and it varies according to the minister’s authority, leadership
351 style and patronage. Advisers’ influence can be over content, and it can be conceived of as changing someone’s mind or directing a person to do something they would not ordinarily do. It can be direct or indirect, overt or covert, and may be discharged on the basis of political expediency related to personal and political power. Advisers’ influence also arises from what Lukes (1974) calls the suppression of ideas or ‘non-decision making’. For example, advisers’ control of the policy agenda provides them with opportunities to either elevate or understate policy issues and alternatives. Influence also arises from inaction: doing nothing can be an effective mechanism for stopping a proposal from succeeding.
Finally, there was evidence to suggest that there are degrees to advisers’ influence and that it can be concentrated in the hands of a few.
Although seemingly straightforward, advisers’ influence is also extremely difficult to characterise and measure, mainly because it manifests itself in so many different ways. For
instance, establishing how it comes to pass in a policy episode is difficult to pinpoint. This is
partly because numerous forces converge to influence policy-making, and in the
examination of what advisers do there are likely to be many other actors seeking to have
input into a policy issue. Thus, isolating advisers’ influence is both empirically and
methodologically challenging and in fact probably unhelpful because their influence is
always in relation to someone and something else. The sum is greater than its constituent
parts. Though influence is difficult to measure, and can only be ascertained as far as the
methodology used in this study allows, it should not detract from the importance of trying to
understand how advisers’ influence is contextualised through what they do and through the
four spheres identified by study participants: agenda-setting, gatekeeping, discretion, and
invoking the minister’s authority. These four spheres have the effect of maintaining control
over the policy activities of the department, suppressing or supporting major initiatives, and
using the minister’s authority to push an agenda.
But there are growing concerns about their accountability
The findings reported in the chapter dealing with advisers’ accountability revealed that the arrangements governing their conduct and activities suffer from an accountability deficit.
352 This deficit appears to be a function of a ministerial staffing system that has grown
significantly in size, is subject to little statutory controls, and is heavily shaped by a political imperative. The findings also point to a number of concerns about the appropriate use of advisers, their independence relative to public servants, and the broader institutional impact they, as an increasingly sizeable group, have had on the role of the public service.
These concerns stem from a number of interrelated factors: first, and from a theoretical standpoint, there are concerns that because advisers carry no constitutional accountability they operate with little or no reference to laws or conventions to guide what they do and
how they do it. Unlike the roles of public servants, which are codified in legislation and
formalised in position descriptions, those of advisers are not. As noted, advisers’ roles are
self-defined and indeterminate; they can be constructed out of the type of relationship they
form with their minister and out of the way they interpret his or her wishes.
Second, concerns emerged regarding advisers having considerable delegated autonomy
and opportunity to influence policy development. This raises the question of what advisers
are accountable for? As mentioned, ministers delegate substantial autonomy to advisers
because ministers lack the time or inclination to manage the scale and scope of their
portfolio responsibilities. Advisers therefore perform a sub-set of ministerial functions solely
on the basis of the authority delegated to them by the minister. This gives them permission
to act on the minister’s behalf as his or her proxy, to operate independently of the formal
administrative and legislative structures, and to cross boundaries between them. This
delegation is mostly informal and uncodified, providing flexibility to move in, around and
across established institutional structures. Hence, the irregularities and anomalies: what
powers do they possess and to whom are they accountable?
Third, the interposition of advisers at the ministerial level raises concerns as to whether
there are adequate safeguards to prevent advisers from encroaching on the roles of public
servants. Public servants are troubled by the degree of influence that advisers exert on
middle-ranking public servants and on the work of the department in general. Advisers
issue instructions and it remains questionable as to whether they are empowered to do so.
353 Officials are equally troubled by how such influence permeates the bureaucracy and impacts on the work of the department. Thus, there remains uncertainty as to what constitutes appropriate interactions between advisers and bureaucrats. Contributing to this problem is the fact that the activities in which advisers engage overlap significantly with those of public servants leading to confusion over who is responsible for what and a breakdown in governing processes.
Finally, concerns surround the effectiveness of the minister-adviser relationship in functioning as a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of advisers’ role and conduct, particularly as these are largely defined by a range of legal, administrative and conventional processes. The doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which holds a minister responsible for the outcomes of their policies, appears to be ineffective in its application to the modern ministerial staffing system. The evidence presented in Chapter 16 suggests that the doctrine, as an organising principle, has been diluted by the delegation of ministers’ authority to ministerial advisers.
A new form of politicisation?
In the sections examining advisers’ influence, their policy roles, interactions with public servants, and accountability, some candid observations emerged, especially from officials and interest group representatives, who expressed the view that a dramatic politicisation of the public service has occurred as a result of advisers’ activities. Examples were given highlighting concerns about advisers usurping the authority of ministers, providing advice which had little or no involvement of the department, altering the content of policy documents, giving directions to public servants and, lastly, interfacing with lower-ranked public servants to obtain information, clarification, and “status reports” (Adviser 5).
Events such as the ‘children overboard’ and Cecil Hills High School controversies highlighted the extent of advisers’ and public servants’ involvement as “partisan defenders” of the respective governments’ action in these particular cases (Mulgan 2007:570). Both incidents revealed instances of political pressure on departments to provide politically
354 correct advice and showed the extent to which the adviser system has provided increased opportunities for ministerial intervention, or politicisation.
On their own, or taken together, these accounts bear some resemblance to the type of
politicisation Eichbaum and Shaw (2008) report on in their analysis of advisers operating in
New Zealand. These researchers argue that to existing conceptions of politicisation, which
according to Mulgan (1998) can include the appointment of public servants with party
affiliation, the subordination of neutral public servants to partisan policies, or newly elected
governments replacing incumbent heads of departments with their own appointees, a new
one can be added, namely “administrative” politicisation (2008:337). This type of
politicisation is grounded in the views largely expressed by officials, who reported instances
of advisers enticing and forcing public servants to act in the political interest. Such reports
included accounts of advisers tampering with or demanding changes to departmental
advice; advisers entering the workplace of public servants requesting files and other
documents; advisers preparing their own advice and then passing this to the minister for
approval with no prior involvement of the department; and public officials having to go
through advisers to pass advice on. Such practices as these can be seen as posing a
threat to public service neutrality and raise questions of propriety.
The current NSW Opposition’s intention to co-locate ministers’ offices with departments as
part of its cost savings plan34 may, if implemented, put this form of politicisation in a new
light. One can see the inherent danger of advisers having relatively free and informal
access to public servants (and vice versa), and the real possibility of not just further
politicisation of the public service but more opportunity for manipulation and politicisation (in its broadest sense) than currently exists. More significant perhaps is the likelihood that politics may become bureaucratised.
One of the key findings in Maley’s study was that the role of advisers was confirmed as partisan. Findings in this study take this one step further and confirm that the role of advisers is political, overtly so. This is grounded in evidence which shows that advisers do
34 Daily Telegraph, 12 March 2009, ‘$55,000 a day for premier views’. 355 more than bring a party view to policy; they bring a ministerial one and, ipso facto, a political one.
Retreat from Westminster?
The evolution of the ministerial office into a political organisation is suggestive of a retreat from Westminster principles in NSW and other Australian jurisdictions (see Tiernan 2004).
As mentioned, the key tenets of Westminster are parliamentary sovereignty, ministerial
responsibility, and a constitutional bureaucracy with a non-partisan and expert public
service. This thesis has argued that the insertion of ministerial advisers into the bilateral relations between ministers and officials has created tension in the relationship between the two. Though a consequence of advisers’ roles is the absorption of political activity from
the public service, their constant interaction with and incursion in the lower levels of the
department poses a significant risk to the principle of a neutral public service. Indeed, the
research undertaken in this study suggests that politicisation is occurring on several fronts:
the placement of former advisers to senior posts in the public service, advisers altering
(even supplanting) departmental advice, and public servants being shut out from the policy
work of advisers.
An implicit concern contained in the debate on the relations between advisers and public
servants is that advisers ‘have too much power’. Some participants felt that advisers are
virtually synonymous with political power. Due to their constantly expanding ambit, their
considerable number and their central positions close to ministers, advisers have revealed
themselves as centres of power that have eroded the significance of other political
institutions and constitutional conventions.
Implications for policy-makers and public policy-making
Researchers and policy practitioners need to pay attention to the work of advisers, given the system in which they operate has become a serious option for organising public policy.
For that reason, public service and non-government policy-makers need to develop an
awareness of the adviser system and its functions, norms, ways of working, complications
356 and ambiguities. Policy practitioners also need to be aware that public policy decisions are likely to pass through the hands of advisers at various points of the policy cycle and in various policy-making contexts. For policy practitioners operating outside the political, the hope no doubt is that advisers’ roles in the policy process will be more thoughtful and effective as a result of their involvement.
Conclusion
This study has contributed to the extant body of knowledge about an important group that is argued here to have evolved into a political institution, ministerial advisers. It has yielded knowledge about what advisers do, what they are meant to do, what is meant to happen when things go wrong, and whether it is appropriate for advisers to intervene in the way and to the extent they do. This knowledge says a great deal about the policy space in which advisers work, one that has opened up for them to have a legitimate place, and one that is constantly changing.
A serious gap in knowledge has been filled in the way advisers interact with interest groups, the media, and importantly, with each other. The position of adviser is now crucial and indispensable in the modern governmental system, yet it has been a relatively understudied area of political science to this point.
Ministers need help. They cannot depend on the bureaucracy to help them manage the way policy folds and unfolds. The types of activities in which advisers engage say a great deal about the challenges and problems that beset governments and about the nature of politics in the development of policy; how, for instance, problems of politics and policy become problems of communication. There is also more to consider than ensuring neutral or responsive competence. For instance, how in a liberal-democratic society are the voices of organised interests heard and taken seriously?
This study has provided data for integrating the distinctive roles and influences of advisers into existing paradigms of the policy-making process. There is valuable information for understanding the way advisers engage in policy practice. There is a sense that a new type
357 of policy practice is emerging in which decisions and their outcomes are being imbued with political content through a process of ministerialisation which advisers help achieve. The policy work of advisers presents a challenge to the conventional view of policy ideas emanating from the bureaucracy and then making their way to the minister and Cabinet for endorsement. This thesis posits that the trajectory of policy in this model is likely to be
punctuated by the policy work of ministerial advisers. Their purchase on the process is one
of ensuring the minister’s view on a policy issue is embedded.
There is a phenomenological point to be made about the capacity and capabilities of the adviser system, which is able to shift according to how far ministers want to contain the development of policy within their own setting or in that of the department.
This study has also examined new areas. Namely, it has explored the adviser system across a broader range of conceptual fields, including advisers’ roles, the reasons for their introduction and functional growth, their influence, and their accountability. The end result is a more integrated view of what these political operatives do.
As noted by Tiernan (2004) advisers do not have an easy fit within the institutional and constitutional frameworks governing the executive core. They go places where they are not intended to and do things which have long-term implications. They have been accommodated just as they have been tolerated. Advisers are part of a system that will continue to evolve, and, as it does, questions such as those addressed in this study are likely to be asked again.
The study has brought to light a number of problems that beset the adviser system and the roles advisers perform. It was argued in parts of this study that advisers take on politically laden activities from departments to ensure their impartiality is preserved. This was a significant reason for the introduction of advisers. Paradoxically, however, there was compelling evidence that advisers politicise and therefore compromise the neutrality of departments. Thus advisers, it seems, depoliticise as well as politicise. Thus the adviser system appears to operate in a permanent paradoxical state, being between a political rock and philosophical hard place. 358 This is the first study in Australia that has gathered and analysed qualitative data on advisers operating in a state political system. Most studies to date have been about advisers operating in the federal jurisdiction. This thesis builds knowledge about the
institutional characteristics of an advisory structure that mirrors the collective personality of
the political executive of which ministers, and increasingly advisers, are a constitutive part.
It has highlighted the role of advisers within the institutional context and provides support
for the view that advisers are as much an institution as they are an actor.
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374 APPENDIX
Consent Form THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW SOUTH WALES No:
SUBJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM A Government of Advisers: The Role, Influence and Accountability of Ministerial Advisers in the New South Wales Political System Chief Investigator: Eileen Baldry I am writing to invite you to participate in a research project looking at the roles of ministerial advisers within the NSW Parliamentary system, and the level and type of influence they have in the policy-making process. The aim of the research is to gain a better understanding of the distinct policy roles played out by ministerial advisers and their significance in the development and making of policy. I am a PhD candidate from the University of New South Wales. By participating in this study, you will assist in developing a greater understanding of the evolving role of ministerial advisers within the context of the NSW Parliamentary system and in current policy-making. The study will provide information about how ministerial advisers fulfil their distinctive policy roles, their function within the minister-department relationship, and their significance for democratic governance. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to answer questions about your own personal experience as a
375 Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or except as required by law. If you give me your permission by signing this document, the results will b discussed with my supervisor Dr Eileen Baldry for the purposes of preparing my research thesis. In any publication, information will be provided in such a way that you cannot be identified. You may contact my supervisor (Dr Eileen Baldry) on 9385 1878 or me on 95162247 if you have any questions about this research. You may also contact the University of New South Wales Human Research Ethics Committee Executive Officer on 9385 4234 if you have any problems with the way this research is being carried out. You may ask the researcher any questions regarding the research during the introductory session or at any time during the interviews. If you are willing to participate in this research, would you please read and sign the agreement attached. Complaints may be directed to the Ethics Secretariat, University of New South Wales, SYDNEY 2052 AUSTRALIA (phone 9385 4234, fax 9385 6648, email [email protected]). Your decision whether or not to participate will not prejudice your future relations with the University of New South Wales or your employer. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time without prejudice. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask us. If you have any additional questions later, Dr Eileen Baldry. will be happy to answer them. You will be given a copy of this form to keep.
376 THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES SUBJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM A Government of Advisers: The Role, Influence and Accountability of Ministerial Advisers in the New South Wales Political System You are making a decision whether or not to participate. Your signature indicates that, having read the information provided above, you have decided to participate. I, ………………………………………………………., understand the purpose of the study titled, The policy activism of ministerial advisers in the NSW Parliamentary system: implications for representative government as explained above. I consent to participate in the study. My consent is voluntary and I understand that all information will be handled in the strictest confidence and that my participation will not be individually identifiable in any reports.
Signature of subject Signature
______
Please print name Name of witness
______
Date Date
______
Signature(s) of investigator(s)
______
Please print name
______
377 Revocation of Consent Regarding participation in the project titled: A Government of Advisers: The Role, Influence and Accountability of Ministerial Advisers in the New South Wales Political System I do not wish to continue participation in the above named project and withdraw my consent to do so. I understand that all information I may have given you will be destroyed and not used in any research. Signature of participant Date …………………………………… ………………………………………. Name of participant (print) …………………………………… The section for revocation of consent should be forwarded to:
Dr Eileen Baldry School of Social Work UNSW NSW 2052
378 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND PROMPTS – MINISTERIAL ADVISERS Recruitment 1. How were you recruited to the Minister’s Office? Prompts Were you known to and/or involved in the X Party before being recruited? How long did you / have you worked as a ministerial adviser? Why were you appointed to the position? (Prompt: because of your expertise in
379 Interaction with Bureaucracy 4. To what extent do/did you interact with the Director-General(s) of the portfolio Department?
Can you describe this interaction in terms of its significance in policy development? How is this interaction constituted? For example, committees, working parties etc. To what extent does the Ministry rely on the Department for its policy advice? Do/did you attend departmental-ministerial meetings on your own, and/or with the Minister, and/or with other ministerial advisers? Would you say your role as a ministerial adviser is/was generally accepted by the Director-General(s) of the Department?
Can you describe this interaction in terms of its significance in policy development? To what extent do/did you rely on interest groups for policy advice? What sort of issues are/were you involved in? Do/did you interact with interest groups in established forums? For example, committees, working parties etc. Do/did you attend these meetings on your own, and/or with the Minister, and/or with other ministerial advisers?
Case study
There is a particular policy matter relevant to your portfolio that I’d like to talk to you about. It involves
1. Can you describe this policy development and your level of involvement in this matter? Prompts
From where did this issue emerge?
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND PROMPTS FOR MINISTERS, DIRECTOR-GENERAL(S), AND INTEREST GROUP REPRESENATIVES 1. Can you describe your level of interaction and/or involvement with and your views on ministerial advisers? Prompts: What are your views about their level of influence in setting the policy agenda? What are your views about their level of influence in determining policy outcomes? 380 Do you think ministerial advisers play/ed an important role in the day-to-day functions of the Ministry? What are your views about why ministerial advisers have become entrenched within our system of government? Do you think there are appropriate mechanisms in place to ensure ministerial advisers are accountable for what they do? What type of contribution do you think ministerial advisers make to our system of government? For Director-Generals only 1. Were/are ministerial advisers involved in any areas of your Department’s administration? Can you elaborate on the area(s) in which they are involved, how they are involved and what you think of their involvement? Prompts Would you say this was appropriate? Why? What level of influence do you think ministerial advisers have in: o Policy development o Policy decisions o Reorganisation of your Department o Negotiating policy decisions/deals with stakeholders o Development of legislation o Setting policy agenda What degree of authority do you think ministerial advisers have in: o Policy development o Policy decisions o Reorganisation of your Department o Negotiating policy decisions/deals with stakeholders o Development of legislation o Setting policy agenda For Ministers only 1. What management and advice roles did/do ministerial advisers perform on your behalf?
Prompts:
What sort of advice did/do ministerial advisers provide you with?
381 Demographics
Gender Age group 20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60+
Length of time in job
Job before becoming an adviser
Annual income
<25K 26-35K 36-45K 46-65K 66-75K 76-85K 86-100 >100k
382