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Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg Controversies regarding the role of the Office of Strategic Services Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg provides a balanced but critical discussion of the contribution of American intelligence officials to the Nuremberg war crimes trials process. It discusses the role of such officials in mobilising the unique resources of a modern intelligence agency in order to provide a range of important trial evidence and undertake controversial plea-bargaining negotiations. The book also reviews recently declassified US intelligence documents to provide new details of how senior Nazi war criminals, such as SS-General Karl Wolff, were provided with effective immunity deals, partly as a reward for their wartime cooperation with US intelligence officials, including Allen Dulles, former CIA Director. This historical case study suggests that both war crimes prosecutors and intelligence officials can engage in mutually beneficial collaborations. The proviso, Michael Salter argues, is that both sides need to recognise and appreciate the problems that may arise from the fact that these institutitions are required to operate according to different, and in some cases contradictory, agendas. Michael Salter is Professor of Law at Lancashire Law School, UK. Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg Controversies regarding the role of the Office of Strategic Services Michael Salter First published 2007 by Routledge-Cavendish 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN, UK Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge-Cavendish 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 A GlassHouse book Routledge-Cavendish is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Michael Salter This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Salter, Michael, 1957– Nazi war crimes, US intelligence and selective prosecution at Nuremburg : controversies regarding the role of the Office of Strategic Services / Michael Salter. p. cm. ISBN–13: 978–1–904385–81–3 (hardback) ISBN–10: 1–904385–81–8 (hardback) ISBN–13: 978–1–904385–80–6 (pbk.) ISBN–10: 1–904385–80–X (pbk.) 1. Nuremberg Trial of Major German War Criminals, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946. 2. Nuremberg War Crime Trials, Nuremberg, Germany, 1946–1949. 3. United States. Office of Strategic Services. 4. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 5. World War, 1939–1945—Military intelligence—United States. 6. Evidence, Criminal—Germany—History—20th century. I. Title. KZ1176.5.S25 2007 341.6′90268—dc22 2006036701 ISBN 0–203–94510–7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 1–904385–80–X (pbk) ISBN10: 1–904385–81–8 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–94510–7 (ebk) lSBN13: 978–1–904385–80–6 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–1–904385–81–3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–94510–0 (ebk) I would like to thank those individuals and publishing collaborators too numerous to list for their professional inspiration and help, and – on a more personal and familial note – to dedicate this work to Charlie, Glen, John, Leslie, Martin, Naomi and Ray. Contents 1 Introducing the rationale, aims and methodology 1 Introduction 1 Conclusion 10 2 Evidence of the war criminality of the Wolff group 11 Introduction 12 Relevant offences 14 Evidence of the Wolff group’s involvement in Nazi war crimes 23 Medical experimentation 30 Funding concentration camps 31 The persecution and extermination of European Jews 32 Italian anti-partisan warfare 33 Wolff’s institutional position 35 Wolff’s defensive claims in the light of the Nuremberg evidence 37 The complicities of Guido Zimmer 54 The complicities of Eugen Dollmann 63 Dollmann’s decision to join the Nazi Party and the SS 65 Dollmann’s activities as a translator and diplomatic emissary 67 Potential defence argument 1: an accidental Nazi? 70 Potential defence argument 2: Dollmann as a saboteur? 72 Potential defence argument 3: Dollmann’s lack of knowledge of SS war criminality? 75 Potential defence argument 4: his lack of any policy-making role 76 Potential defence argument 5: lack of involvement in the unlawful activities of the SS 77 Potential defence argument 6: Dollmann’s humanitarian interventions 80 Problems with these defence arguments 81 Conclusion 84 viii Contents 3 The geo-political context of the peace negotiations surrounding the OSS’s Operation Sunrise 89 Introduction 89 Introducing specific contexts shaping Dulles’ wartime role regarding SS peace feelers 1944–45 92 Negotiating the conditions of an ‘unconditional’ surrender 96 Conclusion 108 4 Intervening on behalf of Karl Wolff 109 Introduction 109 Dulles’ interventions on behalf of Wolff with respect to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 121 Intervening to protect Wolff from the second round of the Nuremberg trials 131 Wolff’s escape from prosecution by the British authorities 135 The ‘Old Lace’ de-Nazification trials 146 1962–64: Wolff’s arrest and German trials 166 Conclusion 176 5 Protecting the wider Sunrise group: Zimmer, Dollmann and Wenner 179 Introduction 179 Zimmer’s post-war recruitment and deployment as a US intelligence asset 180 Dollmann’s post-war detention, recruitment and deployment as a US intelligence asset 184 The internal controversy regarding the ‘privileged treatment’ of the Wolff group 202 Questions of legal immunity in the light of Dollmann’s CIA Name File 215 Intervening to ensure protection 220 The internal controversy concerning Dollmann’s protection 223 Conclusion 243 6 The contribution of OSS officials to the prosecution of Nazi war crimes 246 Designing the courtroom as a stage for a media event 253 Facilitating media coverage: controversies and logistical support 255 Organisational charts 257 Providing documentary and eye-witness evidence 258 Contents ix Producing the Nazi Concentration Camps film 260 The immediate impact of screening the atrocity film 269 7 Gathering and analysing the materials that became the R-Series of Nuremberg trial evidence 277 Waging aggressive war and crimes committed against prisoners of war 288 Rothschild’s work in gathering and organising the R-Series evidence 298 Conclusion 306 8 General Donovan’s contribution to the Nuremberg trials 307 Introduction 307 Donovan’s attempts to secure a leading role for the OSS 309 The courting and honeymoon phases 320 Recruiting Donovan’s OSS personnel 332 The flow of OSS staff and support 338 Providing evidence from Dulles’ OSS contacts within the German opposition 346 Donovan’s assistance with the geo-politics of international negotiations 351 Donovan’s assistance with American organisations 362 The provision of documentation 366 Other forms of support provided by Donovan 367 Donovan’s long-range interventions: July–September 1945 369 The honeymoon ends in desertion: Donovan departs and plays away 374 The irretrievable breakdown 376 Excluding Donovan and the OSS lawyers from the economic case 381 Prosecuting the German General Staff and the High Command 393 The merits of witness or documentary evidence 398 Donovan’s plea-bargaining proposals for Schacht and Göring 410 Informal contacts with Leverkühn and Lahousen 424 An acrimonious divorce 428 Was either leader proved right? 439 Conclusion 444 Summation: taking stock 445 Bibliography 448 Appendix: Abbreviations 452 Index 453 Chapter 1 Introducing the rationale, aims and methodology Intelligence work is by definition illegal. If it is very effective intelligence work it is very illegal. (David Whipple, former OSS official, who worked under Allen Dulles in wartime Bern)1 Introduction This book addresses the various controversies and contradictions affecting the involvement of one US intelligence organisation, the wartime Office of Strategic Services (‘OSS’, 1942–45, precursor to the CIA, 1947–), within the Nuremberg war crimes trial programme. In particular it focuses upon the OSS’s dual role as a source of incriminating trial evidence and possible immunity for war crimes suspects deemed to be valuable for future intelligence operations as informants or agents. The OSS was created in 19422 as a complex wartime organisation. It had various sub-divisions, ranging from the scholarly Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) through to the espionage work and guerrilla warfare oper- ations of the Secret Intelligence (SI) and Special Operations Branches (SO) respectively; it also included Foreign Nationalities, Visual Presentation and Field Photographic Branches.3 The OSS was formally dissolved at the end of September 1945, but nearly all of its 130-plus war crimes staff remained at Nuremberg as employees of a re-branded organisation: the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) attached to the US War Department. It is true that gathering 1 Cited in A. Lebor, Hitler’s Secret Bankers (London: Pocket Books, 1997), 215–16. 2 Originally titled the ‘Office of the Coordinator of Information’, headed by General William J. Donovan. 3 For general studies of the OSS, see also B. Smith, The Shadow Warriors. OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983); A. Cave Brown, The Last Hero, Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982); B. Katz, Foreign Intelligence, Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and R. Winks, Cloak and Gown, Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New York: Morrow, 1987). 2 Nazi War Crimes: US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg potential trial evidence and preparing prosecution strategies was hardly the main wartime aim of the OSS, and its activities on this front only began in earnest from November 1943.
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