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IEEE Globecom 2011 Information Warfare Tom Chen Swansea University Wales, UK [email protected] Outline • Background - Definitions; actors; targets; historical cases • Attack techniques - Reconnaissance; intrusions; stealth; persistent control; DDoS • Defense techniques - Deterrence; prevention; detection; attribution; intrusion tolerance; self healing • Open research issues • Conclusions and future directions TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 2 Background TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 3 Section Outline • Definitions • Actors • Targets • Historical cases TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 4 Definitions • Info. warfare (or cyber warfare): military or political conflicts between nations carried out through computer networks - Actions to adversely affect enemy’s info. and info. systems while defending own - Information is both target and means for gaining advantage (in support of military/political goals) - Definitions vary, e.g., U.S. DoD defines broadly: “operations directed against information in any form, transmitted over any media, including operations against information content, its supporting systems and software, the physical hardware device that stores the data or instructions, and also human practices and perceptions” TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 5 DoD Definitions Info. Operations Broad (info. warfare) definition Psychological Military Operations Computer Electronic operations deception security network warfare Propaganda Weapon hiding, Classified operations Radio Examples: leaflets target decoys info. (CNO) jamming *Definition here Computer Computer Computer network network network exploitation/ attack (CNA) defense (CND) espionage (CNE) DDoS, Firewalls, Backdoors, malware IDS data theft TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 6 Recognition as Warfare Domain • U.S. DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (July 2011) recognizes cyberspace as 5th operational domain (with sea, air, land, space) “Potential U.S. adversaries may seek to exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the networks and systems that DoD depends on... particularly concerned with three areas of potential adversarial activity: - theft or exploitation of data; - disruption or denial of access or service...; - destructive action including corruption, manipulation, or direct activity that threatens to destroy or degrade networks...” TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 7 Definitions (cont) Espionage, reconnaissance, data Increasingly theft common DDoS Suspected (Stuxnet) Attacks Attacks for damage but no blatant incidents Attacks for control Defense Ongoing TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 8 Relation to Cyber Crime • Cyber crime differs in: - Profit motive - Criminals, not state - Aim for theft of personal information, fraud - Targeted to consumers, businesses • Common tools (e.g., malware, botnets) usable for cyber war - Same exploits involved in cyber war: govt. depends on civilian providers for computer equipment, software, services TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 9 Relation to Cyber Terrorism • Terrorist groups make use of Internet as tool and perhaps see as target to multiply physical attack (no incidents yet) - Terrorist groups al-Qaeda, Armed Islamic Group, Aum Shinrikyo, Hizballah, Hamas building up cyber skills - Uses: communications, organization, propaganda, recruiting, fund raising, research targets - Benefits: anonymity, accessibility • U.S. govt. stated that other nations are greater cyber threat than terrorists TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 10 Actors • U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and NSA (joint director and location) - CYBERCOM coordinates and conducts activities to defend DoD networks and conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations - Includes: training; situational awareness; create secure and resilient networks; build partnerships for collective defenses; integrate and deploy innovative capabilities TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 11 Actors (cont) • Services (Army, Navy, AF, Marines) each have cyber unit to support CYBERCOM: Army Cyber Command, 10th Fleet, 24th Air Force, Marine Forces Cyber Command, Coast Guard Cyber Command • Dept. Homeland Security (DHS) to defend civilian networks • Some responsibilities for cyber security: Secret Service, FBI, Homeland Security Council, DoD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 12 Actors (cont) • China: People’s Liberation Army (PLA); unknown whether large population of hackers is affiliated - Report by U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (Oct. 2011) identified China as most active in cyber espionage, though difficult to confirm ties to govt. - Pointed to ‘Project 863’ funding covert activities to acquire US technology and info. - Russian intelligence services also aggressive and capable TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 13 Actors (cont) • Russia: Federal Security Service of Russian Federation (FSB); Federal Guard Service; General Staff • UK: Office Cyber Security (OCS); Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) • Israel: C4I Directorate of Israel Defense Force (IDF); Unit 8200 of Directorate of Military Intelligence • Many emerging: Australia, France, India, S. Korea, Estonia, Brazil TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 14 Actors (cont) • Various non-state actors: script kiddies, malware writers, criminals, scammers, blackhats, hacktivists (e.g., Anonymous) • Cyber terrorists (debatable) aiming at violence, disruption, fear, confusion, for sake of political or ideological agenda TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 15 Motivations • Asymmetric warfare: means for weaker nation to fight stronger nation through indirect tactics - Low cost of entry • Potential payoffs are high - Much information available for espionage - Modern societies are more dependent on networks (vulnerable to disruption) • Risks are low - Attribution is very difficult - International laws are not coordinated TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 16 Targets • Critical infrastructures (communications, energy, transport, finance, human services) • Govt. and military systems • Defense contractors • Industrial control systems • Internet - Most of US gov’t and military communications travel over civilian networks - Servers, databases are easy targets TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 17 Historical Cases • Is information warfare real? None formally declared Year Name Suspect Nature 1998 Moonlight Maze Russia Espionage 2003 Titan Rain China Espionage 2006 Operation Shady RAT China Espionage 2007 Estonia Russia (initially) DDoS 2009 GhostNet China Espionage 2009 Night Dragon China Espionage 2010 Aurora China Espionage 2010 Stuxnet US, Israel Malware attack TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 18 Moonlight Maze • 1998 Series of infiltrations into Pentagon, NASA, DoE, affiliated labs over 2 years • Tens of thousands of files - military maps, US troop configurations, military hardware designs, naval codes • Traced to mainframe in Russia but denied - Russia cooperated with DoD investigation TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 19 Titan Rain • 2003 (disclosed in 2005) Series of intrusions into DoD, Sandia Nat. Labs, NASA, Redstone Arsenal military base, World Bank, defense contractors • Military intelligence stolen - not classified but sensitive, e.g., Army helicopter specs, Falconview (flight planning software), aerospace documents • Term “APT” (advanced persistent threat) created TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 20 Titan Rain (cont) • Discovered by Sandia security expert Shawn Carpenter - Tracked through chat rooms, servers, planted homemade bugging code in primary router to track all connections - Stolen files transmitted to zombie servers in S. Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, before relaying to Guangdong (Chinese province) - Estimated 6-10 full time hackers - Red Hacker Alliance group suspected; unknown ties to PLA TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 21 Titan Rain (cont) • Carpenter passed discoveries to Army and FBI • When Sandia learned of activities, Sandia ordered Carpenter to stop - Illegal for American citizens to hack into foreign computers - When he persisted, he was fired and stripped of top secret clearance - Carpenter won law suit against dismissal TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 22 Shady RAT • 2006 (disclosed 2011) McAfee report of 5 year cyber espionage by one actor (not identified but most assume China) - Compromised 72 defense contractors, various businesses, U.N., Int. Olympic Committee TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 23 Shady RAT (cont) • Targets in U.S., Taiwan, S. Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, UK, Singapore, India, Germany (notably not China) TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 24 Shady RAT (cont) • Stolen emails, contracts, proprietary business documents, source code, govt. secrets, SCADA configurations - maybe 1,000 TB data - Spear phishing installed RAT (remote access tool) • Unspecified by McAfee but said detected by heuristic signatures (Generic BackDoor.t, Generic Downloader.x) - RAT opens backdoor to remote command & control (C&C) servers • Interesting aspect is variety of targets, not techniques TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 25 Estonia • 2007 Moving statue of Soviet soldier from capital to war cemetery caused Russian protests • DDoS shut down hundreds of Estonian govt. services, news sites, e-commerce sites for 2 weeks - 3 waves of attacks April 26 - May 18 - Peaked on May 9 with 4 million packet/sec launched by botnets TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11 p. 26 Estonia (cont) • Estonia is highly wired - 60% population used Internet daily - 97% banking transactions done online • Expected cyber attacks after moving statue but not at such scale • Attacks were well coordinated, sustained, and effective (by Estonia standards) - Choice of govt. and business targets suggested political motive - Russia had motive, means, and opportunity TC/Globecom2011/12-9-11
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