Justice and Politics in Plato's Republic

Draft of 9-24-15

PHIL 161; Fall 2015 Greek Ethics David O. Brink Handout #8: Justice and Politics in Plato's Republic

The Republic is perhaps Plato's most comprehensive and influential work. Its ostensible focus is the eudaimonist defense of the virtue of justice. But it is a very wide-ranging work that tackles the defense of justice by an examination of the ideal form of government and a defense of rule by moral experts. This argument also takes Plato into elaborate discussions of the nature of forms and our knowledge of them and the nature and value of the arts. The result is a comprehensive philosophical system that outstrips in scope and substance anything we find in the Socratic dialogues.

BOOK I In contrast with the rest of the Republic, Book I strongly resembles a Socratic dialogue. It has a narrow focus on the virtue of justice, Socrates engages in substantive critical discussion with multiple interlocutors, and the results are largely negative. This contrasts with the rest of the Republic, which is wide-ranging and contains metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy, and aesthetics, as well as a discussion of several virtues besides justice. The later books contain much constructive theorizing, and the dialogue format is in places only a fig leaf for philosophical monologue. These substantive and stylistic differences have led some scholars to speculate that Book I was an "unpublished" draft of a Socratic dialogue that Plato somewhat clumsily appended to his own later and very different treatise on justice, because of the common subject matter. This rather uncharitable speculation is unnecessary if Plato consciously intends to contrast a Socratic treatment of justice with his own very different treatment. I think that we will see that this alternative interpretation not only is more charitable but also makes better sense of the whole of the Republic. Early in Book I, Socrates considers and rejects various conventional views about justice -- both Cephalus's law-conception as telling the truth and repaying one's debts (331cd) and Polemarchus's more Homeric conception as benefiting one's friends and harming one's enemies (332a-336a). These definitions suffer from the "compresence of opposites," the F and not-F problem.

1. If F = G, then all and only G-things are F-things. 2. Some G-things are F. 3. Some G-things are not-F. 4. Hence, F ≠ G.

Though the style of argument here is firmly Socratic, this way of describing the problem is new and receives further articulation in Book V.

THRASYMACHUS Like Callicles, Thrasymachus notes a tension between eudaimonism and the recognition of other-regarding virtues, such as justice.

1. Justice is a virtue. 2. Virtues benefit their possessor. 3. Conventional-justice often requires the agent to benefit others at her own expense. 4. Conventional-justice = justice.

Whereas Callicles rejects (4), Thrasymachus rejects (1); he denies that justice is a virtue. He makes three claims about justice:

(a) Justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c1-2); (b) Justice is the advantage of the ruler (339a1-2); and (c) Justice is another's good (343c1-3).

Thrasymachus takes the ruler to be stronger and so by (a) takes justice to be conformity with the ruler's orders. If justice only applies to inferiors, this makes justice another's good. This account of justice makes it out to be in the ruler's, not the subject's, interest (341b1-c1). Socrates replies by appeal to the craft analogy. Crafts are generally concerned with the perfection of their objects; if so, ruling should aim at the welfare of the subjects (342bc). However, Thrasymachus replies that crafts are practiced for the good of craftsmen, not the good of the objects of the craft (341b1 c1). Socrates rejoins that Thrasymachus is conflating the original craft (e.g. shepherding) that aims at the good of its object with the money-making craft (345c 346c). But even if Socrates were right about distinguishing the crafts in this way, we would presumably want to distinguish between the particular craft's aiming at producing a good product and aiming at the good of the product -- the good x and the good of x. Shepherds aim at producing good wool or lamb-chops but not at the good of the sheep. In attacking justice, Thrasymachus makes two significantly different claims, which we need to distinguish.

1. Justice is not a virtue, because justice is not always more advantageous than injustice (348c). 2. Injustice is a virtue, because injustice is always more advantageous than justice (348b8- 349a3).

Though both (1) and (2) challenge Socratic assumptions, (2) is a much stronger claim. Among other things, Socrates argues that achieving one's aims requires the cooperation of others that requires justice -- there must be justice even among thieves (351c-354a). Is cooperation among thieves justice, or is it just (selective) conformity to requirements of justice? In any case, any concern that thieves might have with justice is selective. They may practice justice among themselves (if that’s what it is), but they practice injustice against others. But then Socrates's argument undermines Thrasymachus's stronger claim (2), but not his weaker claim (1). But Socrates's claim that justice is sufficient for happiness (353e8-354a6) requires him to reject both claims of Thrasymachus.

BOOK II What roles do Glaucon and Adeimantus play? How does their challenge compare with that of Thrasymachus? On the one hand, they make things easier insofar they require only the comparative claim that justice always be better than injustice, rather than Socrates's sufficiency claim that justice is sufficient for happiness (a complete good).

• Sufficiency: Justice is sufficient for happiness (a complete good). • Dominance: Justice is always better than injustice.

Both are strong and counter-intuitive claims. But Sufficiency is stronger than Dominance. Sufficiency requires one to deny that externals (not already necessary for virtue) can affect one's happiness. Dominance does not. Dominance allows that virtue might have a price, but it insists that it is a price that's always worth paying. 3

On the other hand, Glaucon and Adeimantus make things harder for Socrates insofar as they retreat to Thrasymachus's weaker challenge to justice [(1) above]. Moreover, they require that justice be shown to be better in itself. They distinguish three kinds of goods (357b-):

(a) things good for their consequences, (b) things good in themselves, and (c) things good both for their consequences and in themselves.

They want Socrates to show that justice is a c-good. They concede that justice is typically an a- good. So they demand that Socrates show that justice is a b-good (something that is both an a-good and a b-good is, of course, a c-good). When Socrates accepts their demand to show that justice is good in itself, Plato rejects a purely instrumental justification of justice. In so doing, Plato rejects a purely instrumental relation between virtue and happiness. In doing so, he clearly rejects one strand in Socratic thinking about the relation between virtue and happiness. Because instrumentalism about virtue seems to go hand-in-hand with the craft analogy, it is perhaps no accident that the craft analogy, so prominent in Socratic dialogues and Book I, largely disappears in the rest of the Republic. To make their demand clear, Glaucon and Adeimantus explain the instrumental value of justice. I benefit from another's justice, not my own. The reason I have to be just is that the justice of others is typically conditional on my own. Others won't be just toward me if they see that I am not just toward them. So in order to secure the benefits of other people being just toward me I must be just toward them. In this way, justice is good for its consequences. But this defense of justice is counterfactually unstable, as the ring of Gyges makes clear (359b-360d). For then I could receive the benefits of others' justice without incurring the costs of my own. But this shows that the conventional defense of justice is unstable; justice is really a second-best option behind the first- best option of practicing undetected injustice. But this is to praise the appearance of justice, rather than justice itself (360e-362c, 362e-363e, 365b-367a). Glaucon and Adeimantus demand a counterfactually stable defense of justice. To understand counterfactual stability, imagine that we can rank possible worlds in terms of their value and that their value is a function of virtue and externals, including the appearance of justice or injustice. Moreover, partition these worlds into just and unjust worlds, all those possible worlds in which the agent is just and all those possible worlds in which the agent is unjust.

Socrates must show that the worst just world (the world in which the agent is just but has the reputation for injustice and suffers other assorted bad fortune) is better than the best unjust world (the world in which the agent is unjust but has the reputation of justice and is the beneficiary of other assorted good fortune).

And this would be to show that justice in itself, independently of its attendant circumstances, is good. This would show that justice is a b-good, as well as an a-good, which would show that it is in fact a c-good.1

1 In fact, Glaucon and Adeimantus argue that justice is an imperfect instrumental good, because it is not instrumentally valuable in all possible, or even actual, circumstances. To show that justice is really the best sort of good, it would seem to be enough for Socrates to show that justice is good in itself. But at the very end of the Republic, in the discussion of the myth of Er, Socrates returns to the eudaimonic defense of justice and appeals to an afterlife to show that justice is, indeed, a perfect instrumental good (612b-621d). If the gods know who has been naughty and nice and reward virtue and punish vice many-fold in subsequent lives, then the other-worldly benefits of justice ensure that justice is always instrumentally best. 4

Is this demand coherent? Can justice be shown to contribute to the agent's happiness without making its value depend upon some of its consequences? Their demand is coherent if they distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic consequences of justice. For then Socrates can answer their challenge if he can show that justice is valuable for its intrinsic consequences. This is what he means when he asks to be shown that justice is beneficial "in and by itself" (367be) and when he later praises justice for "the blessings which follow from its very presence" (612d). If Socrates can satisfy this demand, he can show that virtue is its own reward.2

JUSTICE Socrates pursues the eudaimonist justification of justice indirectly, by looking at the justice, not of an individual, but of a city. He appeals to a macro-micro analogy (368d, 441cd).

1. First, identify the tri-partite structure of the ideal city. 2. Next, interpret the political virtues as relations among the parts of the ideal city. 3. Next, provide an independent account of the structure of the soul that represents it as having a tri-partite structure isomorphic to the structure of the ideal city. 4. Hence, conclude that the virtues for an individual agent stand to the structure of the soul as the political virtues stand to the structure of the ideal city.

Does Socrates's discussion meet the constraints that his own macro-micro analogy requires, or is his discussion of the political or social virtues actually parasitic on assumptions about the division of the soul and the psychic virtues (430e)?

JUSTICE AND THE DIVISION OF THE SOUL In Book IV Plato divides the soul into three parts by appeal to a principle of opposites (436b). He seems to reason as follows.

1. The same thing cannot do or undergo contraries at the same time and in the same respect (436b). 2. The soul undergoes contraries at the same time: desire and aversion or rejection (e.g. for drink) (437b-c, 439b-c). 3. Hence, the soul must have different respects. 4. Hence, the soul must have parts.

Does this way of dividing the soul support Plato's tripartite division? If Plato is appealing to conflicting attitudes, he may generate only two parts of the soul, viz. the desiring and aversive parts. If he is appealing to potentially conflicting contents of the attitudes, then it looks like he will

2 If virtue is its own reward, then Plato has one kind of answer to Prichard. In “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Prichard famously objects to the legitimacy of Plato’s project of providing a eudaimonist defense of virtue. See H.A. Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” in Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949). Prichard’s essay is an interpretive nightmare (goldmine?). It’s very hard to pin down his exact concern. But he clearly thinks that it is wrong-headed to attempt a justification of duty in terms of self-interest, and he may reject any attempt to understand morality in terms of some independent standard. Perhaps he thinks that the moral “ought” is the only “ought” there is or that the moral “ought” is necessarily supreme. One response is reject his assumptions outright and insist that the moral “ought” is just one “ought” among many and that it is therefore an open question whether all things considered one has most reason to treat moral considerations as authoritative. A less radical response would be to accept Prichard’s apparent assumption that morality should not be defended by being shown to be instrumental to some other standard and insist that Plato’s attempt to show justice to be its own reward conforms to this requirement. For more discussion, see Irwin, Plato’s Ethics §142. 5 get a different part of the soul for every different content of desire. This looks like either too few or too many parts of the soul for Plato's purposes. At 437e-438a Plato distinguishes between desire for F and desire for F qua good; at 439c-d he distinguishes between rational and nonrational desires; and at 442bc he distinguishes desires that are good-independent and those that are good-dependent. Taken together, these distinctions can yield three, and not just two, parts of the soul.

1. Optimizing desires (associated with the rational part) 2. Good-dependent but not optimizing desires (associated with the emotional part) 3. Good-independent desires (associated with the appetitive part)

This tri-partition is self-consciously contrasted with the Socratic psychology that implies that all desire is good-dependent (438a). What does Plato's division of the soul imply about the possibility of weakness of will? Leontius appears to act against his judgments about what is best (439e- 440a). Does he also act against knowledge of what is best? Plato uses the division of the soul into rational (good-dependent) and nonrational (good- independent) parts to define (psychic) virtue as rule by the rational part of the soul. What does he have in mind by control of the rational part?

• Instrumental control. The rational part decides how best to satisfy existing desires; it determines only how to satisfy appetitive desires most efficiently. • Directive control. Reason forms desires as well as restrains existing ones; both formation and control of desires are guided by reasoning about the overall good of the agent.

If we bear in mind Plato's account of political rule and his analysis of deviant men in Books VIII-IX -- who exhibit instrumental control but lack virtue and happiness -- it seems clear he must have directive control in mind (see below).

1. A person is wise by virtue of his rational part exercising directive control over the other parts of his soul (442c). 2. A person is courageous by virtue of his emotional part honoring and enforcing the dictates of the rational part against his appetites (442bc). 3. A person is temperate by virtue of his appetitive part obeying and agreeing in the rule by the rational parts (442cd). 4. Justice is this relation among the parts of the soul in which each part does its job (441de, 443d).

Plato’s division of the soul is usually interpreted as disagreeing with Socrates not just about the possibility of akrasia but also about the unity and inseparability of the virtues. If the virtues involve noncognitive affective and conative states, then mustn’t the virtues be both distinct and separable? Perhaps, but I’m not sure that this interpretive conclusion is forced on us. Plato might be able to reconcile this account of psychic order with the inseparability and unity of the virtues. Think of Plato’s virtues as involving a single tri-partite pyramid structure just viewed from four angles: the bottom (temperance), the middle (courage), the top (wisdom), and the bird's eye point of view (justice). On this reading, the virtues would seem to involve just one psychic condition viewed from different perspectives and perhaps manifested in different contexts. Plato doesn’t explicitly affirm unity or inseparability in the Republic, but it’s not clear that he needs to deny either.

A FALLACY IN THE REPUBLIC? The Republic develops the account of justice as involving psychic order that was introduced in the Gorgias. Like the Gorgias (504a-507e), the Republic defends the value of psychic order by an appeal to an analogy between the health of the body and the health of the soul (444b-445b). We can see why the proper ordering of an individual's soul -- psychic justice (p-justice) -- is good in itself. But what does p-justice have to do with the demand to benefit others made by conventional justice (c-justice) and challenged by both Thrasymachus and Glaucon and Adeimantus? The gap between p-justice and c-justice was present in the Gorgias but it is perhaps more apparent in the Republic. This gap was perhaps first noticed and criticized by George Grote.3 More recently, David Sachs identified this gap as exposing a fallacy in the Republic.4

1. Because justice is an other-regarding trait, it seems especially difficult to square with the eudaimonist assumption that virtues must benefit their possessor. 2. Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to show not just that justice is beneficial but also that it is good in itself. 3. Claiming that justice is psychic order, Socrates claims to have shown that justice is good in itself.

The worry is that the challenge concerns an other-regarding conception of justice and Socrates’s response defends an internal, self-regarding conception of justice. There seems to be a different sense of justice in (1) and (2) and in (3). If so, Plato’s argument seems to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Plato can be acquitted of the fallacy of equivocation if there are systematic connections between the two conceptions of justice. Plato claims, not implausibly, that c-injustice results from p-injustice (442e-443b; cf. G 507a-e). But does all c-injustice arise from reason being a slave to the appetites? Mightn't there be c-injustice that is not impulsive but calculated?

DEVIANT HAPPINESS The account of deviant men in Republic VIII-IX is relevant here. Whereas the desires of the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul reflect practical reasoning from a partial perspective, only the desires of the rational part reflect practical reasoning from an impartial and comprehensive perspective. Because each part of the soul engages in reasoning, it is possible for Plato to think of each of them as if they were agents (cf. 588c-d). In books viii-ix Plato examines the lives of deviant people -- the timocrat, the oligarch, the democrat, and the tyrant -- who correspond to the nonrational parts of the soul, precisely because, in different ways, they are dominated by the nonrational parts. Only when the rational part rules is a person's conduct regulated by a concern for each part of his soul as part of his overall good (586d-587a; cf. 442c). Plato illustrates this claim by appealing to an image of the soul as consisting of a man, a lion, and a many-headed beast (588c-590d). It is fitting for the man to look after the beast, with the help of the lion; only in this way does the beast get what's best for it (589ab). If Plato literally identifies the rational part with a man, he introduces an apparently vicious regress, because the man himself must have three parts, including a rational part, which itself is a man, which in turn has three parts, etc. But the point of thinking of the rational part as a man having a whole soul is that the rational part alone has a comprehensive or impartial concern for the whole soul, including each of its parts. The rational part does not deny the

3 George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1865) III.xxxiv.129- 31, III.xxxiv.154-55, III.xxxv.162 4 David Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic" Philosophical Review 72 (1963). 7 appetitive and spirited parts but trains them and satisfies them as is appropriate for them as parts of an ordered whole (591c-592a). Here the health analogy becomes important. In caring for my whole body, I am concerned with the health and functioning of my bodily parts as parts of a larger, functioning whole. I will not eat as much as I can, but as much as contributes to optimal functioning of someone with my frame and build. Caring for my right arm will not consist in making it as strong as possible but in strengthening it in proportion to the rest of my body. Similarly, in pursuing the good of the whole soul, one will gratify diverse appetites and passions insofar as their gratification contributes to a well functioning tri-partite soul in which reason rules. The account of deviant men in Books VIII-IX explains why Plato thinks that unhappiness is not due simply to compulsive action on the appetites and passions. He can argue that even calculated restraint in the service of honor, wealth, appetites, and lust does not secure happiness, because it does not represent a comprehensive concern for the various elements of the soul and their role in the agent's own good. If so, Plato can claim that various sorts of c-injustice, not simply compulsive c-injustice, involve p-injustice. But has he shown that all c-injustice involves p-injustice? Moreover, if Plato is to avoid the fallacy of irrelevance, he must show not only that c-injustice results from p-injustice but also that p- justice produces c-justice. Can he do this? Will the p-just person not only refrain from harming her neighbors, avoiding c-injustice, but also do those positive acts of beneficence that c-justice requires?

WHY SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS RULE? Plato raises this question for himself in his discussion of why philosophers should rule. Recall that philosophers are the only ones in the ideal city that possess individual virtues, because only they are ruled by their rational part in the right way. Being dominated by their rational part, it seems that they would prefer to spend their lives in intellectual study of the Forms (500b6-c1, 519c-d) and would regard ruling as necessary, rather than fine (540b). Socrates responds that the ideal city is designed for the benefit of the community as a whole, and not the benefit of any one individual or class (519e-520a; cf. 420b, 421b, 466a). And, as we shall see in more detail later, Plato offers an elaborate argument for why the city is better ruled when ruled by moral experts, who know the Forms. This is problematic for the eudaimonist defense of justice if the only members of society who are in fact just (possess p-justice) would really be better-off in self-absorbed study of the Forms than in active engagement in political life, creating just institutions that benefit others. If philosophers must really be coerced into ruling in the ideal city, there is little reason to expect p- justice to secure c-justice. But perhaps philosophers will rule as something necessary in the sense that they see it is rationally necessary. They may be tempted to retreat to their studies. But this would apparently reflect a parochial concern of the rational part of the soul, akin to the other parochial concerns of the deviant men. Plato must show that someone who has a proper concern for her overall good, and not just the good of her rational part, will see the creation of just laws and institutions as part of her calling and her own good. In the Republic Plato remarks upon the love that a virtuous person will have for others (402d-403c, 412d). Moreover, he famously envisions the rulers of the ideal state as forming an extended family, in which family distinctions are not recognized (463c, 464a), and as regarding other members of society as part of a harmonious whole. To see if the eudaimonist defense of justice can be shown to be non-fallacious, we might look to see why philosophers should love others.

EROS AND ANOTHER'S GOOD To do this, we must look, at least briefly, at Plato's account of love (eros) in the Symposium (esp. 206e-212c) and Phaedrus (esp. 243c-257b).5 Though eros is sometimes linked with sexual desire and the appetites, rather than the rational part (439d6-8), Plato also recognizes philosophical eros. Genuine philosophers are lovers of truth (485a-d, 501d1-2; cf. Ph 68ab). Indeed, the Symposium describes an ascent or progression from sexual desire to philosophical eros (204d, 211c). In the Republic Plato claims that the philosopher will not have consummated his eros until he has had intercourse with true reality and begotten intelligence and truth (490ab). But Plato also thinks that eros is other-regarding. He remarks upon the love that a virtuous person will have for others (402d-403c, 412d). He describes an ascent of desire through various stages (Symp 210a- 212a).

1. Love of a particular beautiful body 2. Love of bodily beauty as such 3. Love of all beautiful bodies 4. Love of spiritual beauty, that is, what is fine or beautiful in souls 5. Love of fine laws and institutions 6. Love of all kinds of knowledge 7. Love of what is fine as such

This last, best sort of love aims at what is good or fine (201a, 204d, 205d, 206b-e) and, in particular, at propagating what is good or fine (206c-208a, 212a). Plato believes that virtue is fine and that spiritual love aims at producing virtue. In middle dialogues, such as the Republic, he understands virtue as a psychic state in which one's appetites, emotions, and actions are regulated by practical deliberation about one's overall good. Virtue, so understood, is the controlling ingredient in a good or flourishing life. So when A loves B, Plato concludes, A will aim to make B virtuous (Symp 209a, 212a). Such love benefits the beloved, because one benefits by becoming virtuous precisely insofar as one is better off being regulated by a correct conception of one's overall good. But Plato also believes that the lover benefits from loving another (Phaedrus 245b), as he must if he is to reconcile interpersonal love with his eudaimonism. The key to seeing how Plato can reconcile interpersonal love with self-love is to appreciate the way in which he thinks that reproducing one's virtuous traits in another is the next best thing to immortality (Symp 206c1-209e5; Phaedrus 276e-277a).

Now although we speak of an individual as being the same so long as he continues to exist in the same form, and therefore assume that a man is the same person in his dotage as in his infancy, yet, for all we call him the same, every bit of him is different, and every day he is becoming a new man, while the old man is ceasing to exist, as you can see from his hair, his flesh, his bones, his blood, and all the rest of his body. And not only his body, for the same thing happens to his soul. And neither his manners, nor his disposition, nor his thoughts, nor his desires, nor his sufferings, nor his fears are the same throughout his life, for some of them grow, while others disappear. ... In this way every mortal creature is perpetuated, not by always being the same in every way, as a divine being is, but by what goes away and gets old leaving behind and in its place some other new thing that is of the same sort as it was [207d3-208b12].

On Plato's view, intrapersonal and interpersonal love are parallel; indeed, love of another appears to be just a special case of self-love. I extend myself into the future by reproducing my traits into

5 Here, as at many other points, I am influenced by Irwin, Plato's Ethics, ch. 18. 9 the future. But I can also reproduce myself somewhat less systematically in others by sharing thought and discussion with them, in particular, thought and discussion about how best to live. On this view, the interests of those whom I love become part of my interests in just the sort of way that the interests of my future self are part of my overall interests.

1. I extend my interests by reproducing my valuable traits into a future self (intrapersonal reproduction). 2. The lover reproduces his valuable traits in his beloved (interpersonal reproduction). 3. Hence, the beloved extends the lover's interests. 4. Hence, benefits the lover confers on his beloved benefit the lover.

If so, the virtuous person has reason to love others. By loving others, the virtuous person will make them virtuous. By making them virtuous, she will benefit them. Therefore, the virtuous person who has p-justice will not only avoid injuring others (avoid c-injustice) but also benefit others. Does Platonic love express concern for the beloved's own sake?6 Because Socrates treats intrinsic and instrumental concern as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (Lysis 219c, 220ab), Socratic eudaimonism implies instrumental concern for the beloved.

1. Insofar as x is desired for the sake of some other thing y, then x is only instrumentally valuable (219c-220b). 2. If A and B are friends, A cares about B because of the contribution this makes to A's eudaimonia. 3. Hence, friends care about each other only instrumentally.

But as the Republic II discussion of the kind of good justice is shows, Plato rejects (1). He allows things can be valuable in themselves, as constituent parts of happiness, and because of their intrinsic contribution to happiness. If so, Platonic eudaimonism can apparently explain love for the beloved's own sake. The fault in Platonic love lies less in Plato's egoism than in his (passive) conception of how the beloved is to be improved. Complaints about Platonic love have a direct bearing on the paternalistic character of Plato's political theory (discussed below).

POLITICAL VIRTUE Plato thinks society should be based upon a natural division of labor (NDL). NDL is reached by consideration of a person's function (353a, 369e, 406-408, 420b, 421b, 433a, 435a, 590d). F is the function of x iff:

1. It's best for x to F (406-8, 420b, 421b). 2. x can F better than anything else x can do (353, 435a). 3. x can F better than anyone/anything else can F (353, 369). 4. It's better for the state for x to F (406-8, 420b, 421b).

6 Vlastos denies that Socratic, Platonic, or Aristotelian conceptions of love can recognize this important condition of intrinsic concern for the beloved. See Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato” reprinted in his Platonic Studies. He thinks that instrumentalism in the Lysis underlies Socrates’s failure, whereas Plato’s failure reflects the impersonal concern with the beloved’s virtue characteristic of Platonic love. I discuss some aspects of Vlastos’s important article in "Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community" Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999). 10

A person's function will depend upon her soul. There will be three main types of functions depending on which part of the person's soul predominates: the city will consist of artisans (whose appetitive part dominates), auxiliaries (whose emotional part dominates), and guardians (whose rational part dominates) (374a-e, 412c-414b, 428de, 429b). We can then define political virtue in terms of NDL. The city is wise when philosophers rule, with the aid of auxiliaries, over the artisans for the benefit of all (428b-e). The city is courageous when the auxiliaries enforce the edicts of the guardians at home and protect the city abroad (429a-430c). The city is temperate when its members, especially the artisans, consent to and follow the rule of the guardians (430e-432b). The city is just when each class performs its own function (433a-434d). Notice that this account of political virtue does not ascribe political virtues to any particular class; the city as a whole is the bearer of these virtues. This is required by the macro-micro analogy. Though members of the ruling class may have psychic virtues, it is not any particular class (much less any members of a class) that has (have) the political virtues.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL RULE Plato's defense of philosophical rule relies on his epistemological claims about the requirements for knowledge and his psychological claims about the distribution of cognitive abilities.

1. Knowledge of certain disputed (D-) matters (e.g. moral matters) is necessary for good ruling. 2. Knowledge of Forms is necessary for having knowledge of such matters. 3. Only philosophers have knowledge of Forms; the many are sightlovers and have no knowledge of forms. 4. Hence, only philosophers can have knowledge of D-properties; the many have only (at most) belief about D-properties. 5. Hence, only philosophers can rule; the many are unfit to rule.

AGAINST THE SIGHTLOVERS Plato argues for (2) and (3) at 475e-480a. At 475e-476d he presents a short argument for these claims.

1. (For certain properties) attention to Forms yields knowledge; whereas, attention to sensibles yields only (at most) belief. 2. The views of the many are concerned with sensibles; the views of the philosophers are concerned with Forms. 3. Hence, (for certain properties) the many have only (at most) belief; whereas, philosophers have knowledge.

But this restates, rather than supports, the claims in question. Plato aims for an argument that might persuade the sightlover (476d). To understand Plato's second, longer argument, it will help to recount some central doctrines of the Phaedo.

THE PHAEDO ON FORMS AND FLUX According to Aristotle, Plato separates the forms, whereas Socrates does not (Meta 987a31- b10, 1078b12-79a4, 1086a30-b7). Forms are ontologically separate from sensible particulars just in case the former can exist independently of the latter. Aristotle claims that it was the search for definitions and knowledge that led Socrates to forms and that Plato's belief in sensible flux that led him to posit Forms. The argument from flux goes something like this (74a9-c5).

1. Sensibles are in flux. 2. What is in flux is unknowable. 3. Hence, there can be no knowledge with sensibles. 4. There is (or can be) knowledge. 5. Hence, there must be nonsensible things -- Forms -- with which one can have knowledge.

But in what way are sensibles in flux? There are really two questions here: What is flux? and What are sensibles? Flux refers to the compresence of opposites -- sensibles are both F and not-F (74b8-9, 78d10-e4). Sometimes sensibles are understood as sensible particulars. But often Plato seems to have in mind sensible or observable properties. Insofar as he is concerned with sensible properties, Plato seems to mean that the set of things having a sensible property or properties will have both F-members and not-F-members, which implies that the form of F cannot consist in any sensible property or properties (78c10-79a7).

1. The form of F is a property. 2. x is F iff it has this property. 3. If F = G, then all and only G-things must be F-things. 4. For any sensible property G, some G things will be F and some G things will be not-F. 5. Hence, F ≠ G. 6. Hence, forms are not sensible properties. 7. Forms are necessary for knowledge. 8. Hence, no knowledge with sensibles.

(4) is a generalization of Socratic claims that virtues cannot be defined in behavioral terms -- e.g. courage cannot be defined as standing firm in battle (La 192a-) and justice cannot consist simply in paying one's debts (Rep 331cd) -- because these observable behaviors are sometimes virtuous and sometimes not. Nor is beauty being brightly colored (Ph 100c9-d3); a brightly colored Monet may be beautiful, but a garish, crushed velvet Elvis portrait will not be beautiful. Largeness is not being so many inches tall (even if this is makes Speedy Gonzales a tall mouse), because being that tall does not make everything large (a giraffe that tall would not be large) (Ph 96de, 100e5-101b2; cf. 74b8-9, 78d10-e4). Plato's main claim is that sensible properties contain both F and not-F instances. In general, there is no reason to think that he believes that sensible particulars are both F and not- F. Presumably, particular actions are not both just and unjust. It's rather that in some cases returning what is owed is just, and in other cases it is not. However, in cases involving relational properties Plato does think that sensible particulars can have contradictory properties. Simmias is both tall (compared to Socrates) and short or not-tall (compared to Phaedo) (102b-d). And Helen is both beautiful (compared with mortals) and ugly or not-beautiful (compared with gods) (Hippias Major 289a-e). Later in the Phaedo Plato returns to the topic of Forms and the nature of formal explanation.

1. Plato contrasts sensible explanations of what makes all and only F-things F, which are subject to the compresence of opposites, with "safe" explanations of what makes F-things F in terms of their participation in F-ness, which are not subject to this problem. Safe explanations are better than sensible explanations (96c5-e5, 100c3-101d3). 2. Plato mentions his desire (and inability) to find an account that explains the coming to be of all things in terms of a Final Good (97c1-98b6). 3. Plato mentions the need to appeal to formal, rather than material efficient causal, explanations (98b6-99d2). 12

4. In addition to safe explanations, there are informative explanations of one nonsensible property in terms of others (e.g. heat arises from fire) (96c5-105c8).

(2) is a special case of (3). (4) satisfies (3) and approximates (2). (1) and (4) appear to reject Socratic constraints on definition, for instance, the idea that an acceptable definition must eliminate disputed terms and supply a decision procedure (cf. Eu 6e-7e, 9a).

AGAINST THE SIGHTLOVERS, AGAIN Now we are in a position to better understand Plato's second argument against the sightlovers.

1. Knowledge is set over what is, and ignorance is set over what is not (477ab); belief is set over what is and is not (478a-e). 2. Hence knowledge entails true belief, ignorance entails false belief, and (mere) belief entails neither true nor false belief. 3. For any property F, the many base their account of F on sensible (or observable or behavioral) properties (479a, 479e). 4. For any D-property F, the sensible property (properties) that the many fix on in their account of F both is [F] and is not [F] (479ab). 5. Hence, for any D-property F, the many's account of F leads to some truths and some falsehoods (479cd). 6. Hence, for any D-property F, the many have only belief about F (479de). 7. Hence, for any D-property F, if one is to have knowledge of F, one must not base one's account of F on sensible properties. 8. Hence, for any D-property F, if one is to have knowledge of F, one must base one's account of F on nonsensible properties. 9. Forms just are nonsensible, explanatory properties. 10. Hence, for any D-property F, one has knowledge of F iff one bases one's account of F on the Form of F (479e). 11. For any D-property F, philosophers base their account of F on nonsensible (explanatory) properties. 12. Hence, for any D-property F, philosophers base their account of F on the Form of F (479e). 13. Hence, for any D-property F, philosophers have knowledge of F (479e).

This reconstruction of the argument requires further commentary.

ESTI There is a question how to understand premise (1). We translate the Greek verb èsti` with the English verb `to be`. Èsti`, like ìs` in English, admits of at least three different interpretations here: existential, predicative, and veridical. This allows three different readings of (1).

• (1e) knowledge is set over what exists; ignorance over what does not exist; and belief over what exists and what does not exist. • (1p) knowledge is set over what is F; ignorance over what is not F; and belief over what is F and not-F. • (1v) knowledge is set over what is true; ignorance over what is false; and belief over what is true and false.

(2) results from understanding (1) as (1v). This (a) makes (1) more acceptable to the sightlovers, (b) makes best philosophical sense of the argument, and (c) fits what Plato says elsewhere about the relation between knowledge and true belief (esp. Meno 97b-99c, Tht 201c-d).

THE RANGE OF NONSENSIBLE FORMS The restriction to D-properties (e.g. relational, moral, and aesthetic properties) is necessary to accommodate the "finger passage" (523-5), which says that appeal to forms is necessary only where sensory accounts lead to compresence, as they do with moral properties, but not with the property of being a finger.

THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF Premise (1) together with Plato's association of knowledge with Forms and mere belief with sensibles lead commentators to think that he is endorsing a Two Worlds theory (TW) according to which there is knowledge only of forms not sensibles, and there is belief only of sensibles. However, TW would be an unwelcome Platonic commitment.

1. TW would seem to undermine the common view that we can progress from belief to knowledge about one and the same thing by tying the original belief down with an explanatory account (Meno 97e 98a). 2. TW would underwrite skepticism about the sensible world, which would make it very difficult to see why we should want philosophers to rule. 3. Plato clearly contradicts TW; he claims that he and others have only beliefs about the various Forms, including the Form of the Good (505e 506a, 506c, 515e 516a, 517bc) and that philosophers do have knowledge of the sensible world (520c).

THE DIVIDED LINE (509d-511c, 533c-534e) AND THE CAVE (514-20) Plato divides our cognitive states into two parts: belief or opinion (endoxa) and knowledge (episteme). Each of these is also divided in two: belief into (L1) conjecture (eikesia) and (L2) confident opinion (pistis) and knowledge into (L3) thought (dianoia) and (L4) understanding (nous). The distinctions might be understood in terms of the degree of justification and truth implications associated with each state. L1 is unclear and concerns appearances (509d); L2 is concerned with sensible particulars that cause appearances (510a); L3 introduces reflection on nonsensible properties, but this reflection is mediated by sensible images and relies on hypotheses (510b-511a, 511c; cf. 435d, 437a, 506c-e); L4 eschews sensible images and tries to remove hypotheses by linking them in one overall explanatory scheme governed by the Form of the Good (510b, 511bc, 517c1, 533c-534c). The image of the Cave is isomorphic to that of the Divided Line: C1 (the prisoners looking at shadows) corresponds to L1; C2 (the prisoners looking at models that cause shadows) to L2; C3 (ex-cons studying real objects through reflections and representations) to L3; and C4 (ex-cons studying objects themselves) to L4 (517b). After achieving C4/L4 philosophers return to the cave (520c).

PLATO'S AUTHORITARIANISM The guardians of the ideal state regulate the behavior of citizens so as to preserve NDL. They are free to implement NDL by whatever means they deem necessary. They have discretion to lie if this promotes social stability or happiness (389c, 459c). They should censor literary and artistic works that do not adequately represent the virtuous life or promote unity (377e-, 399e, 401b). They should install eugenics policies that will produce the best possible offspring (456e, 459d e, 460c, 536a). They should promulgate the myth that people are born with various mixtures of the metals gold, silver, and bronze in their souls. Predominantly gold souls will 14 be rulers; predominantly silver souls will be auxiliaries; and predominantly bronze souls will be artisans (415a-c). Rulers ascertain the proportion of the metals in anyone's soul. They are politically unaccountable; the other classes cannot hold public office, and they have no voting rights. In assessing Plato's authoritarianism, we must remember that the political institutions of the Republic are for ideal theory. Plato says little about non-ideal theory in the Republic. He does not think that the ideal state is impossible (499bc, 502c), but he does think that genuine philosophers are rare (428e, 491ab, 503b) and that popular prejudice will make it difficult to realize the ideal state (488a-489a, 502c, 516e-517a; cf. 592ab). At one point, he suggests that we might try to approximate the ideal (437ab), but we should not assume that he thinks that we should accept authoritarian rule by non-philosophers. Indeed, in the Statesman Plato claims that whereas monarchy is the best ideal constitution, democracy is the best non-ideal constitution (302e6-8, 303a-b). If so, we should assess aristocratic rule for the circumstances for which it is defended, namely, ideal circumstances in which philosophers can be found and convinced to rule.

PLATO AND MILL It is tempting to suppose that Plato simply fails to see the moral importance of individual liberty. But it is surprising to see the extent to which Plato can accept many of the claims of liberals, such as J.S. Mill, about the importance of individual liberties. In On Liberty Mill distinguishes paternalistic restrictions of liberty from restrictions of liberty based upon the harm principle (i 9, iv 1-4, v 2). A's restriction of B's liberty is paternalistic if it is done for B's own sake; it is an application of the harm principle when its objective is to prevent harm to someone other than B. At some points, Mill appears to say that liberty may be restricted iff the restriction is an application of the harm principle (e.g. i 9).

PATERNALISM If we could justify a blanket prohibition on paternalism, we would seem to have a good argument against Plato. Mill offers two explicit arguments against paternalism.

1. State power is liable to abuse (v 20-3). 2. Even well intentioned rulers will misidentify the good of citizens; because an agent is a more reliable judge of his own good, even well intentioned rulers will promote the good of their citizens less well than would the citizens themselves (iv 4, 12).

But Plato's ideal state seems immune to these complaints. His guardians are by nature not liable to corruption, and he introduces various institutional safeguards against their corruption, viz. communal family and property. Nor does Plato think that each person is the best judge of his own good; philosophers alone have this sort of knowledge about the good of the citizens. So far, Mill's arguments provide no principled rejection of paternalism, because they contain no case against successful paternalism (i.e. restrictions on B's liberty that do make B better- off). But Plato has attempted to ensure that all paternalism in the ideal state will be successful.

CENSORSHIP As Books II, III, and X show, many of the restrictions on liberty in the ideal state take the form of censorship. Mill mentions four reasons for ensuring free speech.

1. A censored opinion might be true (ii 1-20, 41). 2. Even if literally false, a censored opinion might contain part of the truth (ii 34-39, 42). 3. Even if wholly false, a censored opinion would prevent true opinions from becoming dogma (ii 1-2, 7, 20-33, 43). 4. As a dogma, an unchallenged opinion will lose its meaning (ii 26, 43). 15

(1)-(2) defend freedom of expression as an instrumental means to promoting true belief (or perhaps the ratio of true to false belief). Do (1) and (2) undermine the censorship exercised by philosopher-kings? Plato seems immune to this argument against censorship, given his assumptions about the nature and capacities of philosophers and non-philosophers. Knowledge of Forms is necessary for knowledge about moral and political matters, and philosophers alone have knowledge of Forms. If so, true belief seems better guaranteed by allowing philosophers to regulate belief than by allowing non-philosophers selection in the "marketplace of ideas." (1)-(2) present no challenge to reliable censors who censor all and only false beliefs. But Mill also believes that there would be something wrong with censorship even if the censors were perfectly reliable (ii 2). Here is where (3)-(4) are relevant. Mill appears to believe that freedom of expression is important because it is essential to the proper exercise of our deliberative capacities, in particular, our capacities for theoretical and practical reason. As cognitively limited beings, we require free exchange of ideas in order to expand our menu of options and to better understand the comparative merits of the items on this menu.

LIBERTIES AND DELIBERATIVE CAPACITIES This argument for free speech is really just a special case of Mill's more general argument for the importance of various liberties of thought and action that appeals to the role of liberties in the realization of our progressive -- deliberative -- natures. If we ground the importance of individual liberties in the exercise of deliberative capacities, what basis do we have for rejecting Plato's authoritarianism? Plato does not recognize liberty or self-expression as a part or constituent of happiness; happiness is being ruled by one's rational part or by the reason of another if one's own rational capacities are too weak (590cd). Because, on his view, non-philosophers are incapable of justifying their beliefs, (3) and (4) do not show freedom of speech to be part of their good. Perhaps surprisingly, Mill accepts similar restrictions on the scope of his defense of individual liberty.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered in its nonage. ... Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion [i 10].

Whereas liberty is a necessary condition for what is intrinsically valuable, it is not itself valuable and not extrinsically valuable for those without sufficiently developed rational faculties. Plato can accept this account of the importance of individual liberties. His authoritarianism rests less on illiberal moral and political commitments than on his conception of human nature and the distribution of deliberative capacities. But even if rational capacities are not distributed equally, artisans and auxiliaries are neither children nor childlike; their good consists in their developing their rational capacities and assuming as much directive control of their own souls as is possible. Plato himself recognizes that everyone has a rational part (518c). If so, and if, as he believes, political institutions should be designed to promote the interests of each citizen (F1), then political institutions should develop everyone's capacities for deliberative control of their lives. But deliberative control of this sort presumably involves participation in public deliberations, a 16 significant sphere for self-control and private deliberation, and informed and reflective assessment of alternatives in both public and private deliberation. We can now see more clearly what is wrong with Platonic love and Plato's conception of the way in which guardians should express their concern for the welfare of their citizens. If, as Plato believes, my own good consists in my exercising directive control over my appetites and passions, then another cannot express proper concern for me for my own sake by trying to improve me in ways in which my own deliberations play no essential role. Concern for another must attempt to improve an agent's deliberative capacities in ways that engage those capacities.7

7 Some of these claims are developed in my "Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community."