Autonomy, Disinterest, and Entrepreneurial Science

AUTONOMY, DISINTEREST, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE

Sheldon Krimsky

here is general agreement among a wide spectrum comprises the elite universities that award doctoral de- Tof informed observers that, beginning in the late grees. To be classified a category I institution in the 1970s and early 1980s, American research universities AAUP database, a university must grant a minimum of underwent changes that brought them greater commer- 30 doctoral-level degrees annually, awarded by three or cialization. The changes involved: more unrelated disciplines. Category II institutions either do not grant doctoral degrees or they grant too few z Greater emphasis on intellectual property to qualify as Category I. The lowest rung of the classi-

z Stronger ties between academia and the private fication consists of two-year colleges whose faculty has sector, including research and development part- no ranks. Between the first and second ranked schools nerships (Categories I and II) the average full professor salaries differ by $25,000 (Academe, March/April 2005). z Greater emphasis on research over teaching and Out of 3,773 institutions AAUP surveyed in 2004- service 05, about 8 percent (299) were classified as Category I. However, Category I institutions have 48 percent of the z Less concern about protecting traditional academic values such as free and open exchange of ideas, total faculty in the entire system of universities: 176,000 and sharing of biological materials such as cell out of 368,000. Moreover, the top 200 research institu- lines tions accounted for 95 percent of all the Research and Development (R&D) expenditures in 1997 (National z More emphasis in new income streams whatever Science Foundation, Science & Engineering Indicators, their source. 2000). It is certainly true that universities aspire to become Category I because that is where the prestige lies, z Institutional involvement in business ventures, eq- and where there are better salaries, lower teaching sched- uity partnerships, and new faculty startup com- ules, and more amenities. panies. In recent years, American universities have become There is no consensus about the meaning of these more commercialized and more managerially (and there- changes. Are they simply an accentuation of trends that fore less democratically) administered. These observa- already existed? Do they represent changes in degree tions are supported by indicators such as patents, a proxy rather than in kind? Do they foreshadow a new ethos in measure of the commercial orientation of faculty, and science and/or a new breed of professoriate? Is there a reported declines in faculty governance. The number of change in the norms of “disinterestedness” and “au- patents obtained by universities has risen dramatically tonomy” within academic science? Will closer ties be- from 96 granted in 1965 to 3,200 in 2000. Similarly, tween academia and business portend less independence private sector contributions to university R&D budgets for the university? Is this a permanent and irreversible have grown. There has also been a trend in university change or can some traditional values be restored? investment into faculty start-up companies and Offices Several of these questions require a careful historical of Technology Transfer on campuses. study of American research universities. Because the University R&D funding from industry was 2.5 per- United States does not have a homogeneous system of cent in 1966 and rose to about 4.1 percent in 1980, 6.1 universities, the effects are not being felt uniformly. percent in 1992, and then to 7.7 percent in 2000. Ac- The American Association of University Professors cording to the National Science Foundation’s Science (AAUP) collects and organizes data based on a five- and Technology Indicators, “The funds provided for part classification system of universities. Category I academic R&D by the industrial sector grew faster than

22 SOCIETY • MAY/JUNE 2006 funding from any other source during the past three 1. The investigator selects the subject matter of the decades although industrial support still accounts for study. A biologist trained in genetics can choose one of the smallest shares of funding” (National Sci- from an array of research programs from human ence Foundation 2000). Expressing the changing R&D to bacterial genetics, from analysis of existing budgets of universities on average does not tell the whole life to synthesis of new life, or from clinical ge- story. Averages can fluctuate and obfuscate what is oc- netics to behavioral genetics. A frontier area of curring at any given institution. The number of univer- research—such as endocrine disruptors or sities whose industry contribution to its R&D funding epigenetics—might attract new investigators. The exceeds twice the average or about 15 percent appears new area of research might be given primacy for to be rising. In 2000, Duke University received 35 per- federal funding, which signals the researcher to cent of its R&D budget from industry, followed by apply—but does not dictate it. Or a new technol- Georgia Tech with 24 percent, Penn State with 17 per- ogy like micro-arrays in genomics might also cent, and University of Texas with 15 percent. Smaller attract new users among scientists in the light of schools also followed the trend: Alfred University, new grant opportunities. Although external fund- University of Tulsa, Eastern Virginia Medical School, ing opportunities play a large role in shaping what and Lehigh University had 48, 32, 24, and 22 percent, people decide to study, it is still their choice on respectively, of industry contributions to their R&D how they want to frame a study, which grants to budgets (D. Stein, Buying In or Selling Out? 2004). apply for, what methodology to use or, in the Given the changes in university culture and funding, context of declining support, whether to switch we may question whether the norms of autonomy and areas of research or to stop doing sponsored disinterestedness have changed among academic scien- works. tists. Before we can address these claims, we should not assume that the meanings of these terms are gener- 2. Methods and protocols developed to undertake ally understood. If the autonomy of scientists has de- the research are the choice of the investigator clined, then against what standard is it measured? And and not imposed on the investigator by a spon- with respect to disinterestedness, what does that mean sor. and how can we assess or interpret a change in it? 3. Data that comes from the investigation is con- I shall address these questions by examining the controlled by the investigator and his/her research cepts of autonomy and disinterestedness in relationship team and not by the funding source. to science. I shall explore how and under what conditions these terms are relevant to scientific practice in 4. Interpretation of results is largely the responsi- the context of what some observers have referred to as bility of the investigative team and not subject to the new era of academic capitalism. external control by a funding agency or sponsor. 5. Publication of the results is also controlled by Autonomy the researchers involved in the study. Because of Absolute autonomy in the university is a myth. It concerns that research sponsors impose covenants would involve a set of conditions that allow a scientist on scientists restricting publication of certain find- to investigate any problem he or she chooses, regard- ings, the International Committee of Medical less of the cost, and without any external accountabil- Journal Editors has issued guidelines to partici- ity—such as peer review or human subjects commit- pating journals. Authors must sign an affidavit tees. This is not a functional view of autonomy. Surely, that they and not the sponsors are in control of it is not reasonable to assume that a scientist has the the publication. right to pursue any investigation (other than pencil and paper operations that do not require external support) Autonomy in the university extends beyond the regardless of cost, ethical impact, merit, social values, investigator’s choice of research project, control of the or environmental consequences. But relative autonomy methodology, ownership of data, and the right to inter- is not unrealistic and distinguishes university profes- pret results. It also means the right of faculty to speak sors from scientists in other sectors. It operates within freely and independently on subjects of their expertise the constraints of peer review, the funding sources, or for that matter on any subject that they choose. This human and animal subject requirements, and account- is what we generally mean by academic freedom. ability to other legal and ethical norms. The legal concept of academic freedom has been Relative autonomy requires the following minimum traced back to Germany around 1850 when the Prus- conditions: sian Constitution asserted the freedom of scientific re-

AUTONOMY, DISINTEREST, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE 23 search (Freiheit der Wissenschaft). Harvard University, contested hydrogeology of contamination, the role of chartered in 1650, appointed Edward Wigglesworth its public agencies, and the behavior of a multinational first professorship (of Divinity) in 1722 without limit corporation at the center of the controversy. Before the of time, ushering in the tenure system into North report was issued, a vice president of the company tried America. to block publication and dissemination of the students’ At the turn of the twentieth century, Edward A. Ross, study by lobbying the president of my university. The Stanford University economist and secretary of the president had not seen the report and could not com- American Economics Association, spoke out in favor ment on its veracity. But he did understand the concept of municipal ownership of utilities and supported the of academic freedom in the university. The quality of socialist Eugene V. Debs for his presidential bid. Ross the report was my responsibility—not the president’s was fired from Stanford University in 1900 because of nor the university. I could be sued but my university the influence of a member of the university Board of would not be held accountable in this case because it Trustees whose wealth was tied to the private owner- was not a party to a contract or grant. ship of utilities. Two philosophers, Arthur Lovejoy and When Robert Merton wrote about the autonomy of John Dewey acted in response to this abuse of board science it was in the context of the rise of fascism and power by establishing the American Association of the totalitarian state. He questioned how science, which University Professors (AAUP). AAUP first issued the is embedded in the social order, can remain indepen- doctrine on tenure in 1915. It changed the balance of dent from state ideology, while it is largely dependent power at American universities and established the idea on state resources? Merton saw a growing tension be- that professors with tenure had a measure of autonomy, tween the scientific and political cultures. “The con- at least in principle, to speak freely and undertake re- flict between the totalitarian state and the scientist de- search in areas of their choosing without controls placed rives in part, then, from an incompatibility between on them by their institution—administrators or Board the ethic of science and the new political code which is of Trustees—and without the fear that they could lose imposed upon all, irrespective of occupational creed” their position because of what they believed or wrote. (R. Merton, Social Structure and Social Theory, 1957, The privilege of tenure, which included protected speech 541). Scientific autonomy means that scientists can and employment, was adopted by most American uni- operate according to their professionally derived norms versities by the mid-twentieth century as a result of the rather than the dicta of state ideology. Currently, scien- continued leadership and influence of the American tific autonomy is threatened by a president who intro- Association of University Professors. Without job se- duces religious and political beliefs as a litmus test for curity and academic freedom, it can be argued, there responsible science (C. Mooney, The Republican War would be no autonomy in the professoriate. Against Science, 2005). “Science must not suffer itself During the period of the 1950s, a number of univer- to become the handmaiden of theology or economy or sities fell prey to the cult of Senator Joseph McCarthy, state. The function of this sentiment is likewise to pre- who exploited the public’s fears about the spread of serve the autonomy of science” (Merton 1957, 543). In communism. A number of faculty who were known to 1938, Merton addressed the autonomy of science, as an be Marxists or socialists or simply open-minded enough institution, when it faced threats by authoritarian state to discuss these ideas were fired for being a national interests. He wrote, “the social stability of science can security risk and, therefore, untrustworthy to hold aca- be ensured only if adequate defences are set up against demic positions. changes imposed from outside the scientific fraternity Of course, tenure does not guarantee a fair wage, itself” (R. K. Merton, “Science and the Social Order” salary increases, or a good working environment. There Philosophy of Science 5 [July 1938]: 328). remain many ways that outspoken faculty with minor- Autonomy in science is more complex, however, than ity views can be punished and ostracized. There is no protection of the scientific subculture from a totalitar- absolute protection against academic tyranny, but job ian state. To understand this we have to recognize that security and the protection of “academic freedom” of decline in autonomy may arise externally or internally. speech remain strong protection in universities that are External causes of decline result from factors outside not replicated widely in other sectors of society. the control of the scientist, where power and authority My own case illustrates the point. While a young are taken from him or her. As an example, suppose a untenured professor, I supervised a class research project scientist requires funding for research but can only get where students investigated a controversy over the con- the funds from a sponsor who requires control over tamination of an aquifer in a small New England town. how the data shall be interpreted? Similarly, a scientist Under my direction, the students prepared a report on might give up control to the sponsor of designing a

24 SOCIETY • MAY/JUNE 2006 research protocol in exchange for receiving funding for where faculty may have tenure but must raise their own the study. salary from sponsored research. An internal decline in autonomy results from the The case of Tyrone Hayes, an endocrinologist at the choices made by the individual scientist, who chooses University of California at Berkeley shows what hap- to conform to a new social structure within the univer- pens when funding imperatives meet the core values of sity. For example, scientists who start their own com- an investigator. Hayes, who studied the effects of low panies and continue as full-time professors will em- concentrations of the herbicide atrazine on frogs, found body a new corporate persona. The norms and values that minute amounts of the chemical inhibit the devel- of the corporate scientist are different from those of an opment of the frog’s larynx and feminize males. His academic scientist in as much as the latter will more research initially received funding from the private sec- likely feel freer to criticize products and activities that tor. When his sponsors learned that he was getting posi- appear in conflict with the public interest. Once the tive results they tried to delay publication because the norms of the commercial culture are superimposed onto studies were not in their financial interest. The contract the university, the autonomy of the academic scientist he signed stated that the company retained the final say is destined to decline. Professors (like other workers) over what could be published. Hayes eventually disas- will eventually internalize the values of their institu- sociated from the company and reasserted his right to tions. publish his findings (Chronicle of Higher Education, Also, a person who was hired at the university but October 31, 2003). who does not have the security of tenure, loses some There is no absolute autonomy in science. Those autonomy—or the protection against dismissal result- scientists who do not work in a hierarchical institution, ing from his or her alignment with unpopular views who are not beholden to a single source of external including political and intellectual deviance. Autonomy, funding, or possess no external funding at all, who have academic freedom, and the tenure system are interlock- academic freedom and are not self-constrained or ex- ing and mutually reinforcing systems. It is possible to ternally constrained from exercising it, whose liveli- have the benefits of academic freedom and tenure but hoods are not wholly dependent on external funding yet decide not to use either in the ways that a fully (soft money), who are not financially or professionally autonomous professor might. In other words, there is vulnerable to pressure for suppressing or distorting re- something we can call autonomous self-repression results or for remaining silent while others violate the sulting from the adaptation of an academic to an emerg- ethical norms of science, score higher on the scale of ing corporate culture that has colonized the university. autonomy, ceteris parabus, than those who cannot claim A faculty member who is also involved with a startup to be working under these condition. company is straddling two cultures, one that has a tra- Government scientists report greater constraints on dition of independence of thought and critical self-ex- their scientific autonomy than academic scientists. Those pression and the other that is premised on withholding government scientists who speak freely end up either public criticism that might malign the corporate name taking on the role of “whistle blower” or becoming or create enemies in an industry that works out its dif- marginalized by their federal agency. ferences though backroom negotiations and quiet liti- University administrators also can exert pressure on gation rather than public discourse. scientists whom they view as a liability or embarrass- Many scientists require research funding in order to ment to the institution. For example, Theodore Postol, do their work. Often, they will follow the fashions of a professor of security studies at MIT issued a critique the funding sources by necessity. There are some fields of the effectiveness of the Patriot missile system. His like philosophy, classical studies, mathematics, litera- institution, MIT, had an interest in a positive evalua- ture and the like that produce scholarship without much tion of the missile shield since the developer of the funding, if any at all. Because their choices are less Patriot missile, Raytheon, sponsored research at MIT. constrained by funding opportunities, I would argue Because the university system has traditionally been that they have more autonomy to select their areas of non-hierarchical and protective of basic job security study than other scientists who must work within the for its faculty, the opportunity still exists for professors constraints of sponsored research. Nevertheless, there to exercise a higher degree of autonomy even under the is still an advantage to autonomy in university science risk of marginalization and recriminations in salary and over that of industry or government, particularly when space by their institution (Boston Globe Magazine, sponsored research does not determine whether the in- October 23, 2005). It is testimony to the importance of dividual has a job, in other words where “soft money” autonomy that some academics embrace it—in the pub- is survival. Many medical schools operate on a system lic interest—despite the penalties they incur.

AUTONOMY, DISINTEREST, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE 25 In 1937, Robert Merton delivered a talk to the Notwithstanding these rather idealized views of the American Sociological Society Conference titled “Sci- emotionally detached and disinterested scientist, there ence and the Social Order,” subsequently reprinted in is the popular image of the multi-vested scientist who the journal, Philosophy of Science, in which he stated: holds many competing personal, professional, institu- “The sentiments embodied in the ethos of science— tional, and fiduciary interests. How do we reconcile characterized by such terms as intellectual honesty, in- the norm of “disinterestedness” with the new profile of tegrity, organized skepticism, disinterestedness, imper- the entrepreneurial scientist? Let me proceed with a sonality—are outraged by the set of new sentiments typology of interests held by contemporary academic which the State would impose in the sphere of scien- scientists: tific research” (Merton 1938, 327). As previously noted, 1. Predilection (intellectual, ideological and/or Merton was responding largely to the growth of fas- emotional attachment) to a hypothesis or theory. cism and its challenge to the autonomy of science. He continued in his later writings to emphasize “disinterest- 2. Applied applications of inquiry. edness” as a norm of scientific activity without defining it outright. His writings indicate that by “disinterestedness” 3. Patent or intellectual property derived from a he meant “of no concern for the utility of science” in- research discovery. cluding any fame or fortune it can bring the scientist. 4. Financial interests in the sponsor of the research Consider the following passage from his 1938 paper (p. beyond funding. 328). “One sentiment which is assimilated by the scientist from the very outset of his training pertains to the 5. Propensity toward and interest in a positive out- purity of science. Science must not suffer itself to become (for publication). come the handmaiden of theology or economy or state.” 6. Academic promotion. Disinterestedness 7. Securing a grant. One of Merton’s interpreters and colleagues Norman Storer wrote: “In Merton’s original delineation of dis- 8. Implications of the science on public policy. interestedness he relates it almost exclusively to pro- 9. Ethical significance of the science. hibiting the scientist from making the search for professional recognition his explicit goal” (N. Storer, The 10. Professional standing among scientific peer Social System of Science, 1966, 79). The currency of group. science, according to Storer, can only be its contribution to knowledge, as an end in itself. Any other com- 11. Equity interest in a company with a commercial modities consciously sought from the work such as fame interest in one’s work. or money would denigrate the integrity of the enter- 12. Paid consultant in one’s area of expertise. prise. He states that “the norm [disinterestedness] acts primarily to prohibit the scientist from planning his Some have argued that these interests are indistin- work so that he will personally benefit from it in terms guishable with respect to their potential influencing of money, influence, public esteem, or even profes- effects on a scientist’s judgment and therefore empha- sional reputation” (Storer 1966, 102). Storer also in- sizing financial interests is a form of political correct- cludes in the norm of “disinterestedness” an emotional ness (K. Rothman, Journal of the American Medical detachment from any theory or hypothesis in which the Association 269: 2782, 1993). However, the popular scientist may be investigating. Such an attachment can culture, professional organizations, legislators, and sci- result in inflexibility and recalcitrance toward accept- entific/medical journals have selected “financial inter- ing negative results. ests” as a special category. The requirement of trans- parency of any real or perceived financial conflicts of Emotional neutrality, hand in hand with rational- interest speaks to the special consideration placed on ity and universalism, enjoin the Scientist to avoid monetary relationships between scientists and other so much emotional involvement in the work that parties related to the subject matter of their research. he cannot adopt a new approach or reject an old But is it justified? answer, when his findings suggest that this is nec- essary, or that he unintentionally distorts his find- Distinguishing Financial Conflicts of Interest ings in order to support a particular hypothesis. It is true that all scientists have multiple interests in (Storer 1966, 80) their work, whether financial or otherwise. But is there

26 SOCIETY • MAY/JUNE 2006 a rational basis for distinguishing a scientist’s financial cided empirically, it is understood by the scientific com- interest from other interests such as seeking fame or munity that a preference for one hypothesis over an- promotion or desiring a positive outcome from a study other can influence the interpretation of data. In an- to maximize the chance of publication? other example, scientists are beginning to question the The argument that all interests are fungible and that somatic mutation theory of cancer (cancer begins from financial interests cannot and should not justifiably be a mutated cell) and in its place have proposed a field set apart for ethical considerations is disingenuous on theory of cancer etiology whereby neoplasms arise from several counts. First, our legal and regulatory institu- the interaction between bodily cells and tissues. No one tions have long distinguished financial interests from doubts that a scientist’s association with one theory or other types of relationships and interests. The Ethics in hypothesis over a competitor will shape his or her in- Government Act, for example, places special emphasis terpretation of experimental evidence. on government employees who have financial interests We expect scientists to become passionate about their associated with their public responsibilities in policy or theories. It is part of the social and psychological en- regulatory matters. Section 208(a) in the rule issued by terprise of science that scientists advocate for a pre- the Office of Government Ethics prohibits employees ferred explanatory framework. The eminent twentieth- of the executive branch from participating in an offi- century philosopher of science Karl Popper believed cial capacity in matters in which they, or persons or that scientists should seek to falsify their theories be- entities in which they have a relationship, have finan- cause theory verification, unlike theory falsification, cial interests. Senior government officials must set aside was logically impossible. He wrote: their stock holdings in a blind trust, but they are not …what characterizes the empirical method is its required to set aside their friendships or disqualify them- manner of exposing to falsification, in every con- selves from votes because of friendships or campaign ceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is support. Judges, on the other hand, are expected to re- not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on cuse themselves in cases where they have a financial the contrary, to select the one which is by com- interest or personal association. The judiciary has a parison the fittest, by exposing them all to the higher ethical standard than other federal and state gov- fiercest struggle for survival. (K. Popper, Logic ernment employees. of Scientific Discovery, 1959, 42) Second, some interests cannot be disassociated from the scientific enterprise. For example, the desire for While it is true that most scientists do not seek to fame, professional advancement, or to win the race to falsify their hypotheses, the norm of organized skepti- scientific discovery are inextricably part of the enter- cism obligates the scientific community to subject a prise of science. While it is plausible that such interests theory or hypothesis to the most rigorous examination can bias the outcome of one’s scientific work, they can- possible to determine if it stands up against the evi- not be distilled from the practice of science. The Ko- dence at least as well as other explanations. rean stem cell scientist Hwang Woo Suk appeared to be Thus, it can be argued that it is part of the enterprise on the path to international fame as the first scientist of science that scientists align themselves with one or allegedly to clone a dog and human embryonic stem another explanatory framework. These interests have cells. The drive for international honor and prestige, become part of their intellectual legacy, which is open both for Dr. Suk and his country, blinded him to the stan- to public view in their scholarly writings. Any bias as- dards of honesty and integrity in science. In an investiga- sociated with a scientist’s propensity toward one theory tion of his claims, Seoul National University administra- or another can be discussed and addressed in open com- tors charged Dr. Suk with fabricating scientific data. He munication with the scientific community. subsequently resigned from his institution admitting to In contrast, a scientist’s financial interest in the sub- having submitted false data in a major publication (New ject matter of his or her research is typically not in the York Times, December 21, 2005, A1). public record and cannot be helpful in judging episte- Third, a scientist’s predilection for a certain theory mological bias. In other words, financial bias is outside or hypothesis is generally part of his or her published the discourse of rational debate. It should also be rec- record. Nothing is hidden about a scientist’s preferred ognized that good science can be produced without fi- approach toward understanding or explaining physical nancial interests in the outcome of research, but cannot phenomenon. One scientist may accept the linear dose- be done without a scientist’s epistemological and psy- response relationship for chemicals at very low doses, chological interests in the outcome. while another might support the threshold hypothesis. If one were to examine the effect of conflicts of Because the correct hypothesis cannot currently be de- interests on the bias of research, it would be possible to

AUTONOMY, DISINTEREST, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE 27 design a study that investigated whether financial in- investigators began by screening 1,664 original research terests were more heavily weighted toward one out- articles. These were culled to 144 that were potentially come over another. A group of such studies was con- eligible for their analysis. They ended up with 37 stud- ducted in drug research and the reports will be ies that met their criteria and found 11 that showed summarized in this article. Investigators divided pub- industry-sponsored research confirmed a funding ef- lished papers into two groups. One group consisted of fect: authors who were funded by government or nonprofit Although only 37 articles met [our] inclusion cri- organizations. In another group of matched studies au- teria, evidence suggests that the financial ties that thors received their funding from for-profit companies. intertwine industry, investigators and academic Using selected outcomes such as potential risks associ- institutions can influence the research process. ated with the drug or efficacy comparing new versus Strong and consistent evidence shows that indus- old versions of a drug, the investigators were able to try-sponsored research tends to draw pro-indus- determine whether financial interests correlated with try conclusions. (J. E. Bekelman et al. Journal of interests of the for-profit sponsor. American Medical Association 289 [January 22/ Such studies can be undertaken because “holding a 29, 2003]: 463) financial interest” or “receiving funding from a for- profit sponsor” is a contingent part of any study, and The fact that “possessing a financial interest” in one’s thus can be compared to a control group where these research has a biasing effect is a troubling finding for relationships do not appear. The same is not true about science. Simply disclosing the effect does not mini- having a passion for one’s hypothesis or seeking recog- mize or bring to light the particular bias. The funding nition for one’s work. All scientists share these inter- effect raises the question of whether scientists who hold ests and as a result their influences are ubiquitous, miti- such interests can be “disinterested,” whether as a norm gating the possibility of a controlled study for “disinterestedness” is linked to objectivity, and whether ascertaining the effects of such interests. “financial conflict of interest” is a good predictor of For the above reasons, the financial interest of sci- bias. entists as a source of potential bias remains an area of The distinguished British physicist John Ziman, who concern among journal editors, members of the print contributed important scholarship to the sociology of media (where conflict of interest among journalists is a science, tackled these issues in his book Real Science. serious matter), medical societies, and government eth- He observed that science was undergoing a transforma- ics committees. tion from its traditional role in universities pursuing basic research to a new variant he called post-academic Funding Effect and Objectivity science. According to Ziman, “post-academic scientists Beginning around the mid-1980s, medical sociolo- are expected to be continually conscious of the poten- gists and biomedical ethicists began to study whether tial applications of their work” (J. Ziman, Real Sci- corporate-funded research was more biased toward the ence, 2000, 74). Moreover, he believes that the norm sponsor as compared to similar research funded by non- of disinterestedness no longer applies in most contem- profit institutions or government agencies. Within a porary science. “What cannot be denied is that the aca- decade, a body of work had evolved that confirmed the demic norm of disinterestedness no longer operates…. “funding effect” in studies on the safety and efficacy of Even the genteel pages of the official scientific drugs. Some examples follow. One report found that literature…are being bypassed by the self-promoting press authors with financial interests in drug studies were 10- releases” (Ziman, 2000, 162). 20 times less likely to present negative findings com- However, Ziman does not view the loss of disinter- pared to those without such interests (L. S. Friedman estedness as epistemologically connected to the demise and E. D. Richter, Journal of General Internal Medi- of objectivity. Rather, he argues, objectivity can be pre- cine 19 [2004]: 54). In another study, the author re- served in post-academic science even with the loss of ported that “in no case was a therapeutic agent manu- disinterestedness. An individual scientist’s interests will factured by the sponsoring company found to be inferior be sorted out, selected, and adjusted for bias by the to an alternative product manufactured by another com- community of scientists who will operate with the other pany” (R. A. Davidson, Journal of General Internal critical norms including organized skepticism (rigor- Medicine 1 [1986]: 155). A third study design took the ously critiquing every result and testing it for its valid- form of a meta-analysis where the authors reviewed ity); communalism (sharing information); and univer- numerous published papers to determine whether the salism (operating under a shared set of criteria and source of funding had an effect on the outcome. The scientific methodology). Ziman writes:

28 SOCIETY • MAY/JUNE 2006 The production of objective knowledge thus de- of science that is blended seamlessly into commerce is pends less on genuine personal “distinterestedness” neither desirable nor inevitable. Craig Calhoun’s con- than on the effective operation of the other norms, tribution provides an excellent overview and diagnosis especially the norms of communalism, universal- of the problem, but I take issue with his comment that ism and skepticism. So long as post-academic sci- “it is important to realize there is no easy return to ence abides by these norms its long term cogni- some earlier, better version of the university.” The pen- tive objectivity is not in serious doubt…but provided dulum in academia has swung out of balance on more that organized skepticism continues to be prac- than one occasion—two examples being the McCarthy ticed conscientiously, we need not revise our be- period and the Vietnam War. Subsequently, most uni- lief—or otherwise—in the “objective reality” of versities reinstituted their traditional values of aca- the scientific world view. (Ziman, 2000, 159) demic freedom and unclassified research. Efforts are currently underway to protect academia from egre- What becomes lost in the age of post-academic sci- gious commercialization and we may yet see the pen- ence is short-term “social objectivity” or what Ziman dulum return to a place where external influences, describes as the public’s trust in science. Ziman trusts such as Big Pharma and tobacco money, do not dis- the self-correcting power of science as evidenced by tort research policy and damage scientific integrity. cases of scientific misconduct that come to light even Universities and independent research institutes are after generations. This is why, I believe, Ziman con- beginning to understand the importance of reestab- siders that the loss of social trust in science will be lishing public trust in science while rewarding au- restored once science corrects itself. But not all pub- tonomy and disinterestedness. lished knowledge is rechecked. Few experiments are or even can be replicated. It could take many years before mistakes are corrected or fraud, misconduct, and bias FURTHER READINGS are discovered. During this period there can be damage to human lives, particularly in drug research. Manu- Aronowitz, Stanley. 2000. The Knowledge Factory. Bos- factured tobacco science is such an example. If the fund- ton: Beacon Press. ing effect proves to be pervasive, then it tells us that Bok, Derek. 2003. Universities in the Marketplace. conflicts of interest distort objectivity. Whether the bi- Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. asing effect will be discovered and how long it will Greenberg, Daniel G. 2001. Science, Money and Politics. take is another question. But should we build a system Chicago: University of Chicago Press. of scientific integrity on the hope that we can in due Kassirer, Jerome P. 2004. On the Take. New York: Oxford time reverse the distortions of biased, commercially University Press. vested science rather than disinterestedness serving as Rodwin, Marc. 1993. Medicine, Money & Morals: Physi- the norm? cians’ Conflicts of Interest. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. Future of Autonomy and Disinterestedness Slaughter, Sheila, and Leslie, Larry L. 1997. Academic Both concepts make sense when applied to universi- Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the Entrepreneur- ties and independent research centers. The term “au- ial University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University tonomy” describes the scientist’s total control over his Press. or her research from planning and executing a study to Stein, Donald D., ed. 2004. Buying In or Selling Out? The the interpretation and publication of results. The ten- Commercialization of the American Research Uni- dency of some observers to give up disinterestedness as versity. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. a norm fails to distinguish financial interests external Weisbrod, Burton A., ed. 1998. To Profit or Not To Profit: to the practice and epistemology of science from those The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit interests that cannot be distilled from scientific work. Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. They also neglect to fully acknowledge the perva- siveness of the funding effect in science and its im- Sheldon Krimsky is professor of urban and environmental plications for objectivity. Moreover, scientific plu- policy and planning at Tufts University and adjunct pro- ralism—a marketplace of stakeholder interests—is not fessor in the Department of Public Health and Family Medi- a substitute for protecting the (financial) disinterested- cine at the Tufts School of Medicine. He is author of Sci- ness of academic science. Transformation to a new stage ence in the Private Interest (2003).

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