Eu-Turkey Relations and General Elections in Germany – Headwinds for Turkey?
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
EU-TURKEY RELATIONS AND GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GERMANY – HEADWINDS FOR TURKEY? DR. FUNDA TEKİN Director at Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin, Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies InBrief Series InBrief Series APRIL 2021 EU-TURKEY RELATIONS AND GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GERMANY – HEADWINDS FOR TURKEY? DR. FUNDA TEKİN Dr. Funda Tekin is Director at Institut für Europäische Politik in Berlin and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies (CETEUS) at the University of Cologne. She was Project Director of the H2020 Project “The Future of EU-Turkey Relations: Mapping Dynamics and Testing Scenarios” (FEUTURE), the Jean Monnet Network “Enhancing VIsibility of the Academic DialogUe on EU-Turkey CooperaTion” (VIADUCT) as well as the research project “TRIANGLE – Blickwechsel in EU/German-Turkish Relations Beyond Conflicts. Towards a Unique Partnership for a Contemporary Turkey?” funded by the Stiftung Mercator. She is also member of the board of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) and editing director of the academic quarterly integration. The analysis, views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Berlin Bosphorus Initiative. All rights reserved. On 26 September 2021 Germany is going to take First, they are going to mark the end of the to the polls to elect a new German Bundestag “Merkel” era that has lasted for 16 years. Ever and consequently a new government. These since her announcement that she would not general elections are taking place in turbulent run for another term as Chancellor, the so- times of the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic, called “K-Question” (who will run for Kanzler, an increasingly unstable EU neighborhood and i.e. Chancellor) has preoccupied the CDU/CSU- a changing world order. Additionally, relations camp. Second, the fact that the future Chancellor between the EU and Turkey have just reached will be someone other than Angela Merkel is the yet another all-time low at the end of 2020. Both only certainty about the elections. The question sides have given evidence of their willingness to of what combinations of party-coalition the mend the relationship in order to preserve their elections will make possible remains highly fragile framework of conflictual cooperation over uncertain. According to the latest polls the the past months. Yet, the tide can still turn either general elections will most likely put an end to towards a positive agenda or to a decision by the the era of the grand coalition because both the EU to finally apply restrictive measures against SPD and most recently the CDU/CSU have lost Turkey. substantial shares in voters’ support. Several coalition formations are conceivable ranging Even though EU-Turkey relations are rarely a top from the so-called Jamaica-coalition of CDU/CSU, priority topic in German general elections, Turkey the Greens and the liberal FDP or the so-called generally features in the election manifestos streetlight-coalition of SPD, FDP and Greens to of all campaigning political parties. Likewise, a black-red-green or a black-green coalition. German general elections can be of relevance While all such coalitions would be arithmetical for EU-Turkey relations. There are three reasons options, each of them would demand substantial why this year’s general elections are of particular compromises of the political parties involved. importance on this score. History has proven how difficult it is to form either one of these coalitions at the federal 2 InBrief Series APRIL 2021 level. In 2017, for instance the liberals drew out The approaching end of the ‘Merkel’ era could of the Jamaica coalition negotiations at the very represent another turning point in relations last minute. Third, in any case a government between Germany and Turkey as well as Turkey coalition without the participation of the Greens, and the EU. Yet, there are certain factors that that have almost tripled their electoral support render Germany’s approach to the relations from 8.4% in the 2017 elections to 22.3% in latest between the EU and Turkey rather sticky, which polls, seems to be a highly unlikely option. This deserve more detailed attention. means majorities in the Bundestag will shift and the government will change. Hence, this might have an impact on Germany’s policies towards Turkey and towards EU-Turkey relations. There The Trilemma of Germany’s Turkey and EU- is historical evidence that changes in government Turkey Policy coalitions in Germany have marked changes in EU-Turkey relations. The era of the red-green Political party positions on Turkey and EU- coalition government between 1998 and 2005 Turkey relations are generally tied down by the coincided with significant progress in EU-Turkey close, longstanding bilateral relations that are relations including the nomination of Turkey as particularly visible in their societal, political and one of EU’s accession candidates at the Helsinki economic dimensions. Germany is Turkey’s most Summit in 1999. Since Angela Merkel’s CDU important trade partner and source for Foreign has been forming the government, accession Direct Investments that constitute a fundamental negotiations have stagnated. Part of the pillar of the country’s economy. In 2020, the explanation might be the ‘Merkel-factor’, who bilateral trade volume amounted to 36.6 billion has never been a strong promoter of Turkish euros and an estimated 7.400 German companies membership in the EU and who has only half- and Turkish companies with German partnerships heartedly played along in complying with existing are active in the Turkish economy. Germany is path-dependencies. When she took office in 2005 among the most important countries for Turkey’s the decision to open accession negotiations had imports after Russia and China. The social and already been taken. Hence, within the framework cultural ties are similarly relevant, because almost of the principle of pacta sunt servanda she 3 million people who originate from Turkey live in did not seek to cancel this process but she Germany and their votes count. Turkey’s diaspora successfully promoted the open-ended nature politics that allow Turkish people living abroad to of these negotiations and the conditionality of vote in Turkish national elections and actively aim the EU’s so-called absorption capacity for Turkish to strengthen their identification with Turkey as a EU membership. prominent part of their national identities play an important role in the bilateral relationship and was Finally, it is also important to note that Ankara at the root of several conflicts. Turkey’s increasing perceives Berlin as a key actor in shaping EU institutionalization of identity building measures policy towards Turkey. This was particularly for instance via Ditib raise concerns in Germany. evident during the months of the so-called Hence, concepts of integration, the provision refugee crisis in Europe when Turkish leadership of religious services, extra-territorial voting and apparently understood Merkel to be the key election campaigning become critical questions of representative of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey at the the bilateral political agenda. The Kurdish diaspora political level. This means that changes in German living in Germany adds to those critical questions, leadership are likely to make a notable difference because domestic conflicts in Turkey spill over into in the terms of Ankara’s access to Brussels. Germany and become politically relevant. 3 InBrief Series APRIL 2021 While bilateral relations are very close, general Wind of Change in Party Positions support among the German population for Turkey’s EU membership is in constant decline. German political parties face this dilemma in In 2017, opposition to membership reached 84% different ways. For the SPD, Turkish-German and developments over the past years have given votes matter. Support for the social democrats no reason for improving the general perception is traditionally high among the Turkish diaspora of Turkey in Germany. in Germany. The majority of them initially came to Germany with the so-called “Gastarbeiter”- Turkey has certain expectations from Germany. programme in the 1960s and are hence organized Based on the strong bilateral economic ties, within trade unions that find their political Erdoğan sees in Germany a close ally within a partner in the SPD. In 2017, 45.3% of the people world order with increasing numbers of global of Turkish origin living in Germany voted for the trade disputes. He also views cooperation in SPD and only 12% for the CDU/CSU. Hence, for the fight against terrorism as highly important. the Christian Democrats, economic and strategic However, Germany and Turkey have a different interests are far more pivotal than Turkish- understanding regarding the definition of German votes. terrorist organisations, which has become most evident after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in However, party manifestos in electoral 2016. Turkey holds the Gülen movement, which campaigns since the general elections in 2013 is classified as Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation highlight a general trend of decreasing support (FETO), accountable for the coup attempt. for Turkey’s EU membership prospects across Germany does not define the Gülen movement all parties. While in 2013 at least the FDP and as a terrorist organisation, and hence is not able SPD generally supported Turkish accession to to meet Ankara’s demands for cooperation. the EU, this support had dissolved by 2017. Furthermore, while narratives of the EU-Turkey Positions ranged from outright rejection by the relationship have changed throughout the years Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – for cultural in Brussels and in the capitals of the EU member reasons – or qualified rejection by the CDU states, the dominant Turkish narrative has and DIE LINKE, to demands of termination of constantly been ‘EU membership’ regardless of accession negotiations in order to reboot the the state of play in relations.