Anthropology Versus Ontology Plessner and Jonas’S Readings of Heidegger’S Philosophy*

Anthropology versus Ontology Plessner and Jonas’s Readings of Heidegger’s Philosophy*

« Vivre » (leben) est une opération primordiale à partir de laquelle il devient possible de « vivre » (erleben) tel ou tel monde. (Merleau-Ponty) Leben birgt als eine seiner Möglichkeiten Existenz. (Plessner)

To begin with I will attempt to shed some light on the several points of convergence between Plessner and Jonas (I). In reference to these affinities it is all the more surprising that Jonas never quotes nor directly mentions Plessner in his writings. In the second section of my paper (II) I will then claim that Jonas’ silence is to be linked to the divergent approaches shaping their respective philosophical projects. I will then test back my claim in section (III) in reference to Plessner and Jonas’ dissimilar approaches to Heidegger’s ontology and particularly to his concept of “existentials”. Finally, in the fourth section (IV) I will try to outline what could have been Jonas’ answer to Plessner’s most cherished question : What is the ground of existence (Was fundiert Existenz) ?

I. Plessner’s and Jonas’ hermeneutics of life

Indisputably, Helmuth Plessner and Hans Jonas’ philosophical pro- posals display several affinities. This is so in particular when it comes to their common interest for the philosophy of the organic, as testified by their two major works, Plessner’s Levels of Organic Life and the Human (Plessner H., 2019 [1928])1 and Jonas’ The Phenomenon of Life

* I am very grateful to Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo for his helpful comments and for letting me read a private letter written to him by Lore Jonas and dated August 3rd, 2005. 1 Quotations from this work, unless otherwise indicated, rely on the recent English translation by Millay Hyatt. The pages indicated after the quotations are those of the original German edition, also referenced in the English translation.

(Jonas H., 1966). Both texts surely belong to the great classics of the 20th century on the topic. Despite reciprocal differences in terms of style and structure — Plessner’s book is systematically structured, while The Phenomenon of Life is an argument-based collection of essays — the two texts are in agreement regarding their main intent. By looking back under many respects at the German tradition of philosophy of nature, and by retrieving to some extent Aristotelian notions, they both embrace the inquiry on living beings as preliminary to and indispensable for any investigation in anthropology and ultimately also — especially according to Jonas — in ethics. As Helmuth Plessner puts it : « We must begin by clarifying what can be described as being alive before further steps are taken to develop a theory of the experience of life in its highest human layer » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 37). Based on similar premises, according to Jonas, even ethics is ultimately part of the philosophy of nature or, better to say, it is based upon an ontology of life : « Only an ethics which is grounded in the breadth of being, not merely in the singularity or oddness of man, can have significance in the scheme of things » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 284). The approach, method, and aim of the philosophy of the living are, for Plessner as for Jonas, irreducible to the parameters of natural sciences ; accordingly, they both firmly believe that the task of a “philosophical biology” or “biophilosophy” should not stop at the mere elu- cidation of sciences’ findings. Their main shared assumption is that it is possible to achieve a form of knowledge of nature even regardless of the exactitude of the scientific method ; and that only by assuming this latter as the only applicable method to the knowledge of nature, one reaches the reductionist conclusion that what surrounds us is but what can be scientifically verified (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 86). Differ- ently, according to Plessner « there is much more to the world than what can be observed » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 119 ; transl. slightly modified). That life cannot be grasped merely in terms of measurements, verifications, and analyses is clearly expressed also by Jonas’ well- known image of a « mathematician God ». A divine mathematician, that is to say a bodiless observer, would not be able to grasp « the point of life », its « ontological status » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 69), since « life can be known only by life » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 91). This famous statement by Jonas suitably outlines the theoretical background of both philosophers’ investigation of the organic. Both authors envisage, in fact, what may be defined as “biohermeneutics”, Anthropology versus Ontology 313 that is to say, in short, the conceptual articulation of that kind of “evidence” on biological phenomena that cannot be corroborated nor falsi- fied by empirical knowledge, since even natural sciences assume it as an interpretative framework, as, that is, the object of intuition, “understanding”, but not of “explanation” or demonstration in scientific terms. « All content that can only be acquired by intuition — Plessner writes — is fated to enter into experience without becoming determinable as experience progresses » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 119)2. On this point, Plessner also says that : « The organic is not dissolved by being explained. Exact biology, as the physics of the organic, shows, if anything, only the system of conditions and occasions for the occurrence of organic modals irreducible in their quality » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 109-110). Dissatisfaction concerning the reductionist approaches to the living and, more generally, to the whole of nature should be furthermore taken, for both authors, as part of a wider criticism of dualisms in general, in particular Descartes’ approach. Plessner and Jonas, however, do not aim to dismiss all differences by resorting to the monism of indifference, nor they embrace a metaphysical unity neutralising the difference between “spirit” and “matter”. On the contrary, they both maintain the practical advantages of the distinction between physical and mental without entirely questioning its ability to grasp essential features of reality. According to Plessner, organic nature — inasmuch as it is different from the inorganic — is what entails “double-aspectivity”, “polar unity” ; similarly, according to Jonas, life itself is a « fact of polarity » or « essentially relationship » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 4). Both Plessner and Jonas keep away from any form of panpsychism, hylozoism, and animism, in other words from any position crediting vitality also to the inorganic nature. The underlying claim they both share is instead that the characteristics of interiority, far from being exclusive of human beings, should be extended to the whole of the living, but not to the non-living. According to Plessner there is a « transition from extended being to interior being, from the world of being to the world of having, not only in the case of the human to the extent that he takes himself on philosophically and turns inward, but everywhere that he

2 Plessner’s references to intuition are clearly indebted to Dilthey’s contributions and to his distinction between “verstehen” and “erklären”, to which also Jonas points us ; see, for instance Jonas H., 2002, p. 28. 314 Francesca Michelini encounters life » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 159). Similarly, while laying out his programme at the beginning of The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas states that « the organic even in its lowest forms prefigures mind, and that mind even on its highest reaches remains part of the organic » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 1). Interiority and subjectivity are part of the original display of life and are not simply equated to the sphere of consciousness and self- consciousness : « A self is not yet a subject of consciousness », Plessner writes in the Levels (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 159). In their accounts, the two philosophers start off instead from the living corporeality (Leiblichkeit) of human beings. According to Jonas, since we are subjects experiencing life and simultaneously also living bodies, we are in terms of perspective at the core of the phenomenon of life. This latter is not simply placed in front of us as a « neutral » object, as if it was observed from « outside » life itself. It is experienced from « within » through the exemplarity of our psychophysical totality (Jonas H., 1966, p. 23). In this sense one should read also Jonas’ previously quoted statement : « Life can be known only by life ». According to Jonas and Plessner, life can never be understood on an exclusively physical or psychological basis. It is neither a mysterious matter-pervading force nor something added to bodily reality. It is not a hidden, secret or deeply concealed quality. Both philosophers’ reference to life is instead always a reference to the actor of life itself, in its most tangible form, that is to say, it is a reference to the organism. Besides the general remarks provided so far, even closer affinities between the two authors can be detected when it comes to the organism and its fundamental features. Their similarities are possibly even more striking in this respect. I will here briefly outline some of them concerning eight main topics3.

I. The boundary between inside and outside. Their common starting point is the quest for a distinctive feature of the living which could “withstand” the simple alternative inside vs outside, without removing or neutralising their difference and making it, on the contrary, into something essentially pertaining to the living. In this respect, in the accounts of both philosophers, the boundary between inner and outer turns out to

3 For a more articulated account, see Michelini F. – Wunsch M. – Stederoth D., 2018. Anthropology versus Ontology 315 be the fundamental constitutive feature of the living. Jonas claims that the actual exchange established by metabolism makes the boundary essential. In the metabolic process we discover in fact to what extent the living is « self-centered individuality, being for itself and in contraposition to all the rest of the world, with an essential boundary dividing “inside” and “outside” — notwithstanding, nay, on the very basis of the actual exchange » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 79). Along similar lines, in Plessner’s account the « realisation of the boundary » is the all-deciding point on which the “double aspectivity” of the living is based : « Phys- ical objects of intuition for which a fundamentally divergent relationship between outer and inner objectively figures as part of their being are called living » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 89).

II. Form. Form is something very different when it comes to the organic or when it comes to the inorganic. Based on the realisation of the boundary, Plessner distinguishes between Form and Gestalt. Whereas this latter describes even a simple physical body, form identifies the organisation of the living body, more specifically the way in which the living being reconciles, better yet compensates for (ausgleichen) the radical conflict between its « closure » to the environment — that is, its independence from it, in that it is a physical body — and its being « open », its being dependent on the life circle as an organism (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 218). In this regard, according to Plessner « Unlike in the case of inorganic bodies, the form here is not the exterior surface of the substance […], but seems to enclose its actual surface like an invisible skin » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 124). Similarly, according to Jonas, the relationship established between matter and form by the metabolic process is the basis for distinguishing the organic identity from mere physical identity. This latter is furthermore taken as the true and only biological identity, in which form is the cause of subsequent material collections (Jonas H., 1966, p. 79). In other words, form is only “dynamic form” or, in Plessner’s words, « the condition of the possibility of the process in which the thing is to maintain its identity as thing and gestalt » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 137).

III. Wholeness (Ganzheit). Closely connected to the previous topic, one finds in both authors the notion of wholeness. To be a whole, for an organism, means to display a form of organization which does not coincide with the sum of its parts, to the point of being unchanged even 316 Francesca Michelini when parts constantly change. Jonas emphasises that the whole is never static but constantly self-integrating itself in the very act of achieving itself in « active performance » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 79). Along the same line but one step further, Plessner warns us against accounting for the whole only in terms of something that is more than the mere sum of its parts. Even the inorganic, in fact, is more than that (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 94-95). What distinguishes the organic whole from the simple inorganic Gestalt is rather, according to Plessner, the different relationship established by the living with its own boundary. Only in virtue of this relationship, life « in its essential phenomena », can be taken as « the series of conditions under which alone a gestalt is whole » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 122).

IV. Processuality. Unlike the purely physical body, which simply is, the organism becomes itself. In the process, then, the living being becomes other and yet remains itself ; the preservation of the given state is in fact achieved by a continual change beyond this state. Its persistence is always more than mere preservation — Jonas reminds us in numerous occasions (for instance Jonas H., 1966 and Jonas H., 1974). It can be consequently argued that living beings are entities whose being is being-active : they are what they do. Plessner’s theory of the organism is also a processual one. His philosophical task is indeed to keep together the organism’s crossing of the boundary with the boundary itself. He argues that the living thing cannot be understood in light of “pure” or “mere” crossing-over. It would simply dissolve if the moment of crossing did not correspond to a moment of standstill : « Remaining what it is and passing over into what it is not (over beyond it) as well as into what it is (into it), must be executed in one move in order to bring about the nature of the organic » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 133). Remaining and crossing over are not independent moments taken in themselves. For Plessner a process is a synthesis of these moments and thus is char- acterised by the aspects of becoming and persisting.

V. Teleology. Both Plessner and Jonas make appeal to the living’s inherent teleology, but this has nothing to do with resorting to « the efficacy of ideas transcending the body or the architectural imagination of God when trying to explain the wonderful expediencies and harmonies found in the ever-newly designed construction plans and schemes of Anthropology versus Ontology 317 organisms » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 197). Plessner, in particular, envisages teleology in close connection to the organisation of the living and understands this latter, inspired by one of Jakob von Uexküll’s theory, as « the combination of varied elements according to a unitary plan for common effect » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 170). This kind of teleology connected to a unitary project, however, is not there realiter since the beginning, but rather emerges as soon as the organic body dif- ferentiates itself and specialises in different organs : « the whole is present in all its parts by virtue of their agreement with the whole given in divergent specialisation ; the parts serve the whole. Or, to put it con- cisely, the real body in all of its effectively attained phases is its own end » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 169). Although he does not deny that the inherent teleology of the living is also expressed by its organisation, Jonas lays emphasis on a different aspect, that is to say, on the organic dialectics of want and satisfaction : « Teleology is the concomitant of want (or vice versa). The organism basically is “in want”, therefore always does want something » (Jonas H., 1974, p. 199). In the incessant needfulness of life, as we shall see in some detail in what follows, Jonas places the core of the organism’s internal teleology as well as its subjec- tive perspective on the world.

VI. Transcendence. The inherent transcendence of the organism should not be understood here in a metaphysical sense, nor as a reference to some external or even super-corporeal principle. Jonas notably understands transcendence as the incessant self-crossing of the living being’s boundary, paradigmatically displayed in the organism by the relation between form and matter : « life is essentially relationship ; and relation as such implies “transcendence”, a going-beyond itself of the part of that which entertains the relation » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 4-5). Similarly, Plessner designates as transcendence the fact that the living is endowed with intrinsic « elasticity » or « ease » (Lockerung) (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 129). This means that the living body doesn’t merely stop at its boundary, like the inorganic one. On the contrary, the living body transcends itself in the two directions of the « beyond itself » and « into itself » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 129). The living « realises » its boundary precisely because it overtakes it. By doing that the living shifts from itself to the surrounding field. Transcendence is finally the relating of the body to its environment, to its « positional field » (Positionsfeld). 318 Francesca Michelini

VII. Centricity. As is well-known, Jonas claims that « to be func- tionally “centered” is an original trait of organism, exhibited already in the nuclear organisation of the single cell » (Jonas H., 1974, p. 199). Along similar lines, an organic totality can emerge, according to Plessner, only as soon as there is a centre the parts can relate to. Such an internal point of reference — which Plessner also calls « deep core » (Tiefenkern – Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 44) — cannot be the object of direct perception ; it cannot be pinpointed by the space-time coordinates of physics ; hence it cannot be measured scientifically. It is not a physical centre, but a merely virtual one, based on which the organism appears as a whole, as a system. In other words, for both authors, having a centre is what defines the emergence and constitution of the living as a self.

VIII. Levels. Based on the existence or not of a centre, according to Plessner, one can establish differences between several « levels » of the organic, between plants, animals and finally mankind. Lacking a central organ to which its entire body is connected, or by which it is represented, the plant fails to display a reference to an agreement between the parts, based on which one could assume a central unum able to synthe- sise them. Rather than an individuum, plants are — claims Plessner — a dividuum, which retains a relative autonomy of the parts (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 220). As a result, plants do not display that referential core which supports the superior unity qualifying the animal as a « closed form » (geschlossene Form). Also on this point remarkable correspondence with Jonas’ position can be spelled out. In the fourth essay of The Phenomenon of Life — under the heading, To Move and to Feel : On the Animal Soul — Jonas presents an outline of different « degrees » pertaining to the living and based upon an analogous principle, even though — as remarked by Marjorie Grene in her review of Jonas’ work (Grene M., 1966) — his articulation is not as solid as Plessner’s The Levels.

II. Jonas’ silence on Plessner

In the light of the convergences I have just now listed, it is surprising that no direct influence or intellectual exchange between the two philosophers has been recorded. What has left the interpreters wondering the most is that Jonas, whose intellectual production comes several years Anthropology versus Ontology 319 after the first edition of Plessner’s major work, never openly acknowledges his indebtedness to The Levels nor, more generally, to Philosoph- ical Anthropology. Jonas mentions Plessner only once, in his Memoirs, not concerning scientific matters, but rather reporting on an exchange they had on publishing-related matters. Marjorie Grene has been the first to express puzzlement in this respect. In the previously mentioned review of The Phenomenon of Life, she also emphasises, however, that Jonas fails to mention, beside Plessner, many more philosophers. For instance he never quotes Merleau- Ponty — nor his notion of lived body — although his stamp is, in her view, clearly recognisable in many of Jonas’ remarks (Grene M., 1966, p. 94). An exception here is the open acknowledgement by Jonas of Alfred North Whitehead’s positive impact on his inquiries (Jonas H., 2002, p. 33). Whitehead is indeed among the very few to whom several full pages are devoted in The Phenomenon of Life (Jonas H., 1966, p. 95-96). Also Joachim Fischer has remarked how Jonas « set[s] his arguments in the context of Scheler and Plessner’s ideas from the ’20s » and that, for this very reason « [i]t is surprising that in his American emigration, in his essays on the anthropology of sense organs and image, Heidegger’s pupil makes no mention of the key figures of German Phil- osophical Anthropology » (Fischer J., 2008, p. 366-367, my transl.)4. The missing reference to Philosophical Anthropology and notably to Plessner has been spotted also by Vallori Rasini, who expresses surprise, more in general, for the fact that « Jonas describes his intellectual journey as a solitary and totally autonomous evolution, immune to any solicita- tion coming from contemporary philosophy, in particular the German one » (Rasini V., 2010, p. 272, my transl.). After reminding the reader of the two leading positions in philosophy in the late ’20s, the antagonist paradigms of the philosophy of existence and of the philosophy of life, Rasini also remarks, as Grene and Fischer before her, how unlikely it is

4 Among Jonas’ most anthropological and aesthesiological essays, one should mention The Nobility of Sight : A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses and Image Making and the Freedom of Man, both included in Jonas H., 1966 ; In addition, see also Werkzeug, Bild und Grab. Vom Transanimalischen im Menschen, included in the collection of essays Philosophische Untersuchungen und metaphysische Vermutungen (Jonas H., 1992, p. 34-50). A full account of potential traces left by Plessner and by Philosophical Anthropology in these works would clearly deserve a separate contribution. For my purposes, here, I aim to emphasise mainly the divergent basic assumptions in Jonas’ and Plessner’s hermeneutics of life. 320 Francesca Michelini that Jonas, Heidegger having been his supervisor, did not come in contact at least with Scheler, to whom Heidegger dedicated his volume from 1929, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. One should also remember here that one of Jonas’ best friends, the philosopher Günther Anders, had even been Scheler’s assistant in Cologne in 1926 (Rasini V., 2010, p. 272). Notwithstanding, Jonas omits any reference, repeating on the contrary that, prior to his endeavours, the field of the philosophy of the living was almost totally unexplored. In particular, in a to say the least astonish- ing passage from « Wissenschaft » as Personal Experience (2002), while outlining his intellectual path, he states that in the ’20s — precisely when Scheler’s and Plessner’s works came to light — during his early university years, nature was exclusively the prerogative of exact sciences and no consideration was given to it from a philosophical perspective : « Natural Philosophy had long ceased to be a respectable philosophical discipline », he says (Jonas H., 2002, p. 32). Rasini concludes that it is both impossible that Jonas was not familiar with German Philosophical Anthropology and that his unilateral account of German philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century — according to which no mention or almost no mention was made of the problem of the living — is hardly tenable. Those were indeed the years in which « lines of thinking came to the fore which not only harshly criticised any form of reductionism — be it idealistic or materialistic — but also insisted on the need for a retrieval in philosophical investigations of the bodily nature of the living » (Rasini V., 2010, p. 274-275, my transl.). Of the reasons why Jonas does not directly address Plessner and Philosophical Anthropology — since, clearly, he must have been familiar with them — however, neither Grene, Fischer nor Rasini formulate a full explanation. They all content themselves with recording this as matter of fact, either dismissing Jonas’ portrayal of himself as one of the few revivers of the philosophy of nature in the 20th century, or suggesting that, based on the affinities between Jonas’ inquiry and the main focus of Philosophical Anthropology, his work can be legitimately placed within the Wirkungsgeschichte of this latter (Fischer J., 2008, p. 367). Nevertheless, the most interesting question is, in my opinion, what precisely are the reasons for this silence. This is the question I would like to answer in this paper. One could be tempted to walk away with what sounds just like a witticism, one that, quite ironically, is handed out by Plessner himself. Anthropology versus Ontology 321

At the end of the Preface (1964) to the second edition of The Levels, to those who reproached him for the lack of quotes from Hegel, or who pointed to the similarities between his claims and notions formulated by Merleau-Ponty and the young Sartre, two more authors he never openly mentions, Plessner replied : « Convergences are not always based on influence. There is more thought in the world than one thinks » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XXIII). While following this hint, concerning “Jonas’ case”, one may suppose that, although he formulated similar claims, Jonas never read neither Plessner nor Scheler5. Such an hypothesis may also be supported by his very intellectual biography. In the late ’20s, in fact, when Philosophical Anthropology reached its peak — Scheler’s The Place of Human Being in Cosmos was published in 1928, the same year of Plessner’s The Levels — Jonas was busy with theological and religious issues. In 1928 he discussed his doctoral thesis with Bultmann and Heidegger on the topic of gnosis. He was also politically very active within the Zionist movement, his activism con- vincing him, foresightedly, to leave Germany already in 1933. His explicit interest for the philosophy of nature, even though developed in contraposition with the elements of “withdrawal from the world” and “dualism” he detected in the “gnosis principle”, only arises in the years during the Second World War. The best evidence in this respect is given by the so-called Didactic Letters sent from the frontline to his wife, Lore (these letters are partially published in Jonas H., 2008 [2003], p. 220 f.). Written by Jonas with no literature available, the letters already outline the main core of The Phenomenon of Life. Furthermore, whereas failing to read Scheler’s works seems inex- cusable, one could easily imagine that Jonas did not read The Levels when it was published. As Plessner himself recalls in the 1964 Preface, back then his book slipped entirely under the radar, due to both the prevailing success of the philosophy of existence in those years — Being and Time being published in 1927 — and Scheler’s open hostility and

5 This assumption seems to be in agreement with what Lore Jonas wrote to Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo in a private letter of August 3rd, 2005. Although she confirms that her husband met Plessner personally (see footnote n. 6), she is of the opinion that he was not influenced by him. According to her, none of Plessner’s books was in Jonas’ private library and, as in the case of other philosophers, one cannot speak of influence but, if anything, only of similarities and affinities. Finally, she adds, very interestingly, that Jonas did not like to quote other philosophers much, and that during his fifty years spent with her, he read few philosophers, except classics such as Plato and Aristotle and the texts that were familiar to him from his university years. 322 Francesca Michelini plagiarism accusations against Plessner himself (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. VII-VIII). With some tone of indignation, but also with a feeling of retrospective triumph, Plessner recalls that, at the time of The Levels’ first publication, the Heideggerians « did not deign to so much as cast a glance » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XIV). Nevertheless, even granted that Jonas, in the ’20s up to his fleeing the country, had plausibly no interest in Philosophical Anthropology and did not read at the time their main contributions, it is still difficult to understand why, retrospectively, when he was already an established “philosopher of the organism”, he never acknowledged, not even in his autobiographical notes, their importance. This is all the more puzzling considering that, whereas Scheler died prematurely in 1928, Jonas certainly had the opportunity to meet Plessner and discuss with him at least on a few occasions, as this latter was invited as visiting professor to the New School for Social Research of New York in 1962/63, where Jonas taught philosophy uninterruptedly from 1955 to 19766. The most plausible explanation is then, in my opinion, that Jonas knew Plessner, but conceived his project for a philosophical biology as different from, if not quasi alternative to that of his colleague. This is also what Plessner’s previously quoted wisecrack could suggest. Convergence can result also from divergent thinking paths. To this line of argument I will therefore devote the third and fourth section of this contribution. I will thus try and test the assumption that Jonas’ silence has its ground not in a more or less intentional omission, in a self-celebratory gesture, or in some kind of “anachronism” — to quote some of the purely extrinsic suggestions made, as we have seen, by the interpreters — but that its motives are more specifically philosophical. A slight switch in perspective is then required. The surprise gener- ated by Jonas’ omission should leave room to wonder whether, despite the clear convergences among the two philosophers, as outlined above,

6 Plessner was the first to hold in 1962/63 the « Theodor-Heuss chair » at the New School for Social Research of New York, funded by the Federal Republic of Germany in recognition of the support given since 1933 to many German intellectuals in exile due to Nazi persecution. In Plessner’s biography written by C. Dietze, one reads that upon Plessner’s arrival in New York, the university Dean organised a garden party in order to give to his guest the opportunity to meet the remaining emigrants from Germany, among whom also « den Heidegger-Schüler » Hans Jonas (Dietze C., 2006, p. 511). In the already quoted Lore Jonas’ private letter to Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo of August 3rd, 2005 (see footnote 6), Lore Jonas confirms that Hans Jonas knew Plessner personally for having been colleagues in this period and adds that he had also been a guest at their home. Anthropology versus Ontology 323 their reciprocal divergences are enough to make their philosophical inquiries ultimately incompatible if not alternative to one another. Need- less to say that “alternative” should be here understood in reference to the same basic issue and the inescapable quest for an answer to the problem of the living : what is the living being’s status ; what is the difference between living and non-living ; to what extent are human beings rooted in nature ; to what extent they depart from it. What is then the general sense of the “hermeneutics of the living” for Jonas and Plessner respectively ? In order to delve deeper into this question, besides the convergences between the authors, a survey of their discrepancies would also be in order. These are several and concern, for instance, their understanding of corporeality and death7. Being unable here to provide a full account of these topics, I will rather focus on what I believe to be their main difference, the one concerning the general meaning of their philosophical project. In a few words, it can be argued that Jonas understands his philosophical programme mainly as an ontology of the living — and not primarily as a philosophical anthropology in Plessner’s sense. In this, Jonas is still close to his master Heidegger’s positions. This last claim might well sound baffling. It is indeed true that, at first sight, among the several points they have in common, one could also mention their incessant criticism of Heidegger and, more generally, of existentialist positions. Jonas fully agrees with Plessner on that Heidegger’s theories belong to the dualistic tradition separating human being from nature in the oblivion of the body as well as of living organisms. However, notwithstanding his claiming the opposite, Jonas’ philosophical path develops along the lines traced, but not pursued, by his teacher, within a continuous dialogue which is equally critical and seeking approval ex negativo (Monaldi M., 2000, p. 79). This is all the more clear in Jonas’ dealing with one of Heidegger’s Being and Time most significant topics, that of the “existentials”. The discrepant approach to the philosophy of Heidegger by Plessner and Jonas helps us, in my opinion, to shed light on the divergence of their wider philosophical projects as well as — I believe — on the meaning of their reciprocal (missed) relation. And here I come to my main claim.

7 On the topic of corporeality in Hans Jonas’ philosophy, see in particular Frogneux N., 2007. On the concept of Leiblichkeit in Plessner and in the German Philo- sophical Anthropology, see Schürmann V., 2012. 324 Francesca Michelini

III. Plessner and Jonas on Heidegger’s philosophy a. Plessner’ criticism and the « German fairy tale of the ego » Plessner’s philosophical development features a frequent criticism of Heidegger8. Unvaried along the years, Plessner’s critical remarks seems to make no distinction between “before” and “after the turn” (die Kehre) in Heidegger’s philosophy. As we shall see in some detail, already in the Preface to the first edition of The Levels — that is to say, less than a year after the publishing of Being and Time — the reference to Heidegger holds a significant position, further extended and articulated in the second edition (1964). Heidegger is also confronted — it is no coincidence — in the programmatic essays in which Plessner deals with nature and the aims of Philosophical Anthropology9. From a general point of view, Plessner sees in Heidegger one of the latest configurations of the dualism-based philosophical tradition that fails to investigate nature — and in particular the living organism — in its “immense concatenation” with the human world, hence abandoning this latter to the dominion of biology and science. In Plessner’s words : « Within the tradition of Kant, of the philosophy of identity and of new Kantianism, nature is the other, something that is fashioned, the product of creative functions, and the spirit as the other of itself, only an interlude toward the origin […] Also Heidegger should be understood as a further step along this line » (H. Plessner, 1963, p. 45). Against this background, Plessner’s criticism of Heidegger can be condensed in four closely interconnected points : (1) the ontomorphism or the priority given to “being” rather than to “human beings” ; (2) the

8 Such a criticism is certainly motivated also by biographical and personal reasons. Heidegger was one of the protagonists of what Joachim Fischer has called the marginali- zation of Plessner (Fischer J., 2008) in the years 1927-28, in this being an ally of Max Scheler and Vittorio Klostermann. It is well known that they asked Plessner, or rather almost forced him, to change the previous title of The Levels. Klostermann even decided to close the journal « Der philosophische Anzeiger », edited by Plessner. Perhaps Kloster- mann was influenced by Scheler in his decision. 9 In what follows, I will refer in particular to Plessner H., 1963 and Plessner H., 1973. Especially in the essay from 1973, Plessner’s reading of Heidegger does not appear to be direct, but rather heavily mediated, as Plessner himself admits, by Fahrenbach’s interpretation of it (Fahrenbach H., 1970). Although this is not the place for a full assess- ment of Plessner’s criticism of Heidegger, nor for the complex issue of the relationship between Heidegger and the whole of Philosophical Anthropology (on this topic, see Ebke T., 2008), for the purposes of this essay I would like to briefly outline some key points on the matter. Anthropology versus Ontology 325 oblivion of the notion of life, which for Plessner has instead absolute priority over that of existence ; (3) the ensuing oblivion of the notion of Leiblichkeit in favour of that of existence ; (4) the subjectivism and anthropomorphism (Plessner H., 1994, p. 172-182). The first and possibly most radical criticism hits the core of Heidegger’s project for a Fundamentalontologie. According to Heidegger, the task of fundamental ontology is not the direct comprehension of what he calls Dasein, but rather the understanding of human fundamental structures by means of the investigation of what accounts for the Dasein in its being — that is to say, the so called existentials. Heidegger though does not rely on existential analytic as one would on anthropology, inasmuch as he never envisages a complete investigation of the several features of humans, but rather aims to unravel the fundamental existentials of Dasein and ultimately investigate the sense of being. Mainly upon this point hinges Plessner’s criticism of Heidegger. This latter’s inquiry on the being of Dasein (Sein des Daseins) is not informed by the ultimate goal of placing human being at the centre of its proceeding ; it is not autonomous, it is deprived of value in itself, its main objective being only the “Being”, as Plessner clearly states in the following paradigmatic quotation : Heidegger’s analysis of the mode of being specific to the human was not an end in itself ; otherwise one could have taken it to be a form of Philo- sophical Anthropology, all reservations notwithstanding. It rather purported to be a procedure for finding the meaning of being, as a method aiming at fundamental ontology. (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. X) To be rigorous, one is hardly allowed to claim that Heidegger’s existential analytic is only a method in view of his Fundamentalontologie, because « [a]ccording to Heidegger, being human, the essence or nature of the human, is only determined by his (historically mutable) relationship to being » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. X). Hence the paradoxical, to say the least, situation of having anthropology covering two roles : « anthropology presupposes fundamental ontology and should also head in its direction » (Plessner H., 1973, p. 388, my transl.). In short, according to Plessner, although under different respects, Heidegger’s mistake mirrors Max Scheler’s misstep. They both attempt to determine what human beings are starting from something that is external to them. As both philosophers believe that « [by] nature there is no such thing as the human » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XI), they rely respectively on the relation to God (Theomorphie), when it comes to Scheler, or on Being 326 Francesca Michelini itself (Ontomorphie), when it comes to Heidegger (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XI). This is a constant refrain in Plessner’s criticism up to his last essays. For instance, in the already mentioned essay, Der Aussagewert einer philosophischen Anthropologie [The Statement Value of Philosophical Anthropology], he claims once more that Heidegger’s approach never leads to anthropology, but only to a question on the sense of being, this latter always remaining Heidegger’s top priority (Plessner H., 1973, p. 398). Although Heidegger seems intermittently attracted, « despite his own intentions », by an anthropological viewpoint, fundamental ontology and anthropology — Plessner concludes — are two alternative and incompatible paths : Therefore « there is no path from Heidegger to Phil- osophical Anthropology, either before the turn or after it » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XIV). In order to avoid « the preliminary ontological imprinting » (Plessner H., 1973, p. 388, my transl.) and avoid falling prey of similar arguments, a different starting point is required. And here comes the second main point in Plessner’s criticism. It is necessary, Plessner main- tains, to start from the “bottom”, that is to say not from the one who asks the question, not from Dasein, but simply from the horizon of life. One should dare to claim, then, that « Life includes existence [Existenz] as one of its possibilities » (Plessner H., 1973, p. 390, my transl.). This does not only entail that the human species is deprived of necessity — as clearly acknowledged by natural evolution — but more importantly also that, from Plessner’s point of view, the dimension of existence can only be grasped based on « The special place of the human being as living being » (Plessner H., 1973, p. 390, my transl.), in other words only based on its « eccentric positionality ». Existence is only secondary and is based upon the special intertwining of “Körper” and “Leib” defining the positionality typical of human beings. Directly from this kind of remarks stems also the third main point of Plessner’s criticism reproaching the loss in existentialism of the body and of the “natural” dimension of human beings, such a loss going hand in hand with the more general oblivion of life, as mentioned above. Plessner recalls in this respect the words of another of Heidegger’s “pupils”, Karl Löwith : « The living world, […] was lost again in existentialism along with the embodied human » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XII). According to Plessner, Dasein is nothing but a « free-floating dimension of existence » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XIV), where Anthropology versus Ontology 327 abstraction is made of its Leiblichkeit, of its « unavoidable intertwining between that human way of being and the human organism » (Plessner H., 1963, p. 244, my transl.), of the destiny it shares with all other living beings, in virtue of the fact that we are born, we live, and we die. To be fair, it should be mentioned that Heidegger’s vision of authentic existence hinges upon the issue of death ; this latter is, however, subsumed under the « Being-towards-death » (Sein zum Tode), that is to say under an existential. Similarly, also other natural dimensions mankind shares with all living beings are taken as “existentials”. For instance, birth is understood by Heidegger as « thrownness » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XII). Even other key features such as anxiety, which Plessner believes, at variance with Heidegger, affects also animals, are included in the domain of the “existentials”. The « world » itself would be according to Heidegger an « existential » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. V). Finally, according to Plessner, the existentials’ very premises are unacceptable, inasmuch as they state that « the study of extra-human being must necessarily be preceded by an existential analysis of the human » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. V). All this shows — coming to the last main point in Plessner’s criticism — that Heidegger is still hostage of the old subjectivist and anthro- pocentric tradition, based on which « the philosophical questioner is existentially closest to himself » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. V). Such a tradition, as previously anticipated, goes back, according to Plessner, to Kant and Husserl, and even before that to Augustin and his withdrawal in interiority. On the contrary, by means of his notion of eccentric positionality, based on which the human being is « neither closest to nor furthest from himself », Plessner wishes to get altogether rid of the whole « German fairy tale of the Ego » (Plessner H., 1994, p. 180, my transl.). And here I come to Jonas. b. Jonas : his criticism of Heidegger and how it differs from Plessner’s The critical engagement with Heidegger’s ideas is clearly a constant feature also in Jonas’ philosophy10. From the outset, though, the pupil

10 Jonas’ discussion of Heidegger’s positions focuses in particular on his “early” phase, notably his work, Being and Time. In The Phenomenon of Life (Jonas H., 1966, p. 227) frequent reference is made also of the Letter on Humanism (1946). The only text tackling Heidegger’s “late” philosophical phase in some detail is Heidegger and Theology (1964), also included in The Phenomenon of Life, which is the result of the much discussed 328 Francesca Michelini openly acknowledges his teacher, as summed up by Jonas’ autobiographical remarks : « He’s not only the most important thinker of our century but also the teacher from whom you [Jonas is speaking to himself ; F.M.] learned more than from any other and who helped shape you as a philosopher — an undeniable fact of your existence » (Jonas H., 2008 [2003], p. 190)11. Nevertheless, the criticism of Heidegger’s philosophy converges, under many respects, with Plessner’s above outlined arguments. Jonas agrees in fact that Heidegger’s contribution belongs to the dualism-based tradition advocating the separation between nature and mankind in full oblivion of bodies and living organisms. Few passages, as exemplified in what follows, should suffice to prove this point : « No philosophy has ever been less concerned about nature than Existentialism, for which it has no dignity left » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 232). « Heidegger had talked about existence as care, but he did so from an exclusively intellectual perspective. There was no mention of the primary physical reason for having to care, which is our corporeality [Leiblichkeit], […] in Being and Time the body had been omitted and nature shunted aside as something merely present » (Jonas H., 2002, p. 31). « Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such » (Jonas H., 1966, p. XXIII). In Heidegger one can find « the rejection of any definable “nature” of man which would subject his sovereign existence to a predetermined essence and thus make him part of an objective order of essences in the totality of nature » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 227-228). As is well known, Jonas argues that Heidegger’s existentialism is notably a transformation of the gnostic (and nihilistic) « syndrome » rejecting nature and the world, which he finds at work not only in late- antiquity gnostic schools, but also, as metahistorical category, in other moments of the history of philosophy (Jonas H., 1974, p. 267-281).

conference held at the Drew University, New Jersey, in 1963. Some hints to the “late” Heidegger are also included, as we shall see shortly, also in the text, Philosophy at the End of the Century : A Survey of Its Past and Future (Jonas H., 1994). On the relationship between Heidegger and Jonas, see, in particular, Jakob E., 1996. 11 Very significant, in this respect, are the passages where Jonas recalls Heidegger’s seminars at Freiburg University, in particular the « primal experience » (Urerlebnis) of the 1921 seminar on Aristotle’s De Anima (see Jonas H., 2002, p. 30 ; Jonas H., 1991, p. 40 f. and p. 100 f.). Anthropology versus Ontology 329

Devoted to history and religion studies, his early intellectual work has indeed produced a brilliant intuition leading to an interpretation of late-antiquity gnosis in the light of Heidegger’s existential analytic categories ; in his post-war production, then, his existential reading of gnosis ended up providing the main framework for a radical criticism of existentialism and its implicit nihilism (Jonas H., 2002, p. 31). However, despite their similarities, the objections moved by Plessner and Jonas belong to two very different contexts and, in Jonas’ philosophical programme, they take upon themselves a different value. Although Jonas, like Plessner, sets his philosophy of life up against existentialism12, his inquiries never cease to be in constant dialogue with Heidegger. Jonas’ approach to philosophy is meant to tackle those very questions that Heidegger defined as fundamental, and, what’s even more relevant, Jonas’ texts are full of Heidegger’s signature traits transposed into a philosophy of the living. This is particularly clear when it comes to the categories of existential analytic. The dismissal of Being and Time’s perspective, in view of an anti-dualist and anti-nihilist philosophical biology, does not entail for Jonas the corresponding dismissal or rejection of the categories of existential analytic, but it rather leads to their extension, so to speak, to living beings all together. According to Jonas, in fact, living organisms make display, as their fundamental characters, of several of the existentials Heidegger’s attaches exclusively to Dasein : the organism struggles, is needy, is concerned about itself, lives constantly exposed to risk and fear, and is mortal. Jonas himself acknowledges, to an extent, this point. In his last essay, which is something of a final intellectual will — Philosophy at the End of the Century — he states that one of Heidegger’s highest achievements is the investigation of Dasein by means of the existentials, and consequently the elaboration of a notion of I alternative to the tran- scendental consciousness of Husserl’s idealism : Heidegger « shattered the entire quasi-optical model of a primarily cognitive consciousness, focusing instead on the wilful, striving, feeble, and mortal ego » (Jonas H., 1994, p. 817). Furthermore, Jonas gives credit to Heidegger for having emphasised, thanks to his notion of « interest » (Interesse), the teleological nature of subjectivity : « For the sake of dominates all

12 « After the war my work in philosophy was marked initially by my renunciation of Heidegger’s existentialism in favor of my philosophy of life » (Jonas H., 2008 [2003], p. 187). 330 Francesca Michelini of Dasein’s relations with the world. The “intentionality” of consciousness, which in Husserl’s case quite neutrally indicates that it has an object, now turns out to be permeated with “interest” » (Jonas H., 1994, p. 819). As is well known, besides the being needy (Bedürftigkeit) and the being mortal (Sterblichkeit), it is precisely teleology what, according to Jonas, fundamentally describes the living, this feature establishing the ground not only for the attribution of value to nature, but also for his formulation of an ethics of responsibility. The close connection of this feature to the other two, those of neediness and mortality, accounts for one of the conceptual pillars of the whole of Jonas’ philosophical biology. Teleology is, in fact, according to Jonas, intrinsic to the organism’s being needy, a character, this latter, exemplified, at a basic level, by metabolism. As anticipated in section 1, the authentic being of the organism — and therefore its very teleology — consists according to Jonas in an endless dialectics of deficiency and satisfaction, in the continuous inter- action with the environment, through which the living incessantly renews itself. The biological individuality is something that has to be achieved each time in the face of « extraneous matter » and internal constraints, and at the very end in the face of death. Its existence is precisely the result of the circumstance of being constantly « threatened » (bedroht) as an end. And precisely based on this being constantly « threatened » the organism’s being turns out to be teleological (Jonas H., 1974, p. 196 f.). Now, the inter-connection between being needy (Bedürftigkeit), being constantly threatened (Bedrohtheit) and teleology (Teleologie) is already detected by Jonas in Heidegger’s account of Dasein — as one more passage from his Philosophy at the End of the Century very aptly shows : But why must Dasein always be concerned with something and, in the last analysis, with itself ? The answer : because without this concern it would perish, since it is constantly exposed to nothingness. Thus, along with its end-orientation, its overall purposiveness, Heidegger’s definition of Dasein articulates its precarious and threatened quality : because it is mortal it must be concerned with existing as such. And this existing must at every moment be wrested from the constant imminence of death. For this reason the basic mode of Dasein’s being is described as « care ». (Jonas H., 1994, p. 819)

One cannot but remark here how Jonas’ description of Heidegger’s Dasein closely mirrors his own philosophy of the organism. Even more, Anthropology versus Ontology 331 one might then conclude that precisely what makes Plessner complain about Heidegger, the fact, that is, that what he takes to be existentials exclusively describing the Dasein (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XIV) are actually natural features of all living beings, becomes the very (bio)-philosophical programme Jonas aims to achieve : the transposi- tion of Heidegger’s main existentials into his ontology of biological phenomena13. How these fundamental characters of the organism are identified is, however, in Plessner’s and Jonas’s cases, rather different. Plessner does not believe in an ontological inquiry into « the manner of being charac- teristic of organisms » (Jonas H., 1992, p. 34), nor, clearly, would embrace the affective connotation (Gefühlston) of the Fundamentalon- tologie extending it to the realm of the living. Plessner advocates instead an « a priori theory of the essential characteristics of the organic or, […] of the “organic modals” » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. 107). The fundamental features of the living are not evinced, according to Plessner, by the purely empirical realm, but it is rather necessary to perform an « a priori foundation », carefully avoiding all presumptive concepts of life already entailing its own take on fundamental characteristics. Plessner believes indeed that : « What could be really called modal — irreducible ultimate element, essential character — is never learnt by experience, but this latter rather assumes it unknowingly » (Plessner H.,

13 This was emphasised in the literature also for instance by E. Jakob : « It seems that Jonas took over some basic ideas from Heidegger’s Being and Time and dressed them up in new naturalistic clothes — despite the radical departure from Heidegger in the second phase of his thinking » (Jakob E., 1996, p. 254). Also J. Taminiaux detects in The Phenomenon of Life the clear trace left by Heidegger’s teachings, and remarks that : « the existential interpretation of biological facts presented by Jonas can be placed in the wake of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s De Anima » (Taminiaux J., 2001, p. 98, my transl.). After pointing out that The Phenomenon of Life works within Being and Time’s categories, P. Becchi goes as far as claiming that this could be taken as the answer to the unwritten part of his master’s work (Becchi P., 1999, p. XIII). Finally, L. Vogel suggests that : « even given the most favorable reading possible of the early Heidegger, Jonas’ diagnosis of and answer to Cartesian dualism and its nihilistic consequences goes much deeper, but precisely by building on the categories of Heidegger’s existential analytic in order to yield “an existential interpretation of biological facts”. He borrows more than he intends and more than he needs, from Heidegger himself » (Vogel L., 1995, p. 56). This does not mean, clearly, that Jonas has totally uncritically adopted Heidegger’s existentials (see, for instance, Jonas H., 1966, p. 229 f.). One should also point out that the opening passages of The Phenomenon of Life, where Jonas claims that his intention is that of offering « an existential interpretation of biological facts » (Jonas H., 1966, p. XXIII), has been modified in the subsequent German edition (here instead of « existential » he uses « ontological »). 332 Francesca Michelini

2019 [1928], p. 111, my transl.). What is at stake here is, in other words, the retrieval of a fundamental character of the living, able to inform the development and deduction of organic modals, that is to say, those ultimate and original qualities of the living that are irreducible to other qualities. A priori foundation stands for the required identification of a distinctive criterion of vitality, which can work as an assumption or postulate for the deduction — relying on a complex phenomenological and dialectical method — of all the irreducible qualities pertaining to the organic realm. Such a criterion rests, according to Plessner, upon the relation entertained by organic bodies with their boundary. Organisms are thereby those beings which “realise” their boundary. Plessner’s clearly opts for a hypothesis-deduction approach to the theory of organic modals. Hence, granted that a physical object entertains one given relation with its boundary, inasmuch as it takes upon itself modes of development, irrita- bility, processuality, old age, death, etc. (i.e. the organic modals), the category value of those modes is thereby proven. And in the light of this noticeable difference between Plessner and Jonas, I come to the last point and to some conclusive remarks.

IV. conclusions : « Was fundiert Existenz ? »

Among the several motivations that might have pushed Jonas to never directly quote Plessner, my conjecture avoids pointing to biographical circumstances, random facts, or the idea that Jonas might have perceived any reference to Plessner as redundant14. My claim is rather linked to Jonas’ understanding of his own philosophical endeavour as the fulfilment or even better the extension of Heidegger’s philosophy, rather than as a direct contribution along the main lines of German Phil- osophical Anthropology. This latter, one should be aware, was probably known to Jonas primarily through the filter of his teacher’s negative criticism. Clearly, Jonas’ personal inquiry led him to a hermeneutics of nature that takes a considerable distance from Heidegger’s positions, makes them capsize, and, under many respects, ends up closer to Plessner, as

14 « Perhaps Jonas thought such references redundant, in which case I think that he was mistaken » (Levy D., 2002, p. 43). Anthropology versus Ontology 333 described at the beginning of this paper. It should then be emphasised that, at variance with what Plessner confidently claimed, Jonas also proves that a viable path actually exists showing the way from Heidegger’s existentialism to anthropology, although Heidegger himself never went that way15. Jonas’ starting point, main motivations, and ultimate goals stem directly from the very fundamental questions underpinning Heidegger’s philosophy, or, even better, from the one fundamental question : « why is there something rather than nothing ? » (warum ist etwas und nicht nichts ?). This is the well-known metaphysical fundamental question, formulated by Leibniz in modern times, revived by Schelling, and placed by Heidegger at the core of his inquiries, which more than anything attracts Jonas’ interests. To this question he attempts to provide an answer in the different phases of his intellectual production, first with the investigation of gnosis, then with the inquiries on the organism, and finally by means of the ethics of responsibility16. In this regard, one might claim that his original theory of freedom hinging upon metabolism is formulated, in the first place, as an answer to the issue of nihilism — in the traps of which even Heidegger, in his opinion, was ensnared — and only secondarily elaborated to the aim of discovering what is “the human place in the cosmos”. This latter is certainly a key issue also for Jonas, as his outright anthropological essays reveal, but a secondary one with respect to the formulation of a general theory of being17. Plessner’s philosophical efforts are instead, from the start, aimed essentially at establishing on solid grounds the difference between the different forms of organic life and accordingly rethink the peculiarities of human beings. Even in the vicious attack to Heidegger’s late “after-the-turn” production, Jonas does not criticise the shift in focus, in Heidegger’s philosophy, from the « being of Dasein » to the « being überhaupt » (Jonas H., 1994, p. 823) ; Jonas laments instead that Heidegger fails to handle the issue of Dasein « into correlation with the testimony of our physical and biological evolution » (Jonas H., 1994, p. 823). The question left open by Being and Time — the fundamental question of “being” — still needs

15 Concerning Heidegger getting possibly closer to Philosophical Anthropology, see in particular Wunsch M., 2010. 16 For the discussion of Leibniz’s fundamental ontological question in The Imper- ative of Responsibility, see Jonas H., 1984 [1979], p. 47-48. 17 On this point, see in particular Hösle’s claim in Hösle V., 1994, p. 108. 334 Francesca Michelini to be investigated ; however, this should happen, Jonas believes, based on the concrete Leiblichkeit of human beings. Finally, Jonas’ reference to the category of organism — rather than to a psycho-physically neutral notion, such as Plessner’s concept of “positionality” — owes more than what is usually acknowledged by the interpreters to his teacher’s philosophy. Although Heidegger is often quoted as the negative paragon of someone who failed to be interested in the living and the body, one should also remember that, in the well- known seminar of 1929-30, under the heading, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, he actually outlined an ontology of the living, which, by distancing itself from any form of psychism, has precisely in the organism, in particular in unicellular organism, its starting point18. Only against the background of a general theory of being, then, it is possible, in my opinion, to fully grasp the sense of Jonas’ hermeneutics of the living, and also the reasons why he cannot acknowledge Plessner as “forerunner”, despite all the « good reasons for it » (Rasini V., 2010, p. 282). In this regard, I would like to add one last remark. It was the aim of my contribution to reply to the interpreters’ puzzlement face to Jonas’ silence concerning Plessner ; however, equally legit would be questioning Plessner’s silence concerning Jonas, although taking into account the chronology of their works said silence is certainly less embarrassing. Jonas and Plessner got to know each other, as previously mentioned, during Plessner’s year in the USA. At that time Plessner was seventy years old, University Dean in Göttingen, and a well-known philosopher (and sociologist). His line of thinking had stayed steadily and consistently anchored to the anthropological theory already outlined in 1928 and then developed in several directions. In 1962, Jonas, although only ten years his junior, still had to publish his major contributions, The Phenomenon of Life and The Imperative of Responsibility. He was known mainly for his work on gnosis and for having been (or still being) Heidegger’s

18 « The fundamental thesis here is that everything that lives is an organism. Everything that lives is a living being in each case and this is an organism » (Heidegger M., 1995 [1929-30], p. 212). Jonas probably never attended these lessons, hence a direct influence cannot be assumed here. However, this seminar clearly develops to the maximum a topic already included in other seminars by Heidegger which Jonas attended and with which he was familiar. On the topic of the influence on Jonas of Heidegger’s ontology of the living, see in particular, Franzini Tibaldeo R., 2009, p. 150 f. Anthropology versus Ontology 335 pupil19. To say the truth, he had already published several philosophical essays on the organism and, notably, in 1955, the essay Is God a Math- ematician ?, which accounts for the original core of his philosophical biology. This essay in particular includes several arguments that could have attracted Plessner’s attention. However, Jonas is not included in the list of people Plessner mentions in his Self-portrayal concerning his long visit in New York and only a generic mention of the professors at the New School can be found there (Plessner H., 1976). Jonas’ name is also absent in the essay from 1973, The Statement Value of Philosophical Anthropology, even though the perfect occasion for a direct quote from Jonas presents itself there. In this text, in fact, within the framework of a discussion — at variance with Heidegger — on the priority of the dimension of life compared to that of existence, Plessner writes : What is the ground of existence ? [Was fundiert Existenz ?] The solution seems to me provided by the concept — formulated in 1928 — of ex-centric positionality. It was defined without knowing Being and Time […]. How- ever, since nobody in the last years has dealt with the question, — being it for Heidegger and his school a taboo — I will formulate it myself in order to raise it to a level of investigation that I hadn’t previously considered. (Plessner H., 1973, p. 390, my emphasis, my transl.) On the idea that the question « what is the ground of existence » was for Heidegger a taboo, one could discuss at length. Certainly, it was not such for Jonas, concerning whom one could instead claim that he devoted his entire life to the quest for an answer to that very question. According to Jonas, existence can only be grounded upon the living body of human beings, which is « the archetype of the concrete » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 24), « the maximum of concrete ontological completeness » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 23) that we know. It is starting from our living body, or from our psycho-physical totality — and not from our rationality or self-consciousness — that us humans, as organisms in a world of organisms, are able to “recognise” life. In this sense, and in

19 That in the early ’70s Jonas was still generally — and probably by Plessner as well — considered a Heideggerian — his public distancing happening, as previously recalled, in 1964 — is evinced by Monika Plessner’s description of the welcoming party for his husband held at the New School and attended also by Jonas : « Close to us an animated discussion was taking place. Around Hans Jonas, philosopher and Heidegger’s friend, young Heideggerians had gathered, as if they were in the far away Freiburg, to discuss about the succession of the master » (Plessner M., 1995, p. 81, my transl.). 336 Francesca Michelini this sense only, the human being can be « the measure of all things » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 23) — as Jonas writes, while making new use of Protagoras’ ancient motto — and only in this sense anthropomorphism is intrinsic and inevitable. According to Jonas — this is a crucial element in order to clarify his approach — it is precisely based on our « maximum of ontological completeness » that « reductively, the species of being [i.e. the levels of the organic ; F.M.], may have to be determined by way of progressive ontological subtraction down to the minimum of bare elementary matter » (Jonas H., 1966, p. 23-24, my emphasis). We do not know whether Plessner ever read this passage from The Phenomenon of Life, but it is nevertheless likely that this example of “reductive approach” provided by Jonas and achieved « by way of progressive ontological subtraction » might have sounded to his ears still too close to the “privative method” he reprimands Heidegger for. Quoting Karl Löwith, Plessner affirms namely that in Heidegger’s philosophy « life’s mode of being is only accessible privatively by way of existing Dasein » (Plessner H., 2019 [1928], p. XIII, my emphasis)20. For this reason, even though in Jonas’ account the Dasein is replaced by the living body in the role of starting point, it is finally very likely that Plessner would not have accepted its reductive approach. He would also have rejected all its anthropomorphic implications, possibly dismissing the whole of it as yet one more transformation of the “German fairy tale of the Ego”, which ex-centric positionality was meant to sweep away once and for all.

Universität Kassel Francesca Michelini Institut für Philosophie Henschelstraße 2 Room 2143 34127 Kassel Germany [email protected]

20 This quote from K. Löwith probably refers to the following passage in Being and Time : « Life has its own kind of being, but it is essentially accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life takes place by way of a privative interpretation » (Heidegger M., 1962 [1927], p. 49). Anthropology versus Ontology 337

Bibliography

Becchi, Paolo (1999). « Presentazione », in H. Jonas, Organismo e libertà. Verso una biologia filosofica. Transl. by A. Patrucco Becchi, Torino, Einaudi, p. IX-XX. Dietze, Carole (2006). Nachgeholtes Leben. Helmuth Plessner 1892-1985, Göttingen, Wallstein. Ebke, Thomas (2008). Plessners Doppelaspekt des Lebens und Heideggers Zweifachheit der Physis : Ein systematischer Vergleich, Munchen, Akad- emische Verlagsgemeinschaft. Fahrenbach, Helmut (1970). « Heidegger und das Problem einer philosophischen Anthropologie », Durchblicke. Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburt- stag. Ed. by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, p. 97-131. Fischer, Joachim (2008). Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts, Munchen, Alber. Franzini Tibaldeo, Roberto (2009). La rivoluzione ontologica di Hans Jonas. Uno studio sulla genesi e il significato di Organismo e Libertà, Milano- Udine, Mimesis. Frogneux, Nathalie (2007). « Pluralität à la Robinson Crusoe. Ist die Anthropo- logie von Hans Jonas eingeschränkt durch den Archetyp des Einzellers ? », Prinzip Zukunft : im Dialog mit Hans Jonas. Ed. by Ralf Seidel and Meiken Endruweit, Paderborn, Mentis, p. 167-183. Grene, Marjorie (1966). « Organic thinking. “The Phenomenon of Life. Towards a Philosophical Biology” by Hans Jonas » (book review), Commentary, XLII (1966), p. 94-95. Heidegger, Martin (1962 [1927]). Being and Time. Transl. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford, Basic Blackwell. — (1995 [1929-30]). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics : World, Finitude, Solitude. Transl. by W. Mcneill and N. Walker, Bloomington- Indianapolis, Indiana University Press. Hösle, Vittorio (1994). « Ontologie und Ethik bei Hans Jonas », Ethik fur die Zukunft : im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas. Ed. by Dietrich Böhler, Munchen, Beck, p. 105-125. Jakob, Eric (1996). Martin Heidegger und Hans Jonas. Die Metaphysik der Subjektivität und die Krise der technologischen Zivilisation, Tubingen- Basel, Franke. Jonas, Hans (1966). The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology, New York, Harper & Row. — (1974). Philosophical Essays : from Ancient Creed to Technological Man, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. — (1984 [1979]). The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Transl. by H. Jonas and D. Herr, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. — (1991). Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. Gespräch mit Ingo Hermann in der Reihe « Zeugen des Jahrhunderts », Göttingen, Lamuv. 338 Francesca Michelini

— (1992). Philosophische Untersuchungen und metaphysische Vermutungen, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. — (1994). « Philosophy at the End of the Century : A Survey of its Past and Future », Social Research, LXI/4 (1994), p. 813-832. — (2002). « Wissenschaft as Personal Experience », The Hastings Center Report, XXXII/4 (2002), p. 27-35. — (2008 [2003]). Memoires. Ed. by Chr. Wiese, transl. by K. Winston, Waltham, Brandeis University Press [Didactic Letters to Lore Jonas, 1944- 45, p. 220-245]. Levy, David J. (2002). The Integrity of Thinking, Columbia-London, University of Missouri Press. Löw, Reinhard (1994). « Zur Wiederbegrundung der organischen Naturphilo- sophie durch Hans Jonas », Ethik fur die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas. Ed. by Dietrich Böhler, München, Beck, p. 68-79. Michelini, Francesca – Wunsch, Matthias – Stederoth, Dirk (2018). « Philos- ophy of Nature and Organism’s Autonomy : On Hegel, Plessner and Jonas’ Theories of Living Beings », History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40/3 (2018), 56. Monaldi, Marcello (2000). Tecnica, vita, responsabilità. Qualche riflessione su Hans Jonas, Napoli, Guida. Plessner, Helmuth (2019 [1928]). The Levels of Organic Life and the Human. An Introduction to Philosophical Anthropology. Transl. by M. Hyatt, New York, Fordham University Press. — (1963). « Immer noch Philosophische Anthropologie ? », in H. Plessner, Conditio Humana. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 235-246. — (1973). « Der Aussagewert einer philosophischen Anthropologie », in H. Plessner, Conditio Humana. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 380-399. — (1994). « Brief an J. König vom 22. Feb. 1928 », Josef König, Helmuth Plessner, Briefwechsel 1923-1933. Ed. by Hans-Ulrich Lessing and Almut Mutzenbecher, Freiburg, Alber Verlag. — (1976). « Selbstdarstellung », in H. Plessner, Schriften zur Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. X, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985, p. 302-341. Plessner, Monika (1995). Die Argonauten auf Long Island : Begegnungen mit Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem, Theodor W. Adorno und anderen, Berlin, Rowohlt. Pöggeler, Otto (1994). « Ausgleich und anderer Anfang. Scheler und Heidegger », Phänomenologische Forschungen, XXVIII-XXIX (1994), p. 166-203. Rasini, Vallori (2010). « Hans Jonas e l’antropologia filosofica tedesca », Rivista di filosofia, CI/2 (2010), p. 269-284. Schürmann, Volker (2012). « Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner – Leiblichkeit in der Philosophischen Anthropologie », Leiblichkeit : Geschichte und Aktualität eines Konzepts. Ed. by Emmanuel Alloa, Thomas Bedorf, Christian Grüny, and Tobias Nikolaus Klass, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2012, p. 207-223. Anthropology versus Ontology 339

Taminiaux, Jacques (2001). « Les enjeux de la lecture gnostique de Jonas », Études phénoménologiques, XVII/33-34 (2001), p. 91-109. Vogel, Laurence (1995). « Hans Jonas’s Diagnosis of Nihilism : The case of Heidegger », International Journal of Philosophical Studies, III (1995), p. 55-73. Wunsch, Matthias (2010). « Heidegger – ein Vertreter der Philosophischen Anthropologie ? Über seine Vorlesung “Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphy- sik” », Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie, LVIII (2010), p. 543-560.

Abstract — The purpose of my paper is to investigate why, despite the clear convergences between Plessner’s and Jonas’ philosophy of organism, the latter never mentions Plessner’s philosophy of nature as one of the antecedents to his project. My main claim is that Jonas’ silence can be explained based on one fundamental difference between the two approaches : the fact, in short, that Jonas’ proposal, before being “anthropological”, is first and foremost “ontological”. Jonas aims to establish a doctrine of living being to answer the fundamental metaphysical question of modernity : « why is there something rather than nothing ? ». Conversely, Plessner’s philosophy of nature serves above all the purpose of understanding the eccentricity of humans and their relationship to the other living beings. This difference can be clearly outlined through an analysis of Plessner and Jonas’ dissimilar approaches to Heidegger’s ontology and particularly to his concept of “existentials”, to which the central sections of my account is dedicated.

Résumé — Le but de mon article est d’évaluer pourquoi, en dépit des convergences manifestes entre les philosophies de l’organisme de Plessner et de Jonas, ce dernier ne mentionne jamais la philosophie de la nature de Plessner comme un des antécédents de son projet. Mon argument principal est que le silence de Jonas peut s’expliquer sur la base d’une différence fondamentale entre les deux approches : en bref, le fait que la proposition de Jonas, avant d’être « anthropologique », soit d’abord et avant tout « ontologique ». Jonas cherche à établir une doctrine de l’être vivant afin de répondre à la question métaphysique fondamentale de la modernité : « pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien ? ». Inversement, la philosophie de la nature de Plessner a avant tout pour objectif de comprendre la singularité des humains et leurs relations avec les autres êtres vivants. Cette différence peut être clairement mise en évidence au moyen d’une analyse des conceptions divergentes que Jonas et Plessner ont de l’ontologie de Heidegger, en particulier de son concept « d’existential », analyse à laquelle je dédie les sections principales de ma contribution.